Iran Updates, January 2025

Iran Update, January 30, 2025

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released three Israeli hostages during the third hostage release on January 30.[i] Hamas released a female soldier hostage in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas transferred her to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the eastern Jabalia refugee camp.[ii] PIJ released two Israeli civilian hostages in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip.[iii] Hamas also released five Thai hostages on January 30.[iv] Israel released 110 Palestinian prisoners in exchange.[v] The ceasefire agreement requires Hamas to release an additional three Israeli hostages on February 1.[vi]

Hamas attempted to signal that it retains the ability to coordinate and communicate with other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip. Several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, the Palestinian Resistance Committee, and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement accompanied PIJ as it released two Israeli hostages in Khan Younis on January 30.[vii] Hamas claimed that the presence of these militias “confirms the unity” among these groups.[viii] The release of the two hostages comes after PIJ failed to release an Israeli hostage on January 25. CTP-ISW assessed on January 27 that PIJ’s failure to release the hostage on January 25 is unlikely to be the result of a rift between Hamas and PIJ.[ix] The militias could face challenges due to weakened institutional coordination mechanisms between the militias after months of IDF operations.

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cutoff on January 29.

The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) will likely not reduce the threat that these militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and their political wings have reportedly considered a negotiated settlement in which the militias would integrate into the PMF in return for political appointments.[x] These militias, which reportedly include Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, seek key positions in the Iraqi federal government, including the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC).[xi] The PMC is responsible for ensuring that militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi Federal government.[xii] Some members of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework seek to remove current PMC Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, in part due to disputes between Fayyadh and PMF Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi.[xiii] The replacement of Fayyadh with another Iranian-backed figure would not make the PMF any less beholden to Iran than it currently is, nor would it result in the PMC fulfilling its duty to ensure the PMF answers to the Iraqi government. Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada all control brigades in the PMF that answer to the militias and Iran rather than the Iraqi prime minister. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would therefore fail to reduce the threat that these militias pose to the United States and its partners.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted an unarmed reconnaissance drone in Lebanon as it flew toward Israel on January 30.[xiv] Lebanese Hezbollah has not mentioned the drone or claimed it as a Hezbollah drone at the time of this writing. The drone may have moved south to monitor Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah last launched a drone towards Israel on November 26, before the ceasefire went into effect.[xv] This incident comes after the United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon extended the ceasefire until February 18, when Israel will presumably withdraw from Lebanon.[xvi]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara said that Syrian sovereignty “under one authority and on one land” is a priority of the HTS-led interim government on January 30.[xvii] Shara officially became the Syrian interim president on January 29.[xviii] Shara said that he consulted with “legal experts” before he assumed the role of president and will work to form a transitional government that represents “the diversity of Syria.”[xix] Shara also stated that he would build state institutions and an economy free of corruption, prosecute former regime elements accused of crimes against the Syrian people, and impose Syrian “sovereignty under one authority and on one land.”[xx] Shara and other former HTS interim government officials have maintained that they will not allow any “federal” entities in Syria.[xxi] This demand has complicated negotiations with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has so far rejected every HTS proposal that limits its political and security autonomy.[xxii] Shara notably did not invite SDF representatives to the “Victory Conference” on January 29.[xxiii]

Shara promised to appoint an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and announced the formation of a preparatory committee for the National Dialogue Conference, which will reportedly represent “different points of view.”[xxiv] Shara said that, once these steps are complete, the government will release a “Constitutional Declaration” that will serve as the legal basis for the transitional period.[xxv] Shara did not specify who or which groups will write the “declaration” and if the National Dialogue Conference will impact the contents of the declaration.

Iran Update, January 29, 2025

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government held a “victory conference” on January 29, during which it formalized much of its consolidation of power since the fall of Bashar al Assad.[i] The conference announced the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as the transitional president, though has informally been the de-factor of the interim government for months. Shara is now responsible for forming an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and approved, according to the conference.[ii] Shara, at the conference, identified his priorities as ”filling the power vacuum, preserving civil peace, building state institutions, working to build a developmental economic infrastructure, and restoring Syria's international and regional standing” in his speech.[iii] Shara has previously described the interim government overseeing a three-to-four transition period, during which he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.[iv]

The victory conference separately announced the disbanding of all Assad regime institutions and its constitution.[v] The interim government has proposed previously holding a representative Syrian national dialogue to write a new Syrian constitution, though it is unclear whether a date or any participants have yet been identified.[vi]

The victory conference also announced the planned dissolution of all former opposition parties in Syria. The conference specifically stated that “all military factions, political, and civil revolutionary bodies will be dissolved and integrated into state institutions.”[vii] This decree follows months of talks between HTS and armed groups.[viii] The interim Defense Ministry announced on January 19 that over 60 military factions agreed to join the new Syrian armed forces.[ix]

Military factions allied with HTS that participated in the overthrow the Assad regime attended the conference, including Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) leaders, who are sanctioned by the United States for abuses against Kurds.[x] An anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) source reported that the SDF was not invited to the conference.[xi] It remains unclear if the interim government’s decree dissolving all military factions will apply to the SDF or if the SDF has agreed to such terms. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said January 14 that he wants the SDF to integrate into the Defense Ministry as a “bloc,“ which the interim defense minister reportedly rejected.[xii]

Russia and the HTS-led interim Syrian government failed to reach an agreement on January 28 on Russian basing in Syria. A Russian delegation that included Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Special Presidential Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev traveled to Syria on January 28 to discuss Russian access to its military bases at Latakia and Tartus.[xiii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Russia and HTS only agreed to continue discussions.[xiv] An unspecified Russian source similarly told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[xv] The stalled negotiations come as Russia continues to evacuate military assets from its bases at Latakia and Tartus.[xvi]

Iran Update, January 28, 2025

Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. Turkey and Ocalan have reportedly reached an agreement in which Ocalan will publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. Unspecified Turkish officials told regional media on January 27 that Ocalan's announcement would "easily" pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[i] This belief reflects misplaced Turkish thinking that the entire SDF will be responsive to PKK demands, which is unlikely. The SDF is composed of Syrian Kurds, some of whom were members of the PKK. The SDF’s leadership presumably recognizes that Turkish-backed attacks pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF and Kurds, given that many Turkish-backed forces have previously committed human rights abuses against Kurdish people in northwestern Syria. The SDF is unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active military attacks, regardless of Ocalan’s position.

The Turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria. The SDF has articulated clear and specific demands since it began talks with the HTS-led government in late December 2024. These demands include joining the new Syrian army as an integrated unit, remaining deployed in northeastern Syria, and maintaining some regional autonomy in a ”decentralized” system.[ii] It is unlikely that the SDF would ”easily” give up these demands if the PKK disarms.

An unspecified source told Middle East Eye that Turkey seeks to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to participate in the political system in Damascus.[iii] The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[iv] The SDF and PYD almost certainly hope to be involved in the political system in Damascus, but that is not mutually exclusive with SDF demands for regional autonomy. The SDF’s stated demands suggest that it would not be satisfied with mere political representation in Damascus and that it seeks firmer guarantees of political and security autonomy.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.[v] Araghchi stated that Iran would ”have to look for an alternative” if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[vi] The E3 has until October 2025 to trigger snapback sanctions if it decides to do so. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[vii] The IAEA Board of Governors is next set to meet in March 2025.[viii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions.[ix] Araghchi added that there is a "heated debate" in Iran about what an "alternative" to diplomacy would be.[x] Araghchi is likely referring to the debate among Iranian officials about whether Iran should revise its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear weapon.[xi] That Araghchi interviewed with British outlet Sky News in English suggests that his statements were directed at the E3.

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[xii] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[xiii] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[xiv] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[xv] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[xvi] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[xvii]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[xviii] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta. [xix]Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships - likely the Sparta and Sparta II - had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[xx]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut-off on January 27.

Key Takeaways:

• Kurds in Syria: Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the PKK to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. The Turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.
• Russia in Syria: The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.

Iran Update, January 27, 2025

Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement.[i] Hamas agreed to release a female civilian hostage held by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.[ii] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) announced that Hamas would release the hostage and two additional Israeli hostages on January 30.[iii] This is in addition to the three hostages Hamas will release on February 1.[iv] Hamas also provided Israel with a list that confirmed 18 of the 26 remaining hostages scheduled for release during the first phase of the ceasefire are alive.[v] The list did not specify which specific individuals were and were not alive, however.

PIJ’s failure to release the hostage is unlikely to be a result of friction between PIJ and Hamas. PIJ has previously released hostages as part of the November 2023 ceasefire agreement and it has not engaged Israeli forces in the strip during the ceasefire, which indicates that PIJ continues to cooperate with Hamas.[vi] Hamas released four female Israeli soldiers as part of the second hostage release on January 25 before PIJ agreed to release the fifth hostage.[vii] Hamas leads a 12-member coalition of Palestinian militias that allows Hamas to coordinate operations between various Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[viii] The breakdown surrounding the release of the fifth hostage on January 25 could be the result of a breakdown in the coordination mechanisms within this coalition, rather than a disagreement between the two factions. IDF operations have probably weakened the institutional coordination mechanisms between the two factions on the ground in the strip.  

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor on January 27 to allow Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip via established routes.[ix] The IDF withdrew from the corridor two days later than mandated under the ceasefire because Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by failing to release a hostage.[x] Gazans began returning to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road, which is the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[xi] US and Egyptian private security contractors started operating a checkpoint on the Netzarim Corridor along the Salah al Din Road where they will inspect Palestinian vehicles returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[xii] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued instructions to Gazans as they returned to the northern strip and prohibited returnees from carrying weapons.[xiii] The spokesperson reiterated the IDF’s warnings that asked Gazans to avoid Israeli forces. Social media footage showed a large number of Palestinians moving to the northern Gaza Strip uninspected as several Hamas fighters greeted them along al Rashid Road.[xiv]

The return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire if Israel and Hamas fail to agree on a second-phase ceasefire.[xv] Relatively few Gazans remained in the northern Gaza Strip after months of intense Israeli combat operations.[xvi] The lack of civilians enabled Israeli forces to operate more freely with a decreased risk that Israeli troops would encounter civilians. The return of approximately 650,000 Gazans will significantly increase the number of civilians in the northern strip, which will complicate the execution and planning of IDF operations.[xvii] New major Israeli combat operations would necessitate the evacuation of Gazan civilians, for example.

Individual Hamas fighters disguised as civilians who move north on foot could also be able to bring small numbers of weapons and small amounts of ammunition to Hamas forces in the north. Such an effort to move supplies by foot is likely insufficient to resupply Hamas forces to a point that would seriously challenge Israeli forces if the IDF resumes operations.

The United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days.[xviii] The ceasefire will now be in effect until February 18.  Axios reported that the Trump administration negotiated the extension with Israel and Lebanon over the past few days.[xix] The ceasefire will presumably require the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon by February 18. The LAF is also expected to backfill the IDF by this date. Israel has withdrawn from about three positions in southern Lebanon thus far and remains active in at least 12 border towns, according to local Lebanese media.[xx] An IDF spokesperson announced on January 27 that the IDF had recently ”re-deployed” to several unspecified locations in southern Lebanon in order to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure.[xxi] The IDF spokesperson said that the implementation of the ceasefire ”is postponed” in some areas of Lebanon as the IDF needs more time to ensure that Hezbollah cannot use those areas to rebuild itself.[xxii]

Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next three weeks. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected the ceasefire’s extension in a January 27 speech and called on Israel to withdraw immediately.[xxiii] Hezbollah had previously threatened to resume attacks on Israel if Israel stayed in Lebanon past the January 26 deadline.[xxiv] Qassem said that Hezbollah ”has the right to act as it sees fit” against Israel and that any ”repercussions” from the IDF’s delayed withdrawal are the responsibility of Israel and the monitors of the ceasefire, which includes the US, France, and the UN.[xxv] Qassem did not directly promise to resume attacks against Israeli troops operating in Lebanon, however. Qassem's restrained response to the ceasefire extension is likely a result of the severe degradation that Israeli operations had inflicted on Hezbollah prior to the ceasefire. Hezbollah likely aims to avoid engaging Israeli forces or attacking Israel as it helps rebuild Lebanon and reconstitute its forces. It is doubtful that Hezbollah has been able to reconstitute a significant portion of its military capabilities during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The SDF reportedly rejected a concessionary proposal from the HTS-led Syrian government that would require it to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry. Unspecified sources close to the new administration told Al Jazeera on January 26 that the SDF rejected a recent proposal from the Syrian government that would allow for a “decentralized” management system that provides local councils with “broad” unspecified powers, recognition of Kurdish rights and inclusion in the new Syrian constitution, and a pathway for Kurdish fighters to join Syrian military and security institutions.[xxvi] The SDF reportedly insisted that it join the new Syrian army as an integrated unit, remain deployed in northeastern Syria, and receive portions of future oil revenue.[xxvii] The SDF has not strayed far from its position since it began negotiations with the HTS-led government on December 30.[xxviii] It is notable that the government’s offer does not provide any meaningful, irreversible protection for Syrian Kurds. HTS and its predecessor organizations have a long history of co-opting groups and then steadily eroding their power. The SDF is also extremely unlikely to willingly disarm while its units are actively repelling SNA attacks along the Euphrates River and Peace Spring frontlines.

