Iran Updates December 2024

Iran Update, December 31, 2024

A new group announced its opposition to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[i] Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. The Syrian Popular Resistance in a statement on December 29 threatened to attack HTS and HTS-affiliated leaders purportedly in response to the killing of Christians, Shia, and Sunnis since overthrowing the Bashar al Assad regime.[ii] The Syrian Popular Resistance labeled the HTS-led coalition as “Kharijites,” which derogatorily frames the coalition as heretical. The statement by the Syrian Popular Resistance comes as nascent opposition against HTS has appeared, especially along the Syrian coast, which is predominantly populated by the Alawite minority.[iii] It is possible that the Syrian Popular Resistance is affiliated with this activity, though CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of the group. Growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further. Although HTS leader Ahmed al Shara has repeatedly used tempered and inclusive rhetoric in recent weeks, he would struggle to contain such a cycle of violence given some of the extreme Salafi-jihadi and sectarian actors that constitute his coalition.

There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria. The main outlet of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) called on December 31 for a counter-revolution in Syria, framing it as a response to the "occupation" of Syria by "takfiri terrorists."[iv] This term refers to apostates and is commonly used by Iran to refer to the so-called “Islamic State” and other armed Sunni organizations. The IRGC report added that the liberation of Syria is “imminent.” This rhetoric from the IRGC marks the first time that CTP-ISW has observed Iran appearing to call for a revolt against the HTS-led interim government. Rhetoric from Iranian leaders and state media has until this point ambiguously called for the formation of armed resistance in Syria but would often mention resistance to Israeli ground operations in southwestern Syria in the same breath. That the main outlet of the IRGC made these remarks is especially noteworthy given that regional sources have claimed that the IRGC is planning to organize, direct, and support new proxy and partner militia networks in Syria. It is also noteworthy that the IRGC report comes around the same time that the Syrian Popular Resistance announced its formation and opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Iranian state media has previously reported on the formation of armed resistance against HTS in positive terms.[v] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately stated on December 31 that "a new resistance has been born [in Syria] that will manifest itself in the coming years" during a meeting with the Omani foreign affairs minister.[vi]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria on December 31. The SDF mourned a fighter that died in clashes near Qara Qozak bridge on December 31, indicating that fighting has persisted there.[vii] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[viii] An SDF media official reported that SNA forces in Manbij City attacked the SDF with heavy artillery near a town that is 15 km southwest of Manbij City on December 30.[ix] Anti-SDF media also claimed that the SNA fired artillery at SDF positions near Kobani on December 31.[x] US Defense Department deputy press secretary said on December 30 that the ceasefire between Turkey and SDF continued to hold around Kobani, where Turkish forces have reportedly massed along the Syria-Turkey border.[xi]

The HTS-led Military Operations Department continued to clash with pro-Assad elements that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm. Syrian media reported small arms fire during a Military Operations Room raid in northern Damascus that is generally considered loyal to the former Assad regime on December 31.[xii] Other sources disputed the account of clashes and said that the HTS-affiliated forces only entered the suburb to detain three gunmen when called by neighborhood officials.[xiii] HTS-affiliated forces operated against former regime elements in other Damascus neighborhoods without reports of small arms fire as well.[xiv] The Damascus clashes appear to have been isolated and minor, if they even occurred at all, especially compared to the interim government’s deployment to coastal Syria during which its used attack helicopter against pro-regime fighters.[xv] The HTS-led Military Operations Department additionally imposed a curfew in Talbiseh, north of Homs City, during an operation to detain former regime fighters.[xvi]

An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen.[xvii] The official emphasized the threat that the Houthis pose to international security and shipping and that the international coalition should ”confront and eliminate this threat.” The Israeli official also emphasized that the Houthis should not be underestimated due to their advanced technologies and intent to threaten Israel, international shipping, and other regional targets, including Saudi Arabia.

These Israeli comments come amid continued US airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed US airstrikes targeting Houthi command-and-control sites and military infrastructure on December 30 and 31.[xviii] Houthi media confirmed two US airstrikes hit around al Tuhayta, south of Hudaydah on December 30, and 10 airstrikes hit the and two airstrikes hit al Arad military complex, both in Sanaa.[xix] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis tried to preempt the US airstrikes by firing a drone and seven cruise missiles at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier.[xx] CENTCOM intercepted these projectiles and destroyed a Houthi coastal radar site.[xxi]

Sarea also claimed the Houthis fired two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion airport and a power station south of Jerusalem in central Israel on December 31.[xxii] An Israeli war correspondent confirmed that a Houthi ballistic missile fragment crashed in Beit Shemesh, near Jerusalem, late on December 30 but did not cause any major damage.[xxiii] The IDF intercepted a missile from Yemen before it entered Israeli airspace, and sirens sounded across central Israel to warn of falling debris.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: A new group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition.
• Syria: There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria.
• Yemen: An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. These comments come amid continued US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.

Iran Update, December 30, 2024

Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there. Outlets affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Armed Forces General Staff published reports on December 30 to this end. One outlet reported on HTS-affiliated elements committing violence against Syrian Alawites.[i] Another outlet reported that armed ”resistance” has formed against the HTS-led interim government in response to its offenses against the Syrian people.[ii] CTP-ISW has independently observed anti-HTS elements appearing in predominantly Alawite areas in recent days. That the Iranian outlet framed these elements as ”resistance” is noteworthy given that the term has an overwhelmingly positive connotation in Iranian regime discourse.[iii] Other Iranian outlets that have no obvious affiliation with the Iranian security establishment have published reports emphasizing sectarian tensions in recent days as well. For instance, one outlet reported on purported HTS efforts to achieve the “de-Shia-ization of Syria.”[iv] A Middle Eastern source separately told a Western analyst that regional countries have shared intelligence with HTS in recent days that the IRGC is planning to “foster, direct, and support an insurgency” in Syria, presumably by exploiting the sectarian tension that Iran is currently trying to stoke.[v] Another source told the Western analyst that HTS-led forces detained two former Syrian regime operatives with IRGC identification cards and at least three Lebanese nationals.[vi] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports, but it is consistent with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, suggesting in recent days that Syrian youth should arm and mobilize against the interim government.[vii]

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara promoted loyalists to the senior levels of the new Syrian security establishment that he is currently forming. Shara promoted these individuals even though the exact organization and structure of the new Syrian armed forces remains unclear. Shara promoted two individuals to major general, five individuals to brigadier general, and over forty individuals to colonel, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[viii] The two major generals—Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra and Ali Nour al Din—are the interim defense minister and armed forces chief of staff, respectively. The individuals whom Shara promoted to brigadier general all appear to have close ties to HTS, and in some cases, personal relations with Shara. These individuals include:

• Mohammad Khair Hassan Shuaib (also known as Abu al Khair Taftanaz). Shuaib is a military leader in HTS.[ix] Shuaib previously headed a military council that was comprised of HTS and the National Liberation Front.[x] Shuaib also reportedly founded the Syrian Salvation Government Military College.[xi]
• Abdul Rahman Hussein al Khatib (also known as Abu Hussein al Urduni). Khatib is a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin.[xii] Khatib went to Syria in late 2013 and is deeply loyal to HTS leader Ahmed al Shara.[xiii] Khatib is reportedly a member of the HTS Shura Council.[xiv] Jordanian media reported that Khatib is known for his “Salafi-jihadi approach.”[xv]
• Abdul Aziz Dawoud Khodaberdi (also known as Abu Muhammad Turkistan). Khodaberdi commands the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) forces in Syria. TIP is an al Qaeda-affiliated Uyghur jihadist group.[xvi] China has labeled TIP as a terrorist organization and accused it of “gravely threaten[ing]” Chinese interests.[xvii] TIP announced that Shara promoted two other Uyghur fighters to the rank of colonel.[xviii]
• Abdo Mohammad Sarhan. Sarhan previously commanded Jabhat al Nusra in the Eastern Ghouta.[xix]
• Omar Mohammad Ciftci (also known as Mukhtar al Turki). Ciftci is a Turkish citizen who previously commander a unit called the Omar Brigade.[xx] Ciftci reportedly led the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation room to overthrow the Bashar al Assad regime.[xxi]

HTS-led interim government officials are continuing to meet with military commanders affiliated with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra met with the leaders of the SNA-affiliated Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade on December 30.[xxii] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara previously met with these commanders on December 16.[xxiii] The United States sanctioned the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade in August 2023 for committing “serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria.”[xxiv] The HTS-led interim government’s frequent and publicized meetings with SNA-affiliated commanders signals that HTS is continuing to heavily favor the SNA and pursuing “strategic relations” with Turkey, both of which have stated their intent to “eliminate” the SDF.[xxv]

The SDF and SNA have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. The SDF published footage showing its forces destroying SNA portable radar systems, a radar-jamming system, and an armored vehicle at SNA positions west of Qara Qozak bridge.[xxvi] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[xxvii] Anti-SDF media also claimed that Turkey conducted drone strikes targeting SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam in Aleppo Province and at a security point in Raqqa Province on December 30.[xxviii]

The SDF likely advanced north of Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo City, and led SNA forces to withdraw at least four kilometers from the M4 highway. An SNA field commander told a local outlet on December 29 that the SNA had withdrawn from towns near Deir Hafer north to Rasm al Harmal al Imam, a town seven kilometers north of the M4 highway.[xxix] The field commander said that the SDF controlled all territory south of an east-west water canal that connects Lake Assad to Aleppo City.[xxx] The SNA field commander’s statement is consistent with recent local reports about SDF operations in Deir Hafer and nearby towns.[xxxi] The SDF does not appear to have advanced further west than Deir Hafer as of this writing.

Iran Update, December 29, 2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building new Syrian state, during which he presumably would rule and could heavily influence the allocation of political power.[i] Shara articulated this vision, marking his most detailed articulation of the state formation process yet, in an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya.[ii] He said that he expects writing a constitution will take three years and organizing elections will take four years.[iii] Shara justified the long election timeline by emphasizing the need to conduct a “comprehensive population census” for election results to be “valid.”[iv] Shara acknowledged that he has appointed HTS members to most major ministries as a “necessity” but that the “National Dialogue Conference” will fully represent Syria’s diversity and be empowered to vote to rebuild the Syrian legal code.[v] This interview is the latest in Shara’s effort to portray himself to international audiences as a moderate leader and distance himself from his extremist al Qaeda in Iraq and al Nusra Front background.[vi] Shara and his HTS-led interim government have yet to enact the tangible and irreversible steps toward implementing the type of representative democracy described in his interview at this time.

The HTS-led interim government is negotiating with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate it politically and militarily into the future Syrian state.[vii] Shara said that these negotiations are meant to resolve the “crisis” in northeastern Syria.[viii] Turkey and HTS have tried in recent weeks to disarm and integrate the SDF into the HTS-led government by threatening the SDF with a full-scale assault.[ix] Shara reiterated that, under a potential agreement, there will be no federalism in Syria and noted that the SDF would be integrated into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[x] It is unclear whether Shara intends to re-flag SDF units and thus retain them as cohesive units or disperse individual SDF members across the Syrian armed forces. Shara and other Syrian former opposition leaders met on December 24 and agreed to dissolve and “merge” their armed factions under the Syrian Defense Ministry.[xi]

Shara continues to meet with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) while engaging in negotiations with the SDF. Shara met with SNA leaders, including Turkish ultranationalist and Grey Wolves member Fahim Issa, on December 29.[xii] Shara has heavily favored the SNA and is pursuing “strategic relations” with Turkey, both of which have stated their intent to “eliminate” the SDF.[xiii]

The SDF and SNA have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. The SDF posted footage showing its forces destroying a mobile SNA radar south of Manbij.[xiv] The SNA shelled at least 16 SDF positions around Kobani and in northeastern Syria.[xv] Anti-SDF media claimed that Turkey conducted drone strikes targeting the SDF around Manbij and Kobani.[xvi]

The HTS-led interim Syrian government promoted HTS commanders and Shara loyalists to senior military ranks on December 29.[xvii] Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ali Nour al Din were promoted to major general. The interim government also promoted five individuals to brigadier general and 41 individuals to colonel. Former opposition groups who have agreed to merge under the new Syrian Defense Ministry would be subordinating their fighters to this HTS-dominated command structure.[xviii]

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi inspected combat units in Anbar Province along the Iraq-Syria border on December 29. Muhammadawi visited the PMF 17th Brigade, which is under the PMF Anbar Operations Command.[xix] The PMF 17th Brigade reportedly operates in Akashat along the Iraq-Syria border.[xx] Muhammadawi also visited the Second Region Border Command, which is under the Iraqi Interior Ministry.[xxi] The Second Region Border Command is located in al Waleed, west of Rutba, Anbar Province.[xxii] Second Region Border Commander Khairallah Issa, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, and PMF Anbar Operations Commander Qasim Musleh al Khafaji accompanied Muhammadawi.[xxiii] Khafaji simultaneously commands the 13th PMF Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) and Anbar Operations Command.[xxiv] Liwa al Tafuf is closely aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[xxv] Muhammadawi previously served as the secretary general of Kataib Hezbollah.[xxvi]

Baloch Salafi-jihadi militia Ansar al Furqan claimed a suicide bombing targeting the head of police intelligence in Bandar Lengeh in southern Iran on December 28.[xxvii] The attack killed the local head of police intelligence and injured another police officer.[xxviii] The attack is notably deep into Iran given that most Baloch militancy in Iran occurs immediately around the border with Pakistan. Ansar al Furqan previously claimed a suicide bombing attack in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in December 2018.[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building a new Syrian state, during which he presumably would rule and could heavily influence the allocation of political power.
• Syria: The HTS-led interim government is negotiating with the US-backed SDF to integrate it politically and militarily into the future Syrian state. It is unclear whether such integration would involve re-flagging SDF units or dispersing SDF members across the new Syrian armed forces.
• Iran: Baloch Salafi-jihadi militia Ansar al Furqan claimed a suicide bombing targeting the head of political intelligence in Bandar Lengeh in southern Iran. The attack is notably deep into Iran given that most Baloch militancy in Iran occurs around the border with Pakistan.

Iran Update, December 27, 2024

An explosion from a former SAA position in Homs City suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance. Syrian media reported a large explosion near a former SAA barracks in Homs City on December 27, injuring nine people.[i] The Homs Police Commander Colonel Alaa Omran told state media that former regime elements rigged and detonated ordinance in a missile warehouse in the city to target a passing civilian.[ii] A Syrian source contradicted the police commander’s statement, however, and claimed that the explosion was the result of Syrians attempting to remove parts from old air defense missiles to sell them.[iii] Taking apart and repurposing explosives inside of munitions is one way military organizations can build rudimentary improvised explosive devices. The incident demonstrates that HTS does not control all former SAA weapons stockpiles and that locals can still access some of these stockpiles. This incident also suggests that the HTS-led security forces have not fully established total control over Homs City if these positions are easily accessible.

The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community. Unspecified opposition fighters have looted homes and stolen vehicles belonging to Alawites in Lattakia Province—a former regime stronghold—since the fall of the Assad regime.[iv] An Alawite sheikh in Damascus told Reuters on December 26 that there have been multiple instances of “[Alawites] being beaten at a checkpoint.”[v] The HTS-led interim government has established several checkpoints across Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, but it is unclear who has attacked Alawite citizens at the checkpoint in Damascus.[vi] An HTS fighter in Damascus separately told Reuters that unspecified individuals offloaded a bus and beat Alawite passengers on December 26.[vii] These Alawite community members are framing these events as sectarian-motivated, underscoring the mistrust and fear that is permeating Alawite communities at this time. These instances of sectarian violence have caused some Alawites to refuse to hand in their weapons to the interim government, highlighting how the Alawite community currently distrusts the interim government to guarantee their security.[viii]

The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the town during Christmas celebrations.[ix] The deployment of forces to al Masmiyah comes after members of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23.[x]

The HTS-led interim government is continuing to pursue and detain former members of the Bashar al Assad regime. HTS forces have pursued Assad regime remnants in areas of Hama, Homs, Lattakia Tartous, Deir ez Zor, and Damascus provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 26.[xi] HTS forces arrested a large number of former Assad regime members, including:

• Khaled al Zubaidi. Zubaidi is a Syrian businessman with ties to the Assad regime.[xii] The United States sanctioned Zubaidi in June 2020 for supporting Assad’s “corrupt reconstruction efforts.”[xiii]
• Fakhri Darwish: Darwish headed the office of the pro-Assad regime Palestinian militia Liwa al Quds in Aleppo.[xiv]
• Riyad Hassan. Hassan previously served as the head of political security in Damascus under Assad.[xv]

HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.[xvi] Ali was the leader of a regime-supported armed group that operated near the Lebanese border and was accused of kidnapping and torture. [xvii]Syrian media reported that HTS-led security forces clashed with alleged former regime-affiliated fighters in Balqassa.[xviii] HTS killed Ali and former regime elements killed two HTS-led security force members in the fighting.[xix] A Deir ez Zor-focused social media user stated that the HTS-led security forces used long-range rockets and drones to target former regime remnants in Balqassa and nearby town Khirbet al Hamam.[xx] CTP-ISW cannot confirm HTS-affiliated forces’ use of these weapons. This would be the first reported use of indirect and deep strike fires by HTS-affiliated forces since HTS assumed control of Damascus.[xxi]

The HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and incorporation into a Syrian state. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi reiterated his desire for the incorporation of the SDF into a future Syria to Asharq al Awsat on December 27.[xxii] Abdi said that the SDF has not yet engaged in direct negotiations with HTS despite Abdi’s repeated expressed interest in negotiations since the fall of the Assad regime.[xxiii] Abdi outlined his priorities for negotiations with HTS—should such negotiations occur—and noted that the SDF would require an end to Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks on the SDF so that Syrians may discuss the future without “external interference.”[xxiv]

It appears increasingly unlikely, however, that the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to Turkey, has been quick to deepen its cooperation with Turkey since the fall of the Assad regime. HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish interests continues to pose an existential threat to the SDF as Turkey continues to signal a possible Turkish incursion into Syria or a Turkish-backed operation in northern Syria to “eliminate” the SDF. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on December 27 that Turkey shall ensure security “beyond its southern borders” and “eliminate terrorist threats” starting in 2025.[xxv] Abdi warned of a potential “catastrophe” facing Kobani from the Turkish military buildup on the border.[xxvi] Syrian media reported on December 27 that Turkish military reinforcements arrived in the town of Suluk, which is located north of Raqqa in SNA-controlled territory.[xxvii]

The SNA continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[xxviii] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam.[xxix] The SDF claimed on December 27 that it engaged SNA forces near Abu Qalqal in the Manbij countryside.[xxx]

Local sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December 27.[xxxi] A pro-SDF social media user posted a photo of SDF members on the “Deir Hafer and Khafsah front” and said that SDF forces are operating in the area.[xxxii] An Aleppo-based outlet reported on December 27 that the Khafsah water treatment plant, which the SDF had reportedly taken control of on December 23, is not operating at ”maximum capacity” due to nearby fighting.[xxxiii] The Khafsah water treatment plant is a critical plant services in Aleppo City. The Aleppo Water Establishment asked Aleppo citizens to ration water consumption.[xxxiv] The SDF advance in the south may intend to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat.

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri met with combat units at the Rabia border crossing in northern Ninewa Province on December 26.[xxxv] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Ninewa Operations Commander Khadir al Matrohi, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, accompanied Ameri.[xxxvi] Ameri met with a military official named Majid Saleh Jassem, although it is unclear whether this official serves in the Iraqi Army, PMF, or Iraqi Border Guard.[xxxvii] The 15th and 20th Infantry divisions redeployed to areas between Rabia and Sinjar on December 7.[xxxviii]

Ameri separately reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations” during a visit to the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division in al Qaim, western Anbar Province, on December 27.[xxxix] 7th Infantry Division Commander Major General Hassan al Silawi and unspecified PMF commanders attended the meeting. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah controls several PMF brigades that control the al Qaim border crossing.[xl] The Iraqi Army 27th Infantry Brigade, which operates under the 7th Infantry Division, oversees border security north of al Qaim across from the Syrian town of Baghouz.[xli]

Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq. Sudani stated that “any dysfunction” in Syrian prisons would “push [Iraq] to counter terrorism.”[xlii] Sudani was likely referring to the SDF-controlled al Hol camp and network of Syrian prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters.[xliii] Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director Hamid al Shatri similarly suggested on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified Syrian armed groups threatened Iraq.[xliv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with threats from Turkey and its allies in Syria, namely the SNA.[xlv] Ongoing Turkish-backed operations against the SDF have forced the SDF to prioritize the existential threat posed by Turkey over the counter-ISIS mission.

An Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework member said on December 26 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will resume attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces extend their presence in Iraq beyond the agreed–upon withdrawal date of December 2026.[xlvi] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops will withdraw by the end of 2026.[xlvii] Mukhtar al Musawi, a Shia Coordination Framework member of parliament, denied reports that the Iraqi government is considering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 due to concerns that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[xlviii] Musawi also told Iraqi media that the Iraqi militias had stopped targeting US forces due to the withdrawal timeline but added that operations could resume if the United States extends its presence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias last claimed an attack targeting US forces in Iraq on August 5, 2024.[xlix] Likely Iranian militias also launched three rockets at Baghdad International Airport on October 1, but no militia claimed this attack.[l]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with “occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26.[li] Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces.[lii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports or indications of Israeli forces operating in Jenin at the time of this writing. The Palestinian Authority (PA), however, continued to operate against Palestinian militias in Jenin on December 26.[liii] Palestinian militia fighters killed a PA security forces officer in Jenin on December 26, marking the third PA officer killed in Jenin since the operation began on December 5.[liv] It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.” It would, conversely, also be notable if the IDF began operating in Jenin at the same time as the PA operation against Palestinian militias.

Key Takeaways:

• Explosion in Homs: An explosion in Homs suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance.
• Sectarian Tension in Syria: The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.
• HTS and Christian Communities: The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the town during Christmas celebrations.
• HTS Operations Against Former Regime Elements: HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.
• HTS-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Negotiations: The HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and incorporation into a Syrian state. It appears increasingly unlikelythat the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey.
• SDF-Syrian National Army (SNA) Fighting: Local sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December 27. The SNA also continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri also reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations.” Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with “occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26. Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces, but CTP-ISW has not observed IDF operations in Jenin in recent days. It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.”

Iran Update, December 26, 2024

Several trends have placed Syria on a trajectory that is increasingly likely to lead to ethno-sectarian conflict. Social media reports have alleged that individuals affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have killed and kidnapped Alawites and other Syrians accused of being Assad regime officials.[i] These killings and kidnappings have taken place outside of formal and documented judicial processes, which may significantly heighten sectarian tension between the majority and empowered Sunni and the minority Alawites. Some of the Alawites targeted are almost certainly Assad regime officials who can and should be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in fair and transparent tribunals. Failure to prosecute criminals fairly and transparently risks degrading community trust and encouraging tit-for-tat retaliatory violence between ethnic and sectarian groups.

The HTS-led government and transitional government leader Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite's fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aims to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.[ii] The interim government has established a reconciliation program under which former regime elements are granted amnesty in exchange for disarmament and registering with the interim government.[iii] The terms of this amnesty have not been publicly discussed, and the lists could be used by sectarian actors to target former regime elements in the coastal areas, who would be predominantly Alawite. The interim government began targeting ”criminal gang leaders” who did not hand over weapons and settle with the interim government in Latakia on December 25.[iv]

An old video surfaced on December 25 showing Sunni fighters desecrating a major Alawite shrine in Aleppo, which could increase Alawite fears.[v] The Interim Interior Ministry said that that the video was taken at least three weeks ago and that republishing such clips is intended to stir up strife among the Syrian people at this sensitive stage of government creation.[vi] The original source of the Alawite shrine video remains unknown at this time. The video spurred Alawite demonstrations on December 25 in several Syrian cities.[vii] Some reportedly pro-Assad protesters called for violence and other demonstrators used what at least one anti-Assad media outlet described as “sectarian language.“[viii] Alawite community leaders in Latakia called for HTS-led security forces to establish security and disarm former regime elements amid the protests, which suggests genuine concern among community leaders about former regime activity.[ix] The HTS-led military operations department sent military reinforcements to Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Latakia and imposed curfews in response to the unrest.[x] A violent HTS crackdown on protests in Alawite areas of Syria could dramatically accelerate sectarian tension and trigger serious violence. HTS has previously violently cracked down on protesters challenging Shara’s rule in Idlib. The newly appointed Syrian intelligence chief (see below) played a major role in that crackdown.[xi]

Pro-Assad fighters separately “ambushed” and killed 14 HTS-led interior ministry officers in Khirbet al Maaza on December 26.[xii]

Iran is also making remarks that risk stoking sectarian tension. Senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader, have repeatedly suggested that the Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.[xiii] The Iranian supreme leader compared these “Syrian youth” to the Iraqi militia groups that systematically hunted down and killed Sunni civilians in Baghdad as part of a campaign of sectarian cleansing in Iraq.[xiv] Core HTS fighters from Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda in Iraq, like Shara, are intimately familiar with the Iraqi context and would presumably read “Syrian youth” as a much more sectarian call than it immediately appears. Sectarian Iranian remarks would provide an opening for Sunni sectarian elements in Syria to portray all Alawites and Shia as pro-Iranian proxies to justify a violent crackdown.

Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad Hassan al Shaibani responded to these Iranian statements. He warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria” and stated that Syria will hold Iran “accountable for the repercussions of [its] latest remarks,” likely referring to ongoing rhetoric from senior Iranian officials suggesting that Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.[xv]

The HTS-led interim government appointed former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Hasan Khattab as head of the General Intelligence Service on December 26.[xvi] Khattab helped found HTS predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and served as Shara's deputy commander in HTS.[xvii] Khattab was presumably a member of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), given that Jabhat al Nusra was an outgrowth of AQI. The United States and UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[xviii] Khattab’s appointment is consistent with the HTS-led interim governments’ appointment of key HTS allies and loyalists to ministerial positions.[xix]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in contested territory southeast of Manbij and likely pushed SDF forces east towards Tishreen Dam. The SDF recently launched a counteroffensive to regain ground seized by the SNA in the Manbij countryside.[xx] SDF spokesperson told Western media on December 24 that SDF fighters had advanced about 11 kilometers away from Manbij.[xxi] The SDF reported that it defended against several SNA attacks on Tishreen Dam and its surrounding villages and that its forces killed nine SNA fighters and destroyed three armored vehicles in operations since December 24.[xxii]  Local sources reported SNA forces pushed the SDF east towards the dam amid intermittent skirmishes in villages east of Manbij.[xxiii] The Turkish Ministry of Defense claimed on December 26 that the SNA took control of the Tishreen Dam, but SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami posted a video of himself at the dam to refute Turkish claims.[xxiv]

Syrian media reported that the SDF advanced on a new axis into SNA-controlled territory east of Aleppo, likely to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat. Syrian journalists and social media users reported on December 23 and 24 that the SDF advanced from SDF-controlled territory towards Deir Hafer.[xxv] Deir Hafer is a Syrian city along the M4 highway between SDF-controlled territory and Aleppo City, which is currently controlled by Syrian opposition factions. CTP-ISW cannot confirm local reporting about the SDF’s westward advance. Syrian sources reported that the SDF clashed with SNA forces in Kayarieh, north of Deir Hafer, on December 26.[xxvi]  Multiple Syrian sources also reported that the SDF secured a water treatment plant south of Kfahsah and clashed with SNA forces in the vicinity of the treatment plant.[xxvii] An Aleppo-based channel reported that one of the water plant’s workers was killed amid the clashes.[xxviii] The Kfahsah plant provides a critical water supply to Aleppo City.[xxix]

The Turkish Ministry of Defense announced in a statement on December 26 that Turkey supports a “unified Syrian army,” likely referring to a Syrian army that excludes the SDF.[xxx] The Turkish statement references the HTS-led interim government’s plan to dissolve Syria’s armed factions into a Syrian armed forces under the Syrian Defense Ministry.[xxxi] Turkey’s support for a ”unified Syrian army” likely refers to an army that does not include the SDF.[xxxii] Shara has met extensively in recent days with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces but has yet to meet with SDF leadership.[xxxiii] CTP-ISW has assessed that Turkey and the HTS-led government are attempting to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into an HTS-led armed forces. 

The pro-Iran Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) director implied to HTS leader Ahmad al Shara on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified instability threatened Iraq.[xxxiv] INIS Director Hamid Shatri's meeting with Shara is the first meeting between Iraqi government representatives and the HTS-led government since the Assad regime fell on December 8. An “informed [Iraqi] governmental source” told Iraqi media on December 26 that Shatri confirmed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would not “interfere” in Syria if Syrian armed groups do not threaten Iraqi stability.[xxxv] It is unclear which precise issue Iraq would define as a threat to its stability, and what armed groups it sees as particularly threatening other than ISIS.[xxxvi] Shatri, who is close to Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces head Faleh al Fayyadh and Hadi al Ameri, might mean HTS itself. Shatri and his pro-Iranian allies, including the Badr Organization, fought Ahmed Shara and al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s in Iraq. Shatri also expressed the Iraqi government’s concerns of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) elements escaping from SDF detention and threatening Iraq.[xxxvii] Shatri is implying that Iraqi militias could intervene if ”Syrian armed groups” cross certain unspecified redlines, which is almost certainly a threat towards Shara and HTS.

The IDF continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa Provinces. Several groups of Syrians protested the IDF presence near Swisah, Quneitra Province, approximately 3 kilometers east of the disengagement zone.[xxxviii]  The IDF, after instructing the protesters not to approach the IDF forces operating in the area, fired shots to disperse the protesters.[xxxix] Syrian media reported that the IDF injured four Syrian civilians, including one child, near Swisah village.[xl] The IDF stated it is investigating the casualties.[xli] A separate Syrian outlet reported that the IDF withdrew from Swisah towards Diwaya al Kabira, Quneitra Province, after injuring seven civilians.[xlii]  Syrian media separately reported on December 26 that the IDF withdrew from several towns in western Daraa province, including six towns in the Yarmouk Basin.[xliii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify that the IDF withdrew from this area at this time.

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 26. The IDF struck the Houthi sites in Sanaa and Hudaydah provinces in response to persistent Houthi drone and missile attacks against Israel.[xliv] The IDF targeted the Sanaa International Airport and Heyzaz power station in Sanaa.[xlv] The IDF also struck Ras Katib power station, Hudaydah Port, al Salif Port, and Ras Issa Oil Facility in Hudaydah province.[xlvi] The Houthis use Hudaydah Port as a logistical hub to facilitate the movement of Iranian officials and Iran’s weapons shipments across the region. The IDF previously struck most of these Houthi positions on December 18.[xlvii]

The Houthis claimed three missile and drone attacks targeting southern and central Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on December 24.[xlviii] The Houthis claimed a drone attack targeting Ashkelon industrial zone in southern Israel on December 25.[xlix] The IDF reported that the drone fell in an open area in southern Israel.[l]

Key Takeaways:

• Conflict in Syria: Several trends have placed Syria on a trajectory that is increasingly likely to lead to ethno-sectarian conflict. There is already an ongoing ethnic conflict between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). These trends include killings, arrests, and kidnappings that appear to occur outside of a transparent judicial process for trying war criminals, provocative protests and sectarian imagery on social media, and Iranian provocation.
• HTS Government Formation: The HTS-led interim government appointed former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Hasan Khattab as head of the General Intelligence Service on December 26.
• SNA-SDF Fighting: The Turkish-backed SNA engaged the US-backed SDF in contested territory southeast of Manbij and likely pushed SDF forces east towards Tishreen Dam. Syrian media reported that the SDF advanced on a new axis into SNA-controlled territory east of Aleppo, likely to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat.
• Turkey: The Turkish Ministry of Defense announced in a statement on December 26 that Turkey supports a “unified Syrian army,” likely referring to a Syrian army that excludes the SDF.
• Iraq in Syria: The pro-Iran Iraqi National Intelligence Service director implied to HTS leader Ahmad al Shara on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified instability threatened Iraq.
• Israel in Syria: The IDF continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa Provinces.
• Yemen: The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 26.

Iran Upate, December 24, 2024

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defended against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attempts to recapture SDF-held ground on the west bank of the Euphrates River near the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge. The SDF reported its forces defended against SNA assaults in Mahshiyet al Tawahin and Khirbet Tueni, approximately 5 kilometers west of the Tishreen Dam.[i] The SDF conducted three separate FPV drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles west of the Tishreen Dam.[ii] The SDF reported that its fighters killed “dozens” of SNA fighters, seized two SNA tanks, and destroyed SNA equipment.[iii]  The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) reported that the SNA killed 16 of its fighters during the fighting.[iv]

SDF forces also defended against an SNA attack on Qabr Imo, approximately 4.3 kilometers west of the Qere Qozak Bridge.[v] SDF fighters conducted an FPV drone strike targeting an SNA military vehicle less than a kilometer away from the Qere Qozak Bridge.[vi] The SDF reported that it also destroyed an SNA tank near the Qere Qozak Bridge.[vii]

Unspecified sources reportedly told Syria-based al Khabour News that the YPG threatened to cut off bread to Hasakah if the people did not demonstrate in support of the group.[viii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Arab communities have defected from the SDF in recent weeks and called for an end to SDF rule in Arab areas in Hasakah.[ix] Kurdish media outlets circulated imagery appearing to show Hasakah locals demonstrating in support of the SDF.[x]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara may face resistance to the current moderate approach to governance from Salafi-Jihadi factions within the HTS-led coalition. Members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23.[xi] TIP in Syria is the local affiliate of the main TIP branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda appointed the overall TIP leader, Abdul Haq al Turkistani, to its Shura Council in 2005.[xii] Local footage posted after the incident showed a local HTS government official attempting to reassure locals that government security forces would pursue the perpetrators and that the government would repair the tree.[xiii] TIP’s religiously motivated attack is an example of the inherent friction between the ideology and objectives of Salafi-Jihadi elements within the HTS-led coalition and HTS’s stated approach to respect and preserve the rights of Syrian minorities. Six Al Qaeda-affiliated groups TIP, Harakat al Islam, Jaysh al Muharijeen wal Ansar, Katibat al Tawhis wal Jihad, Katibat al Alban, and Maldivian Mujahideen have publicly supported HTS in the past.[xiv] TIP itself has fought alongside HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.

The friction between the Salafi-jihadi ideologues and Shara’s relatively moderate governance could force Shara to compel Salafi-jihadists to adhere to his vision or take a more Salafi approach to preserve Shara’s coalition. Both al Qaeda-linked ideologues and ISIS have denounced HTS’s protection of religious minorities and engagement with the West. A “prominent” al Qaeda supporter publicly “advised” HTS to avoid the mistakes of the Taliban by adhering to “Islamic principles” and avoid “pleasing the West.” He added that Shara must adhere to Islamic principles because the West and “Jews and Christians” would not be pleased with moderate measures until Shara converted to Judaism or Christianity.[xv] ISIS similarly argued that HTS’s protection of religious minorities and engagement with “infidel” states is unacceptable. Other ISIS supporters are criticizing Shara‘s Western dress--including suits and ties--and implying these make him un-Islamic.[xvi] These arguments may attract some Salafi-jihadists who are resistant to Shara’s approach.[xvii] Shara has previously suppressed similar Salafi-jihadist opposition by force of arms.[xviii] He would likely attempt to do so again if he believes he has the bandwidth to do so.

ISIS may be attempting to resupply its forces with weapons captured from regime, Russian, and Iranian stocks in the central Syrian desert. US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted an airstrike targeting ISIS operatives moving a “truckload of weapons” in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 23.[xix] CENTCOM confirmed that it killed two ISIS fighters and wounded one fighter in an area of Deir Ez Zor formerly controlled by the Assad regime and Russia. ISIS fighters−who have long fought under threat of airstrikes−would presumably avoid transporting large amounts of weapons from existing ISIS stocks, given the risk that US airstrikes would destroy much-needed weapons stockpiles. The decision to transport these weapons in a “truckload“ suggests that ISIS had captured a new stock of weapons and attempted to transport them to a safe location when CENTCOM struck the vehicle. There are many positions throughout the desert in Syria formerly occupied by Russian, Iranian, or Assad regime forces that are currently unoccupied and could contain weapons that ISIS needs to reconstitute itself. ISIS seeks to exploit the hasty withdrawal of Russian and Syrian regime forces by capturing these stocks.

Syrian armed groups agreed to “dissolve” themselves and merge under the HTS-led Defense Ministry, but this does not mean that Syrian opposition forces will answer to the Defense Ministry in practice. The leaders of Syrian armed groups allied with HTS agreed to “dissolve and merge” their armed groups under the HTS-led Ministry of Defense in a meeting with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara on December 24.[xx] It is not immediately clear what groups outside of HTS-led and SNA-led structures participated in the meeting, nor is it clear what concrete steps the groups agreed to as part of dissolving themselves and merging under the HTS-led Defense Ministry. HTS will likely absorb the various armed groups and functionally reflag them as new Syrian army units as a way to ameliorate concerns about losing power among various leaders. Dissolving and integrating therefore does not necessarily mean that these armed groups will cease to exist entirely, but rather they could be absorbed into a new command and control structure in which the armed groups may retain their current leaders and fighters but nominally answer to a higher headquarters. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command, however. The Iranian-backed Badr Corps reflagged some of its formations as part of the Iraqi Interior Ministry in 2005, for example, and these units did not answer to the Iraqi chain of command, but instead to the Badr Organization and Iran.

Most of the militia groups at the meeting have also fought against or are fighting against the SDF, making it notable that the US-backed SDF led by Mazloum Abdi did not attend the meeting.[xxii] The HTS-led interim government has recently called for the SDF to disarm amid the threat of a Turkish-led assault to “eliminate” the SDF and ongoing fighting between the SDF and SNA.[xxiii] Disarming the SDF would leave it vulnerable to Turkey and Turkish-backed forces which have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and its fighters, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[xxiv] Leaders of militia groups that have previously fought against the SDF or are currently part of the SNA did attend the meeting.[xxv] Shara has met extensively in recent days with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces.[xxvi] Shara has also appointed several SNA commanders as governors in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8.

Israeli forces launched an unusual "brigade-wide" counterterrorism operation in Tulkarm, in the northern West Bank, on December 23.[xxvii]  Israeli forces killed one Palestinian fighter in close-quarters combat, confiscated weapons, and arrested two individuals in Tulkarm.[xxviii] The IDF conducted a drone strike targeting armed Palestinian fighters in Nour Shams refugee camp, which is close to Tulkarm, as part of the operation.[xxix] The IDF clashed with Palestinian militias, including PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, in at least four locations in Tulkarm Governorate on December 24.[xxx] Most of these engagements included Palestinian militias detonating IEDs targeting IDF forces.

The IDF simultaneously conducted an operation in Nablus, approximately 32 kilometers southeast of Tulkarm, overnight on December 23.[xxxi] The IDF killed one fighter in Nablus.[xxxii] The IDF arrested 18 wanted individuals in several areas across the West Bank between December 23 and December 24.[xxxiii]

The IDF is executing its operation at the same time Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces are operating against Palestinian militias to regain security control of Jenin from the militias. Israeli media reported that armed Palestinian fighters killed a second PA police officer in the Jenin refugee camp on December 23.[xxxiv] PA forces killed three fighters in recent days who were likely in the combined Hamas-PIJ “Jenin Battalion”.[xxxv] Israeli media reported on December 24 that PA forces used rocket-propelled grenades against armed fighters in the camp for the first time. Israeli media, citing an unspecified Israeli security official, reported that the PA imposed a ”closed” the Jenin refugee camp. It is unclear what ”closing” the camp implies, though it could be a PA effort to isolate the camp before renewed operations there. Unverified videos circulated on social media showing four men wearing white robes threatening to conduct suicide bombings if the PA entered Jenin refugee camp, suggesting PA security forces are on the outside of the camp at this time.[xxxvi] The decision to don white robes for the video is probably meant to signal the participants’ willingness to become martyrs, given that the dead are often shrouded in white for burial in Islamic societies.[xxxvii] Armed fighters seized control of an UNRWA health center in Jenin refugee camp on December 17 and it is unclear at this time if the PA has regained control of this center.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defended against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attempts to recapture SDF-held ground on the west bank of the Euphrates River near the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge.
• HTS Governance: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara may face resistance to the current moderate approach to governance from Salafi-Jihadi factions within the HTS-led coalition. Members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23. The friction between the Salafi-jihadi ideologues and Shara over his relatively moderate governance could force Shara to compel Salafi-jihadists to adhere to his vision or take a more Salafi approach to preserve Shara’s coalition.
• ISIS Activity: ISIS may be attempting to resupply its forces with weapons captured from regime, Russian, and Iranian stocks in the central Syrian desert. CENTCOM targeted a “truckload of ISIS weapons” in Deir ez Zor. ISIS fighters−who have long fought under threat of airstrikes−would presumably avoid transporting large amounts of weapons from existing ISIS stocks, given the risk that US airstrikes would destroy much-needed weapons stockpiles. The decision to transport these weapons in a “truckload“ suggests that ISIS had captured a new stock of weapons and attempted to transport them to a safe location when CENTCOM struck the vehicle.
• Building Syria’s Army: Syrian armed groups agreed to “dissolve” themselves and merge under the HTS-led Defense Ministry, but this does not mean that Syrian opposition forces will answer to the Defense Ministry in practice. HTS will likely absorb the various armed groups and functionally reflag them as new Syrian army units as a way to ameliorate concerns about losing power among various leaders. Dissolving and integrating therefore does not necessarily mean that these armed groups will cease to exist entirely. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command.  
• West Bank: The IDF is executing its operation at the same time Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces are operating against Palestinian militias to regain security control of Jenin from the militias. Israeli forces launched an unusual "brigade-wide" counterterrorism operation in Tulkarm, in the northern West Bank, on December 23. It also conducted a separate operation in Nablus

Iran Upate, December 23, 2024

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government stated it will discuss mechanisms for disarming and dissolving the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) with SDF leadership, according to unspecified SDF sources.[i] The sources cited by a Syrian journalist claimed that the interim government will avoid any negotiation to establish a decentralized system that grants some autonomy to Kurdish-governed areas. HTS and Turkey have called for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which CTP-ISW previously identified as implicitly demanding that the SDF disarm and cease to exist as an autonomous organization.[ii]

The HTS-led interim government does not appear to have discussed integrating the SDF into the newly forming Syrian armed forces as the interim government has with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The HTS-led interim government has emphasized the disarmament and dissolution of the SDF.[iii] HTS leader Ahmad al Shara has meanwhile met extensively with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces.[iv]  The interim government’s call for the SDF to disarm comes amid the threat of a Turkish-led assault to “eliminate” the SDF and ongoing fighting between the SDF and SNA.[v]  Disarming the SDF would leave it vulnerable to Turkey and Turkish-backed forces which have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and its fighters.[vi]

The SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to engage in fighting around Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge on December 23. Elements of the Manbij Military Council, which is under the SDF, thwarted an attack on Tishreen Dam, according to the People’s Defense Units (YPG) Media Center.[vii] Forces then combed nearby villages used by the SNA to stage attacks. The Manbij Military Council forces reportedly destroyed an SNA tank in Abu Qalqal, around 9.5 kilometers northwest of Tishreen Dam.[viii] SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami reported that SDF elements are operating around 15 kilometers from Manbij City.[ix] Footage posted on December 23 by anti-Kurdish media appeared to show the SNA in possession of an SDF armored vehicle after reportedly killing its crew.[x]

Elements of the SDF continue to defect in areas that are protesting SDF control. Around 70 Arab SDF fighters from the Raqqa Military Council refused orders to join fighting at Tishreen Dam and turned their weapons into their command headquarters.[xi] Anti-Kurdish media claimed tha around 10 fighters abandoned fighting in the Aleppo countryside and returned home to al Shaddadi.[xii] A group of fighters from Markada, south of Hasakah, defected from the SDF as well.[xiii]

Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 23 that Russian elements completed their withdrawal from all positions in Syria’s interior and are now only present at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.[xiv] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR report, though it is consistent with the pace of Russian military evacuations from Syria since the fall of Assad. CTP-ISW last observed Russian forces present at the Qamishli base, Hasakah Province, on December 18, suggesting that Russian elements fully evacuated the base in the days since.[xv] Russia still maintains a presence in coastal Syria at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus, but visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or withdraw fully from coastal Syria.[xvi] The GUR stated on December 23 that a Russian cargo ship that broke down off the coast of Portugal was traveling to Syria to evacuate Russian equipment and weapons from Tartus.[xvii]

Russia’s reported evacuation from its helicopter base at Qamishli marks its withdrawal from its last sizeable base in northern Syria amid an ongoing Turkish-backed and potential Turkish-led offensive against the SDF. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s withdrawal from northern Syria and its loss of influence in Syria overall will likely expose the SDF to continued Turkish or Turkish-backed attacks.[xviii] Russia's presence across northern Syria had previously enabled Moscow to oppose and block Turkish ground offensives into Syria in 2021 and 2022.[xix] One of the primary barriers against a Turkish or Turkish-led attempt to ”eliminate” the SDF is now gone.

It remains unclear whether Russia will withdraw from coastal Syria. The GUR stated on December 23 that Russia and the HTS-led interim government have continued negotiations and have discussed alleged Syrian demands that Russia withdraw from Hmeimim and Tartus no later than February 2025.[xx] It does not appear that an agreement has yet been reached. Several HTS-affiliated sources have given conflicting statements to Western media about the future of Russia’s presence in Syria, suggesting that there is likely some dissonance within the interim government regarding its plan for Russian bases.[xxi] HTS is likely facing substantial international pressure to fully remove the Russian presence in Syria. HTS may demand Russia's full military withdrawal to convince the international community to lift sanctions on Syria, which HTS has repeatedly called upon the international community to do.[xxii]

Iran Upate, December 22, 2024

A senior official in the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expressed the readiness to negotiate with the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in order to determine the future role of the SDF.[i] The official, Riad Darar, said that the SDF would negotiate to ensure its participation in a new Syrian political structure and unify the country. Darar qualified that the SDF would negotiate only if there were a ceasefire with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the establishment of a demilitarized zone around Kobani. These comments come as Turkey, the SNA, and HTS have coerced the SDF to disarm and integrate into a new Syrian security sector under HTS control, depriving it of its autonomy.[ii]  

Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan separately said on December 21 that Turkey would only discuss the establishment of a demilitarized zone around Kobani after the SDF reaches an settlement with the HTS-led interim government.[iii] This demand is incompatible with the SDF requirement for a ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized zone precedes negotiations with HTS.

Turkey and HTS are continuing to coordinate their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Fidan met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 22 to discuss Turkish support for the interim government and its control over all Syrian territory.[iv] Fidan previously said on December 21 that Ankara prefers for HTS to address its SDF concerns but reiterated that Turkey would do “whatever it takes” to ensure Turkish national security.[v] This remark refers to the stated Turkish strategic objective of ”eliminat[ing]” the SDF. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler similarly expressed support for HTS and SNA efforts to “liberate” territory from the SDF during a visit with Turkish forces on the Syria-Turkey border.[vi] Turkish forces are stationed on the border near Kobani, Syria, in a fashion that resembles preparations before previous Turkish incursions into northern Syria.[vii]

The HTS-led interim government continues to signal a shift away from Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli media reported that HTS leader Ahmad al Shara recently decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace.[viii] Unspecified security sources told Israeli media that this decision represents "the deepest expression of change" in Syrian policy since the fall of Assad. The sources said that this decision will significantly limit Iranian freedom of movement in the Middle East and make it difficult for Iran to help Lebanese Hezbollah reconstitute militarily. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to help Hamas and Hezbollah recuperate rapidly at scale.[ix]

The HTS-led interim government reportedly appointed HTS military commander Murhaf Abu Qasra (aka Abu Hassan al Hamawi) as the new Syrian defense minister.[x] Qasra has commanded the HTS military wing and spent years developing its drone unit.[xi] Qasra also commanded the HTS offensive that toppled the Bashar al Assad regime.[xii] Qasra will presumably oversee the dissolution and integration of Syria’s armed factions into the new Syrian armed forces in his role as defense minister. Qasra told Western media recently that HTS planned to be ”the first” to dissolve its armed wing and subordinate its forces to the new Defense Ministry.[xiii] Qasra, who has overseen Latakia Province since the fall of the regime, appeared with Shara to meet military faction leaders in Damascus on December 21.[xiv] Qasra’s appointment to defense minister would be consistent with the HTS-led interim governments’ appointment of key HTS allies and loyalists to ministerial positions.[xv]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with prominent Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and other Druze sheikhs in Damascus on December 22.[xvi] Shara said during the meeting that no sects will be excluded in Syria and that it is “our duty to protect” the many Syrian sects.[xvii] Shara’s meeting with Jumblatt comes amid indications that HTS wants to establish a centralized and unitary Syrian state without autonomous or federal regions for minorities, such as Druze and Kurds.[xviii] Shara also said during the meeting that Syria seeks to build a “close” relationship with Lebanon.[xix] Jumblatt, who has been historically involved in Lebanese political movements, said the meeting was a key step in restoring relations between Lebanon and Syria.[xx] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati recently ordered the re-opening of the Lebanese embassy in Damascus.[xxi]

Former Syrian regime elements have continued to reconcile and settle their status with the interim government.[xxii] Former regime military personnel, whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service, have reported to settlement centers in large numbers in the days since HTS announced general amnesty.[xxiii] Syrian newspaper al Watan reported on December 21 that at least 34,000 former regime members have submitted applications to settle their statuses at the centers across eight provinces.[xxiv] At least 20,000 of these applicants were from the former regime strongholds of Latakia and Tartous provinces, according to al Watan.[xxv]

Syrian media reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in Daraa and Quneitra provinces on December 22. Local media reported that the IDF advanced into the outskirts of al Baath, Quneitra Province, and met with local officials to negotiate weapons collection efforts in the area.[xxvi] Local media reported that the IDF continues to maintain a presence near Maariya, western Daraa Province.[xxvii]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed Syrians revolting against unspecified oppressors during a speech on December 22.[xxviii] Khamenei said that "Syrian youth . . . must stand up to the planners and executors of insecurity [in Syria] with strong will and overcome them." It is unclear exactly whom Khamenei was referencing when he said “planners and executors.” Such comments reflect the second time that Khamenei has discussed young Syrians organizing and arming themselves since the fall of Assad. Khamenei said on December 11 that "undoubtedly the occupied area[s] of Syria will be liberated by the zealous Syrian youth.”[xxix] Khamenei in the same breath compared Syria today to Iraq in the 2003-2011 period and said that Syrian youth would free Syria in the same way that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “freed” Iraq from the United States. CTP-ISW previously assessed that this comparison suggests that Iran may pursue efforts to support similar militias in Syria to combat opposition forces and US-Israeli “interference” while undermining any new government in Syria, although CTP-ISW has not observed any material developments to indicate that Iran is currently pursuing these efforts.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: A senior SDF political official expressed the readiness to negotiate with HTS in order to determine the future role of the SDF. Turkey and HTS are continuing to coordinate their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus.
• Syria: The HTS-led interim government continues to signal a shift away from Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli media reported that HTS leader Ahmad al Shara recently decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace.
• Syria: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed Syrians revolting against unspecified oppressors during a speech. This marks the second time that Khamenei has discussed young Syrians mobilizing and arming themselves since Assad f

Iran Upate, December 21, 2024

US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf described Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara as “pragmatic” but did not specify what concrete steps Shara or the HTS-led interim government will take to combat terrorism or ensure minority rights.[i] Leaf stated that Shara gave ”moderate” statements on issues, including women's rights and protection for minorities, when they met in Damascus on December 20. Leaf confirmed that the United States will no longer pursue the 10-million-dollar Rewards for Justice bounty on Shara due his commitment to ensuring terrorist groups inside Syria pose no threat to the United States or its regional partners. The US readout offered no details on whether Shara agreed to any binding commitments in exchange. Leaf stated the United States supports a Syrian-led political process that results in an ”inclusive and representative government” and includes Syria’s ”diverse ethnic and religious communities.”

