Iran Updates, February 2023

This page collects the Iran Updates produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) for February 2023. CTP and ISW began publishing daily updates in September 2022 covering key events related to supreme leader succession, the Mahsa Amini protests, and regional developments. Full list of Iran Updates are available here.

Iran Update, February 28, 2023

February 28, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

Regime incompetence and mismanagement is driving further protest activity and popular frustration toward the regime and may unite citizens with disparate grievances. The regime is facing several concurrent crises over its mishandling of economic, ecological, and security issues. The regime is continuing to victimize its people with a range of different problems, stoking anti-regime frustration across many different demographics.

CTP recorded 20 protests across 14 provinces on February 28, 18 of which focused on Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions. The extent and scale of these demonstrations supports CTP’s previous assessment that protest activity in Iran is rising and returning to levels not seen since the end of 2022, and economic frustrations are driving much of this unrest.[i] The value of the Iranian rial appreciated slightly to 556,500 against the US dollar on February 28—an improvement from a record low of roughly 600,000 on February 26—following the reported intervention of the Central Bank of Iran to stabilize the currency, although the Raisi administration has not yet articulated a clear policy to meaningfully improve the economy.[ii] An Iranian parliamentarian characterized Raisi’s economic strategy as “emotional—not a plan based on science and decisive decisions” on February 28, echoing previous criticisms of Raisi’s cabinet in recent days.[iii]

Iran Update, February 27, 2023

February 27, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

Protest activity in Iran is rising and returning to levels not seen since the end of 2022. CTP has recorded an uptick in demonstrations in recent weeks, most of which have focused on the worsening economic conditions in Iran. Costs of goods and services have risen over 53 percent since February 2022, and the Iranian rial continues to depreciate dramatically.[i] The rial fell to a record low on February 26, valuing at around 600,000 to the US dollar.[ii] CTP previously reported that the rial fell to 500,000 for one dollar on February 21.[iii] The economic nature of these protests diverges slightly from the rest of the Mahsa Amini movement, which focused primarily (but not exclusively) on socio-cultural and political grievances. These economically motivated protests may nevertheless add momentum to and build on the Mahsa Amini movement, as CTP previously suggested.[iv]

Different regime power centers are arguing with one another over how to address economic issues and trying to deflect blame away from themselves. President Ebrahim Raisi emphasized the role of foreign enemies in driving the worsening currency crisis and lauded the economic performance of his administration on February 27.[v] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and IRGC-affiliated outlets have contrastingly blamed the Raisi administration in recent days for the poor performance of the economy.[vi] Ghalibaf stated on February 27 that Parliament predicted the current crisis weeks ago and made policy recommendations to Raisi that he did not implement. Ghalibaf has regularly warned that the regime must reform to address popular grievances and indicated that he lacks faith in Raisi to resolve these issues in recent months.[vii] Regime actors close to Parliament may have organized protests or at least chants against the Raisi administration on February 26 as well. Retired workers gathered in Esfahan and chanted “the [Raisi administration] betrays, Parliament supports.” CTP has not previously observed such chants among protesters.

Ghalibaf may be additionally clashing with IRGC leadership over the role of parastatal organizations in the economy. Ghalibaf explicitly called for state-run economic conglomerates to decrease their involvement in the economy on February 22, correctly diagnosing that these entities have impeded economic efficiency.[viii] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami appeared to respond on February 27, publishing a statement praising the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters for cooperating with the Raisi administration to complete a water transfer project to Lake Oroumiyeh.[ix] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the economy. It is difficult to interpret Salami’s statement as anything other than a response to Ghalibaf given the context in which Salami issued it and the fact that the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is one of the parastatal entities to which Ghalibaf was likely referring.

The Raisi administration may replace some of its economic managers with figures closely tied to the IRGC financial network to address the economic crisis. Online rumors have suggested in recent days that Raisi may replace First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber with IRGC financier Parviz Fattah.[x] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei designated Mokhber as particularly responsible for economic policy during a speech on January 30.[xi] The rial has lost about 25 percent of its value since then.[xii] Fattah is long-retired IRGC officer and a hardline industrialist who has held leadership positions in several prominent parastatal organizations, including some closely affiliated with the IRGC. If the online rumors are true, Raisi may seek to bring into his administration economic managers who appear capable and could draw on their connections in the parastatal network to try to address the currency crisis. The broader IRGC economic network likely has access to capital and the ability to generate and smuggle hard currency into Iran. That network would likely insist on securing a return on any such investment, however, whether in the form of increased control over portions of the Iranian economy or in the form of greater control over Islamic Republic policy or both. Installing Fattah as a senior economic policy official would likely expand hardliner and possibly IRGC influence in the Raisi administration and over the economy regardless of the possibility of the Guards infusing their own cash into the budget. Doing so would also likely fuel tensions with Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf given his apparent opposition to the dominance of parastatal entities in Iran.

The Raisi administration may be trying to revitalize the nuclear negotiations with the West. Online rumors have claimed in recent days that former Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Abbas Araghchi has joined the nuclear negotiating team and traveled to Geneva with Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian.[xiii] Araghchi is a career Iranian diplomat who played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration. CTP cannot confirm these rumors. Raisi may seek to add diplomatic momentum to the negotiations, which could increase confidence in the Iranian economy in the short-term and obtain sanctions relief for Tehran in the event of a deal.

Iran could need months if not longer to secure significant, long-term economic improvement if it reached a nuclear deal with the West. Iran has slowly abrogated its commitments to the nuclear deal since 2019.[xiv] Resuming compliance to achieve sanctions relief would require that Iran reestablish significant monitoring and verification cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and resume compliance with the centrifuge requirements and uranium and heavy water enrichment and stockpile limits set by the nuclear deal, among other possible measures. Such measures would take time to complete and time to verify. Even if an agreement to return to the deal were announced instantly, therefore, Iran could not expect to receive significant economic relief for some time unless the Biden Administration front-loaded the execution of US commitments without waiting for Iran to execute its own.

Iran is likely continuing to reinforce its military presence in Syria. Forces from the Fatemiyoun Division—Iran’s Afghan Shia proxy—arrived at the Imam Ali base in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria from Iraq on February 25 to replace local elements of the Iranian-backed Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 47^th Hashemiyoun Brigade stationed at the base.[xv] The Imam Ali base is a prominent Iranian military base near the Iraq-Syria border that the IRGC constructed in 2018 and uses to host drones, missiles, and fighters. It is unclear where the 47^th Brigade elements went after the Fatemiyoun forces replaced them. They may have returned to their local headquarters in Deir ez Zour City. The Quds Force maintains a much tighter degree of control over the Fatemiyoun militants than it does over SAA forces, suggesting that the Quds Force is trying to strengthen its control over local militia elements at the Imam Ali base and nearby military positions in Deir ez Zor Province.

This activity is part of a larger trend of Iran increasing its paramilitary forces in Syria in recent weeks. CTP has repeatedly observed Iranian-backed militants entering eastern Syria from Iraq via the al Qaim border crossing and dispersing throughout the country under the guise of humanitarian aid convoys since the February 6 earthquake.[xvi] Lebanese Hezbollah units have also used the same justification to deploy forces from Lebanon likely to Hama and Aleppo Provinces.[xvii] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have traveled to Aleppo, Homs, and Hama Provinces from other positions in Syria as well, sometimes leaving SAA or Fatemiyoun forces to backfill their positions.[xviii] CTP has yet to observe indications that Iranian-backed forces are conversely traveling back into Iraq or Lebanon from Syria.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity in Iran is rising and returning to levels not seen since the end of 2022.
• Different regime power centers are arguing with one another over how to address economic issues and trying to deflect blame away from themselves.
• The Raisi administration may replace some of its economic managers with figures closely tied to the IRGC financial network to address the economic crisis.
• The Raisi administration may be trying to revitalize the nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Iran is likely continuing to reinforce its military presence in Syria.
• At least one protest occurred on February 25, eight protests on February 26, and 13 protests on February 27.

Iran Update, February 24, 2023

Iranian regime security forces escalated against prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid on February 24 after months of relative restraint. Security forces surrounded Zahedan’s Grand Makki Mosque, where Abdol Hamid gives his weekly Friday sermons, assaulted some nearby worshippers, and reportedly attempted to enter the mosque.[i] The regime reportedly stationed snipers around Zahedan and disrupted local internet services as well.[ii] Abdol Hamid lamented on social media that he could not livestream his Friday sermon due to the severity of these restrictions.[iii] The regime has significantly increased its security presence in Zahedan since January 2023 to deter Abdol Hamid from criticizing the regime. However, these security forces have largely refrained from interfering with Abdol Hamid’s weekly sermon and the ensuing protests until this point, likely to avoid enflaming domestic unrest further. Security forces conducted a brutal crackdown against citizens in Zahedan on September 30, 2022, which was the initial driver of the weekly Friday protests during the last five months.[iv]

Multiple factors may have driven the regime to escalate today. Iranian leaders may feel more confident in their capability to quell internal unrest following weeks of relatively low protest activity throughout Iran. They may also perceive a renewed sense of urgency to confront Abdol Hamid, who continues to challenge the regime’s legitimacy and criticize its performance as the country faces significant problems, such as economic mismanagement, that resonate with large segments of the Iranian population.

Abdol Hamid scaled back his criticism of the regime in his Friday sermon, possibly in response to the regime’s more aggressive security approach. Abdol Hamid attacked the Ebrahim Raisi administration specifically rather than condemning the whole Islamic Republic as in previous sermons. He stated: “Around the world, sometimes presidents, prime ministers, and other high-ranking officials resign, and problems are solved. In our country, unfortunately, they do not know how to step aside.”[v] This criticism is noteworthy in that he targeted the president without suggesting that the Islamic Republic should be replaced. That framing is acceptable within the regime’s official discourse and comparatively tempered to some of his past rhetoric. Abdol Hamid previously expressed support for reformist leader Mir Hossein Mousavi, who issued a statement on February 4 calling for a referendum on the Islamic Republic and the drafting of a new constitution if that referendum fails.[vi] Abdol Hamid may have called on Raisi to resign to maintain his popularity among his congregation while simultaneously not overstepping the regime’s boundaries and risking a violent crackdown in Zahedan. He may also have intended for his sermon to resonate with other elements of Iranian society that are blaming the Raisi administration for Iran’s economic troubles.

Abdol Hamid called on worshippers to “return home in complete calm” following his sermon.[vii] Abdol Hamid’s congregation has typically conducted large-scale protests directly after his sermons since September 2022. Abdol Hamid’s call for calm suggests that he wanted to avoid provoking security forces. 

