Iran Updates June 2024

Iran Update, June 30, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued re-clearing Shujaiya in Gaza City. Hamas combat units began reconstituting there after Israeli forces withdrew in April 2024.
• West Bank: Israeli forces conducted a drone strike killing a senior PIJ official in Tulkarm. The official was responsible for recent militia activity targeting civilian and military targets.
• Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted 10 attacks into northern Israel. One of the attacks involved a one-way attack drone that injured nine Israelis.

Iran Update, June 29, 2024

No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28.[i] Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5.[ii] Jalili will likely win the runoff vote and become the next Iranian president. The Iranian regime reported that Pezeshkian received the most votes at around 10.4 million, while Jalili received around 9.5 million.[iii] Jalili will likely receive significantly more votes in the runoff election since there will be no other hardline candidates splitting the hardline vote. The second most prominent hardline candidate—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—received around 3.4 million votes, which was not enough to compete in the runoff election. At least some Ghalibaf voters will presumably back Jalili in the runoff election, giving him a significant advantage over Pezeshkian.

Jalili would run an ultraconservative hardline government similar to late-President Ebrahim Raisi. Such a president would likely exacerbate the economic and socio-cultural issues frustrating large swaths of the Iranian population. Jalili is a deeply ideological regime loyalist who has long supported extreme domestic and foreign policies. Western and Iranian opposition outlets reported that some Iranian hardliners, including senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, tried to prevent Jalili from running for president, feeling that his views are too radical.[iv] Jalili downplayed the importance of external engagement to improve the Iranian economy during the presidential debates, suggesting that he might instead favor an autarkic agenda.[v] Jalili also voiced support for Iran’s “nuclear rights” and criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in the debates.[vi] These comments are particularly concerning given that Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program significantly and begun running computer simulations that could help build a nuclear weapon.

The presidential election on June 28 saw unprecedently low voter turnout, highlighting widespread disillusionment with the Iranian regime. The Iranian Interior Ministry announced that around 25.5 million votes were cast, which is around 40 percent of the Iranian electorate.[vii] Notwithstanding the possibility that the regime inflated these numbers, they reflect a notable drop-off from the roughly 48.5-percent turnout for the Iranian presidential election in 2021.[viii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election. Iran will hold a runoff vote on July 5. Hardliner Saeed Jalili will likely win the runoff vote and become the next Iranian president.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division continued raids in Shujaiya, Gaza City. An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas' Shujaiya Battalion reconstituted after previous Israeli raids by recruiting new fighters and fighters who fled to Shujaiya from other parts of the strip.
• Gaza Strip: The United States has proposed new language for the US-backed Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, according to three unspecified informed sources cited by Axios.
• Yemen: The Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a combined drone attack targeting a commercial vessel in the Mediterranean Sea. This attack marks the sixth time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation targeting Israel with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Iran Update, June 28, 2024

Iran held its presidential election on June 28.[i] Iran will likely have to hold a runoff election on July 5 given that neither of the two hardline frontrunners—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili—withdrew from the election before the first round of voting on June 28. Four candidates—pragmatic hardliner Ghalibaf, ultraconservative hardliner Jalili, reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, and hardliner Mostafa Pour Mohammadi—participated in the June 28 election. The Iranian constitution stipulates that a candidate must win over 50 percent of the vote to become president.[ii] Senior hardline Iranian officials have repeatedly called in recent weeks on the hardline candidates to coalesce around a single candidate.[iii] These calls were driven by concerns that splitting the hardline vote across numerous candidates could inadvertently advantage the sole reformist candidate, Pezeshkian. Two unspecified Iranian officials confirmed to the New York Times on June 28 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani called on Jalili to withdraw from the race during an emergency meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf in Mashhad, Iran, on June 26.[iv] Ghaani reportedly stated that Ghalibaf is better qualified than Jalili to run the government because of his “military background and pragmatic outlook.”[v] Ghaani’s characterization of Ghalibaf as “pragmatic” is consistent with recent Western reports that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning the election because they regard him as “too hardline.”[vi] Ghaani’s intervention also highlights hardliners’ concerns that Pezeshkian could pose a real threat to Jalili and Ghalibaf in the election. The New York Times later deleted its report about Ghaani’s meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf without providing an explanation.

Preliminary reports suggest that most Iranians did not participate in the June 28 election. The Iranian Election Headquarters extended the voting deadline twice until 2200 local time, likely to try to increase voter turnout.[vii] This action is not unprecedented; the regime has previously extended voting hours during both presidential and parliamentary elections.[viii] The decision to extend the voting deadline nevertheless highlights that voter turnout likely did not reach the regime’s desired level during the regular voting hours. The Interior Ministry, which runs elections in Iran, reportedly estimated a voter turnout of less than 30 percent by 2000 local time.[ix] A Tehran-based researcher similarly claimed that turnout only reached approximately 35 percent by 2115 local time.[x] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports.  Opposition media separately circulated videos of poll workers sleeping at empty voting centers and reported that the regime forced prisoners in Kurdistan Province to vote to boost voter turnout statistics.[xi]  

Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed security developments in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip with Jamaa al Islamiya Secretary General Mohammed Taqoush on June 28.[xii] Nasrallah and Taqoush discussed the importance of coordination between Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance to support Palestinian fighters in Gaza.[xiii] Jamaa al Islamiya has conducted attacks targeting northern Israel and the disputed Sheba Farms area since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.[xiv] Jamaa al Islamiya was founded in 1964 as the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.[xv]

Palestinian militias defended against Israeli forces advancing in Shujaiya. Palestinian fighters have conducted 24 attacks targeting Israeli forces advancing in Shujaiya since the IDF began its operation on June 27.[xvi] Palestinian fighters conducted 33 attacks targeting Israeli forces during the first 24 hours of a re-clearing operations in Jabalia in May 2024.[xvii] IDF officers described the fighting in Jabalia during the May re-clearing operation as some of the most intense of the war.[xviii]

Reuters, citing an unpublished International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, reported that Iran installed four new cascades of IR-6 centrifuges in Unit 1 of the Fordow fuel enrichment facility on June 28.[xix] Iran has not yet brought the four new cascades online. Iran previously informed the IAEA on June 13 that it planned to add eight total cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow within the next three to four weeks.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran held its presidential election on June 28. Iran will likely have to hold a runoff election on July 5 given that neither of the two hardline frontrunners—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili—withdrew from the election before the first round of voting on June 28. Preliminary reports suggest that most Iranians did not participate in the June 28 election. 
• Iran: Reuters, citing an unpublished International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, reported that Iran installed four new cascades of IR-6 centrifuges in Unit 1 of the Fordow fuel enrichment facility on June 28. 
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed security developments in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip with Jamaa al Islamiya Secretary General Mohammed Taqoush on June 28. 
• Gaza: Palestinian fighters have conducted 24 attacks targeting Israeli forces advancing in Shujaiya since the IDF began its operation on June 27. 

Iran Update, June 27, 2024

Iranian hardliners have made only limited progress toward uniting behind a single candidate ahead of the Iranian presidential election on June 28. Remaining divisions among the hardliners by the time of the vote significantly increases the likelihood of a runoff election. Two hardline candidates—Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Ali Reza Zakani—have withdrawn from the race since June 26 in order to help unify their faction.[i] Neither candidate was especially popular, however, making it unclear that their exits will meaningfully affect the vote. The two most prominent hardline candidates (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili) remain in the race and have refused to withdraw in support of the other at the time of this writing. Ghalibaf and Jalili both staying in the election ensures that they will split at least some of the hardliner vote. It will also likely prevent either from reaching the majority needed to win—unless the supreme leader and his inner circle manipulate the vote blatantly to favor either candidate. Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates on July 5 if no one wins the majority.[ii]

Some hardliners, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appear concerned that the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, could win the vote outright. Khamenei indirectly criticized Pezeshkian on June 25 for supporting engagement with the West, indicating Khamenei’s opposition to him.[iii] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is run by hardliners, additionally cancelled one of Pezeshkian‘s rallies at the last minute on June 26, further indicating that some in the regime view him as a serious contender for the presidency.[iv] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has separately tried to unite the hardline camp against Pezeshkian, according to unverified social media rumors. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly met with Ghalibaf and Jalili in Mashhad on June 26 to form a consensus between them.[v] Ghaani clearly failed, if this reporting is accurate. But his intervention is nonetheless remarkable and possibly unprecedented, reflecting hardliners’ serious concerns about Pezeshkian.

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are concerned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could escalate the war with Israel too far, according to Saudi media. The Saudi outlet, citing unspecified sources, reported that the Iraqi militias are developing plans to support Hezbollah if Israel launches a major military offensive into Lebanon. The plans involve sending fighters and weapons to Hezbollah. There is precedent for close military cooperation between Hezbollah and the Iraqi groups, as they fought alongside one another in the Syrian civil war to preserve the Bashar al Assad regime. The Iraqi militias reportedly proposed their plans to intervene in Lebanon during a recent meeting with a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer in Baghdad. Both the IRGC and Hezbollah had reservations, with the senior IRGC officer describing the plans as “too enthusiastic at the moment.” The Saudi outlet noted that Iran must still reach a final decision on the plans, however.

That Iran has hesitated to approve the plans in consistent with the long-standing Iranian desire to avoid an overt regional war against the United States and Israel. Iranian leaders will almost certainly use their proxy and partner militias to deter and pressure Israel. But Iranian leaders have also historically tried to restrain the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, fearing that they could inadvertently spiral the escalation cycle out of Iranian control. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, for instance, traveled to Baghdad and ordered the militias to stop attacking US targets after the militias killed three US soldiers in Jordan in January 2024.

Qais Khazali, who is the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, argued in the meeting with the senior IRGC officer that the Iraqi militias should attack US interests rather than intervening in Lebanon. This reporting is consistent with Khazali threatening on June 24 to attack US interests if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated deep-buried improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting two Israeli vehicles around Jenin in the West Bank on June 27, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding 16 others.[vi] Israeli forces were conducting a raid targeting Hamas networks in the area when PIJ attacked.[vii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that PIJ buried the IEDs 1.5 meters underground, making them difficult for Israeli forces to detect.[viii] The use of deep-buried IEDs is especially noteworthy given that burying them could be a relatively time-intensive process.  Palestinian militias have previously used sophisticated means to attack Israeli forces around Jenin. Palestinian militias, for instance, used an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) against Israeli forces in Jenin in July 2023.[ix] The attack marked the first recorded use of an EFP in the West Bank.[x] EFPs require specially manufactured concave copper disks, indicating that the militia that used them either imported the disks or received technical instruction and materials to produce them.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian hardliners have made only limited progress toward uniting behind a single candidate ahead of the Iranian presidential election. Remaining divisions among hardliners significantly increases the likelihood of a runoff vote.
• Iraq: Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are reportedly concerned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could escalate the war with Israel too far. Iran has thus hesitated to approve the militias’ plans to intervene if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.
• West Bank: PIJ detonated a deep-buried IED targeting Israeli forces in the West Bank, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding 16 others. Palestinian militias previously conducted an EFP attack targeting Israeli forces in the area in July 2023.

Iran Update, June 26, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Hardline candidate Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh withdrew from the Iranian presidential election. Ghazi Zadeh did not appear to have a serious chance at winning and withdrew to avoid splitting votes across too many hardline candidates.
• Iraq: A member of an Iranian-backed militia became the deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi PMF. The appointment reflects the significant control and influence that the loyal Iranian-backed militia has in the Iraqi security apparatus.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted airstrikes killing two Palestinian militia members involved in manufacturing and smuggling weapons in the Gaza Strip.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a combined drone attack with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq into Israel for the fourth time.

Iran Update, June 25, 2024

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, possibly indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili in the upcoming election. Khamenei’s views also signal the supreme leader’s opposition to reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian. Khamenei expressed strong opposition to mending ties with the United States during a speech on June 25, which mirrored similar statements made by Jalili in a foreign policy debate on June 24.[i] Jalili defended Iran’s “nuclear rights” and criticized the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during the debate.[ii] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian, stating that politicians who are “attached to America” cannot be “good managers.”[iii] Pezeshkian expressed support for improving relations and resuming nuclear negotiations with the West during the June 24 foreign policy debate.[iv] Pezeshkian stated that “no country in history has been able to achieve prosperity and growth by closing its borders and wanting to work alone.”[v] Khamenei’s criticisms of Pezeshkian may also stem from the fact that Pezeshkian has closely coordinated his presidential campaign with Mohammad Javad Zarif, who served as Iran’s foreign affairs minister under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also expressed support for nuclear negotiations during the June 24 debate, which is consistent with recent reports from Iranian opposition outlets that advisers to Ghalibaf have approached Western diplomats in recent weeks.[vi]

Khamenei’s possible endorsement of Jalili would diverge from some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) factions’ support for pragmatic hardline candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The Telegraph reported in early June 2024 that some senior IRGC commanders, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, are supporting Ghalibaf.[vii] An IRGC member told the Telegraph that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning the election because they regard him as “too hardline.”[viii] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh separately stated on June 24 that Iran’s next president must have “strong executive management” experience.[ix] Some Western commentators and analysts have interpreted Haji Zadeh’s statement as an implicit endorsement of Ghalibaf given Ghalibaf’s experience serving as Iran's parliament speaker since 2020.[x] Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.[xi] Ghalibaf is also part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[xii]

Khamenei’s explicit opposition to engagement with the West also challenges recent Western reports that incorrectly suggested that Iran is seeking to renew nuclear talks with the West. Iranian Permanent Representative to the UN Saeed Iravani stated that the JCPOA is “not perfect” but is the “best option” during a UN Security Council meeting on June 24.[xiii] Some Western media outlets incorrectly interpreted Iravani’s statement as signaling the Iranian regime’s readiness to renew nuclear negotiations. Iravani’s statements were instead consistent with repeated statements by regime officials blaming the current state of the JCPOA on the United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, Germany). Iravani accused the United States of “unilaterally and illegally” withdrawing from the JCPOA and accused the E3 of “failing” to fulfill their JCPOA obligations.[xiv] Jalili additionally accused the United States and the E3 of lacking “sincerity and determination” to revive the JCPOA.