The HTS-published readout of the meeting between Leaf and Shara portrayed the United States as supporting HTS efforts to consolidate control and deprive Syrian Kurds of regional autonomy, even though the US readout gave no indication of such things.[ii] The HTS-published readout framed the United States as supporting a “unified Syrian army” that stands by the interim government “in confronting pending issues and major challenges such as the northeastern region.” This language implies US support for the HTS and Turkish effort to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into disbanding and forfeiting their autonomy to integrate into a new state structure under HTS.[iii] Elements of the SDF would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[iv] The HTS-readout further claimed that the United States “affirmed its commitment to supporting the Syrian people and the new Syrian administration,” likely to portray the United States as recognizing the HTS-led interim government as the official Syrian government, despite the United States having made no such comments. The HTS-readout--like the US one--provided no specific or binding steps that Shara or the HTS-led government will take to counter terrorist groups in Syria.

HTS is trying to consolidate control over the Syrian coastal region amid reports of instability and violence there. HTS launched an effort purportedly to crack down on crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, and theft, in Latakia.[v] Although some lawlessness is probably present in certain parts of Syria at the moment, it appears that HTS is confronting politically motivated civil conflict beyond regular criminal activity. Unspecified individuals fired small arms at an HTS checkpoint south of Tartus, for instance.[vi]  Unspecified individuals have also conducted arson attacks on former Assad regime courts and police sites, possibly to destroy evidence that could be used to prosecute former regime officials.[vii] These arson attacks extend to other Syrian provinces, such as Suwayda.[viii]  There is a risk that politically motivated civil conflict in the Syrian coastal region could develop along ethnic and sectarian lines. The coastal region is heavily populated by Alawites, who may expect retaliation or persecution from the HTS-led government since Assad is Alawite.[ix] Western media has already reported some incidents of violence against Alawite civilians in recent days.[x]

The SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to clash along the lines of control in Aleppo, Hasakah, and Raqqa provinces on December 21. The Manbij Military Council–an element of the SDF—claimed to kill 52 SNA fighters in at least twelve hours of clashes near Tishreen Dam.[xi] The SDF also claimed to destroy SNA armored vehicles and seize weapons.[xii] The SDF claimed that Turkey provided air support to SNA ground forces near the dam.[xiii] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the Tishreen Dam near Manbij, east of Aleppo on December 20.[xiv] The dam has been the site of clashes since December 9 and was specifically named under a now-nullified ceasefire between the SDF and SNA.[xv] SDF elements in Tal Othman fired artillery at SNA forces near Tishreen Dam.[xvi] A Turkish drone subsequently struck the SDF positions in Tal Othman.[xvii]  The SDF engaged the SNA in several areas of Hasakah Province near the lines of control.[xviii] An SNA faction separately engaged the SDF south of Tal Abyad in Raqqa Province.[xix]

Turkish aggression has renewed toward the SDF in recent days after the failure of a ceasefire in Manbij. Turkish officials have defined one of their objectives in Syria as ”eliminat[ing]” the SDF.[xx] Turkey and the SNA have built up their military presence immediately outside SDF-held territory and indicated that they may attack to seize territory.

The HTS-led interim government appointed officials to key governing posts on December 21. The interim government appointed Syrian Salvation Government official Asaad Hassan al Shaibani as foreign affairs minister.[xxi] Shaibani’s appointment is consistent with Sharaa’s pick for other key cabinet officials, such as Interim Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir, who similarly had headed the Syrian Salvation Government since January 2024.[xxii] The interim government also appointed SNA-affiliated commander Azzam al Gharib Abu al Ezz Saraqib as governor of Aleppo Province.[xxiii] Saraqib is the commander-in-chief of al Jabhat al Shamiya, or the Levant Front, which controls Azaz in Aleppo Province.[xxiv] Azaz is part of the SNA-held territory, which expanded during the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime. The appointment of Saraqib as provincial governor of Aleppo reflects how HTS seeks to reconcile and distribute power across other armed factions, especially those close to HTS and the SNA.[xxv] The interim government appointed two Idlib Province-based leaders as provincial governors of Rif Dimashq and Latakia on December 17.[xxvi]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara is continuing to try to portray himself and HTS as pragmatic and inclusive by engaging minorities. Shara reportedly met with Shia authorities who manage and oversee the services at the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus on December 21.[xxvii] Shara assured the authorities that the shrine would be protected and assigned a security unit to guard it, according to a United Kingdom-based, Egyptian-owned outlet.[xxviii] Shara would then be assuming responsibility and accountability for the safety of the shrine. Iranian state media has previously published conflicting accounts of HTS activity at Shia sites, ranging from HTS elements "storming" the sites to agreements for their protection.[xxix]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei announced the killing of an Iranian embassy staff member, Davoud Bitaraf, in Damascus.[xxx] Unidentified individuals reportedly opened fire on Bitaraf's vehicle in Damascus on December 15. Baghaei urged the interim government to find and prosecute the perpetrators.[xxxi] Bitaraf reportedly served as a religious scholar at the Damascus seminary and Imam of the Sayyidah Ruqayya Shrine there for over two decades.[xxxii]

The Houthis fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting an IDF position in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, central Israel, injuring 16 Israelis on December 20.[xxxiii] The IDF detected the missile but failed to intercept it.[xxxiv] A preliminary investigation revealed that the IDF air defense systems launched two interceptors that missed the missile.[xxxv]  The Houthis have used this missile variant to attack Israel several times in the recent weeks, however, the IDF had successfully intercepted each of the previous attacks.[xxxvi] The IDF separately intercepted a drone that entered southern Israeli airspace from the east.[xxxvii] Israeli Army Radio stated that the drone was launched from Yemen.[xxxviii]

Iran Upate, December 20, 2024

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed readiness to help Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) form a new political system in Syria.[i] Erdogan said that Turkey could offer expertise and guidance to this end. Erdogan also emphasized the need to draft a new Syrian constitution. Erdogan added that Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan will travel to Damascus soon to discuss the formation of a new Syrian state. These comments come amid indications from HTS that it wants to establish a centralized and unitary Syrian state without autonomous or federal regions for minorities, such as Druze and Kurds.[ii]

Erdogan’s comments also come amid renewed Turkish aggression toward the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in recent days. Turkish officials have defined one of their objectives in Syria as ”eliminat[ing]” the SDF.[iii] Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have built up their military presence immediately outside SDF-held territory and indicated that they may attack to seize territory. An SNA military commander said on December 20 that his forces were fighting against ”separatist parties,” referring to the SDF.[iv] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said on December 10 that he wanted to ”enter into a political process for the future of” Syria, but it is unclear what role he would play if Turkey adopts a major role in the formation of a new Syrian state.[v]

The SDF and SNA continued to clash along the lines of control in Aleppo Province on December 20. The head of the SDF media center reported “fierce clashes” on Qere Qozaq bridge, which spans the Euphrates River.[vi] This bridge and a downstream dam have been the site of consistent fighting between the SDF and SNA since December 9.[vii]

The SDF deployed forces to clear towns of opposition forces east of Raqqa City on December 19.[viii] Local sources reported that opposition forces took control of Madan and five other nearby towns from the SDF.[ix] The SDF had seized these areas from the Assad regime on December 6.[x] The SDF stated that its forces deployed on December 19 to operate against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) elements in the towns and pushed them into the desert.[xi] The SDF originally took control of these towns from the Assad regime on December 6.[xii] Residents of Madan disputed the SDF claim that it was fighting ISIS and instead labeled the opposition fighters actually as ”local revolutionary forces.”[xiii] The exact identity of these anti-SDF elements is unclear at this time. These events come amid an SNA-affiliated leader visiting Madan on December 20.[xiv]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla said that ISIS plans to exploit instability in Syria to break 8,000 of its fighters out of Syrian detention facilities.[xv] This statement comes amid an ISIS outlet criticizing the detention of its fighters in Syria.[xvi] ISIS has long sought to free its forces from detention facilities, and ISIS supporters have increasingly suggested online that the fall of Bashar al Assad presents an opportunity to exploit to this end.[xvii] CENTCOM separately killed two ISIS members, including an ISIS commander, in an airstrike in Deir Ez Zor Province, eastern Syria, on December 19.[xviii] CENTCOM specified that the airstrike was conducted in an area that was formerly controlled by the Assad regime and Russian forces.

There is precedent for Salafi-jihadi groups exploiting political instability, such as what is occurring in Syria, to rapidly reconstitute their forces. ISIS’s predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, rapidly reconstituted itself by freeing fighters from Iraqi detention facilities after the US withdrawal from Iraq from 2011 to 2014.[xix] The ISIS fighters and commanders held in Syrian detention centers represent a sizeable fighting force that would support further operations in Iraq and Syria.

The US counter-ISIS mission relies heavily on the SDF as the leading counter-ISIS partner force in Syria.[xx] The current SDF-SNA fighting, as outlined in the paragraphs above, will likely impact the SDF ability to execute this mission. ISIS is likely aware of the current SDF-SNA dynamic and views it as a further opportunity that it could exploit. US Department of Defense Press Secretary Pat Ryder said on December 19 that the United States increased its force presence in Syria from 900 troops to approximately 2,000.[xxi] Ryder specified that these additional troops are “temporary rotational forces“ deployed to meet changing mission needs.

A US delegation led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf met HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 20.[xxii] Leaf had "good” and “thorough" discussions with Shara on domestic and regional issues.[xxiii] This is the first time that US officials have visited Damascus in over a decade.[xxiv]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in villages in Daraa and Quneitra provinces. Tens of Syrians protested the IDF presence in Maariya, Daraa Province, on December 20.[xxv] The IDF deemed one approaching protester as a ”threat” to Israeli soldiers in the area.[xxvi] The IDF shot the protester in the leg. Israeli media reported that the IDF was operating based on in its open-fire procedures, which involve verbally instructing the individual to stop and firing warning shots into the air before shooting at their legs.[xxvii] Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) separately showed the IDF in al Rafeed, Quneitra Governorate, for the first time on December 20.[xxviii] Syrian media similarly reported that around 30 IDF soldiers with vehicles operated in al Rafeed to clear trees, search houses, and request a meeting with locals.[xxix]

Senior Iranian officials are trying to justify domestically the years-long Iranian support for Bashar al Assad while downplaying the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian reiterated regime talking about along these lines in an interview with the official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[xxx] Ahmadian said that Iran intervened in Syria to fight ISIS and at the request of Assad. This framing ignores that Iran intervened to defend Assad at the early stages of the Syrian civil war in 2011—well before ISIS surged across Iraq and Syria. This framing also ignores how senior Iranian officials have framed previously their role in Syria as part of their efforts to deter and threaten the United States and Israel. Ahmadian admitted that the fall of Assad hurts the Axis of Resistance but then proceeded to argue that Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah are self-sufficient and do not require Iranian support to remain strong. This downplaying of the fall of Assad and its negative impact on Iranian strategy mirrors Russian efforts to frame the fall of Assad as a victory for Moscow.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed readiness to help HTS form a new political system in Syria. These comments come amid renewed Turkish aggression toward the US-backed SDF and fighting with the Turkish-backed SNA.
• US CENTCOM Commander Michael Kurilla stated that ISIS plans to exploit political instability in Syria in order to break 8,000 of its fighters out of detention facilities, which would help ISIS reconstitute rapidly.
• Senior Iranian officials are trying to justify domestically the years-long Iranian support for the Bashar al Assad regime while downplaying the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.

Iran Upate, Decmber 19, 2024

Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) are attempting to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led armed forces by threatening the SDF with a full-scale assault against SDF-held areas. Turkey massed forces on the Turkey-Syria border, dismantled the Kobani-Turkey border wall, and increased drone attacks in the Manbij countryside ahead of a potential Turkish invasion into Syria.[i] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey will not need to intervene in Syria if HTS addresses its concerns with the SDF “properly.”[ii] Fidan added on December 13 that Turkey’s strategic objective is to “eliminate” the SDF.[iii] HTS has called for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which is an implicit demand for the SDF to disarm and cease to exist as an autonomous organization, consistent with Turkish demands.[iv] Unrest, defections, and Turkey’s potential assault pose existential threats to the SDF.[v] Turkey’s offer nominally presents the opportunity for the SDF to avoid a full-scale war but would ultimately still result in the elimination of the SDF.

The SDF is unlikely to accept Turkish maximalist demands, which would result in the SDF’s complete destruction, without suffering a military defeat. Incorporating SDF-held territory into the new Syrian government would require the SDF to disarm and disband its security forces, given HTS’s demand for a unitary state ruled from Damascus.[vi] Elements of these forces would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities. The SDF’s Kurdish leaders will almost certainly resist such a step, given their previous experience with the abuse of Kurdish civilians in northern Syria by the very forces that would integrate into the Syrian army alongside former SDF fighters.

Turkey and HTS’s coercive effort presents a limited window of opportunity to engage with Turkish and Kurdish parties to avoid a full-scale war which could result in ethnic cleansing. Fighting in northeastern Syria risks ethnically motivated harassment and violence against Kurds there given that Turkish-backed fighters have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and fighters.[vii] Turkey’s decision to defer to HTS’s efforts to integrate the SDF into the interim government suggests that Turkey may prefer a negotiated settlement to a politically and militarily costly full-scale assault into Syria by Turkish or Turkish-backed forces.[viii] SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi has similarly called for a dialogue and has reportedly agreed to a Turkish demand to expel non-Syrian Kurds from Syria if the SDF and Turkey and Turkish-backed forces reached a ceasefire in northern Syria.[ix] The apparent willingness of Turkey to temporarily forgo direct military action to compel the SDF to dissolve may be exploited to moderate Turkey and its Syrian allies’ maximalist demands.

It is unclear if Shara's vision of appointing a committee of legal experts to write the Syrian constitution will include multi-sectarian and religious representation. Shara told the BBC on December 18 that a “Syrian committee of legal experts” will assemble to write a constitution and will “decide” on a number of unspecified legal issues, including alcohol consumption.[x] It is unclear which “legal experts” Shara is referring to and if these experts would be representative of Syria’s multi-ethnic, sectarian, and religious population or would be HTS-affiliated Sunni scholars. HTS-affiliated scholars writing Syria’s constitution would allow HTS to decide what type of legal code it would adopt and how it would delegate power across Syria. Shara has indicated that he is committed to “respect[ing] all sects” and holding “national dialogue” with them, but it is not yet clear if this dialogue will involve the discussion of constitutional issues and he has not yet taken concrete steps to include Syrian minorities in the government.[xi] Shara and the interim prime minister have, however, appointed loyalists as governors in several provinces and ministers in the transitional government. Syria‘s diverse population may not be satisfied with an HTS-written constitution. The spiritual leader of the Druze sect, Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, issued a call to the Syrian people on December 18 to convene a constitutional convention with representatives from all Syrian provinces to elect working constitution committees.[xii] Hijri said that the constitution should adopt an administrative decentralized system and ensure the separation of powers to safeguard the institutions of governance.[xiii] Hijri’s vision of a “decentralized system” directly conflicts with HTS’s previous calls for a unified Syria under one central government and rejection of federal entities. Shara has yet to clarify his plans for the establishment of constitutional committees.[xiv]  Shara previously noted that the establishment of these committees would be unlikely to occur in the near term.[xv]

At least hundreds of Syrians also demonstrated in support a secular, representative government in Damascus on December 19.[xvi] The Civil Youth Gathering organized the protest. CTP-ISW will continue to monitor reports of demonstrations in the coming days and weeks.

Syrian residents of Tartous demonstrated in front of the police headquarters in Tartous City on December 18 to protest the slow interim government response to theft and violent crime in the area.[xvii] This is the first documented protest against the HTS-led government since the fall of the Assad regime.[xviii] Syrian media has reported numerous incidents of violent crime and threat in the Tartous area in recent days.[xix] It is not immediately clear that this protest was organized by members of a certain sect or affiliation. The HTS-led interim government recently announced that it was recruiting police and security forces in Tartous.[xx]

Syrian media reported that the Southern Operations Room is attempting to unite disparate southern armed factions under the HTS-led interim government, likely in order to increase the relative strength of the Southern Operations Room vis-a-vis the HTS-led Fateh Mubin.[xxi] Local media reported on December 19 that a convoy of vehicles affiliated with the Southern Operations Room—an opposition coalition that now controls most of southwestern Syria and coordinates with the HTS-led interim government—toured several towns in the northern Daraa countryside.[xxii] Local media reported that the Southern Operations Room met with officials and local leaders in these towns to convince them to unite all armed factions in southern Syria within one operations room in coordination with the HTS-led interim government.[xxiii] The interim government recently announced it would dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them under the new Defense Ministry.[xxiv] The Southern Operations Room may seek to strengthen its own organization ahead of a merger into the new Syrian army in order to retain their relative strength vis-a-vis HTS-led elements.

The IDF conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 18.[xxv] Fourteen IDF Air Force aircraft conducted the strikes in Hudaydah and Sanaa provinces as part of a plan that the IDF made several weeks ago in response to persistent Houthi drone and missile attacks on Israel.[xxvi]  The IDF targeted six tugboats in the Hudaydah and Salif ports, and the Ras Issa Oil Refinery, on the western coast of Yemen.[xxvii] The IDF also targeted the Dhabhan and Heyzaz power stations in Sanaa.[xxviii] The power stations sustained minimal damage, and the Houthis have reportedly restored power to Sanaa.[xxix]  The IDF previously attacked infrastructure in Hudaydah Port in July 2024 to disrupt Iranian weapons shipments to the Houthis.[xxx] The Houthis will likely continue to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting Israel given that these strikes do not appear to have disrupted the Houthis’ ability to do so.

The Houthis have conducted two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 18. The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack targeting two “specific and sensitive” Israeli military targets in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area in central Israel on December 18.[xxxi] The Houthis conducted this attack at the same time that the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen..[xxxii] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed on December 19 that one of the missile attacks targeted the Israeli Defense Ministry.[xxxiii] The IDF intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli territory on December 18.[xxxiv] Shrapnel from a Houthi missile damaged a school building near Tel Aviv.[xxxv] The Houthis separately claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on December 19.[xxxvi] The IDF intercepted ”a suspicious aerial target” over the Mediterranean Sea before it entered Israeli territory on December 19.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• HTS, Turkey, and the Syrian Democratic Forces: Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) are attempting to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led armed forces by threatening the SDF with a full-scale assault against SDF-held areas. The SDF is unlikely to accept Turkish maximalist demands, which would result in the SDF’s complete destruction, without suffering a military defeat.
• HTS Consolidation: It is unclear if Shara's vision of appointing a committee of legal experts to write the Syrian constitution will include multi-sectarian and religious representation. Shara and the interim prime minister have, however, appointed loyalists as governors in several provinces and ministers in the transitional government.
• Protests in Syria: Syrian residents of Tartous demonstrated in front of the police headquarters in Tartous City on December 18 to protest the slow interim government response to theft and violent crime in the area. At least hundreds of Syrians also demonstrated in support of a secular, representative government in Damascus on December 19.
• Southern Operations Room in Syria: Syrian media reported that the Southern Operations Room is attempting to unite disparate southern armed factions under the HTS-led interim government, likely in order to increase the relative strength of the Southern Operations Room vis-a-vis the HTS-led Fateh Mubin.
• Israeli Strikes in Yemen: The IDF conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 18.
• Houthi Strikes in Israel: The Houthis have conducted two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 18.

Iran Update, December 18, 2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is calling for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which aligns with Turkey's objective of destroying the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and constitutes an implicit call by HTS to disarm the SDF. A top HTS military commander called for a unified Syrian state, which implies that the SDF could not exist as an autonomous organization and that all Kurdish communities would be under the control of Damascus.[i] This demand is consistent with HTS’s broader objective in Syria, which is likely to solidify its control over Syrian territory. Controlling all of Syria in a unitary system would require the dismantling of the SDF because the SDF’s leaders appear to desire a federal region. The SDF is currently facing a Turkish-led or Turkish-backed assault on Kobani and other Kurdish-held territory in northeastern Syria.[ii] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan named the “eliminat[ion]” of the SDF as a Turkish strategic objective on December 13.[iii] Increased Turkish force buildup on the Turkish-Syria border, the dismantling of the Kobani-Turkey border wall, and increased drone attacks in the Manbij countryside suggest that Turkey intends to pursue this assault to “eliminate” the SDF in the coming days and that Turkey could launch this assault with Turkish forces.[iv]

HTS is deepening its cooperation with Turkey and Turkish-backed groups to solidify its control over Syrian territory. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to Turkey, receives significant support from Turkey. Turkey was almost certainly aware of and approved of HTS’s offensive that toppled Assad.[v] The HTS-led interim government has publicly expressed solidarity with the Kurdish people since coming to power, but it has not yet provided concrete assurances or a path toward any sort of autonomous authority that the SDF desires. HTS leader Ahmad al Shara has met and possibly forged alliances with Turkish-aligned armed factions to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian government's armed services.[vi] Shara has met with several SNA elements that have previously fought against the Kurds—including the Suleiman Shah Brigades, which are sanctioned for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurdish populations during the Turkish-backed operation to seize Afrin, northwestern Syria, in 2019.[vii]  Shara also indicated interest in a direct relationship with Turkey, telling an Islamist Turkish daily newspaper on December 18 that Syria would pursue “strategic relations” with Turkey moving forward and meeting with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin on December 12.[viii]  HTS is likely eager to formalize its relationship with Turkey in HTS’s capacity as the de facto authority of Syria because it needs formal relationships with influential states at a time when it is still designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, and UN.

