Iran Updates, March 2025

Iran Update, March 31, 2025

Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal.[i] Trump added that he would impose secondary tariffs on Iran if Iran makes no progress towards a deal.[ii] Secondary tariffs would impose sanctions on countries that trade with Iran. US officials have previously threatened military action against Iran if there were no direct negotiations.[iii] Iranian officials have said they are open to indirect negotiations, though they reject direct negotiations with the United States.[iv] Senior Iranian officials have also repeatedly threatened to strike US interests in the region since at least January 2025, likely to shape US decision-making and discourage a US or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program.[v] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told the Telegraph on March 29 that Iran would attack any base "used by Americans" to attack Iran.[vi] Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation.

Iranian officials have recently threatened the following responses to a US-Israeli strike on Iran. These courses of action are not mutually exclusive.

• Attack US bases and forces: Iranian officials have repeatedly explicitly threatened to attack US bases and forces in the region in recent months.[vii] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told Western media on March 29 that Iran would target Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean if the United States attacked Iran.[viii] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[ix] An anonymous official also told Tehran Times that Iran's missile launchers at its underground bases are loaded with missiles and "ready for launch."[x] Iran's reported current maximum missile range is 2000 kilometers (km), and its reported maximum drone range is around 2500km.[xi] Diego Garcia Island is located about 3700km from Iran's southernmost city, Pasabandar. Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of the warhead on its medium-range missiles or otherwise decrease missile weight to launch a successful attack on Diego Garcia. Iran could target other US facilities in the region if it chose to do so. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh threatened on March 31 that US bases in the region are ”sitting in a glass house" near Iran.[xii]
• Disrupt international trade: IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri suggested on March 29 that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[xiii] Tangsiri also threatened to seize ships if Iranian ships were seized.
• Conduct a direct attack on Israel: Senior Iranian military commanders have recently resurfaced threats to conduct another missile attack on Israel.[xiv] Iran unveiled its latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[xv] Iranian media referred to the missile as the “Israeli ballistic missile” because it can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[xvi] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles, or missiles that can reach Israel, has been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, however.

Iranian officials have publicly stated that they are unwilling to make concessions to reach a new nuclear deal with the United States under President Trump's desired timeline or terms. Iranian sources stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance.[xvii] A senior Iranian military official stated on March 29 that Iran will "never negotiate” on its missiles or the “capabilities” of the Axis of Resistance.[xviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to expel the United States from the region and establish itself as the regional hegemon. An unspecified senior Iranian source separately told a UK-based, Gulf-linked outlet that Trump's letter refers to the "zero enrichment" approach.[xix] It remains unclear if Iran is willing to reverse significant progress on its nuclear program to meet the terms. Western media also reported in mid-March that Trump's letter set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal.[xx] Prior negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), took 20 months to negotiate.

Iran is likely rebuilding its solid-fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.[xxi] The sanctioned Iranian cargo vessel Jairan, which is carrying sodium perchlorate, a chemical used to make solid missile fuel, arrived near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, around March 29.[xxii] Marine Traffic and Maritime Executive confirmed that the Jairan, one of two Iranian Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessels sanctioned for transporting missile materials, is waiting near the Gheshm and Hormoz islands. Western officials told The Financial Times in January 2025 that Golbon and Jairan would deliver over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran.[xxiii] The IRGC’s Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which partially oversees Iran’s missile research and development, received most of the shipment offloaded by Golbon on February 13.[xxiv] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[xxv] The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to one of these locations would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.

Iran continues to coordinate with Russia and China on nuclear issues. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov in Tehran on March 31 to discuss nuclear talks and sanctions relief.[xxvi] Gharibabadi said Iran, Russia, and China will continue trilateral meetings and that Russia invited him to a UN Charter group meeting in Moscow in mid-April. The meeting follows a March 14 joint statement from Russia, China, and Iran that condemned US sanctions and described Iran’s nuclear activities as “peaceful.”[xxvii] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia and China plan to support Tehran under growing US pressure. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests through mediation, particularly in talks on Iran’s nuclear program and support of the Axis of Resistance.[xxviii]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara announced the appointments of 23 transitional ministers to his cabinet during a press conference on March 29.[xxix] These ministers are expected to remain in power until the transitional government cedes power to a new, elected government after a five-year interim period.[xxx] Shara replaced the majority of former interim ministers with new appointments and appointed one woman, one Christian, one Alawite, one Druze, and two Kurds to lead ministries within his government.[xxxi] Shara also appointed nine ”independent” ministers, including various professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[xxxii] He also dismissed the former interim justice minister, who was an ex-Jabhat al Nusra official.[xxxiii] These are undoubtedly positive steps towards a representative transitional government, but Shara still prioritized maintaining his control over key ministries such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice by appointing Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated officials or former HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) officials to these posts.[xxxiv] He also appointed former HTS and SSG officials to the less important ministries of energy, local administration and environment, public works and housing, youth and sports, and administrative development.[xxxv] The decision to expand his transitional cabinet to include minorities and “newcomers” follows widespread concern that Shara is personalizing power and appointing loyalists while blocking opportunities to represent Syria’s various minority communities in the transitional government.[xxxvi] Shara previously appointed a cabinet nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based SSG.[xxxvii]

Shara’s appointments of long-time loyalists to key positions suggests Shara hopes to continue to maintain his own and HTS’s influence within the transitional government. Shara has appointed or reappointed close advisers and allies from HTS to oversee portfolios directly concerning internal security and state stability. Shara has retained two of his most trusted advisors, Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Asaad al Shaibani, as ministers of defense and foreign affairs, respectively.[xxxviii] Former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Khattab has transitioned from intelligence chief to Interior Minister, where he will oversee the state’s General Security Services, border control, and intelligence services.[xxxix] The United States and the UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[xl] It is not clear if or who Shara will appoint to directly oversee Syrian intelligence services, given the expansion of Khattab’s role. Shara also appointed “key HTS ideologue” and Sunni scholar Mazhar al Wais as his Justice Minister.[xli] Arab media has reported that Wais has served as a ”senior legal figure” in HTS and has accompanied Shara to numerous high-level meetings without having been appointed to an official role.[xlii] Shara’s decision to position these loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the trajectory of the Syrian government and its security services, which could allow him to maintain his rule well into the future. Qasra, Shaibani, Khattab, and Wais’s appointments suggest that Shara intends to maintain significant control over ministries that directly concern internal security and state stability, and it could enable him to sideline rivals as he did during his rule of Idlib.

Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[xliii] These ministries—particularly education—can be used to remake the next generation of a country by altering textbooks. The Assad regime and other Middle Eastern autocratic regimes—like the Houthis in Yemen and ISIS—have created educational materials to brainwash the next generation. Shara probably recognized that placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have earned him significant international blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions. Shara could still employ a ”supervisory” system in which deputy ministers make the decisions and hold the real power while the minister serves as a figurehead.

Shara’s new transitional government is unlikely to assuage fears from minority communities about the future of minority representation in the transitional government and the trajectory of Shara’s rule. Shara’s clear preference for Sunni Arabs, the very few minorities, and the lack of appointees from other strong Syrian parties like the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) or Kurdish National Council (KNC) has already led several minority-dominated groups to condemn his “one-party government.”[xliv] The Alawite community, for its part, remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. The SDC decried the new government as “largely homogenous.”[xlv] A KNC official told Kurdish media that the KNC ”will not participate in a government that does not recognize the rights of the Kurdish people.”[xlvi] The official warned that the Kurds have been ignored for the ”third time,” likely referring to widespread Kurdish criticism over exclusion from the National Dialogue Conference, the drafting of the constitutional declaration, and the recent appointments.[xlvii] Fear among key Kurdish powerbrokers that Shara will continue to exclude their parties from a voice in his government’s formation risks disrupting the Syrian interim government’s efforts to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state.

The separatist Druze-majority Suwayda Military Council (SMC) also rejected Shara’s “one-color" government during a press conference on March 30.[xlviii] The group called on Shara to form a government that ”represents all Syrian components.”[xlix] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[l] A Western analyst recently reported that it is ”well known” within the Druze community that the SMC has connections to Israel through members of the Israeli Druze community.[li] It does not appear that the SMC represents a majority of the Syrian Druze population. That multiple camps across Syria continue to reject Shara’s transitional government will not help grow the government’s legitimacy, however.

Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28.[lii] Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.[liii] The Supreme Council of Fatwa will rule on decisions by majority vote, and Shara will vote as a tiebreaker if needed.[liv] HTS established a Supreme Fatwa Council in Idlib in 2019 that Shara effectively controlled and used to sideline his hardline Islamist rivals.[lv] Shara’s ability to use the council against his rivals will depend on his level of influence over a majority of its council members. Several notable HTS-affiliated scholars, including Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atun, former HTS-backed Supreme Fatwa Council member Anas Ayrut, and new Minister of Justice Mazhar al Wais, sit on the new council.[lvi]

Shara appointed Sheikh Osama al Rifai as the council’s chairman.[lvii] The Syrian Islamic Council, which was a body of Sunni Islamic scholars that opposed the Assad regime, appointed Rifai as the Grand Mufti in Syria in 2021 after the regime abolished the office.[lviii] Rifai has connections to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood.[lix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies enabling a strike, may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel.
• Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities. The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to product long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.
• Syrian Transitional Government: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.
• Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council: Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28. Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.

Iran Update, March 28, 2025

Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[i] Iran signaled openness to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions.  Senior Iranian officials expressing support for indirect negotiations likely aim to reassure the Iranian public that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief amid Iran's deteriorating economic situation. Senior Iranian officials have, however, heavily caveated that Iran should remain cautious in negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on March 28 that Iran's response to Trump's letter is “restrained” and emphasized Iran's readiness to "confront" threats.[ii] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized US attempts to "impose [its] demands" on Iran.[iii] Iranian officials have also explicitly rejected any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[iv] These statements likely aim to appease hardline elements within the regime that oppose negotiations with the West.

Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[v] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments."[vi] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi asked the E3 to "reconsider its approach" towards Iran during a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on March 28.[vii] A Wall Street Journal reporter also reported on March 28 that Iran and the E3 held "technical talks" in Geneva this week.[viii] Iranian efforts to signal openness to indirect negotiations and discussions with the E3 likely aim to deter the E3 from triggering the “snapback” mechanism.

Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has engaged in a concerted effort since at least January 2025 to shape US-Israeli decision-making and deter a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. A senior Iranian military commander warned in February 2024 that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist" an Israeli attack on Iran, likely referring to US bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries.[ix] Ghalibaf separately stated on March 28 that US allies and bases in the region "will be as vulnerable as a powder keg" if the United States and Israel threaten Iran.[x] Iran has recently unveiled new missile bases and conducted air defense exercises around nuclear sites, likely to highlight its missile capabilities and prepare for a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[xi] Iran may be signaling a willingness to engage in indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States to further shape US-Israeli decision-making and avoid a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official stated on March 25 that Trump's letter said "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[xii] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.

The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. [xiii] The government-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Aden announced on March 16 that eight Sanaa-based banks will move to Aden to avoid being subject to sanctions after the United States designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2025.[xiv] Remaining in Houthi-controlled areas would risk these banks coming under US sanctions.[xv] The Houthis have already arrested five employees at checkpoints as of March 27, according to anonymous sources talking to a Saudi news outlet.[xvi] The relocation of banks will likely further damage the Houthis' already unstable economy, which could lead to unrest and weaken the Houthis’ control over these areas in Yemen.