Some clerics within Abdol Hamid’s circle adopted a more aggressive position regarding the regime escalation in Zahedan. The Office of Rask Sunni Friday Prayer Leader Moulana Abdol Ghaffar Naghshbandi published a statement calling for mass protests in response to security forces’ “siege” of the Grand Makki Mosque. Naghshbandi warned that he will issue a “historic fatwa” if security forces continue this “brutal action.”[viii] Naghshbandi did not specify what this fatwa would include but clearly meant it as a threat to the regime. The contrast in messages between Abdol Hamid and Abdol Ghaffar suggests some misalignment between them. It is unclear whether they will overcome this misalignment or face further friction.

Iranian state media reported that Tehran will likely sell air defense equipment, such as radars and surface-to-air missiles, to Syria on February 24.[ix] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani met with the Commander of the Syrian Air Defense Forces Salahuddin Kaser al Ghanem in Tehran on February 22 to discuss these sales.[x] The sale to the Bashar al Assad regime will reportedly include munitions for the Iranian-made 15-Khordad air defense system, which Iran unveiled in 2019.[xi] It is unclear how the Assad regime plans to compensate Iran for this equipment. Some anti-regime outlets have reported that Iran sent 15-Khordad systems to Syria as early as 2020, although CTP cannot verify these reports.[xii]

These potential sales would be part of the Iranian effort to expand and strengthen the regime’s air defense capabilities in Syria to repel Israeli airstrikes. Iranian and Syrian officials have discussed such cooperation since 2020. Iranian state media outlet PressTV, which communicates regime messages to Western audiences in English, noted that the 15-Khordad system is capable of detecting fighter jets and combat drones.[xiii] Issuing the news through the state-run, English-language PressTV indicates that the regime wants to highlight the sale to the United States, Israel, and possibly European countries. Iranian leaders may calculate that Israel is less willing to target a weapons shipment entering Syria that is part of an official state-to-state arms sale. Iran may be trying to introduce its own air defense systems to Syria to replace the S-300 systems that the Russians reportedly withdrew from Syria in 2022.[xiv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian regime security forces escalated against prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid after months of relative restraint while concentrating forces in Zahedan. Abdol Hamid deescalated slightly in his Friday sermon, possibly in response to the regime’s more aggressive security approach. Some clerics within Abdol Hamid’s circle adopted a more aggressive position regarding the regime escalation in Zahedan.
• Iranian state media reported that Tehran will sell air defense equipment, such as radars and surface-to-air missiles, to Syria.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• The Iranian rial fell to a new record low, valuing at around 540,000 rials to the US dollar.
• Supreme Cultural Revolution Council Secretary Abdol Hossein Khosrou Panah called for establishing a cohesive state-run media apparatus to quickly and efficiently promote regime narratives publicly.

Iran Update, February 23, 2023

February 23, 2023 | 6:00 pm ET

Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implicitly warned of increased rifts between Iranian leadership and its youth in a speech addressed to the Assembly of Experts on February 23. Khamenei described the assembly—a body of 88 clerics responsible for supervising, dismissing, and selecting Iran’s Supreme Leader—as a paragon of democracy. All elected assembly members must secure approval from a separate supervisory council, vetted by Khamenei, before running for office.[i] Khamenei stressed the importance of “preserving”-- possibly implying that the regime risks losing--the Islamic Republic’s social capital and called on the assembly to increase political participation among Iranian youth, echoing similar calls from actors across the Iranian political spectrum in recent weeks.[ii] Khamenei added that measures to increase social capital must occur within the ideological boundaries of the regime, and tasked the Assembly of Experts with “monitor(ing) and maintain(ing) the overall movement and important parts of the regime (so that) the revolution does not digress like other revolutions.” Khamenei also seemingly warned against public criticisms of the regime’s core ideology, stating: “no one should say online or elsewhere that the Islamic Republic has created an enemy for itself” and advised officials against “talking loosely and illogically.” Khamenei seemed to frame connecting with Iranian youth as an uphill battle and told his audience that “one should not be offended by doubt … one should be prepared to face doubt.” Khamenei additionally urged officials to “perform (their) duties seriously and without fatigue or weakness of action,” possibly an exhortation to President Ebrahim Raisi, who attended the meeting.[iii] It is noteworthy that Khamenei did not signal his desire to end calls for the impeachment of Raisi administration officials, which parliamentarians have made in recent days as Iran faces significant economic challenges.[iv] The Supreme Leader previously instructed parliament against impeaching former President Hassan Rouhani in 2020, making his silence in this context conspicuous.[v]

Khamenei’s comments are not necessarily anomalous; he has previously acknowledged the regime’s shortcomings following recent protests.[vi] Khamenei’s solution to these shortcomings is not new, either. The Supreme Leader instructed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to further ideologize Iranian youth instead of granting sociocultural concessions, asking the Guard to “redouble its efforts to attract, nurture, and train talented youth … to strengthen the Guards’ spiritual, revolutionary, and military foundations” in a statement celebrating a regime holiday on February 23.[vii] The frequency with which and context wherein Khamenei is discussing the deepening divide between the Islamic Republic and its youth, however, indicates that Khamenei feels and wishes to express an increased sense of urgency even as other regime officials express urgency and alarm more openly.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately made an urgent appeal for governmental change in a parliamentary meeting on February 23. Ghalibaf warned that the regime risked delegitimization if it failed to reform, stating “if we do not reform governance...the sacred institution of the Islamic Republic will be harmed.” Ghalibaf added that “the survival of the Islamic Revolution without the people is questionable.” CTP has previously assessed that Ghalibaf is a pragmatic hardliner and that such calls for reform are made with the aim of strengthening the Islamic Republic rather than altering it fundamentally, as Ghalibaf appears sincere in his devotion to the ideals and preservation of the revolution.[viii] Ghalibaf stated that Iranian officials “must make the governance of the regime efficient” and that “the people like the revolution but criticize officials,” signaling his support for the ideological core of the regime but recognizing that the regime must introduce meaningful governmental reforms in order to avoid losing the people’s trust.[ix]

Ghalibaf delivered his comments at a meeting about the function of the Article 90 Committee. Article 90 of the Iranian Constitution and the Article 90 Committee relate to complaints against parliament, the executive, and the judiciary.[x] Article 90 also specifies the procedures for interpellating, impeaching, and removing officials of those bodies, including ministers and the president. Ghalibaf may have made this speech in response to recent calls among parliamentarians for the impeachment of Raisi administration officials.[xi] Ghalibaf may be aiming to discourage a frenzy of impeachment proceedings, as such actions risk exacerbating Iran’s internal issues and distracting officials from rectifying the economy. There is currently no direct evidence to support this hypothesis, however.

Ghalibaf explicitly called for parastatal organizations to decrease their involvement in the Iranian economy.[xii] Ghalibaf stated that a significant part of Iran’s economy is “khasoulati,” a term of opprobrium referring to the disproportionate role played by government-controlled organizations in the economy.[xiii] Ghalibaf added that former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had warned the government against interfering in affairs that the Iranian people can handle themselves (although Khomeini himself established a number of such organizations). These statements follow Ghalibaf’s speech on February 22 in which he implied that the IRGC is an obstacle to allowing the Iranian economy to operate efficiently. Ghalibaf may be suggesting that Iran’s economic issues can only be addressed through fundamental change.[xiv] Ghalibaf’s observations are accurate that parastatal organizations including, but not limited to, the IRGC and those it controls badly distort Iran’s economy and have interfered with efforts to increase Iran’s economic health and efficiency for decades. His focus on criticizing such organizations in a speech ostensibly about the constitutional article related to impeachment supports the hypothesis that he seeks to redirect parliamentary focus away from fruitless impeachment proceedings that cannot lead to economic improvement and toward addressing some of the root causes of the Iranian economy’s struggles.

An Israeli OSINT Twitter account circulated uncorroborated claims that unknown actors targeted two IRGC-affiliated complexes in the vicinity of Karaj, Alborz Province on February 23, citing inside sources.[xv] Local residents reported hearing blasts and anti-aircraft activity roughly 13 miles away from Karaj, Alborz Province.[xvi] One resident observed that that anti-aircraft activity ”seemed like it was targeting a drone,” consistent with footage that allegedly captured the event.[xvii] The Israeli OSINT Twitter account stated that the purported attack resulted in one casualty.[xviii] CTP cannot independently verify this report. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency acknowledged reports of explosions in Karaj, but claimed that such blasts resulted from ”Basij training exercises.”[xix] The footage allegedly capturing the event features two explosions on or near ground level. Israel previously conducted a kamikaze drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28, as CTP previously reported.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk.
• An Israeli OSINT Twitter account circulated uncorroborated claims that unknown actors targeted two IRGC-affiliated complexes in the vicinity of Karaj, Alborz Province, citing inside sources.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• Sports and Youth Minister Hamid Sajjadi has sustained serious injuries following a helicopter crash in Baft, Kerman Province.
• Iranian social media users continued to report symptoms of chemical poisoning among some high school students.
• An unnamed senior Iranian official told Al Monitor on February 23 that Iran would support reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or establishing a separate nuclear agreement with the United States.
• The Iranian rial continued to plummet on February 23, reaching approximately 526,500 rials to one US dollar.
• Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on February 21.
• Independent Iraqi political parties boycotted a session of Parliament.

Iran Update, February 22, 2023

February 22, 2023 | 6:00 pm ET

Growing elements of the regime are publicly recognizing that the Islamic Republic has lost the confidence of its people as Iran faces a period of severe economic disruption that risks further popular discontent. CTP has previously assessed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will tolerate limited criticisms of the regime, particularly those that pertain to Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions. Actors from across the political spectrum have subsequently acknowledged such issues and discussed the economy with urgency in recent days, suggesting that the regime must improve Iran’s economic conditions to regain the trust of an increasingly disillusioned populous. They have become increasingly vocal as the Iranian rial hit a new all-time low on February 21--valuing at around 500,000 for one US dollar--and as inflation rates hold at roughly 50 percent. The regime must implement significant economic reforms in order to meaningfully address Iran’s economic conditions, although it is presently unclear if Iranian officials have articulated and cohered around such a solution.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf framed anti-regime sentiments as economic in nature and called for a change in governance in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated conference on February 22. Ghalibaf identified economic conditions as the primary issue facing the regime. Ghalibaf claimed that foreign actors were capitalizing on the regime’s shortcomings to foment dissent, a prevalent talking point among hardliners, but noted that they would not have shortcomings to seize upon if the regime had been functioning efficiently. Ghalibaf also stated that “if we don’t pay attention to [the foundations and principles of the revolution], they will be stripped of their meaning,” insinuating that the regime had deviated from its ideological core. Ghalibaf specifically called on the IRGC to improve economic conditions and reexamine its role within Iranian society, using the collective “we” throughout his address. Ghalibaf stated that the IRGC must play an active role in “unraveling the knots” within the Iranian economic system and stressed the importance of having “a people’s economy,” suggesting that the economy no longer belonged to the people. Ghalibaf reminded his audience of the IRGC’s role within Iranian society, stating that “we must preserve our spirituality and know that we are not solely a military institution” and claimed that “we can solve the country’s economic problems, but we have to change our perspective and the way we govern.” It is unclear to which changes Ghalibaf was referencing, although the IRGC plays a dominant role within the Iranian economy and is an obstacle in allowing it to operate efficiently. Ghalibaf has previously endorsed economic and sociopolitical reforms in response to the Mahsa Amini protest movement, as CTP previously reported.