HTS‘s military commander, Murhaf Abu Qasra (aka Abu Hassan al Hamawi), said the Kurds are “components of the Syrian people” and that HTS does not seek to allow any “federal entities” within Syria.[ix]  Incorporating SDF-held territory into the new Syrian government would require the SDF to disarm and disband their security forces. Elements of these forces would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities. The Syrian army—which HTS or one of its close allies would likely control—could then dilute the influence of any wholly Kurdish forces on the ground. The SDF’s Kurdish leaders will almost certainly resist such a step, given their previous experience with the abuse of Kurdish civilians in northern Syria by the very forces that would integrate into the Syrian army alongside former SDF fighters. HTS’s leadership in Damascus has not yet officially weighed in on the issue of Kurdish-held territory in northern Syria, and it is unclear how much authority Qasra has over the HTS-led government’s intentions. HTS and the SDF do not appear to have made public contact to discuss these issues as of this writing. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi indicated on December 13 that he planned to send an SDF delegation to Damascus to negotiate SDF representation in the new Syrian government and armed forces, but this meeting has not yet materialized.[x]  

HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish interests is an existential threat to the SDF, given the likely Turkish incursion into Syria to “eliminate” the SDF.[xi] Arab communities continued to defect from the SDF on December 18 and called an end to SDF rule in Arab areas in Raqqa and Hasakah.[xii]  SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has attempted to preserve and unify the Kurdish base, calling on Kurdish and Arab youth to “join the ranks of the SDF.” He has also reportedly called up reserve SDF fighters in an attempt to bolster its forces.[xiii]

The US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) ceasefire in northeastern Syria appears to have failed. SNA and SDF fighters have resumed fighting in the Manbij countryside since the ceasefire was announced on December 17. The SDF and SNA agreed on December 17 to extend the temporary ceasefire “to the end of the week.”[xiv] The People’s Defense Units (YPG), a component of the SDF, accused the SNA of “breaching” and “disregarding” the ceasefire.[xv] The YPG reported that Turkish reconnaissance drones supported SNA attacks on SDF forces at the Tishreen Dam.[xvi] The SDF repelled two SNA attacks on the Tishreen Dam, killing 37 SNA fighters and wounding “dozens.”[xvii] The YPG reported that Turkish drones also conducted airstrikes near the Qere Qozak Bridge and Bir Hisso, approximately 28 kilometers north of the Tishreen Dam.[xviii] Pro-SNA media posted imagery reportedly showing SNA fighters detaining SDF fighters in an unspecified area of the Manbij countryside.[xix]

Israeli forces continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on December 17. Local Syrian sources reported that an Israeli armor convoy, bulldozers, and ten other military vehicles entered Saida town, Quneitra Province, on December 17, to destroy former SAA military infrastructure and seize military equipment.[xx] Geolocated footage showed IDF soldiers with residents in Kwdana, Quneitra Province, on December 18.[xxi] Local Syrian media also reported Israeli convoys in unspecified locations in Daraa province.[xxii] Local Syrian media claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike targeting radar systems near Deir ez Zor city on December 18, stating that it was the second Israeli airstrike on this site in 12 hours.[xxiii] The IDF has not commented on this strike at this time of writing.

Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 18 showed a cargo plane on the tarmac of Russia’s helicopter base at Qamishli, northeastern Syria, suggesting that the Russian withdrawal there is still underway and Russian forces remain there as of December 18.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is likely exploiting the current weakness of major Palestinian militia groups to reduce their strongholds in the northern West Bank. Israeli ground operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank over the last year have severely degraded both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), diminishing the ability of both groups to resist the PA. Various Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have effectively controlled certain areas of the West Bank in recent years.[xxiv] The fact that the PA feels empowered enough at this time to crack down on West Bank militias—particularly in the historic militia stronghold of Jenin—demonstrates the extent to which militias including Hamas have been militarily damaged.[xxv] This is likely due to recent Israeli counterterrorism operations targeting militias in the northern West Bank in Summer 2024.[xxvi] Palestinian militias clashed with PA security forces in Jenin for the 14th consecutive day on December 18.[xxvii] Clashes between the PA and militias began following an unusual PA raid targeting militias in Jenin on December 5.[xxviii] Hamas called on Palestinians across the West Bank to “take a decisive stance“ against the PA on December 14.[xxix] An Israeli journalist reported that shops closed in Jenin camp on December 18 due to local strikes.[xxx] It is unclear at this time if the shop closures are a result of any Hamas calls for strikes or the aforementioned call for a ”decisive stance”, or if shop owners closed the shop due to the violence. CTP-ISW has not observed Palestinians heeding Hamas’ call to confront the PA in other areas of the West Bank at this time of writing.

Iran Update, December 17, 2024

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) agreed to extend their temporary ceasefire in northeastern Syria “to the end of the week.”[i] The ceasefire was originally meant to last from December 12 to 16.[ii] The SNA and Turkey deployed artillery and fighters to the front lines around Kobani on December 17 before the ceasefire extension[iii] SDF elements under the Manbij Military Council engaged the SNA on Tishreen Dam for several hours on December 17, but fighting was mostly contained to the area.[iv]

The SNA and Turkey may launch an offensive to capture Kobani and other SDF-held territory after the ceasefire expires. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Turkish military buildup near Kobani includes special operations forces and resembles preparations ahead of previous Turkish incursions into northern Syria.[v] Local sources reported on December 16 that Turkey has dismantled the border wall near Kobani, further indicating that Turkish forces are preparing for offensive operations in the area.[vi] These possible preparations come shortly after the Turkish foreign affairs minister saying on December 13 that a Turkish strategic objective is to “eliminate” the SDF.[vii]

The SDF wants to negotiate a permanent ceasefire under which it would establish “a demilitarized zone in Kobani” under US supervision.[viii] The SDF General Command released a statement accusing Turkey of wanting to seize and annex all Syrian territory.[ix] The possibility of an SNA-Turkish offensive comes as SDF is facing widespread defections from its ranks.[x] The SDF called for Arab and Kurdish youth to ”join the ranks of the SDF” in a statement and has reportedly called up SDF fighters on break to help manage these defections.[xi]

Fighting in northeastern Syria risks ethnically motivated harassment and violence against Kurds there given that Turkish-backed fighters have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and fighters. SNA fighters executed injured SDF fighters at hospitals in northern Syria and reportedly looted civilian areas in Manbij during their most recent offensive into Manbij, for example.[xii] Such crimes risk upsetting Syria’s current relative stability. Some elements of the SNA, such as the Suleiman Shah Brigade, are sanctioned for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurdish populations during the Turkish-backed operation to seize Afrin, northwestern Syria, in 2019.[xiii]

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara (also known as Abu Mohammad al Jolani) announced on December 16 that the HTS-led interim government will dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[xiv] This announcement, which Shara made during a meeting with members of the Syrian Druze community, is part of his effort to rebuild the Syrian security sector.[xv] Syrian Interim Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir has similarly described plans to cohere former opposition groups under the Defense Ministry.[xvi] Shara likely discussed these plans during meetings with leaders from several opposition groups under the SNA, including the Hamza Division, Suleiman Shah Brigade, and Jaish al Ahrar, on December 16.[xvii] The United States sanctioned the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade in August 2023 for committing “serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria.”[xviii]  Shara also met with leaders from Jaish al Izza, which operates under the HTS-led Fateh al Mubin coalition.[xix] It is far from clear that Shara can cohere the many different opposition groups, which have a diverse range of allegiances and ideologies, into a unified national force.

HTS leader Shara has suggested that elections and the drafting of a new Syrian constitution are unlikely to occur in the near term.[xx] Shara said that elections are “somewhat far-fetched now” while speaking to foreign journalists in Damascus on December 16[xxi]  Shara added that “Syria has many problems” that require “patience.”[xxii] Shara also said that forming a constitutional committee is a ”long process,” implying that doing so will take some time. An unspecified adviser to Shara told foreign journalists that “it could be a year or more” before constitutional committees are created.[xxiii]

It is unclear what will happen after the term of the interim government expires in March 2025 given Shara’s comments. Syrian Interim Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir has said that the interim government would end by then.[xxiv] No officials in the interim government have conveyed plans for what would proceed the expiration of the government at the time of this writing.

HTS leader Shara continued to portray HTS as a moderate force in his foreign engagements likely in order to cultivate foreign backing. Western media reported that Sharaa downplayed the possibility of imposing Islamic law on Syria to foreign journalists on December 19 and said that the government will “not deeply intrude on personal freedoms.”[xxv] Shara noted that unspecified “customs” will be considered, however.[xxvi] Shara has repeatedly tried to present HTS as a moderate force and continues to do so as he receives diplomatic visits from countries that have designated or support the designation of HTS as a terrorist organization.[xxvii] Shara called on several governments to remove their terrorist designations for HTS on December 16, claiming that lifting the designations is necessary for Syria to rebuild.[xxviii]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will remain on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon until Israel reaches “another arrangement” to ensure Israeli security.[xxix] Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz visited IDF elements on Mount Hermon on December 17.[xxx] Netanyahu and Katz held a situational assessment with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, and Northern Command Commander Uri Gordin.[xxxi] Katz said that the IDF will remain in its positions on the mountain for “whatever length of time is required,” citing that Mount Hermon offers observation into both southern Syria and Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.[xxxii] The IDF seized the Syrian side of Mount Hermon on December 8.[xxxiii]

The IDF continued to operate in southern Syrian towns on December 17.[xxxiv] Geolocated footage posted on December 17 showed IDF tanks in Saida, which is just outside the disengagement line on the border between Daraa and Quneitra provinces.[xxxv] Local  media reported that IDF armor advanced into Saida to search former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) battalion sites in the area, including in the nearby town of Maqraz.[xxxvi] The IDF appears to have successfully reached an agreement with local Syrian officials to have Syrians gather materiel left in the area by the SAA and bring them to the IDF.[xxxvii] Israeli media posted footage that showed the IDF loading hundreds of crates containing ammunition and weapons confiscated during operations into trucks.[xxxviii] Israeli media reported on December 17 that Syrian villagers have asked the new Syrian interim government and other Arab countries to push Israel out southern Syria.[xxxix]

The Southern Operations Room appears to be conducting similar weapons-collecting operations in western Daraa Province towns. Local media reported that the Southern Operations Room—an opposition coalition that now controls most of southwestern Syria and coordinates with the HTS-led interim government—called upon residents of Tafas, western Daraa Province, to hand over any military vehicles, weapons, or other state property.[xl] The Southern Operations Room set a week-long deadline for people to hand over these possessions and warned that anyone still possessing them at the end of the deadline will be punished, according to the report.[xli] These weapons-collecting efforts in the western Daraa countryside appear to be distinct from Israeli operations along the disengagement line.

Neither the Kremlin nor the interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian bases in Syria, likely accounting for Russia's continued visible preparations at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus to withdraw forces despite claims and reports that the interim Syrian government might extend Russian basing rights. Various HTS-affiliated sources have given Western media outlets conflicting statements about the status of Russian bases—suggesting that there is likely some dissonance even within the transitional Syrian government about its plan regarding Russian bases. The Economist cited an HTS source on December 17 saying that Russia and HTS have "now entered negotiations" and that HTS "has conceded that it will probably allow Russia to keep some or all of its bases."[xlii] UK-based, Qatari-owned news outlet Al Araby al Jadeed reported on December 16, in contrast, that sources "close to the [HTS-led] military operations department" in Syria stated that Russia will withdraw all its military forces from Syria within one month, as ISW reported.[xliii]The divergent HTS-affiliated reporting suggests that HTS itself has not come to a decision on Russian basing yet, and HTS is likely facing substantial international pressure to fully remove the Russian presence from Syria. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas stated on December 16 that the EU will raise the possibility of closing all Russian bases in Syria "with the country's new leadership."[xliv] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted on December 16 that Russia is "closely monitoring" developments in Syria and that Moscow believes that there is a path to a "sustainable normalization of the situation in Syria...through the launch of an inclusive intra-Syrian dialogue.”[xlv]

Visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or fully withdraw from Syria, however. A well-placed Damascus-based outlet reported on December 17 that Russian forces were evacuating their positions in Latakia (Hmeimim Air Base) and preparing a large military convoy to leave via the Port of Tartus.[xlvi] Maxar satellite imagery from December 17 shows a Russian Il-76 transport aircraft and dozens of military vehicles on the tarmac at Hmeimim Airbase and dozens of Russian military vehicles assembled at the Port of Tartus (see embedded images below). Russia is likely adopting this tentative posture and withdrawing some assets on the chance that HTS decides deny Russia a continued military presence in Syria, but it remains unclear what HTS intends to do.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that Iran is continuing “any possible support and assistance" to Hezbollah and “Palestinian fighters” in a speech on December 17.[xlvii] CTP-ISW has assessed that the sudden fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hezbollah and Hamas.[xlviii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) long used Syria under Assad to move material to proxy and partner forces around the Israeli periphery. HTS leader Ahmad al Shara said on December 14 that Iranian presence in Syria has ended.[xlix] It is unclear therefore whether Khamenei is referring to specific material support when saying that Iran is continuing to support Hezbollah and Palestinian fighters.

Israeli media reported on December 17 that Israel and Saudi Arabia may normalize relations during the second phase of a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas.[l] Saudi Arabia has accepted Israel’s vague commitment to a “path towards Palestinian statehood” rather than the long-held demand for an explicit recognition of a Palestinian state, according to sources familiar with recent negotiations. Normalization would reportedly occur in the second phase of a ceasefire-hostage deal after a first phase that would entail a hostage-prisoner exchange, a cessation of fighting in the Gaza Strip for an unspecified period, and a gradual IDF withdrawal from the Strip. Israeli media provided no further details of the expected timeline of these phases. The source added that Saudi Arabia along with a coalition of unspecified countries and the Palestinian Authority would manage reconstruction in the Gaza Strip and ensure Israeli security along the Philadelphi Corridor.

Hamas demanded that Israel stops “setting new conditions” in ceasefire-hostage discussions on December 17.[li] A senior Israeli political source claimed on December 17 that the main issue currently impacting negotiations is the number of hostages to be released.[lii] Hamas continues to demand a guarantee that any deal for the release of some hostages will lead to a more comprehensive deal later and for displaced Palestinians to be able to return to the northern Gaza Strip.[liii] A Hamas official told Western media on December 16 that Hamas has relented on its demands for a complete end to the war and a full withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip.[liv] This reflects a change in Hamas’ maximalist position following a report on December 10 that Hamas officials are willing to accept an extended IDF presence along the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors while still demanding an eventual, complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[lv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: The US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA agreed to extend their temporary ceasefire in northeastern Syria “to the end of the week.” Turkey and the SNA appear to be preparing to launch an offensive to capture SDF-held Syrian territory after the ceasefire expires.
• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara announced that the HTS-led interim Syrian government will dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them under the new Defense Ministry. This announcement is part of Shara’s effort to rebuild the Syrian security sector.
• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara suggested that elections and the drafting of a new Syrian constitution are unlikely to occur in the near term. It is unclear therefore what will proceed after the term of the interim Syrian government expires in March 2025.
• Russia: Neither Russia nor the HTS-led interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian basing in Syria. Syrian reporting and visual evidence continue to suggest that Russian forces are preparing draw down significantly or even fully from Syria, however.
• Israel: Israel and Saudi Arabia may normalize relations during the second phase of a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas, according to Israeli media. This report comes amid indications that Hamas has softened its maximalist position in talks with Israel.

Iran Update, December 16, 2024

The HTS-controlled interim government is continuing to reconcile with former members of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). The Russian-backed SAA 5th Corps in Lattakia is reportedly negotiating with the interim government to “merge its forces” into the new Syrian army.[i] Integrating members of other armed groups, including the SAA, into the new army could reduce insecurity and instability during the transition period. Syrian media separately reported on December 16 that the interim government is negotiating with the Iraqi federal government to “recover” over 2,000 former SAA soldiers who fled to Iraq during the Syrian opposition offensive.[ii] Around 2,150 SAA soldiers and high-ranking officers are currently staying at a camp in western Anbar Province near the Iraqi border with Syria.[iii] The mayor of Rutba District, Anbar Province, told Iraqi media on December 16 that the majority of soldiers at the camp wish to return to Syria since HTS granted a general amnesty to SAA soldiers whom the Assad regime conscripted under compulsory service.[iv] HTS leader Ahmed al Sharaa (aka Abu Mohammad al Jolani) stated on December 15 that he will end mandatory conscription in Syria.[v] It is unclear how the interim government will generate enough income to support a volunteer army.

The HTS-controlled interim government is also continuing to signal that it will reform the Syrian security establishment. The interim government Interior Minister, Mohammed Abdul Rahman, stated in an interview with al Araby on December 16 that the interim government has a “ready plan” to reform the security establishment.[vi] Rahman stated that the security establishment needs “major reforms,” including in the fields of “procedures, internal work regulations, and laws.” Rahman added that the interim government will dissolve security institutions that were previously “a source of terror” for the Syrian people. The Interior Ministry has begun recruiting police officers in Damascus, Hama, and Homs in recent days as part of a “comprehensive plan to ensure access to a safe society.”[vii] Syrian media previously reported that the interim government would "conduct an assessment” and reorganize the SAA.[viii]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara (aka Abu Mohammad al Jolani) met with UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen in Damascus to discuss a Syrian political transition within the framework of UNSCR 2254.[ix] Syrian caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir also attended the meeting.[x] Pedersen stressed the need for a Syrian-led political transition based on the principles of UNSCR 2254.[xi] The UN adopted UNSCR 2254 in 2015 to call for a full ceasefire in Syria and set guidance and benchmarks for Syria’s political transition, including establishing a constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months.[xii]

HTS has not suggested it will implement key elements of UNSCR 2254 and is attempting to change the resolution’s guidance to account for Syria’s “new reality.”[xiii] The conditions in Syria in 2015 under which the UN adopted UNSCR 2254 were much different than those in Damascus today under Shara’s and HTS’ control. The caretaker government’s term will end in March 2025, but the government has not set up a timeline for holding elections.[xiv] Shara noted on December 16 that Syria is not ready for elections, and the interim government has so far failed to outline any process for generating a constitution.[xv] HTS-selected officials within the transitional government would presumably be relied upon to establish a method to write a constitution, including the selection of various powerbrokers across the country and in different minority groups to attend negotiations. Shara and other HTS officials have alluded to a potential pursuit of a technocratic government that would place Syrian institutions under the ”supervision of specialized teams.”[xvi] A true technocratic government would appoint ministers to positions based on experience regardless of affiliation with HTS, however. It is unclear if Shara is willing to incorporate non-HTS members into the new Syrian government.

The international community has continued to engage HTS leader Ahmad al Shara and the HTS-controlled interim government in Damascus. HTS has conducted more diplomatic engagements in its first week than the Taliban did in the five weeks following the fall of Kabul.[xvii] Qatar and Lebanon announced the re-opening of their respective embassies in Damascus.[xviii] The French Foreign Ministry announced that it will send a delegation to Damascus on December 17.[xix] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas told reporters that she has sent a European diplomat to establish contact with the new Syrian government but will not lift sanctions until the HTS-led government demonstrates that it will protect minority rights, women’s rights, and disavow extremism.[xx] The United States, European Union, and United Nations have designated HTS as a terrorist organization.[xxi] Shara called on governments such as the United States to remove their terrorist designations for HTS on December 16.[xxii] Shara claimed that lifting the designations is necessary for Syria to rebuild.[xxiii]

A four-day ceasefire between the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Manbij area expired without an extension on December 16. The four-day ceasefire lasted from December 12 to 16 to allow humanitarian aid to enter and unspecified security agreements to be negotiated.[xxiv] The SDF Media Center said on December 16 that US-backed efforts to declare a permanent ceasefire in Manbij and Kobani failed. The SDF blamed Turkey for its inflexibility.[xxv] The Turkish foreign minister said on December 13 that Turkey’s strategic objective in Syria is to ”destroy” the SDF, meaning that any ceasefire between the SDF and Turkish-backed groups is presumably temporary.[xxvi] An SNA capture of Kurdish areas like Kobani risks triggering ethnically motivated violence and upsetting Syria’s current relative stability. Initial social media reports indicate that Turkish-backed forces have begun an advance toward Kobani.[xxvii]  CTP-ISW will closely monitor this development and issue updates in the coming days.

The Turkish-backed SNA is reportedly seizing private and government property in Manbij. Local media reported that at least some of these seizures target Kurds, “under the pretext of [the Kurds] belonging to the SDF. Local sources reported on December 16 that the SNA is seizing cars and buildings from residents in Manbij.[xxviii] The SNA also took control of parts of the local electricity grid.[xxix] The SNA-managed Civil Administration in Manbij issued three notices related to car theft, the circulation of the Syrian currency and the US dollar, and price controls on bread and other goods on December 16.[xxx] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas on December 9 after seizing the city from the Syrian Democratic Forces.[xxxi]

Arab elements continue to defect from the Syrian Democratic Forces. The head of internal security for the al Busayrah and Dhiban region in SDF-controlled Deir ez Zor Province announced he and “hundreds” of his fighters would join the HTS-led Military Operations Department.[xxxii] This internal security officer is at least the fourth SDF-affiliated security leader in Deir ez Zor Province to defect since the fall of the Assad regime.[xxxiii] Local media similarly reported that over 150 Arab elements defected from the military academy affiliated with the SDF in al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province.[xxxiv] The US maintains a force presence near both al Shaddadi and Dhiban, and continued defections risk further drawing in US forces and compromising the ability of the international coalition to conduct counter-ISIS missions. There is also a significant ISIS presence near Dhiban.[xxxv] Only the SDF is capable of conducting competent counter-ISIS operations in the areas it controls, given that HTS and other groups are currently preoccupied with securing newly controlled areas. CTP-ISW previously assessed on December 13 that Abdi intends to negotiate a role for the SDF in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias living under its control.[xxxvi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in southern Syrian towns near the Jordanian border on December 16. Geolocated footage shows Israeli forces operating in the villages of Abidin and Maariyah in the Yarmouk Basin. Both villages are just outside the 1974 disengagement line in Daraa Province.[xxxvii] Israeli forces operated in this general area on December 15 as well.[xxxviii] Israeli military officials have approved plans for operations further into Syria, but the Israeli presence in Abidin and Maariyah does not appear to be the start of a broader campaign.[xxxix] The IDF’s operation along the Jordanian border comes after December 13 talks to discuss the situation in Syria and the threat of Iranian weapons smuggling to Palestinian militias in the West Bank.[xl] ISIS also historically maintained a presence in the Yarmouk Basin.

The IDF continued to target former SAA positions across Syria after CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 15.  Geolocated imagery posted on December 15 shows a massive explosion at a weapons warehouse near Bamlaka village, Tartus Province.[xli] Local sources reported that Israeli airstrikes also targeted former SAA sites in HTS-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province.[xlii]

The Israeli cabinet approved Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to double the population in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on December 15.[xliii] Netanyahu’s plan proposed 40 million NIS (around USD 11 million) to increase education and renewable energy sources in Golan Heights settlements as well as establishing a student village and a plan for bringing in new residents. Israeli media reported that already 50,000 Israeli Jewish and Druze citizens live in these settlements.[xliv] Netanyahu stated that “strengthening the Golan Heights is strengthening the State of Israel.” Several governments, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany criticized Netanyahu’s plan, calling it a violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria.[xlv]

Israel’s large-scale aerial attack on Iranian missile production sites on October 25 significantly damaged Iran's missile production capability, including its ability to export Iranian-made missiles to partners like Russia and the Houthis.[xlvi] An unspecified Israeli military source told the Washington Post that Israel’s October 25 strike in Iran caused Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile production to drop from two ballistic missiles a day to one missile per week.[xlvii] Iran’s capacity to produce new missiles is unlikely to increase, given that it would take at least a year for Iran to acquire new solid fuel mixers from China to replace the Iranian mixers that Israel destroyed on October 25.[xlviii] The decrease in Iranian ballistic missile production will make it difficult for Iran to conduct another large-scale missile attack targeting Israel and would presumably prevent Iran from supplying the Houthis or Russians with solid-fuel ballistic missiles.[xlix] The Houthis continue to launch missile and drone attacks targeting sites in Israel, using Iranian-made missiles.[l]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is continuing to conduct airstrikes in previously regime-held areas in order to disrupt ISIS operations. CENTCOM conducted airstrikes targeting ISIS positions and killed 12 ISIS fighters in Syria on December 16.[li] CENTCOM stated that it is conducting airstrikes in former Assad regime-held territories and in Russian-controlled areas to prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting instability in Syria.[lii] CENTCOM rarely struck Assad-held areas prior to the collapse of the regime. CENTCOM reported no indications of civilian casualties. Previously, CENTCOM conducted more than 75 airstrikes targeting ISIS positions in central Syria on December 8.[liii]

The IDF announced on December 16 that the IDF 98th Division had completed its mission in southern Lebanon on December 11 and that the IDF would redeploy the division to the Gaza Strip.[liv] The 98th Division has been active in southern Lebanon since October 1.[lv] The IDF has not clarified if the 98th Division will replace another division already deployed to the Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW has not identified any indicators that the IDF is aiming to increase the number of divisions In the Strip from three to four.

Some Iranian media outlets appear to be engaged in an information campaign to stoke sectarian tensions and promote a hardline approach toward the new HTS-led interim government. Some Iranian media outlets are circulating reports of sectarian harassment, but CTP-ISW has found no evidence that this sectarian harassment is widespread or significant at this time. Some Iranian media outlets, including Tabnak News and Mashregh, separately claimed on December 12 that HTS fighters "stormed" the Sayyida Zeinab shrine and chanted "provocative slogans."[lvi] The custodian of the Sayyida Zainab shrine stated that the fighters "visited the shrine with respect."[lvii] Tabnak is affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei and Mashregh is affiliated with the IRGC Intelligence Organization.[lviii]  Tabnak also claimed on December 13 that HTS ordered the removal of flags, religious texts, and prayer stones from the Sayyida Ruqayya shrine.[lix] Some Iranian outlets, including armed forces-run Defa Press, emphasized in their reports on the Sayyida Ruqayya shrine that HTS members entered the shrine ”respectfully.”[lx] Tabnak separately reported on December 16 that HTS allegedly handed control of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine to the "Shirazi movement.”[lxi] Tabnak claimed that this movement is "headquartered in Iraq...and propagates all behaviors that are derogatory to Shiites." CTP-ISW found no evidence, including in Syrian media, to support the claim that HTS handed control of the shrine to the ”Shirazi movement.” The variations within the Iranian information space suggest that different elements of the Iranian regime have adopted different attitudes toward the new HTS-led interim government. The New York Times reported--citing a Tehran-based analyst--on December 13 that a “Syria debate” is occurring in Iran “at all levels of society.”[lxii] The different tones and varying reports in the Iranian information space likely reflect this internal debate.