A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[xvii] The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE in July 2024 if the two states did not pressure the Yemeni government to stop efforts to remove the Houthi-controlled Central Bank from the SWIFT international banking network.[xviii]  The Houthis' threats worked, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE convinced the Yemeni government to drop their campaign. The Houthis recognize that Saudi Arabia and the UAE fear a resumption of Houthi attacks targeting key Saudi and Emirati commercial centers.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[xix] CENTCOM conducted at least eight airstrikes on a Houthi military base and Houthi underground facilities and communication infrastructure in the Jabal al Aswad area, Amran Governorate.[xx]  CENTCOM also targeted the Houthis‘ military command headquarters in Sanaa City.[xxi] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi denied that CENTCOM’s airstrikes have impacted their capabilities in his Quds Day speech on March 27.[xxii] A published list of dead Houthi fighters released on March 26 indicated that CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 41 Houthi fighters.[xxiii] The Houthis are unlikely to report the real number of casualties in the CENTCOM airstrikes among their fighters or release the names of Houthi senior officials killed in action. An anonymous US defense official confirmed that CENTCOM has killed several Houthi leaders since the start of their airstrike campaign, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxiv] The Wall Street Journal also reported that Abdulmalik has ordered Houthi leadership to not carry cellphones to avoid being tracked.[xxv]

Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes. A senior Houthi political official condemned the UAE for their cooperation with the United States, threatening to attack Abu Dhabi and Dubai in a post on X on March 27.[xxvi]

A Houthi delegation met with Egyptian intelligence officials in Cairo on March 26, at the Houthis’ request, to discuss deescalating regional tensions, according to anonymous sources speaking to a Saudi news outlet.[xxvii] These Egyptian officials reportedly passed on a message from the United States requesting the Houthis to not pursue an offensive campaign targeting international shipping. The source added that it was unclear if the message mentioned anything about the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have consistently linked their attacks on international shipping and Israel to their support for the Palestinian people.[xxviii] The Houthis halted their attacks when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was initially implemented in January 2025.[xxix]

Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[xxx] Sadr called on his followers to completely boycott the elections. Sadr urged Sadrists to update their voter registration on February 19 but had refused to announce whether his movement would participate in the elections.[xxxi] Sadr’s boycott of the elections is noteworthy given that his movement, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections to exclude Iranian-backed Shia political parties from government formation.[xxxii] The Sadrist political bloc’s withdrawal from Parliament in 2022 enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in Parliament.[xxxiii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could have threatened the Shia Coordination Framework’s strength in Parliament.

Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Multiple parliamentarians, including from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, the KDP, and a Turkmen bloc, called on Sadr to reverse his decision on March 28.[xxxiv] These calls follow other recent calls for Sadr to participate in the elections from senior Iraqi politicians, including Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai.[xxxv] Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xxxvi]  Iraqi political leaders across the political spectrum are likely concerned that Sadr could call for protests against governmental corruption if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xxxvii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xxxviii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xxxix]

Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Unknown actors in Lebanon launched two rockets at Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel, on March 28, which is the second rocket attack targeting Israel in the past week.[xl] The March 28 attack did not strike Kiryat Shmona.[xli] Both Hezbollah and the Lebanese president said that Hezbollah was not responsible.[xlii] Hezbollah’s central leadership is unlikely to approve any attacks targeting Israel, which would risk major Israeli reprisals. Hezbollah faces serious threats to its control, including substantial reconstruction costs that it is having trouble meeting. Israeli airstrikes would only further imperil Hezbollah. The IDF conducted an airstrike that destroyed a Hezbollah drone storage facility in Beirut, Lebanon, in response to the rocket attack.[xliii] The Israeli campaign in Lebanon badly weakened Hezbollah’s military wing in southern Lebanon, destroying approximately 80% of its 40-kilometer range rocket stockpiles and killing many senior commanders.[xliv]

Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there. Hezbollah has historically maintained de facto security control over southern Lebanon and smaller armed factions operating there, and it would be able to prevent these attacks if it were not badly damaged. It has also historically maintained good command and control over its forces, as demonstrated by the carefully calibrated attack campaign into northern Israel between October 2023 and October 2024. That Hezbollah cannot control its fighters or prevent them from conducting these attacks—which risk drawing a devastating Israeli response contrary to Hezbollah’s interests—suggests that Hezbollah lacks strong commanders who can discipline their forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Houthi Economy: The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27. Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes.
• Iraqi Politics: Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.
• Rocket Attacks in Lebanon: Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there.

Iran Update, March 27, 2025

Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[i] Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Trump sent a letter to Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, and Iran responded to the letter via Oman on March 26.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States, though it rejects direct negotiations under the current US “maximum pressure” campaign and US-Israeli threat of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated on March 25 that Trump's letter to Iran proposed "direct talks" and emphasized that "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[iii] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to grant sanctions relief or avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.

This likely suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approved indirect negotiations with the United States. Araghchi said that Iran conducted such indirect talks under former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Kamal Kharazi, have also recently expressed willingness to engage in indirect negotiations with the United States.[iv] That Kharazi spoke to state media may suggest that Iranian officials are concerned about internal unrest over Iran’s economic situation and want to signal to the Iranian population that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief.[v]

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors (see graphic below). A media official from the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria told Lebanese media on March 27 that the group does not receive “internal or external” support from Iran or Iranian-backed actors in the region.[vi] The official described the group as an “integrated organization” with political, social, military, and legal offices.[vii] There is no evidence that the group has any affiliations with external actors, but it is unclear why an independent local actor would decide to use iconography that many Syrians and people in the region and the world widely associate with Iran and its proxies and partners.[viii] The group initially established itself on January 8 as the ”Southern Liberation Front” and used red, green, and black text over a grey map of Syria as its logo until January 12, when it changed to the current logo.[ix]

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria said it communicated with the Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, but broke off communications after the Coastal Shield Brigades launched its military offensive in early March.[x] The media official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria opposed the killing of any Syrians, indicating that the group is attempting to present itself as cross-sectarian. The official also referred to the current government as an ”internal enemy,” suggesting that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[xi] The official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria cannot conduct many operations due to the interim government’s ”movements.” Fourteen members of the group have been killed in operations against the Israelis, however.[xii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations. Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely approved indirect negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations.
• Anti-Government Militias in Syria: The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors. This group also referred to the interim government as an “internal enemy” and communicated with other anti-government insurgents in western Syria before early March.

Iran Update, March 26, 2025

The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters.[i] Unspecified US and Syrian sources told Reuters on March 25 that US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi gave a list of US conditions for partial sanctions relief to Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[ii] The conditions reportedly include counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing structure.”[iii] The United States is considering extending an existing sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions exemption if the Syrian interim government fulfills these conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[iv] The United States would also reportedly issue a statement expressing support for Syria’s territorial integrity.[v]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. “Foreign fighters” likely refers to non-Syrian fighters whom Shara has promoted within the ranks of the Defense Ministry since coming to power. These fighters include Abdul Rahman al Khatib, a Jordanian, and Omar Mohammad Ciftci, a Turk.[vi] Khatib and Ciftci are HTS fighters who are loyal to Shara and have fought alongside Shara for over a decade.[vii] Shara recently appointed Khatib and Ciftci to command the Republican Guard and Damascus Division of the new Syrian army, respectively.[viii] These positions are key to maintaining security in Damascus and protecting Shara and the interim government, underscoring Shara’s trust in both men to protect his nascent rule over the country. Shara will likely oppose dismissing Khatib and Ciftci from their posts and appointing other, potentially less trusted, commanders to their posts. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.

Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. These militias include elements that operate outside of the PMF.[ix] “Informed political sources” told Iraqi media on March 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework has reached a “preliminary agreement,” with Iranian approval, to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF.[x] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq.[xi] The agreement also stipulates that PMF brigades and units can only carry out orders that the Iraqi prime minister gives them. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.[xii] The integration of militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[xiii]

This agreement comes amid US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reported plans to sanction PMF leaders.[xiv] This agreement also comes as the Iraqi parliament is debating the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which is meant to replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law and clarify the PMF’s structure and administrative functions.[xv]

Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25.[xvi] This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.[xvii] The facility contains both solid- and liquid-fuel ballistic missiles, including Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, Sejjil, Emad, and Haj Qassem missiles. Iran used Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, and Emad ballistic missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[xviii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri claimed on March 25 that the new facility includes enough missiles for Iran to conduct an attack “dozens of times” greater than its October 2024 attack on Israel.[xix]

Open-source reports suggest that the United States recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.[xx] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that B-2 Stealth Bombers, KC-135 refueling tankers, and a C-17 cargo plane recently arrived at Diego Garcia Island.[xxi] The United States has not confirmed the arrival of these aircraft at the time of this writing. The military buildup comes amid the US air campaign targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Yemen.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Integration into the PMF: Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.
• Iranian Deterrence Efforts: Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25. This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.

Iran Update, March 25, 2025

Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime.[i] It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin ”any diplomatic initiative,” but the supreme leader would almost certainly make such a decision. Araghchi has historically taken a softer line on nuclear negotiations with the United States compared to the regime’s hardline elements. Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[ii] Former President Hassan Rouhani and former leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team Mohammad Javad Zarif were previously given "full authority" to advance nuclear talks during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations.[iii]

An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch. Shara announced on March 25 that the interim government will comprise 22 ministerial portfolios led by a majority of “newcomers,” suggesting that he will replace the 22 existing ministers.[iv] This likely includes dissolving the office of Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir.[v] Emirati media reported in late February that Shara’s ministerial changes are imminent and are supposed to reflect that Shara understands the concerns about his consolidation of power.[vi] This follows widespread concern over Shara’s concentration of executive authority and the lack of checks and balances on the Presidency outlined in the recently announced constitutional declaration.[vii]

Shara’s current roster of transitional ministers is nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based, HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[viii] At least 18 of the 22 ministers that Shara appointed shortly after coming to power in December 2024 have close ties to or deep experience working with Shara, either through the SSG or through direct participation in HTS.[ix] The SSG was nominally independent of HTS but, in practice, subordinate to HTS. Men who have been deeply loyal to Shara and have worked with him since his Jabhat al Nusra days currently hold the largest and highest priority ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs and intelligence.[x]

Shara’s appointments in the coming days will be a strong indicator of the sort of government and state Shara intends to lead. A bias towards non-SSG, non-Sunni, non-Islamist, and non-HTS backgrounds would indicate Shara’s willingness to form a representative government that represents all of Syria. An opposite bias towards Sunni Arabs, Sunni Islamists, or former HTS and SSG members would indicate that Shara is not willing to form a representative or inclusive government at this time and instead seeks to cement his own control. This would also likely increase the distrust of the Shara government among minority communities, including the Alawites, Kurds, and Druze communities.

The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.[xi] Local media reported on March 24 that Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis at the Sarfait border crossing with Oman in southeastern Yemen.[xii] The Houthis have previously procured dual-use items on the international market for drone and missile components.[xiii] The Houthis smuggle these shipments through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and through land borders, particularly from the Omani-Yemeni border via Yemeni government-controlled Mahra and Hadramawt governorates in eastern Yemen.[xiv]  The United States sanctioned China-based electronics companies for selling dual-use components to the Houthis in October 2024.[xv] The Houthis also imported hydrogen fuel cylinders from unspecified Chinese suppliers in August 2024, which were aimed to increase the range and payloads of the Houthis’ drones.[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime. It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin ”any diplomatic initiative,” but such a decision would almost certainly be made by the supreme leader.
• Syrian Transitional Government Formation: An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch.
• Houthi Arms Smuggling: The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.

Iran Update, March 24, 2025

Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. [i] Top Trump Administration Envoy Steve Witkoff said that the proposal sought to put in place verification mechanisms and prevent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear material.[ii] Witkoff added that Iran did express interest in the proposal by reaching back out via multiple intermediaries, and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[iii]

Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic.[iv] An Iranian expert close to the regime and an Iranian media outlet close to a former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary both said that Iran would not negotiate over its missile program.[v] The Iranian expert also added that Iranian officials could not negotiate over its role in the Axis of Resistance because its proxy and partner militias “are not proxies.”[vi] This is a continuation of a long-running Iranian information operation that seeks to obfuscate Tehran’s role as the leader of the Axis of Resistance. These positions echo previous statements from senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei rejecting any measures to "set new expectations" for Iran's missile range.[vii]

Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran seeks to expel the United States from the region to exert itself as the regional hegemon and shape the region in its image. Its missile program forms one part of this effort. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to coerce its adversaries and provide new capabilities to its allies. Expelling the United States and emerging as a regional hegemon also requires like-minded partners and proxies that can actualize Iran’s vision in regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. An Iranian decision to curtail its proxy and partner network would be akin to an Iranian surrender and would require top Iranian leaders to give up on key ideological positions they have held for their entire adult lives.