Parliamentarians are explicitly blaming the Raisi administration for Iran’s economic shortcomings. Hardline Parliamentarian Ahmad Naderi publicly announced on February 22 that a planned meeting among Raisi administration officials to discuss currency fluctuations had been postponed until February 25. Naderi emphasized that First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber and Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin could not attend the original meeting. Naderi may have been trying to portray these Raisi administration officials as apathetic towards and responsible for Iran’s worsening economic situation.

Hardline Parliamentarian Lotfollah Siah Kali separately called for the impeachment of unspecified Raisi administration officials during a public parliamentary address on February 22. This follows Iranian media reports on February 21 that parliamentarians held a closed-door meeting demanding the impeachment of “at least two to three” Raisi administration officials. Parliamentarians may follow through on impeachment threats to convey that they are actively working to confront Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.

Raisi officials have presented several superficial economic policies in recent days to confront growing criticisms of their administration. First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber headed a meeting on February 22 in which several Raisi administration officials approved a plan on sustainable food supplies. This plan likely seeks to lower Iran’s dependence on foreign food imports and may be an indicator that the Iranian rial’s depreciation is hampering the regime’s ability to purchase basic goods from abroad. Mokhber’s plan follows reports on February 21 that Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani wrote a letter to President Ebrahim Raisi warning of an impending basic goods shortage. The time required to establish new domestic food sources and current unfavorable environmental conditions make it is highly unlikely that Iran will become agriculturally self-sufficient in the near future. This plan is likely intended to alleviate public frustrations in the short-term rather than providing long-term solutions to Iran’s economic problems.

Ideological hardliners are blaming inflation and the depreciation of the Iranian rial on foreign actors, signaling that they may be unwilling to pursue meaningful reforms to improve Iran’s economy. Raisi Administration Spokesperson Ali Bahadori Jahromi stated on February 21 that Iran’s enemies had recently prioritized the economic dimension of their purported “hybrid war” aimed at overthrowing the regime. Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Legal Council Chairperson and Expediency Discernment Council and Assembly of Experts Member Gholam Reza Mesbahi Moghaddam separately blamed the depreciation of the Iranian rial on “the US’ currency war against Iran” on February 21. Such statements underscore that some hardline officials are cognizant of Iran’s dire economic conditions, but are reluctant to take responsibility for alleviating them. The regime can—and did not—make meaningful concessions on the core political and sociocultural issues that sparked the Mahsa Amini movement, which will likely exacerbate public grievances with the regime if it fails to resolve ongoing economic issues.

Key Takeaways

• Growing elements of the regime are publicly recognizing that the Islamic Republic has lost the confidence of its people as Iran faces a period of severe economic disruption that risks further popular discontent.
• Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf framed anti-regime sentiments as economic in nature and called for a change in governance in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated conference.
• Parliamentarians are explicitly blaming the Raisi administration for Iran’s economic shortcomings.
• Raisi officials have presented several superficial economic policies in recent days to confront growing criticisms of their administration.
• Ideological hardliners are blaming inflation and the depreciation of the Iranian rial on foreign actors, signaling that they may be unwilling to pursue meaningful reforms to improve Iran’s economy.
• At least eight protests occurred in four cities across four provinces on February 22.
• An Iranian official confirmed on February 22 that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials were currently in Iran to investigate reports of 84 percent enriched uranium at an unspecified nuclear facility.
• Axios reported that Iranian officials are currently deprioritizing ballistic missile exports to Russia, citing a senior Israeli official.
• The IDF carried out a daytime raid to apprehend suspected Palestinian militants operating in Nablus, the West Bank.
• Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Mohammed Mohie met with Aleppo Province Governor Ahmad Hussein Diab.
• Between 250-300 Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Republican Guard personnel deployed to positions along the right bank of the Euphrates River near Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.

Iran Update, February 21, 2023

February 21, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what pattern of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase. Protest activity has increased substantially in recent days, including at least 15 protests on February 16, 12 protests on February 19, 14 on February 20, and seven on February 21. This increased turnout is the most that CTP has recorded since assessing that the Mahsa Amini movement culminated in January 2023. This renewed protest activity could indicate that the movement has regained momentum after what was in effect an operational pause. It is unclear if protest activity in this new phase will resemble the patterns that CTP first observed in the Mahsa Amini movement or what form acts of anti-regime defiance will take. It is also unclear how long this uptick in protest activity will last.

Western media outlets have reported lingering discontent throughout the Iranian population, corroborating CTP’s prior assessment that conditions remain present for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity. The Washington Post reported on February 19 that protesters in Saghez, Kurdistan Province—the birthplace of Mahsa Amini and site of significant anti-regime activity in recent months—are preparing for further unrest. Protesters reportedly stated that the regime has failed to address their grievances and that they have begun stockpiling materials to fight security forces, including Molotov cocktails. Protesters added: ”we’re ready for the next clash. All it needs is a spark.” The Associated Press separately reported enduring sociopolitical and economic grievances among several pro-regime individuals in the conservative city of Qom. One cleric told the outlet that he strongly disapproved of the regime’s brutal protest crackdown and felt increasingly strained by Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.

Moderate and reformist politicians are urgently renewing their calls for the regime to address protester grievances. Former Rouhani administration First Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri insinuated that Iranian leadership had lost touch with its people and urged the regime to apologize for its shortcomings in an interview on February 21. Jahangiri stated that “Iran is in danger, and [the Mahsa Amini protests] were reaching a point where they could and still can endanger Iran.” Jahangiri called on regime loyalists and supporters to “show their credibility” and address protester grievances. Jahangiri additionally asserted that the regime suffered from fundamental and structural flaws, stating that “our structure is such that stable solutions do not come from it. . . we usually erase problems instead of solving them.”[v] Two former politicians affiliated with former reformist President Mohammad Khatami separately discussed the deepening divide between Iranian leadership and its population. Mohammad Ali Abtahi—a reformist politician and associate of Khatami—urged the regime to reframe its approach to Iranian youth participating in recent unrest on February 19. A former Khatami cabinet official also claimed that Iranian officials’ disinterest in communicating with the public would only increase anger with the regime on February 19. Khatami called for reforming various regime institutions, such as the Assembly of Experts and Guardian Council, but did not suggest a referendum on the Islamic Republic as did Mir Hossein Mousavi, on February 5.

Iran continues to face severe economic issues, which may fuel increased political attacks against President Ebrahim Raisi and his administration. The Iranian rial hit a new all-time low, valuing at around 500,000 for one US dollar on February 21. The regime responded by imposing new restrictions on how many Euros air passengers may withdraw in Iran, likely to prevent any significant reduction in the regime‘s foreign currency reserves. UK-based anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that regime officials are concerned about severe shortages in basic grocery items, although CTP cannot verify this reporting. Numerous regime officials have expressed growing alarm over the economic situation in recent days as well. These officials include Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Raisi administration spokesperson Ali Bahadori Jahromi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has long used the presidency as a relief valve for popular economic discontent and may similarly allow the regime to direct blame unto the Raisi administration. Raisi pledged to stabilize the national currency during a meeting with Khamenei and other Iranian leaders on February 18, affirming his responsibility for the matter. Parliamentarians, such as hardliner Javad Nik Beyn, have suggested summoning Raisi and his ministers to Parliament for questioning. Such summonses are common in Iran but can conclude with Parliament impeaching the president or members of his cabinet if enough lawmakers approve (although no Iranian president has been removed from office by parliament). Nik Beyn previously attacked the Raisi administration for failing to designate a single individual to manage economic policy, as CTP previously reported. There are numerous officials involved in shaping the Raisi administration’s economic policy. Many of these officials have ties to other regime power centers, such as the IRGC, judiciary, or various parastatal economic giants. These interpersonal connections will likely introduce an additional political dynamic to any parliamentary efforts to summon and/or remove officials from the Raisi administration. This parliamentary activity, which was the norm under previous presidents, shows that Raisi’s hardliner credentials and cabinet and rumors that Khamenei has selected him to be the next supreme leader are no longer shielding him personally or his cabinet from political attacks and possibly even impeachment proceedings. It is likely an indication that parliamentarians are very concerned about the threat the regime faces in the form of popular discontent.

The worsening economic conditions in Iran are facilitating solidarity and possibly cooperation between protest organizers and some domestic economic actors. Twenty Iranian civil society and economic organizations published a political manifesto on February 14, criticizing the regime protest crackdown and expressing support for the Mahsa Amini protests. The signatories included organizations representing industrial and petrochemical workers, retirees, students, and various activist groups. Eighteen protest groups, including the United Youth of Iran, issued a joint statement expressing solidarity with the signatories on February 18. Economically driven protests have become increasingly common in recent weeks, and CTP hypothesized that labor groups are coordinating some of this protest activity. The civil society and economic organizations that signed the manifesto may have facilitated these recent demonstrations and strikes, although CTP cannot verify that hypothesis at this time.

Protest organizers may leverage popular economic frustrations to generate further political unrest against the regime. Making economic frustrations into a political issue would essentially invert the narrative that Iranian leaders have asserted in recent weeks. Many regime officials have focused on the role that poor economic conditions have played in driving the Mahsa Amini protests, as CTP previously reported, rather than addressing the core political and sociocultural factors that triggered the movement.

The efforts of regime officials and protest groups to associate the protest movement with economic issues will complicate any regime effort to de-escalate with the population. The regime cannot easily control macroeconomic trends in Iran but could have made meaningful concessions on the core political and sociocultural issues that sparked the Mahsa Amini movement. Iranian leaders have instead doubled down on their commitment to ideologizing the population and continuing to enforce the mandatory hijab law, while rhetorically tying the protests to the economy that they are struggling to improve.

Bloomberg reported on February 19 that International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) monitors had detected 84-percent-enriched uranium—the highest level of enrichment in Iran reported to date—at an unspecified nuclear facility, citing two senior diplomats. It is unclear how much uranium Iran has produced at this level of enrichment. Weapons-grade uranium purity is enriched to around 90 percent. The IAEA had previously condemned Iran on February 1 for failing to inform it of ”substantial” changes and enriching uranium of up to 60 percent at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.