Israel assesses that it will complete the intense phase of ground operation in the Gaza Strip within a few days.[xv] Israeli Army Radio reported on June 25 that the IDF will fully transition to conducting raids after it declares that it has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[xvi] The IDF raids will require two divisions in the Gaza Strip.[xvii] The IDF will remain along the Philadelphi Corridor to locate and destroy smuggling tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, a process that will take several more months to complete.[xviii] The IDF similarly transitioned to a raid system in the northern Gaza Strip in early January 2024.[xix]

Hamas will very likely exploit the Israeli raid system to reconstitute its combat units and reassert its governing authority across the Gaza Strip. Hamas has rebuilt itself elsewhere in the Gaza Strip after Israeli drawdowns elsewhere in Strip, which began in January 2024. The IDF has subsequently re-cleared the areas that it withdrew from and has found reconstituted Hamas forces there.[xx] Hamas exploits these Israeli raids—which by definition include a planned retrograde—to subsequently reorganize and regenerate themselves. The IDF currently assesses that it will soon destroy Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[xxi] Thousands of Palestinian fighters fled the Rafah area prior to the Israeli operation, however.[xxii] This cadre of surviving Hamas fighters assigned to the Rafah Brigade could provide Hamas commanders in Rafah or elsewhere sufficient human resources to reorganize themselves into composite, fully combat effective units by combining assets from various degraded Hamas units.[xxiii] Hamas commanders are also engaging in regenerative tasks, such as recruiting personnel and replenishing stockpiles of military equipment and weapons.[xxiv] Hamas is capable of regrouping in the Gaza Strip in the absence of sustained military pressure and a viable alternative to its rule. Raids can temporarily disrupt but will not stop a reconstitution process.[xxv]

Hamas is disrupting Israeli efforts to create nascent governing authorities that exclude Hamas’ political wing. Hamas reportedly killed two clan leaders in the central and southern Gaza Strip as part of this effort.[xxvi] A Palestinian journalist reported on June 25 that members of the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry’s Internal Security Forces, which employs fighters from the Hamas military wing, killed the clan leaders.[xxvii] The leaders were coordinating with Israel and forming ”criminal armed groups,” presumably to counter Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip.[xxviii] Hamas has not claimed responsibility for the killings at the time of writing. Hamas’ similarly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City in March 2024, after which the clans signed a letter refusing to coordinate with Israel.[xxix] Israel was working with the clan leader in an attempt to create a nascent governing authority.[xxx]

Hamas will likely continue to suppress Israeli-organized political alternatives. The lack of security for Palestinians involved in Israeli-organized alternatives to Hamas makes establishing a non-Hamas governing authority more difficult. Hamas has a long history of killing and suppressing dissidents and political alternatives, including members of local Gazan clans.[xxxi] An attempt to use these clan leaders to form a nascent alternative to Hamas will necessitate the provision of security to protect the clan members from Hamas. The Israeli national security adviser said on June 25 that the IDF will replace Hamas in the northern Gaza Strip ”in the coming days,” suggesting confidence that an unspecified force will take over despite Hamas’ continued presence.[xxxii] Hamas responded to the national security adviser’s statement, threatening that it would “cut off any hand” of Israel attempting to decide Gaza’s political future.[xxxiii]

Iranian-backed groups are continuing to recruit members and smuggle and manufacture weapons, likely to destabilize Jordan and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank. Jordanian police discovered and detonated two separate caches of unspecified explosives in east Amman on June 21 and June 24.[xxxiv] An initial explosion tipped police off to the first cache of explosives in Marka, a dense residential neighborhood.[xxxv] Former Jordanian officials said the explosion may have been a failed attempt to manufacture more explosives.[xxxvi] Police discovered a second cache of explosives tied to the Marka suspects in a car repair shop in an industrial area of Abu Alanda, Amman, on June 24.[xxxvii] Jordanian police are still investigating the incidents and have not released the suspects’ identities.[xxxviii] However, anonymous Jordanian security officials told Reuters the quantities of discovered explosives indicated that the incidents are “terror-related.”[xxxix]

These explosive caches and other security incidents in Jordan, including weapons smuggling, are part of a possible Iranian effort to destabilize Jordan and use it as a springboard to increase Iranian influence in the West Bank. The Jordanian security officials said that the Marka and Abu Alanda incidents are linked to Iranian efforts to recruit agents within Jordan to destabilize the Kingdom.[xl] Jordanian territory offers multiple ground routes through which Iran could move military materiel into the West Bank. Tehran has sought to develop its militia capabilities and infrastructure in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted Iranian shortcomings there.[xli] Iran and Iranian-backed groups have shown a recently shown greater interest in developing networks in Jordan, including by threatening to equip thousands of ”Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons.[xlii] This threat is likely aspirational at present, but Jordanian police disrupted an attempt by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons to a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell in late March 2024.[xliii] Both Jordanian and Israeli police have thwarted several attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to conduct attacks within the kingdom or smuggle weapons into the West Bank.[xliv]

Iranian efforts to manufacture weapons, arm Jordanian agents, and undermine the Jordanian state are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[xlv] An expanding Axis of Resistance network in Jordan could destabilize a major Western partner in the region and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank by providing a ground line of communication over which Iran could transport weapons and other capabilities to its allies in the West Bank. It is notable in this context that Iranian-linked actors were reportedly manufacturing weapons in Jordan. Weapons smugglers—Iranian-linked and otherwise—continue to face significant difficulty in moving weapons and other materiel into the West Bank.[xlvi] These smugglers will continue to attempt to move weapons into the West Bank, however, and a destabilized Jordan could facilitate an Iranian effort to accelerate this process.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, possibly indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili in the upcoming election. Khamenei’s views also signal the supreme leader’s opposition to reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian.
• Gaza Strip: Israel assesses that it will complete the intense phase of ground operation in the Gaza Strip within a few days. Hamas will very likely exploit the Israeli raid system to reconstitute its combat units and reassert its governing authority across the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas is disrupting Israeli efforts to create nascent governing authorities that exclude Hamas’ political wing. Hamas reportedly killed two clan leaders in the central and southern Gaza Strip as part of this effort
• Jordan: Iranian-backed groups are continuing to recruit members and smuggle and manufacture weapons, likely to destabilize Jordan and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank.
• West Bank: Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades infiltrated Israeli territory near Tulkarm and fired at IDF soldiers.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: US presidential envoy Amos Hochstein warned Hezbollah that the group cannot rely on the United States to prevent Israel from conducting an attack into Lebanon.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in Haifa, Israel.

Iran Update, June 24, 2024

Hamas is rebuilding its weapons production capacity in the Gaza Strip as part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 24 that Hamas is establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Gaza Strip in order to replenish its stockpiles of military equipment and weapons.[i] The replenishment of these resources is a key component to the reconstitution of a military force.

Reconstitution consists of two general tasks: reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization involves a commander redistributing the resources at their disposal to restore attritted units to a minimal level of effectiveness.[ii] Regeneration is a more complex, resource intensive, and time intensive process “that requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.“[iii] This process naturally involves replenishing stockpiles of military equipment and weapons. Hamas is also recruiting 18-year-olds and trying to train them as part of that reconstitution effort, as CTP-ISW previously reported, which is crucial to restoring combat units.[iv] These reports indicate that at least some Hamas commanders have begun to regenerate the forces and materiel under their command and could become again prepared to engage Israeli forces.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is trying to disrupt Hamas’ reconstitution efforts by targeting relevant Hamas officials. The IDF conducted an airstrike killing a Hamas weapons production specialist in Gaza City on June 23.[v] The IDF stated that the specialist developed ”strategic“ weapons for Hamas and oversaw several weapons development cells.[vi] The IDF has killed about 45 weapons production specialists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) since the war began.[vii]

Hamas will likely try to exploit the absence of Israeli forces throughout much of the Gaza Strip in order to facilitate its reorganization and regeneration efforts.[viii] A commander usually must disengage their force from opposing forces to efficiently and successfully reconstitute. Hamas has exploited IDF withdrawals in much of the Gaza Strip to rebuild the combat power of degraded Hamas battalions, integrate new forces, and prepare them for further combat activities. This is particularly accurate in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, where Hamas has reportedly established weapons production workshops.[ix]

Iranian presidential candidates discussed socio-cultural issues during the third debate for the upcoming election. None of the presumed frontrunners (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Masoud Pezeshkian) suggested that they would support fundamental changes to long-standing regime policies. All three frontrunners indicated support for the mandatory hijab law and did not suggest that they would support easing restrictions on women’s dress code.[x] That none of these candidates challenged the regime policy reflects their subordination to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has expressed opposition repeatedly to changing the hijab requirement. Khamenei has described veiling as an “irrevocable, religious necessity.”[xi] The frontrunners did debate slightly how to enforce the mandatory hijab law.

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner). Ghalibaf emphasized that all regime bodies—not just the national police force—should encourage and enforce the hijab requirement.[xii] Ghalibaf claimed that some regime bodies have supported the police insufficiently in enforcing the mandatory hijab law, leading to violent confrontations between the regime and unveiled women. Ghalibaf also expressed support for a recent hijab enforcement bill that Parliament is considering currently. The legislation codifies legal punishments, including fines and salary cuts, for women who violate the hijab requirement.[xiii]
• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist). Pezeshkian emphasized his opposition to using violence to enforce the mandatory hijab law but did not propose changing the law itself.[xiv] Pezeshkian described regime treatment of unveiled women as immoral. Pezeshkian also argued that the regime could stop women from questioning the need to veil by changing how it educates girls in mosques and schools. This statement mirrors similar remarks from Khamenei calling for greater emphasis on indoctrinating Iranian youth in order to resolve social issues.[xv]
• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner). Jalili avoided addressing the hijab issue directly and instead focused on criticizing the West. Jalili accused the West of hypocrisy for condemning Iran for treating women harshly while ignoring the deaths of Palestinian women in the Gaza Strip.[xvi]

The frontrunners’ comments on the mandatory hijab law reflect their efforts to appeal to certain demographics. Pezeshkian has consistently tried to rally Iranian youth who are frustrated with the harsh enforcement of the hijab requirement. Jalili contrastingly tried to pander to hardline, anti-Western voters in order to distinguish himself from Ghalibaf.

The frontrunning candidates separately expressed support for ongoing censorship and internet restrictions in Iran. Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian both claimed that they support internet freedom but added that censorship is necessary during “crises.”[xvii] Ghalibaf emphasized the need to “carefully and intelligently monitor” the internet and expressed support for building the national intranet, which would increase regime control of the Iranian domestic information space.[xviii] Jalili praised regime efforts to develop indigenous communications and social media platforms as alternatives to Western platforms.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas is rebuilding its weapons production capacity in the Gaza Strip as part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. Hamas has also begun trying to recruit and train 18-year-olds to this end.
• Iran: Iranian presidential candidates discussed socio-cultural issues during the third debate of the upcoming election. None of the presumed frontrunners suggested that they would support fundamental changes to long-standing regime policies.
• West Bank: PIJ detonated an IED around Bat Hefer, which is near the Israel-West Bank border. The attack comes amid an uptick in Palestinian militant activity in the area in recent weeks.
• Lebanon: Workers at Beirut-Rafik Hariri International Airport are reportedly concerned about an increase in Iranian weapons deliveries to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Iraq: Hamas is reportedly planning to relocate its political leadership from Qatar to Iraq. Iran and the Iraqi federal government would reportedly provide security to Hamas leaders in Iraq.

Iran Update, June 23, 2024

Hamas appears to be accelerating its reconstitution effort in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is actively recruiting 18-year-olds and has attempted to conduct training for new recruits.[i] Recruitment is one element of the second stage of reconstitution, regeneration. Reconstitution consists of two general tasks, reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization involves a commander redistributing the resources at their disposal to restore attrited units to a minimal level of effectiveness.[ii] Regeneration is a more complex, time-intensive, and resource-intensive process “that requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.”[iii] This process includes training of new personnel.[iv] Active Hamas recruitment efforts indicate that at least some Hamas commanders have begun to regenerate the forces under their command.

Hamas will likely continue to try to exploit the lack of Israeli forces throughout much of the Gaza Strip by executing both reorganization and regeneration efforts to reconstitute itself.[v] A commander usually must disengage their force from opposing forces to successfully and efficiently reconstitute. Hamas taken advantage of Israeli withdrawals in much of the Gaza Strip to rebuild the combat power of degraded local battalions, integrate new forces, and prepare them for further combat activities. Recruitment and training are key components of restoring combat units, which will enable Hamas to prepare for further engagements with the IDF.[vi]

Hamas appears to be successfully reconstituting itself militarily and politically in areas where the IDF is no longer present. Repeated Israeli raids into Gaza City suggest that Hamas is successfully reconstituting itself militarily, prompting the raids. A senior Israeli defense official said that Hamas is focusing on recovery and rehabilitation across the Gaza Strip, particularly in areas where the IDF is no longer operating.[vii] Hamas is also working to reassert local control in Khan Younis by deploying fighters on the streets, managing local policing, and taking over humanitarian aid shipments.[viii] Hamas is restoring its governing arms as well, which has prompted the IDF to target Hamas officials involved in these activities.[ix]

The Houthis claimed on June 22 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting five vessels in and around Haifa Port.[x] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Houthi military spokesperson issued separate but complimentary statements claiming to target four commercial vessels in the Haifa Port using drones on June 22.[xi] The Houthi military spokesperson said that the groups targeted two unnamed “cement tankers” and two cargo ships that violated the Houthis’ unofficial blockade of Israel.[xii] The groups also claimed a drone attack on a Luxembourg-flagged livestock carrier in the Mediterranean Sea as it approached Haifa Port.[xiii] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred. These attacks mark the third time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation targeting Israel with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq since June 6.[xiv] The growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias furthermore reflects the desire of the Axis of Resistance to present itself as an interoperable coalition.[xv]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted two drone attacks targeting US forces at al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria on June 22. Iranian-backed militia Telegram accounts, Syrian media, and international journalists reported that three drones targeted al Tanf Garrison in two separate attack waves on June 22.[xvi] No group has claimed responsibly for the attack at the time of this writing and CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred.