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.[viii]  CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base and ammunition depots in al Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen on March 22 and a Houthi storage facility in western Sanaa suburbs on March 23.[ix] CENTCOM also struck Houthi ports and an airport in Hudaydah on March 22, reportedly injuring Houthi naval operations chief Mansour al Saadi, also known as Abu Sajjad.[x] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told CBS on March 23 that CENTCOM eliminated the Houthis’ missile unit chief.[xi] Local media also reported that US airstrikes killed three Houthi commanders in Majzar, Maarib Governorate, on March 22.[xii] The Houthis launched a retaliatory drone attack and a separate combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xiii]

The Houthis modified their military communication encryption codes and enhanced personal security measures for Houthi leadership in response to CENTCOM airstrikes targeting Houthi officials, according to a March 22 report in Yemeni media.[xiv] The Houthis have also reportedly increased security around military sites and imposed further censorship restrictions on the Yemeni population in Houthi-controlled territory, to prevent leaks showing Houthi military activities, sites, and leaders. Waltz also confirmed that CENTCOM will continue to target Houthi military infrastructure, weapons production sites, and communication lines, alongside Houthi leadership, to deter and weaken the Houthis’ capabilities to conduct attacks on Israel and international shipping.[xv]  Regional sources reported that CENTCOM struck the Houthis’ Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in the capital city Sanaa on March 19.[xvi]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed on March 22 that the United States ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail to the Red Sea because the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group failed to confront the Houthis.[xvii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Vinson to deploy to the Red Sea and extended Truman’s deployment by one month to maintain a continuous carrier presence in the region.[xviii]

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both Houthi missiles before they entered Israeli airspace.[xx] An Israeli war correspondent, citing an anonymous defense source, reported that the Houthis also launched a missile on March 22. The March 22 missile fell short of Israel and landed in an unidentified location in Saudi Arabia.[xxi]

The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.[xxii] The Central Bank added that this move will impact the Houthis’ economy. The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the Yemeni government attempted to remove the Houthi-controlled wing of the Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa from the SWIFT system in July 2024.[xxiii] The Saudis and Emiratis promptly and successfully pressured the Yemeni government to cease its plan to remove the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank from SWIFT.

The Houthis evacuated their headquarters in Baghdad and are considering closing their other two offices in Iraq after Iran warned the United States may strike Houthi targets, according to a Saudi news report on March 22.[xxiv] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned Iraqi militia leaders that US airstrikes against Houthi facilities could ”quickly backfire on Baghdad.” Ghaani called for ”avoiding any military activity during this sensitive period.”

Iran and the Iraqi federal government continue to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to “avoid all provocations” with Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxv] An unspecified source told Saudi media on March 21 that Ghaani, during his visit to Baghdad on March 19, told Iranian-backed militia and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to avoid provoking the United States or Israel.[xxvi] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein separately acknowledged in a recent interview that the federal government’s failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli attacks in Iraq.[xxvii] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[xxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some parties with Iranian-backed armed wings. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq, including via the transfer of weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night.[xxix]

The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxx] The Iraqi parliament first read through the draft law, titled the “Popular Mobilization Authority Law,” in a session on March 24 and Parliament will reportedly vote on the law on April 1.[xxxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians have debated the Popular Mobilization Authority Law’s components for weeks.[xxxii] Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the Iraqi federal government sought to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which has been debated in parliament several times in recent months, with a rewritten law--presumably the new Popular Mobilization Authority Law--that would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces.[xxxiii] This effort to restructure the PMF occurred as the United States pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxxiv]

Kurdish media reported on March 24 that the draft Popular Mobilization Authority law will replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law that formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxv] The current form of the PMF law clarifies the PMF’s structure and administrative functions, including the Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman’s authorities and the number of departments and directorates associated with the PMF.[xxxvi] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) is formally responsible for ensuring that the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[xxxvii] The draft law adds that the PMF will have a military academy like other Iraqi security institutions.[xxxviii] The draft law also prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties, as did the 2016 version.[xxxix]

The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties. Most Iraqi political leaders instead control their parties from outside government, unlike in most parliamentary systems. This means that Iranian-backed Iraqi figures like Qais al Khazali or Hadi al Ameri—leaders of Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization respectively—could easily continue to control both their military organizations and their political organizations without technically violating this law. The law also does not make any changes that would impede Iran’s ability to command and control the PMF, which does not listen to its official commander-in-chief, the Iraqi prime minister. Many elements of the PMF instead take their orders from Iran or Iranian-backed commanders.

Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[xl] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[xli] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[xlii] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[xliii] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[xliv] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[xlv] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[xlvi] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[xlvii]

The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran presented new evidence on March 14 that demonstrates ongoing and systematic human rights violations by the Iranian regime in response to the protests that sparked in September 2022.[xlviii] The report states that women are increasingly summoned to court for alleged non-compliance with mandatory Hijab laws. Penalties include fines, flogging, and bank account closure and are often based on photos or reports submitted by police or loyalist groups. The report states that Iranian authorities also rely heavily on advanced surveillance tools to monitor hijab violations. These include facial recognition systems, aerial drones, and mobile apps such as Nazer, which allows approved users to report women not wearing the hijab—even in private vehicles or ambulances. These developments reflect the Iranian regime’s broader effort to tighten control over the population by expanding surveillance and leveraging informal enforcement networks.

Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions. A large crowd gathered at Iranian poet Ferdowsi’s tomb near Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi on March 20 and chanted anti-regime slogans.[xlix] The governor of Mashhad confirmed that 15 individuals were arrested for what he described as “subversive slogans,” and stated they would face legal consequences.[l] Citizens in Fars Province gathered at Hafezieh in Shiraz on March 20, where many women appeared without the mandatory hijab, some participants danced in celebration and chanted pro-monarchy slogans.[li] Kurdistan Province Chief Prosecutor separately reported the arrest of seven individuals on March 23, accusing them of organizing anti-state activities under the guise of Nowruz events in the province.[lii] The Prosecutor claimed that the suspects had “organizational ties” and aimed to spread propaganda and insult religious sentiments. Independent human rights group Hengaw confirmed three of the arrests but noted the exact charges remain unclear.[liii] The arrests during Nowruz celebrations highlight the regime’s deepening fear of public gatherings that could evolve into anti-regime protests.

Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21.[liv] This marked the first rocket attack from Lebanon into Israel since early December 2024.[lv] The IDF intercepted three rockets, and the other three landed in Lebanese territory.[lvi] The IDF conducted counterbattery fire against the rocket launch site and later conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers across Lebanon on March 22 and 23.[lvii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) destroyed three rudimentary rocket launchers that consisted of simple wood and metal launch rails in two towns in Nabatieh District, southern Lebanon, on March 22.[lviii]

Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lix]  Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now. Hezbollah released a statement on March 18 condemning the renewed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has not said that it would resume attacks against Israel.[lx]

The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade.[lxi] Likely anti-government insurgents killed a Hayat Tahrir al Sham commander and two other pro-government fighters in separate areas of Idlib province on March 22 and March 24 respectively.[lxii] These attacks come after Coastal Shield Brigade commander Miqdad Fatiha stated on March 12 that the insurgency would begin to target interim government forces with improvised explosive devices and assassinations as part of the insurgency’s second phase.[lxiii] Insurgent leaders can use public statements as a way to signal intent to their followers.[lxiv] These attacks, combined with the discovery of two rudimentary IEDs on the Jableh-Latakia road on March 19 suggest that the insurgency may be adopting new tactics that are consistent with Fatiha’s second phase of operations.[lxv]

Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence. Interim government forces launched a search operation in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Province, on March 23 targeting former regime members who failed to register with the interim government and arrested individuals who refused to disarm.[lxvi] It is unclear if government forces cordoned off the area before conducting its search. Former Assad regime members previously ambushed interim government forces on February 19 along the Maarat al Numan-Khan Sheikhoun road.[lxvii] Government forces also arrested approximately 15 individuals in Jisr al Shughur, Idlib Province, on March 24 charged with collaboration under the former Assad regime.[lxviii] Pro-Assad insurgents killed approximately 25 individuals, primarily interim government forces, in Jisr al Shughur in the coordinated attack in early March.[lxix]

Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state.[lxx] The “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance,” or “Tamasuk,” identified itself as an alliance that transcends ”ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and even political and ideological” affiliations that seek to encourage a "civil, democratic, and pluralistic state” during its first press conference in Damascus on March 22.[lxxi] The Tamasuk alliance comprises at least 34 political and civil groups, including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other Kurdish, Christian, and Druze-affiliated groups.[lxxii] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing. A leader from the leftist ”People's Will Party” said that Tamasuk does not see itself as an “opposition” group but a group that is willing to engage ”all forces,” including the Shara government, in dialogue.[lxxiii] The alliances’ founding statement confirmed that it seeks to work towards a ”unified Syria” under a single state and single army and called for a “just, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.”[lxxiv] The coalition, while relatively small, is the first organized political alliance in Syria outside of the government itself since the fall of the regime.

The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government. Many of these parties and groups have previously criticized the Shara government for its exclusionary organization of the National Dialogue Conference.[lxxv] Many groups, like the SDC, have rejected Shara’s constitution for granting the executive branch “absolute powers.”[lxxvi] Tamasuk called for the writing of a new constitution that better defines the dispersion of decentralized powers in order to allow the people to exercise direct authority within their regions while centralizing affairs like foreign affairs, defense, and the economy under the central government.[lxxvii] The Shara government has so far ignored local calls from Syria’s various communities demanding decentralized powers.[lxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic. Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives.
• US Air Campaign against the Houthis: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.
• Houthi-Gulf Relations: The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties.
• Ethnic Tension in Iran: Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam. The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.
• Iranian Social Control: The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. Iran is using mobile applications, drones, and other tactics and technologies as part of this effort.
• Protests in Iran: Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions.
• Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire: Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21. Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lxxix] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade. Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence.
• Syrian Politics: Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state. The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government.

Iran Update, March 21, 2025

Senior Iranian officials are trying to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance by denying that Iran exerts direct control over groups like the Houthis, likely to avoid escalation with the United States. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a Nowruz speech to Iranian officials in Tehran on March 21 and claimed that the people of Yemen and resistance groups in the region "have their own motivation" and called Western claims that these groups act on Iran’s behalf “a big mistake.”[i] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami separately claimed on March 16 that the “Yemenis” are an “independent and free nation” and that Houthis make their own strategic and operational decisions that Iran does not direct.[ii] These statements ignore that the Houthis have repeatedly highlighted their coordination with the Axis of Resistance prior to conducting operations.[iii] Iran leads the Axis of Resistance and provides IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers to advise the Houthis, including senior IRGC Quds Force commander Abdul Reza Shahlai.[iv]

Khamenei and Salami’s remarks echo other Iranian statements that have come amid US threats to target Iran or key Iranian assets in the region.  In early 2024, for example, IRGC-QF Commander Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad to direct Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to stop attacks targeting US forces in Iraq. Senior Iranian officials simultaneously attempted to obfuscate Iran’s own involvement in the attacks and avoid a US response against Iran for the January 2024 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan.[v] US President Donald Trump warned on March 17 that the United States could respond to Houthi attacks as if those attacks came from Iran.[vi] Iran likely seeks to reduce the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States while maintaining its leadership of the Axis of Resistance—including the Houthis.

The United States deployed another US aircraft carrier to the Red Sea, according to an anonymous official talking to the Associated Press on March 21.[vii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail from the Sea of Japan to the Red Sea for a three-month deployment. The USS Carl Vinson group is set to arrive in April. Hegseth also extended the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group’s deployment to the Red Sea by a month. The decision to extend the Truman group’s deployment by one month will enable CENTCOM to maintain at least one carrier in the Red Sea without gaps in coverage.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 20.[viii] CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base in the al Fazah-al Tuhayta area, south of Hudaydah Port.[ix] CENTCOM also struck an unspecified location near Safraa in the Houthi stronghold of Saada City on March 20.[x] The Houthis did not launch retaliatory attacks targeting the Truman, as it has done previously.[xi]

The Houthis separately launched a ballistic missile targeting an unspecified Israeli military site south of Tel Aviv in central Israel on March 20.[xii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[xiii] This is the third attack the Houthis have launched targeting Israeli territory since the Houthis announced the resumption of their campaign against Israel, which they said is in response to Israel not sending aid into the Gaza Strip.[xiv]

The US Treasury is allowing energy imports to Yemen loaded before March 5, 2025, to proceed until April 4, 2025, despite US recent sanctions on the Houthis. After April 4 all energy imports will require specific US Treasury authorization.[xv] The Houthis have monopolized control of Yemeni oil imports by striking government-controlled port facilities, forcing those facilities to shut down and redirect traffic to Houthi-controlled Hudaydah port.[xvi] The Houthis do not control Yemen’s energy resources, meaning they cannot export Yemeni energy resources from Hudaydah.

Shipping companies are set to avoid the Red Sea transit route until a more comprehensive peace agreement is reached, according to the New York Times.[xvii] Approximately 200 cargo ships transited the Bab el Mandeb Strait in the southern Red Sea near Yemen in February 2025.[xviii] Two hundred cargo ships still represent an increase from the 144 ships that transited the Red Sea in February 2024, but it is still significantly fewer ships compared to before the Houthi attack campaign targeting maritime shipping, according to the New York Times.[xix] Global freight prices also remain significantly higher than before October 2023 though freight prices have decreased since December 2024, when the Houthis halted their attacks on international shipping.[xx] The Houthis have not targeted commercial vessels in the Red Sea since announcing their resumption of attacks on ”Israeli shipping” on March 11.[xxi]

Widespread reports about likely Sunni-perpetrated sectarian and revenge-based attacks targeting the Alawite community threaten to fuel the Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Alawite media has widely reported on instances of violence committed against the Alawite community by Sunnis and government forces.[xxii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify all of these reports at this time, but these reports will likely exacerbate Alawite distrust towards Sunni communities and Sunni-majority security forces. This distrust delegitimizes the interim government among the population and could enable insurgents to move in as security guarantors for the Alawite community.[xxiii] Insurgent groups seek to exploit insecurity and abuses to control the population and establish themselves as the primary security guarantor in a community.[xxiv]  Failure by the interim government to hold perpetrators of these abuses accountable and rebuild trust within the Alawite community will undermine any counterinsurgency campaigns.