Key Takeaways

• The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what the pattern and nature of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase.
• Western media outlets have reported lingering discontent throughout the Iranian population, corroborating CTP’s prior assessment that conditions remain present for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity.
• Moderate and reformist politicians are urgently renewing their calls for the regime to address protester grievances.
• Iran continues to face severe economic issues, which may fuel increased political attacks against President Ebrahim Raisi and his administration.
• The worsening economic conditions in Iran are facilitating solidarity and possibly cooperation between protest organizers and some domestic economic actors.
• The efforts of regime officials and protest groups to associate the protest movement with economic issues will complicate any regime effort to de-escalate with the population.
• Bloomberg reported on February 19 that International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) monitors had detected 84-percent-enriched uranium—the highest level of enrichment in Iran reported to date—at an unspecified nuclear facility, citing two senior diplomats.
• At least 12 protests occurred in 10 cities across eight provinces on February 19, 14 protests occurred in 14 cities across 13 provinces on February 20, and seven protests occurred in six cities across five provinces on February 21. CTP did not record protest activity on February 18.

Iran Update, February 17, 2023

February 17, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

Actors from across the Iranian political spectrum are publicly acknowledging Mir Hossein Mousavi’s February 4 call for “foundational change” in the Islamic Republic. Mousavi discussed holding a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic and suggested drafting a new constitution on February 4, as CTP previously reported. Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid expressed support for a referendum on the “regime and system” during his weekly Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on February 17.[i] Abdol Hamid did not explicitly reference Mousavi, but his use of the term “referendum” demonstrates that he is likely seeking to keep Mousavi’s idea of “foundational change” at the forefront of Iran’s internal political debate.

Mousavi’s political opponents have also publicly discussed his February 4 statement in recent days. Ardabil Friday Prayer Leader Seyyed Hassan Amali stated on February 17 that pro-regime marches on February 11 symbolized a “national referendum,” suggesting that the regime is attempting to appropriate Mousavi’s message in order to increase its own legitimacy.[ii] The Reformist Front Coordination Council separately released a statement on February 16 endorsing Khatami’s February 5 statement but rejecting Mousavi’s “approach of amending the constitution after obtaining the opinion of the people through a referendum.”[iii] By publicly discussing Mousavi’s revolutionary statement, these opponents are inadvertently legitimizing the very ideas they seek to undermine. This may have the unintended consequence of increasing support and traction among the Iranian people and various government officials for Mousavi’s call for fundamental change.

Iran is reportedly taking advantage of humanitarian aid convoys to move rockets or missiles into eastern Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that Iran-backed militants deposited two weapons shipments at a warehouse in Abu Kamal and a third at a warehouse in Deir Ezzour, Syria.[iv] Shipments to Abu Kamal and Deir Ezzour allegedly included munitions and unspecified logistical equipment according to SOHR.[v] Iran-backed militias transported weapons shipments in humanitarian aid convoys for earthquake victims as CTP previously reported.[vi]

CTP is currently considering three possible courses of action that Iranian-backed proxies may take. Weapons shipments containing short-range munitions may be used to target US and Coalition targets in the vicinity of Deir Ezzor. CTP previously reported that likely Iran-backed militants flew a reconnaissance drone over the Conoco Mission Support Site as a test of US air defense systems, according to an unspecified Iranian military advisor on February 16.[vii] Short-range rockets would also be capable of reaching this site. However, Iranian weapons shipments to Syria containing mid to long-range munitions would likely be used to hit Israeli targets. Alternatively, Iran-backed militants may not be planning an imminent strike and instead may be taking advantage of humanitarian aid convoys to stockpile weapons for future attacks. CTP will continue to monitor developments and refine its assessment.

Iran targeted an Israeli-owned oil tanker in the Arabian Sea on February 10, according to Western reports. A BBC journalist announced on February 17 that Iranian drones had targeted the commercial Campo Square ship but caused no serious damage or casualties, citing a US military official.[viii] The source stated that the attack involved several Iranian ships and likely a Shahed-136 drone, one of the UAVs Russia has been using in its invasion of Ukraine.[ix] The February 10 attack on the Campo Square may be a retaliation to the Israeli drone strike on a on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.

Key Takeaways

• Actors from across the Iranian political spectrum are publicly acknowledging Mir Hossein Mousavi’s February 4 call for “foundational change” in the Islamic Republic.
• Iran is reportedly taking advantage of humanitarian aid convoys to move rockets or missiles into eastern Syria.
• Iran targeted an Israeli-owned oil tanker in the Arabian Sea on February 10, according to Western reports.
• At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces.
• The Ministry of Intelligence and Security Deputy Hossein Hojjati stated on February 17 that approximately 30,000 security personnel participated in suppressing the Mahsa Amini protest movement.
• Iranian officials continued to frame increased Sino-Iranian cooperation as a partial solution to Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.

Iran Update, February 16, 2023

February 16 | 5:00 pm ET

Iran and its proxies may be preparing for a major effort with military elements in northern Syria. Senior officers from the IRGC Quds Force, its Iraqi proxies, the Assad regime, and possibly Russian forces have participated in a flurry of meetings throughout Syria in recent days. These meetings are noteworthy given their frequency and the seniority of their participants. Local media has framed many but not all of these meetings as ostensibly related to earthquake relief. That explanation is improbable considering that most participants lead or represent military and paramilitary groups but do not include the officials who would normally be involved in delivering humanitarian assistance and because of reports that Iran is moving fighters and weapons in ostensibly humanitarian convoys. The order of the recent meetings is as follows:

February 8: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and senior IRGC officer Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi traveled to Aleppo, Syria.

February 9: The commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, traveled to Aleppo and may have met with Ghaani and other Iranian officers.

February 10: Syrian President Bashar al Assad traveled to Aleppo and met with Iraqi proxy leader Abu Fadak al Mohammedawi. Mohammedawi is currently the chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces and was previously the secretary general of Iraqi proxy Kataib Hezbollah.

February 12: Ghaani met with Latakia Provincial Governor Amer Ismail Hilal. Officials from Lebanese Hezbollah may have accompanied Ghaani.

February 13: Ghaani and Mohammedawi met with Assad at the Aleppo International Airport.

February 16: Assad met with chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces Falih al Fayyadh in Damascus.

These meetings notably did not include representatives of the Syrian or Iranian foreign ministries or of the organizations normally responsible for emergency responses, healthcare, finances, or economic activities.

CTP previously assessed that the Quds Force may be reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake. Iranian-backed militants have been smuggling likely weaponry and military equipment disguised as humanitarian aid convoys through eastern Syria since the earthquake on February 5. Pro-Syrian-opposition Thiqa News reported that five trucks with disaster relief markings arrived at a military storage warehouse in Hama Province on February 16. Thiqa News also reported that Iranian-backed forces in more than 150 vehicles—many likely transporting military equipment and weapons—had arrived in Aleppo by February 13.

It is difficult to assess at this time what these officials have discussed in their recent meetings, and CTP is considering several hypotheses. Iran and its proxies may be discussing supporting a pro-Assad-regime offensive into Idlib Province—currently held by former al Qaeda affiliate and currently Turkish-backed Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al Sham—amidst the Turkish government’s distraction and disrupted operations. The February 5 earthquake caused widespread destruction in Gaziantep and other areas along the Turkey-Syria border. The Turkish military (and possibly Erdogan’s government altogether) may be too preoccupied with disaster relief operations to mobilize to deter a pro-Assad-regime offensive before it begins--or at least Iran and its partners may hope so. Iran may not intend to execute this potential offensive into Idlib, on the other hand, but could instead intend to use its threat to improve its own and the Assad regime’s bargaining positions with Turkey. Iran and its proxies may be alternatively discussing efforts to entrench themselves further in northern Syria, and around Aleppo specifically, to repel any future Turkish ground incursion in the months and years ahead.  CTP will continue to monitor the situation for indicators of which course of action the Iranians and their proxies and partners might take.

Protest organizers successfully generated significant turnout for the planned countrywide protests on February 16. CTP recorded 15 protests in 13 cities across 12 provinces on February 16, the most significant uptick in anti-regime protest activity since CTP assessed the Mahsa Amini protest movement culminated in January 2023.

This success suggests that the factors that initially drove the protests to culminate have subsided to varying extents. These factors included extremely cold weather and severe pollution, the heavy securitization of some Iranian cities and towns, protester exhaustion and the need to return to work and normal life, and the imprisonment of many thousands of protesters. CTP previously argued that these factors were temporary and would subside with time. Weather conditions in Iran have improved marginally in recent weeks. The regime has deployed security forces, especially to northwestern Iran to assist with earthquake relief efforts and preempt unrest following the earthquake, possibly reducing the securitization of some Iranian cities and towns. Protesters have had time to recuperate. And the recent amnesty of “tens of thousands” of protesters has released many from prison, although CTP cannot verify how many protesters on February 16 were part of this amnesty. Protest groups may have realized that they could take advantage of these changing factors to drive increased turnout when planning the demonstrations on February 16. The groups have also been saying that they have been actively reorganizing themselves and did post clear and unambiguous calls for the February 16 protests in contrast with the disorganization and confusion that had marked some of their earlier failed attempts to bring demonstrators into the streets.

This latest uptick in protest activity demonstrates once again that the choice to engage in anti-regime protests and acts of political defiance lies with the Iranian people. Neither the regime nor the protest groups are able to decide when protests do or do not occur. It is uncertain whether the Iranian people will choose to sustain this increased protest activity. It is clear, however, that anti-regime sentiments remain strongly entrenched among certain segments of the population.

Hardline Iranian media is continuing to give increased public attention to prominent moderates and reformists who have criticized the regime. Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), published an article on February 16 criticizing former moderate President Hassan Rouhani and the performance of his administration. The article claimed that Rouhani had the lowest approval rating of any Iranian president after the revolution. Tasnim News Agency was responding to Rouhani’s recent criticisms of the regime and efforts to reenter the political space, which CTP reported previously. Hardline media has similarly focused on attacking former reformist President Mohammad Khatami and reformist politician Mir Hossein Mousavi in recent days, further drawing attention to their criticisms of the regime. These attacks are injecting the arguments and views of these moderate and reformist leaders into the hardline information space even as hardliners try to discredit them.

Hardliners may be intentionally giving air to moderate and reformist individuals and their views in an attempt to lure some alienated segments of the population back toward the regime. Hardliners have consolidated control over the three branches of the formal Iranian government—the presidency, parliament, and judiciary—since 2019, locking many prominent moderates and reformists out of government and out of political discourse more generally. These actions likely antagonized many moderate and reformist supporters. Highlighting the presence of diversity across the Iranian political spectrum and the public debate among officials may be intended to reduce moderate and reformist supporters disillusionment with the Islamic Republic. Expediency Discernment Council Mohammad Reza Bahonar may have been articulating this theory when he endorsed political activity from “benign reformists” on February 15.