Turkey’s encouragement of Turkish-backed factions to join the Syrian army is likely part of a Turkish effort to coerce the SDF to concede to the Syrian government in negotiations. Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 27 that Ankara has told Turkish-backed Syrian armed factions to integrate into the Syrian army.[xxix] Fidan said there are over 80,000 members of factions ”loyal” to Turkey in northern Syria.[xxx] Fidan also encouraged armed groups in southern Syria to do the same.[xxxi] The integration of Turkish-backed groups, including groups currently operating within the Syrian National Army (SNA), would enable Turkey to wield significant influence within Syria’s armed forces. Turkey’s direct influence on Turkish-backed Syrian factions varies by group and some factions would be more responsive to Turkish direction than others. The HTS-led Defense Ministry has already promoted several fighters from these groups to high ranks within the Defense Ministry, however.[xxxii] Turkey is likely encouraging these factions to join the Syrian army because it believes it will retain some influence over these groups.  Turkey could then use their integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry and the Turkish influence that the integration would generate for Turkey to demonstrate to the SDF that it can encourage both the SNA and HTS-aligned forces to unite against SDF interests. The SDF has so far been unwilling to compromise on its demands as it contends with attacks from the SNA and Turkey. HTS, for its part, has been reticent to threaten the SDF with military force, though this reticence could change as the SDF maintains its position.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas and PIJ fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement. PIJ’s failure to release the hostage is unlikely to be a result of friction between PIJ and Hamas. PIJ has previously released hostages as part of the November 2023 ceasefire agreement and it has not engaged Israeli forces in the strip during the ceasefire, which indicates that PIJ continues to cooperate with Hamas.
• Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire: The United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days. Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next three weeks.
• Syrian Army Formation: The SDF reportedly rejected a concessionary proposal from the HTS-led Syrian government that would require it to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry. Turkey’s encouragement of Turkish-backed factions to join the Syrian army is likely part of a Turkish effort to coerce the SDF to concede to the Syrian government in negotiations.

Iran Update, January 26, 2025

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.[i]PIJ confirmed that hostage, Arbel Yehud, is “alive and in good health” and stated it will release Yehud after reaching an agreement with the mediators.[ii] Israel accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by releasing female soldiers before female civilians.[iii] In response, the IDF maintained its position in the Netzarim Corridor along al Rashid Road—the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—preventing Gazans from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[iv] The IDF reiterated on January 26 that it will only fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern part of the strip once PIJ releases Yehud.[v] The Palestinian Resistance Committee (PRC) and PIJ jointly took Yehud hostage on October 7, 2023.[vi]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 25.

The IDF fired at individuals in southern Lebanon on January 26 in order to eliminate “imminent threats” to Israeli forces. The 60-day Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire period ended on January 26.[vii] The ceasefire agreement stipulates a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26.[viii] Israel announced on January 24 that the IDF will refrain from withdrawing from southern Lebanon by January 26 because the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) purportedly failed to destroy Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure south of the Litani River, which it is required to do, according to the ceasefire agreement.[ix] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson re-issued warnings to residents against returning to 62 towns in southern Lebanon on January 25.[x] Lebanese media claimed that returning residents entered 22 towns in southeastern Lebanon and 13 towns in southwestern Lebanon on January 26.[xi] The LAF “accompanied" some residents as they returned to several towns.[xii]  The IDF stated that it used ”dispersal fire” to eliminate threats posed to Israeli forces, including at ”rioters” and at a vehicle flagged with a Hezbollah flag that approached Israeli forces.[xiii]  Lebanese media claimed that the IDF fired artillery and small arms at Lebanese residents and LAF soldiers in several towns in southeastern Lebanon.[xiv] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that Israeli operations killed at least 23 people, including an LAF soldier, and injured 124 additional people in southern Lebanon.[xv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson accused Hezbollah of exploiting residents to cover up the repercussions of its “irresponsible decisions.”[xvi]

The Iraqi Progress Party, which is a Sunni political party headed by former Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, signaled its openness to forming an alliance with the Sadrist Movement ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Progress Party spokesperson Yahya al Mohammadi stated on January 26 that the Sadrist Movement’s withdrawal from politics after the October 2021 parliamentary elections created a “defect” in the Iraqi political system.[xvii] Mohammadi stated that “political balances” and “future visions for the formation of the next government” will determine whether the Progress Party allies with the Sadrist Movement. Mohammadi’s statements come after the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition has aligned with Sadr on several issues in recent weeks.[xviii] Prominent Sunni politician Khamis al Khanjar, who helped establish the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, recently called on Iraqi political parties to adopt Sadr’s position of “non-interference” in Syria, for example.[xix]

The United States will deliver a shipment of 1,800 MK-84 general purpose aircraft munitions to Israel in the “coming days.”[xx]  US President Donald Trump said that the United States has been holding these bombs in storage since May 2024.[xxi]

Syrian border forces thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq on January 25.[xxii] The General Directorate of Border Security announced that it seized a shipment of rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq, before the shipment reached Lebanon.[xxiii] The General Directorate specified that the weapons were intended for Hezbollah.[xxiv] Syrian government forces recently interdicted a drone shipment in Tartus likely intended to resupply Hezbollah.[xxv] The General Directorate did not specify the identities of the smugglers but noted that the shipment traveled through existing smuggling routes. It is unlikely that these networks fully collapsed when the Assad regime fell, despite the flight of numerous Iranian-backed elements from Syria.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: PIJ agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: The IDF fired at individuals in southern Lebanon on January 26 in order to eliminate “imminent threats” to Israeli forces.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Progress Party signaled its openness to forming an alliance with the Sadrist Movement ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Syria: Syrian border forces thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq.

Iran Update, January 23, 2025

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 22.

Israel and Hamas appear to have agreed to allow Gazans to return from the southern to the northern Gaza Strip. This agreement may prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from moving large quantities of weapons and fighters to the northern Gaza Strip. A multinational consortium led by US and Egyptian contractors will oversee the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios on January 23 that Israel and Hamas agreed to establish a multinational consortium to oversee vehicle movement through the Netzarim Corridor.[i] The consortium will include two United States-based private security firms and an Egyptian company. The consortium will establish a vehicle checkpoint on Salah al Din Road at the corridor once the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraws from the area. Hamas will likely try to move materiel and resources to the northern Gaza Strip via Salah al Din Road, which the vehicle checkpoint should prevent. Hamas announced that Gazans can return to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road--the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—after the IDF withdraws from there.[ii] The ceasefire agreement requires the IDF to withdraw from al Rashid Road by January 25.[iii]  Hamas will likely try to move fighters and weapons via al Rashid Road to the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters who transit al Rashid Road on foot will not be able to carry large weaponry or large amounts of ammunition, however.  

Lebanese Hezbollah called on the Lebanese government to pressure the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon if the IDF remains past January 26, which is the date by which the IDF is required by the ceasefire with Hezbollah to withdraw.[iv] Hezbollah emphasized that the IDF must withdraw from Lebanon by January 26 but refrained from explicitly threatening to attack if the IDF does not withdraw. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Hezbollah will resume attacks targeting Israel at this time. Israeli media reported on January 23, citing an informed source familiar, that Israel submitted a request to the United States to postpone its withdrawal from Lebanon by 30 days. Israeli media reported that members of the ceasefire monitoring committee, including the United States, France, Lebanon, and Israel, discussed the request. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met with the chair of the ceasefire monitoring committee, US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers, on January 23, likely to discuss the request.[v] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer stated on January 23 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL have made “positive movements. . . but not fast enough.”[vi]

The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region. The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Iraqi security establishment who answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister would increase Iranian influence and facilitate Iranian capture of the Iraqi security establishment. The Iraqi federal government’s failure to punish militias who conduct attacks without the permission of the state would encourage the militias to conduct further attacks, given that they have no incentive to stop their attacks. The Iraqi federal government has notably previously failed to deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly offered to protect Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from foreign attacks and allow them to keep their weapons in return for the militias integrating into the Iraqi security establishment.[vii] These concessions do not guarantee that the militias will answer to the Iraqi prime minister instead of Iran. These concessions also do not guarantee that the militias will not conduct attacks targeting US or allied interests. Granting these concessions and failing to impose other requirements on the militias to join the Iraqi security establishment could therefore harm US security interests in the region.

Over 130 unspecified Iraqi parliamentarians signed a petition to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, possibly because he recently helped establish a new Sunni political alliance and pass the General Amnesty Law. Parliament passed three “controversial” laws—including the General Amnesty Law—on January 21.[viii] The General Amnesty Law will grant amnesty to a large number of Iraqis who were previously wrongfully imprisoned. The law is a long-standing demand for Sunni political parties in Iraq. The State of Law Coalition, which is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, and some independent parliamentarians have challenged the constitutionality of the January 21 parliament session in the Iraqi Federal Court.[ix] A petition to remove the parliament speaker requires 109 signatures. An absolute majority vote of 165 parliamentarians is subsequently required to remove the parliament speaker.[x] Mashhadani’s deputy, Shia Coordination Framework member Mohsen al Mandalawi, would become the temporary parliament speaker if Mashhadani was removed.[xi] Mandalawi previously served as interim parliament speaker between November 2023 and October 2024, while Parliament struggled to elect a new speaker.[xii] The petition to remove Mashhadani comes after he helped form the United Sunni Leadership Coalition in early January 2024. The coalition called on the Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands--including passing the General Amnesty Law--on January 18.[xiii]

Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli have recently held talks with Ocalan.[xiv] Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15, according to the director of the Washington DC-based Middle East Institute’s Turkey Program.[xv] The Turkish government will reportedly release Ocalan from prison and draft a new constitution that includes Kurdish rights and other unspecified changes in return.[xvi] "PKK-linked groups" will reportedly share power with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and integrate some forces into the new Syrian armed forces as part of the agreement.[xvii] It is unclear whether ”PKK-linked groups” includes the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses ”PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. PKK groups in Qandil, northern Iraq, have reportedly agreed to the terms of the agreement.[xviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report. The demand for “PKK-linked groups” to share authority with the KNC is consistent with Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani’s efforts to pressure the SDF to work with minority Kurdish parties and avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey.[xix] It remains unclear whether the PKK would heed calls from Ocalan to disarm. The disarmament of the PKK would also likely not satisfy Turkey’s demand to ”eliminate” the SDF.[xx]

Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra warned that the Syrian interim government is “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces.[xxi] Qasra told reporters on January 22 that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.”[xxii] Qasra's comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF. The SDF has so far refused to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry and has instead called for a “decentralized” system that would allow the SDF to join the new Syrian armed forces as a “bloc” and remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[xxiii] The interim government is currently pursuing a two-pronged strategy to coerce the SDF to disarm: it is actively negotiating with the SDF while simultaneously coordinating with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey and the SNA are both actively fighting the SDF in northern Syria. A Syrian government decision to deploy forces to SDF frontlines would mark a significant departure from the government’s current strategy. Syrian government leadership, such as Shara and Qasra, may calculate that HTS military involvement would sufficiently coerce the SDF to disarm, which it has so far been unwilling to do through negotiations with HTS alone.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. Geolocated footage shows a Department of Military Operations convoy arriving in Zamla, a town around 12 kilometers south of Rusafa, on January 23.[xxiv] Syrian media reported that HTS-led forces took control of several oil fields near Zamla and several towns in the desert west of Zamla.[xxv] The commander of the SDF-affiliated Northern Democratic Brigade said on January 23 that the SDF recently warned the international coalition about the threat of ISIS in the “significant security vacuum” between SDF-held territory and Syrian interim government-held territory.[xxvi] Assad regime forces and Iranian-backed militias formerly controlled Zamla and its oil fields, and the withdrawal of regime-affiliated forces could allow ISIS to resurge in those areas.[xxvii] The commander said that the SDF, Department of Military Operations, and international coalition recently held a meeting near Rusafa and that Department of Military Operations forces subsequently deployed to the area.[xxviii] This meeting and subsequent deployment is consistent with likely HTS objectives to consolidate control over areas of the Syrian Badia, particularly in areas where ISIS could grow and resurge.