Unspecified vigilantes also conducted two separate attacks targeting former Assad regime officials outside of the Syrian coastal area. These vigilante-style attacks may become more common as a result of a lack of government-led transitional justice.[xxv] Unidentified gunmen killed former Baath Party Secretary for Izra, Daraa Province, Mohammed Sharif al Zoubi.[xxvi] Unidentified gunmen also killed the former mayor of Khaldiya district, Aleppo City, Ibrahim Othman.[xxvii] Othman was accused of being an informant under the Assad regime.[xxviii]

Syrian government forces continued raids and arrests targeting elements of nascent insurgent networks elsewhere in Syria. Government forces arrested a Deir ez Zor City-based insurgent cell on March 20 that was planning an attack on a security headquarters.[xxix] The cell was affiliated with the US-sanctioned Qatirji Company.[xxx] The Qaterji Company facilitated Iranian oil sales to Syria and China under the former Assad regime, generating ”hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue” for the IRGC Quds Force and the Houthis.[xxxi] The Qaterji Company was a key revenue stream for the IRGC Quds Force and its affiliated proxies under the Assad Regime.[xxxii] These militiamen may form the core of a more broad-based insurgency outside of Alawite areas, given that they have lost economic power after the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran and the Axis of Resistance: Senior Iranian officials are trying to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance by denying that Iran exerts direct control over groups like the Houthis, likely to avoid escalation with the United States. Khamenei and Salami’s remarks echo Iranian statements in early 2024 that came amid US threats to target Iran or key Iranian assets in the region.
• Houthis in Yemen: The United States deployed another US aircraft carrier to the Red Sea, according to an anonymous official talking to the Associated Press on March 21. The US secretary of defense also extended the Truman group’s deployment by one month, which will enable CENTCOM to maintain at least one carrier in the Red Sea without gaps in coverage.
• Maritime Shipping in the Red Sea: Shipping companies are set to avoid the Red Sea transit route until a more comprehensive peace agreement is reached, according to the New York Times.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: Widespread reports about likely Sunni-perpetrated sectarian and revenge-based attacks targeting the Alawite community threaten to fuel the Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Alawite media has widely reported on instances of violence committed against the Alawite community by Sunnis and government forces.
• Other Insurgent Elements in Syria: Syrian government forces continued raids and arrests targeting elements of nascent insurgent networks elsewhere in Syria. Government forces arrested a Deir ez Zor City-based insurgent cell affiliated with the US-sanctioned Qaterji Company on March 20 that was planning an attack on a security headquarters.

Iran Update, March 20, 2025

A senior official from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2025.[i] The official suggested that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct “advanced and modern strikes” targeting US forces if US forces do not withdraw from Iraq by this date. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[ii] The Iraqi federal government has reportedly considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces in recent months due to the security threat it perceives that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria poses to Iraq, however.[iii] The removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria is a long-standing Iranian objective and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[iv] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba previously resisted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s order to halt attacks targeting US forces in early January 2024.[v] Ghaani recently met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on March 19 and may have discussed efforts to remove US forces from Iraq with these leaders.[vi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis are increasingly sharing military knowledge, which could increase both groups’ ability to threaten US and allied interests in the region. The Houthis have extensive experience in drone warfare and have shared this experience with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, as evidenced by the death of a Houthi drone expert in a US airstrike south of Baghdad in July 2024.[vii] The Houthis also reportedly operate three offices across Iraq and a training camp in a town controlled by Kataib Hezbollah in Diyala Province, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).[viii] RUSI reported on March 19 that Iranian-backed fighters in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have reportedly deployed to Yemen in recent months to train Houthi fighters in combat technology, including drones and improvised explosive devices.[ix] The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters in Yemen and Houthi members in Iraq highlights that knowledge transfers between the Houthis and Iraqi militias are reciprocal.

US President Donald Trump announced on March 19 that the United States will partner with regional allies “to dismantle Houthi operations and secure the Red Sea.”[x] These allies almost certainly include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) given that Saudi and Emirati-backed proxy forces in Yemen would be best suited to threaten Houthi control in Yemen. It is unclear what Trump means by ”dismantle.” Defeating the Houthis and ending their operations would probably require the US and its partners to support the Yemeni government to threaten Houthi control of Yemen.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[xi] CENTCOM targeted a cotton mill in Zabid, Hudaydah Governorate, which local media reported the Houthis had converted into a mines and explosive devices factory.[xii] The Houthis claimed that 16 Houthis fighters have died in the recent CENTCOM strikes.[xiii] The Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones targeting the USS Harry S. Truman and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 19 in response to the CENTCOM strikes.[xiv

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 19.[xv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[xvi] The Houthis previously targeted the IDF Nevatim Air Base in central Israel with two ballistic missiles on March 18.[xvii] The IDF intercepted both missiles.[xviii] The United States reportedly asked Israel not to respond to these attacks and to ”let [the United States] deal with it,” according to Israeli media.

Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghaleb Nasser al Rahwi separately met with former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi in Sanaa, Yemen, on March 20.[xix]  A Kurdish journalist suggested that Mahdi may have relayed a message from the United States urging the Houthis to stop their attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.[xx] Mahdi previously served as a member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which was founded by former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini.[xxi] Mahdi resigned as prime minister following the outbreak of large-scale protests in Iraq in October 2019.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei highlighted Iran's economic weaknesses and problems in his Nowruz speech on March 20.[xxii] Khamenei announced "Investment for Production” as Iran’s new year’s slogan, which is consistent with Khamenei’s economic-focused new year’s slogans in recent years. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized the issues of inflation and rising costs in his Nowruz speech on March 20.[xxiii] Khamenei's recent rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States, which would potentially provide Iran with sanctions relief, will likely contribute to worsening Iranian economic conditions. The Iranian regime will also likely not be able to meaningfully improve the Iranian economy if it does not address underlying issues, such as rampant corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement, that currently plague the economy.[xxiv] The value of the Iranian rial has depreciated around 103 percent over the past two years, highlighting how Iranian officials have either lacked the capability or willingness to meaningfully address Iran’s economic problems.[xxv]

Syrian government forces have conducted a series of raids and arrests targeting insurgent networks in Deir ez Zor Province, northeastern Syria, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19. Syrian government forces interdicted a weapons shipment on March 19 that was bound for insurgents in Deir ez Zor City.[xxvi] Syrian forces also arrested the former IRGC Sayyida Zainab Shrine militia commander in Mayadeen on March 20.[xxvii] Deir ez Zor City’s proximity to the Albu Kamal border crossing with Iraq and its location on a primary transportation route made it a key distribution point for weapons smuggling under the Assad regime. Various Assad- and Iranian-backed groups developed human networks and physical infrastructure in the area that emerging insurgent cells could exploit.

Insurgent cells in northeastern Syria may be driven by different underlying motivations than cells in western Syria. Insurgent cells based in Alawite-majority areas in western Syria appear motivated by an interest to restore Assad-era power structures to address economic grievances and security concerns. The insurgents in these areas very likely seek to improve their personal welfare and security rather than reinstate the Assad regime.[xxviii] Anti-interim government attacks in northeastern Syria have occurred in towns along the primary smuggling route from Iraq into Syria on the southern bank of the Euphrates River.[xxix] These towns were heavily dominated by Iranian and Iranian-backed armed factions and smugglers during Assad’s rule. Anti-smuggling crackdowns remove sources of revenue and rents, which in turn increases anti-government sentiment.

A Syrian journalist reported that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will withdraw from Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces and form an SDF-affiliated army division in Hasakah Province. The SDF met with a Syrian interim government delegation to discuss the terms of the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state at al Shaddadi base, Hasakah Province, on March 19.[xxx] An eastern Syria-focused journalist, citing unspecified sources and leaks from the meeting, claimed on March 20 that the integration agreement requires the SDF to “completely” withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces.[xxxi] The journalist added that the government will establish three divisions in northeastern Syria and an “SDF-affiliated” division in Hasakah Province.[xxxii]  CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, but it is unlikely that the SDF would agree to withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces and integrate into the Syrian army while under active attack from Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). An “SDF-affiliated” division would be consistent with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi’s demand that the SDF maintain some degree of autonomy by joining the Defense Ministry as a “military bloc,” however.[xxxiii] Syrian interim government officials have repeatedly rejected Abdi’s demand, but Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara’s recent decision to allow Suwaydawi-led security forces to oversee security in Suwayda Province suggests that Shara could be willing to allow the formation of an SDF-affiliated or SDF-led unit in northeastern Syria.[xxxiv]

The journalist also claimed that Hasakah Province will be “jointly administered.” It is unclear if a “joint administration” refers to the presence of an SDF-affiliated division in Hasakah Province or a decentralized system of governance that would afford the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) some local autonomy.[xxxv] Abdi reportedly requested that the integration process last three years, but the interim government reportedly insists that the SDF’s integration take place within one year.[xxxvi] Abdi likely seeks a longer integration timeline in order to assess the progress of the transition period and the trajectory of Shara’s government, given that the Syrian Democratic Council and the AANES recently publicly rejected the new government’s transitional constitution.[xxxvii] The transition period is scheduled to last around five years.[xxxviii]

Russia aims to increase cooperation with the Syrian interim government, likely to secure military basing rights in Syria. Russian President Vladmir Putin sent a letter to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on March 20 in which he expressed Russia’s willingness to develop “practical cooperation” with the Syrian interim government on “all issues on the agenda.”[xxxix] These issues almost certainly include economic cooperation. Russia has established some degree of economic cooperation with Syria since February 2025. Russia has delivered local Syrian currency and shipped crude oil to Syrian ports, for example.[xl] A tanker sanctioned for transporting Russian oil arrived at Baniyas Port on March 6.[xli] Another oil tanker carrying Russian crude oil reportedly reached Baniyas Port on March 20, and at least one more shipment of Russian oil is expected to arrive at Baniyas Port in early April 2025.[xlii]  Russia has not yet concluded a deal with the interim government to maintain its basing rights in Syria and will likely try to use these economic incentives as leverage to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• Threat to US Forces: A senior official from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2025. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026. The Iraqi federal government has reportedly considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces in recent months due to the security threat it perceives that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria poses to Iraq, however.
• Iraqi Militia-Houthi Cooperation: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis are increasingly sharing military knowledge, which could increase both groups’ ability to threaten US and allied interests in the region. The Royal United Services Institute reported on March 19 that Iranian-backed fighters in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have reportedly deployed to Yemen in recent months to train Houthi fighters in combat technology, including drones and improvised explosive devices.
• SDF Integration into the Syrian State: A Syrian journalist reported that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will withdraw from Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces and form an SDF-affiliated army division in Hasakah Province. it is unlikely that the SDF would agree to withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces and integrate into the Syrian army while under active attack from Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). An “SDF-affiliated” division would be consistent with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi’s demand that the SDF maintain some degree of autonomy by joining the Defense Ministry as a “military bloc,” however.
• Syrian Insurgency: Syrian government forces have conducted a series of raids and arrests targeting insurgent networks in Deir ez Zor Province, northeastern Syria, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19. Insurgent cells in northeastern Syria may be driven by different underlying motivations than cells in western Syria. Anti-interim government attacks in northeastern Syria have occurred in towns along the primary smuggling route from Iraq into Syria on the southern bank of the Euphrates River.
• Iranian Economy: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei highlighted Iran's economic weaknesses and problems in his Nowruz speech on March 20. Khamenei's recent rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States, which would potentially provide Iran with sanctions relief, will likely contribute to worsening Iranian economic conditions. The Iranian regime will also likely not be able to meaningfully improve the Iranian economy if it does not address underlying issues, such as rampant corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement, that currently plague the economy,