Senior Iranian officials promoted the slogan “Woman, Chastity, Security” on February 14, capturing much of the regime response to the Mahsa Amini protests. Vice President for Women’s and Family Affairs Ensieh Khazali and Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib attended a conference titled “Woman, Chastity, Security”—an alternative to the popular “Woman, Life, Freedom” chant that has pervaded recent protests. This alternative slogan is not entirely new and has circulated on social media to a limited extent in recent months. The use of the slogan nevertheless captures how Iranian political and security leaders have largely responded to the protests by calling for greater ideologization and using extreme force rather than addressing core protester grievances. The continued emphasis on this rhetoric suggests that the Raisi administration remains committed to this approach.

Key Takeaways

• Iran and its proxies may be preparing for a major effort with military elements in northern Syria.
• Protest organizers successfully generated significant turnout for the planned countrywide protests on February 16. At least 15 protests occurred in 13 cities across 12 provinces.
• Hardline Iranian media is continuing to give increased public attention to prominent moderates and reformists who have criticized the regime.
• Senior Iranian officials promoted the slogan “Woman, Chastity, Security” on February 14, capturing much of the regime response to the Mahsa Amini protests.
• An unidentified individual threw homemade hand grenades at a Basij base in Mohammad Shahr, Alborz Province.
• The UN released a report detailing that unidentified member states assess that the de facto leader of al Qaeda, Saif al Adel, is currently living in Iran.

Iran Update, February 14, 2023

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is positioning himself to reenter the political arena after a period of relative absence. Rouhani promoted his administration’s economic, foreign, defense, and health policies in a standing meeting with his former cabinet members on February 13 that he publicized.[i] Rouhani stressed the need to “restore the people’s trust,” implicitly acknowledging deepening divides between the regime and the Iranian public following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, and called on Iranian officials to consider criticisms of the regime seriously. Rouhani framed ongoing unrest as economically-motivated, and endorsed less government involvement in the Iranian economy, a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and democratically-held elections. Rouhani separately urged his former cabinet to provide policy recommendations to the Raisi administration, stating that “it is (their) national and religious duty to convey every opinion and thought (they) have to the government. Regardless of whether we think it’ll work or not.”[ii] It is noteworthy that Rouhani publicized his meeting with former moderate reformist officials, although such meetings are not new. Iranian media previously reported that Rouhani was cooperating with other moderate and reformists in attempt to regain political influence in early 2022.[iii]

Rouhani is playing an increasingly prominent role in discussing the future of the regime following the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Rouhani criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the political sphere in an interview on February 1, after a period of relative silence.[iv] Rouhani separately described deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as an urgent threat and suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had failed to sufficiently address such divides on February 7.[v] His rhetoric in the meeting he publicized on February 14 is relatively milder and more focused on economic problems than his previous statements. Rouhani may be tempering his rhetoric in response to Khamenei’s drawing of boundaries of acceptable discourse. CTP previously assessed that Khamenei‘s February 8 speech indicated that he will tolerate limited debates on reform, but will not sanction discussions in line with reformist politician Mir Hossein Mousavi’s calls for ”foundational” change in Iran.[vi]

Rouhani has additionally launched a new website and Twitter account in recent months, possibly signaling his attempt to return to the public arena.[vii] Rouhani is eligible to run in the 2025 Iranian Presidential elections, although it is unclear whether he intends to do so.[viii] Khamenei is seemingly continuing to permit Rouhani to publicly discuss how the regime should respond to recent protests. Khamenei could see allowing Rouhani and other moderate and reformist actor to reenter the political arena could serve as a pressure relief valve to address mounting grievances without having to fundamentally alter the regime.

Iran Update, February 13, 2023

The IRGC Quds Force is likely coordinating a large-scale effort to consolidate its control and influence over critical transportation routes and nodes through Syria. Kataib Hezbollah (KH)—an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—assumed control of a key logistics chokepoint on the Iraqi side of the al Qaim border crossing on February 11 likely to facilitate Iranian weapons shipments into Syria.[i] A Syrian Twitter account reported that KH has begun expediting the transfer of such shipments across the border, likely to mitigate the possibility of an Israeli airstrike interdicting and destroying them. The Quds Force and Iranian-backed militias have expanded their presence on the Syrian side of the border in recent years.[ii] Iranian control over both sides of the crossing has consolidated Iranian control of an important node on the ground line of communication that connects Iran to western Syria and Lebanon. CTP previously assessed that the Quds Force is exploiting the recent earthquake in Syria and Turkey to justify these changes in border personnel.[iii]

The Quds Force is similarly attempting to expand its presence over an important transportation corridor that runs from Damascus to northern Syria. Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo Province on February 8 and likely met with the commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, as CTP previously reported.[iv] He later traveled to Latakia Province and met with its governor, Amer Ismail Hilal, on February 12.[v] Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) officials likely accompanied Ghaani during his time in Aleppo based on available imagery, shortly before LH sent a 23-truck humanitarian aid convoy to northern Syria on February 12.[vi] Ghaani may have coordinated with Serdyukov and Hilal on the Quds Force expanding control over critical transportation routes connecting northern Syria to central Syria along the M4 and M5 highways.

Iran has long sought to consolidate control of these key transportation nodes to deepen its control and influence in Syria. Iran has secured positions along major land routes throughout the country and heavily participated in the battle to retake Aleppo from the Syrian opposition in 2016.[vii] Northern Syria—especially Aleppo—is a location of significance to most major actors in Syria, including Russian forces, the Assad regime, Syrian Democratic Forces, Hayat Tahrir al Sham, and Turkey and its affiliated Syrian militias. Expanding Iranian influence in northern Syria could grant Tehran greater leverage over the Assad regime by increasing Iranian control over one of the most important economic hubs and transit corridors in Syria. Expanding Iranian influence could also facilitate military cooperation with Russia. Moscow controls the Hmeimim airport in nearby Latakia Province and uses it for various military operations and possibly arms transfers. Tehran, finally, likely seeks to expand its military presence in northern Syria to improve its defensive posture to deter or if necessary resist a Turkish ground incursion nearby.

The Quds Force is using humanitarian aid as cover for its efforts to expand its presence in key areas likely to obstruct Israeli efforts to interdict and destroy Iranian weapons shipments into and around Syria. Expanding Iranian control over multiple supply routes into and through Syria, such as the al Qaim border crossing, Aleppo airport, and Latakia port, will likely complicate Israeli efforts to identify and strike weapons shipments. Increasing the number and types of possible means of transportation and the number of potential targets—officially claimed to be humanitarian aid convoys by Iran—can impede Israeli target selection.

Iranian leaders and state-run media promoted the narrative that the regime has popular support surrounding the anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic on February 11. Iranian officials organized pro-regime rallies throughout Iran and issued statements celebrating them on February 11. Some officials claimed that turnout was significantly greater than in previous years, although images and videos of the rallies do not suggest a significant difference if any at all.[viii] Regime officials separately focused heavily on the amnesty and commutation of sentences that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei granted arrested protesters on February 6.[ix] Officials and state-run media framed the amnesty as a step toward reinforcing popular support for the regime.[x]

President Ebrahim Raisi announced on February 13 that he obtained permission from Khamenei to extend the amnesty and commutation of sentences to university students and celebrities.[xi] It is not clear that these groups were previously excluded from Khamenei’s decree or that Raisi’s statement represents any meaningful change in the policy that Khamenei had already announced. Raisi may have made the statement to positively frame himself to the public as being involved in the amnesty and commutation of sentences and able to secure boons from the supreme leader on behalf of the people.

Some Iranian officials focused on discussing economic grievances rather than publicly continuing the conversation they have had in recent days about the growing alienation of the population. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has previously called for limited economic and sociopolitical reforms, discussed economic frustrations with parliamentarians on February 11.[xii] Raisi stated that his administration is actively working to solve the country’s economic problems during a pro-regime rally in Tehran February 11.[xiii] The IRGC separately published a statement on February 11 in which it wrote that the regime must make effective and serious plans to alleviate economic and livelihood difficulties.[xiv] These regime officials are correctly acknowledging protesters’ economic frustrations but ignoring at least publicly the other issues driving discontent, such as the social oppression of women, human rights abuses, and expanding censorship.

The regime meanwhile continued to crack down aggressively on violations of the mandatory hijab law, further highlighting the regime’s eagerness to return to what it perceives to be normalcy. Raisi stated on February 12 that cultural and media organizations must “persuasively explain” the importance of hijab to the public.[xv] Iranian media separately reported on February 13 than an LEC officer received “educational vindication” after failing to confront an unveiled women in Kermanshah Province.[xvi]

Former President Hassan Rouhani acknowledged on February 11 that the Islamic Republic has not returned to a normal state of affairs despite hardliner officials’ efforts to return to business as relatively usual. Rouhani emphasized that the Islamic Revolution belongs to “the people” and that the revolution will end if a “power-hungry minority” pushes the majority aside.[xvii] Rouhani’s statement is noteworthy in that he has continued to call for broader change to the regime rather than discussing economic issues as Raisi and Ghalibaf did.

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC Quds Force is likely coordinating a large-scale effort to consolidate its control and influence over critical transportation routes and nodes through Syria. Iran has long sought to consolidate control of these key transportation nodes to deepen its control and influence in Syria.
• Iranian leaders and state-run media promoted the narrative that the regime has popular support surrounding the anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic.
• Some Iranian officials focused on discussing economic grievances rather than publicly continuing the conversation they have had in recent days about the growing alienation of the population.
• CTP recorded one protest on February 11, three protests on February 12, and ten protests on February 13.
• Over 300 Iranian activists, journalists, and reformist politicians signed an open letter expressing support for Mir Hossein Mousavi and his calls for “foundational” change in Iran.
• Amwaj Media—a UK-based, anti-regime site—reported on February 12 that Iranian officials have renewed internal discussions over whether to establish a parliamentary system, citing an unidentified hardline source.
• President Ebrahim Raisi is conducting an official visit to China from February 13 to 16.

Iran Update, February 10, 2023

February 10, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force is probably reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake on February 6. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani arrived in northern Syria on February 9—as CTP previously reported—with Quds Force official Mohammed Reza Zahedi—who formerly was a liaison to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and Syrian military intelligence for weapons shipments.[i] The Quds Force’s mission—covert lethal activities outside of Iran, including asymmetric warfare and special operations—is ill-suited for disaster relief operations. Their arrival of under the pretext of disaster relief suggests Iran is attempting to exploit the humanitarian crisis to entrench and expand its military presence in northern Syria, as CTP previously reported.[ii]

Ghaani and Zahedi’s appearance in northern Syria follows deployments around Aleppo that also indicate the IRGC Quds Force is reinforcing its presence in the province. Syrian Arab Army (SAA) personnel replaced LH militants “distributed within the front lines of western” Aleppo on January 10.[iii] Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) also formed a joint operations center with the Syrian Arab Army to facilitate engineering, medical, and logistics support in Aleppo Province, which demonstrates greater coordination between the two in northern Syria. [iv] Iran-backed Fatemiyoun militants—which the IRGC-QF or LH typically oversee—also established positions in northeast Aleppo on February 3.[v] CTP has not observed LH activity since January 10 in Aleppo Province, where it has held positions since at least 2013.