The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad. The deployment of these forces comes after Qasra warned that the Syrian government is ready for a potential military operation against the SDF. The interim government's deployment of forces to Rusafa may set conditions for a potential operation. The current HTS position in the Rusafa desert is located at the crossroads of government-held territory to the west and SDF-held territory to the north. Such a position would allow HTS-led forces to advance north and potentially cut off the SDF’s southern salient along the southwestern bank of Lake Assad from the rear, disrupting an SDF defense of Raqqa. The Rusafa position is furthermore located south of Ain Issa, where SNA forces are currently deployed. The HTS-led forces and SNA could possibly coordinate to envelope Raqqa City from the north and south. CTP-ISW has not observed any indicators that HTS is planning a military operation targeting the SDF at the time of this writing, however.

Anti-SDF media reported that the Department of Military Operations reportedly clashed with SDF-affiliated gunmen in the village of Amala, west of Zamla, and captured several men.[xxix] The SDF denied that its forces clashed with Syrian government forces in the area and blamed ”Turkish-run media” for spreading false narratives.[xxx]

The HTS-led interim government appears to be forming a police force that is centered on Islamic principles.[xxxi] Members of the HTS police force in Idlib have traveled to Damascus to recruit police officers. The HTS police has asked applicants a series of questions about their beliefs and training for new recruits is focused on Sharia Law. Unspecified Syrian officers cited by Reuters stated that the Islamic teaching is intended to instill morality in the new Syrian police force. Reuters cited Syrian civilians who expressed apprehension toward a police force based on religious doctrine. Minority Syrian communities have expressed distrust toward the Sunni majority HTS-led interim government following reports of sectarian motivated attacks by HTS-affiliated fighters.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways: 

• Turkey and Syria: Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. 
• SDF Negotiations: The Syrian Interim Defense Minister said that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.” His comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF. 
• HTS Deployment: The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad. 
• Iraq: The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. 

Iran Update, January 22, 2025

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.[i] The PIJ statement claimed the joint operations rooms would coordinate and develop ”field work” and ”joint action.” The joint operations rooms will be comprised of fighters from PIJ’s al Quds Brigades, Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch.[ii] The ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch, which is one of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades many branches based in various locations throughout the West Bank, was active in Tulkarm in summer 2024.[iii] It is unclear at this time where the joint operations rooms will be based, or which subgroup or groups of the ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch will be involved. Hamas, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and PIJ previously established a combined operations room known as ”the Hornets’ Nest” that was based in Jenin and active from 2022-2024. The Hornets’ Nest also included the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others.[iv] PIJ, Hamas, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed to fire small arms and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a combined operation targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[v]

Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. A senior Iraqi diplomat claimed on January 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will only integrate into the Iraqi army after US forces completely withdraw from Iraq.[vi]  The outgoing Biden administration reportedly pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraq militias.[vii] The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups. Many of these groups have committed acts of sectarian cleansing dating back to the 2000s, which would destroy the national character of the Iraqi army if the government reflagged entire militia units as Iraqi army units.[viii] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization, swear allegiance to the Iranian supreme leader, not the Iraqi state.[ix] The state-recognized wings of these groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) already answer to militia chains of command—not the Iraqi prime minister—and there is no reason to believe that these groups would adhere to an Iraqi army chain of command if reflagged as Iraqi army units. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[x] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani told Saudi outlet al Elaph in January 2025 that the Iraqi government is actively trying to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within Iraq’s legal and institutional framework.[xi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal date or makes “sudden moves.”[xii] Kaabi added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain al Asad airbase.[xiii] It is notable that US-led international coalition forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq until the end of 2026.[xiv]

Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks.[xv] The officials expect the vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [xvi]

Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[xvii] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12 mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran’s ability to produce missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of Iran’s supply of ammonium perchlorate.

Iran has previously used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[xviii] The US Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to make explosives.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.
• Iraq: Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups.
• Iran: Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks. Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however.

Iran Update, January 21, 2025

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of ceasefire violations in the Gaza Strip since the last data cut off on January 20.

Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. The Associated Press reported that Hamas has patrolled aid convoy routes, coordinated the distribution of humanitarian aid, and monitored the return of Gazans to Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip after the ceasefire went into effect.[i] Some Gazans began to return from IDF-designated humanitarian zones to the northern Gaza Strip on January 19, and the IDF announced on January 21 that it would soon allow Gazans to return from the southern Gaza Strip to the northern Gaza Strip.[ii]

These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7. Hamas does appear to function as a proto-government that can provide and distribute basic services and goods while controlling the population, which would be consistent with an insurgent organization that seeks to re-exert control over the Gaza Strip. It is notable in this context that Hamas is the sole actor in the Gaza Strip capable and willing to undertake this relatively broad spectrum of tasks. Hamas therefore appears to be prepared to reemerge as the sole authority in the Gaza Strip, even though the IDF destroyed its government structure. Hamas will likely begin to use its small, insurgent-like cells of fighters to reimpose its control over the population and other armed groups, including criminal elements.

Hamas announced that it will release four female Israeli hostages on January 25.[iii] Hamas previously announced that it would release the next group of hostages on January 26.[iv] The ceasefire agreement requires Hamas to release three hostages every Saturday during the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal and 14 hostages on the last day of the first phase.[v] Hamas released three Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[vi]

The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.[vii] Halevi will officially leave as chief of staff on March 6, four days after the first phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement ends.[viii] Halevi stated that the IDF has not fully destroyed Hamas’ governance and military capabilities or returned Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip.[ix] Halevi called for an external committee to investigate the IDF’s failure on October 7.[x] IDF Southern Command Commander Major General Yaron Finkelman also resigned on January 21. Finkelman cited his failure to protect Israel on October 7.[xi] The IDF Southern Command is responsible for areas of southern Israel, including the area along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[xii]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish offensive. The SDF is currently engaged against the SNA on the western bank of the Euphrates River and Arab tribal forces under the command of Sheikh Ibrahim al Hifl in Deir ez Zor.[xiii] The SNA has deployed to the lines of control at Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr, which CTP-ISW assessed may be in preparation for a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xiv] The SNA and Turkey have continued to attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication to interdict supplies and reinforcements from the east, which would isolate SDF forces along the river.[xv]

The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive. The SDF deployed reinforcements from Hasakah to Deir ez Zor on January 21, which could leave SDF defenses in Tal Tamr, Hasakah Province, vulnerable to a Turkish or SNA attack if the SDF weakened any reserve or frontline positions near Tal Tamr.[xvi] The SDF’s decision to withdraw forces from Hasakah leaves this front relatively more vulnerable to Turkish or SNA capture, depending on the strength of the forces that the SDF has redeployed. CTP-ISW cannot ascertain from where in Hasakah Province the SDF redeployed forces. The requirement on the SDF to deploy forces to Deir ez Zor nonetheless further strains SDF bandwidth. A Deir ez Zor-based journalist reported that the SDF deployed forces to Dhiban, Tayyana, Kasra, and Hajin in Deir ez Zor Province.[xvii] The SDF has fought Arab tribal forces that are likely under the guidance of Sheikh Ibrahim al Hifl in Deir ez Zor since December 20.[xviii] The SNA has deployed forces toward Tal Tamr in recent weeks, possibly in preparation for a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.[xix]

Turkey and the SNA have concentrated air and artillery strikes on SDF positions around the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 20.[xx] The SNA has deployed forces to the lines of control at Ain Issa and Kobani. CTP-ISW assessed that these forces could launch two lines of advance to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.[xxi] Turkish and SNA strikes on SDF positions could set conditions for an SNA assault. The SNA and Turkey have conducted strikes on SDF positions along a key ground line of communication in northern Syria that would isolate the SDF at Qara Qozak Bridge.[xxii]

The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament.[xxiii]  Sistani is the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Bureau head Ali al Asadi likely made this comment in response to Iraqi federal government efforts to convince Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to either surrender their weapons or join the official Iraqi security apparatus.[xxiv]  Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.[xxv] Sistani said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[xxvi] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[xxvii] It is unclear if other Iranian-backed militias besides Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba would agree to disarm if Sistani directly requested that they disarm. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is also implicitly bypassing and rejecting the authority of the Iraqi federal government by the invocation of Sistani’s authority. Sistani does not hold an official position in the Iraqi government.

Victory Coalition spokesperson Salam al Zubaidi separately claimed on January 21 that the Iraqi federal government will be able to force Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to surrender their weapons and integrate “rehabilitated elements” into the Iraqi military establishment or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxviii] The Victory Coalition is a Shia political party that is led by former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi. It is part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, but Abadi attempted to form a political party with Ammar al Hakim in 2020 that would have supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[xxix] Zubaidi claimed that a “large portion” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could surrender their weapons and integrate into the Iraqi military establishment and the PMF “in the coming days.”[xxx]

The Iraqi parliament passed three controversial laws on January 21. Some parliamentarians have claimed that parliament lacked a legal quorum when it passed the laws.[xxxi] Parliament passed the Personal Status Law, General Amnesty Law, and Property Restitution Law on January 21. The Personal Status Law, which gives Islamic courts increased authority over matters like marriage, is mainly supported by Shia political parties.[xxxii] Iraqi law previously set the minimum age for marriage at 18, but the Personal Status Law allows Shia and Sunni clerics to permit marriages at younger ages based on different interpretations of Islamic law.[xxxiii] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis whom Iraqi courts wrongfully convicted. Sunni political parties have long demanded the implementation of this law.[xxxiv] Some parliamentarians claimed that parliament passed these laws without a quorum. They also accused Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani and his deputies of adding amendments to the laws without discussion and leading a vote on all three laws as a package.[xxxv] Independent parliamentarian Zuhair Fatlawi told Iraqi media that over 180 parliamentarians left parliament before the vote. Over 50 parliamentarians started a petition to remove Mashhadani.[xxxvi]

The Iraqi parliament did not vote on an amendment that would benefit Kurdish political parties during its session on January 21, despite the amendment appearing on the parliamentary agenda.[xxxvii] This amendment would increase the Iraqi federal government’s compensation for oil production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) from $6 to $16 and in return, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would resume oil exports.[xxxviii] Some Shia political parties walked out of parliament on January 19 in protest against the amendment.[xxxix] A Shia Coordination Framework-aligned parliamentarian told Iraqi media on January 21 that parliament delayed the vote on the amendment due to the addition of a new amendment to the budget.[xl]