Iran Update, March 19, 2025

President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios report.[i] Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations. Trump’s May 2025 nuclear deal deadline would expire one month before the E3’s (Germany, France, and Italy) reported June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the reimposition of snapback sanctions.[ii] Prior negotiations, including the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), have taken much longer and fell well short of the current US goals in negotiations. The JCPOA took 20 months to negotiate.[iii] White House National Security Adviser Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Iran must ”hand over and give up” all elements of its nuclear program.[iv]  Khamenei has also repeatedly explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States given the US‘ current ”maximum pressure” campaign.[v] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[vi] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations even as his top military commanders and hardliner allies advocate against negotiations.[vii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein also said that Israel had threatened to strike Iraq during an interview on March 17.[viii] Multiple US officials, including the secretaries of state and defense, may have discussed these warnings during recent conversations with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[ix]  These warnings come amid renewed US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and new Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias initially began their October 2023 to February 2024 attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip. Three militia-affiliated Iraqi sources told Qatari media on March 19 that multiple militias recently transferred weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night, in coordination with the Iraqi federal government, "in anticipation” of Israeli strikes.[x]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis. A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may assume unspecified activities due to “recent developments.”[xi] These “recent developments” could include US airstrikes targeting the Houthis or resumed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. These militias have previously attacked US forces in retaliation for real and perceived Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere in the region.[xii] The Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, includes some parties with armed wings in the Islamic Resistance of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that consistently launched drone strikes that targeted Israel (from January to November 2024) and US forces (from October 2023 to January 2024).[xiii] The attacks targeting Israel sought to retaliate for Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip.[xiv] The attacks targeting US forces likely sought to pressure the US to force the Israelis to end the war in the Gaza Strip while simultaneously encouraging a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly told PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders that Iran would support any militia reaction to an Israeli strike in Iraq during a visit to Baghdad on March 19, which could include targeting US forces.[xv]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.[xvi] CENTCOM struck al Hebshi Iron Factory, north of Hudaydah Port, twice in two days.[xvii] Local and regional media reported that CENTCOM also conducted airstrikes on the Houthi’s Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in Sanaa City, as well as several sites in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate.[xviii] Yemeni journalists also reported that US airstrikes in Al Jawf Governorate, northern Yemen, on March 16 killed three Houthi officials, including Commander Zain al Abidin al Mahtouri in al Hazm City, al Jawf Governorate. Mahtouri reportedly trained in Iran in 2020.[xix]

The Houthis launched an unspecified number of drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 18.[xx] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated that this is the fourth time the Houthis have attacked the aircraft carrier in 72 hours. CENTCOM published footage on March 19 showing the USS Harry S. Truman intercepting a Houthi one-way attack drone over an unspecified location in the Red Sea.[xxi]

US President Donald Trump warned Iran against sending supplies to the Houthis on March 19.[xxii] Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer told Iranian media that ”Iran does not interfere in our [Houthis] decision-making" and refuted reports from March 18 that Iran requested the Houthis to de-escalate tensions with the United States and Israel in the Red Sea.[xxiii] The Houthis are aligned with Iran and Iran is almost certainly still supplying them with weapons, but the Houthis sometimes act without direct Iranian approval.[xxiv]

Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities. Security forces dismantled an IED discovered near the Latakia-Jableh highway on March 19.[xxv] The IED, which appears to be a pipe with two fragmentation grenades, is a rudimentary device that the insurgents likely built to resemble garbage and escape notice. Security forces also located and dismantled a similarly produced IED near the same road on March 13.[xxvi] Both IEDs are rudimentary devices that are not particularly difficult to produce, but it is notable that insurgent cells in the area have nascent IED production capabilities. These capabilities could improve if insurgents are able to acquire more expertise, equipment, and materials. Miqdad al Fatiha, leader of Assadist insurgent group the Coastal Shield Brigade, vowed in a March 13 video statement that his fighters would plant IEDs on roads in the next phase of fighting against government forces.[xxvii]

Syrian media reported that insurgents targeted several vehicles with Molotov cocktails in Jableh, Latakia Province, on March 19.[xxviii] The insurgents then attacked a gas station in the area before security forces arrived.[xxix] Insurgents’ targeting of possible civilian vehicles or civilian infrastructure may seek to generate fear in local communities and reduce a community’s faith in government forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations.
• Israel and Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.
• Insurgency in Syria: Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities.

Iran Update, March 18, 2025

Recent tit-for-tat sectarian killings and local support for pro-Assad insurgent cells will likely hamper Syrian interim government efforts to promote security and community reconciliation in coastal Syria. Assadist insurgent cells attacked Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces in early March, which caused a spate of violence and extrajudicial killings across coastal Syria.[i] Revenge killings and kidnappings have continued to take place in coastal provinces over the past week even as coordinated insurgent attacks and extrajudicial sectarian killings by interim government forces have decreased.[ii] The kidnappings have targeted both interim government forces and civilians from Alawite, Sunni, and Ismaili communities.[iii] Tit-for-tat sectarian killings increase fear and feelings of insecurity among members of targeted communities. This fear makes it less likely that community members will disarm or turn in insurgent leaders because they do not have guarantees from the interim government that government forces will prevent future attacks on the community. Local notables in Tartous villages have gathered hundreds of weapons to surrender to the interim government but it is difficult to determine what percentage of village residents retain weapons.[iv] Local Alawite villages in the same area have refused to turn in around 40 insurgent leaders, which indicates that the residents of these villages support the insurgents or at least are willing to cooperate with them.[v] This support may be predominantly driven by fear that Sunni interim government forces could conduct extrajudicial killings if insurgents are not present to protect villagers rather than by ideological support for the deposed Assad regime.

Alawite insurgent leaders likely designed the early March 2025 attacks to trigger sectarian violence against their community in order to stoke fear and thereby increase support for the insurgency. Insurgencies attempt to control local populations by stoking fear and reducing a community’s faith in government forces.[vi] The coordinated and violent Assadist insurgent attacks in early March were likely intended to cause interim Defense Ministry deployments to the coast and trigger violent government reprisals.[vii] The Ismaili Shia-majority town of Qadmus and its surrounding Alawite villages in Tartous Province had established a positive working relationship with interim Interior Ministry units since mid-December 2024 but did not have the same positive relationship or trust in interim Defense Ministry units.[viii] Extrajudicial killings and violence committed by rogue interim Defense Ministry units in Tartous and Latakia provinces increased panic and fear in local communities and erased the goodwill and trust that interim Interior Ministry units had established with these communities.[ix] The majority of interim Defense Ministry forces have withdrawn from coastal Syria, but some forces continue to guard checkpoints and harass local Alawite communities.[x] The interim Defense Ministry forces’ continued presence in Alawite areas will likely increase local support for the insurgency in coastal areas. Increased local support will allow the insurgents to sustain their operations and will drive recruitment for insurgent groups beyond the group's initial power base and community.  Failure to hold perpetrators of extrajudicial killings during the recent clearing operations accountable will similarly exacerbate fears that government forces are targeting civilians and further drive support for insurgent cells.

Some Iraqi groups have continued to amplify sectarian rhetoric against Sunnis following the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria.  The United Council of Sheikhs and Notables of Basra and Iraq, which is a tribal committee that appears to be affiliated with the Basra Provincial Council, called on the Iraqi federal government to sever ties with the Syrian interim government on March 18.[xi]  The council called on the federal government to monitor Syrians in Iraq and hold individuals, such as Sunni Azm Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, accountable for ”inciting sectarian strife.”[xii] Khanjar expressed support for the Syrian interim government’s efforts to counter pro-Assad insurgents in coastal Syria on March 7.[xiii] The council added that Basrawi tribes are prepared to protect Iraqi holy sites--likely referring to the Shia shrines in Najaf and Karbala--and to confront anyone who attempts to ignite sectarian strife in Iraq.[xiv] Unspecified Shias in Basra separately announced a demonstration at the Turkish consulate in Basra on March 18 to protest the suppression of Shias in Syria by “takfiris.”[xv] The term “takfiri” refers to apostates and is commonly used by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures to refer to armed Sunni organizations.[xvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have described the fall of the Assad regime as a “Turkish conspiracy” and Iranian media has accused Turkey of condoning the killing of Alawites in Syria[xvii]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi political figures seek to prevent the Iraqi federal government from developing ties with the Syrian interim government because they view the interim government and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists.”[xviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, fought al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and presumably view Shara as an al Qaeda in Iraq ideologue. Iraqi media reported on March 17 that Shia Coordination Framework leaders refused to meet with Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani during his recent visit to Iraq.[xix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly called Shaibani’s visit “normalization with terrorism.”[xx]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force conducted over 30 airstrikes on March 17 targeting former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria that unspecified actors sought to repurpose.[xxi] Syrian media reported that the IDF struck the 132nd Brigade outside Daraa City, the 175th Regiment near Izraa, and al Thaala Airbase in western Suwayda Province.[xxii] The strikes killed at least two individuals and injured 19 others.[xxiii] The IDF said that it attacked military headquarters and SAA weapons and equipment that unspecified actors were attempting to use.[xxiv]  The IDF was likely referring to Syrian interim government forces’ attempts to repurpose former SAA positions in southern Syria as part of the interim government’s efforts to rebuild the Syrian army in the south. The Syrian interim government began recruiting soldiers in Daraa and Suwayda provinces on March 11 and have established several recruitment centers across Daraa Province to recruit soldiers into the 40th Division of the new Syrian army.[xxv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in late February 2025 that Israel would not allow "forces of the [Hayat Tahrir al Sham] or the new Syrian army to enter the territory south of Damascus" and called for a fully demilitarized southern Syria.[xxvi] Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani strongly condemned the Israeli strikes, describing them as part of a “campaign waged by Israel against the Syrian people and stability of the country.”[xxvii] Shaibani called on the United Nations to stop Israel’s actions and enforce the 1974 disengagement agreement.[xxviii]

An anti-Israel militia, the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria-the First of the Brave, acknowledged that the Israeli airstrikes targeted one of its positions in Daraa Province.[xxix] The group said that the strike killed one of its fighters and injured two others.[xxx]

The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel.[xxxi] The Houthis’ refusal to “dial down” tensions with the United States and Israel, despite Iran’s reported call for calm, demonstrates how the Houthis are aligned with Iran but do not answer directly to Iran.[xxxii] The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17.[xxxiii] The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel. The Houthis claimed that the attack was in response to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[xxxiv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[xxxv] Iranian officials may be trying to distance Iran from Houthi attacks against international shipping and Israel to try to prevent the United States from retaliating against Iran for Houthi attacks.[xxxvi]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in western Yemen on March 17.[xxxvii] US Joint Staff Operations Director Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich stated that the United States will continue to conduct airstrikes “in the coming days until we achieve [President Donald Trump’s] objectives.”[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Insurgency in Syria: Recent tit-for-tat sectarian killings and local support for pro-Assad insurgent cells will likely hamper Syrian interim government efforts to promote security and community reconciliation in coastal Syria. Revenge killings and kidnappings have continued to take place in coastal provinces over the past week even as coordinated insurgent attacks and extrajudicial sectarian killings by interim government forces have decreased. Tit-for-tat sectarian killings increase fear and feelings of insecurity among members of targeted communities. This fear makes it less likely that community members will disarm or turn in insurgent leaders because they do not have guarantees from the interim government that government forces will prevent future attacks on the community.
• IDF in Syria: The IDF Air Force conducted over 30 airstrikes on March 17 targeting former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria that unspecified actors sought to repurpose. The IDF was likely referring to Syrian interim government forces’ attempts to repurpose former SAA positions in southern Syria as part of the interim government’s efforts to rebuild the Syrian army in the south.
• Houthi Attacks: The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel. The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17. The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel.