Iran possibly coordinated the movement of Iranian-backed forces in Aleppo Province with Russia and Syria. The newly appointed commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, was in Aleppo when Ghaani and Zahedi arrived on February 9.  CTP and ISW cannot confirm Serdyukov met with either of the IRGC Quds Force officials.[vi] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meet with Iraqi PMF Chairman and Kata’ib Hezbollah leader Abu Fadak on February 10 in Aleppo.[vii]

The senior IRGC Quds Force and PMF officials’ highly publicized appearance in northern Syria probably also is part of an information operation aimed at Israel and Turkey. Iran may aim to demonstrate to Israel its ability to operate and remain in northern Syria. Israel acknowledged the implications of this development on February 8, when an unidentified Israeli military official asserted Iran will take advantage of the February 6 earthquake to move in weapons.[viii] Iran also possibly intends to signal its presence to deter a future Turkish ground incursion by occupying tactically advantageous points near the border.

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid implicitly called for revolutionary change to the Iranian regime and sought to broaden his appeal beyond Sunni Iranians on February 10. Abdol Hamid stated in his weekly Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province that the Iranian population had lost hope in the regime’s ability to manage ongoing economic issues and characterized recent protests as economically motivated. He criticized military officials for their overinvolvement in governance, stating “military persons should only be active in the military arena” whereas “politicians and political experts” should be engaged in the political administration of the country. Abdol Hamid also stated that "political experts" residing outside of the country should return to the country and govern Iran.[ix] Although his comments echo regular calls to reverse “brain drain” within Iran, singling out the need for “political” experts to return suggests applying Western theories of governance to Iran and subverting the anti-Western ideological core of the Islamic Republic. Combating “Westoxification”—a perceived loss of Iranian and Islamic identity due to the spread of Western ideas and practices—has been a rhetorical touchstone of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his predecessor.[x] Abdol Hamid’s comment conveys undermining the revolutionary nature of the regime.

Abdol Hamid likely sought to extend his influence beyond Sunni-Iranian communities during his Friday prayer sermon. Abdol Hamid downplayed religious divisions in Iran, stating that “there is no such thing as Shia or Sunni” and that the Iranian people “are one,” adding “officials should not worry about a dispute between Shias and Sunnis.”[xi] Abdol Hamid stated in a separate part of his sermon that women became second-class citizens and Sunnis became third-class citizens following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, possibly to signal that his movement seeks to address the grievances of various oppressed groups in Iran beyond the Sunni community.

Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon was a rhetorical de-escalation from his Tweet on February 9 in which he declared explicit support for Mir Hossein Mousavi’s revolutionary call for “foundational” change in Iran.[xii] Abdol Hamid did not reference Mousavi in his February 10 sermon, possibly to avoid alienating segments of his congregation who oppose the controversial figure or the Green Movement he led in 2009. He may have also been preempting the possibility of protesters cohering around Mousavi, which would contain Abdol Hamid within his own movement. Abdol Hamid’s ability to strategically escalate and de-escalate against the regime—and the consistent protest turnout that he generates in Zahedan—underscores the skill with which he leads anti-regime activity within his community.

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC Quds Force is likely reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake on February 6.
• The senior IRGC Quds Force and PMF officials’ highly publicized appearance in northern Syria probably also is part of an information operation aimed at Israel and Turkey.
• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid implicitly called for revolutionary change to the Iranian regime and sought to broaden his appeal beyond Sunni Iranians on February 10.
• At least five protests occurred in four cities across four provinces.
• Several senior regime officials called on the Iranian population to participate in pro-regime demonstrations commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic on February 11.
• The Sunday Times reported on February 10 that IRGC personnel were experiencing “doubt and confusion” following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, citing inside sources.
• Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexev Dedov announced on February 10 that the National Iranian Oil Company and Russian state-owned Gazprom were engaged in consultations on developing of gas fields inside Iran.
• The Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the IRGC Intelligence Organization published a joint statement announcing the arrest of perpetrators behind the drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.

Iran Update, February 9, 2023

February 9, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid escalated rhetorically against the regime on February 9, expressing support for reformist calls for “fundamental” change in Iran. Abdol Hamid tweeted criticizing the regime for placing reformist politicians Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi under house arrest for leading the 2009 Green Movement. Abdol Hamid added that Mousavi has demonstrated that he “understands the realities of society” and urged regime officials to do so as well. Abdol Hamid was referring to the statement from Mousavi on February 4, in which he adopted a revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary in the context of the Islamic Republic) tone, calling for a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic and for the drafting of a new constitution if that referendum fails.

Abdol Hamid’s statement crossed the rhetorical boundaries that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has appeared to set for internal regime discourse. Khamenei indicated on February 8 that he will tolerate limited debates on reform and how to address protester grievances but warned officials against infighting and slander. Khamenei added that “some who become revolutionaries do not remain revolutionaries,” likely referring to Mousavi and indicating that he would not tolerate support for Mousavi or his positions.

Abdol Hamid may seek to gain support from a wider range of protesters, particularly those who support Mousavi and other reformists. Abdol Hamid has largely spoken to the Iranian Sunni minority to this point. But Abdol Hamid could increasingly appeal to reformist supporters and certain Shia throughout Iran by aligning with the leaders of the Green Movement. Abdol Hamid may seek to expand his support base to further pressure the regime and raise the cost the regime would likely incur if the security forces arrest Abdol Hamid or continue arresting clerics close to him.

The regime may respond by escalating against Abdol Hamid during his weekly Friday sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on February 10. The regime has sent security reinforcements to Zahedan since early January 2022 to deter and intimidate Abdol Hamid and his supporters but has refrained from interfering with the weekly demonstrations thus far. Iranian political and security leaders find themselves now in a difficult position. Abdol Hamid has so clearly crossed Khamenei’s red line that the regime will appear weak if it takes no action against him. But the regime clearly fears taking action that could inflame not only Zahedan and Sistan and Baluchistan Province but also the larger Iranian Sunni minority.

Hardline officials may be inadvertently facilitating and amplifying the calls from Mousavi and other reformists for serious change. Several pragmatic hardline officials initiated the regime conversation over how to respond to the Mahsa Amini protests and address popular grievances days before Mousavi issued his statement. These officials are all close advisers to Khamenei: Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi. These officials expressing concern over the alienation of the population opened the way to a large discussion about fundamental problems facing the regime after a number of regime officials had labored to present the protest movement as over. The dialogue these pragmatic hardliners initiated may have encouraged Mousavi to issue his statement going much further.

Iranian state media has attacked Mousavi and his statement in recent days, likely drawing further attention to his rhetoric inadvertently. Outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the judiciary have attacked and tried to discredit him. These attacks have included presentations of some of Mousavi’s extreme views and have thereby injected those views into the hardline information space even as they seek to discredit them.

Some protest groups are attempting to generate significant protest activity throughout Iran for the first time since late January 2022, indicating that they believe they have regained the ability to do so. The Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union (INYU) and affiliated groups have called for countrywide demonstrations on February 16 to mark 40 days since the judiciary executed Mohammad Hosseini and Mohammad Mehdi Karami.

CTP previously assessed that the protest movement likely culminated in January 2022 after protest groups repeatedly failed to generate turnout for planned demonstrations. At least four factors likely contributed to the culmination at that time:

• Extremely cold weather and severe pollution
• Heavy securitization of some Iranian cities and towns
• Protester exhaustion and need to return to work and normal life
• Regime imprisonment of many thousands of protesters

These factors have likely subsided to varying degrees, which may have encouraged protest organizers to try to again generate significant turnout. Iran is getting marginally warmer after an unusually cold winter.[ix] The regime has redeployed security forces, especially to northwestern Iran to assist with earthquake relief efforts and preempt unrest following the earthquake. Protesters have had time to recuperate. And Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei granted amnesty to and commuted the sentences of “tens of thousands” of protesters on January 6, freeing many from prison. The regime has begun releasing detained protesters, some of whom promptly began chanting protest slogans. Protest groups may hope that the release of detained protesters will translate into much larger groups in the streets on February 16.

The protest groups calling for renewed countrywide demonstrations risk undermining themselves within the protest movement if they fail to generate turnout. The INYU statement calling for protest activity on February 16 included signatures from 50 different protest groups, suggesting that the INYU has expanded its organizational network. It is unclear to what extent these signatures reflect meaningful cooperation, however.

The recently appointed commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, traveled to Aleppo, Syria on February 8 and may have met with IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani. Syrian media reported that Serdyukov discussed disaster relief for earthquake victims during his visit. Serdyukov previously commanded Russian forces in Syria from April to September 2019. Russian military leadership reappointed Serdyukov to this position in January 2023 as part of a larger reshuffling of senior Russian military command positions prior to the initiation of the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Ghaani traveled to Aleppo on the same date as Serdyukov, as CTP previously reported.

Key Takeaways

• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid escalated rhetorically against the regime, expressing support for reformist calls for “fundamental” change in Iran.
• Hardline officials may be inadvertently facilitating and amplifying the calls from Mousavi and other reformists for serious change.
• Some protest groups are attempting to generate significant protest activity throughout Iran for the first time since late January 2022, indicating that they believe they have regained the ability to do so.
• The newly appointed commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, traveled to Aleppo, Syria and may have met with IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri stated that over 90 security officers have died in the Mahsa Amini protest movement.
• President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian have tried to defend the regime’s protest crackdown and treatment of women to an international audience in recent days.

Iran Update, February 8, 2023

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo City, Syria on February 8. Iranian state media reported on Ghaani’s visit and published a video of him overseeing humanitarian operations in response to the February 6 earthquake that has devastated southern Turkey and northwest Syria. A pro-regime social media account also posted images of Ghaani meeting with an unspecified Iranian field commander.

Iranian state media does not typically acknowledge when Ghaani or other senior Quds Force officials travel to Syria. Ghaani’s presence in Aleppo—and Iranian state media’s anomalous coverage of the visit—suggests the Iranian regime is conducting an information operation. Iran may intend to signal its commitment to maintaining and further entrenching its military presence in northwest Syria and throughout the rest of the country. Turkish and Russian officials could interpret Ghaani’s trip, and the related February 7 Popular Mobilization Forces deployment to Aleppo that CTP previously reported, as Iran’s response to its past exclusion from Moscow-facilitated reconciliation talks between Turkey and the Assad Regime. Turkey and Russia may also read Ghaani’s highly conspicuous public appearance as an attempt to gain additional negotiating leverage for subsequent reconciliation talks. Assad Regime officials could similarly interpret Iranian actions as a message that they must consider Iranian interests before entering into any diplomatic agreement with Turkey.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set rhetorical conditions for how regime officials should discuss divides between Iranian leadership and its people, suggesting that he may tolerate limited debates on the future of the regime. Khamenei implicitly acknowledged divisions between the regime and the Iranian people and called for national unity in a speech commemorating the Artesh Air Defense Force’s pledge of allegiance to Islamic Republic Founder Ruhollah Khomeini on February 8. Khamenei stated that disagreements regarding women, religion, and generational differences were inevitable, but such disagreements should not become “faults” within the regime. The supreme leader added that the Iranian people must not permit Iran’s enemies to capitalize on its internal divisions.