An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.[xli] The Iraqi government established the Accountability and Justice Commission in 2008 to rid Iraq of Baathist ideology, but it was weaponized by Shia politicians to target Sunnis and secular Iraqis to prevent Sunnis and secular Iraqis from winning elections.[xlii] Any government body created to replace the commission and scrutinize political candidates is liable to abuse. It remains unclear what responsibilities the proposed judicial body would have. This report comes after the United Sunni Leadership Coalition called for the dissolution of the Accountability and Justice Commission, among other demands, on January 18.[xliii]

Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website shows that the Russian cargo ship Sparta II entered the port of Tartus on January 21. The Sparta II is likely transferring Russian military equipment to Libya, given that the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia intended to use the Sparta II to transport equipment from Syria to Libya.[xliv] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that columns of Russian military equipment and cargo have remained lined up for evacuation at the port since at least December 17.  Sparta II’s entry into the port suggests that Russia and the HTS-led interim government recently reached an agreement that allows Russian vessels to enter the port. The GUR reported as recently as January 12 that the HTS-led government had not granted permission for Russian ships to enter the port.[xlv] The GUR also reported that Russian Rear Admiral Valery Varfolomeyev failed to negotiate Russian entry to the port on January 9.[xlvi]  At least three other Russian vessels, including two landing ships and a cargo ship, have remained off the coast of Tartus since January 6.[xlvii]

The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus. The Tartus customs director told Syrian media on January 20 that the interim government suspended a previous agreement that allowed an unspecified Russian company to invest in the port of Tartus.[xlviii] The director claimed that the interim government would receive all the revenue that the Russian company accrued.[xlix] The Assad regime leased control of the port of Tartous to the Russian oil and gas company Stroytransgaz in 2019 for 49 years.[l] It is unclear if Russia and the HTS-led interim government have reached a definitive agreement on the future of Russian basing rights in Syria. HTS’s decision to end Russian financial involvement in Tartus suggests that HTS intends to reassert Syrian control over the port, which makes it unlikely that Russia will maintain a military presence there.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7, however.
• IDF Resignations: The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed SDF faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate and possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish. The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.
• Iraqi Militia Disarmament: The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.
• Iraqi Politics: An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.
• Russia in Syria: Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus.

Iran Update, January 20, 2025

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 19.

Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.[i] Hamas released three female Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[ii] Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank in exchange.[iii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) facilitated the entry of 630 humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip on January 19.[iv] Israel is required to support the entry of 600 aid trucks into the Gaza Strip daily during the first phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.[v]

The IDF fired warning shots at approaching Gazans in the Gaza Strip on January 20.[vi] Palestinian medical officials reported that IDF injured eight Gazans in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[vii] A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF also injured two individuals in the central Gaza Strip.[viii] The IDF warned Gazans on January 19 to avoid approaching Israeli forces in designated areas.[ix]

 Iran Update, January 16, 2025

The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue.[i] Both sides resolved the issue. Hamas reportedly renegotiated the names of the Palestinian prisoners it expects Israel to release as part of the agreement.[ii] An Israeli official confirmed that both sides resolved the issue, and the Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17. The ceasefire will take effect on January 19, if approved.[iii]

A senior Israeli official confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will remain in the Philadelphi Corridor during the first 42-day phase of the ceasefire.[iv] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, was a major point of contention between Israel and Hamas during the ceasefire talks.[v] The official stated that Israel will stay in the Philadelphi Corridor beyond the first phase of the ceasefire until Israel achieves its war aims.[vi] These aims include the release of all hostages. The IDF will gradually withdraw from the remaining parts of the Gaza Strip to a 700-meter-deep buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries, however.[vii]  Israel will also temporarily halt air reconnaissance over the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[viii]   Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. Reconstitution is a very time- and resource-intensive task even under ideal conditions when the reconstituting force is out of contact with the opposing force. It includes restoring degraded units to combat effectiveness and increase their survivability.[ix] IDF operations have destroyed Hamas‘ military organization in the Gaza Strip by damaging the organization so badly that it cannot be made usable without being completely rebuilt. Israel has also depleted Hamas’ weapons stockpile. Hamas can execute limited reorganization tasks, perhaps even including efforts to organize isolated cells under some semblance of a military hierarchy. The regenerative tasks that would create true, cohesive military units within a fighting organization would take months free of Israeli interference to complete. Regenerating the weapons stockpile is similarly impossible in the 42-day window.[x]

Regeneration of Hamas’ military force is not possible in this 42-day window. Regeneration requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.[xi] The replacement of personnel to a capable level requires training, which is not possible without sanctuary and a period longer than 42 days. Hamas may be able to undertake some minimal training, but these newly trained fighters will be unable to seriously impede Israeli forces if the IDF chooses to resume combat operations. Recent reports indicate that Hamas has intensified recruitment efforts, but these recruits are inexperienced and untrained.[xii]

The IDF will be able to rapidly re-seize areas it withdraws from if the ceasefire deal collapses after the first phase. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). A representative of KDP leader Masoud Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, on January 13.[xiii] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media that Barzani likely seeks to pressure the SDF to conclude an agreement with Turkey and the SNA to “prevent the destruction” of Kurdish areas in Syria. Turkey and the SNA continue to threaten the SDF positions in northeastern Syria.[xiv] The KDP has steadily improved its relationship with Turkey in recent years, primarily due to the KDP’s hostility to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[xv] Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses ”PKK” as a euphemism for the entire SDF.[xvi]

The KDP is also pressuring the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the HTS-led interim government. Masoud Barzani met with Abdi in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 16.[xvii] A senior KDP member told Western media that Barzani and Abdi focused on unifying Kurdish political efforts in Syria.[xviii] The KDP has historically aligned itself with the Kurdish National Council, a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties.[xix] The SDF’s political body is led by the Kurdish National Council’s political rival.[xx] Barzani’s representative also met with Kurdish National Council officials on January 13 to attempt to dissolve tensions between the Syrian Kurdish political parties.[xxi]

Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.[xxii] A PKK official separately told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria.[xxiii] Abdi similarly said that the PKK would withdraw from Syria if Turkey agreed to a ceasefire.[xxiv] The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view. Turkey has also explicitly called for the destruction of the YPG/PKK and views the SDF and YPG and PKK as undistinguishable.[xxv]

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara addressed Israeli military activity in southern Syria on January 16 during a meeting with the Qatari foreign minister.[xxvi] Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power.[xxvii] He emphasized that Israeli forces must return to the 1974 disengagement line in the Golan Heights and that UN forces should deploy to the buffer zone.[xxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the fall of the Syrian regime.[xxix] Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.”[xxx]

Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons.[xxxi] The Israeli strike also killed the mayor of Ghadir al Bustan.[xxxii] The January 15 strike appears to be the first IDF strike that has directly targeted HTS-led government forces.[xxxiii] It remains unclear at this time how much effort Shara will devote to the restoration of the 1974 disengagement line with Israel and whether this statement is predominantly due to public pressure after the January 15 attack.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire Deal: The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue. Both sides resolved the issue.
• Military Implications for Ceasefire: Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.
• Kurdish Coordination: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the SDF: A PKK official told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria. The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire in northern Syria difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view.
• Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Israel: Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power. Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.” Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons.

 Iran Update, January 15, 2025

Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 15.[i] Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on January 19.[ii] Hamas confirmed that it agreed to the final draft agreement on January 15.[iii] The agreement outlines three phases, as proposed by US President Joe Biden in May 2024.[iv] During the first phase, which will last for 42 days beginning on January 19, Hamas must release 33 hostages.[v] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will gradually withdraw from the central Gaza Strip to an 800-meter-deep buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries during the first phase.[vi] Reuters reported that ”Israel will release 30 Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli civilian and 50 Palestinian prisoners for every female Israeli soldier that Hamas releases.”[vii] Israel will also allow displaced Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip during this phase.[viii] Israel and Hamas will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a permanent ceasefire.[ix] This presumably means that if negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire fail, the fighting would resume. The third phase of the ceasefire reportedly includes provisions for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip supervised by Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations.[x]

Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.[xi] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Corridor was a major point of contention between Israel and Hamas during the ceasefire talks.[xii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced on January 15 that Hamas "backed down" on its demand for an IDF withdrawal from the corridor "at the last minute."[xiii]

A large number of Iraqi political parties boycotted parliament on January 15, likely to demonstrate their ability to rally sufficient support to block parliament.[xiv] Iraqi media reported that “the majority of [political] blocs” boycotted parliament because Parliament Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani and the two deputy speakers did not place the General Amnesty Law on Parliament’s agenda.[xv] The Iraqi Parliament Speaker and the two deputies are responsible for ”jointly” determining the agenda.[xvi] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[xvii] This law has been a long-standing demand of Sunni political parties in Iraq and was part of the “political agreement paper” that enabled the formation of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s administration in 2022.[xviii] Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party announced on January 13 that it would boycott parliament until the speaker places the General Amnesty Law on Parliament’s agenda.[xix] The newly-formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition separately discussed the implementation of the General Amnesty Law in a meeting on January 11 suggesting that this coalition may have boycotted parliament on January 15 as well.[xx] This coalition includes Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai, and Mashhadani, among others.[xxi]

Mashhadani and his allies, including the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, may also have deliberately blocked the General Amnesty Law in order to block the passage of the Intelligence Service Law, which was also on the agenda.[xxii] The Intelligence Service Law was also on the December 5, 2024, agenda but Parliament again failed to reach quorum.[xxiii] There are no other laws on both the December 5 and January 15, 2025, agendas.[xxiv] A member of the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee told Iraqi media that the Intelligence Service Law expanded the ”legal cover” for the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which is now led by an Iranian-backed Badr Organization-linked director.[xxv] The Parliamentary boycott comes after several notable Sunni politicians, including Mashhadani, called in December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[xxvi] The boycott also comes after Khanjar warned in December 2024 that Sunnis would turn to “other parties” that oppose dialogue and negotiation if the Iraqi federal government fails to defend them, suggesting that Sunni Iraqis remain frustrated by the federal government’s treatment of the Sunni community.[xxvii]

Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara on January 15, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm. Syrian interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and interim Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxviii] The Syrian officials also met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin.[xxix] A meeting between key defense and security stakeholders suggests that the parties likely discussed military coordination in northern Syria, where the Turkish aircraft and drones are supporting the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) against the SDF. CTP-ISW previously assessed that HTS and Turkey are coordinating to disarm and integrate the SDF into the HTS-led defense apparatus.[xxx] Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the SDF in a military operation if it does not disarm. Turkey has directly supported SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River since at least late December 2024.[xxxi] Turkish support efforts could also be a precursor to a Turkish operation into Syria. Shaibani said during a press conference in Ankara that the HTS-led government will not allow Syrian territory to be used as a ”launchpad” for actors to threaten Turkey, signaling HTS support for Turkey’s effort to destroy the SDF.[xxxii]

The SDF has continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF. Fidan suggested on January 10 that Turkey would give the Syrian interim government an opportunity to disarm and dissolve the SDF before Turkey takes military action.[xxxiii] HTS and the SDF have not yet made tangible progress toward an agreement. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said on January 14 that he and HTS leader Ahmed al Shara have not agreed on the terms of the SDF and Kurdish-controlled government’s integration into the new Syrian military and political establishment but are in the process of forming a committee to discuss such issues.[xxxiv] Shaibani confirmed during a press conference in Ankara that Syrian officials are engaged in “dialogue and negotiation” with the SDF.[xxxv] Abdi maintained that he seeks a “decentralized” administration and wants the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” rather than on an “individual” level.”[xxxvi] Abdi likely calculates that maintaining some degree of Kurdish political and security autonomy would provide Kurds in northeastern Syria with better security guarantees than if the Kurdish-controlled government and SDF fully subordinated themselves to a centralized government. The ongoing Turkish and SNA attacks on the SDF have likely heightened Abdi’s concerns about the need to retain political and security autonomy. HTS officials have maintained that they will not allow any “federal” entities in Syria, however, and are unlikely to capitulate on this demand.[xxxvii] Shaibani declared in Ankara that the HTS-led interim government cannot ”accept” the SDF in its current form outside the central government.[xxxviii] Abdi also mentioned that the SDF would allow HTS to take control of the oil fields in SDF-held territory, provided that the profits of the oil fields are distributed “fairly.”[xxxix]

 Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 15. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on January 19. Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Politics: A large number of Iraqi political parties boycotted parliament on January 15, likely to demonstrate their ability to rally sufficient support to block parliament. The Iraqi Parliament Speaker and his allies, including the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, may also have deliberately blocked the General Amnesty Law in order to block the passage of the Intelligence Service Law, which was also on the agenda.
• Syria-Turkey Meeting: Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara on January 15, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF. The SDF has continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry.