Iran Update, March 17, 2025

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Houthi leaders and infrastructure in Yemen since March 15.[i] The strikes are in response to the Houthi attack campaign on international shipping, which the Houthis launched in October 2023 in support of Hamas.[ii] The Houthis have conducted 174 attacks targeting US military vessels and 145 attacks targeting commercial vessels since October 2023.[iii] CENTCOM reportedly conducted around 50 strikes across 9 Yemeni provinces, according to Yemeni journalists.[iv] The recent US strikes differ from previous US strikes against the Houthis under former President Joe Biden given that the recent strikes directly targeted Houthi leadership. US National Security Adviser Michael Waltz stated that the strikes killed “multiple” Houthi leaders.[v] The strikes killed senior Houthi leader Hassan Sharaf al Din and Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s bodyguard, according to Yemeni sources.[vi]

The strikes also targeted Houthi missile launchers, radars, air defense systems, and drone launch points.[vii] The Houthis use radars to target vessels.[viii] CENTCOM previously destroyed seven Houthi radars in June 2024 after the Houthis sunk a Greek-owned vessel.[ix]

The Houthis will likely respond by increasing their rate of attacks targeting US naval and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea stated on March 16 that the Houthis will respond “to escalation with escalation.”[x] The Houthis claimed on March 16 that they conducted two missile and drone attacks targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea in response to the US strikes.[xi] An unspecified US official told ABC News that “none of [the missiles and drones] came close” to hitting the USS Harry S. Truman.[xii] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times on March 15 that CENTCOM could continue to conduct strikes for several weeks and "intensify” the scope and scale of the strikes depending on the Houthis’ response.[xiii]

Senior Iranian military officials have tried to distance Iran from the Houthi attack campaign against international shipping in the aftermath of the US strikes. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on March 16 that Iran does not determine the “national or operational policies” of its proxies.[xiv] Iran has provided the Houthis with intelligence to identify Israeli-owned vessels in the Red Sea and has helped the Houthis develop their drone and missile stockpiles in recent years.[xv] US President Donald Trump stated on March 17 that the United States will hold Iran responsible for any future Houthi attacks.[xvi]

Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on March 8 that Western powers are trying to use nuclear negotiations to “set new expectations” for Iran’s missile range.[xvii] Khamenei emphasized that Iran "will not accept or comply" with such demands. Senior Advisor to the Armed Forces General Staff Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari echoed Khamenei's remarks and stated on March 15 that Iran "will definitely not accept" new “expectations” for the ranges of its missiles.[xviii] Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi previously stated in November 2024 that Iran may increase its missile range.[xix] Iran's explicit unwillingness to limit its missile program suggests that Iranian leadership perceives that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s primary deterrent against US and Israeli threats. This is particularly true after IDF airstrikes on Iran in October 2024 disrupted Iran‘s ability to produce solid-propellant ballistic missiles and neutralized Iran’s most advanced air defense assets.[xx] Iranian leaders likely recognize that Iran is increasingly vulnerable and may prioritize their missile program to establish deterrence against US and Israeli threats. Iran unveiled their latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad" in February 2025.[xxi] The missile has a range of 1,700 kilometers. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on March 16 on the “Etemad” missile, referring to it as the "Israeli ballistic missile” that can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[xxii] Iranian media is emphasizing that the “Etemad“ missile can hit Israeli cities likely to try to shape Israeli decision-making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Likely Hezbollah-linked Lebanese smugglers engaged Syrian forces on March 16 near Qusayr, on the Syria-Lebanon border. The smugglers kidnapped and killed three Syrian soldiers.[xxiii] Hezbollah ”categorically denied” any involvement in the clashes on the Syria-Lebanon border, but the smugglers in the Qusayr area almost certainly cooperate with Hezbollah given that the Qusayr area is part of a long-time supply corridor from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria.[xxiv] Likely Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers previously clashed with Syrian border security forces during a counter-smuggling operation near Qusayr in February 2025.[xxv] Iran almost certainly seeks to re-establish its overland smuggling network through Syria and rebuild its influence in the territory by promoting insurgent movements.

Pro-Assad insurgent elements are likely coordinating with the Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling network along the border. The Syrian Popular Resistance, a pro-Assad insurgent group operating in Syria, conducted attacks in January 2025 in western Homs Province near the Lebanon-Syria border related to smuggling networks.[xxvi] These attacks occurred during fighting between the Syrian government and Lebanese fighters. The Syrian Popular Resistance also announced its support on March 16 for what it said were “Lebanese tribes” engaged in clashes with Syrian forces.[xxvii] The overlapping activity in the border area suggests a degree of cooperation at a minimum between the Hezbollah-linked smugglers and the pro-Assad Alawite insurgent fighters.[xxviii] Interim government crackdowns on these smuggling networks could exacerbate grievances in coastal Syria by removing income sources for some community members. Successful counter-smuggling and counterinsurgent operations against smugglers and pro-Assad insurgents will remain critical to preventing Iran from expanding a foothold in Syria, however.

Prolonged clashes on the northeastern Lebanese border may inhibit the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) ability to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution in southern Lebanon. The LAF deployed to the Lebanese side of the border and “responded to sources of fire” after Syrian forces shelled Lebanese border villages on March 17.[xxix] The LAF could experience bandwidth constraints should it have to engage in multiple areas of Lebanon as Hezbollah is attempting to reconstitute its military capabilities in southern Lebanon.[xxx]

Diverse Syrian groups rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.  Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri condemned the new constitution on March 15, calling it “illogical.”[xxxi] Hijri has been at odds with other Druze leaders in recent weeks over the integration of Suwayda into the Syrian interim government.[xxxii] Suwaydawi lawyers also criticized the new constitution for its lack of safeguards against Shara’s pursuit of authoritarian policies.[xxxiii] CTP-ISW noted on March 13 that Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his personal power over the Syrian state.[xxxiv] Druze and Suwaydawi views of the constitution could impact ongoing governance and military integration agreements. Prominent Druze militias, including the Men of Dignity Movement, Mudafa al Karama, and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, agreed with the interim Syrian Interior Ministry on March 6 to establish locally led provincial security forces under interim Syrian government control.[xxxv] Kurdish groups similarly continued to condemn the new constitution after the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) rejected the constitution on March 13 and 14 for obstructing a democratic transition and prioritizing Arab identity.[xxxvi] Hardline Islamist and jihadist factions also denounced the new constitution and argued that key clauses were “un-Islamic.”[xxxvii] It is unclear at this time if these factions are part of Shara’s original support base. Some hardline jihadist factions have likely formed splinter groups in opposition to the interim government in response to Shara’s moderate policies.[xxxviii]

A new Iraqi group called the “Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces” announced on March 15 that it would protect Iraq and its religious beliefs.[xxxix] The group called on Iraqis and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) members to join.[xl] It claimed on March 17 that 40,000 people have submitted membership applications.[xli] Iraqi media reported that the group’s leader, Karar Fatah al Subihawi, has previously attended PMF events and was connected to the former leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Jaysh al Mukhtar, Wathiq al Battat.[xlii] Battat was a senior official in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah before he formed Jaysh al Mukhtar in 2013.[xliii] Subihawi reportedly remained in Damascus, Syria, after the collapse of the Assad regime to “liberate” the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine from the Syrian interim government.[xliv] Subihawi’s return to Iraq and the formation of the Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces may reflect concerns among some hardline pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians and militia figures about the Syrian interim government. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political figures see the Syrian interim government and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists.”[xlv] This new group could seek to directly stoke sectarian tensions in Iraq. The newly formed Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 11 that it has begun to pursue Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) members and supporters in Baghdad.[xlvi] CTP-ISW assessed on March 12 that the risk of sectarian violence from Syria spilling into Iraq is increasing due, in part, to the Ya Ali Popular Formations.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Houthi leaders and infrastructure in Yemen since March 15. The recent US strikes differ from previous US strikes against the Houthis under former President Joe Biden given that the recent strikes directly targeted Houthi leadership. The strikes reportedly killed at least one senior Houthi official and the head of security for Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.
• Iranian Negotiations: Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran.
• Syrian Insurgency and Smuggling: Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Pro-Assad insurgent elements are likely coordinating with the Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling network along the border.
• Syrian Constitution: Kurdish and Suwaydawi Syrian groups rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.
• Iraqi Militias: A new Iraqi group called the “Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces” announced on March 15 that it would protect Iraq and its religious beliefs.

Iran Update, March 14, 2025

Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement on March 14 effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[i] The statement came from a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.[ii] The statement called on “relevant parties”—a reference to the United States—to “lift all illegal unilateral sanctions” on Iran. The statement described Iranian nuclear activities as “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” despite numerous indications that Tehran has restarted its nuclear weapons program.[iii] Iran currently has enough high-enriched uranium to build six nuclear weapons, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[iv] The statement also emphasized the parties’ commitment to strengthening their cooperation through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran wants to use these institutions to undermine US sanctions and build a parallel economic order to the US-led one.

The Iran-China-Russia statement underscores that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran. Western media reported that the Kremlin has offered to mediate in recent days.[v] CTP-ISW has assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests via such mediation, especially in negotiations focused on Iranian nuclear activities and the Axis of Resistance.[vi]

The Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.[vii] The SDC is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The AANES similarly stated on March 13 that the constitution was too like the Bashar al Assad regime’s constitution and noted that the focus on Arab identity is a “de-facto falsification of Syria’s national and societal identity.”[viii] The SDC claimed that the constitution “grants the executive authority absolute powers, while restricting political activity” and obstructs democratic transition.[ix] CTP-ISW noted on March 13 that Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his personal power over the Syrian state.[x] The SDC view of the constitution could impact the political and military integration efforts between AANES and Damascus that began on March 10, but it is unclear what exact effects it will have at this time.[xi] The SDC condemned the constitution drafting process when National Dialogue Conference sessions were not held in AANES territory before committing to integration efforts.[xii] Civilians in SDF-controlled Hasakah shared the SDC sentiment and demonstrated against the new constitution on March 14.[xiii]

Assadist insurgents ambushed an interim government patrol securing fuel trucks between Baniyas and Latakia on March 12.[xiv] The Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR) claimed the attack and stated that government forces did not detain the fighters responsible.[xv] Local media contrastingly reported that government forces did detain someone.[xvi] The SPR has little incentive to lie about the detention of its fighters, as the repeated publication of clearly false information risks discrediting the group among its target communities. Acquiring the intelligence necessary to consistently detain insurgents—rather than innocent bystanders—very often plagues counter-insurgency operations, moreover. Arresting the wrong person could spur additional grievances and mistrust of the interim government in these coastal communities. Attacks on fuel transports in this area could have wide-reaching effects if conducted at a larger scale, as the Baniyas port is critical for energy shipments into Syria. Continuing attacks targeting energy infrastructure could worsen the economy and living conditions outside of coastal Syria, where the Assadist insurgency is currently centered. Insurgent leaders may calculate that deteriorating economic conditions will weaken popular support for the interim government and generate momentum for the Assadist movement. Interim government forces collected small arms in negotiated settlements with locals around Baniyas on March 14, suggesting that wrongful arrests have not deterred some communities from collaboration with security officials.[xvii]

Interim government forces responded to several fires in insurgent attack zones in Latakia Province on March 13.[xviii] It is unclear at this time whether the fires near both Sunni and Alawite communities were intentionally set or by whom. Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah set forest fires that it claimed endangered Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on March 5 before major insurgent violence began in coastal Syria.[xix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements that warned it would attack Alawites for crimes committed under Assad and that the group would continue its attacks until the Alawites and Shia were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[xx] These forest fires exhaust limited government resources and could exacerbate disorder in an already tense environment.

Assadist insurgents likely exploited Latakia Province’s mountainous geography to delay the interim government’s response to major insurgent attacks on March 5-7. Insurgent cells attacked Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces, leading government forces to deploy to re-impose security over the coastal region in early March.[xxi] The interim government response resulted in sectarian violence and extrajudicial killings in some instances. Insurgents chose a choke point on an east to west highway from which interim government forces could access insurgent attack zones on the coast.[xxii] The fighters fired at vehicles passing the area, blocking the road with disabled cars and discouraging anyone from trying to pass.[xxiii] Insurgents will likely reuse this road-blocking tactic to isolate areas where they are conducting attacks. The terrain in these areas is such that any road-bound force will be canalized by the terrain and roadways and thus easily ambushed from the high ground surrounding the roads.[xxiv] This method highlights the tactical proficiency of this insurgency of former Assad regime officers and soldiers.[xxv]

Russia is using both diplomatic and economic incentives to gain favor with the interim Syrian government likely to retain its military basing rights in Syria. Russia and the interim government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria without conclusion.[xxvi] Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara told Reuters on March 11 that he aims to ”preserve. . . deep strategic relations” with Russia, suggesting that Russian officials still have room to influence Shara’s decision making, especially through incentives.[xxvii] Russia has avoided publicly condemning Damascus for its response to insurgent activity on Syria’s coasts, which led to mass extrajudicial killings, but reportedly strongly denounced the new Syrian administration in a closed-door UN briefing on March 10.[xxviii] Russian envoy Vassily Nebenzia compared the partially government-perpetrated sectarian violence to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[xxix] Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on March 13 that Moscow has faith “that the current authorities in Damascus recognize their responsibility to protect the legitimate rights of citizens in Syria, regardless of their religious affiliations.” Zakharova's statement is far from accusing Damascus of perpetrating a genocide, further suggesting that Moscow is tempering its public condemnation of the Shara government, which may be part of a larger effort to maintain good working relations with the interim government and to secure a deal for the bases.[xxx]

Russia has also established some economic cooperation with Syria since February. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[xxxi] A tanker sanctioned for transporting Russian oil also arrived at the Baniyas Port on March 6.[xxxii] Russian fuel could alleviate the energy shortages that the interim government is facing. Syria also sources fuel through other avenues, such as Qatar and the SDF, which present adequate alternatives to Russian fuel, possibly making Russian economic leverage less effective in this context.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran. The statement reaffirms that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran.
• Syria: The Kurdish-majority SDC rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara approved. It is unclear what effect this rejection will have on ongoing efforts to integrate the SDF into the interim Syrian government armed forces.
• Syria: Russia is using diplomatic and economic incentives to develop and maintain a working relationship with the interim Syrian government likely in order to maintain Russian military basing there.