Some Iranian media outlets, including Tabnak, Hamshahri, and Rouydad24, claimed that HTS Leader Ahmad al Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al Jolani) appointed Abdulrahman Fattahi as his deputy for Iranian affairs. This appointment could embolden the Iranian faction that has adopted a more hostile stance toward the new Syrian government.[lxiii]  Fattahi is known for his leadership of the "Movement of the Muhajerin of Iran's Sunnis," which is a group of Iranian Kurdish fighters who fought alongside HTS's predecessor Jabhat al Nusra in Syria in 2015.[lxiv] Some Iranian media reports characterized Fattahi as the "ISIS leader in Iran" and published footage of Fattahi delivering sermons in Kurdish criticizing Iranian leadership and calling for the liberation of Iranian Sunnis.[lxv] Syrian media has not confirmed Fattahi’s appointment. The reports about Fattahi’s appointment could increase hostility toward the HTS-led interim government among senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has recently voiced opposition to the new government.

The following text also appears in the Institute for the Study of War’s December 16, 2024, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 16 that there are "no final decisions" about Russia's military bases in Syria and that Moscow is in contact with "representatives of the forces that currently control the situation" in Syria - likely referring to HTS.^[lxvi] Kadyrov claimed on December 15 in a post in both English and Arabic that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "always treated the Syrian people with respect and compassion" and that Russia considers it a duty to stand by Russia's "brotherly people" in Syria.^[lxvii] Kadyrov emphasized Russia's efforts to restore mosques in Syria and provide humanitarian aid to the country. Kadyrov also applauded the interim Syrian government on December 16 for its efforts to bring stability and peace to the country."^[lxviii] Kadyrov claimed that it will be difficult to achieve stability "without the help of partners," however, and highlighted Russia's "strength and means" that can help prevent a humanitarian crisis from developing in the country. Kadyrov called on Russia to remove HTS from Russia's list of terrorist organizations and create a Russian-HTS contact group, which should also involve Syrians who have been living in Chechnya. Kadyrov has previously used his position as a leader of the Russian Muslim community to reach out to the Arab world.^[lxix] The relatively late timing of Kadyrov's overtures to HTS - one week after the fall of the Assad regime and days into reported Russian-HTS talks - and his overt emphasis on how the interim Syrian government can benefit from cooperation with Russia suggest that Russian-HTS talks may have hit obstacles and that the Kremlin is trying to use alternative channels to appeal to HTS.

Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) stated on December 15 that Russian forces are withdrawing from the Russian bases near Manbij, Kobani, and Qamishli and that Russian negotiations with HTS are not covering these other bases.^[lxx] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 16 that Russian military transport aircraft, including three Il-76MD and two An-124 transport aircraft, are flying from Syria to Chkalovsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and Makhachkla, Republic of Dagestan as Russian forces in Syria continue to withdraw westward to Hmeimim and Tartus.^[lxxi] CNN reported on December 16 that two US officials and one Western official familiar with intelligence on the matter stated that Russia has been withdrawing a large amount of military equipment and soldiers from Syria but that it is not clear if the withdrawal is intended to be permanent.^[lxxii] The two US officials reportedly stated that Russia has started to move naval assets from Syria to Libya, with another defense official stating that Russia is increasing pressure on Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar in order to secure Russia's use of a port in Benghazi. The Financial Times reported on December 15 that Kamal Lababidi, a member of the political bureau of HTS who has been involved in the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government, stated that Russia, in coordination with HTS, recently evacuated at least 400 soldiers from Qudsayya near Damascus to Hmeimim, from where the Russian personnel flew back to Russia.^[lxxiii] Lababidi reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing forces to Hmeimim from elsewhere in Syria but is not currently evacuating Hmeimim.

UK-based, Qatari-owned news outlet Al Araby al Jadeed reported on December 16 that sources "close to the [HTS-led] military operations department" in Syria stated that Russia will withdraw all its military forces from Syria within one month.^[lxxiv] The SZRU reported on December 15 that Russia is "urgently" transferring large landing ships from the Baltic and North seas to Syria for evacuations and that Russia is also chartering ships flagged in unspecified countries to load equipment from the Port of Tartus.^[lxxv] The GUR stated on December 12 that Russia was moving two landing ships from its Northern Fleet to Tartus and that the ships were in the Norwegian Sea at the time.^[lxxvi] It will likely be weeks before the landing ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and the Port of Tartus, but Russia may be able to evacuate limited military assets with other chartered ships. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported that satellite imagery captured on December 16 shows that the Russian vessels that recently left the Port of Tartus, including some that were in a holding pattern off the coast as of December 15, have yet to return.^[lxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• HTS and the Syrian Security Sector: The HTS-controlled interim government is continuing to reconcile with former members of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).
• Syrian Transition: HTS has not suggested it will implement key elements of UNSCR 2254 and is attempting to change the resolution’s guidance to account for Syria’s “new reality.” HTS leader Ahmad Shara (Jolani) noted on December 16 that Syria is not ready for elections, and the interim government has so far failed to outline any process for generating a constitution. HTS-selected officials within the transitional government would presumably be relied upon to establish a method to write a constitution, including the selection of various powerbrokers across the country and in different minority groups to attend negotiations.
• Northern Syria: A four-day ceasefire between the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Manbij area expired without an extension on December 16. The Turkish-backed SNA is reportedly seizing private and government property in Manbij. Local media reported that at least some of these seizures target Kurds, “under the pretext of [the Kurds] belonging to the SDF.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: Arab elements continue to defect from the Syrian Democratic Forces. The head of internal security for the al Busayrah and Dhiban region in SDF-controlled Deir ez Zor Province announced he and “hundreds” of his fighters would join the HTS-led Military Operations Department.
• Israel in Syria: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in southern Syrian towns near the Jordanian border on December 16.
• Israel’s October 25 Strike on Iran: Israel’s large-scale aerial attack on Iranian missile production sites on October 25 significantly damaged Iran's missile production capability, including its ability to export Iranian-made missiles to partners like Russia and the Houthis.
• ISIS: US Central Command (CENTCOM) is continuing to conduct airstrikes in previously regime-held areas to disrupt ISIS operations.
• Iranian Information Space: Some Iranian media outlets appear to be engaged in an information campaign to stoke sectarian tensions and promote a hardline approach toward the new HTS-led interim government.
• Russia-HTS Negotiations: Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag.
• Russia in Syria: Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month. UK-based, Qatari-owned news outlet Al Araby al Jadeed reported on December 16 that sources "close to the [HTS-led] military operations department" in Syria stated that Russia will withdraw all its military forces from Syria within one month.

Iran Update, December 15, 2024

Russia’s withdrawal from bases in northern Syria and its loss of influence in Syria will likely expose the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to continued Turkish attacks in northern Syria. Russia has withdrawn from a series of bases in the Manbij and Kobani areas in northern Syria amid the ongoing Turkish-backed offensive against the SDF.[i] Russia will probably withdraw from its last sizeable base in northern Syria, Qamishli, because Turkey and the groups on the ground in Syria—including HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA)—do not appear to be prepared to allow Russia to remain there. Unspecified actors reportedly agreed to allow Russia to remain in Tartus and Hmeimim but did not mention Qamishli.[ii] The Turkish defense minister also offered to ”support” Russia’s consolidation at Hmeimim and Tartus, suggesting Turkey would not support other Russian bases.[iii] Russia's presence across northern Syria had previously enabled Russia to oppose and block Turkish-backed offensives in Tel Rifaat and Manbij, two areas that Turkish-backed forces have captured in recent days.[iv] The loss of Russia’s physical presence and influence in northern Syria means that the primary barrier against a Turkish or Turkish-backed operation to seize even more SDF-controlled areas—or a Turkish attempt to destroy the SDF outright—no longer exists.

Turkey will likely continue to back the SNA’s ground operation against the SDF to destroy the SDF. The Turkish foreign minister said on December 13 that Turkey’s strategic objective in Syria is to ”destroy” the SDF, meaning that any ceasefire between the SDF and Turkish-backed groups is presumably temporary.[v] It is unclear when large-scale operations will resume, however. Turkish-backed fighters have also executed injured SDF fighters at hospitals in northern Syria and reportedly looted civilian areas in Manbij.[vi] These crimes risk triggering ethnically motivated violence and upsetting Syria’s current relative stability, especially if Turkish-backed fighters enter Kurdish areas and begin killing Kurdish civilians.

The SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF is the key US partner in Syria against ISIS. Only the SDF is capable of conducting competent counter-ISIS operations in the areas it controls, given that HTS and other groups are currently preoccupied with securing newly controlled areas. The SDF also controls al Hol IDP camp and a network of prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters. Turkish violence—including the threat of ethnically motivated killing—would almost certainly cause the SDF to mobilize its forces against Turkish-backed groups. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria. It is unclear if the SDF would be able to secure these key facilities if it faces a severe threat from Turkish-backed forces to Kurdish civilian areas.

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) continues to consolidate security control over disparate armed groups in Syria. The Men of Dignity—a Druze militia that was instrumental in seizing southern Syria from the Assad regime—set up checkpoints in Rif Dimashq Province on December 15.[vii] A fighter in the militia confirmed on December 15 that the Men of Dignity are "coordinating completely" with the HTS-led Military Operations Department, which operates in all "newly liberated Syrian territories."[viii] HTS military commander Abu Hassan al Hamwi confirmed on December 13 that the Idlib-based fighters created a ”unified war room” with about 25 opposition groups in southern Syria with the strategy of surrounding Damascus from both sides.[ix] This pre-offensive coordination started over a year ago and suggests the groups have developed pragmatic working relationships at least around military operations against the Assad regime.[x] The groups’ cooperation to overthrow Assad does not immediately indicate that they will collaborate on governance. Opposition groups throughout Syria have historically coordinated militarily with HTS’s predecessor Jabhat al Nusra, but often came into conflict with the group over governance and control.[xi]

Former regime soldiers in coastal areas of Syria are reportedly giving up their arms to HTS-led authorities as part of a settlement process.[xii] HTS announced the opening of settlement offices in Latakia on December 14.[xiii] Social media users posted images of men lined up outside these offices on December 15.[xiv] The HTS-led operations room carried out an identical process in other major cities, but it was unclear if soldiers in the former regime stronghold of Latakia would cooperate with the order or opt to keep their weapons in fear of sectarian reprisals from the HTS-led government.[xv] HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel, whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[xvi]

HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani also reached out to Kurdish Syrians on December 14.[xvii] Jolani said the Kurds are part of the homeland and partners in the coming Syria.[xviii]  Members of the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) leadership acknowledged Jolani’s sentiments and called for negotiations including the Kurds for a ”joint action plan”[xix] The Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the political wing of the YPG, also called for an end to attacks on Kurdish-controlled territory in eastern and northern Syria.[xx]  SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi echoed the PYD statement on December 15 and called for a ”constructive dialogue” to build a new Syria and halt to all military operations in Syria.[xxi]  CTP-ISW assessed on December 13 that Abdi intends to negotiate a role for the SDF in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias living under its control.[xxii] Unrest, defections, and Turkey’s stated intent to ”eliminate” the SDF pose existential threats that are likely encouraging the Kurdish groups to negotiate with Jolani.[xxiii]

Iran Update, December 13, 2024

The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.[i] Five unspecified Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps members, told the New York Times on December 13 that the Iranian regime is “disoriented” and “befuddled.”[ii] The officials added that the regime is “trying to find a way forward with Syria” and will accept “any level of diplomatic presence” in Syria.[iii] The New York Times also reported--citing a Tehran-based analyst--that a “Syria debate” is occurring in Iran “at all levels of society.”.[iv] Iranian civilians and media have openly criticized the regime for funding and bolstering the Assad regime for years at the expense of developing Iran.[v] Shia cleric Mohammad Shariati Dehghan recently stated that Iran should prioritize developing relations with other countries over supporting militias in the region.[vi] Dehghan added that the regime should redirect money and resources “back to the people of Iran.” Dehghan’s statements could be indicative of a broader regime and Iranian conversation about how Iran should adjust its regional strategy after the fall of Assad, though Dehghan presumably does not have a large role in policymaking or the government. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently described criticisms such as Dehghan’s as a “crime” during a speech on December 13.[vii]

The Turkish Embassy in Damascus will resume operations on December 14 after remaining closed for 12 years.[viii] The Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed Turkish Ambassador to Mauritania Burhan Koroglu as the interim charge d’affaires to the Turkish Embassy in Damascus.[ix] Koroglu speaks Turkish, English, and Arabic.[x] Turkish media separately reported on December 13 that the Syrian General Consulate in Istanbul has also resumed operations.[xi]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.[xii] The United States has backed the SDF in the Syrian Civil War to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.[xiii] The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched an operation to take territory from the SDF in northern Syria on November 30 and captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, on December 1.[xiv] Fidan said on December 13 that the destruction of the YPG is Turkey’s objective in Syria.[xv] Turkey frequently refers to the SDF as the YPG, suggesting that Fidan is referring to the US-backed partner force.

Blinken separately met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Baghdad on December 13.[xvi] Blinken emphasized the need to form an “inclusive, nonsectarian government” in Syria that “does not become, in any way, a platform for terrorism.”[xvii] Blinken and Sudani discussed ongoing efforts to prevent ISIS from “resurging and destabilizing” the Middle East.[xviii] Iraq has bolstered border security since the Syrian opposition offensive began in late November 2024. Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh of Fayyadh stated on December 13 that the Popular Mobilization Forces will confront any security or terrorist threat to Iraq.[xix]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly cause the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. The United States helped create the SDF by binding together Kurdish and Arab forces in Deir ez Zor.[xx] Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and an end to SDF rule in Arab areas, which threatens to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish.[xxi] Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and People’s Defense Units (YPG).[xxii] Fidan added that these groups must leave Syria. The SDF, given that it prioritizes these existential threats over the threat it faces from ISIS, has stopped all counter-ISIS operations. This reallocation of SDF resources creates opportunities for ISIS to reemerge and leaves the United States without a viable counter-ISIS partner in Syria at least temporarily.

SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.[xxiii] Abdi stated that the SDF seeks a ”decentralized” Syrian administration in which the SDF is represented in the future government and armed forces..[xxiv] The defection of Arab SDF formations and protests against SDF rule is probably contributing to Abdi’s decision to negotiate with the interim government. Arab citizens in SDF-controlled areas have long-standing grievances against the SDF which include limited reconstruction, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[xxv] Abdi probably calculates that by reaching out to the interim government, he can temper the unrest by expressing his willingness to integrate into the Syrian government. Abdi’s outreach to the interim government does not guarantee the SDF’s ability to control popular unrest. Even if he reaches a deal with the interim government. Arab communities are calling for an end to SDF rule, not just the SDF’s integration into the rest of Syria. This implies that these groups do not seek to be a part of an SDF-led autonomous region.

Reports of Sunni Muslims harassing and threatening minority religious and sectarian groups in Syria continue to gain traction in the information space, which could create opportunities for extreme groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence.  A former HTS religious scholar, Abu Yahya al Shami, called upon Sunni Muslims to kill “Nusayri” who have participated in the killing of Muslims in Syria.[xxvi] “Nusayri” is a highly derogatory term for Alawites.[xxvii] Shami circulated an Arabic-language copy of the US-based nonprofit ProJustice’s 2019 report on violations committed by members of the Syrian regime and called upon Sunnis to track down former regime members.[xxviii] Shami praised recent killings of former regime members, including ”shabiha” members, referring to pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime.[xxix] Shami called upon “every honorable free person” who knows the location of Shabiha members to target and kill them.[xxx] Shami is specifically calling for Sunni Muslims to target the regime, but his use of ”Nusayri” indicates a sectarian angle to his calls that encourages sectarian violence. Reports of revenge killings or violence against minority groups remain relatively isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. CTP-ISW will continue to report these indicators, however, given the serious nature of these crimes and the risk that revenge, sectarian, and interfaith killings and harassment could spark larger-scale cycles of violence.

Iranian media is boosting reports of sectarian harassment, though it is unclear how widespread the harassment is currently. Iranian media claimed that HTS-led fighters interfered with holy Shia shrines in Damascus and that HTS ordered the removal of flags and religious items including prayer stones, and religious texts from Sayyidah Ruqayya Shrine in Damascus.[xxxi] HTS has reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites in Syria, and it is unclear at this time why HTS ordered the removal of religious items from the shrine. Iranian sources also reported that HTS members conducted a “respectful“ visit to the shrine.[xxxii] The prevalence of these reports in the information space could stoke sectarian tensions, particularly if the reports begin to gain traction in Arabic-language or Syrian media. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned Syrian opposition forces on December 13 not to “touch” the Sayyida Zeinab shrine after social media reports on December 12 claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine—a Shia site in Damascus—and chanted provocative slogans.[xxxiii]

The HTS-led operations room is taking steps to solidify its control over Deir ez Zor City following its recent capture from the SDF on December 11. HTS has deployed military police to the city in an effort to maintain order. These units will oversee security, manage the transition of key institutions, and ensure the transfer of government centers to the Syrian Transitional Government.[xxxiv] The deployment of additional forces strengthens HTS's control over Deir ez Zor City and its military airport.

The HTS-led interim government in Damascus continued to provide security and public safety services to residents. Thousands of Syrians in cities and villages across the country joined mass celebrations after Friday prayers on December 13 to celebrate the fall of the regime.[xxxv] HTS leader Jolani called upon Syrians to celebrate in town squares “without firing bullets.”[xxxvi] HTS announced it would deploy “intensive security” during the celebrations in Damascus to maintain order and public safety.[xxxvii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 474th Territorial Brigade (210th Division) continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border on December 13.[xxxviii] The IDF located anti-tank missiles, vests, ammunition, and other weapons during searches in unspecified areas of the Israel-Syria disengagement zone. The IDF reiterated its mission is to protect the citizens of Israel and not to interfere in Syria. Syrian media and a Syria-focused analyst reported that the IDF operated in or entered multiple towns and villages in Quneitra and Daraa Province, just east of the disengagement zone, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 12.[xxxix] The IDF is not maintaining a presence in these towns, suggesting that it is conducting raids. Raids include a planned retrograde from the target area. The IDF has not commented on its activities outside of the disengagement zone at this time of writing.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on December 13 that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.[xl] The IDF seized the Syrian side of Mt Hermon on December 8.[xli] Mt Hermon is a strategic site as it allows full view of the entire surrounding Syrian plain. Israel and Syria agreed that Mt Hermon would be part of the 235 square kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that ended the Yom Kippur War in 1974, which Israel considers void until order is restored in Syria.[xlii] Katz ordered this decision following an assessment on December 12 with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and other senior IDF officials.[xliii]

The IDF has likely conducted airstrikes in at least three locations in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 12. Local Syrian media reported on December 13 that the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting the Mezzeh military airport, an IRGC headquarters, and various unspecified warehouses near Damascus.[xliv] Fox News’ foreign correspondent also reported airstrikes in Damascus.[xlv] Geolocated footage posted on X on December 12 showed a recent IDF targeting the Shayrat airbase, southeast of Homs city.[xlvi] The IDF has conducted an air campaign targeting military capabilities of the former Assad regime in Syria in recent days.[xlvii] Syrian media reported separate IDF airstrikes targeting SAA warehouses near Latakia.[xlviii] The IDF has not commented on the latest reported airstrikes at this time of writing.

Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[xlix] The source reportedly stated that Russia has only secured "temporary security guarantees" but that the two military bases are "functioning as usual." Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which currently controls the areas at Hmeimim and Tartus, and the TASS source is likely referring to ongoing Russian talks with HTS.[l] Maxar satellite imagery from December 13 shows two Russian An-124 military transport aircraft preparing to load cargo while a Ka-52 helicopter and elements of an S-400 air defense system are likely undergoing preparations for transport at Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The Maxar imagery also shows two Russian frigates still offshore of the Port of Tartus. Drone footage reportedly of Hmeimim Air Base shows An-72, An-26, and Il-76 transport aircraft; Ka-52 and Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopters; and at least four Su-34, seven Su-24M2, and four Su-35S fighter jets under hangars.[li] Geolocated footage published on December 13 shows a Russian military convoy moving from Hisyah (south of Homs) along the M5 highway.[lii] Additional footage published on December 13 reportedly shows Russian military convoys moving from Talkalakh (west of Homs), Homs, and Damascus.[liii] It is unclear if the convoys are heading towards the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base, but the reported movement of Russian military assets indicates that Russia is pulling some of its forward assets in southern Syria to the western coast. At least four Russian landing ships and cargo ships are reportedly heading from Russian ports to the Port of Tartus but will likely not reach Syria for weeks.[liv] Russia is likely evacuating forces from its two main bases in Syria while negotiations are ongoing with new Syrian authorities as the outcome of these negotiations and Russia's longer-term presence at the bases are still unclear. Russia would be able to relatively quickly reestablish its military presence in Syria after evacuating from Hmeimim and Tartus should Moscow be able to secure more permanent agreements with the current Syrian authorities.

Overview of Russian naval base at Tartus on December 13, 2024. Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies 

Overview of northern section of Russian Hmeimim Air Base on December 13, 2024. Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies 

The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however. A Kurdish journalist stated on December 11 that Russian forces were withdrawing from the Qamishli base after unspecified authorities granted them safe passage out of Syria.[lv] Photos from December 12 show Russian equipment, helicopters, and personnel at the Qamishli base, however, and a Russian source claimed on December 12 that Russia maintains a presence at Hmeimim Air Base, the Port of Tartus, Qamishli, and other unspecified sites in Syria.[lvi] It is unclear if Russia is preparing to withdraw assets from Qamishli in the near future. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently control Qamishli, and Russian officials have only stated that Moscow has established contacts with HTS, which controls the area of the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus.[lvii] ISW has not observed reports that Russia is trying to separately negotiate with the SDF about Russia's continued presence at the Qamishli base, and it is unclear if Russian forces intend to or will be able to remain at the base.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Reactions to Syria: The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.
• Blinken in the Middle East: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The SDF is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly cause the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.
• Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Reports of Sunni Muslims harassing and threatening minority religious and sectarian groups in Syria continue to gain traction in the information space, which could create opportunities for extreme groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence. CTP-ISW will continue to report these indicators of any interfaith or sectarian violence given the serious nature of these crimes and the risk that revenge, sectarian, and interfaith killings and harassment could spark larger-scale cycles of violence.
• Israel in Syria: The IDF continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border on December 13. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on December 13 that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.

Iran Update, December 12, 2024

 Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS stated on December 12 that it would hold accountable any fighters who fail to comply with orders.[i] HTS also stated that any individuals violating orders do not represent HTS-led forces or the transitional government.[ii] This statement comes after HTS announced that interfering in women’s choice of clothing or demanding that women dress modestly is ”strictly forbidden.”[iii] HTS has also ordered its fighters to protect public and private property, respect public institutions, and treat former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers well.[iv] HTS is trying to present itself as a moderate force with these orders.