 Iran Update, January 14, 2025

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is confronting small pockets of locally organized fighter cells in areas under its control. Some of these groups are led by known Assad regime officials who have military experience and control pre-existing militias.[i] HTS-led forces have successfully confronted and suppressed these isolated incidents of resistance in a way that mirrors the Assad regime’s counter-revolutionary approach at the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011-2012.[ii] The HTS-led forces have deployed tanks and used attack helicopters and drones to target pro-regime forces in coastal Syria.[iii] These deployments have enabled HTS-led forces to swiftly confront small groups of regime remnants.[iv] The organization, coordination, size, and spread of these opposition groups do not currently appear to strain HTS-led forces‘ bandwidth. An increase in pro-Assad activity coupled with an ISIS resurgence in HTS-held areas would very likely present HTS with a bandwidth problem, however, and thus impede future efforts to suppress dissent.[v]

A pro-Assad group is attempting to coordinate and expand attacks targeting HTS-led forces but has yet to demonstrate any ability to do so. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” announced in late December 2024 the launch of armed resistance against the HTS-led interim government.[vi] The group has since claimed on multiple occasions that its fighters have attacked and killed interim government forces. It remains unclear whether the group has had any real involvement in these attacks, however.[vii] The “Syrian Popular Resistance” claimed on January 13 that it killed over 35 HTS-led forces in western Homs near the Lebanon-Syria border in coordination with fighters from Hermel, Lebanon.[viii] Some security analysts attributed the clashes to Lebanese Hezbollah or smugglers, omitting mention of the ”Syrian Popular Resistance.”[ix] The interim government gave no comment on the clashes, which would be surprising if opposition fighters had indeed killed 35 HTS-led fighters. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” also claimed to be affiliated with a former Syrian regime officer who led an attack taking interim government forces hostage in Latakia on January 14.[x] The militia leader did not mention the ”Syrian Popular Resistance” in a video he posted shortly after the attack.[xi] That the perpetrators of these attacks do not independently acknowledge any affiliation with the "Syrian Popular Resistance” suggests that this coordinating body is largely aspirational at this time. The formation of an opposition group that operates under the Syrian Popular Resistance would likely strain the interim government’s bandwidth and make them less effective in responding to anti-HTS resistance.

A likely Islamist HTS splinter group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government on January 11. The group, which calls itself the “Sayf al Bahr Battalion,” reportedly formed on January 3 after defecting from HTS.[xii] The group’s spokesperson, Abu Khaled al Shami, accused HTS leader Ahmed al Shara of stripping HTS of its “Islamic character and working to dissolve it in the name of the secular civil state.”[xiii] Shami announced the “start of the fighting” against HTS-led forces in a statement on January 11.[xiv] Shami called on Syrians to prevent their sons from joining the new Syrian army and to reject nationalism and secularism.[xv] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion claimed to fire on HTS military vehicles at an unspecified town in Rif Dimashq on January 11.[xvi] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that this attack took place or verify the exact nature and origin of the group. CTP-ISW has observed the formation of nascent opposition against HTS, particularly along the Syrian coast.[xvii] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion appears to be the first organized opposition faction that has defected from HTS. Armed opposition from this group could encourage more extreme jihadist elements in HTS’s coalition to revolt against its rule.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians in Baghdad on January 13, which is consistent with previous indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the October 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[xviii] Barzani held separate meetings with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, and Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai. Barzani emphasized the role of Parliament in “strengthening national dialogue” in his meeting with Mashhadani.[xix] Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians recently called in mid-December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[xx] It is unclear where Barzani was referring to these politicians’ call when he mentioned ”national dialogue.”

Barzani also discussed the 2025 Iraqi budget with Iraqi political officials on January 13. Barzani called on the Iraqi judiciary to “guarantee the [KRG’s] financial rights” during a meeting with Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan. Barzani and former interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi reportedly agreed to amend the 2025 budget to guarantee the salaries of [KRG] employees.”[xxi] The KRG recently threatened on January 8 to withdraw from the Iraqi government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[xxii]

A source close to nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr separately claimed on January 13 that Sadr opposes the return of his political bloc—the Shia National Movement—to politics. The Sadrist political bloc withdrew from Parliament in 2022, enabling the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in parliament. Sadr’s reported opposition to his political bloc reentering politics is noteworthy given that some Sunni politicians have recently aligned with Sadr on some issues. CTP-ISW previously noted that the alignment of Sadr’s and Sunni positions could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Israel and Hamas have reportedly made progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement but have yet to solve a key outstanding issue.[xxiii] An unspecified Palestinian official told the BBC on January 14 that the final draft of the ceasefire agreement allows Israel to maintain an 800-meter-long buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries.[xxiv] Israel’s ability to establish such a buffer zone was reportedly a significant point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas.[xxv] Israel and Hamas have yet to solve another key outstanding issue--the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors--however.[xxvi]

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 14 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, has “agreed in principle” to the terms of the final ceasefire draft.[xxvii] Sinwar may be making autonomous decisions about the ceasefire agreement without consulting Hamas central leadership.[xxviii] The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13 that Sinwar has begun operating autonomously and ignoring the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. It is unclear how Sinwar would implement the terms of a ceasefire agreement given that he lacks sufficient command-and-control across the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip.[xxix]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Israel on January 14 that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new militants as it has lost.”[xxx] Blinken stated that Hamas’ new recruitment effort is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.” The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on January 13 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[xxxi] These new recruits are not capable of successfully operating in organized military units given that Hamas has lost adequate safe areas to train new recruits.[xxxii] Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas the sanctuary to conduct training programs, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them safe areas there by conducting repeated raids.[xxxiii] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train new recruits in a way that would make them competent and capable of fighting against the IDF.

The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization.[xxxiv] Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[xxxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Small pockets of locally organized, armed resistance against HTS have emerged in Syria. The expansion of such resistance would strain the bandwidth of HTS-led forces and impede any efforts to suppress this resistance.
• Iraq: KRG President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Sunni politicians in Baghdad, which is consistent with early indications that Kurdish and Sunni parties are trying to build a political coalition ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas made significant progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement. They appear to have yet to resolve disagreement over whether the IDF would withdraw from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, however.

 Iran Update, January 13, 2025

Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a "breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Israel and Hamas have yet to solve at least two outstanding issues, however.[i] Two Israeli officials told Axios that mediators from Qatar, the US, and Egypt presented Hamas with a “final draft” of the agreement.[ii] The draft stipulates that Hamas must release 33 hostages during a 42-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israel will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining hostages in exchange for "high-profile" Hamas members, according to details shared by an Israeli military correspondent.[iii]

Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.[iv] Israeli officials told an Israeli military correspondent that the IDF will maintain its presence in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, which are two operationally significant IDF-held areas, between the first and second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[v] Another presumably separate Israeli official told Axios that the IDF will “gradually withdraw” to a buffer zone along the border and that the IDF will withdraw from the corridors.[vi] The official did not make clear when the IDF would withdraw from the corridors. A Hamas official told CNN that negotiations regarding the buffer zone and a permanent ceasefire are ongoing and remain “sticking points.”[vii] Hamas demands the buffer zone return to its pre-war width of 300-500 meters, while Israel insists on a two-kilometer-wide zone along Gaza’s eastern and northern boundaries.[viii] The IDF intends to use this buffer zone to protect Israeli communities in southern Israel. Israel will not completely withdraw from the Gaza Strip until its war objectives are achieved, among them the return of all the hostages, according to Israeli officials speaking to an Israeli military correspondent.[ix]

Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council.[x] Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[xi] Hamas has obtained some of these resources by hijacking aid convoys. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Hamas is using unexploded ordinance to build new improvised explosive devices.[xii] New recruits are not capable of successfully disassembling and reassembling unexploded ordinance to build improvised explosive devices. Such efforts require relatively experienced explosives experts. The loss of those experts due to Israeli military action would likely have outsized effects on the nascent reconstructed Hamas military organization, which will already need substantial time and space to reconstitute itself.

Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization. Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. Military units have institutionalized command, recruitment, and replenishment functions that make them resilient in the face of casualties and degradation. Individual cells of fighters lack this institutionalization and are relatively easy to destroy. A decentralized, guerrilla force like the one Hamas employs can “wait out” the Israelis and prepare to rebuild, however. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them sanctuary there by repeatedly raiding areas where Hamas is strong.[xiii] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train their new recruits to make them competent and capable against the IDF.[xiv]

Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[xv] The successful IDF effort to isolate the northern Gaza Strip both above and below ground means that it is highly unlikely that Sinwar is capable of communicating with forces in the north by runner or other physical means. Sinwar or someone close to him could presumably communicate electronically, but the use of electronic communications would be extremely risky and therefore unlikely to enable Sinwar to exert day-to-day control over Hamas’ military organization in the northern Strip. Sinwar likely retains significant control over Hamas forces in the central Gaza Strip and in Khan Younis, however.[xvi] The IDF raids these areas only rarely and it is not permanently present close to many of the major Gazan towns and cities in the Central Camps or Khan Younis areas.

The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[xvii] It is also far from clear that Sinwar would decide to rebuild Hamas in the same way Hamas built itself from the 1990s to 2023, given the obvious failure of Hamas’ military operations in the Gaza Strip and the inability of those operations to achieve any of Hamas’ war aims. These war aims include the destruction of the Israeli state by triggering a regional war or the destruction of the Abraham Accords.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey and the SNA continued shelling SDF positions along both the line of control and deeper into SDF-held territory on January 13.[xviii] The SNA has also reportedly deployed forces to the line of control near Tal Tamr since at least January 8.[xix] These deployments and the shelling around Tal Tamr will almost certainly force the SDF to deploy forces to the area to protect against any possible Turkish-SNA offensive, thus fixing significant SDF forces far from the main fighting near the Euphrates. Turkey and the SNA can therefore force the SDF to stretch its bandwidth by allocating forces to Tal Tamr without an attack from Tal Tamr. Stretching the SDF’s bandwidth would likely make Turkish or SNA operations near Kobani or the Euphrates River much easier.

Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River. Turkey and the SNA are attempting to isolate the SDF forces in their bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates by striking along supply lines and key nodes behind the front while pressuring the SDF bridgeheads with ground attacks. Local, anti-SDF media reported that Turkey struck an SDF barracks and two guard posts in Sarrin, east of the Qara Qozak bridge.[xx]  The SDF operates from a base in Sarrin that Russian forces evacuated after the fall of the regime, meaning that Turkey is striking an SDF rear base that could be used to sustain the bridgeheads.[xxi] Turkey also reportedly conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions west of the Tishreen Dam.[xxii]

The SNA has followed up these airstrikes by pressuring the SDF bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates. Geolocated footage posted on January 13 showed SNA-affiliated fighters firing small arms at an unseen target in a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxiii] The SDF posted footage on January 12 of an SDF drone strike that targeted an SNA personnel carrier.[xxiv] Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains as of this writing, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to its rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.[xxv] The enemy force—if it discovers a withdrawal is underway—will typically attempt to turn the withdrawal into a rout to destroy the withdrawing force.[xxvi]

Geolocated footage posted by the commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—on January 13 showed SNA armored vehicles traveling through a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxvii] Abu Amsha claimed that the video showed SNA reinforcements arriving at the frontlines.[xxviii] The SNA may seek to move more forces to the frontline in order to continue pressuring the SDF positions or prepare for a large-scale assault to collapse the bridgehead.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a "breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.
• Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Leadership: The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad.
• Turkish and Syrian National Army (SNA) Operations: Turkey and the SNA may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River.
• SDF Bridgeheads on the Euphrates: Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains around the bridgeheads, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to their rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.