Iran Update, March 13, 2025

The Houthis have sought to obtain hydrogen fuel cells from unspecified Chinese suppliers to increase the range and payloads of their drones, according to a November 2024 Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigation.[i] CAR reported that the Yemeni National Resistance Forces seized hydrogen cylinders bound for the Houthis in August 2024 that the Houthis intended to use for drone production.[ii] CAR reported that the range of hydrogen-powered drones is at least three times greater than other drones. The Houthis conducted frequent drone attacks against Israel during the October 7 War and could use hydrogen-powered drones to attack Israel, commercial shipping, and US interests in the region. The Houthis announced on March 11 the resumption of their attack campaign on international shipping.[iii]

Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara signed a draft constitution on March 13 that initiates a five-year transition period.[iv] The Constitutional Committee emphasized that the document ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.[v] The document is based on Islamic jurisprudence but protects religious freedoms.[vi] The constitution also grants Syrian women rights to education, employment, and political participation.[vii] The constitution enshrines the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press.[viii] The constitution reflects the topics that Syrians discussed at the National Dialogue Conference in late February 2025, including transitional justice, personal liberties, the role of civil society, and economic principles.[ix] The principles enshrined in the constitution are encouraging and may alleviate Western concerns that Shara’s Salafi-jihadi roots will negatively impact ethnic, gender, and religious protections.

Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state. Shara will appoint a third of the Syrian legislature, called the People’s Assembly. Shara could appoint individuals who are loyal to him and reluctant to hold him accountable.[x] Shara will also select the committee that will appoint the other two-thirds of the legislature, giving him further influence over the body’s composition.[xi] Shara will appoint all seven members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, which gives him influence over how the court interprets the law.[xii] The constitution grants Shara the right to declare a state of emergency with the approval of the National Security Council for a maximum period of three months.[xiii]  The newly-formed National Security Council is comprised of Shara loyalists, including Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, Interior Minister Ali Keddah, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Intelligence Director Anas Khattab.[xiv] It is unclear under what conditions Shara could declare a state of emergency and what special authorities he would assume during a state of emergency.

Key Takeaways:

• Houthi Military Capabilities: The Houthis have sought to obtain hydrogen fuel cells from unspecified Chinese suppliers to increase the range and payloads of their drones, according to a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigation. CAR reported that the range of hydrogen-powered drones is at least three times greater than other drones. The Houthis conducted frequent drone attacks against Israel during the October 7 War and could use hydrogen-powered drones to attack Israel, commercial shipping, and US interests in the region.
• Syrian Constitution: Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara signed a draft constitution on March 13 that initiates a five-year transition period. The Constitutional Committee emphasized that the document ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The constitution enshrines the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press. Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state, however.

Iran Update, March 12, 2025

The risk of sectarian violence from Syria spilling into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Shia group called the Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 11 that it has begun to pursue Jabhat al Nusra members and supporters around Baghdad.[i] The group is likely referring to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) members and supporters, given that Jabhat al Nusra was the predecessor group to HTS. The group then posted a video purportedly of masked individuals physically threatening Syrian nationals in a bakery in Baghdad.[ii] The group expressed hope that others would emulate these actions throughout Iraq.[iii] This comes after the group stated on March 9 that it would “pursue” and “expel” Syrians who support “[HTS] terrorism against the Alawite people and minorities.”[iv] Social media accounts claimed that the group is affiliated with either the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[v] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims at the time of this writing. It is not clear exactly what end state the Ya Ali Popular Formations seeks to generate based on its statements thus far. The group may, in fact, seek to stoke sectarian conflict directly.

The Ya Ali Popular Formations’ activity comes at a particularly tense moment in the Iraqi political scene. Sunni parties have tried to relitigate their position in the Iraqi political order in recent weeks, specifically calling for the implementation of long-held political demands. Prominent Shia leaders, including former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, have responded harshly, using sectarian rhetoric and conflating Sunni parties with extremist groups.[vi] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.[vii] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, similarly compared some Sunni actors to the Islamic State after these actors criticized the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court for blocking certain legislation.[viii] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 4.[ix] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[x] Several notable Sunnis, including former Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi protested the Federal Supreme Court’s initial decision.[xi]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda on March 11.[xii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xiii] The PMF Service and Retirement Law would reportedly require around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, to retire due to their age.[xiv] Sudani likely withdrew the law from the parliamentary agenda because he opposes Fayyadh’s removal and seeks to prevent political deadlock.[xv] Parliament has failed to convene in recent weeks because some Iranian-aligned parties have boycotted Parliament over the PMF Service and Retirement Law.[xvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s (AAH) Sadiqoun Bloc and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition announced in February 2025 that they would boycott Parliament until the law is included on the parliamentary agenda, for example.[xvii] AAH and Maliki both seek to remove Fayyadh.

Iraqi media reported that the Iraqi federal government seeks to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law with a law that would restructure the PMF.[xviii] It is unclear who or what group in the Iraqi federal government is leading the effort to restructure the PMF. Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the PMF restructuring law would “confirm” former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s 2019 decree that required the PMF to integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.[xix] The 2019 decree declared that “all Popular Mobilization Forces are to operate as an indivisible part of the armed forces and be subject to the same regulations.”[xx] The efforts to restructure the PMF come as the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxi] The Iraqi federal government may calculate that it could prevent US sanctions if it takes meaningful steps toward integrating the PMF into the Iraqi security establishment. These efforts have thus far proven fruitless, however, as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that control units in the PMF have “complete[ly] refused” to disarm and integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.[xxii]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri expressed support for the PMF restructuring law and allowing Sudani to extend Fayyadh’s term as PMC chairman during an interview on March 11.[xxiii] Ameri’s support for the PMF restructuring law and Fayyadh is notable given recent reports that Sudani may ally with Ameri, Fayyadh, and Iraqi Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmed al Asadi in the October 2025 parliamentary elections.[xxiv]

Unidentified actors conducted a drone strike targeting a Turkish base in Ninewa Province, Iraq, on March 12.[xxv] Iraqi media reported that Turkish forces intercepted the drone before it reached Zilkan base. This attack comes as Iran has appeared increasingly frustrated with Turkish influence in Syria and Turkish regional policy.[xxvi] Iranian state media circulated reports that Turkey interfered in Syrian affairs and condoned the killing of Alawites.[xxvii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically attacked Zilkan base and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[xxviii]

The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping.[xxix] This announcement highlights the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes. The Houthis announced that their forthcoming attacks will target Israeli vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli entities. The Houthis may attack US vessels as well, given the close relationship between the United States and Israel.

Houthi attacks on international shipping will continue to impose an economic toll on the United States and broader international community. Shipping costs around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden increased significantly after the Houthis began attacking vessels there in October 2023. These costs have yet to return to their pre-October 2023 levels, even though the Houthis have conducted no attacks since November 2024.[xxx] The resumption of Houthi attacks will likely raise shipping costs further, as transit around Yemen becomes riskier.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States on March 12, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.[xxxi] Khamenei accused the United States of trying to deceive and weaken Iran.[xxxii] Khamenei asserted that Iran cannot secure sanctions relief through talks in response to unspecified domestic calls for engagement with the United States. That Khamenei has reiterated this rejection of negotiations repeatedly in recent weeks may indicate that he is specifically responding to pro-negotiations elements in the regime. His comments come as senior UAE official Anwar Gargash delivered a message from US President Donald Trump to Iran on March 12.[xxxiii] The message called for negotiations, according to Trump.[xxxiv]

The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Victor Khrenin in Minsk on March 12.[xxxv] Nasir Zadeh lauded Tehran-Minsk cooperation against ”unilateralism” and signed a defense memorandum of understanding. This memorandum likely related to defense industrial cooperation, given that is one of the primary responsibilities of the Iranian defense ministry.[xxxvi] This visit follows other recent meetings between senior Iranian and Belarusian officials held multiple in late 2024.[xxxvii] These meetings come as Iran and Belarus signed a strategic cooperation agreement and Iran began working to build a military drone factory in Belarus in order to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The risk of sectarian violence spilling from Syria into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Iraqi Shia group called for attacks and harassment targeting HTS members and supporters.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda.
• Yemen: The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping, highlighting the threat that they pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.
• Iran: The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries.

Iran Update, March 11, 2025

The Syrian interim government has taken initial steps to prosecute individuals who committed crimes during recent insurgent activity in western Syria between March 6 and 10. Interim government forces arrested five individuals on March 11 for committing extrajudicial killings.[i] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara acknowledged accusations that interim government-affiliated forces committed extrajudicial killings and promised that the interim government would hold those who “exceeded the powers of the state” accountable during a speech on March 9.[ii] Interim government raids targeting former Assad regime members since December 2024 have fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[iii] The interim government will need to take concrete action and ensure a fair legal process, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, in order to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities. Prosecuting perpetrators of sectarian violence will enable the interim government to restore trust among Syrians, particularly Alawites, and could undercut any insurgent recruitment efforts.

Pro-Assad insurgent cells remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations. The commander of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade, Mikdad Fatiha, posted a video of himself traveling near Safita Dam, Tartus Province.[iv] Fatiha‘s ability to move relatively freely in Syrian coastal areas demonstrates that insurgents feel relatively safe moving around the countryside by road and do not fear government patrols or checkpoints. Checkpoints are commonly established on major roads and not on small roads and trails that local fighters may be aware of and can use to bypass checkpoints. Static checkpoints also do not destroy an insurgent force and usually fail to protect civilian populations.

Qardaha and its surrounding neighborhoods may be support zones for the pro-Assad insurgency. Interim government forces evacuated residents from Salata, Latakia Province, on March 11 following intense fighting between pro-Assad fighters and interim government forces in the area.[v] Salata is around two kilometers west of Qardaha, which is Bashar al Assad’s hometown and a former Assad regime stronghold.[vi] Former Assad regime members have conducted periodic attacks targeting interim government forces since at least January 2025.[vii] Qardaha residents demonstrated against interim government forces operating in Qardaha and called for their removal prior to the recent outbreak of violence between March 6 and 10, which suggests that the population may be sympathetic to pro-Assad insurgent cells and support their activity.[viii] Insurgents in Qardaha fled to nearby hills on March 7 after interim government forces began clearing operations in the area.[ix] Insurgents may draw away resources from the town and intimidate locals to prevent them from cooperating with security forces.

Iran likely seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government. Iranian media has accused the Syrian interim government of committing acts of sectarian violence. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed that the interim government has targeted innocent Alawite civilians with "no political affiliation," for example.[x] An outlet linked to the Islamic Propaganda Organization separately argued on March 8 that Kurdish, Druze, and Christian groups in Syria must coordinate to ensure the success of the "Alawite uprising." This statement may seek to encourage minority groups in Syria to band together to resist the interim government.[xi] The same outlet also claimed that the possibility of "disintegration and civil war in Syria is very high."[xii]  These reports focus on Syrian interim government crimes against Alawites but do not acknowledge that the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria has also included sectarian killings and other extrajudicial killings perpetrated by Alawite, Assadist insurgents.[xiii] Former Assad regime members initiated the violence on March 6 by attacking interim government forces in Latakia Province.[xiv]

Iran appears to be growing increasingly frustrated with Turkey’s influence in Syria and Turkish regional policy. Iranian media circulated reports that claimed that Turkey interfered in Syrian affairs and condoned the killing of Alawites. An outlet linked to the Islamic Propaganda Organization claimed that the Syrian interim government is a Turkish proxy.[xv] Iran views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic regional objectives. Iran and Turkey's opposing interests and policies in Syria and other parts of the region could increase fissures in the Iran-Turkey relationship.