Although Khamenei has periodically chastised regime infighting and discussed divisions within Iran’s political establishment, his reference to internal fissures is noteworthy as hardline figures have increasingly acknowledged deep societal divides in recent days. Hardline President Ebrahim Raisi stressed the importance of repairing schisms with arrested protesters on the sidelines of a religious meeting on February 7. Raisi reiterated Khamenei’s rhetorical distinction between protesters and “rioters” and urged regime entities to facilitate the return of lawful protesters to the fold. The president of Imam Hossein University—an institution closely affiliated with the IRGC and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics—suggested that Iranian leadership had lost touch with its people on February 8. IRGC Basij Commander Brigadier General Gholam Reza Soleimani separately acknowledged “current problems” and emphasized the country-wide need to expeditiously solve such problems. Supreme Leader Military Adviser IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi made a similarly oblique reference to the “problems” the regime faced on February 6, as CTP previously reported.

Khamenei did not prohibit ongoing debates on how the regime should respond to the grievances that led to the Mahsa Amini protest movement in his February 8 address, but appeared to set rhetorical limits to the debates by warning that political disputes must not lead to fighting and slander. He additionally stated that “some who become revolutionaries do not remain revolutionaries,” possibly referencing Mir Hossein Mousavi’s calls for “foundational” change in Iran. Mousavi, who partly led the 2009 Green Movement, adopted a largely revolutionary tone in his February 4 statement and discussed the need for a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic, as CTP previously reported. Khamenei’s implicit references to and rejection of Mousavi’s statement may signal that he will not tolerate calls for significant structural or ideological changes to the regime.

 Key Takeaways

• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo City, Syria on February 8.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set rhetorical conditions for how officials should discuss responding to divides between Iranian leadership and its people, suggesting that he may tolerate limited debates on the future of the regime.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• The Iranian Judiciary announced on February 8 that it began releasing prisoners in Alborz, Ghazvin, Semnan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Tehran, and West Azerbaijan Provinces.
• Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani met with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in Moscow.
• Vice President for Parliamentary Affairs Mohammad Hosseini announced that President Ebrahim Raisi will travel to China at an unspecified time in the near future.
• The IRGC Aerospace Force displayed a Shahab-3 missile featuring “Death to Israel” during a military exhibition in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.
• Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani met with Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri in Beirut.

Iran Update, February 7, 2023

Multiple Iranian political factions, including hardliners, are coalescing around the assessment that the regime has lost touch with its people. Former moderate President Hassan Rouhani continued to frame the deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as an urgent threat and suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has failed to sufficiently address such divides on February 7. Rouhani described Khamenei’s efforts to grant amnesty to and commute the sentences of “tens of thousands” of prisoners and arrested protesters as “a starting point.” Rouhani called on the regime to pursue policies aimed at addressing protester grievances, including reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and easing ongoing internet restrictions. Rouhani also stated that actions that damage “human dignity. . . go against national security and public interests,” inverting the regime’s narrative that anti-regime dissidents and critics threaten Iranian internal security.[i] Rouhani previously criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the Iranian political sphere in an interview on February 1, as CTP previously reported.[ii]

It is noteworthy that Rouhani did not comment on Mir Hossein Mousavi’s calls for “foundational” change in Iran. Mousavi, who partly led the 2009 Green Movement, adopted a largely revolutionary tone in his February 4 statement and discussed the need for a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic.[iii] Rouhani had the opportunity to but did not reject or distance himself from Mousavi’s statement. CTP has not presently observed other prominent moderate and reformist politicians dismiss Mousavi’s calls for significant structural changes to the regime, which could signal implicit support for Mousavi’s proposals. Mousavi’s comments may alternatively embolden some moderates and reformists to continue to promote targeted reforms.

Iran Update, February 6, 2023

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has taken several public-facing measures in recent days likely to alleviate public frustrations toward the regime. Khamenei met with a group of schoolgirls on February 3, during which he celebrated the role of women of Iranian history and society.[i] Iranian state-run media widely promoted images from the event, showcasing a particularly ham-fisted regime propaganda effort. Khamenei was likely responding in part to the public criticisms of the regime mistreatment of women during the Mahsa Amini protests. Khamenei separately granted amnesty to and commuted the sentences of “tens of thousands” of protesters on January 6.[ii] The regime will require eligible detainees to “express remorse,” essentially pleading guilty, according to some reports.[iii] It is unclear on what charges and legal grounds the regime had detained these protesters to this point. The Iranian constitution requires that law enforcement agencies submit to judicial authorities an explanation of the charges for each individual no more than 24 hours after their arrest, but it is unclear whether the regime has followed such standards in its detention of thousands of protesters.[iv]

Khamenei may have decided to conduct this public outreach and supposed amnesty in response to senior officials urging the regime to reconcile with its people in recent days. Several pragmatic hardline officials have voiced concern over the alienation of the population and emphasized the need to maintain a constructive dialogue with them, as CTP previously reported.[v] These officials include Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi. Ultra-hardline figures, such as various IRGC commanders, have contrastingly adopted a harsh and uncompromising position vis-a-vis the protests, framing the unrest exclusively as a foreign conspiracy and manifestation of Western hybrid warfare against the regime.[vi]

The pragmatic hardliners may have succeeded in conveying to Khamenei the urgency with which the regime must address popular grievances but may have failed to convince him to take any meaningful action to address protester demands. Khamenei is likely continuing to misdiagnose the core issues driving the protests. He has indicated in recent months that he defines the unrest as a sociocultural and religious issue and seems to believe that the solution is trying to further ideologize the population.[vii]

Recent rhetoric from senior reformist figures reflects the divisions within this faction. Mir Hossein Mousavi, who partly led the 2009 Green Movement, called for “foundational” change in Iran in a statement on February 4.[viii] Mousavi adopted a largely revolutionary tone, discussing the need for a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic and suggested drafting a new constitution. Former reformist President Mohammad Khatami adopted a critical but slightly more tempered tone toward the regime in a statement on February 5.[ix] Khatami called for reforming various regime institutions, such as the Assembly of Experts and Guardian Council, but did not suggest any referendum on continuing the Islamic Republic. These statements thus show that there are at least four different categories into which regime officials fall regarding how to respond to the protest movement: uncompromising hardliners, pragmatic hardliners, reformists seeking to reform the political system, and reformists seeking a fundamentally new political system.

These reformist statements, especially Khatami’s, may create space for regime officials to discuss possible reforms in response to the recent protests. Iranian state media, including outlets affiliated with the IRGC, reported on Khatami’s argument and will thus likely draw some attention to it.[x] CTP has seen no indication that Khamenei is prepared to accept any meaningful reforms, however.

Failures of Western sanctions efforts against the provision of arms components to Iran have likely contributed to Russia’s ability to bypass Western sanctions to acquire components for combat drones through military cooperation with Iran. US officials stated on February 5 that Russia and Iran are moving ahead with plans to build an Iranian drone factory on Russian soil, the second such international Iranian drone factory.[xi] Iran opened a drone production factory in Tajikistan - a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member state and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) candidate - in May 2022.[xii] Russia may leverage its significant economic ties to Tajikistan through the CSTO and EAEU to launder drone components or procure manufactured drones for use in Ukraine in an effort to bypass international sanctions.[xiii]

UK investigative group Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported in November 2022 that 82% of Iranian Shahed-131, Shahed 136, and Mohajer-6 drones downed in Ukraine had chips, semiconductors, and other components that came from the US despite high import and export control restrictions on such components to Iran.[xiv] CAR also noted that the downed drones contained higher-end technological capabilities and have a ”significant jump in capabilities” compared to other systems previously observed in the Middle East.[xv] Most Western-manufactured components in the downed Iranian drones were produced between 2020 and 2021, following the expiration of United Nations Security Council heavy arms sanctions against Iran in 2020.[xvi] Most Western companies whose components were found in downed Iranian drones in Ukraine denied directly selling components to Russia, Iran, or Belarus since the start of the war.[xvii] However, the representative of a Swiss manufacturing company noted that it is impossible to be completely sure that distributors of arms components do not sell components to sanctioned entities, implying that Russia, Iran, or other sanctioned states can exploit loopholes allowing them to acquire Western-produced arms components via proxy actors.[xviii]

Regime-affiliated social media accounts have claimed that the Artesh—Iran's conventional military—will make a major announcement, possibly related to the acquisition of Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, on February 8.[xix] The regime recognizes this date as Artesh Air Force Day and has historically used the occasion and other similar ones to announce and celebrate recent technological achievements. Parliamentarian Shahryar Heydari previously stated that Iran will receive an unspecified number of Su-35s from Russia early in the next Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024), as CTP previously reported.[xx] Tehran likely seeks these aircraft and other advanced military platforms in exchange for it militarily supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has taken several public-facing measures in recent days likely to alleviate public frustrations toward the regime.
• Recent rhetoric from senior reformist figures reflects the divisions within this faction.
• Regime-affiliated social media accounts have claimed that the Artesh—Iran's conventional military—will make a major announcement, possibly related to the acquisition of Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, on February 8.
• CTP recorded no protest activity on February 4. CTP recorded at least one protest on February 5 and at least three protests on February 6.
• Parliamentarian Hassan Nowrouzi announced that a specialized parliamentary committee approved a controversial internet censorship bill, known as the Cyberspace Protection Bill, and will soon send it to the Guardian Council for final approval.
• Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani will travel to Moscow at some point in the next week, according to the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Iran Crisis Update, February 3, 2023

The Iranian regime is in a steady pattern of escalation with prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, which risks stoking sectarian tensions in Iran. Abdol Hamid is an outspoken regime critic who has used his Friday sermons in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province to inspire weekly demonstrations criticizing regime mistreatment of Iranian Baloch and mistreatment of protesters. Abdol Hamid began facilitating these demonstrations initially in response to the Bloody Friday event in Zahedan on September 30, in which security forces attacked protesters and killed around 100 individuals.[i] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded by trying to organize an effort to discredit Abdol Hamid, according to a leaked Fars News Agency bulletin, and dispatching a personal delegation to meet with him in November 2022.[ii] Both efforts failed to silence Abdol Hamid and his supporters.