 Iran Update, January 12, 2025

Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as Tehran has continued to expand its nuclear program. The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—conducted the latest air defense exercise across northern and western Iran on January 12.[i] This exercise notably covered the Iranian nuclear facilities around Arak and Fordow.[ii] Though Iran typically conducts air defense exercises around this time of year, this activity nonetheless probably reflects Iranian leaders’ assumption that they will face airstrikes against their nuclear program in the near term. This assumption has no bearing on the likelihood that the United States or Israel would actually conduct such a strike, however.

The Artesh exercises tested the manned and unmanned aircrafts as well as the following air defense systems, according to Iranian state media:[iii]

• Rad missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, anti-tank missile designed for T-72 tanks, fired from a 125 millimeters (mm) caliber barrel, and with a target distance of four kilometers (km).[iv]
• Majid An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired, electro-optical-guided missile with a maximum target range of 15 km.[v]
• Talash missile. An Iranian-made, long-range, mobile surface-to-air air defense missile system, capable of hitting all altitude targets with at a maximum range of 200km.[vi]
• Misagh-3 missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired system with a laser fuse and maximum range of five km and flight altitude of 3,500 meters (m).[vii]
• Khordad-15 system. An Iranian-made, long-range air defense system with a detection range of 85 km and target range of 45 km.[viii]
• Shahid Jalilvand radar system. An Iranian-made, medium-range, phased array radar system able to detect small flying targets with low cross-sections in three dimensions and a 24-hour operational continuity.[ix]
• Samavat radar-controlled artillery system. A short-range Iranian version of the Swiss low-altitude Skyguard radar system with a range of 4 km and uses an anti-aircraft 35mm Oerlikon caliber barrel gun.[x]
• Seraj radar-controlled air defense artillery system. Iranian-made artillery system with a 35mm caliber barrel gun, radar, and new optical system.[xi]

This activity comes after the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted an air defense exercise around the other major Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz on January 7.[xii] This flurry of air defense activity is part of the larger military exercise that the Iranian armed forces are holding across Iran until March 2025.[xiii] This exercise includes the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is unlikely that Iran could repel a US or Israeli airstrike given the inferiority of the Iranian systems that have been used in these exercises relative to the modern US and Israeli capabilities. This is especially the case given that Israel neutralized Iran’s S-300s—its most advanced air defense platform—in October 2024.

Iran could use part of its exercises to prepare for an attack on US or Israeli targets, though CTP-ISW assesses that this possibility is relatively unlikely at this time. Iran previously conducted exercises ahead of its Operation True Promise and Operation True Promise II attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 respectively.[xiv] And Iranian officials have yet to fulfill their vow to conduct a third missile attack on Israel.

Fatah released a statement on January 11 affirming that the PA will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict in the West Bank.[xv] Fatah stated that Hamas is responsible for the destruction of the Gaza Strip because Hamas ”gambled with the interests and resources of the Palestinian people for Iran’s benefit.” PA forces have been operating in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank, since early December 2024 to degrade Palestinian militias networks there.

 Iran Update, January 11, 2025 

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus. The Syrian Interior Ministry announced on January 11 the arrest of ISIS members who were planning a suicide bombing attack at the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[i] The ministry stated that the General Intelligence Directorate and General Security Administration coordinated to thwart the attack.[ii] ISIS has previously attacked Shia shrines in Syria, including in July 2023, when ISIS detonated a bomb near the Sayyidah Zeinab Shrine, killing six individuals and wounding 20 others.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the interim government claim about the most recent attempted ISIS attack. If true, it would indicate that ISIS seeks to attack Shia targets to stoke sectarian tensions and delegitimize HTS as the primary ruling power in Syria. HTS announced recently that it has accepted responsibility for securing the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[iv]

HTS-led Syrian interim government officials met with a senior Lebanese delegation in Damascus to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration on January 11.[v] HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with a Lebanese delegation headed by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[vi] Shara said that they agreed to securing the border to prevent illegal smuggling as a top priority.[vii] Such efforts could impede Lebanese Hezbollah efforts to reconstitute militarily. Hezbollah has long relied on Syria as a conduit to receive funds and materiel from Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah had lost its ground access to Iran via Syria and signaled his willingness to restore this connection with the support of the new interim government in Syria in December 2024.[viii] The border policies that the HTS-led interim government and Lebanon enact in the coming months will determine how easily Iran can revive its ground access to Hezbollah.

The Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) launched an operation targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Hamrin Mountains, Diyala Province. The Iraqi Air Force conducted an airstrike on January 10 that killed four ISIS members.[ix] Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah visited the site of the airstrike on January 11.[x] The PMF announced on January 11 that the Iraqi Army and PMF Diyala Operations Command launched a security operation under the direction of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to “clear and search” the Hamrin Mountains.[xi] The Diyala Operations Commander, Talib al Musawi, is affiliated with the Badr Organization and the Badr-controlled PMF 1st, 4th, 23rd, and 24th brigades all operate in Diyala.[xii]

The security operation in Diyala Province comes after Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) special operations forces conducted military exercises in neighboring Kermanshah Province, Iran, between January 4 and 9.[xiii] The Gilan Province-based Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Saberin Special Forces Brigade participated in the exercises.[xiv] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour stated on the sidelines of the exercise that Diyala Province was previously a “cradle of terrorist and Takfiri groups.”[xv] The exercises and Pakpour’s statement highlight heightened concerns among Iranian officials over external threats, particularly the possibility of ISIS infiltrations into Iran.

• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted ISIS attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus.
• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government hosted a senior Lebanese delegation to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Army and PMF launched an operation targeting ISIS in the Hamrin Mountains in eastern Iraq.

 Iran Update, January 10, 2025

There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the Iranian-backed Shia parties in these elections. A prominent Sunni politician, Khamis al Khanjar, met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masoud Barzani on January 9 to discuss the upcoming parliamentary elections and “the formation of alliances that can guarantee the rights of their people and regions.”[i] This meeting comes as Khanjar helped form a political coalition—the United Sunni Leadership Coalition—with other prominent Sunni leaders on January 7.<a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-10-2025#_edn5c17955a889c5adfa421f38e31e542b2c0e29edecfef5daab01186bb2d1cbf892" name="_edn5c17955a889c5adfa421f38e31e542b2c0e29edecfef5daab01186bb2

 Iran Update, January 9, 2025

Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported on January 9 that the SDF and SNA exchanged artillery fire and “clashed” near the Balikh River, north of SDF-controlled Ain Issa.[i] Three SNA-affiliated fighters were reportedly injured in the fighting.[ii] Local media reported artillery shelling and fighting along the M4 highway, west of Tal Tamr as well.[iii] The SNA has reportedly sent units to the frontlines in recent days, indicating that the SNA is preparing to attack the SDF.[iv] Such an attack would be part of the Turkish and SNA effort to coerce the SDF into disarming and disbanding. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about fighting along the frontline. Although it is unclear which side initiated the reported fighting, the SNA may nevertheless exploit the recent shelling to set conditions for further attacks on the SDF.

The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam on January 8, possibly in order to fix the SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline. The SNA launched a “large-scale” attack against the SDF about five kilometers northwest of the dam.[v]  The SNA also ambushed SDF fighters around Tal al Zamalah, south of the dam.[vi] The SDF accused Turkey of providing air support to the SNA attacks.[vii] A Kurdish journalist reported that the SNA launched the attacks after receiving reinforcements from al Bab, Mare, and Jarabulus.[viii] The journalist previously reported that the SNA had sent ”significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus.[ix] SNA forces likely advanced within three kilometers of Tishreen Dam, given that geolocated footage posted on January 8 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes on SNA fighters in Khirbet Tueni, which is 2.8 kilometers northwest of the dam.[x] It is unclear whether the SNA has retained any territorial gains from its attacks, however. The SNA has continued to conduct artillery and drone strikes targeting the SDF around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[xi] Fixing the SDF to these locations could impede any SDF effort to reinforce its positions elsewhere along the frontline.

Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near the SDF-SNA frontline on January 9. Local media reported that Turkey struck an SDF rocket launcher near al Jarniyah, which is along an SDF supply line.[xii] Turkish artillery and aircraft also struck SDF positions near Qara Qozak Bridge and north of the bridge.[xiii] CTP-ISW has noted that Turkey is conducting airstrikes targeting SDF in support of SNA offensive operations but that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Agence France-Presse that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity with the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government on December 30, 2024.[xiv] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Turkish officials have called for destroying the SDF as well—a step farther than HTS leaders have gone.[xv] The report of an agreement between the SDF and HTS raises the question of whether HTS may accept a lesser objective, such as the integration of coherent SDF units into the new Syrian armed forces, which would presumably fall short of the desired Turkish end state in Syria. The SDF may seek to integrate into the larger Syrian Defense Ministry apparatus by simply reflagging as opposed to fully dismantling its command structures. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command, however.

Abdi separately said that the interim government has the responsibility to intervene and achieve a ceasefire throughout Syria, likely as an implicit call for HTS to negotiate with Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA to cease offensive operations against the SDF.[xvi] Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan has threatened that both the HTS-led interim government and Turkish armed forces could begin “military operations” against the SDF if the organization fails to disarm.[xvii]

Behrouz Esbati, one of the seniormost Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Syria, discussed in a leaked video Iranian plans to rebuild proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.[xviii] These remarks are consistent with CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit it to rebuild the Axis of Resistance there. Esbati claimed to command over 10,000 Syrian fighters before the fall of Bashar al Assad.[xix] Esbati said that Iran can “activate all the networks” that it has developed over the years in Syria and use social media to “form resistance cells.”[xx] Esbati made these comments during a speech to military members at the Vali-ye Asr mosque in Tehran. An unspecified IRGC official—likely a member of the IRGC Quds Force—told the New York Times that Esbati’s comments about recruiting militia fighters were aspirational rather than reflective of discrete IRGC plans.[xxi] This denial is likely meant to suppress the narrative that the IRGC is trying to subvert the new Syrian government. The unspecified IRGC official also said that Iran would have a better chance at securing its interests in the Middle East if Syria descended into chaos, which is consistent with CTP-ISW‘s assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria.

Esbati also notably said candidly that Iran "was defeated very badly, [and] took a very big blow and it's been very difficult.”[xxii] Esbati’s statements are a stark contrast from the formal Iranian regime line that has aimed to downplay the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.[xxiii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to recuperate other actors within its Axis of Resistance namely Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxiv]

The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian capture the Iraqi security sector. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba has reportedly agreed to such integration, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[xxv] The source added that the Iraqi federal government seeks to integrate Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada into the armed forces as well.[xxvi] This report comes after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly agreed to preserve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxvii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada all control brigades in the PMF.[xxviii] Khamenei opposes dissolving the PMF outright but may support the integration of the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi federal government could reflag PMF brigades as new units, which would largely retain the units’ composition and structure. Integrating the PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would more entrench the militias into the Iraqi security sector more thoroughly, which would enable deeper Iranian infiltration.

The Anbar Province Police Command will reportedly assume responsibility for security in Anbar Province, Iraq, from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxix] The Anbar Police Command, which is headed by Adel Hamid al Alwani, will reportedly control border areas and checkpoints that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously controlled.[xxx] This report comes after the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 13th Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) withdrew from security checkpoints in al Qaim, along the Iraq-Syria border, on January 5.[xxxi] The Iraqi Federal Police operates under the Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is headed by Abdul Amir al Shammari.[xxxii] Shammari is a Shia whom Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s al Furatain Movement nominated as interior minister in late 2022.[xxxiii] Major General Saleh Nasser al Ameri has commanded the Iraqi Federal Police since January 2021.[xxxiv]

Prominent Iraqi Sunni politician and former Ninewa Province Governor Atheel al Nujaifi said that the newly formed “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” will likely oppose former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[xxxv] Five prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians, including current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, established the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” on January 7.[xxxvi] The establishment of the coalition came after Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” in mid-December 2024.[xxxvii] Halbousi notably did not sign the statement calling for a national dialogue and has not joined the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition.” Iraqi media reported on January 9 that Halbousi has recently formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali.[xxxviii] Halbousi reportedly contacted Khazali in March 2024 to try to secure the victory of his preferred candidate in the Iraqi parliament speaker elections.[xxxix] An Iraqi researcher separately observed in October 2024 that an Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated Iraqi media outlet had begun “present[ing] [Halbousi] in a beautiful light.”[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF.
• Syria: The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam in northern Syria, possibly in order to fix SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline.
• Syria: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unit with HTS, raising the question of whether HTS would accept a lesser objective than the Turkish one of destroying the SDF outright.
• Syria: One of the seniormost IRGC commanders in Syria discussed in a leaked video plans to rebuild Iranian-backed proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian infiltration and capture of the Iraqi security sector.