The attacks may be linked to a likely Israeli strike that killed a Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) militant in Albu Kamal, eastern Syria, on June 21.[xvii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and KSS blamed the United States for the June 21 airstrike.[xviii] Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve categorically denied on June 22 that US or other coalition forces conducted an airstrike on the Iraq-Syria border.[xix] Local opposition media reported the strike targeted an Iranian-backed militia vehicle transporting weapons near an ammunition warehouse.[xx]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee issued a statement suggesting a consensus among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to resume attacks targeting US forces on June 19.[xxi] The reported al Tanf garrison drone attacks do not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has decided to restart its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, however.  Unspecified actors have previously conducted unclaimed attacks targeting US positions in Syria since the Islamic Resistance in Iraq paused its attack campaign.[xxii] Kataib Hezbollah has been driving efforts to resume attacks on US forces since at least April 2024 after its resistance to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani‘s original order to stop attacks in January.[xxiii] Emirati state media reported in April 2024 that Islamic Resistance in Iraq militia leaders disagreed with Kataib Hezbollah’s calls to resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq.[xxiv]

• Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas appears to be accelerating its reconstitution effort in the Gaza Strip by beginning to regenerate its forces through recruitment. Hamas appears to be successfully reconstituting itself militarily and politically in areas where the IDF is no longer present.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on June 22 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting five vessels in and around Haifa Port.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 22.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 22.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted two drone attacks targeting US forces at al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria on June 22. The reported al Tanf garrison drone attacks do not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has decided to restart its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, however.

Iran Update, June 22, 2024

• Gaza Strip: The IDF reportedly attempted to target the fourth highest-ranking Hamas military commander in Gaza City.
• Humanitarian Aid: An anonymous UN official said that unspecified armed groups regularly block aid convoys and hold aid drivers at gunpoint along the Israeli-declared humanitarian corridor east of Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed two attacks targeting vessels in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.

Iran Update, June 21, 2024

Iranian presidential candidates discussed government management and service provision during the second debate for the upcoming election.[i]  The debate occurred on June 20. The candidates spoke in generalities without describing substantive policies to address domestic issues for much of the debate. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said in the debate.

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner): Ghalibaf presented the most discrete policy positions among the frontrunners. Ghalibaf reiterated readiness to negotiate with the West in order to secure relief from international sanctions.[ii] He discussed increasing wages to match inflation and launching a ”multi-layered” social security insurance program.[iii] Ghalibaf also reiterated support for foreign currency investment in Iran. Ghalibaf separately advocated for building a border wall dividing Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan.[iv]
• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili discussed resolving domestic issues but downplayed the importance of external economic interaction. Jalili discussed increasing food subsidies, managing energy consumption, and preventing brain drain.[v] Jalili also hesitated to endorse negotiations with the West and dismissed the need for Iran to adhere to international anti-corruption and transparency standards. Jalili separately criticized the Iranian healthcare system.
• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian emphasizes his subordination to the supreme leader, as he has done repeatedly throughout his campaign.[vi] His rhetoric reaffirms that, if elected, he would be constrained by whatever political boundaries the supreme leader sets just as every Iranian president is. Pezeshkian expressed support for loans and public works projects for rural communities. He also emphasized the importance of countering corruption and promoting education.[vii]

• Iran: Iranian presidential candidates discussed government management and service provision during the second debate for the upcoming election. The candidates spoke in generalities without describing substantive policies to address domestic issues for much of the debate.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters continued attacking Israeli forces throughout the area.
• West Bank: Israeli police located and a disarmed a IED planted under a car in Lod—an Israeli city around five miles from the Israel-West Bank border.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted six attacks into northern Israel, including with one-way attack drones.
• Yemen: The United States intercepted four Houthi unmanned surface vessels and two unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea.

Iran Update, June 20, 2024

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee issued a statement suggesting a consensus among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to resume attacks targeting US forces. This is its first coordinated statement since attacks on US forces paused in January 2024 that suggests such a consensus.  The committee said on June 19 that its militia members would use “all available means“ to achieve “full“ Iraqi sovereignty.[i] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including those that comprise the Islamic Resistance of Iraq.[ii] The committee agreed during the meeting that it must continue efforts to achieve Iraqi sovereignty, namely by achieving a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The committee stated that it had provided the Iraqi government with an opportunity to establish a timeline for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq during a pause in attacks, and that the United States has ”procrastinated.”

Kataib Hezbollah has been driving efforts to resume attacks on US forces since at least April 2024 after its resistance to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani‘s original order to stop attacks in January.[iii] Emirati state media reported in April 2024 that Islamic Resistance in Iraq militia leaders disagreed with Kataib Hezbollah’s calls to resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq.[iv] Iraqi and Axis of Resistance-affiliated media outlets have suggested that KH had some success in building support among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to resume attacks targeting US forces. Iraqi Kurdish news outlet Shafaaq reported on June 5 that unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to resume attacks targeting US forces if Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani fails to set a deadline for a US troop withdrawal within 40-days of the ultimatum.[v] This deadline would fall somewhere around July 15, assuming that the Shafaaq reported the message close to the time that the militias issued the threat.

Iran and Hamas are continuing to coordinate politically to maintain alignment across the Axis of Resistance during the Israel-Hamas War. Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, on June 20.[vi] Bagheri Kani emphasized that the Axis of Resistance should pursue alternative methods of “resistance” against Israel including through legal and political forums as well as public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the practice of advancing national goals and objectives through informing and influencing foreign publics.[vii] Iran and Hamas have both used information operations to inform and influence foreign publics during the current war. Bagheri Kani appears to be continuing to pursue political coordination with Haniyeh in line with the precedent set by his predecessor, Hossein Amir Abdollahian.[viii]

Bagheri Kani further encouraged members of the Axis of Resistance to use ”all capacities” to exact a heavier cost on Israel for its actions in the Israel-Hamas war.[ix] Haniyeh stated the actions of the Axis of Resistance have made it impossible to return to a pre-October 7 world. Haniyeh said that Hamas ”welcomes any [ceasefire] that will meet the demands of the Palestinian people. Haniyeh presumably is referring to Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands that will leave Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip.[x]

Recent US and Israeli reports have emphasized the Hezbollah rocket, drone, and missile threat that Israel could face in the event of a major war between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said on June 19 that Hezbollah is well-positioned to target Israel in a potential war, and that “no place in Israel” would be safe.[xi] He also implied that the short distance between Israel and Lebanon would enable Hezbollah to more effectively target Israel compared to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[xii] US and Israeli officials have highlighted this threat. Biden administration officials told CNN on June 19 that they assess Hezbollah will overwhelm some Iron Dome batteries in the event of a war between Israel and Hezbollah, and that Israeli officials believe that the Iron Dome could be vulnerable to Hezbollah attacks using precision guided munitions.[xiii] These Israeli officials also said that Israel has been ”surprised” by the sophisticated nature of Hezbollah attacks. The IDF has recently highlighted the challenges it has faced in intercepting Hezbollah drones because of their short flight time from Lebanon to Israel.[xiv]

Hezbollah is targeting Israeli air defense assets and surveillance equipment, probably to create temporary and local advantages vis-a-vis Israel and prepare for possible escalation. Hezbollah has repeatedly attacked these targets since October 2023, but Nasrallah emphasized that Hezbollah has worked since February 2024 to “blind Israel” and “shut down its ears.”[xv] Nasrallah claimed that this effort has enabled Hezbollah to target the IDF base at Mount Meron at “any time.”[xvi] Hezbollah targeted Mount Meron four times in May 2024 and twice in June 2024.[xvii] Targeting these installations creates only temporary effects, given that Israel would quickly repair damage to sensitive intelligence assets. The temporary effects could enable Hezbollah to undertake certain movements with a lower risk of detection and Israeli targeting, however. Hezbollah is also presumably learning lessons from its attacks, allowing it to optimize its strike packages and tactics to beat Israeli air defenses. This learning process may explain why Hezbollah has begun using more sophisticated tactics, as noted by Israeli officials.[xviii]  

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee issued a statement suggesting a consensus among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to resume attacks targeting US forces. This is its first coordinated statement since attacks on US forces paused in January 2024 that suggests such a consensus.
• Iran and Hamas: Iran and Hamas are continuing to coordinate politically to maintain alignment across the Axis of Resistance during the Israel-Hamas War.
• Northern Israel Border: Recent US and Israeli reports have emphasized the Hezbollah rocket, drone, and missile threat that Israel could face in the event of a major war between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah is targeting Israeli air defense assets and surveillance equipment, probably to create temporary and local advantages vis-a-vis Israel and prepare for possible escalation.
• Rafah: The tactically sophisticated nature of two Hamas attacks targeting IDF units in Rafah on June 20 underscores that two Hamas battalions in Rafah remain cohesive fighting units that have not been defeated or seriously degraded. This is consistent with the IDF’s report that it has “somewhat degraded” two of the four Hamas battalions in Rafah.

Iran Update, June 19, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Rafah: Hamas is preserving its forces in Rafah rather than engaging the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), likely because Hamas does not believe Israel’s Rafah operation will be decisive. Hamas’ Rafah Brigade would presumably become decisively engaged with Israeli forces if Hamas believed the Rafah operation would destroy Hamas’ military organization.
• Gaza Strip: An IDF commander said that the IDF determines if a Hamas battalion is “dismantled” by assessing whether the IDF has destroyed tunnel systems.
• Iranian Presidential Election: Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is continuing to struggle to consolidate support among Iranian youth ahead of the June 28 election.
• Northern Israeli Border: The IDF on June 18 approved operational plans for a possible military offensive into Lebanon. The Israeli government has not approved an operation into Lebanon.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened to strike against Israel’s economy and civilian positions in the event of a war. Nasrallah suggested that Hezbollah has internalized some lessons derived from the April 13 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran notified the IAEA that will install 1,400 new centrifuges at Fordow, which has the capacity to produce nearly 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium within one month of being installed.

Iran Update, June 18, 2024

Iranian presidential candidates discussed the economy in the first debate for the upcoming election.[i] The debate occurred on June 17. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said in the debate.

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (hardliner): Ghalibaf expressed openness to nuclear negotiations with the West in order to remove sanctions from the economy.[ii] Ghalibaf suggested that a phased agreement could work to secure sanctions relief. Ghalibaf’s comments are consistent with reports from Iranian opposition outlets saying that advisers to Ghalibaf have approached Western diplomats in recent weeks. CTP-ISW noted at the time that the outreach is possibly meant to set conditions for the resumption of nuclear negotiations if Ghalibaf becomes president.[iii] Ghalibaf also lamented that economic agreements that Iran has signed with China and Russia have not yet been operationalized.[iv] Ghalibaf separately identified inflation as one of the most pressing economic issues.
• Saeed Jalili (hardliner). Jalili contrastingly downplayed the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West.[v] Jalili criticized past Iranian presidents, specifically Hassan Rouhani, for relying on international agreements to solve economic issues. Jalili instead promoted an agenda focused on autarkic policies and self-sufficiency. Jalili attributed issues, such as inflation and the struggling private sector, to resource mismanagement.

Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist). Pezeshkian advocated for expanding economic diplomacy with regional and extra-regional countries.[vi] Pezeshkian asserted that Iran needs economic interaction with other countries in order to grow its economy. He specifically called for Iran to increase its exports and foreign investment. Pezeshkian separately stated that international sanctions have been a “disaster” for Iran, which is consistent with his historic support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[vii]

The dates and topics of the upcoming Iranian presidential debates are as follows:[viii]

Iran has begun running computer models that could support the research and development of nuclear weapons.[ix] The purpose of the models is unclear. US and Israeli intelligence services have learned of the models and are investigating further, according to Axios.

The use of these models come as Iran has expanded its nuclear program in recent months.[x] Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[xi] The Iranian stockpile of 60-percent-enriched uranium separately increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bringing the stockpile to around 6,201 kilograms.[xii] The expansion of the Iranian nuclear program is especially noteworthy given that senior Iranian officials have threatened repeatedly to pursue nuclear weapons in recent months.[xiii]  

Key Takeaways:

Iran: Iranian presidential candidates discussed the economy in the first debate for the upcoming election.

Iran has begun running computer models that could support the research and development of nuclear weapons.

Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli negotiator told Agence France-Presse that Hamas still holds “dozens” of living hostages in the Gaza Strip.

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 18 details from an IDF Southern Command discussion on Hamas’ military capabilities in the Gaza Strip.

West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted three attacks into northern Israel.

Iraq: The US State Department designated Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya (HAAA) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

Yemen: US CENTCOM said that it has destroyed four Houthi radars and one Houthi unmanned surface vessel in Yemen.

Iran Update, June 17, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said on June 17 that it has dismantled about half of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.[i] The IDF 162nd Division advanced into Rafah on May 7 and the IDF said that it now controls approximately 60 to 70 percent of the governorate, including the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.[ii] The IDF assesses that it has almost completely ”dismantled” two of four battalions in Hamas’ Rafah Brigade and that IDF units have ”somewhat degraded” the other two battalions.[iii] An Israeli media correspondent estimated that Israel will take ”several more weeks” to completely ”dismantle” Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.   Israeli forces have also located 200 tunnel openings, 25 of which led to tunnels that reach the border with Egypt.[iv] The IDF said that its forces have killed at least 550 Palestinian fighters in Rafah since the start of ground operations.[v] Twenty-two 162nd Division soldiers have died during fighting in Rafah.[vi] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the IDF will shift to a ”targeted raid” approach in the whole of the Gaza Strip after the end of the Rafah operation.[vii] Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip have already shifted to this approach to target reconstituting Hamas units.