The most recent statement threatening to punish fighters is likely in response to reports of HTS-led fighters conducting religion-based harassment and revenge killings.[v] Some reports, for instance, claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which is a holy Shia shrine.[vi] The reports claimed that the fighters chanted “provocative slogans” while in the shrine.[vii] Several reports claimed that the fighters were affiliated with HTS, which reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites and minorities in Syria.[viii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the details of the event or the accuracy of the reports. But their prevalence in the information space could nevertheless stoke sectarian tensions. CTP-ISW similarly reported on December 11 that an HTS-led fighter questioned a Christian journalist about her religious background, asking specifically whether she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.“[ix]

These incidents and the traction they gain in the information space creates opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious-based violence and destabilize the government formation process in Syria. These incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. But HTS is comprised of numerous Islamist groups formed with varying degrees of representation in the broader HTS leadership structure.[x] It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian tensions or whether they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and religion-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

The SDF is factionalizing under internal and external pressure. Local footage posted on December 12 showed the SDF try to suppress demonstrators in Raqqa who demanded that the city be brought under the HTS-led transitional government.[xi] Citizens have long standing grievances against the SDF in Raqqa, which include limited reconstruction in Arab areas, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[xii] The head of the al Kasra Military Council--a membe”r of the SDF-- defected from the SDF, citing SDF “violations” against civilians in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa.[xiii] Arab contingents of the SDF have rapidly begun to defect in recent days.[xiv] A Syrian journalist reported that approximately 220 members of the Deir ez Zor Military Council have defected from the SDF over the past 48 hours.[xv]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) confirmed on December 12 that it reached a ceasefire agreement with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, northern Syria.[xvi] The four-day ceasefire will last from December 12 to 16 in order to allow humanitarian aid to enter and unspecified security agreements. Under the agreement, the SNA will transfer control of the Sultan Suleiman Tomb and its surrounding hills to the SDF. In exchange, the SDF and SDF families will also withdraw from Manbij and the surrounding countryside. The ceasefire agreement also established the Tishreen Dam as a demilitarized zone to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 11 that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the SNA.[xvii] The SDF disputed territorial control over Manbij after the SNA seized control on December 8.[xviii]

The HTS-led interim government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state. The transitional government posted a statement on December 12, thanking Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia for resuming their diplomatic missions in Damascus.[xix] The statement also noted that Qatar and Turkey would reopen their respective embassies.[xx] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir separately met with the Turkish foreign affairs minister and intelligence chief as well as the Qatari State Security Agency chief in Damascus on December 12.[xxi] The publication of these events portrays the HTS-led transitional government as the legitimate Syrian state despite no countries having yet formally recognized it as such.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to operate on the ground in southwestern Syria, according to Syrian sources. One outlet reported that the IDF entered towns in and around the disengagement zone in Quneitra Province and seized arms from residents on December 12.[xxii] Another source reported that the IDF detonated explosives at a former SAA site around Umm Batnah.[xxiii]

Syrian media separately reported that the IDF plans to enter Marbah in western Daraa Province in order to disrupt the movement of arms there. The IDF previously paved a road leading from the disengagement zone to Marbah on December 11.[xxiv] Syrian media stated that the IDF announced on December 12 via loudspeaker to residents that it plans to enter the town.[xxv] IDF officers met with tribal leaders at a nearby military site to discuss these plans as well. Marbah residents have requested that the HTS-led opposition forces intervene against the IDF.

The IDF has likely conducted three airstrikes in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 11. Local Syrian media reported two IDF airstrikes targeting Latakia port on December 11.[xxvi] The outlet also reported an IDF airstrike on the outskirts of Damascus on December 12.[xxvii] The IDF air campaign into Syria on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the Bashar al Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports.[xxviii] The IDF has given no comment on the latest reported airstrikes at the time of this writing.

The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) sent a letter to the UN Security Council on December 6, announcing its readiness to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran.[xxix] The E3 would invoke the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action if Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and decline to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The E3 letter comes after Iran dramatically increased its enrichment of uranium to 60 percent.[xxx] Iran announced on November 27 that it had activated “thousands of advanced centrifuges.”[xxxi] Iran was retaliating for an earlier censure resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors, criticizing the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.

Reuters reported on December 12 that Iran agreed with the IAEA to increase the “frequency and intensity” of international monitoring of activities at the Fordow nuclear site.[xxxii] Iran is likely responding to the threat from the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. It is notable, however, that greater international monitoring has no effect on Iran’s accelerated rate of uranium enrichment.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: HTS is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS likely recognizes the risk of revenge killings and sectarian violence, which could destabilize Syria further.
• Syria: The US-backed SDF is facing intense external and internal pressure. The SDF did, however, reach a four-day ceasefire agreement with the Turkish-backed SNA around Manbij in northern Syria.
• Syria: The HTS-led transitional government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state by publicizing its engagement with foreign actors. No foreign countries have yet recognized the transitional government as the legitimate state, however.
• Iran: The E3 sent a letter to the UN Security Council, threatening to impose “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 is responding to the dramatic expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian non-cooperation with the IAEA.

Iran Update, December 11, 2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-interim Syrian government. The HTS-led military coalition has secured control over key civil and security services since the interim Syrian Salvation Government was established on December 9.[i] HTS-led opposition forces have assumed control over the Syrian state media outlet SANA and local police forces, which has enabled the HTS-led opposition to disseminate and enforce official government edicts.[ii] HTS has also appointed loyal members to ministerial positions within the interim government to guarantee HTS’s role in shaping policies and the new Syrian constitution during this critical transition period.[iii] HTS—and Jolani in particular—is attempting to impose a fait accompli in which it controls the Syrian government, thus enabling it to influence Syria for the foreseeable future.

Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Other Syrian groups, including southern opposition forces and the SDF, have not yet subordinated themselves to Jolani’s control. The leaders of the Southern Operations Room, an opposition group that now controls most of southwestern Syria, met with Jolani on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs.[iv] The meeting probably discussed the future of the Syrian government while focusing on “coordination.” These leaders did not explicitly endorse the central government, though noted the importance of a “unified effort” and “cooperation.”[v] The leaders of the Southern Operations Room previously fought against Jolani and the HTS predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s as part of the Southern Front.[vi] The SDF also appears to be preparing itself for negotiations that would create a broader-based Syrian government that is not under Jolani’s control. The SDF voiced support for a ceasefire but did not explicitly voice its support for the HTS-led government.[vii] The SDF’s position may harden further as Arab contingents within the SDF defect to HTS.[viii]

More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria.[ix] A Christian journalist from a formerly pro-regime radio station said on December 10 that an HTS-led opposition member asked her about her religious and sectarian background during an encounter in Damascus and asked if she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.”[x]  It is unclear which specific organization in the opposition coalition controlled this member. This type of harassment could rapidly transform into a way for more extreme and sectarian organizations to identify and kill religious minorities in Syria. This particular incident is relatively minor, and CTP-ISW has not yet observed a well-organized campaign to intimidate, coerce, or kill religious and sectarian minorities. There have been other reports of individual revenge killings targeting ”Alawites” and ”Assad loyalists,” however.[xi]

These incidents—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government. HTS is an organization consisting of numerous Syrian Islamist opposition groups formed in 2017 with varying degrees of representation in the group’s leadership, however.[xii] It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian violence or if they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and sectarian- or religious-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

Fateh Mubin fighters seized a Captagon factory at Mezzeh Military Airbase on December 11.[xiii] The opposition fighters claimed that they discovered “millions” of Captagon pills, raw drug materials, and production equipment within an Air Force Intelligence building on the airbase.[xiv] The Assad regime and its Iranian-backed partners mass-produced Captagon in Syria for years and smuggled it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states through a smuggling and distribution cartel that has generated billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[xv] HTS has not explicitly stated that it will halt Captagon supply lines into Jordan.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not face resistance when it seized Syrian outposts outside of the disengagement zone in Syria. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 11 that the IDF 101st Paratrooper Battalion (35th Paratroopers Brigade) did not fire a single bullet when seizing outposts.[xvi] SAA soldiers abandoned their positions amid the collapse of the regime. Israeli media also noted on December 11 that the IDF is conducting defensive operations in the disengagement zone.[xvii] Israeli media reported that the IDF seized several former SAA tanks in the disengagement zone. Israeli media also reported that the IDF 810th Mountain Brigade recently seized a cache of former SAA weapons on Mt. Hermon. The army radio correspondent added that the IDF forces deployed to the Syrian front are preparing for a “long stay in the field.”[xviii] Geolocated imagery posted on December 11 and local Syrian sources confirmed IDF presence in Hader military base and Hader town, which are both in the disengagement zone.[xix] Local Syria media claimed that the IDF had also paved a road that extended out of the disengagement zone from the Golan Heights to Marbah, western Daraa Province.[xx]

An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.[xxi] CTP-ISW has not recorded any IDF airstrikes in Syria since the last data cutoff at 2pm on December 10. The IDF’s intense air campaign on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the former Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing the weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports on December 9.[xxii] Russian news outlet Sputnik reported that the IDF destroyed radar systems on the outskirts of Tartus, where a Russian naval base is located.[xxiii] Satellite imagery posted on X on December 11 showed the aftermath of IDF airstrikes on December 9 and 10 on ammunition depots at Yafour Base, in Rif Dimashq Province, the air defense systems at Damascus International Airport, and an air defense site in Izraa, Daraa Province.[xxiv]

The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10.[xxv] Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9, calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the city from the SDF.[xxvi] HTS-affiliated leaders addressed locals in the street and locals came out in support of the opposition forces.[xxvii] The fighters also seized an oil field near Deir ez Zor and the Deir ez Zor military airport.[xxviii] The HTS-led operations room also claimed to seize Deir ez Zor’s eastern and western countrysides, although it remains unclear at this time what territory the operations room is referring to.[xxix]

Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. The leader of the Busayrah Military Council, an Arab formation in the SDF, declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December 11.[xxx] Fateh Mubin is the coordinating body for HTS-led forces. Two other Arab military leaders defected on December 10.[xxxi] These military leaders live on the left, eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates serves as a defensive line protecting SDF-held territory from the remainder of Syria. The SDF deployed reinforcements to the areas where Arab forces had defected and reportedly retaliated against a commander by burning his home.[xxxii]

HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting. The SDF and the HTS-affiliated operations room have thus far avoided major armed conflict, and HTS support for the Arab groups in Deir ez Zor would likely undermine reconciliation and transition government negotiations. The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious problem for the SDF, however, because the SDF has had a difficult relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against the SDF.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).[xxxiii] Abdi said that the United States helped broker the deal to preserve the security of civilians in the town.[xxxiv] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas on December 9. [xxxv]Abdi said that the SNA attempted to advance on Kobani along the Turkish border on December 10.[xxxvi]

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on December 10 that all Iranian military forces have withdrawn from Syria.[xxxvii] Iranian-backed militias reportedly withdrew from Syria as the Syrian opposition forces advanced.[xxxviii] Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated that 4,000 Iranian civilians have also returned from Syria, with plans to continue evacuation efforts "until the departure of the last Iranian."[xxxix] Iran maintained forces in Syria since shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[xl]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the role of Syrian youth in reclaiming the “occupied area[s]” in Syria in a speech on December 11. Khamenei stated that "undoubtedly the occupied area[s] of Syria will be liberated by the zealous Syrian youth,” implying that some of the areas recently recaptured from the Assad Regime are now “occupied.”[xli] Khamenei stated that Syrian youth "will definitely rise up and overcome the situation...just as brave Iraqi youth [after Iraq’s] occupation by the United States, were able to...with the help" of former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, in reference to Iran’s support to Iraqi militias against US forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. This comparison suggests that Iran may pursue efforts to support similar militias in Syria to combat opposition forces and US-Israeli “interference” while undermining any new government in Syria. Khamenei's repeated praise of Soleimani and his leadership while refraining from any mention of the role that current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has played in institutionalizing the Axis of Resistance in the last four years suggests Khamenei may be disenchanted with Ghaani’s approach. The Telegraph reported on December 10 that there is discontent within the IRGC with Ghaani and “calls” for Khamenei to remove him.[xlii]

Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.[xliii] Senior Iranian officials and state media previously criticized Turkish policy in Syria amid the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.[xliv] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan approved HTS launching its surprise offensive on November 27 and expressed support for the HTS-led drive toward Damascus from the north.[xlv] These statements probably suggest an increasingly hostile relationship between Iran and Turkey. Media affiliated with the IRGC suggested that Iran might refrain from supporting Erdogan during future crises--like coups against Erdogan--if the Syrian opposition weakens the Axis of Resistance.[xlvi] CTP-ISW assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of this phase of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future.[xlvii] The sudden loss of Assad will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Hezbollah, key actors within the Axis of Resistance.

Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.[xlviii] Israel has recently arrested 30 individuals operating as a part of nine covert cells across Israel. The recruited assets were responsible for tasks such as sabotage, intelligence gathering on military facilities, and assassination plots against high-profile Israeli figures, such as nuclear scientists and government officials.[xlix] These intelligence assets have likely supported Iranian-backed efforts to target key Israeli assets.[l] The October 13, 2024, Hezbollah attack targeting an IDF training base‘s dining facility would have required familiarity with pattern-of-life and habits on base to target the dining facility and cause casualties.[li]

Key Takeaways:

• Government Consolidation in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-interim Syrian government. Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Some of these groups have previously fought against Jolani’s organization and may be reticent to see Jolani expand his influence.
• Sectarianism in Syria: More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria. Reported sectarian incidents and revenge killings—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government.
• Israel in Syria: An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.
• Eastern Syria: The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10. Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting.
• Iranian Response to Syria: The Iranian supreme leader gave a speech in which he claimed that Syria was “occupied” by opposition forces. The supreme leader compared Syria today to Iraq in the 2003-2011 period and said that Syrian youth would free Syrian just like Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “freed” Iraq from the United States.
• Iran-Turkey: Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.
• Iranian Intelligence Operations in Israel: Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.

Iran Update, December 10, 2024

Senior Syrian officials from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime have begun to transfer power to the HTS-led interim government as of December 10. Outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed al Jalili reported that former Assad officials are working with the interim government to preserve state institutions and government workers’ jobs.[i] The chief executive of Sawsan Abu Zainedin—an umbrella group of 200 Syrian civil society groups—emphasized that the interim government would refrain from the “de-Baathification” of the Syrian state.[ii] CTP-ISW previously noted that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) likely recognizes that its own, smaller government apparatus in Idlib Province is ill-equipped to govern all of Syria and that it will need to rely on Syrian institutions at least for a period.[iii] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken voiced the United States’ support for a Syrian-led political transition leading to a ”credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance” in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.[iv]

Syrian media reported that the interim Syrian Salvation Government will conduct an assessment of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) prior to its reorganization.[v] This activity is part of a broader HTS-led effort to reconcile with members of the former Syrian regime and SAA. HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel, whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[vi] HTS has similarly sought to integrate Syrian regime military and security personnel into civilian life in Aleppo City since seizing the city in November 2024.[vii] CTP-ISW previously noted that integrating former combatants into civilian life could help ensure security and stability during the post-conflict transition period.[viii]

HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani stated that “we” will hold former regime officers “accountable” for torturing civilians under Assad.[ix] Julani’s statement is alarmingly ambiguous regarding whether HTS or a new Syrian government will oversee the judicial proceedings for former regime officials. While it is necessary to hold former regime officials accountable for crimes committed against the Syrian people, HTS lacks the formal authority to prosecute regime officials. That authority should rest with a new Syrian government and constitution that have yet to be established or with an international tribunal. Julani may be reacting to pressure from hardliners in HTS, as there have already been reports of revenge killings in HTS-controlled territory. Revenge killings have historically exacerbated sectarian conflict, as seen in neighboring Iraq.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly advanced beyond the disengagement zone further into Syrian territory on December 9. Geolocated imagery posted on December 10 showed the IDF near Kudna, which is approximately one kilometer from the disengagement zone.[x] Syrian media claimed on December 10 that the IDF advanced to the towns of Beqaasem, Erneh, Heeneh, and Rima in Damascus Province.[xi] Beqaasem is around 25 kilometers from Damascus.[xii] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. The IDF denied reports on December 9 that it is “advancing [toward] or approaching Damascus” and emphasized that the IDF is operating within the disengagement zone and at “defensive points close to the border.”[xiii]

The IDF continued to destroy former SAA sites across Syria on December 10. The IDF announced on December 10 that it has destroyed around 70-80 percent of the Assad regime’s military capabilities.[xiv] The IDF added that it has struck most of the SAA’s strategic weapons stockpiles in the past 48 hours to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing the weapons.[xv] The IDF Navy struck the ports of al Bayda and Latakia on December 9.[xvi] Fifteen Syrian naval vessels were docked at the ports at the time of the strikes.[xvii] The IDF reported that it destroyed dozens of anti-ship missiles with ranges of 80-190 kilometers.[xviii]

The Arab contingents within the US-backed, Kurdish-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defected to the HTS-led transitional government. The leader of the Hajin Military Council—an Arab-majority militia in the SDF—declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December 10.[xix]Fateh Mubin is the coordinating element for the HTS-led forces that were formerly centered in Idlib Province and recently took Damascus City. Two militia leaders in eastern Deir ez Zor Province have separately posted videos declaring allegiance to the HTS-affiliated coalition.[xx] A tribal leader who incited an Arab uprising against the SDF in the autumn of 2023 and later defected to regime-controlled territory called for Arabs to leave the SDF on December 9.[xxi] Some of the Arab-majority communities in Deir ez Zor Province hold longstanding grievances against the SDF due to limited reconstruction efforts, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[xxii] Local sources reported that the SDF deployed reinforcements to areas where the Arab commanders defected, including Hajin, Hawji, and Theban on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xxiii]

The defected militias have no guarantee of holding territory in Deir ez Zor Province, particularly without military support from the Fateh Mubin operations room. The SDF quashed an Arab-militia revolt in Deir ez Zor Province in ten days in the autumn of 2023.[xxiv] Arab-majority militias under the SDF led the offensive into regime-controlled areas of Deir ez Zor Province on December 6, but other likely Kurdish SDF units have since deployed to province.[xxv]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is consolidating control over Manbij in northern Syria after seizing it from the SDF on December 8.[xxvi] The SNA claimed that it began providing basic services to locals and that “life has returned to normal" there.^v[xxvii] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas.[xxviii] The SNA deployed its forces east of Manbij along the line of contact with the SDF.[xxix] The SNA claimed control over a site east of Manbij along the Euphrates River on December 10.[xxx]

Iran is trying to project continued confidence in its regional position despite the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria.This comes amid reports of infighting within the Iranian security establishment. Senior Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami, have asserted in recent days that Iran and the Axis of Resistance remain strong.[xxxi] Salami said that Iran has "not been weakened, and Iranian power has not diminished."[xxxii] The supreme leader representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi, similarly said that the Axis of Resistance "has not changed at all" while acknowledging that the fall of Assad has created ”a major obstacle."[xxxiii] CTP-ISW has contrastingly assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future.[xxxiv] Iranian influence in Syria historically allowed the IRGC to project force westward and move material to proxy and partner forces around the Israeli periphery. The sudden loss of Assad deprives Iran of these military and strategic advantages and will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.

The fall of Assad has reportedly stoked divisions within the IRGC. An unspecified IRGC official told the Telegraph that senior IRGC officers are blaming one another for the fall of Assad.[xxxv] Another unspecified IRGC official said that Iran is at an "impasse" in its efforts to rearm Hezbollah because everyone who Iran sends to move the weapons "are either getting killed or escaping." The officials noted that some officials are blaming IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and that "many are now calling" for his removal as he is formally responsible for managing the Axis of Resistance, of which Assad was a part. Ghaani does not solely manage Iranian policy vis-a-vis Syria, however. Other key Iranian officials, including officials close to the supreme leader, are involved as well. These officials include senior advisers to the supreme leader, such as Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati.[xxxvi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that regime infighting could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders.[xxxvii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias responded on December 10 to the fall of Assad. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed that a Turkish operations room facilitated the fall of Assad with Israeli, UK, and NATO support, while the Axis of Resistance was “preoccupied with supporting Gaza.”[xxxviii] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed that the operations room seeks to “sabotage Iraq.”[xxxix] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba also claimed that Syrian opposition forces allowed Israel to “create a federation” in Suwayda Province in return for its support for the opposition forces.[xl] The militia claimed that Israel seeks to annex parts of Syria and receive guarantees from the new Syrian government that it will work to normalize ties with Israel.[xli]

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada separately stated that it will approach the situation in Syria based on the national security interests of Iraq, and Kataib Hezbollah stated that it is “monitoring the situation” in Syria.[xlii] Kataib Hezbollah stated that HTS and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will retain their core character ”no matter how much they pretend to be humane in front of the cameras.”[xliii] Kataib Hezbollah added that it is waiting for the establishment of a new Syrian government to ”reach an understanding [with it] on the basis of resistance and the Palestinian cause.”[xliv]

Commander of the Iraqi Rapid Response Division, Lieutenant General Thamer al Husseini, stated on December 10 that Iraqi forces will “crush anyone” who tries to approach the Iraq-Syria border.[xlv] This statement reflects Iraqi concerns that the conflict in Syria could create a security vacuum and allow ISIS to resurge. Iraqi political and military officials have emphasized in recent days the need to prevent a “repetition of 2014,” referring to the ISIS takeover of Mosul in June 2014.[xlvi] The statement also reflects how the Iraqi federal government appears to be equating Syrian opposition forces with Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS. Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh emphasized on December 2, for example, that the Syrian opposition forces are ”internationally recognized as terrorist organizations.”[xlvii]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla traveled to Syria and Iraq.[xlviii] Kurilla discussed international efforts to fight and defeat ISIS during his travels. Kurilla met with senior Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Chief of Staff General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah. Kurilla also met with US officers and SDF members in Syria. Kurilla’s travel comes after CENTCOM struck over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria on December 8.[xlix]

Hamas indicated willingness to concede slightly on some of its maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage deal with Israel. Hamas leaders are reportedly willing to accept an extended IDF presence along the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors while still demanding an eventual, complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, according to a Hamas source speaking to the New York Times.[l] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on a continued IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant obstacles in negotiations.[li] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[lii] An unspecified Israeli official reported that Israeli leaders hope that the combined effect of Yahya Sinwar’s death, the ceasefire in Lebanon, and the incoming Trump administration will facilitate further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[liii] Israel reportedly assessed that Hamas wanted a ceasefire deal in late November 2024, marking the first suggestion that Hamas would break from its maximalist demands maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[liv]

Hamas’ unwillingness to grant even minimal concessions until this point in the ceasefire-hostage negotiations highlights the group’s zealous commitment to fighting Israel. The IDF has already defeated Hamas militarily and is close to destroying the group militarily as well. That Hamas has retained such a hardline negotiating position is remarkable in this context.

An Egyptian official told Israeli media on December 10 that a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas is “imminent.”[lv] Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[lvi] The updated Israeli proposal included a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a serious medical condition. An Egyptian official told Ynet on December 10 that an Israeli delegation will receive a list of names for a hostage-prisoner release in Cairo in the coming days.[lvii] Hamas provided this list to Egyptian intelligence officials after asking other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip to share the names of the hostages in their custody, according to Egyptian and Palestinian officials.[lviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Senior Syrian officials from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime have begun to transfer power to the HTS-led interim government. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani vowed to hold accountable former regime officials for crimes against the Syrian people.
• Syria: The IDF reportedly advanced further into southwestern Syria. The IDF is also conducting a large-scale air campaign to destroy sensitive SAA capabilities that other armed Syrian groups could seize.
• Syria: Arab contingents in the US-backed SDF defected to the HTS-led interim government. These defections highlight the tenuous relationship that the SDF has with some of the Arab communities in its territory.
• Iran: Iran is trying to project continued confidence in its regional position despite the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria. This comes amid reports of infighting within the Iranian security establishment.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas indicated willingness to concede slightly on its maximalist demands in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel. Hamas’ unwillingness to grant even minor concessions until now highlights its zealous commitment to fighting Israel.

Iran Update, December 9, 2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with former Syrian regime and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) members. HTS is attempting to ensure continuity of governance to prevent widespread anarchy in Syria, which is consistent with HTS’ longstanding approach to “liberated areas.”[i]  HTS appointed HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir to lead the transitional government on December 9.[ii] HTS established the Salvation Government in northwestern Syria in 2017.[iii] Bashir met with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and former Assad Regime Prime Minister Mohammed al Jalali on December 9 to discuss the transfer of power from the Assad regime to HTS.[iv] Jalali stated on December 8 that he and HTS agreed on “the importance of preserving government institutions and trying to return 400,000 employees to their jobs.”[v] HTS-led Salvation Government Justice Minister Shadi al Waisi separately met with former Assad Regime Justice Minister Ahmed al Sayeh on December 9 to discuss “an efficient handover.”[vi] HTS has rapidly rolled out its own governance apparatus in areas of Syria it has liberated from the Assad Regime in the past.[vii] HTS likely correctly recognizes that it cannot rely upon its own much smaller and Idlib-focused government apparatus to govern all of Syria it has recently captured and will need to rely upon Syrian government institutions in the interim.

HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[viii] HTS emphasized that these individuals’ lives “are safe” and that “no assault on them is permitted.”[ix] HTS has similarly sought to integrate Syrian regime military and security personnel into civilian life in Aleppo City since it seized that city on November 30.[x] CTP-ISW previously noted that integrating former combatants into civilian life could ensure stability and security during the post-conflict transition period.[xi]

HTS likely attempting to improve its image among the Syrian people and international community by framing itself as an organization that is devoted to building a pluralist Syrian state. HTS announced on December 9 that it is “strictly forbidden” to interfere in women’s choice of clothing or to demand that women dress modestly.[xii] HTS emphasized that “respect[ing] the rights of individuals is the basis for building a civilized nation.”[xiii] HTS separately announced on December 9 that it is “strictly forbidden” to attack or threaten journalists and reporters.[xiv] It is unclear whether HTS will indefinitely protect the rights of women and journalists. HTS’s “morality police,” called Markaz al Falah, has previously arrested women for dressing “inappropriately.”[xv] HTS has also imprisoned journalists who criticized its rule in northwestern Syria.[xvi]

The Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may face increased challenges governing Arab areas in northeastern Syria due to the emergence of the HTS-led transitional government as a viable alternative to the SDF.  Local opposition to SDF rule has broken out in several cities and villages in Raqqa Province since the fall of the Assad regime.[xvii]  Arab sources reported that locals seized SDF military checkpoints and headquarters in Karamah and Tabqa on December 8.[xviii] The SDF deployed reinforcements to Karamah on December 9 and conducted a large arrest campaign in several villages involved in opposition activities the day before.[xix]  Armed local resistance in these towns does not appear to be organized or well-equipped enough to force the SDF out of these areas.  The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious problem for the SDF, which has a difficult relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against the SDF. Several Arab-majority areas in Deir ez Zor Province began an armed uprising and participated in demonstrations against the SDF in the autumn of 2023, demonstrating the existing discontent in the region, however.[xx] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi called Assad’s fall ”an opportunity to build a new Syria based on democracy and justice“ on December 8, but did not elaborate further on the SDF’s willingness to join the transitional government.[xxi]

The SDF is also facing local dissent in the areas of Deir ez Zor Province that it seized from the Syrian regime on December 6.[xxii]  Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9, calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the city.[xxiii] Local media reported that the SDF opened fire on the demonstrators and killed several of them.[xxiv] The HTS-affiliated Fateh Mubin operations room confirmed that its forces were operating in Deir ez Zor City on December 7 shortly before Assad fled the country.[xxv] Local media has since reported that convoys affiliated with Fateh Mubin are operating between Deir ez Zor and Albu Kamal, but few reliable sources are reporting direct clashes between the SDF and HTS-affiliated forces.[xxvi] Engagements between the SDF and local opposition demonstrate that HTS-affiliated forces have not established full security control over the Deir ez Zor corridor.[xxvii]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is also attacking the SDF as the SDF contends with internal dissent. SNA forces advanced east of Manbij to Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishrin Dam, which are two key river crossings in SDF territory.[xxviii] The SDF confirmed that its forces engaged SNA fighters at both sites and did not acknowledge that its forces lost control over the river crossings.[xxix] Opposition media claimed that the SNA took control of the Qara Qozak Bridge and posted a video from the site, however.[xxx] The SDF continued to dispute that SNA forces seized full control of Manbij on December 9.[xxxi] The SNA claimed that it seized Manbij on December 8.[xxxii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights on December 9. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar stated on December 9 that the IDF “advanced into new positions” in the disengagement zone between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[xxxiii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 9 that the IDF had advanced several kilometers into the disengagement zone.[xxxiv] Geolocated imagery posted on December 8 showed Israeli forces near a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) position on Mount Hermon.[xxxv] Israeli forces captured an SAA position at the top of Mount Hermon on December 8.[xxxvi] Geolocated imagery posted on December 9 also showed Israeli tanks entering the disengagement zone from Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights and Israeli forces operating west of the town of Hader in Quneitra Province.[xxxvii] The IDF operated in Quneitra and al Hamidiyah cities on December 9 after issuing warnings to residents in these cities on December 8 to stay inside.[xxxviii]

The IDF Air Force continued conducting airstrikes targeting former SAA and Lebanese Hezbollah sites in Syria on December 9. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 9 that the IAF conducted airstrikes targeting over 100 SAA targets in the past day.[xxxix] The IAF targeted the SAA 9th Division, 112th Brigade, and 12th Brigade bases in Daraa Province.[xl] The IAF also targeted SAA military sites, barracks, and missile warehouses, as well as unspecified Hezbollah sites in the Qalamoun area north of Damascus.[xli] Israeli officials told Axios on December 9 that the IAF has targeted facilities that were part of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs to ”make sure strategic weapon systems don’t fall into the wrong hands.”[xlii]

The fall of the Assad regime has exposed fissures between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi was “surprised” during his visit to Baghdad on December 6 that the Iraqi federal government refused to send forces to Syria to defend the Assad regime, according to an unspecified Iraqi official speaking to the Washington Post on December 9.[xliii] The official stated that Araghchi assumed that the Iraqi federal government would support Assad as it had previously done in the Syrian Civil War.[xliv] Senior Iraqi security officials, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, emphasized in recent days that the conflict in Syria is an “internal matter.”[xlv] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, including Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, seemed to oppose the stance of the Iraqi government and called on fighters to bolster the SAA and not wait for ”Baghdad to escalate” against opposition forces.[xlvi]

Iran is attempting to reframe its role in the Syrian Civil War in order to reestablish influence within the new Syrian government. A senior Iranian official told Reuters on December 9 that Iran opened direct communication with unspecified Syrian rebels to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the two countries.[xlvii] Another official stated that Iran aims to build ties with "those within Syria's new ruling groups whose views are closer to [Iranian views], though the specific opposition groups are unclear. Iran's "main concern" is that Assad's successor may shift Syria away from Iranian influence, demonstrating that Iranian officials remain concerned about the requirement to reestablish Iranian influence in Syria. Key Iranian officials, including the foreign affairs minister and parliament speaker, have recently tried to reframe the role Iran held in the war. The Iranian foreign affairs minister claimed that Iran has always advocated for “dialogue” with opposition forces, but it is highly unlikely that Iran would have supported talks that would have given Assad or a pliant pro-Iran actor a subordinate role to any opposition organization.[xlviii] Iran‘s parliament speaker falsely claimed that Iran had only intervened to counter ISIS, not rebel groups.[xlix] Iran launched a concerted effort to keep Assad in power and maintained its forces in Syria since shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[l] This effort required Iran to fight ISIS, but Iran also fought all threats to Assad’s rule, including the opposition.

This Iranian effort is unlikely to succeed, at least in the near term. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 9 that the victory of Syrian opposition forces would end Syria's role as a "playground for Iranian ambitions, spreading sectarianism, and stirring corruption", reflecting deep resentment toward Iranian influence in Syria.[li]

Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime. Iran observers have noted that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij members are critical of Iran's failure to intervene more decisively in Syria to support Assad against the opposition's surprise offensive, citing IRGC communication channels and interviews with IRGC members.[lii] An IRGC member stated that Syria was ”crucial” for the Axis of Resistance, and "abandoning" Assad was a "betrayal" that would have serious consequences for Iran.[liii] Another member stated that the "[IRGC youth] will not forget the cowardice of the decision-makers."[liv] Iranian Parliamentarian Mohammad Manan Raisi stated that "after sacrificing six thousand martyrs and spending billions of tomans, we handed Syria over [in just one week]."[lv] These statements reveal dissatisfaction within Iran over its failure to support the Syrian regime, raising concerns about Iran's ability to sustain its influence via the Axis of Resistance. These frustrations—if they become wildly held among the security services and key Iranian leaders—could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders, including in the IRGC.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Transitional Government Formation: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with former Syrian regime and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) members. HTS likely attempting to improve its image among the Syrian people and international community by framing itself as an organization that is devoted to building a pluralist Syrian state.
• Northeastern Syria: The Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may face increased challenges governing Arab areas in northeastern Syria due to the emergence of the HTS-led transitional government as a viable alternative to the SDF. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is also attacking the SDF as the SDF contends with internal dissent.
• Israel in Syria: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights on December 9. The IDF Air Force continued conducting airstrikes targeting former SAA and Lebanese Hezbollah sites in Syria on December 9.
• Iraq and Iran in Syria: The fall of the Assad regime has exposed fissures between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi was “surprised” during his visit to Baghdad on December 6 that the Iraqi federal government refused to send forces to Syria to defend the Assad regime.
• Iranian Syria Policy: Iran is attempting to reframe its role in the Syrian Civil War to reestablish influence within the new Syrian government.
• Iranian Reactions to Assad’s Collapse: Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime.

Iran Update, December 8, 2024

Syrian opposition forces toppled the Bashar al Assad regime on December 7 after only 11 days of fighting.[i] Opposition forces declared victory over Assad, as they advanced into Damascus.[ii] The regime negotiated its surrender, as Assad fled to Russia without making any statements to his people to acknowledge the instability.[iii] The HTS-led opposition group noted that regime supporters even “laid down [their] weapons” in Sayyidah Zeynab in southern Damascus, where Iran has long held deep influence.[iv] HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani arrived in Damascus on December 8.[v] Opposition forces separately entered final remaining regime strongholds of Jableh, Latakia, and Tartus on the Syrian coast on December 8.[vi]

HTS under Julani is beginning to consolidate power in Damascus and across formerly regime-controlled territory.[vii] The “Military Operations Management” of opposition groups issued orders to protect public and private property in Damascus and issued a curfew in the city.[viii] Opposition forces attempted to restore order after a bank heist on the Central Syrian Bank as well.[ix] Opposition leaders have visited the former regime stronghold of Latakia as a show of good will and religious tolerance toward the Alawite people there.[x] The opposition forces quickly established alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements after seizing control there on November 30.[xi] It remains unclear what government structure will emerge among the opposition groups in the coming weeks; it is not a given that HTS will by default lead the next Syrian government.

All groups in control of Syrian territory have praised the fall of the Syrian regime and articulated a hopeful but unspecific view for the future. HTS’s relationship with other groups that remain in control of Syrian territory remains ambiguous, making the coming days of consolidation and negotiations pivotal. Both the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have capitalized on the HTS-led offensive to expand their own territory, including by fighting with each other.[xii] Clashes between the SDF and SNA continued on December 8.[xiii] An SNA-affiliated operations room praised the overthrow of Assad on December 8 and emphasized the importance of preserving state institutions, the need for cooperation, and the “sense of responsibility” shared by the Syrian people.[xiv] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi called Assad’s fall ”an opportunity to build a new Syria based on democracy and justice“ but without elaborating further.[xv] A key Druze leader who holds influence with the southern opposition groups called on December 8 for a transitional administration to create a new, united, and free Syria.[xvi]

HTS-affiliated forces appear to be taking control of the western bank of Deir ez Zor Province, which the SDF had seized from the Syrian regime on December 6.[xvii] SDF units have reportedly struggled to keep control over the local population in Deir ez Zor Province despite issuing a military curfew.[xviii] The HTS-affiliated opposition spokesperson said that opposition forces had entered Deir ez Zor City and that hundreds of regime soldiers surrendered.[xix] Local sources reported tribal militias joined the HTS-led opposition and seized the Albu Kamal-al Qaim crossing between Iraq and Syria from the SDF on December 8.[xx] HTS-affiliated convoys traveled along the Deir ez Zor-Albu Kamal road on December 8.[xxi] Opposition forces reportedly seized control over the main Damascus-Deir ez Zor road that runs through Sukhnah and Palmyra in Homs Province, which was essential to Iran’s former ground line of communication to Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxii] Opposition groups, possibly those based in the al Tanf Deconfliction Zone, seized Palmyra on December 7.[xxiii]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) clashed with the SDF in Manbij in eastern Aleppo Province on December 8. An SNA-affiliated operations room claimed to seize all of Manbij on December 8 after days of clashes in the surrounding area.[xxiv] The SDF rejected the claim and stated later in the day that clashes were ongoing in several neighborhoods of Manbij.[xxv] The SNA claimed that it seized several formerly SDF-controlled towns west of Manbij on December 8.[xxvi] CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess control of Manbij at this time.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed forces to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights.[xxvii] The IDF stated that these deployments are a defensive and temporary operation to protect Israel from possible instability in Syria resulting from the fall of the Syrian regime.[xxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the fall of the Syrian regime.[xxix] Netanyahu said that he ordered the IDF to take the vacated Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions ”to ensure that no hostile force” took them.[xxx] IDF activity concentrated around Khan Arnabeh in the center of the disengagement zone in Quneitra Governorate.[xxxi] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Ufaniya, Quneitra, al Hamidiyah, Samdaniya al Gharbiya, and al Qahtaniah in Syria to stay inside on December 8.[xxxii] Israeli Air Force's Shaldag special operations forces unit captured an SAA position at the top of Mt. Hermon without resistance on December 8.[xxxiii] The IDF continued building defensive features, such as trenches, along the border.[xxxiv] HTS-led opposition forces announced that they took control of Quneitra on December 7.[xxxv]

The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes targeting former SAA sites, including advanced weapons and ammunition depots in Syria to prevent opposition groups from acquiring these materials.[xxxvi] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a weapons and ammunition depot in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.[xxxvii] The IDF hit at least seven military targets in southwestern Syria, including Mezzeh Military Airport and the former SAA 4th Division base at Mount Qasioun outside Damascus.[xxxviii] The IDF also struck the former SAA 90th Brigade base near the Israel-Syria border and Khalkhala airbase north of Suwayda City in southwest Syria.[xxxix] The IDF also targeted the Scientific Research Center and a security complex in Damascus, including intelligence and customs administration buildings, which unspecified regional security sources told Reuters had both been used previously by Iran to develop and store missiles as well as sensitive military data and other equipment.[xl] Opposition-affiliated sources reported that an IDF airstrike hit al Qusayr crossing on the Lebanon-Syria border, which Hezbollah has previously used to transport arms into Lebanon.[xli] Israel is destroying Iranian military infrastructure in Syria, which will hinder Hezbollah efforts to reconstitute in Lebanon and thus limit the Iranian threat to Israel.

The United States conducted airstrikes against over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria on December 8.[xlii]  The airstrikes targeted ISIS personnel and sites and caused no civilian casualties.[xliii] US President Joseph Biden and US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla separately emphasized that the United States would prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting instability in Syria.[xliv] These statements reflect the risk that the collapse of the Syrian regime could enable ISIS to consolidate and expand its position in Syria. Kurilla warned that the United States would hold accountable any actor in Syria that supports or partners with ISIS.[xlv]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a generic statement acknowledging the collapse of the Syrian regime. The ministry stated that the Syrian people should determine the future of their country and without foreign interference.[xlvi] The ministry expressed readiness to engage “all influential parties” and “help establish security and stability in Syria.” The ministry also expressed interest in friendly relations with a future Syrian government. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated separately that the Syrian people should determine the future of their country.[xlvii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi expressed support for UN Security Council Resolution 2254, calling for a political settlement, wherein “all different parties have their role.”[xlviii] An internal Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) memo stated that Iranian leaders “accepted the fall of Assad and. . .lost the will to resist,” according to the New York Times.[xlix]

A hardline Iranian parliamentarian stated that Iran should focus on "atomic bomb testing" following the fall of the Syrian regime. Ahmad Naderi posted on X (Twitter) on December 8 that Iran should focus on testing nuclear bombs and reviving the Axis of Resistance.[l] Naderi has previously stated that Iran should acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence.[li] Naderi’s rhetoric is consistent with growing calls from senior Iranian officials encouraging Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his 2003 fatwa banning the production and use of nuclear weapons.[lii] This rhetoric is especially noteworthy given the recent expansion of the Iranian nuclear program, which is making it easier for Iran to build a weapon. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2024 that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[liii] Iran notified the IAEA on November 29 that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity significantly by installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating some at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.[liv]

Iraqi media reported on December 7 that between 2,500 and 2,700 former SAA soldiers and officers and Syrian regime employees have entered Iraq over the past day.[lv] Iraqi media reported that the soldiers and officers handed in their weapons before entering Iraq.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not commented on the overthrow of the Assad regime at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian opposition forces toppled the Bashar al Assad regime after only 11 days of fighting. HTS under Julani is beginning to consolidate power in Damascus and across formerly regime-controlled territory.
• HTS-affiliated forces appear to be taking control of the western bank of the Euphrates River, which the SDF had seized from the Syrian regime. The SDF clashed with the Turkish-backed SNA east of Aleppo City.
• The IDF deployed units to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights. The IDF also conducted airstrikes targeting ammunition depots and advanced weapons to prevent opposition forces from acquiring those materials.
• The United States conducted airstrikes against over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria. US leaders emphasized that they would prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting the instability in Syria amid the collapse of the Syrian regime.

Iran Update, December 6, 2024

Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it remains unclear whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance swiftly across regime-held territory. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen assessed that the Russian Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, a Gorshkov-class frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, and possibly the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler have returned to the port in Tartus based on satellite imagery collected on December 6.[xviii] Satellite imagery collected on December 3 showed that Russia had removed all of its ships stationed at Tartus - the Admiral Grigorovich frigate, the Novorossisysk submarine, the Admiral Gorshkov, and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, and likely the Vyazma oiler and the Yelnya Altay-class oiler - from the port sometime between December 1 and 3.[xix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 3 that ten Russian naval vessels, including the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko frigates and Novorossiysk submarine, participated in hypersonic and cruise missile launch exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly informed the US about Russian exercises in the Mediterranean during a call on November 27.[xx] It is unclear if Russia removed the Admiral Grigorovich and the two oilers from Tartus as part of the exercise as well. Some of the vessels that Russian forces removed from Tartus between December 1 and 3 have not returned to port as of December 6. Bloomberg reported on December 6 that a person close to the Kremlin stated that Russia does not have a plan to save Syrian President Bashar al Assad and that Russia is unlikely to create such a plan as long as pro-regime forces continue to abandon their positions.[xxi] The Russian Embassy in Syria notably announced on December 6 that Russian citizens living in Syria should leave the country on commercial flights due to the "difficult military and political situation" in Syria.[xxii] It remains unclear whether Russia plans to continue to maintain all of these vessels at Tartus or is planning to evacuate all or some of them elsewhere.

Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air defense assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this redeployment remains unclear at this time. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian forces transporting S-300 or S-400 and Tor-M1 air defense systems near Baniyas along the M1 Lakatia-Tartus highway.[xxiii] A Russian milblogger posted the same footage on December 6 and claimed that it showed Russian forces moving an S-400 system and a Tor-M2 system that Russian forces had deployed near Masyaf (about 50 kilometers southeast of Khmeimin Air Base) in 2017 to protect Khmeimin Air Base.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are either redeploying the air defense systems to Khmeimim Air Base or to Tartus due to Syrian rebel groups' recent seizure of Hama City (roughly 35 kilometers east of Masyaf). It is unclear if Russian forces are redeploying the air defense systems to new positions within western Syria in order to improve their survivability or if Russian forces are moving the air defense systems for evacuation from Syria through Tartus.

Key Takeaways:

• State of the Syrian Regime: The Bashar al Assad regime faces an existential threat given the widespread collapse of regime forces and lack of sufficient external backing to bolster these forces. One source “close to the Kremlin,” for example, told Bloomberg that unless Assad’s forces manage to form a defensive line—a scenario that is becoming increasingly less likely as more and more Syrian regime units break—Russia will not “save” Assad.
• Support to Assad: The Axis of Resistance’s support to the Assad regime will almost certainly fail to stop the opposition offensive at this time unless ground forces are deployed rapidly and in larger numbers.
• Turkish Response: Turkey appears equally unwilling to broker a settlement short of Assad’s removal as HTS seeks to overthrow Assad. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani said that his forces seek to replace the Assad regime in Damascus with a government and a “council chosen by the people.”
• Homs City Front: Syrian opposition forces led by HTS are now on the outskirts of Homs City after seizing Hama City on December 5.
• Deir ez Zor Front: The SDF seized key areas in regime-held Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces on December 6, making it more difficult for Iran to move forces to Assad or to supply Iranian-backed forces in Syria.
• Deraa Front: Local opposition groups in southwestern Syria have rapidly seized towns across Daraa Province and Suwayda Province, south of Damascus.

Iran Update, December 5, 2024

Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting. Locals in two Christian-majority towns north of Hama reportedly negotiated surrender with advancing opposition forces, avoiding any large-scale fighting in the towns.[v] Ismaili Shia officials in Salamiyah, southeast of Hama, also reportedly came to an agreement with opposition forces to avoid fighting.[vi] Regime forces reportedly withdrew from Salamiyah on December 5 after opposition forces advanced to the town’s outskirts on December 4.[vii] The decision by towns to abandon the regime appears to be a trend across Hama countryside. This trend may help HTS-aligned forces approach Homs within the next day without being slowed down by fighting through country villages.

Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. The regime does not appear to have established any defensive line between Hama City and the Orontes River. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama City and Homs City. A pro-regime aircraft bombed the Rastan Bridge over the Orontes River after Opposition forces seized the left, north bank of the Orontes.[viii] A force retreating in good order and not under significant pressure would have presumably blown the bridge themselves, rather than relying on aircraft. Airstrikes will usually fail to damage a bridge sufficiently to prevent a crossing, making ground-based detonation preferable unless a force is unable to detonate the bridge. The reported low casualties among Regime forces during the collapse around Hama suggest that Regime forces were not under significant pressure.[ix] It is also possible that the regime was forced to rely on aircraft due to a lack of combat engineers to detonate the bridge. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo on November 30.[x] There are other intact bridges and likely fords east and west of the Rastan Bridge that opposition forces could use to cross the Orontes, however.

HTS is establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements.  Fateh Mubin, HTS’ joint operations room, has ordered all Syrian regime army, security, and police defectors to report to one of two designated processing centers in the city.[xi] HTS has presumably designed this effort to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life, which in theory ensures stability and security during the post-conflict transition period.[xii] Fateh Mubin has also sought to prevent its fighters from harassing civilians or coming into conflict with locals by restricting the activity of fighters in the city.[xiii] Fateh Mubin ordered the fighters to report to the front lines and continue their advance to secure regime-held towns. The group has also mobilized local quasi-police forces to backfill these military units.[xiv] Fateh Mubin released the names and contact information for new opposition government ministers, effectively establishing HTS and the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government as the de facto governing authority of Aleppo.[xv] HTS has pursued similar successful government-building approaches in northwestern Syria by incorporating local religious and political figures into the governing body to eliminate rivalry.[xvi]

HTS is attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.[xvii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xviii] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[xix] Dozens of PMF fighters have reportedly entered Syria in recent days to help defend the Syrian regime against opposition forces.[xx] Sudani is likely unable to prevent militias that answer to Iran from intervening in Syria.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.[xxi] Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah fighters will withdraw north of the Litani River in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, in accordance with the ceasefire deal.[xxii] Qassem claimed that Israel violated the ceasefire deal ”at least 60 ” times since it went into place on November 26. Qassem stated that it is the responsibility of the Lebanese government—and not Hezbollah—to address these violations. Qassem stated that Hezbollah will provide financial assistance, mainly through Iranian donations, to Lebanese civilians in Beirut to rebuild. Qassem also stated that Hezbollah ”stands by” the Syrian regime amidst the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.

The IDF conducted an airstrike on December 5 targeting a weapons stockpile southeast of Aleppo, Syria.[xxiii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the SAA previously held the targeted area, but that Syrian opposition forces had recently seized the area.[xxiv]

Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[xxv] Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios. Israel’s updated proposal includes a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a serious medical condition.[xxvi] Hamas has not commented on this proposal as of the time of this writing. An Israeli official told Ynet on December 2 that Hamas may be willing to compromise on an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[xxvii] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on an Israeli military presence on the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant sticking points in the negotiations.[xxviii] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[xxix]

Israeli officials also told Axios that Egypt is now the “main channel” for negotiations with Hamas after Qatar announced on November 9 that it would cease its efforts to mediate a ceasefire-hostage deal until Israel and Hamas showed a “willingness” to resume negotiations.[xxx] Reuters reported on December 4 that Qatar has resumed its role as a mediator.[xxxi] This news follows reports that Qatari officials had ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar. [xxxii] Hamas denied on November 18 that it had departed Qatar.[xxxiii]

Hamas confirmed that it approved an Egyptian proposal to form a post-war governance committee in the Gaza Strip on December 5.[xxxiv] Hamas added in a statement that the committee should help implement the “comprehensive agreements” to “achieve national unity.” This is possibly about the joint declaration Hamas, Fatah, and other unspecified Palestinian political factions signed in July 2024 to form a “temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank after the war.[xxxv] Hamas said it met with several Palestinian figures during post-war governance and ceasefire-hostage negotiations in Cairo, including the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[xxxvi] Israeli media reported that Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance on November 3.[xxxvii] Hamas will almost certainly attempt to infiltrate or subvert whatever civilian government emerges to manage the post-war Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented from doing so by force.

Key Takeaways:

• Hama City-Homs City Axis: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5. Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting.
• State of Regime Forces: Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama City and Homs City. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo on November 30.
• Aleppo: HTS is establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements.
• HTS Diplomacy: HTS is attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.
• Lebanese Hezbollah: Secretary General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.
• Gaza Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations: Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2. Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios.

Iran Update, December 4, 2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS—this campaign appears to have several different subordinate objectives. Fateh Mubin's main effort is focused around the city itself. The main effort aims to isolate Hama City, presumably before assaulting it. The group is supporting its main effort by interdicting regime reinforcements coming from eastern Syria in order to prevent any relief force from reaching the city.

The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. A second force to the west may be seeking to capture Hama Military Airport. A commander directs their unit to bypass an obstacle in order to maintain the momentum of an operation.[i] The regime has positioned forces on Zain al Abidin Hill, north of the city, and Qomhana town, a key town northwest of the city.[ii] The hill is a tactically advantageous position from which a defender has sweeping views northwards up the M5 Highway. Some opposition forces likely fixed these forces while the main western Hama and eastern Hama advances proceeded southwards. Opposition forces east of Hama had proceeded directly south along the M5 Highway before swinging east, bypassing the hill.[iii] Opposition forces in the west attacked Qomhana while the remainder continued towards the Hama Military Airport.[iv] An unspecified Fateh Mubin military source cited by al Quds al Araby stated that opposition forces plan to "encircle” the city of Hama, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that opposition forces cut two major roads connecting Hama City to areas east of it.[v] Hama is not fully isolated, given major roads moving south.

Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key ground lines of communication connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east. Interdict is defined as a tactical mission task that “prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route...[to] impact... an enemy force’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions.”[vi] Opposition forces have captured SAA bases northeast of Hama and cut multiple roads far east of Hama to prevent or delay regime forces from reaching the battlefield in time to support regime forces in Hama.[vii] Pro-Syrian regime sources claimed that the SAA has continued to send reinforcements to Hama City from Raqqa and Rusafa, which are connected to Hama by these roads, to counter the expected attack on the city.[viii] Opposition forces’ advance into towns surrounding Hama with little SAA resistance suggests that the supporting line of effort has had some success.

Opposition groups retained control of previously seized territory in Aleppo Province, including Aleppo City, on December 4. Social media users posted footage of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani visiting Aleppo Citadel on December 4, emphasizing the extent of control that opposition forces maintain in Aleppo City.[ix]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.[x] The strikes targeted three truck-mounted Multiple Rocket Launchers, a T-64 tank, and an armored personnel carrier.[xi] CENTCOM confirmed that unspecified fighters fired mortars toward US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site before the strikes.[xii] The strikes occurred during a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) offensive into seven regime-controlled villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[xiii] CTP-ISW has not yet observed lasting control-of-terrain changes on the left bank of the Euphrates River as a result of the SDF offensive.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.[xiv] The IDF said that Hamas fighters killed the hostage, Itay Svirski, in January 2024 and kept his body in the Gaza Strip.

An IDF investigation revealed that Hamas fighters shot and killed six hostages in the Gaza Strip in early 2024.[xv] The IDF launched an investigation after recovering the bodies of six hostages and six Hamas fighters from a tunnel in Khan Younis in August 2024.[xvi] Hamas moved the hostages to the tunnel in January 2024.[xvii] The IDF conducted an airstrike that struck the tunnel in February 2024. The IDF clarified that it did not have any information on the presence of hostages there during the time of the airstrike, however.[xviii] The investigation found that the bodies had bullet wounds and assessed with high confidence that Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages. The IDF could not clarify if the Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages before or after the IDF struck the tunnel. The IDF investigation determined that if the hostages had been alive at the time of the airstrike, the collapse of the tunnel would have killed them by causing the hostages to suffocate. The forensic investigation revealed that the Hamas fighters likely suffocated to death inside the tunnel after the IDF airstrike.[xix]

Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Reuters, citing a senior US official, a senior Israeli official, and US lawmakers, reported that Hezbollah has begun recruiting new fighters and trying to find new ways to rearm through domestic production and by smuggling materials through Syria in recent weeks.[xx] It is unclear, however, if those efforts have slowed due to the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal on November 26. US intelligence agencies assessed that Israel destroyed more than half of Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile and killed ”thousands” of Hezbollah fighters. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hezbollah will almost certainly try to reconstitute its forces despite Israel’s victory in Lebanon.[xxi]

Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters.  Hezbollah may choose to send these fighters to Syria in the future if the group becomes concerned that it will lose its overland resupply route through Syria due to the Syrian Opposition offensive. Reuters reported that US officials are ”concerned” about Hezbollah’s access to Syria following the recent Syrian opposition offensive due to Hezbollah’s previous use of Syria as a safe haven for fighters and a weapons transport corridor.[xxii] Hezbollah also historically maintained ground lines of communication in Syria.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hama Campaign: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key ground lines of communication connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east.
• Eastern Syria: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.
• Hezbollah and Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters. 

Iran Update, December 3, 2024

Syrian opposition forces have continued to advance rapidly and pushed through regime defensive lines in the northern Hama countryside on December 3. Opposition forces—led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)—advanced through the northern Hama countryside and seized numerous towns that regime force previously secured only two days ago.[i] Opposition forces captured Halfaya, northwest of Hama City, after advancing over the Orontes River possibly using the Mahrada dam. Opposition forces also seized Tayybat al Imam, Souran, and Maardis from regime control in their advance toward Hama City.[ii] The opposition seized SAA tanks in at least one of these towns, suggesting that regime forces withdrew in a disorderly fashion.[iii] Russian forces conducted several airstrikes targeting the al Ghab plain, about 25 kilometers northeast of Hama City, possibly to interdict reinforcements as opposition forces advanced south and seized towns.[iv] Regime and Russian forces continued airstrikes in opposition-controlled areas of northwest Syria on December 3.[v]

Opposition forces have advanced within five kilometers of Hama City and likely seized key defensive terrain in the area.[vi] Regime forces withdrew from Qomhana—a village immediately north of Hama City—and Zine al Abdine hill, which overlooks Hama City.[vii] The SAA previously established  a first line of defense for Hama City on Zine al Abdine hill, which opposition forces then targeted with drone strikes.[viii] The withdrawal of regime forces will almost certainly cede this hill to opposition forces. Opposition forces announced that they also captured the second hill overlooking Hama City, Jabal Kafra.[ix] Opposition forces appear to remain outside Hama City at the time of this writing. Opposition forces fired drones targeting SAA tanks near the northern entrance to the city, however.[x] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed on December 3 that it sent “large reinforcements” to Hama City to counter the expected attack on the city.[xi]

Opposition forces’ capture of Hama City would facilitate successive campaigns, such as an effort to take Homs City. The fall of Hama would enable opposition forces to continue to move south into Homs Province. Syrian social media users have reported that pro-regime forces have begun establishing defensive lines in Homs City and forcibly conscripting youths into the SAA.[xii] Maintaining regime control of Homs City is vital to Iranian-backed efforts to transport materiel from Iran and Iraq to Lebanese Hezbollah.

Hama City is also a critical node connecting Damascus and southern Syria to regime- and Russian-controlled coastal areas. Tartous and Latakia provinces are long-time Assad strongholds that risk being isolated from the rest of regime-held territory. The Russian evacuation of naval assets from Tartous and the reported deployment of additional Russian forces to Syria suggest that Moscow is worried that opposition forces may advance southward to Hama City and threaten the Tartous base.[xiii]

Iran Update, December 2, 2024

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly deployed to northern Syria to help defend the Bashar al Assad regime against Syrian opposition forces.[i] Kataib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba fighters have deployed from Iraq to northern Syria over the past day, according to a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) source and two Iraqi security sources speaking to Reuters on December 2.[ii] The SAA source told Reuters that dozens of Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters crossed into Syria via the Albu Kamal border crossing overnight on December 1 and 2.[iii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iv] The PMF, on paper, reports directly to the Iraqi prime minister, but in reality, many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran.[v] Social media users published images on December 1 purporting to show Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters heading toward Syria.[vi] A local Syrian source denied on December 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias entered Syria from Iraq and instead claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias redeployed from Palmyra in central Syria and Deir ez Zor in eastern Syria to northern Syria.[vii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may redeploy from other areas in Syria to the north given that these militias have long operated in Syria.

Hezbollah does not appear willing to commit fighters to assist its pro-regime allies in northern Syria, probably as a result of the severe losses it has suffered in Lebanon. Hezbollah has not yet deployed fighters to Syria to support the Syrian regime. An unspecified Hezbollah spokesperson told Newsweek on December 2 that the SAA does not need Hezbollah fighters to assist in the defense of territory seized by Syrian opposition forces.[viii] Hezbollah fighters previously deployed thousands of fighters in defense of Assad in 2011, and Hezbollah was an extremely important element of the pro-regime forces.[ix] Decisively supporting regime forces would likely require Hezbollah to organize a large-scale re-deployment of fighters to Syria, as numerous Hezbollah fighters left Syria to join the southern front in Lebanon in the past few months.[x]

It is not clear that Hezbollah can currently support a deployment of this size, given postwar commitments to reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah is currently regenerating and reorganizing its forces after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon that has severely degraded its command-and-control networks, communications, and weapons stockpiles.[xi] Regeneration and reorganization take place out of contact with enemy forces and could not be undertaken at the same time as large-scale deployments. Regeneration and reorganization would need to occur before any forces can be deployed as units. It is possible, however, that Hezbollah could choose to deploy individuals to Syria to advise regime forces. The pressure on Hezbollah to defend Syrian territory from rebel advances is greater given that a rebel advance towards Hama begins to threaten Hezbollah’s access to Iranian materiel and equipment through its ground line of communication in Homs Province. It does not appear that pro-regime forces, including Iran, have asked Hezbollah to join in on defensive efforts, however.[xii]

Iran is coordinating with Syria and Russia to counter the rebel offensive in Syria. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed countering “the spread of terrorism” in a telephone conversation with President Bashar al Assad on December 2.[xiii] Assad blamed the United States and Israel for their interference in the region. Iranian Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also reiterated Iran’s support for Syria in a phone call with Syrian counterpart Hammouda Sabbagh on December 2.[xiv] Pezeshkian reemphasized regional cohesion to counter “terrorism” in Syria in separate calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani on December 2.[xv]

Iran and Turkey continue to hold different desired political goals in Syria, which could cause increased friction as the Syrian opposition offensive continues. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan both agreed on the preservation of Syria’s territorial sovereignty and returning to the Astana process in a joint press conference in Ankara on December 2.[xvi] Araghchi acknowledged the “differences of opinion” between Iran and Turkey and emphasized Iran's support for Assad’s regime.[xvii] Fidan said that Turkey believes Assad is ignoring the “legitimate demands“ of the Syrian opposition.[xviii] Turkey’s ”legitimate demands“ would presumably include some role for Turkey’s allies in Syria because a total Assad takeover of the country, as Assad and Iran desire, would trigger massive refugee flows north towards Turkey.[xix]  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey will prioritize its national security on December 2.[xx] Erdogan almost certainly believes that the collapse of Turkish allies would endanger Turkish national security by increasing refugee flows as well as the threat from Kurdish militants.

Syrian opposition forces appear to be slowing their advance into regime-controlled areas of northwest Syria after encountering Syrian Arab Army (SAA) defensive lines north of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room including Hayat Tahrir al Sham and several other armed opposition factions leading the offensive—did not claim to seize additional towns in northwest Syria on December 2. The Syrian Defense Minister announced on December 1 that it sent large reinforcements to Hama’s northern countryside to bolster the SAA’s defensive operations in the area.[xxi] Regime forces reportedly deployed from eastern Hama province near Rusafa to Hama City on December 2, demonstrating that the regime continues to reinforce its defensive lines there.[xxii] The SAA also deployed forces on the left bank of the Orontes River near Hama City on December 1 and 2 after opposition forces initially claimed to seize towns in the area.[xxiii] Fateh Mubin’s spokesperson said that opposition forces were in control of seven unspecified towns in northern Hama and were approaching regime forces from multiple axes on December 2, however.[xxiv] Idlib-based opposition forces also claimed likely drone attacks targeting regime forces, command centers, and other operationally significant assets on December 2.[xxv] These attacks may reflect the increased ground-based resistance that opposition forces are facing in Hama. The SAA’s defense of northern Hama is the first effective defense that pro-regime forces have mounted against Syrian opposition forces since the offensive began on November 27.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is similarly slowing its advance after accomplishing its main goal of seizing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo, on December 1.[xxvi] The SNA claimed to seize 14 towns north of Aleppo, compared to the more than 30 sites the force seized the day prior.[xxvii] Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and SNA leaders reportedly negotiated a deal to allow civilians and fighters to evacuate east to SDF territory from Tel Rifat and Sheikh Maqsoud, a Kurdish neighborhood of eastern Aleppo.[xxviii] SDF leader Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 1 that locals were evacuating Tel Rifat through an ”opening a humanitarian corridor.“[xxix] It remains unclear at this time the extent to which the SNA and Idlib-based opposition groups are coordinating their attacks targeting the Syrian regime.  Social media users circulated footage on December 1 of SNA and HTS fighters joining convoys near the Aleppo International Airport, reportedly to launch an operation northeast of Aleppo City.[xxx]

A local Syrian source suggested that the SDF may launch an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province.[xxxi] The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia within the SDF—reportedly mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[xxxii] These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates that the regime controls, making it a strategic holding for the regime and its allies. Both Russia and Iranian-backed militias maintain positions in these seven towns.[xxxiii] Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly launched rockets targeting US forces stationed nearby from these seven villages.[xxxiv] CTP-ISW is monitoring early rumors about possible clashes between SDF fighters and unspecified militias in Deir ez Zor.[xxxv]

Russian and Syrian regime forces continued a limited airstrike campaign in opposition-occupied areas of northwest Syria on December 2. Pro-regime forces struck sites across Idlib and Aleppo governorates, including hospitals in Idlib.[xxxvi] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that the air and artillery strikes destroyed five opposition command centers and seven weapons and ammunition depots.[xxxvii] The regime said that airstrikes killed at least 400 opposition fighters.[xxxviii]

The United States and France reportedly warned Israel that it is violating the terms of the ceasefire, according to Israeli media. Israeli media reported on December 2 that senior French and US officials, including US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein, told their Israeli counterparts that Israel was violating terms of the ceasefire agreement by conducting military activities in Lebanese territory and failing to report them to the designated oversight mechanism.[xxxix] The IDF has conducted numerous strikes into Lebanese territory since the ceasefire went into effect on November 27 to thwart what it deemed as Hezbollah’s violations of the ceasefire agreement.[xl] Israel and Lebanon are both required to report any possible violations of their obligations to both UNIFIL and the oversight mechanism, according to leaked copies of the agreement published by Israeli Army Radio.[xli]

Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position as a “warning” on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.[xlii] The rockets fell in open areas in the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[xliii] Hezbollah has long maintained that Shebaa Farms is Lebanese territory and it has targeted the area repeatedly since October 2023.[xliv] Hezbollah said in a statement that the “concerned authorities” that reviewed Israel’s violations did not stop them from occurring.”[xlv] This incident was Hezbollah’s first attack into Israeli territory since the ceasefire went into effect. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to respond “with force” to Hezbollah’s attack and the IDF announced that it began to strike Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[xlvi] Hezbollah has not conducted any further attacks into Israeli territory at this time.

Israel retains the “inherent right to self-defense” under the current ceasefire agreement and Israel has justified its military activity in Lebanon since the ceasefire as a responses to “immediate” Hezbollah threats to Israel.[xlvii] The IDF also struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site near Sidon on November 28 classified as a “non-immediate” threat that the IDF needed to neutralize.[xlviii] This action is reportedly guaranteed by the US, which pledged to support Israel’s right to respond to threats in a side letter.[xlix]

Senior IDF officials have recommended that Israel propose a temporary ceasefire-hostage deal in response to Hamas’ perceived willingness to concede on some of its maximalist ceasefire demands.[l] Senior IDF officials told Israeli media on December 2 that several factors, including the ceasefire in Lebanon, may pressure Hamas to accept a deal. Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[li] A senior Israeli cabinet minister reported on November 29 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also interested in a partial ceasefire-hostage deal to capitalize on Hamas’ “weaker position” after the ceasefire in Lebanon.[lii] Egyptian officials discussed a new ceasefire-hostage proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials during the most recent round of negotiations in Cairo that began on November 29.[liii]

Hamas and Fatah have made “significant progress” towards the formation of a civilian committee to handle post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[liv] A senior Hamas official told Al Araby al Jadeed on December 2 that Hamas and Fatah had solved major differences during meetings in Cairo, including the management of relief and construction funds.[lv] The official added that Hamas and Fatah agreed that unidentified donors would independently supervise the funds.[lvi] Hamas will almost certainly attempt to gain control over an independent reconstruction agency. Hamas control--or attempts to control--an independent reconstruction agency would make it more difficult to secure donor funding.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Support to Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly deployed to northern Syria to help defend the Bashar al Assad regime against Syrian opposition forces.
• Hezbollah Support to Syria: It is not clear that Hezbollah can currently support a deployment of this size, given postwar commitments to reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah is regenerating and reorganizing its forces after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon that has severely degraded its command-and-control networks, communications, and weapons stockpiles. Regeneration and reorganization would need to occur before any forces can be deployed as units. It is possible, however, that Hezbollah could choose to deploy individuals to Syria to advise regime forces.
• Iranian Diplomatic Responses: Iran is coordinating with Syria and Russia to counter the rebel offensive in Syria. Iran and Turkey continue to hold different desired political goals in Syria, which could cause increased friction as the Syrian opposition offensive continues.
• Syrian Opposition Operations: Syrian opposition forces appear to be slowing their advance into regime-controlled areas of northwest Syria after encountering Syrian Arab Army (SAA) defensive lines north of Hama City. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is similarly slowing its advance after accomplishing its main goal of seizing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo, on December 1.
• US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces: A local Syrian source suggested that the SDF may launch an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province. The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia within the SDF—reportedly mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River. These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates that the regime controls, making it a strategic holding for the regime and its allies
• Lebanon Ceasefire: The United States and France reportedly warned Israel that it is violating the terms of the ceasefire, according to Israeli media. The IDF has conducted numerous strikes into Lebanese territory since the ceasefire went into effect. Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position as a “warning” on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Senior IDF officials have recommended that Israel propose a temporary ceasefire-hostage deal in response to Hamas’ perceived willingness to concede on some of its maximalist ceasefire demands.

Iran Update, December 1, 2024

Syrian Arab Army (SAA) reinforcements fortified defensive lines north of Hama City and prevented Syrian opposition forces from advancing into Hama City. The Syrian Defense Minister announced on December 1 that it sent large reinforcements to Hama’s northern countryside to bolster the SAA’s defensive operations in the area.[i] SAA Chief of Staff General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim arrived to oversee SAA operations in the area.[ii] Opposition forces began advancing south from Idlib towards Hama City on November 30.[iii] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that SAA units expelled opposition fighters from the town of Maardis, about 10 kilometers from Hama City.[iv] The SAA 25th Special Mission Forces Division secured and fortified defensive lines in several villages and towns north of Hama, including villages that rebels claimed to seize on November 30, such as Tayyiba al Imam.[v] Local Syrian sources reported that SAA forces pushed opposition fighters north towards the town of Morek.[vi]  Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room including Hayat Tahrir al Sham and several other armed opposition factions leading the offensive—appears to remain in control of Khan Sheikhoun, a town immediately north of Morek on the other side of the Hama-Idlib border.[vii] This suggests that opposition forces remain in control of Idlib Province. Syrian opposition forces conducted a drone strike that killed the commander of Hama’s Military Security in Souran amid clashes in the area.[viii] An SAA-affiliated social media account claimed that the Syrian army would advance into Idlib before continuing to Aleppo.[ix]

The Syrian regime appears to be concentrating its efforts on securing Hama Province and has not yet attempted to re-capture or send reinforcements towards Aleppo. The SAA’s defense of northern Hama is the first effective defense that pro-regime forces have mounted against Syrian opposition forces since the offensive began on November 27. Russian forces separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City and Idlib Province on December 1.[x]

Syrian opposition forces also advanced southeast of Aleppo to the town of Khanasir on December 1, which is probably part of an effort to isolate Aleppo and block resupply and reinforcements. Syrian opposition forces advanced through Safirah and captured the largest group of SAA forces they have captured so far.[xi] The opposition forces captured an SAA general in Safirah.[xii] A Syria-focused analyst reported that rebels have captured over 150 Syrian regime soldiers so far.[xiii] Fateh Mubin announced that it took control of the town of Khanasir and the Khanasir-Aleppo highway.[xiv] Cutting off this highway would prevent regime reinforcements from approaching Aleppo City from the southeast, further isolating the city from regime attacks.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) announced that it captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 1.[xv] The SNA launched a separate operation into regime-controlled territory on November 30 to take territory from the SDF, Syrian regime, and Iranian-backed militias.[xvi] The SNA seized Deir Jamal and blocked off access to Tal Rifaat before moving into the town.[xvii] The SNA also seized several towns and military positions north of Aleppo along Highway 214, including the Menagh military airport.[xviii] Regime-affiliated media reported that SDF forces based in Deir ez Zor mobilized to deploy to Manbij to increase the SDF‘s force presence there.[xix]

The SNA continues to retain territory that it seized during the first day of its operation, including the Kuweires military airport, east of Aleppo City.[xx] Local sources circulated footage of SNA fighters seizing SAA L-39 fighter jets, a Syrian Pantsir air defense system, and an Iranian drone from the Ababil family at the airport.[xxi]

Fateh Mubin and the SNA appear to be coordinating operations to seize territory from the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Social media users circulated footage of SNA and HTS fighters joining convoys near the Aleppo International Airport to launch an operation northeast of Aleppo City reportedly.[xxii] It is unclear if HTS’s forces were involved in the seizure of Tal Rifaat or any nearby towns. Fateh Mubin and the SNA have both operated in some of the same towns during the ongoing operation, suggesting that they have at least some degree of tactical coordination.[xxiii] It is not immediately clear to what degree Fateh Mubin and the SNA are coordinating to isolate Aleppo.

Fateh Mubin issued a statement addressed to all SDF combat units in Aleppo City.[xxiv] The group said that they would allow SDF units safe passage out of Aleppo city towards northeastern Syria. The group said that Syrian Kurds are ”our people” and that Fateh Mubin is “responsible for protecting [the Kurds] and ensuring a decent life for “them.”[xxv] It is unclear if SNA forces will follow Fateh Mubin’s calls for safe passage for the SDF. Damascus-based media reported that SDF forces began to evacuate from Aleppo City towards Manbij.[xxvi]

Syrian regime leadership held several diplomatic meetings with regional officials almost certainly to coordinate with allies and other stakeholders amid the opposition offensive. President Bashar al Assad was reportedly in Moscow, Russia on November 30, though the Kremlin spokesperson declined to comment on the matter.[xxvii] Assad met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Damascus on December 1 to discuss Iranian support for Assad’s regime in Syria.[xxviii]  Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will meet with Turkish officials in Ankara, Turkey after he visits Damascus on December 1.[xxix] Assad also spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on November 30.[xxx] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Bassem Sabbagh also spoke with his Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi in a telephone conversation.[xxxi]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed the importance of cohesion among Islamic countries in countering “regional terrorism” in a telephone conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 1.[xxxii] The phone conversation focused on northern Syria.

Some of Assad’s allies have already begun assisting the regime. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly been active in northwestern Syria since Syrian opposition forces began their surprise offensive on November 27. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s Secretary General, Abu Alaa al Walai, claimed that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada helped to defend against Turkish-backed SNA offensives on November 30.[xxxiii] A Syrian journalist claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia the Badr Organization deployed fighters in an unspecified area in Syria.[xxxiv] These militias have long operated in Syria to support the Syrian regime.[xxxv] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will probably deploy additional forces into Deir ez Zor Province to secure ground lines of communication between Iraq and the frontline areas if Iranian-backed militias continue to fight in northwestern Syria.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, including the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, claimed on November 30 and December 1 that the MoD removed Kisel as Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria and replaced him with Chaiko.[xxxvi] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 1 that Chaiko replaced Kisel and that Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev arrived in Tartous, Syria.[xxxvii] Chaiko served as chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria from September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and from September to December 2022.[xxxviii] It is unclear what position Chaiko held from December 2022 until present. Kisel has reportedly commanded the Russian force grouping in Syria since at least May 2024.[xxxix] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Kisel's removal will not significantly change the situation or Russian operations in Syria because the Russian military command has routinely rotated commanders to positions in Syria after battlefield failures in Ukraine.[xl] ISW is unable to independently confirm this reported command change at this time.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Regime Operations: Syrian Arab Army (SAA) reinforcements fortified defensive lines north of Hama City and prevented Syrian opposition forces from advancing into Hama City. The Syrian regime appears to be concentrating its efforts on securing Hama Province and has not yet attempted to re-capture or send reinforcements towards Aleppo.
• Syrian Opposition Operations in Tel Rifat: The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) announced that it captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 1.
• Syrian Opposition Operations near Aleppo: Syrian opposition forces also advanced southeast of Aleppo to the town of Khanasir on December 1, which is probably part of an effort to isolate Aleppo and block resupply and reinforcements.
• Coordination Between Opposition Groups: Fateh Mubin and the SNA appear to be coordinating operations to seize territory from the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Fateh Mubin and the SNA have both operated in some of the same towns during the ongoing operation, suggesting that they have at least some degree of tactical coordination. It is not immediately clear to what degree Fateh Mubin and the SNA are coordinating to isolate Aleppo.
• Syrian Regime Diplomatic Response: Syrian regime leadership held several diplomatic meetings with regional officials almost certainly to coordinate with allies and other stakeholders amid the opposition offensive.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias in Syria: Some of Assad’s allies, including Iraqi militias, have already begun assisting the regime. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly been active in northwestern Syria since Syrian opposition forces began their surprise offensive on November 27.
• Russian Forces in Syria: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.