 Iran Update, January 8, 2025

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would conduct a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and integrate into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[i] Turkey frequently conflates the YPG with the SDF and uses the YPG to refer to the entire SDF. Fidan’s comment is one of the most explicit statements by a senior Turkish official threatening military action against the SDF. The SDF is currently negotiating the terms of its potential integration into the future Syrian armed forces with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus, but it remains unclear if Turkey would wait for these negotiations to conclude before launching an operation.[ii]

SNA forces have reportedly deployed and mobilized along SDF-SNA frontlines, which suggests that the SNA is preparing to launch a potential offensive against the SDF from the SNA-controlled Peace Spring area. The Peace Spring area is an SNA-controlled enclave between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr and north of the M4 Highway. Turkish state-run media reported on January 8 that the SNA sent “heavy weapons” to SDF frontlines in the Peace Spring area.[iii] A commander in the Joint Force, an SNA formation that includes the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade, said that the SNA sent fighters, tanks, and other vehicles to the frontlines overlooking the SDF-controlled towns of Kobani in Aleppo Province, Ain Issa in Raqqa Province, and Tal Tamr in Hasakah Province.[iv] The US Treasury Department has sanctioned the commanders of the Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division for human rights abuses against Kurds.[v] Syrian media circulated footage on January 7 of a small convoy of T-series tanks and vehicles moving through Ras al Ain, a city in northern SNA-controlled territory along the Syria-Turkey border.[vi] CTP-ISW can neither confirm local reports about SNA deployments nor comment on their size and scale. The reports of SNA mobilization are consistent with recent Turkish and Turkish-backed airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting SDF positions and assets along the Peace Spring line of control.[vii] A Kurdish journalist separately reported that the SNA sent ”significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus, which is north of the Qara Qozak Bridge on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[viii]

The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River provide contours of a potential future SNA offensive. Deployments to the “frontlines” of Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr suggest that the SNA could launch a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. One objective of this advance may be to capture Kobani or fix SDF forces around Kobani while a second prong advances west and southwards from the Ain Issa area towards the rear of the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge positions. Some interim objectives could include cutting the M4 Highway to block any SDF reinforcements to the Qara Qozak Bridge from areas to the east. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to the Tal Tamr frontlines suggest that the SNA could advance east toward al Hasakah and attempt to isolate the northernmost Kurdish-controlled territory. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to Jarabulus could advance southwards toward the SDF bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The timeline of a potential SNA operation from Peace Spring territory is unclear, however.

It remains unclear if Turkey will pursue a military operation into northern Syria at the same time as a potential SNA assault on the SDF. It is unlikely that the SNA’s reported deployments are happening without Turkish approval and support. Turkey is currently conducting airstrikes to interdict SDF supplies in support of SNA operations, but these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed and –approved SNA operation. Turkey has also conducted drone strikes deeper into SDF-controlled territory, which could be part of Turkish efforts to set conditions prior to a Turkish operation. Syrian media reported on January 8 that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle in al Malikiya, in northeast Hasakah Province.[ix] The strike likely targeted an SDF commander, given that the strike targeted only one vehicle.

Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8.[x] The SDF and SNA have fought near the Tishreen Dam, east of Aleppo, since mid-December 2024. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.[xi] Local media reported that the SDF called on employees and teachers in Raqqa and Tabqa to attend the protest.[xii] Videos posted on social media show that the convoy included around 100 vehicles, and a Kurdish social media user claimed that thousands of people ”answered the call” to participate in the convoy.[xiii] Photo and video evidence from the site of the attack shows that a single strike targeted the road and a car in the convoy, causing at least two deaths.[xiv] The SDF said that a Turkish combat drone conducted the strike.[xv]

The drone strike targeted an SDF supply line that Turkish forces have targeted since late December 2024 to try to isolate the SDF around the Tishreen Dam.[xvi] Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters along the supply line, which flows across the dam, on January 6.[xvii]  Turkish backed-SNA forces continued to advance against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River on January 8 as the civilian convoy approached the dam. The SDF reported intense fighting between the SDF Manbij Military Council and SNA forces in several villages north of Tishreen Dam.[xviii] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian media reported that Sudani would likely discuss “suspending the activities” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, during his visit to Tehran.[xix] Sudani’s visit to Tehran comes after Iraqi media reports that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xx] Iraqi National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim stated on January 4 that the incoming Trump administration has warned the Iraqi federal government that it will “target” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxii] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[xxiii] Sudani’s visit to Iraq also follows Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5.[xxiv]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Khamenei stated during a meeting with Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[xxv]

Sudani separately discussed decreased Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[xxvi] Iran typically supplies approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s gas supply but has reportedly ceased gas exports to Iraq in the past two months.[xxvii] Iran is currently facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages, which has presumably caused it to reduce gas exports to Iraq.[xxviii] Iraq and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in October 2024 for Iraq to import Turkmen gas via Iran to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iranian gas exports.[xxix] Iranian media reported on January 8 that the agreement has not come into effect, however.[xxx] It is unclear why Iraq and Turkmenistan have not implemented the agreement, given that there are existing gas pipelines between Iran and Turkmenistan and Iran and Iraq.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties[xxxi] Aliyev thanked Iran for supporting Azerbaijani ”territorial integrity” and congratulated Azerbaijan on the ”liberation of its land” after the September 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive into the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[xxxii] Aliyev’s praise for Iran is notable given the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.[xxxiii] Ahmadian separately emphasized the need to strengthen energy and transportation cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, including by completing the International North-South Transport Corridor.[xxxiv] Ahmadian will visit Armenia after his visit to Azerbaijan.

The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.[xxxv] The IDF also found traces of another hostage in the tunnel. The IDF could not confirm the status of the second hostage. Israeli media reported that these hostages were previously thought to be alive.[xxxvi] The IDF also located the bodies of two or three militia fighters in the tunnel who were likely the captors of the hostages.[xxxvii] The IDF launched an investigation into the death of the hostage.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. An SNA commander said that the SNA deployed forces to the line of control between the SNA and SDF in northern Syria. The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River suggest the SNA may launch a three-pronged offensive designed to collapse SDF units along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
• Tishreen Dam Airstrike: Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.
• Iraqi Prime Minister in Iran: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
• Iran-Azerbaijan Ties: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties.
• Hamas-Held Hostages in the Gaza Strip: The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.

 Iran Update, January 7, 2025

Six notable Iraqi Sunni politicians issued a statement on December 14 calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[i] The officials included:

• Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani,
• Former Parliament Speaker Osama al Nujaifi,
• Former Parliament Speaker Salim al Jabouri,
• Former Parliament Speaker Ayad al Samarrai,
• Former Iraqi National Assembly Speaker Hajim al Hassani, and
• Former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al [ii]

The officials emphasized the need to address issues that have caused “widespread public discontent and anger,” including corruption and “injustices in prisons.”[iii] The officials also emphasized that Iraq should be an independent country void of external influence. The officials rejected the use of violence to achieve political transformation and reforms. The Baghdad-based Center for Political Thought interpreted the statement as a warning to the Shia Coordination Framework that the Iraqi federal government could face a major “restructuring” if it does not address these grievances.[iv]

Mashhadani separately called on unspecified Iraqi political actors to implement the “Political Settlement” document in a speech on January 4.[v] The Iraqi Forces Alliance, which was a coalition of Sunni political parties, introduced the “Political Settlement” document in March 2017 as a framework for “resolving political and security differences in the post-ISIS period.”[vi] Mohammad al Halbousi, who served as the Iraqi parliament speaker until late 2023, previously led the Iraqi Forces Alliance.[vii] Mashhadani highlighted that the “Political Settlement” document requires signatories to “reconsider the constitution.”[viii] Mashhadani was likely referring to the article in the “Political settlement document” that requires signatories to “make real and fundamental constitutional amendments that address the gaps” in the implementation of the constitution in recent years.[ix] Mashhadani stated that the Syrian regime may not have collapsed if it had reconciled with opposition groups.[x]

Senior Iraqi political and security officials appear to have rejected the recent calls for political reform and national dialogue. Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani criticized those who have called for reforming the Iraqi political system following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria during a speech on January 4.[xi] Sudani added that changing the Iraqi political system is “not up for discussion."[xii] Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh separately emphasized on January 2 that Iraq has experienced a “greater degree of political calm, harmony, and coexistence between societal components” during the past two years.[xiii] Fayyadh added that relations between Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds in Iraq are better than they were in the past. These statements suggest that Fayyadh opposes the calls for a ”national dialogue” to address grievances from various elements of Iraqi society.

Iraqi media reported that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xiv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality. The Iraqi media reports coincide with calls from prominent Shia figures, including Iraqi Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr, and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim, to confine the possession of weapons to the Iraqi state.[xv]

Turkish forces are likely attempting to isolate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by interdicting SDF supply lines to the Tishreen Dam on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xvi] Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish drone strikes have prevented the SDF from accessing a main road that leads to the Dam in Aleppo Province. This would isolate the SDF forces that are holding the Dam and terrain on the western side of the river.[xvii] The isolation effect generated by these Turkish strikes may be temporary in nature, however, unless Turkey can maintain around-the-clock air superiority over SDF lines of communication. The SDF has shot down some Turkish drones, which would make maintaining around-the-clock air superiority more difficult for Turkey.[xviii] SDF supply lines currently flow across the Dam itself. Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters on the supply line road on January 6.[xix]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advanced against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The SNA seized hilly terrain overlooking the village of Mahshiyyat al Sheikh about three miles from Tishreen Dam.[xx] The SNA continued to conduct drone strikes targeting SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River near the dam.[xxi] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank. The SDF retains a salient south of Lake Assad about 20 miles from Tishreen Dam, but SNA forces have reportedly advanced near Maskanah to outflank the SDF along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway.[xxii] Turkish drone strikes targeted an SDF vehicle along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway east of Maskanah, suggesting that Turkey is also attempting to interdict SDF supplies and reinforcements for the SDF’s southern flank.[xxiii] The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4 on the southern salient.

Turkish efforts to interdict SDF supplies may be a precursor to a wider operation, especially if these interdiction strikes attempt to strike deeper behind the front line. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would carry out a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and join the new integrated Syrian Ministry of Defense.[xxiv]  Turkey frequently fails to differentiate between the YPG and the SDF and uses the ”YPG” as a euphemism for the entire SDF. Fidan said on January 6 that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent.”[xxv] Fidan, the Turkish defense minister, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have made several similar statements threatening to SDF to disarm and disband but have not up until this point explicitly threatened a military operation into northeastern Syria.[xxvi] Turkish forces have limited their military action to air support for the SNA but have reportedly brought a significant number of ground forces to the border with Syria.[xxvii] Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.ISIS fighters killed one non-US soldier of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers during a ground operation in the Hamrin Mountains, Iraq.[xxviii] CENTCOM and Iraqi forces conducted a series of airstrikes and ground operations in the Hamrin Mountains between December 30 and January 6. ISIS engaged non-US coalition forces on the ground during these operations, triggering coalition airstrikes. ISIS forces killed one non-US coalition soldier and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers, however. No US personnel were killed or wounded.  