Both sides have escalated further in recent weeks. The regime has sent security reinforcements to Zahedan since early January 2022 to deter and intimidate Abdol Hamid and his supporters.[iii] These deployments began around the same time that Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan as law enforcement commander, although it is unclear if these events are related.[iv] Regime security forces have reportedly blocked roads leading into Zahedan, conducted mass arrests, and established checkpoints throughout the city.[v] Security forces also arrested a Sunni cleric tied to Abdol Hamid in Zahedan and two other local Sunni leaders in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province on January 30.[vi] Although the regime has allowed the Friday demonstrations to continue each week with minimal security interference, likely to avoid repeating the Bloody Friday incident and further fueling anti-regime frustrations. Abdol Hamid has responded by framing himself as a grassroots leader for disenfranchised Sunni communities across Iran. He criticized the heightened security presence in Zahedan, expressed support for similar Sunni-led demonstrations in Golestan and Kurdistan provinces, and spoke to protesters directly on a street in Zahedan, during which demonstrators shouted anti-regime chants.[vii]

This ongoing escalation pattern between the regime and Abdol Hamid could stoke further tensions between the regime and its Sunni population. Abdol Hamid remains capable and willing to organize protests each Friday even though the rest of the protest movement has culminated, as CTP previously assessed. The regime seeks to avoid this trajectory but has inadvertently facilitated it through its heavy handed and uncompromising response to Abdol Hamid and his supporters.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime is in a steady pattern of escalation with prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, which risks stoking sectarian tensions in Iran.
• At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces.
• An Israeli open-source Twitter account tweeted a claim that the recent Israeli kamikaze drone strike in Esfahan targeted a centrifuge assembly facility.
• Several protest groups, including the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union, circulated posts calling on “Turks” to publicly condemn the regime oppression of Iranian Baloch.
• The Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Division delivered a shipment of drones and rockets to the Mahin military storage facility near al Qaryatayn, Homs Province in Syria, according to anti-regime outlet Qasioun News.

Iran Crisis Update, February 2, 2023

February 2, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

A group of pragmatic hardliners are continuing to cohere around calls for the regime to reconcile with its alienated population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—a hardline Iranian official and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General—urged the regime to examine its weaknesses on February 2, expounding on his February 1 comments about schisms between the Islamic Republic and its population. Ghalibaf warned that Iran’s enemies would exploit its weaknesses if the regime failed to probe them.[i] Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately urged Iranian officials to rectify economic, livelihood, and social justice issues and stated that Iran’s adversaries would “seize this weakness,” rhetorically mirroring Ghalibaf’s warning on the same date.[ii] Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi additionally stated that the regime must engage in constructive dialogue with activists who operate within the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic and stressed the importance of political participation on February 2.[iii] Vahidi is an IRGC Brigadier General and formed Quds Force Commander and was the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Vahidi is currently an elected official of the ultra-hardline Raisi administration and oversees the Iranian Law Enforcement Command--which the regime mobilizes to violently suppress anti-regime demonstrations—making Vahidi’s calls for improving political engagement with the Iranian population particularly noteworthy. Vahidi previously acknowledged that the Mahsa Amini protest movement had created deep sociopolitical fissures between the regime and Iranian youth on January 26.[iv] Ghalibaf’s, Ejei’s, and Vahidi’s comments follow former President Hassan Rouhani’s February 1 statement implying that Iranian leadership had lost the support of its population.[v]

Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that former Rouhani officials discussed limiting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s authority on January 30, citing exclusive access to an audio file of the meeting. Former President Hassan Rouhani’s Deputy for Logistics and former North Khorasan Provincial Governor Mohammad Reza Salehi allegedly criticized the regime's response to the Mahsa Amini protest movement and its economic policies in a meeting with other unspecified former Rouhani administration provincial governors and former First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri. Iran International claimed that Salehi framed anti-regime sentiments as an urgent threat to the Islamic Republic and stated that structural reforms were the only solution to this threat. Salehi allegedly criticized recent privatization initiatives and legislation proposals aimed at curtailing freedom of speech and likened sham trials for arrested protesters to “a systemic massacre.” The former Rouhani administration official also alleged that former Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari offered to issue a televised apology for Mahsa Amini’s death but was instructed to violently suppress unrest, presumably by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei dismissed Ashtari as law enforcement commander on January 7, likely due to Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the LEC in responding to the protests.[vi] Iran International also claimed that Salehi advocated for convincing Khamenei to hold referenda to reduce the Supreme Leader’s executive powers and suggested that the next Supreme Leader might oppose such a referendum. These comments, if true, corroborate other indicators that supreme leader succession is coloring how the Iranian political establishment is conceptualizing and responding to the Mahsa Amini protest movement.[vii]

CTP cannot verify the claims made in Iran International’s February 1 article, but this reporting is consistent with prior CTP assessments about internal regime divisions caused by recent unrest and by increasing regime focus on supreme leader succession. CTP previously wrote that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s refusal to concede on the mandatory hijab law was likely driving fissures among the political elite on October 18.[viii] Iran International’s February 1 article additionally coheres with multiple CTP assessments that hardline officials were pursuing sociopolitical reforms in hopes of preempting further unrest. Such officials include Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, Vice President for Economic Affairs Mohsen Rezaei, and Ghalibaf.[ix]

Recent reporting and comments from Iranian officials on February 1 and 2 suggests the coherence of a group of pragmatic hardliners who acknowledge the disconnect between the regime and its population and are struggling with hardline ideologues who are either unable or unwilling to recognize the grievances that led to the Mahsa Amini protest movement. The pragmatic hardliners ultimately seek to preserve and strengthen the regime through limited concessions and should not be seen as seeking or supporting any fundamental changes in the nature of the regime. Recent statements and reports suggest a certain degree of urgency with which this faction seeks to bridge societal divides as the regime continues to enforce policies that led to recent unrest. CTP assessed on January 20 that the Mahsa Amini protest movement had largely culminated but that the conditions for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity remained intact.[x] It is possible that individuals within the pragmatic hardline camp have reached a similar assessment.

Key Takeaways

• A group of pragmatic hardliners are continuing to cohere around calls for the regime to reconcile with its alienated population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests.
• At least one protest occurred in one city across one province.
• Iranian regime-affiliated news outlets confirmed reports that one hundred protesters chanted anti-regime slogans and damaged pro-regime symbols in Abdanan, Ilam Province on February 1.
• Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for expanding ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
• A senior Iranian diplomat explicitly blamed Israel for the January 28 drone attack on a military munitions factory in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province for the first time and warned of Iran’s right to retaliation.
• Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zahreh Pour announced on February 2 that unknown actors conducted a cyberattack that significantly impacted Iranian internet infrastructure on January 24.
• President Ebrahim Raisi defended his administration’s economic policies amidst growing criticism.
• The Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike on two Hamas weapons manufacturing facilities in the Gaza Strip.
• Turkish forces have likely withdrawn from a military checkpoint located in Qastoun, Syria.
• The Iraqi and Saudi governments signed a memorandum of understanding to link Iraq’s electrical grid to the Saudi electrical grid on February 2

Iran Crisis Update, February 1, 2023

February 1, 2023 | 5:30 pm ET

Iranian officials across the political spectrum are cohering around different lessons the regime should draw from the protest movement and how to best respond. Former reformist president Hassan Rouhani criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the political sphere in an interview on February 1. Rouhani implied that Iranian leadership had lost the support of the Iranian population and acknowledged the existence of deep societal fissures following the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Rouhani urged Iranian officials to address protester grievances by enforcing corresponding cultural and political changes, although he did not specify the nature or content of these changes. Rouhani framed deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as a serious threat to the legitimacy and preservation of the regime, stating: “we have no choice but to preserve and fix the regime […] we must bring the people who have turned away from us back into the fold.” Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—a hardline Iranian official and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General—echoed Rouhani’s warnings of schisms between the regime and its people on February 1. Ghalibaf stressed the importance of Iranian leadership maintaining a dialogue with the population and stated that “the Islamic Revolution has no meaning without the participation of the people […] the people are the foundation of the revolution.”

Moderates and reformists have previously called for greater plurality and participation within the Iranian political establishment; they have sought to regain their influence following the regime-backed election of President Ebrahim Raisi in 2021. Rouhani’s criticisms of the regime coincide with a ten-day holiday commemorating the 1979 return to Iran of Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini—the founder of the Islamic Republic--however, making his comments particularly noteworthy. It is also significant that Ghalibaf--a prominent hardliner--has echoed moderate and reformist talking points in recent months. Ghalibaf endorsed limited economic and sociopolitical reforms in a parliamentary address on November 5, 2022 and described changes made within the parameters of the Islamic Republic as ”legitimate and necessary.” Officials affiliated with Ghalibaf have separately blamed other hardliners’ uncompromising and inflexible views for stoking the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Rouhani and Ghalibaf constitute part of an increasingly broad swath of pro-regime actors adopting a pragmatist approach to anti-regime sentiments and are seeking to gain the support of disillusioned Iranian youth. This camp likely seeks to strengthen the regime through pragmatic measures like increased dialogue with alienated Iranians and limited sociopolitical concessions. It is unclear how and to what extent this camp seeks to execute such measures, although it is clear that it does not seek to overthrow or significantly alter the regime.

Ultra-hardline individuals offered a contrasting solution to addressing anti-regime sentiments and advocated for greater indoctrination and paternalistic social control measures on February 1. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami dismissed recent unrest as a foreign conspiracy aimed at minimizing the regime’s regional influence in a speech. Tehran Province IRGC Commander Ahmad Zolghadr called on Iranian officials to ”better explain” the Islamic Republic’s ideology to Iranian youth on February 1 and described the regime’s protest suppression response to the Mahsa Amini movement as ”tolerant” and restrained. Human rights organizations estimate that Iranian security personnel have killed at least 522 protesters since September 16. Iranian officials separately promoted initiatives that would enforce mandatory veiling laws on February 1. Calls for exerting increased control over the Iranian population are likely to exacerbate tensions between the regime and its people, however, and are based a fundamental misdiagnosis of the root causes of anti-regime sentiments.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian officials across the political spectrum are cohering around different lessons the regime should draw from the protest movement and how to best respond.
• IRGC-affiliated and ultra-hardline individuals advocated for exerting greater control over Iranian youth and women on February 1.
• At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on February 1.
• Protest organizations called for individual and sustainable acts of anti-regime defiance from February 1-11.
• Iranian officials close to President Ebrahim Raisi are attempting to downplay recent criticisms of the Raisi administration.
• President Ebrahim Raisi ordered First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber to form a working group to implement Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s economic recommendations.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International published a report claiming that the officials working at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad are involved in an IRGC Quds Force money laundering operation.
• A credible, open-source intelligence Twitter account claimed unspecified IRGC forces are preparing to conduct cross-border attacks on anti-regime Kurdish groups along the Iran-Iraqi Kurdistan border.
• A possibly Iran-backed militia launched at least eight rockets at the Zilkan Turkish military base near Bashiqa, Nineveh Province, Iraq.