Hamas’ Rafah Brigade will likely survive with sufficient assets to reconstitute itself, given the time and space to reconstitute. Successful reconstitution requires a commander to disengage their force from combat. An Israeli war correspondent said that an unspecified number of Hamas fighters left the Rafah area when Israeli forces first entered Rafah.[viii] This cadre of surviving Hamas fighters assigned to the Rafah Brigade could provide Hamas commanders in Rafah sufficient human capital to rebuild the Rafah Brigade over time absent sustained Israeli military pressure against the Rafah Brigade.[ix] The IDF has discovered large numbers of Hamas fighters in previously uncleared areas during other operations. Israeli forces found that three battalions—not the expected one battalion—had withdrawn into a previously uncleared area of Jabalia prior to early May, for example.[x]

The Houthis conducted four attacks that caused physical damage to commercial vessels between June 9 and June 13, possibly indicating an increase in the effectiveness of Houthi attacks.  A British maritime security firm said on June 14 that recent Houthi attacks on commercial vessels demonstrated a “significant increase in effectiveness” in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[xi] CTP-ISW has observed that Houthi attacks have struck commercial vessels at a rate of about 0.4 impacts per week since the beginning of the Houthi attack campaign in November 2023. Separate Houthi attacks on two ships on June 9 caused fires aboard both vessels.[xii] The Houthis then launched a remote-controlled, one-way attack naval surface drone targeting the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Tutor on June 12.[xiii] A British maritime security firm said that one crewmember died in the attack, marking the second crew fatality in the Houthi attack campaign.[xiv] The Houthis struck the Palauan-flagged, Ukranian-owned, Polish-operated M/V Verbena with ballistic missiles on June 13, causing the vessel to catch fire and the crew to abandon ship.[xv]

Western and Houthi officials told the Wall Street Journal on June 16 that the Houthis used routes through Djibouti and Lebanon to import Iranian weapons and equipment and Chinese-manufactured weapons parts.[xvi] Anonymous Western and Houthi officials said that Iranian arms arrive in Djibouti and that unspecified actors transfer the weapons to civilian ships. The Houthis use an established corridor between Djibouti and Houthi-controlled ports along the Yemeni Red Sea coast to smuggle ”illicit cargo."[xvii] The officials also noted that the Houthis are using Lebanon as a base through which to purchase spare drone parts from China.[xviii] The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen found in two 2023 Panel of Experts reports that the Houthis smuggled weapons that were manufactured or partially manufactured in China.[xix]

Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be struggling to consolidate support among Iranian youth, a key voter demographic.[xx] Pezeshkian promoted reformist ideals such as increased international engagement and looser social restrictions during a discussion with Tehran University students on June 16.[xxi] Pezeshkian also stressed his subordination to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, discouraging students from criticizing Khamenei or his role within the regime. A group of Sharif University students read a statement that questioned the utility of the Iranian presidency and called Pezeshkian’s campaign a ”colorful deception” after Pezeshkian’s talk.[xxii] The students stressed that Iranian presidents do ”not have the ability to influence the decisions of" the supreme leader and that ”there is no guarantee that [Iranian presidents have] authority in internal decisions.” The students called on Pezeshkian to withdraw from the election unless he could guarantee meaningful change within the regime, saying that failing to withdraw would contribute to ”the illusion of democracy.” Pezeshkian is currently attempting to balance his subordination to Khamenei with his reformist agenda, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[xxiii]

The Sharif University students’ statements—while not emblematic of all individuals in this demographic—are demonstrative of the increased disillusionment of Iranian youth in recent years. The Sharif University students’ criticisms of Pezeshkian’s campaign is indicative of a widening gap between the Iranian reformist party—who are dedicated to preserving the Islamic Republic and serving its Supreme Leader—and a key voter demographic. Iranians between ages 10 and 24 encompassed roughly 20 percent of the country’s population in 2021 and Iranian youth has historically favored candidates pursuing moderate or reformist agendas.[xxiv] Iranian youth and specifically university students have led anti-regime protest movements in recent years. These protest movements have openly criticized the regime’s core principles, including Velayat-e Faqih, and in some cases called for the regime’s collapse.[xxv] The response of this group of university students highlights the widening gap between Iranian youth and students and Pezeshkian and other Iranian reformists.

A hardline Iranian cleric and parliamentarian claimed on June 17 that unspecified hardline presidential candidates have agreed to withdraw from the election if they perform poorly in upcoming presidential debates.[xxvi] Iran will hold five televised debates beginning on June 17.[xxvii] Reza Taghavi claimed that four unspecified ”trusted institutions” will rate the hardline candidates based on their performance in the debates and that “some candidates” have agreed to withdraw in support of the candidate with the best performance.[xxviii]

Taghavi’s claim follows repeated statements from hardline officials calling on the hardline camp to reach a “consensus” ahead of the June 28 election.[xxix] These calls are driven by concerns that the five hardline candidates risk splitting the vote and inadvertently advantaging the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas’ Rafah Brigade will likely survive with sufficient assets to reconstitute itself, given the time and space to reconstitute. An Israeli war correspondent said that an unspecified number of Hamas fighters left the Rafah area when Israeli forces first entered Rafah.
• Israeli Operations in Rafah: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said on June 17 that it has dismantled about half of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.
• Iranian Presidential Election: Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be struggling to consolidate support among Iranian youth, a key voter demographic. The Sharif University students’ statements—while not emblematic of all individuals in this demographic—are demonstrative of the increased disillusionment of Iranian youth in recent years.
• Yemen: The Houthis conducted four attacks that caused physical damage to commercial vessels between June 9 and June 13, possibly indicating an increase in the effectiveness of Houthi attacks.

Iran Update, June 16, 2024

• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters have continued to defend against Israeli forces in western Rafah. The IDF announced on June 16 it has begun executing a daily 11-hour “tactical pause” along a route east of Rafah to increase humanitarian aid delivery into the southern Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in al Faraa refugee camp, Tubas, and Balata refugee camp, Nablus.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF intercepted a ”suspicious aerial target” over Lebanese airspace approaching Nahariya.
• Yemen: United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two explosions near a vessel approximately 40 nautical miles south of al Mokha, Yemen.

Iran Update, June 15, 2024

• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters have continued to defend against Israeli forces in the Saudi neighborhood, western Rafah. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces in eastern Zaytoun.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fighters in Kfar Dan.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed seven Houthi radars in a Houthi-controlled area in Yemen. Crew from a commercial vessel that the Houthis attacked evacuated the vessel, marking the second such incident in 24 hours.
• Region: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two separate drone attacks targeting Haifa, Israel.

Iran Update, June 14, 2024

• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in Rafah on June 14. The Nahal Brigade identified openings between buildings in Rafah that Hamas fighters use to traverse quickly through dense neighborhoods.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Israeli officials are continuing to discuss an offensive into Lebanon amid a heightened rate of Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel. Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 22 attacks into northern Israel.
• Iran: Iranian hardline candidate Saeed Jalili launched his 2024 presidential campaign by defining his political platform as a continuation of former President Ebrahim Raisi’s policies.
• Iran: Reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is adopting an increasingly reformist political agenda likely to bolster endorsements from high-profile reformist individuals.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed several Houthi systems, including an air defense sensor, drone, and two patrol boats.

Iran Update, June 13, 2024

Hamas is requiring Israel to meet its maximalist demands sooner than stipulated in the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. Hamas has not seemingly shortened the timeline on which it would release Israeli hostages, however. Hamas issued new demands on June 11 in response to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal.[i] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described the new demands as going beyond Hamas’ previous negotiating position and questioned whether Hamas is acting in good faith in the talks.[ii] The new demands involve Israel committing immediately to a permanent ceasefire, accelerating the timeline for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip, and making greater concessions on the release of Palestinian prisoners.[iii] Hamas also reportedly requested that Israeli forces withdraw sooner from the Gaza Strip.[iv] These changes would help Hamas secure most of its maximalist demands in the first phase of the proposed ceasefire deal and dilutes the second and third phases.[v] An anonymous Hamas official speaking to Reuters downplayed the significant changes that Hamas made to the ceasefire proposal by framing the changes as insignificant and unobjectionable.”[vi] 

Hamas’ changes are meant to force Israel to either accept the new demands or risk being perceived as the party that ended ceasefire negotiations. Israeli officials have indicated repeatedly that the latest proposal is the last one.[vii] Senior US officials, including President Joe Biden, have stated in recent weeks that Hamas remains the primary obstacle to a ceasefire agreement.[viii]

Hamas feels that it can manipulate the ceasefire negotiations in this manner because it is confident that it is winning in the Gaza Strip. Senior Hamas officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that Hamas will survive the war, despite Israeli military pressure.[ix] Hamas forces throughout the Gaza Strip remain combat effective and are trying to reconstitute. Hamas has also begun trying to reassert its political authority in some parts of the strip.[x] Hamas has achieved this success by exploiting the fact that Israeli forces withdraw from areas in the Gaza Strip after clearing them rather than conducting follow-on holding operations.

The Houthis claimed on June 12 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting two locations in Israel.[xi] The Houthis stated that they launched drones and missiles targeting Ashdod and Haifa in cooperation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xii] The attack marks the second time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting Israel. The Houthis claimed the first combined operation on June 6.[xiii] This Houthi-Iraqi militia cooperation comes shortly after a series of coordination calls and meetings across the Axis of Resistance. The Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted the two combined attacks as part of their larger effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. The growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias furthermore reflects the desire of the Axis of Resistance to present itself as an interoperable coalition.[xiv]

Iran is continuing to expand its nuclear program. Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[xv] The diplomats said that Iran is responding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors censuring Iran on June 5 for failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA.[xvi] The diplomats noted that the Iranian retaliation to the IAEA Board of Governors censure “is not as big as many had feared.”

This report comes amid other indications of Iran advancing its nuclear program. The Iranian stockpile of 60-percent-enriched uranium increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the IAEA, bringing the stockpile to around 6,201 kilograms.[xvii] Tehran has separately sought to acquire materials for its nuclear program from Niger in recent months. Iran and Niger began negotiating in late 2023 to trade Iranian drones and surface-to-air missiles for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger.[xviii] An Iranian opposition outlet reported on June 1 that Iran and Niger finalized the deal, though CTP-ISW cannot verify that report.[xix]

Senior Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly threatened in recent months to pursue nuclear weapons, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively.[xx] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in May 2024 that Iranian officials “must stop” normalizing such discussions.[xxi] He also called on Iran to "meaningfully engage” with the IAEA so that the IAEA can guarantee that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.[xxii]

Iranian hardliners are debating and negotiating amongst themselves to unite their faction behind a single candidate in the Iranian presidential election. The faction is concerned that the five hardline candidates risk splitting the vote and inadvertently advantaging the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian. Some hardliners are urging Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf or Saeed Jalili to withdraw in support of the other.[xxiii] Other hardline officials and media outlets are expressing concerns that that the faction is too divided to win the race.[xxiv] Ali Reza Zakani, who is a hardline candidate and the Tehran City mayor, stated on June 13 that candidates who are behind in electoral polls should withdraw in favor of more popular contenders.[xxv] 

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas is requiring Israel to meet its maximalist demands sooner than stipulated in the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. Hamas has not seemingly shortened the timeline on which it would release Israeli hostages, however.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed for the second time that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting Israel. They have conducted these attacks as part of a larger effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to expand its nuclear program. Iran is installing new centrifuges to increase its uranium enrichment capacity. Iran has also negotiated with Niger to receive 300 tons of uranium yellowcake.
• Iran: Iranian hardliners are debating and negotiating amongst themselves to unite their faction behind a single candidate in the Iranian presidential election. The faction is concerned that the five hardline candidates will split the vote and advantage the sole reformist candidate.

Iran Update, June 12, 2024

Hamas issued new demands in the ceasefire negotiations with Israel on June 11. Hamas made the demands in response to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal.[i] The demands include determining timelines for a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. An unspecified senior Biden administration official said Hamas requested greater specificity in the proposal that would undermine the phased nature of the proposal. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 12 that Hamas’ new demands go beyond its previous negotiating position.[ii] Blinken said that the issues Hamas raised are “bridgeable” but questioned whether Hamas is acting in good faith in the negotiations.[iii] The Israeli proposal includes provisions to meet Hamas’ maximalist demands but does not guarantee them. Israeli officials have framed Hamas’ new demands as tantamount to a rejection of the Israeli proposal.[iv]

Hamas portrayed its response to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal as a technical iteration rather than an outright rejection likely to frame Israel as the party that is obstructing ceasefire talks. Hamas has repeatedly framed its participation in the negotiations as positive and productive.[v] This framing ignores that Hamas has refused to change its maximalist demands or grant any concessions since December 2023 and is now making new demands. Senior US officials, including President Joe Biden, have stated in recent weeks that Hamas remains the primary obstacle to a ceasefire agreement.[vi] Hamas’ mis-framing is meant to force Israel to either accept the new demands or risk being perceived as the party that ended ceasefire negotiations. Israeli officials have indicated repeatedly that their latest proposal is the last one that they will make.[vii]

Hamas feels that it can manipulate the ceasefire negotiations in this manner because it is confident that it can survive the Gaza Strip. Senior Hamas officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that Hamas will survive the war, despite Israeli military pressure.[viii] Hamas forces throughout the Gaza Strip remain combat effective and are trying to reconstitute. Hamas has also begun trying to reassert its political authority in some parts of the strip.[ix] Hamas has achieved this success by exploiting the fact that Israeli forces withdraw from areas in the Gaza Strip after clearing them rather than conducting follow-on holding operations.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed a senior Lebanese Hezbollah commander and three other Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on June 11.[x] The IDF said that the commander, Taleb Sami Abdullah, was one of the seniormost Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon and responsible for attacks into northern Israel.[xi] Abdullah commanded Hezbollah’s Nasr unit, which is one of three regional commands in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel.[xii] Images of Abdullah alongside IRGC Quds Force commanders Qassem Soleimani and Esmail Ghaani appeared after his death.[xiii][xiv]

Hezbollah launched over 200 mortars and rockets into northern Israel on June 12 in response to the killing of Abdullah.[xv] The attack marks the largest that Hezbollah has conducted into Israel since the war began.[xvi] The IDF said that the attack caused fires but no casualties.[xvii] Senior Hezbollah official Hashem Safieddine threatened to increase the rate and scale of attacks into northern Israel in response to the killing of Abdullah.[xviii]

Hezbollah has continued almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023, despite the IDF killing several Hezbollah commanders throughout the war. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated in April 2024 that the IDF has killed around half of Hezbollah’s field commanders in southern Lebanon. The IDF also killed a senior officer in Hezbollah’s Radwan special forces in January 2024. Hezbollah has nevertheless sustained and even intensified in some cases its direct and indirect fire attacks into northern Israel.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is framing his candidacy in the presidential election around improving the Iranian economy. Ghalibaf has discussed in recent days the need to improve economic conditions in Iran and chose “service and progress” as his campaign slogan.[xix] Ghalibaf also emphasized the need to increase production in the automotive, energy and housing industries and advocated against price fixing.[xx] Ghalibaf affirmed that he will implement the seventh five-year development plan, which is a Raisi-era document focused partly on curbing inflation, optimizing the state budget, and resolving government debts.[xxi] Ghalibaf’s emphatic support for the five-year development plan indicates that he is trying to frame his candidacy as least partly as a continuation of the policies of late-President Ebrahim Raisi.