CENTCOM-supported SDF personnel separately captured an ISIS attack cell leader during a raid near Deir ez Zor, Syria, on the evening of January 2 to 3. [xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Politics: Six notable Iraqi Sunni politicians called on December 14 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances. The officials emphasized the need to address issues that have caused “widespread public discontent and anger,” including corruption and “injustices in prisons.” Senior Iraqi political and security officials appear to have rejected the recent calls for political reform and national dialogue.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iraqi media reported that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
• Northern Syria: Turkish forces are likely attempting to isolate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by interdicting SDF supply lines to the Tishreen Dam on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. Turkish efforts to interdict SDF supplies may be a precursor to a wider operation, especially if these interdiction strikes attempt to strike deeper behind the front line.
• Counter-ISIS Mission: ISIS fighters killed one non-US soldier of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers during a ground operation in the Hamrin Mountains, Iraq. CENTCOM-supported SDF personnel separately captured an ISIS attack cell leader during a raid near Deir ez Zor, Syria, on the evening of January 2 to 3.

 Iran Update, January 6, 2025

Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini told the Financial Times that Iran has doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”[i] These increases in the scope and quantity of Iranian military exercises indicate that Iran feels increasingly vulnerable after the setbacks it suffered in the October 7 War and after the fall of the Assad regime. Naieini also announced that the IRGC and Artesh will conduct 30 joint land, air, and naval exercises in six western and southern provinces until the end of the Iranian year in mid-March. Naini specified that maritime exercises will start at the end of this week with a large naval parade in the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, to unveil new equipment.[ii]  Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ghadir Rahimzadeh separately stated that there will be a nationwide joint air defense exercise in the vicinity of sensitive centers “with new and unknown systems” in the next few days.[iii]

The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The Syrian Resistance Movement acknowledged that Sunni fighters conducted an attack on January 5 (see below for details), and added that it is a multi-sectarian movement.[iv] It also framed itself as a protector of the ”Syrian people” against ”terrorist gangs” and ”foreign mercenaries,” which is similar to the language employed by Assadist propaganda outlets before the fall of the regime.[v] The group also uses the flag of the Assad regime. The group has employed sectarian narratives in an attempt to undermine the HTS-led coalition, but this is also consistent with the Assad regime’s propaganda strategy, which sought to portray the HTS and other majority Sunni opposition forces as inherently sectarian.[vi] CTP-ISW previously noted that growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further.[vii]

The Syrian Resistance Movement also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.[viii] The Syria Resistance Movement claimed that it ambushed interim government forces conducting security patrols in al Awaina, Latakia City.[ix] This is the first attack claimed by the Syrian Resistance Movement since the group announced its armed opposition to the interim government on December 29.[x] Interim government forces have clashed with pro-Assad remnants in other parts of the country, but this is the first attack claimed by an organized opposition group.[xi] Local sources reported that former pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime (also known as Shabiha) targeted the forces with an improvised explosive device.[xii] The attack killed two interim government forces, including a Jaysh al Izza battalion commander.[xiii] Jaysh al Izza is subordinated to HTS as part of the Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[xiv] The Syrian Resistance Movement said its attack was a response to the interim government’s clearing operations in Homs City, which have gone on for four days.[xv] The interim government announced that the Homs operations had ended after achieving their goals on January 6.[xvi] The Syrian Resistance Movement had accused HTS-led forces of sectarian targeting during the operations in Homs and in other cities.[xvii]

The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. The SDF conducted a series of drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles and positions along the frontline northeast of the Tishreen Dam on January 5 and January 6.[xviii] The drone strikes likely supported the SDF Manbij Military Council as it engaged SNA forces north of the Tishreen Dam. The head of the SDF media center reported that Turkish forces supported the SNA with artillery shelling and drone strikes.[xix] SNA artillery also shelled SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near Jaada, which is approximately 4km north of the eastern side of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[xx] Local Arab anti-SDF social media accounts said that the SDF still controlled the Tishreen Dam on the Euphrates River, and Maskanah, in Aleppo Province, on January 6.[xxi]

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” during a joint press conference with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi on January 6.[xxii] Turkish officials have repeatedly emphasized that it will destroy the “YPG“ militia, which is a euphemism for the SDF.[xxiii] Turkey has been shelling SDF positions throughout northeastern Syria since the fall of the regime.[xxiv] Turkey more recently increased airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting likely SDF supply lines closer to the battlefields along the Euphrates River.[xxv] Turkish drones struck SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam on January 6, for example.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Armed Pro-Assad Opposition to the HTS-led Government: The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The group also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.
• Iranian Regional Policy: Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. An IRGC spokesperson said that Iran doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”
• Northern Syria: The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” amid increasing Turkish interdiction strikes against the SDF.

 Iran Update, January 5, 2025

Iran is likely taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5 for covert meetings with senior Iraqi officials and militia commanders to discuss “restructuring” an informed source told Iraqi media.[i] Ghaani will reportedly meet with the Iraqi prime minister, leaders in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the Iraqi “armed forces commander.” Ghaani and the IRGC very likely also discuss the fall of the Assad Regime with these key Iraqi leaders. The many militia elements that withdrew from Syria will presumably also need to be reorganized. IRGC Ground Forces Special Forces Brigade also recently conducted military exercises in the western Kermanshah province and the Iranian Artesh Ground Forces deployed several brigades in western Iran to confront hostile groups aimed to create instability on Iran’s western border with Iraq, illustrating Iran‘s preoccupation with the threat posed by insecurity in Iraq.[ii] 

IRGC-affiliated media separately published an op-ed that highlights some of the probable concerns that Iran has after the fall of Syria. The op-ed claimed that political insecurity in Syria could be transported to Iraq by terrorists who assassinate key Iraqi officials to cause insecurity and destabilize the country. [iii]Tasnim‘s Salman al Maliki claimed that other powers, such as the United States and Israel, would try to exploit a power vacuum in Iraq for their own interests. Iran regularly holds the United States and Israel responsible for the formation of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and could conclude that ISIS attacks targeting Iraqi military officers and officials are encouraged by the United States and Israel.[iv] Maliki could also be referring to retaliatory Israeli or US strikes against militia targets in response to future attacks targeting Israel or US bases. Maliki urged Iraq to create a joint political and military council for addressing these security threats, sharing intelligence, and responding to terrorism in the op-ed.[v]

Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. Tabnak reported on January 4 that an HTS-linked commander entered the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus and repeated “sectarian and sarcastic sentences.”[vi] Tabnak claimed that the provocative video could lead the Shiites and Alawites in Syria to respond with “harsh actions.” Tabnak has previously claimed that HTS fighters have threatened the security of the sacred Shia shrine.[vii]

Syrian Popular Resistance, which is a purportedly Syrian telegram channel espousing sectarian narratives, accused the HTS-led government of killing six Sayyida Zeinab Shrine workers after six dead bodies were reportedly found on January 5.[viii] The channel provided no evidence of the deaths or whether the killings were motivated by sectarian violence. This is also the first time the channel has discussed Sayyida Zeinab, which is notable given that most of the claims about the shrine have come from the Iranian information space.

Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that if the first condition of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement–the complete withdrawal of Hezbollah and dismantling of Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)–is not met, Israel will be “forced to act on its own.”[ix] Katz specified that if Hezbollah does not withdraw there is “no agreement.” The outgoing IDF 91st Division Commander Brigadier General Shai Klepper similarly stated in an interview published on January 5 that the IDF is ”not expected” to leave southern Lebanon after the 60-day ceasefire period concludes if the IDF’s objectives are not fulfilled.[x] The 91st Division is responsible for Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. Israeli media reported that the United States and Israel are making unspecified efforts to extend the 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah to prevent a ”premature withdrawal” or a return to full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.[xi]

The LAF likely does not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26. Israeli media reported the IDF still controls most of the Lebanese territory as it did in November 2024, when the ceasefire deal was signed.[xii] The Washington Post similarly reported that the IDF has withdrawn and allowed the LAF to backfill in only two of the over 60 IDF-controlled areas in southern Lebanon.[xiii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Hezbollah fighters and weapons have not yet moved north of the Litani River, as required by the deal.[xiv] CTP-ISW has previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.[xv]

Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south. A reportedly former regime-affiliated militia led by Mohsen al Haymad engaged other local factions with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms in al Sanamayn City, northern Daraa Province, on January 4.[xvi] Syrian sources suggested that Haymad‘s faction clashed with local groups affiliated with the Southern Operations Room, but it is not clear what started the fighting.[xvii] Haymad’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[xviii] Many Southern Operations Room commanders—including Ahmed al Awda, a key commander in the group—were also former opposition groups that reconciled with the regime in 2018 under a Russian reconciliation plan.[xix] The HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed reinforcements to al Sanamayn City and convened the factions to negotiate a ceasefire.[xx] Haymad’s group and other unspecified local factions agreed to a ceasefire and to hand over heavy weapons to HTS forces.[xxi] HTS reportedly allowed the local groups to retain their individual weapons, however, which contradicts HTS’s policy of requiring the disarmament of all armed groups within Syria.[xxii] Short-term arrangements to ensure temporary security in al Sanamyan may present problems in the future as HTS continues its mission to disarm and dissolve armed factions into the Syrian Defense Ministry. This incident also highlights that the Southern Operation Room has not yet been fully folded into HTS’s forces. HTS-controlled forces will remain in al Sanamayn to set up checkpoints and maintain security within the city.[xxiii] The necessity of HTS forces and checkpoints in the city underscores HTS’s lack of control over armed factions in the Daraa and other southern provinces, which regularly sees fighting between local groups.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Regional Policy: Iran is taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5.
• Iranian Information Space: Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus.
• Lebanon: Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. The Lebanese Armed Forces likely do not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26.
• Southwestern Syria: Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south.

 Iran Update, January 4, 2025

An Alawite organization accused the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government of failing to address instances of sectarian violence. The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria released a statement on January 3 expressing its support for the interim Syrian government but argued that the interim government, though it has stated it seeks to respect all Syrians, has so far failed to back words with action.[i] The group cited instances of sectarian-motivated attacks and killings in Homs, Hama, Latakia, Tartous, Damascus, and Daraa. HTS-led security forces have been conducting clearing operations targeting former regime members in these areas since December 28.[ii] The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria rejected the interim government’s claims that acts of violence were perpetrated by individuals and argued that the prevalence of this violence suggested that the violence was a planned revenge campaign.[iii] The group added that the government must protect all Syrians by holding the perpetrators accountable, regardless of whether the perpetrators are loyal to the HTS-led interim government or engaging in individual actions against orders.

The HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite's fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aim to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.[iv] The HTS-led interim government has also thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.[v] Accusations of sectarian-motivated attacks can create a dangerous cycle of groups refusing to disarm because they fear for their safety, which then causes HTS-affiliated forces to target those groups that don’t disarm, thereby causing the groups to continue to accuse HTS of sectarianism. This dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked. The HTS-led government has a requirement to assuage the concerns of former regime loyalists and minorities, part of which requires controlling these sectarian narratives as and if they spread.

The interim Syrian government has begun to implement changes to the Syrian government without the consensus of a representative Syrian national dialogue conference. The interim Syrian Education Minister Nazir Mohammed al Qadri released a 12-page document on January 1 detailing changes to the Syrian education curriculum.[vi] Qadir held several administrative educational positions under the HTS Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib before being appointed by HTS as the interim Syrian Education Minister.[vii] The changes eliminated references to the Assad regime and family and altered several religious phrasings.[viii] The Wall Street Journal cited several examples of changes in religious textbooks including “sacrifice one’s life in defense of his homeland” changed to “sacrifice one’s life for the sake of Allah,” “path of goodness” changed to “Islamic path,” and “those who have gone astray” changed to “Jews and Christians.”[ix]  The Wall Street Journal cited unspecified Syrians who expressed concern that the changes to the education curriculum were made without input from the rest of Syrian society.[x] Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building a new Syrian state, during which CTP-ISW assessed he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.[xi] This timeline would effectively enable Shara to shape a Syrian government into one compatible with HTS’s ideology prior to any referendum.