Ghalibaf appointed Ali Nikzad—a hardline, ethnically Azeri parliamentarian—as his campaign manager on June 10.[xxii] Nikzad previously worked in Raisi’s presidential campaigns in 2017 and 2021.[xxiii] An Iranian opposition outlet suggested that Ghalibaf hired Nikzad to garner support from the Iranian Azeri population and rural, conservative communities. The outlet also suggested that hiring Nikzad could be meant to balance against reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian, who is an ethnic Azeri as well. Nikzad and Pezeshkian have both represented heavily Azeri constituencies in Parliament.

The Houthis attacked and disabled a commercial vessel in the Red Sea on June 12.[xxiv] The Houthis struck the vessel with an unmanned surface vehicle and again with an “unknown airborne projectile.”[xxv] The crew lost control of the vessel due to the damage. Maritime security firms identified the vessel as the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Tutor, which was sailing to India.[xxvi] The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack and alleged that they used drones, missiles, and an unmanned surface vehicle.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: Hamas issued new demands in the ceasefire negotiations with Israel. Hamas portrayed its new demands as technical iteration rather than an outright rejection of the proposal likely to frame Israel as the party that is obstructing ceasefire talks.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF killed a senior Lebanese Hezbollah commander in an airstrike in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah responded by launching over 200 mortars and rockets into northern Israel.

Iran: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is framing his candidacy in the presidential election around improving the Iranian economy.

Yemen: The Houthis attacked and disabled a commercial vessel in the Red Sea. The Houthis claimed to use drones, missiles, and an unmanned surface vehicle.

Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting Eilat.

Iran Update, June 11, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas sent a formal response to the Israeli ceasefire proposal to international mediators on June 11, but the full response has not yet been released. A senior Hamas member told Hezbollah-affiliated media that Hamas left comments on the proposal including descriptions of the ceasefire and demands for Israeli withdrawals from the Rafah crossing and Philadelphi Corridor.
• Hamas Ceasefire Calculations: Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar remains confident in Hamas’ position in the Gaza Strip and believes that Israel has “more to lose” than Hamas. Sinwar analogized himself to Imam Hussein in a statement to unspecified allies. Hussein was a major figure in Islamic history who fought and died against a much larger army at Karbala in 680 CE.
• Iranian Presidential Elections: Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is trying to balance his relatively moderate agenda with his need to maintain the approval of the Iranian supreme leader. Most—if not all—actors in the Iranian political spectrum are ultimately dedicated to preserving the Islamic Republic and serving its supreme leader.
• Iranian Presidential Disqualifications: UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported that multiple regime officials worked to disqualify prominent moderate Iranian politician Ali Larijani from the 2021 presidential elections.
• Iraq and Syria: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia claimed that unidentified fighters fired rockets at US forces in northeastern Syria on June 11. This group previously claimed that unidentified fighters targeted US forces in northeastern Syria in March 2024, but CENTCOM did not confirm that attack. There is no evidence that either the June 11 or March 2024 attacks actually occurred.
• Yemen: CNN reported on June 11 that US intelligence learned that Houthis are in talks to provide weapons to Somalia-based Sunni militant group al Shabaab, citing three anonymous US officials.

Iran Update, June 10, 2024

The Iranian Guardian Council approved a pool of six candidates that included mostly hardliners for the upcoming 2024 presidential election. The six approved candidates include five hardliners and one reformist on June 9 for the upcoming presidential election.[i]  The Iranian regime likely approved the sole reformist candidate to feign political diversity and therefore increase voter participation. Iranian officials have emphasized the need for ”competitive” and ”participatory” elections.[ii] Iran recorded record low voter turnout in its March 2024 parliamentary election, though the real voter turnout was likely even lower than the officially recorded turnout.[iii] The Guardian Council approved the following individuals to run for president:

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Hardliner). Ghalibaf is a hardline politician who has served as Iran’s parliament speaker since 2020.[iv] Parliamentarians recently re-elected Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[v] Ghalibaf is a long-time member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), having served as the IRGC Air Force commander between 1997 and 2000.[vi]He is a very well-connected politician who maintains close personal relationships with the highest echelons of the IRGC dating back to the Iran-Iraq War.[vii] Ghalibaf also served as Iran’s police chief between 2000 and 2005.[viii] This marks Ghalibaf’s fourth bid for the presidency.[ix]
• Saeed Jalili (Hardliner). Jalili is a hardline politician and diplomat who currently serves as a member of the Expediency Discernment Council.[x] Jalili previously served as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and chief nuclear negotiator from 2007 to 2013.[xi] Jalili currently serves as the Supreme Leader’s representative to the SNSC.[xii] This marks Jalili’s third bid for the presidency.[xiii]
• Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi (Hardliner). Hashemi is a hardline politician who has served as vice president and the head of the Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation in the Raisi administration from 2021 to the present.[xiv] Hashemi served as a representative for Mashhad in parliament from 2008 to 2021.[xv] Hashemi ran for president and lost in 2021.[xvi]
• Ali Reza Zakani (Hardliner). Zakani is a hardline politician who has served as the mayor of Tehran since 2021.[xvii] The Guardian Council barred Zakani from running in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.[xviii] Zakani competed in the 2021 presidential election but ultimately withdrew his candidacy in support of Raisi.[xix] Zakani previously headed the Student Basij Organization during the crackdown on student protesters in July 1999.[xx]
• Mostafa Pour Mohammadi (Hardliner). Pour Mohammadi is a hardline politician and cleric from Qom.[xxi] Pour Mohammadi served as the Justice Minister under President Hassan Rouhani from 2013 to 2017.[xxii] Pour Mohammadi notoriously served with former President Ebrahim Raisi on the 1988 ”Death Commission,” which approved the executions of thousands of political prisoners.[xxiii]
• Masoud Pezeshkian (Reformist): Pezeshkian is the sole reformist politician the Guardian Council permitted to run in the 2024 presidential election. Pezeshkian is an ethnic Azeri who has represented Tabriz, near the Iran-Azerbaijan border, from 2008 to present.[xxiv] Pezeshkian was initially disqualified from running in the 2024 parliamentary elections, but the Guardian Council later permitted him to run. Pezeshkian has criticized the Iranian government over the issue of hijab enforcement.[xxv] Pezeshkian announced that Mohammad Javad Zarif would serve as his foreign minister should he be elected president.[xxvi]

The candidacy of five Iranian hardliners risks an electoral challenge for the hardline camp, wherein the hardline votes could be split amongst the five candidates. The hardline camp may split its votes amongst the five hardline candidates, which would benefit the sole reformist candidate.[xxvii] It is likely that some hardline candidates will withdraw from the election to prevent the vote from splitting. The moderate-reformist camp, by comparison, appears relatively united. Reform Front Spokesperson Javad Emam stated on June 8 that reformist politicians would not participate in the upcoming presidential election unless one of their candidates—including Masoud Pezeshkian—was approved.[xxviii] Multiple elements of the reformist camp expressed support for reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on June 10.[xxix]

The Guardian Council did not approve the candidacy of some high-profile politicians, including former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and adviser to the supreme leader Vahid Haghanian.[xxx] The disqualification of Larijani illustrates the increased isolation of the once-prominent Larijani family from the regime.[xxxi]  The Guardian Council also disqualified a close aide to supreme leader, Vahid Haghanian.[xxxii] The disqualification of Haghanian illustrates that the regime is going as far as to reject elements of its own government that it has trusted for decades. These disqualifications emphasize the regime’s commitment to engineering who will be the next president by limiting the pool of approved candidates.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s advisers have spoken to Western diplomats in recent weeks, possibly to set conditions for the resumption of nuclear negotiations if he becomes president. An Iranian opposition outlet reported on June 10 that Ghalibaf’s advisers have talked to US and European diplomats over the past two weeks, citing an unspecified European diplomat.[xxxiii] The advisers have emphasized Ghalibaf’s willingness to “improve Iran’s relations with the rest of the world” and to “cleanse” the Iranian regime of “radical elements” during the advisers’ conversations with foreign officials.[xxxiv] The advisers have also emphasized that Ghalibaf would play a significant role in stabilizing the Iranian regime following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death.[xxxv] Ghalibaf is one of six candidates the Guardian Council approved to compete in the June 28 presidential election.[xxxvi] Ghalibaf is a pragmatic hardliner who has previously called for limited political and economic reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic.[xxxvii] Ghalibaf may be trying to signal to Western governments that his administration would be more willing than the hardline Ebrahim Raisi administration to conduct nuclear negotiations and conclude a new nuclear deal.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada warned on June 8 that it will resume attacks targeting US forces if US forces do not leave Iraq.[xxxviii] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi told Iraqi media that the militia will “return to military actions” if ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iraq do not lead to the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[xxxix] The United States and Iraq began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in late January 2024.[xl] A Lebanese Hezbollah–affiliated news outlet reported on May 25 that several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias believe the United States and Iraq have been "procrastinating” a decision to remove US forces from Iraq and are considering resuming attacks on US forces.[xli] Iraqi media recently reported on June 5 that unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias plan to renew their attacks targeting US forces if Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani does not set a deadline for a full US military withdrawal by July 15.[xlii]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent highlighted some of the challenges that Israeli forces face intercepting drones targeting northern Israel in an X (Twitter) post on June 10.[xliii] The correspondent said that the drones are difficult for the IDF to intercept because of their short flight time from Lebanon to Israel. The close proximity between the drone launch sites and Israel makes it more difficult for the IDF to intercept the drones when compared to drone attacks against Israel from elsewhere in the Middle East. The long distance between Israel and Iran allowed Israel and its allies to detect and then intercept Iran’s incoming drones and missiles during Iran’s attack in April, for example.[xliv] The correspondent added that the drones launched from Lebanon fly low through challenging topography which makes them difficult to intercept.[xlv]

These challenges are particularly salient given the increased risk of a major war between Israel and Hezbollah in northern Israel. Hezbollah would likely use the lessons it is learning in its attacks on Israel to penetrate Israeli air defenses and strike critical infrastructure and civilian areas, including Haifa port. Hezbollah more than doubled its drone attacks targeting Israel between April and May 2024, though the group has used its drones to target Israel since the war began in October 2023.[xlvi] The correspondent said that the IDF plans to place 20mm Vulcan cannons in several areas along the Israel-Lebanon border to counter the drones.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Presidential Elections: The Iranian Guardian Council approved six candidates including one reformist and five hardliners for the upcoming 2024 presidential election. The participation of five hardliners risks splitting the hardline vote, though some hardliners will probably withdraw from the election to prevent splitting the vote. The Guardian Council did not approve some top politicians, including former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani.
• Iran: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s advisers have spoken to Western diplomats in recent weeks, possibly to set conditions for the resumption of nuclear negotiations if he becomes president.
• Iraq: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia warned on June 8 that it will resume attacks targeting US forces if US forces do not leave Iraq. Unspecified Iranian-backed militias in Iraq reportedly plan to renew attacks if the Iraqi prime minister does not set a deadline for a full US military withdrawal by May 15.
• Lebanon: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent highlighted some of the challenges that Israeli forces face intercepting drones targeting northern Israel in an X (Twitter) post on June 10. These challenges are particularly salient given the increased risk of a major war between Israel and Hezbollah in northern Israel. Hezbollah would likely use the lessons it is learning in its attacks on Israel to penetrate Israeli air defenses and strike critical infrastructure and civilian areas, including Haifa port.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The United States is reportedly considering bilateral hostage talks with Hamas to free Americans from the Gaza Strip.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is likely hiding in a “vast” tunnel system beneath Khan Younis, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the New York Times.

Iran Update, June 9, 2024

Israeli War Cabinet minister Benny Gantz resigned from the coalition government on June 9.[i] Gantz said he resigned because of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in the Gaza Strip, which he believes is ”preventing [Israel] from reaching true victory.”[ii] Gantz called for Netanyahu to set an election date for Fall 2024.[iii] Gantz postponed the announcement, which was originally scheduled for June 8, after Israeli forces rescued four hostages from the Gaza Strip.[iv] Gantz’s resignation will not on its own cause the collapse of the Netanyahu government.

The IDF expects to conclude clearing operations in Rafah in the “next few weeks,” according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[v] The correspondent noted that the IDF will fully transfer to a targeted raid approach in the Gaza Strip after concluding the Rafah operation. The IDF transferred to a ”targeted raid” model in the northern Gaza Strip in late December 2023 after withdrawing five brigades and completing large-scale clearing operations in the northern Strip.[vi] The IDF has repeatedly relaunched clearing operations into the northern Gaza Strip after transitioning to the raid model to degrade reconstituting Hamas forces.[vii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas and other Palestinian militias would likely try to exploit the Israeli withdrawal to reconstitute militarily and reassert Hamas' governing authority in Khan Younis.[viii] An Israeli transition to targeted raids in Rafah would be similarly exploited by Hamas.

The Guardian Council approved six candidates to participate in the June 28 Iranian presidential elections.[ix] CTP-ISW will publish additional analysis on the approval of these candidates on June 10. These candidates include Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Raisi administration Vice President and Martyrs and Veteran Affairs Foundation Head Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh, Supreme National Security Council Supreme Leader Representative Saeed Jalili, Parliamentarian Masoud Pezeshkian, former prosecutor and Interior Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi, and Tehran Mayor Ali Reza Zakani.

Pezeshkian is the only reformist politician whom the council permitted to run. The Guardian Council notably did not approve prominent moderate politician Ali Larijani--marking Larijani’s second consecutive disqualification--or Vahid Haghanian, a close aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[x]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel: Israeli War Cabinet minister Benny Gantz resigned from the coalition government on June 9. Gantz’s resignation will not on its own cause the collapse of the Netanyahu government.
• Rafah: The IDF expects to conclude clearing operations in Rafah in the “next few weeks,” according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.
• Iran: Iran’s Guardian Council approved six candidates to participate in the June 28 Iranian presidential elections. The council only approved one reformist politician, and it disqualified prominent moderate politician Ali Larijani for the second consecutive presidential election.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 10 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 8.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on June 8.
• Yemen: A Houthi attack in the Arabian Sea on June 9 caused two ships to catch fire.

Iran Update, June 8, 2024

Israeli forces rescued four Hamas-held hostages during a complex operation in the central Gaza Strip.[i] Hamas captured the four hostages from the Nova music festival during the October 7 attack.[ii] This marks the second successful rescue of living hostages by Israel during the war.[iii] Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during the rescue and Palestinian fighters killed one Israeli officer during the engagement.[iv] Hamas fighters fired a man portable air defense system at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) helicopter in Nuseirat, where the rescue occurred.[v] The IDF acknowledged the presence of civilians in the area and estimated the number of casualties to be under 100. Palestinian reports said that hundreds of civilians died during the rescue.[vi] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF recently launched raids in eastern Bureij and eastern Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip prior to ”provide cover” for the rescue operation.[vii] US officials speaking to Western media said that the United States provided some intelligence to support the hostage rescue operation.[viii]

The spokesperson for Hamas’ military wing threatened to capture more hostages and noted that most hostages remain in Hamas’ hands in response to the Israeli hostage rescue.[ix] Hamas referenced its May 2024 claims that it captured Israeli soldiers in Jabalia as evidence of its ability to take additional hostages.[x] The IDF has previously denied that Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier in Jabalia in May 2024.[xi] Hamas also said that Israel killed other hostages while conducting the rescue.[xii] Hamas stated that Israel’s rescue operation does not alter what it calls Israel’s “strategic failure” in the Gaza Strip.[xiii] Hamas commended its fighters who engaged Israeli forces during the rescue and criticized the United States for its involvement in the operation.[xiv]

Israeli war cabinet minister Benny Gantz canceled his June 8 speech, in which he was expected to announce his resignation from the coalition government.[xv] He made this decision following the Israeli hostage rescue. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Gantz not to leave the government during ”this time for unity.”[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF rescued four hostages in an operation in Nuseirat, central Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters killed one Israeli officer during the rescue. Separately, Israeli War Cabinet minister Benny Gantz cancelled a speech in which he was expected to announce his resignation from the Israeli coalition government.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on June 7.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 7.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed a Houthi patrol boat in the Red Sea on June 7.

Iran Update, June 7, 2024

Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar indicated opposition to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal, according to unspecified Arab officials. Sinwar stated that Hamas will only accept a proposal that guarantees a permanent ceasefire, which is one of the maximalist demands that Hamas has maintained since December 2023.[i] The current Israeli proposal provides provisions to meet Hamas’ demands but does not guarantee them. Sinwar’s comment comes amid international pressure on Hamas to accept the Israeli proposal. The United States has urged Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to pressure Hamas to accept the proposal. An Israeli official indicated that ”there will not be a better offer.”[ii] US officials similarly said there is no backup plan if Hamas refuses the proposal.[iii] Hamas has not delivered an official response to the proposal at the time of this writing.

seems unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Hamas likely remains confident that it will survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and can therefore maintain its maximalist demands without granting major concessions.

Some senior members of the Ebrahim Raisi administration are backing Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. They have framed their support for Esmaili as meant to continue Raisi’s agenda. Fifteen senior officials signed a letter on June 7 urging the Guardian Council, which is responsible for vetting and approving electoral candidates, to allow Esmaili to compete in the election.[iv] The officials praised Esmaili’s “intellectual, political, and managerial abilities and qualifications."[v] The letter’s signatories include the following:

• Vice President for Executive Affairs Mohsen Mansouri
• Vice President for Women’s Affairs Ensieh Khazali
• Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani
• Energy Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian
• Oil Minister Javad Owji
• Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister Abbas Ali Abadi
• Agricultural Jihad Minister Mohammad Ali Nikbakht
• Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour
• Environmental Protection Organization Director Ali Salajegheh
• Administration and Employment Organization Director Meysam Latifi

Esmaili leads a faction affiliated with Raisi’s son-in-law, Mekdad Nili.[vi] Mekdad’s brother, Meyshem Nili, and Mohsen Mansouri accompanied Esmaili when he registered for the presidential election on June 2.[vii] Esmaili’s faction also includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi.[viii] Esmaili’s faction is reportedly competing against another faction in the Raisi administration that is led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash.[ix] Bazrpash has also registered as a candidate in the presidential election. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and is affiliated with Presidential Office Cultural Deputy Mehdi Mojahed.[x] Bazrpash, along with Interim President Mohammad Mokhber, did not sign the letter to the Guardian Council endorsing Esmaili.[xi] Mortazavi, who is part of Esmaili’s faction, also notably did not sign the letter.[xii]

Some elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) appear to be supporting Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an article on June 4 indirectly criticizing Ghalibaf’s competitor, Vahid Haghanian.[xiii] The article accused Haghanian of “unethically” using his relationship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to advance his presidential campaign. The article was referencing that Haghanian has long worked in the Office of the Supreme Leader as a senior adviser to Khamenei. Haghanian responded to the article by vowing to end Iranian media’s “interference in internal politics” if he becomes president.[xiv] Reformist and opposition media attributed the attack on Haghanian to Tasnim News Agency supporting Ghalibaf in the upcoming election.[xv] These reports are consistent with other reports that Tasnim News Agency has defended Ghalibaf against corruption allegations in recent months.[xvi]

Tasnim News Agency’s support for Ghalibaf could indicate that the top echelons of the IRGC also support him. Hamid Reza Moghadam Far, who is one of the outlet’s founders and current chairman of its board of directors, serves as a cultural and media adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.[xvii] The close relationship between Moghadam Far and Salami suggests that there is a broader IRGC effort to help Ghalibaf win the presidency. Tasnim News Agency has notably left an article of Salami congratulating Ghalibaf on his reelection as parliament speaker on its politics home page since May 28.[xviii]

It would be unsurprising for significant elements in the IRGC to support Ghalibaf in the presidential race. Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s. Ghalibaf is moreover part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.

US State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller said on June 6 that the United States is concerned that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani does not control fully the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xix] Miller’s statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran has infiltrated the PMF extensively and uses it to exert significant influence in Iraq.[xx] The PMF and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that comprise it answer to Iran—not the Iraqi prime minister. Iranian-backed militias under the PMF paused attacks targeting US forces in January 2024 after IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani ordered them to stop.[xxi] Iraqi Kurdish media reported on June 5 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias plan to renew their attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if Sudani does not set a deadline for a full US military withdrawal by the end of a 40-day deadline.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar indicated opposition to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. Hamas seems unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands.
• Iran: Some elements in the IRGC appear to be supporting Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. This support is unsurprising given Ghalibaf’s deep connections to the IRGC.
• Iraq: The US State Department said that it is concerned that the Iraqi prime minister does not control fully the Iraqi PMF. Iran has infiltrated the PMF extensively and uses it to exert significant influence in Iraq.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed two Houthi uncrewed surface vessels and intercepted eight Houthi drones in the Red Sea.

Iran Update, June 6, 2024

Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election. These efforts probably seek to avoid infighting between Iranian hardliners that could provide an opening for a more moderate candidate to win the presidency. Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei called for “synergy and unity” among hardliners in a Twitter (X) post on June 5.[i] Rezaei similarly called for a "consensus” among "revolutionary forces” during a meeting with Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Parliamentary Economic Committee Chairman Mohammad Reza Pour Ebrahimi on June 4.[ii] Hardline politician Gholam Ali Haddad Adel separately called on hardliners on June 6 to support a single candidate in the upcoming election.[iii] Haddad Adel warned that hardliners could suffer a “defeat” in the election if they support a “plurality of candidates.”[iv] Haddad Adel added that supporting a “plurality of candidates” could lead to a repeat of the 2013 presidential election in which a reformist candidate, Hassan Rouhani, won the presidency.[v]

Hamas reportedly said that it will reject the Israeli ceasefire proposal, arguing that the proposal does not ensure a permanent end to hostilities.[vi] Saudi-based media obtained a copy of a Hamas memo to other Palestinian militias in which Hamas explained that Hamas did not accept the proposal because it is  "fundamentally different" from the proposal that US President Joe Biden outlined on May 31.[vii] Hamas said that it is committed to the proposal it accepted on May 6. Egypt unilaterally modified the May 6 proposal to include a permanent end to hostilities.[viii] Hamas has previously said that it will not accept a ceasefire that does not ensure a permanent ceasefire after the completion of the initial phase of the proposal.[ix] Hamas does not view any ceasefire as permanent and believes that any truce that ends before Israel’s destruction is a temporary truce.[x] The United States said on June 6 that Hamas has not delivered an official response to the Israeli proposal.[xi]

Hamas’ reported rejection follows several reports that negotiations involving Israel, Hamas, and international mediators were showing no signs of a breakthrough.[xii] Unspecified Egyptian sources said the mediators were attempting to reassure Hamas that the proposal would lead to an end to the fighting and full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[xiii]

Hamas will likely continue to reject ceasefire proposals if the proposal fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire. Hamas remains confident that it can survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, and it can therefore pursue its maximalist demands without major concessions. Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, said in February that his military forces are in good condition and would survive a Rafah operation and he was in no rush to secure an agreement in early May.[xiv] CTP-ISW has previously noted that Hamas’ confidence in its survival increased and its ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[xv]

Hamas attempted to infiltrate Israel using a tunnel 200 meters from the Israel-Gaza Strip border in Rafah.[xvi] Four Palestinian fighters armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) emerged from the tunnel under the cover of a thick fog.[xvii] Israeli forces engaged the Palestinian fighters in a fire fight and directed a drone and tank to engage the fighters.[xviii] The IDF killed three of the four Palestinian fighters 400 meters from the Israeli border in the Gaza Strip.[xix] The fourth Hamas fighter fled into Rafah.[xx] One Israeli soldier died during the incident.[xxi] Palestinian fighters have very rarely attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory since the October 7, 2023, attack.

Unspecified US and Israeli officials said in a June 6 Reuters report that Hamas has lost half of its forces and is currently using insurgent tactics.[xxii] Three senior US officials familiar with battlefield developments said that Hamas’ numbers have decreased from an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 before the conflict to 9,000 to 12,000 fighters at present.[xxiii] US intelligence previously estimated that Hamas has lost 30 to 35 percent of its fighters, and Israeli intelligence previously estimated that Hamas had as many as 30,000 to 40,000 fighters prior to the war.[xxiv] An IDF spokesperson acknowledged that destroying Hamas as a governing authority is “an achievable and attainable military objective,” instead of attempting to kill every Hamas fighter.[xxv] Israeli officials have previously said that Israel’s war objectives are to destroy Hamas as a military organization and governing authority.[xxvi]

One of the officials said that Hamas is avoiding direct battles with Israeli forces, preferring to ambush the IDF and using improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces.[xxvii] A Gazan resident noted that Hamas previously immediately engaged Israeli forces as they advanced, but now Hamas is waiting for the IDF to enter the IDF’s target area before attacking.[xxviii] An Israeli officer similarly noted that Hamas allows the IDF to advance into a target area before Hamas begins to engage the IDF.[xxix] Hamas fighters have previously employed similar ”insurgent” tactics, however. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that Israeli forces encountered significant militia ”resistance” in Zaytoun but not en route to Zaytoun in February 2024.[xxx] US officials estimate that Hamas can sustain such tactics “for months,” given Hamas’ ability to access weapons smuggled into the Strip via tunnels as well as additional weapons and ordinance captured from the IDF.[xxxi]

A US official told Reuters that the Palestinian militias are withdrawing rapidly after attacks, taking cover, regrouping, before appearing in areas where Israeli forces are absent.[xxxii] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Palestinian militias withdraw into areas where Israeli forces are absent to rest and reconstitute.[xxxiii] This complicates Israeli efforts to conduct repeated raids, as Palestinian fighters can withdraw from the areas that the IDF targets if the Palestinian fighters are at risk of being destroyed.

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias issued a 40-day deadline for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to set a date for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq according to an “informed [Iraqi] political source” cited by an Iraqi Kurdish news outlet on June 5.[xxxiv] The ultimatum warned that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces if Sudani fails to meet the 40-day deadline. A Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated news outlet reported on May 25 that several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias believe the United States and Iraq were "procrastinating” a decision to remove US forces from Iraq and were considering resuming attacks on US forces.[xxxv] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suspend attacks on US forces in January 2024.[xxxvi] Some militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, fiercely resisted the order. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not changed their long-standing objective to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria and retain the capabilities to resume their attack campaign at any time.[xxxvii] Kataib Hezbollah has been driving efforts to resume attacks on US forces since at least April 2024 after their resistance to Ghaani‘s original stand-down order in January.[xxxviii] Various Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, have also warned that Iranian-backed militias will resume attacks on US forces if the United States and Iraq fail to set a timely date for a US troop withdrawal.[xxxix]  This report in Iraqi media did not make clear whether individual Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or the Islamic Resistance in Iraq as a whole issued this ultimatum. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that conducted attacks targeting US forces between October 2023 and January 2024, but many of the coalition’s constituent militias have attacked US forces prior to the current war.

The Houthis claimed on June 6 that they conducted a combined operation targeting Israel with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as part of their effort to impose an unofficial blockade.[xl] The Houthis said that they conducted a combined operation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting three ships near Haifa port, Israel, on June 6, including one ship that the Houthis said violated their unofficial blockade on Israel.[xli] The IDF has not acknowledged any such attacks and CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim at the time of this writing. Both the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have targeted shipping companies for transporting goods to Israel ports overland or by sea.[xlii] Iran and its Houthi partners have begun to articulate an aspiration to increase their ability to target Israel’s economy through military action, including by using drones and missiles to discourage shipping from traveling to Israeli ports.[xliii] Iran and its militia partners cannot likely impose a blockade using drone and missile attacks in the near term, given that the Houthis and other Iranian-backed groups have not yet proven that they can successfully fire missiles and drones into the Mediterranean Sea at a rate sufficient to impose costs on the Israeli economy.[xliv] But Iran and its so-called ”Axis of Resistance” likely believe that a severe economic disruption would compel Israeli leaders to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state.[xlv]

The combined attacks come shortly after a flurry of engagements across the Axis of Resistance to promote cooperation against Israel. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to join the Houthis in attacking international shipping in the Mediterranean Sea during a speech on May 16.[xlvi] The secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah held a phone call with Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi on May 24 to discuss the war, including coordination and force readiness.[xlvii] Such engagements demonstrate that members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance are continuing to coordinate their actions during the Israel-Hamas war.

The combined Houthi-Iraqi militia attack reflects the broader desire of the Axis of Resistance to operate and present itself as an interoperable coalition. The claimed attacks highlight how Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to function as a coalition to achieve its goals against Israel.[xlviii] The Axis of Resistance has also seemingly attempted to present itself as an interoperable coalition at other junctures in the war. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi said on October 10 that the Houthis were ”coordinating” with the Axis of Resistance to decide when and how to enter the war, and both the Houthis and Iraqi groups began their respective attack campaigns on October 18, one day after the al Ahli Hospital explosion.[xlix] This coordination is emblematic of Iran’s vision for the Axis of Resistance, which Iran sees as its unconventional alliance of like-minded actors united by anti-US and anti-Israeli ideologies.[l] This strategic alignment helps Iran and Iranian-backed groups accomplish their shared objectives, such as the destruction of Israel and the expulsion of US influence from the region.

The Houthis released a video on June 5 that shows the Houthis firing a likely Iranian-supplied missile that it used to target Eilat, southern Israel, on June 3.[li] The Houthis said that its Palestine missile is “locally made,” but the missile bears visual similarities to the Iranian Kheiber Shekan ballistic missile.[lii] Iran originally unveiled the Khiber Shekan in February 2022.[liii] Associated Press reported that the Palestine missile uses solid fuel as opposed to liquid fuel.[liv] The Kheiber Shekan is also a solid fuel missile.[lv] A Syrian Arab Army affiliated source also reported that the Palestine missile resembles the Kheiber Shekan missile.[lvi]

Palestinian fighters are likely maintaining at least one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) manufacturing cell northeast of Tubas. Unidentified Palestinian fighters detonated a VBIED approximately one kilometer from the IDF’s Tayasir checkpoint in Tubas on June 6.[lvii] The VBIED exploded in an open area and there were no casualties.[lviii] There are no obvious targets in the area where the Palestinian fighters detonated the VBIED, and the IDF is investigating whether this incident was a failed attempt to detonate the VBIED at the Tayasir checkpoint.[lix] No Palestinian militia has claimed the attack as of this writing. Palestinian fighters have deployed at least five VBIED attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.[lx] Four of those attacks took place near Tubas.[lxi]

Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the significant amount of resources and expertise required to manufacture a VBIED. It is unclear how sophisticated or well-manufactured these VBIEDs are, especially because the VBIED used in this attack appears to have detonated before its operators intended. An Israeli military correspondent noted that IED attacks of an “unprecedented nature” have appeared in the West Bank in recent months.[lxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Presidential Elections: Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election as part of an effort to avoid infighting between hardliners that could provide an opening for a moderate victory.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas reportedly said that it will reject the Israeli ceasefire proposal, arguing that the proposal does not ensure a permanent end to hostilities. Hamas will continue to reject proposals until it secures a “permanent ceasefire.” Hamas does not acknowledge the legitimacy of any permanent ceasefire and has repeatedly said that any ceasefire is temporary until Hamas destroys Israel.
• Gaza Strip: An Israeli official said that Hamas is avoiding direct battles with Israeli forces, preferring to ambush the IDF and using improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on June 6 that they conducted a combined operation targeting Israel with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as part of their effort to impose an unofficial blockade. This blockade is unlikely to be successful, given that the Houthis have so far been unable to successfully attack Israeli shipping in the Mediterranean at a sufficient rate to impact imports or exports from Mediterranean ports.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reportedly set a 40-day deadline for the Iraqi prime minister to expel US forces from Iraq.
• West Bank: Palestinian fighters are likely maintaining at least one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) manufacturing cell northeast of Tubas. Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the significant amount of resources and expertise required to manufacture a VBIED.

Iran Update, June 5, 2024

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami threatened to retaliate against Israel for the June 3 airstrike that killed IRGC Quds Force Gen. Saeid Abyar in Aleppo, Syria.[i] Abyar was a member of the IRGC Quds Force and had been stationed in Syria since 2012.[ii]   Salami stated that Israel must “wait” for Iran’s response during the funeral ceremony for Saeid Abyar. The IRGC uses Syria as a regional hub for coordination among the larger Axis of Resistance.[iii] Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes in Syria targeting weapons transfer lines through Syria to Iranian-backed fighters or proxy groups since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011.[iv] Salami previously stated that Iran has adopted a new ”equation” following its April 13 drone and missile attack.[v] Salami emphasized that this “new equation” means that should Israel attack Iran or Iranian targets abroad, Iran would launch attacks targeting Israel directly from Iranian territory.[vi] Iran conducted the April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel in response to an April 1 IDF airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Syria who played a critical role in the transfer of Iranian-sourced weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah.[vii] The June 3 airstrike in Aleppo represented the first Israeli attack on Iranian targets abroad since Salami threatened Israel with Iran‘s “new equation.“[viii]

A Syrian Arab Army (SAA)-affiliated source reported on June 4 that the Syrian Defense Laboratories Corporation manufactured rockets that Lebanese Hezbollah has used to conduct attacks against Israeli positions in northern Israel.[ix] The Defense Laboratories Corporation works under the Syrian Ministry of Defense to produce equipment and supplies for the SAA.[x] The source suggested that Israel may be targeting Syrian industrial facilities to mitigate the transfer of Syrian-produced weapons to Hezbollah.[xi] This statement is consistent with Israel’s air campaign to disrupt the transfer of Iranian military materiel to its partners and proxies in the Levant, especially Hezbollah, by targeting Syrian weapons production facilities.[xii]

Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei appears to be trying to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 Iranian presidential election. Rezaei met with Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Parliamentary Economic Committee Chairman Mohammad Reza Pour Ebrahimi on June 4 to promote a "consensus” among "revolutionary forces” ahead of the upcoming election.[xiii] The June 4 meeting comes shortly after Rezaei and Interim President Mohammad Mokhber met with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and expressed support for his candidacy.[xiv] Hashemi is reportedly part of a political faction that supports Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash for president.[xv] It is possible that Rezaei is attempting to rally the hardline camp behind Ghalibaf.

Israeli officials are continuing to discuss an offensive into Lebanon amid an increase in Hezbollah drone attacks targeting northern Israel. Hezbollah doubled its drone attacks targeting northern Israel between April and May 2024.[xvi] These drone attacks have been more difficult for Israeli air defenses to intercept.[xvii] Several senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and War Cabinet member Benny Gantz, have said in recent days amid these attacks that they will “respond” to Hezbollah to restore Israeli security.[xviii] Gantz explicitly noted that Israel would respond to Hezbollah by either securing a diplomatic agreement or through military action.[xix] Netanyahu seemingly implied that the diplomatic option remained on the table, noting that Israel would restore its security “one way or another.”[xx] Senior Israeli officials, including Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, have repeatedly said that Israel would attempt to force Hezbollah north of the Litani River through diplomatic measures before resorting to force.[xxi] Hezbollah is not allowed south of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War.[xxii] Three unspecified Israeli officials also told the Washington Post on June 5 that an Israeli offensive in Lebanon could be imminent if Hezbollah attacks continue in northern Israel.[xxiii]

The Israeli government remains under domestic pressure to return Israeli citizens to northern Israel, who have been displaced from their homes by Hezbollah attacks since October. The discussions of an Israeli offensive in Lebanon follow demonstrations in May against the Israeli government for its inability to return displaced Israeli civilians to northern Israel.[xxiv] Local officials in northern Israel also threatened in May that communities in the area will permanently relocate if security concerns are not addressed and schools are not reopened by the fall.[xxv] Such a permanent departure would functionally allow Hezbollah to hold prime Israeli agriculture areas hostage for an indefinite period of time.[xxvi]

Hezbollah began conducting near daily attacks into northern Israel on October 8 and will continue to pose a significant long-term threat to Israel even if Israel secures a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has previously planned attacks like the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks.[xxvii] Hezbollah has also established an elite commando arm—the Radwan Force—that is designed to conduct ground operations into Israel itself.[xxviii] Hezbollah’s patron, Iran, sees ground operations into Israel as the means through which it can destroy the Israeli state.[xxix] Iran and Hezbollah’s aspirations to destroy Israel will not end with a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xxx]   

The IDF 98th Division established “operational control” over eastern Deir al Balah and eastern Bureij in the central Gaza Strip on June 5.

Hamas is continuing to discuss its desired political end state for the war, in which a Hamas-influenced government that includes Fatah governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas and Fatah officials will meet for a second round of China-hosted “Palestinian unity” talks in mid-June.[xlii] China hosted talks between Hamas and Fatah aimed at achieving ”Palestinian unity” in April 2024.[xliii] Senior Hamas official Bassem Naim said that Hamas wants Fatah to agree to a “technocratic administration” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[xliv] Naim claimed that Hamas is not using its participation in the technocratic government as a condition from reconciliation with Fatah.[xlv] Hamas officials cited by Reuters on June 5 indicated that Hamas is seeking to obtain an influential, rather than political, role in a post-war Palestinian government.[xlvi] A technocratic government would allow Hamas to retain functional control of Palestinian institutions by enabling Hamas to appoint deputy ministers and directors-general who could undermine technocratic ministers at Hamas‘ behest.

A possible Islamic State gunman attacked the US embassy in Beirut on June 5 before being wounded by the Lebanese army in a shootout and arrested.[xlvii] One Lebanese guard was injured in the attack.[xlviii] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said that the gunman did not kill or injure any Americans at the embassy.[xlix] There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, but a Lebanese security official told Reuters that the Lebanese army is investigating possible links to the Islamic State.[l] The attacker was wearing clothing with the words ”ISIS” in English and ”Islamic State” in Arabic, according to Lebanese security sources.[li] The attacker is a Syrian national and a resident of the Sunni-majority town of Majdal Anjar in Lebanon’s central Bekaa Governorate.[lii] The Islamic State is a Sunni Salafi-jihadi group and maintains small attack cells in Lebanon.[liii] Lebanese security forces have arrested several Islamic State-linked individuals across Lebanon since 2022, including an 8-person cell on May 31.[liv] The Islamic State last claimed an attack targeting Lebanese security forces in Tripoli in 2019.[lv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IRGC commander threatened to retaliate against Israel for the June 3 airstrike that that killed in IRGC Quds Force general in Syria. The general was a member of the IRGC Quds Force and had been stationed in Syria since 2012.
• Iranian Presidential Elections: Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei appears to be trying to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 Iranian presidential election.
• Syria: A source close to the Syrian Arab Army said that a Syrian government corporation manufactured rockets for Hezbollah. This is notable given the repeated Israeli airstrikes targeting weapons sites in Syria.
• Lebanon: Israeli officials are continuing to talk about an offensive into Lebanon amid an increase in Hezbollah drone attacks targeting northern Israel.
• Gaza Strip: An IDF lieutenant colonel highlighted Palestinian militias’ use of “guerilla-style” tactics in the Gaza Strip, in which Palestinian militias allow IDF units to enter their target areas before Palestinian militias engage the IDF troops.
• Post-War Palestine: Hamas is continuing to discuss its desired political end state for the war, in which a Hamas-influenced government that includes Fatah governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
• Islamic State: A possible Islamic State gunman attacked the US embassy in Beirut on June 5 before being wounded by the Lebanese army in a shootout and arrested. No Americans were killed or injured.

Iran Update, June 4, 2024

A senior Hamas official responded negatively on June 4 to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas appears unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet the maximalist demands that Hamas has maintained since December 2023. Hamas Political Bureau member Osama Hamdan said Hamas cannot agree to a proposal that does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[i] Hamdan called on international mediators to obtain a clear Israeli commitment to these demands. Hamdan added that all Palestinian factions share Hamas’ position. Hamas remains confident that it will survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and can therefore maintain its maximalist demands without granting major concessions.

The current Israeli proposal provides provisions to meet Hamas’ demands but does not guarantee them. An anonymous Israeli official told Israeli media that “there will not be a better offer” than the current Israeli proposal that Hamas is reviewing.[ii] US President Joe Biden outlined the three phases of the  proposal as follows:[iii] 

• Phase one involves a six-week ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would release an unspecified number of hostages,
  including Americans, women, and elderly and sick individuals, as well as the bodies of hostages in exchange for “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners in this phase. Displaced Palestinian civilians would return to their homes, including those in the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid would “surge with 600 trucks [entering the Gaza Strip] per day” as well. Negotiations for a permanent ceasefire would continue during this phase.
• Phase two involves Hamas and other Palestinian militias releasing all remaining living hostages and Israeli forces withdrawing from the Gaza Strip completely. Biden said that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would ensure that negotiations continue during this phase.
• Phase three involves major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. It also involves Hamas and the other militias returning the bodies of all hostages to Israel.

Axios reported that some Israeli officials are concerned that recent remarks from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could disrupt ceasefire negotiations.[iv] Netanyahu stated that Israel will not agree to a ceasefire until Hamas is destroyed.[v] Some Israeli officials are concerned that these comments could signal to Hamas that Israel only wants a temporary pause in the fighting rather than a permanent ceasefire.[vi] The proposal includes two clauses with vague language that would allow both sides to begin the first phase of the deal and progress into phase two as long as talks persist.[vii] Axios noted that the ambiguous phrasing could allow fighting to resume after the first phase without meaningful progress toward an end to the war.[viii] Netanyahu has said that he wants to retain the option to resume fighting should negotiations falter and that Israel could initiate the first phase of the ceasefire proposal without a follow-on agreement for a permanent ceasefire, according to Israeli media.[ix]

US President Joe Biden said on June 3 that Hamas is the only obstacle to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[x] Biden told the Qatari emir that Israel is ready to initiate the ceasefire deal. Biden also said in an interview with Time that the Israeli proposal was “very generous” regarding which Palestinian prisoners Israel would release in exchange for Hamas-held hostages.[xi] The Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson said on June 4 that Qatar has delivered the latest Israeli proposal to Hamas.[xii]

Kataib Hezbollah, which is a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, called for a boycott of US businesses in Iraq and implied support for recent attacks targeting these businesses.[xiii] KH spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari called for the boycott in a statement on June 3. Askari accused US businesses of working as fronts for US intelligence services. Askari’s statement comes amid a series of attacks on US and UK companies in Iraq in recent days. Unidentified assailants have stormed and thrown explosives at these businesses, including Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurants. damaging and vandalizing their property.[xiv] Local reporting claims that some of the assailants are KH members.[xv]

Askari separately called on Iraqi security forces personnel to refuse to comply with US instruction in operations against the so-called “Islamic State” (IS). US advisory forces under Operation Inherent Resolve advise Iraqi security forces on air operations, intelligence, logistics, planning, and targeting through the Joint Operations Command.[xvi] The US Defense Department has said that Iraqi security forces rely on US support for counter-IS operations.[xvii] Iraqi security forces personnel refusing to follow US instruction would undermine combined US-Iraqi counterterrorism operations.

Senior officials tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are supporting Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the Iranian presidential election. Iranian media reported on June 4 that former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei and Interim President Mohammad Mokhber recently met with Ghalibaf and expressed support for his candidacy.[xviii] Their backing alleviated Ghalibaf’s “doubts” about running, according to the Iranian reports.[xix] The Telegraph similarly reported that IRGC factions, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, are supporting Ghalibaf.[xx] Dehghan is currently a senior adviser for defense industrial policy to the Iranian supreme leader. The Telegraph reported that individuals close to Dehghan ”are contacting everyone they know” to improve Ghalibaf’s chances. Ghalibaf—like Rezaei and Dehghan—is himself a former IRGC commander. Ghalibaf headed the IRGC Air Force from 1997 to 2000. He also has deep personal ties dating back to the Iran-Iraq War to many senior officers in the Iranian security establishment.[xxi]

Ghalibaf and other prominent figures are apparently focused on preventing Saeed Jalili in particular from winning the election. The Telegraph reported that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning because they consider him too extreme politically.[xxii] Jalili serves as one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s personal representatives to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and was the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013. A former official from the Iranian Interior Ministry told the Telegraph that individuals close to Ghalibaf oppose Jalili and “are contacting everyone they know to block Jalili.” An Iranian opposition outlet similarly reported in May 2024 that elements in the regime tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from competing in the election.[xxiii] These elements included Ghalibaf as well as other hardliners, such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani and senior adviser to the supreme leader Ali Shamkhani. These elements also included some moderates, such as Ali Larijani, who is the brother of Sadegh.

Ghalibaf and Jalili were previously at odds during the Mahsa Amini protest movement in Iran in late 2022. Ghalibaf accused Jalili of adopting too harsh a stance vis-a-vis the protests and exacerbating frustrations among disaffected Iranian youth.[xxiv] Ghalibaf contrastingly called for limited economic and political reforms to address protester grievances. Ghalibaf could use this contrast to appeal to more moderate elements in the Iranian political establishment.

Two factions from the Ebrahim Raisi administration are vying for the Iranian presidency, according to Iranian media.[xxv] These factions revolve around Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili and Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, both of whom registered as candidates for the election. Esmaili’s faction includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: A senior Hamas official responded negatively to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas appears unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet the maximalist demands that Hamas has maintained since December 2023.
• Iraq: A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia called for a boycott of US businesses in Iraq and implied its support for recent attacks targeting these businesses.
• Iran: Senior officials tied to the IRGC are supporting Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the Iranian presidential election.
• West Bank: Palestinian militias have continued trying to attack and threaten Israeli towns adjacent to the West Bank.
• Yemen: The Houthis announced that they recently fired a ballistic missile from Yemen toward Israel.

Iran Update, June 3, 2024

Hardliners overwhelmingly dominate the candidate pool for the upcoming Iranian presidential election. The registration period for the election ended on June 3, and 80 individuals registered to compete in the election.[i] The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for supervising elections and approving candidates—will vet candidates between June 4 and 10, and the Interior Ministry will then announce the final list of presidential candidates on June 11.[ii] The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures to advantage hardline candidates.[iii]

The following individuals registered between June 1 and 3:

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[iv] Ghalibaf is a hardline politician who has served as Iran’s parliament speaker since 2020.[v] Parliamentarians recently re-elected Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[vi] Ghalibaf is a long-time member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), having served as the IRGC Air Force commander between 1997 and 2000.[vii] He is a very well-connected politician who maintains close personal relationships with the highest echelons of the IRGC dating back to the Iran-Iraq War.[viii] Ghalibaf also served as Iran’s police chief between 2000 and 2005.[ix]
• Vahid Haghanian.[x] Haghanian is a close aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Haghanian serves as Khamenei’s Executive Deputy and Deputy for Special Affairs and acts as a liaison between Khamenei’s office and senior Iranian politicians.[xi] Iranian media noted on June 3 that Haghanian has “always been present in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle.”[xii] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Haghanian in 2019 for acting on behalf of Khamenei’s office and noted that Haghanian “has been referred to as the Supreme Leader’s right hand.”[xiii] The US Treasury Department added that Haghanian is a former military commander and usually accompanies Khamenei on social engagements.[xiv] Haghanian emphasized on June 1 that it was his “personal decision” to register for the upcoming presidential election.[xv]
• Zohreh Elahian, Hamida Zarabadi, and Hajar Chenarani.[xvi] Three women registered for the upcoming presidential election. The Guardian Council has never allowed a woman to compete in a presidential election.[xvii] Elahian is a hardline politician and a former member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[xviii] The Canadian government sanctioned Elahian in March 2024 for supporting the dealth penalty of protesters involved in the Mahsa Amini movement.[xix] Zarabadi is a reformist politician who represents Qazvin Province’s Qazvin, Abyek, and Alborz districts in Parliament.[xx] Zarabadi stated on June 3 that her cabinet would be composed of men and women representing every ethnicity, religion, and class if she became president.[xxi]
• Mehrdad Bazrpash and Mohammad Esmaili.[xxii] Two current Ebrahim Raisi administration officials registered for the upcoming presidential election. Bazrpash currently serves as Iran’s roads and urban development minister and Esmaili serves as Iran’s culture and Islamic guidance minister. Bazrpash previously headed Iran’s two largest car manufacturing companies, SAIPA and Pars Khodrow.[xxiii] The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada announced coordinated sanctions against Esmaili on the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in September 2023 for his role in enforcing the mandatory veiling law.[xxiv]
• Ali Reza Zakani.[xxv] Zakani is a hardline politician who has served as the mayor of Tehran since 2021.[xxvi] The Guardian Council barred Zakani from running in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.[xxvii] Zakani competed in the 2021 presidential election but ultimately withdrew his candidacy in support of Raisi.[xxviii] Zakani previously headed the Student Basij Organization during the crackdown on student protesters in July 1999.[xxix]
• Eshaq Jahangiri.[xxx] Jahangiri is a reformist politician who served as Iran’s first vice president under former President Hassan Rouhani between 2013 and 2021.[xxxi] Jahangiri withdrew from the 2017 election in support of Rouhani.[xxxii] The Guardian Council barred Jahangiri from competing in the 2021 presidential election.[xxxiii]
• Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[xxxiv] Ahmadinejad is a hardline politician who served as Iran’s president between 2005 and 2013.[xxxv] The Guardian Council barred Ahmadinejad from competing in the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections.[xxxvi]

Iran is continuing to increase its enriched uranium stockpile, according to a statement by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi during an IAEA Border of Governors meeting on June 3.[xxxvii] Grossi stated that the IAEA had not been able to access Iranian nuclear sites for over three years and that Iran had made no progress in resolving outstanding safeguards issues. Safeguards are IAEA activities that enable the IAEA to verify that a state is not using its nuclear programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.”[xxxviii] Grossi added that “public statements made in Iran” made about Iran’s ability “to produce nuclear weapons and possible changes to Iran’s nuclear doctrine” increased his concerns about the “correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.”[xxxix] Iranian officials have increasingly normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon in recent months, as CTP previously reported.[xl]

The Associated Press cited a confidential IAEA report on May 27 that reported that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium from 121.5 kilograms to 142.1 kilograms (a 16.95 percent increase).[xli] Weapons-grade uranium is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity.  A US expert noted on May 28 that, based on the confidential IAEA report, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for almost eight nuclear weapons in the first month after breakout.[xlii]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 3 that Israel will not agree to a permanent ceasefire until Israel achieves its war objectives.[xliii] US President Joe Biden outlined the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal and encouraged both Hamas and Israel to accept it during a speech on May 31.[xliv] He said that the proposal includes an initial six-week ceasefire with a partial Israeli military withdrawal and the release of some hostages while Hamas and Israel negotiate a permanent end to hostilities.[xlv] Netanyahu said on June 3 that Biden’s outline of the proposal was only “partial.”[xlvi] Israel has confirmed that it approves the proposal that Biden outlined but insisted that a permanent ceasefire is only possible once Israel achieves its war objectives.[xlvii] Two right-wing members of Netanyahu‘s coalition have threatened to dissolve the Israeli government if Netanyahu agrees to end the war.[xlviii] Netanyahu said that Israel is insisting that a second phase of the ceasefire can begin only after there is an agreement on the terms of the complete ceasefire.[xlix] This would allow Israel to retain the right to resume fighting in the Gaza Strip as long as Israel views that the negotiations are futile. Netanyahu said during a closed-door parliamentary meeting that Israel could initiate the first phase of the proposal without an agreement on what follows.[l]

Hamas official Suheil al Hindi told The Washington Post on June 3 that Hamas is still discussing the ceasefire proposal that Biden presented.[li] Hamas told international mediators that it wants a detailed proposal that reflects the one Biden presented in his speech.[lii] Hamas officials told international mediators that the latest Israeli proposal described a period of “sustainable calm“ in ambiguous terms, suggesting that Hamas was not confident that the “sustainable calm“ would secure Hamas‘ key demand, a permanent ceasefire.[liii] Hamas stated on May 31 that it is willing to engage "positively and constructively" with the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal, so long as it meets Hamas’ maximalist demands.[liv] Qatar sent the Israeli proposal to Hamas on May 30.[lv] A senior US official mentioned that the proposal is "nearly identical" to one presented by Hamas three weeks prior before that proposal was unilaterally altered by Egyptian intelligence.[lvi] Hamas has not issued an official response to the Israeli proposal at the time of writing.

Hamas may reject the agreement if the agreement fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire. Hamas remains confident that it can survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, and it can therefore pursue its maximalist demands without major concessions. CTP-ISW has previously noted that Hamas’ confidence in its survival increased, and its ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[lvii] Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar expressed confidence in February 2024, stating that Hamas is "doing fine" amid Israeli clearing operations.[lviii] Sinwar conveyed to Arab mediators in early May 2024 that he is in no hurry to end the war, as it is drawing international condemnation of Israel and reviving the Palestinian national cause.[lix]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and War Cabinet member Benny Gantz on June 2.[lx] Blinken commended Israel for its latest ceasefire proposal and emphasized that Hamas should accept the deal without delay.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on June 2 that Israel is assessing an alternative governing authority to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[lxi] Gallant stated that Israel will isolate areas in the Gaza Strip, remove Hamas operatives, and bring in other forces to enable an alternative government. He emphasized that Israel will not accept Hamas’ rule.[lxii] Hamas will violently resist and undermine alternative governing authorities that do not include it. An Israeli intelligence source confirmed on June 1 that Hamas killed the head of a local clan in the Gaza Strip, disrupting an Israeli plan to replace Hamas as the primary governing authority.[lxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Presidential Elections: Hardliners overwhelmingly dominate the candidate pool for the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Current Parliament Speaker and former IRGC Air Force commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and close Khamenei aide Vahid Haghanian both registered for the election between June 1 and 3.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel will not agree to a permanent ceasefire until Israel achieves its war objectives. Hamas may reject the agreement if the agreement fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire.
• Post-War Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on June 2 that Israel is assessing an alternative governing authority to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas will violently resist and undermine alternative governing authorities that do not include it.
• West Bank: Palestinian fighters continue to seek to attack Israeli towns from the West Bank.
• Northern Israel: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 3 that the IDF faces challenges intercepting drones targeting northern Israel. Other military forces, including the US Army, have also encountered challenges combatting Iranian-made drones in the Middle East.
• Yemen: The Houthis likely launched a ballistic missile from the Red Sea targeting Israel on June 3. The IDF’s Arrow ballistic missile defense system intercepted the Houthi missile.

Iran Update, June 2, 2024

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces launched a raid targeting Palestinian militias in Sabra and Zaytoun neighborhoods of Gaza City.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas stated that it will engage the latest Israeli proposal constructively, so long as the proposal meets Hamas’ maximalist demands.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in eight locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted 11 attacks into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed six drone and missile attacks targeting commercial and US naval vessels.

Iran Update, June 1, 2024

Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force has killed three Hamas officials in the central Gaza Strip over the past week. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Rafah.

West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in five locations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Yemen: The Houthis launched one drone from Houthi-controlled Yemen into the Red Sea.