The Syrian interim government began integrating militia members from Daraa Province into the interim Defense Ministry on March 11.[xvi] A Defense Ministry-affiliated committee registered Syrians from multiple towns in western Daraa and assigned the new soldiers military identification numbers.  The soldiers will join the 40th Division, which the government initially called the Southern Division. Colonel Banyan al Hariri will command the division.[xvii] Hariri defected from the Syrian Arab Army in 2011 as a warrant officer and later helped create Ahrar al Sham in Daraa Province before moving north in 2018 instead of reconciling with the regime.[xviii] The Syrian Defense Ministry promoted Hariri to the rank of colonel in December 2024 and recently assigned him to command a task force overseeing Daraa Province in southern Syria.[xix]

Details about the formation of this division suggest that the new Syrian Army may employ independent brigade combat teams rather than use a division-centric structure. A General Security member told local leaders on February 21 that the new division will consist of four brigades located in Izraa, Nawa, and Daraa City, Daraa Province, and Suwayda City, Suwayda Province.[xx] Each brigade will be “independent” with organic infantry, armor, administration, medical, reconnaissance, and “technical,” capabilities.[xxi] “Independent” presumably means that the brigades will be able to—in theory—operate independent of division-level headquarters and division-level assets. These independent brigades will be better suited to conduct small-scale tasks associated with counterinsurgent or low-intensity operations—either against ISIS, former regime supporters, or well-equipped smugglers—compared to large divisions.

Iranian-backed Shia political parties are hampering the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to prevent US sanctions on Iraq. Iraqi media reported on March 11 that there are “deep rivalries” in the Shia Coordination Framework over resistance by the Iranian-backed factions to the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to avoid US sanctions.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraqi media has reported in recent weeks that the United States plans to sanction Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors.[xxiii]  The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm and integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi military establishment.[xxiv] Some of these militias have refused to disarm and dissolve despite warnings from the Iraqi federal government about Israeli and US economic and military consequences if the militias fail to do so.[xxv] The economic consequences likely refer to sanctions Iranian-backed political parties’ unwillingness to work with the Iraqi federal government to avoid US sanctions highlights the control that Iranian-backed groups hold in Iraq.

Key Takeaways:

• Pro-Assad Insurgency: The Syrian interim government has taken initial steps to prosecute individuals who committed crimes during recent insurgent activity in western Syria between March 6 and 10. The interim government will need to take concrete action, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, in order to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities. Pro-Assad insurgent cells remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations.
• Iranian Response to Syrian Insurgency: Iran likely seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government. Iranian media has accused the Syrian interim government of committing acts of sectarian violence. These reports focus on Syrian interim government crimes against Alawites but do not acknowledge that the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria has also included sectarian killings and other extrajudicial killings perpetrated by Alawite, Assadist insurgents.
• Integration of Syrian Armed Groups: The Syrian interim government began integrating militia members from Daraa Province into the interim Defense Ministry on March 11. The militia members will join the 40th Division, which the government initially called the Southern Division. Details about the formation of this division suggest that the new Syrian Army may employ independent brigade combat teams rather than use a division-centric structure.
• Iraqi Political Fissures: Iranian-backed Shia political parties are hampering the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to prevent US sanctions on Iraq. The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm and integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi military establishment. Some of these militias have refused to disarm and dissolve despite warnings from the Iraqi federal government about Israeli and US economic and military consequences if the militias fail to do so.

Iran Update, March 10, 2025

Current Syrian interim government counterinsurgency operations are insufficient to defeat pro-Assad insurgent cells across Syria. Interim government forces launched major counterinsurgent operations in former regime strongholds between March 7 and 10.[i] These operations have coincided with a decrease in insurgent activity but insurgent cells have continued attacks on interim government forces while expanding attacks across Tartous Province.[ii] The decrease in rate of insurgent attacks during major counterinsurgent operations is more likely due to insurgents withdrawing from an area for the duration of the operation rather than a reflection of the operation’s success in destroying cells. There have been few engagements between insurgents and Syrian government forces during these large-scale counterinsurgent operations, suggesting that the insurgents are lying low and avoiding contact. Counterinsurgency operations require that security forces maintain their presence in an area to control it and prevent insurgents from reestablishing their connections with their support base.[iii] The interim government announced Syrian forces began to withdraw from western Syria after successfully pushing insurgents out of city centers.[iv] Interim government forces established approximately 150 checkpoints to prevent the movement of fighters. Checkpoints alone will not defeat the insurgency, because checkpoints are commonly placed on major thoroughfares and not the sorts of small roads and trails that are known to local fighters and can easily bypass checkpoints. Static checkpoints also do not destroy the insurgent force and usually fail to protect the population.[v]

The interim Syrian government has not addressed outstanding grievances within the Alawite community. Damascus will need to address these grievances to build the stability and confidence in government institutions necessary to defeat the insurgency. A unit within the interim government forces was removed from counterinsurgency operations over the weekend after committing extrajudicial killings but was not appropriately detained and reportedly proceeded to commit additional acts of violence against the civilian population.[vi] Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara gave a speech on March 9 in which he briefly acknowledged accusations of extrajudicial killings by HTS-led forces and promised that those who “exceeded the powers of the state” will be held accountable.[vii] Shara also appointed two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to a committee to investigate the crimes committed by government troops, which is a notable step towards ameliorating sectarian concerns.[viii] Government forces have arrested some of those responsible for extrajudicial killings.[ix] Interim government raids targeting former Assad regime members since December 2024 have fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[x] Failure to hold perpetrators of extrajudicial killings during the recent clearing operations accountable will exacerbate fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians.

The violence in coastal Syria has prompted calls for sectarian violence in Iraq. A new group called the Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 9 that it will “pursue” and “expel” Syrians in Iraq who support “al Jolani’s terrorism against the Alawite people and minorities.”[xi] The group accused the Iraqi federal government of supporting “crimes against humanity” and warned that it will “escalate” attacks if the Iraqi federal government does not confront the Syrian interim government. The Ya Ali Popular Formations has not claimed an attack at the time of this writing.

Iraqi security forces separately arrested two Syrian nationals in Baghdad on March 8 and 9 for promoting sectarianism. Security forces arrested a Syrian man in Um al Kuber wa al Gazlan neighborhood in northeastern Baghdad on March 8 for "promoting extremist content” online.[xii] An unspecified source told Iraqi media on March 10 that Iraqi authorities have “intensified efforts to monitor and dismantle” online networks that promote terrorism.[xiii] Security forces also arrested a Syrian man in Zafaraniya neighborhood in southeastern Baghdad on March 9 for “glorifying ISIS and inciting sectarianism” on social media.[xiv]

Some Iraqi Shia officials have accused the Syrian interim government and interim government-affiliated forces of fomenting violence and committing acts of sectarian cleansing against Alawites in Syria. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali accused groups “disguised as security forces” of executing members of the Alawite community.[xv] Khazali called on the international community and “active and inactive countries in the Syrian area” to intervene in the conflict and protect Alawite civilians. Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr separately accused the Syrian interim government of targeting Alawites ”with violent methods that may amount to sectarian cleansing.”[xvi] Sadr called on the Syrian interim government to preserve unity in Syria in order to prevent Israel from exploiting the situation to ”invade” Syria.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his rejection of negotiations with the United States. Khamenei rejected negotiations with Western powers during a speech to senior Iranian officials in Tehran on March 8.[xvii] Khamenei dismissed talks as a ”tool for imposing new restrictions” on Iran’s defense capabilities, missile range, and international partnerships. Khamenei framed Western insistence on negotiations as a ”pressure tactic” and emphasized that ”Iran will not accept any new demands.” Khamenei’s remarks come after US President Donald Trump sent a letter on March 5 proposing nuclear talks.[xviii] Khamenei’s remarks reinforced his speech on February 7, where he categorically rejected nuclear talks and called negotiations with the United States, “unwise, unintelligent, and dishonorable.”[xix] Senior Iranian military officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, have echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations since his speech on March 8.[xx]

Khamenei also addressed Iran’s economic challenges during his speech and tried to downplay the impact of sanctions.[xxi] Khamenei demanded currency system reforms, increased investment in domestic industries, and stronger action against smuggling to stabilize the economy. It is unlikely that any of these policies would outweigh the effects of US sanctions on the Iranian economy or solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues include corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the IRGC and parastatal organizations in the economy. Khamenei warned that Western powers aim to weaken Iran by targeting public livelihoods and claimed that Iran’s adversaries want to make Iran’s economy fail. Khamenei framed economic reforms as essential to resist Western pressure. Khamenei remarks reflected the regime’s concern over economic instability, rising inflation, national currency devaluation, and the impact of renewed US ”maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran.[xxii]

The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity as part of the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran.[xxiii] The removal of the waiver will likely threaten political stability in Iraq and damage Iran’s economy further. The waiver suspension bars Iraq from directly importing Iranian electricity, but Iraq can still import Iranian gas. The Iraqi state-owned gas company head told Reuters on March 10 that Iraq will sign a new gas import deal with Qatar and Oman at the end of March 2025 to mitigate the effects of a potential US decision to bar Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[xxiv] It is unclear whether Qatari and Omani gas exports to Iraq would be sufficient to compensate for the potential cessation of gas imports from Iran. Iranian electricity exports to Iraq comprised around four percent of Iraq’s total electricity consumption in 2023, whereas Iranian gas exports accounted for over 30 percent of Iraq’s total gas consumption.[xxv]  

An energy shortage could threaten Iraqi political stability by triggering power outages amid summer heat waves, which could trigger major anti-government protests ahead of Iraq’s October 2025 parliamentary elections. Summer power cuts have caused major anti-government demonstrations in Iraq in the past.[xxvi] Temperatures in Baghdad can reach as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer. Public frustration about electricity outages could influence the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025 because Iraqi citizens could blame incumbent politicians for the energy shortage, which could advantage independents or help Moqtada al Sadr‘s Sadrist Movement. The Sadrist Movement is currently not active in national-level parliamentary politics. US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz assured Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani on March 9 that the United States will collaborate closely with Iraq to minimize any effects the waiver has on Iraqi stability, while stressing that this strategy is designed to isolate Iran.[xxvii] The United States has historically issued sanctions waivers for Iranian electricity exports to Iraq.

The suspension of the waiver will likely further damage the Iranian economy. Iraq has been Iran’s second-largest destination for non-oil exports, which have amounted to 11.2 billion USD since last March, according to recent Iranian media reports.[xxviii] The top three non-oil Iranian exports are three different forms of gas. The suspension of the electricity waiver is another measure the United States has taken in its “maximum pressure” campaign, which aims to reduce Iran’s energy exports to zero in an effort to force Iran into negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear program.[xxix] The United States has already considered implementing an accord that would allow the United States to ask other nations to inspect Iranian oil tankers, in addition to sanctioning individuals, entities, and vessels facilitating Iranian oil trade.[xxx]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian interim government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10.[xxxi] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed a seven-point document outlining principles of understanding between the two leaders.[xxxii] The ceasefire is notable given that the SDF and factions affiliated with the interim government have ostensibly fought each other in northern Syria since December 2024.[xxxiii] The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which was brought under the command of the interim defense ministry in January 2025, has launched daily attacks targeting the SDF along the Euphrates River with Turkish air support.[xxxiv] The interim government has not deployed its official miliary formations to lines of contact with the SDF, but Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra warned in January that the Syrian interim government was “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces.[xxxv]

The March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF’s military and civil organizations will integrate into the Syrian state, but it is unclear how the integration will occur in practice. The agreement’s text provides few details on the method of integration beyond that it will bring “all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state.”[xxxvi] Damascus had requested in January 2025 that the SDF disintegrate its forces and have its fighters join the Interim Defense Ministry as individuals, not as a military bloc under previous SDF command structures.[xxxvii] SDF commander Abdi refused this demand when it was first presented.[xxxviii] Abdi also refused pressure to integrate into the Interim Defense Ministry after Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call to disarm in late February 2025.[xxxix] Ocalan’s call could have influenced Abdi’s decision to sign this agreement, though Abdi had previously said he would not sign an agreement on integration without a ceasefire.

The emerging insurgency in coastal Syria likely influenced the terms that Shara and the SDF were willing to compromise on, leading to a deal. It remains unclear at this time which party conceded their previously held position regarding terms of military integration. Unrest in Latakia and Tartous provinces has drastically decreased the interim government’s bandwidth, however. An interim government deployment to the contact lines with the SDF would require a large number of combat-experienced, well-disciplined forces, which are the exact sort of forces required to conduct counterinsurgency operations against Assadists in western Syria. The SDF agreed to support Damascus in “its fight against the remnants of Assad” and other threats to Syrian security on March 10, suggesting that SDF forces could help alleviate bandwidth concerns by countering former Assadists in Sunni Arab areas along the Euphrates River.[xl]

The insurgency and harsh counter-insurgent reprisals from interim government forces likely strengthened SDF leaders’ conviction that the organization must retain some force capable of defending the Kurdish population from ethno-sectarian violence, however.[xli] The Syrian interim government had not previously provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The Abdi-Shara agreement recognized Kurdish rights to Syrian citizenship and ensured the return and protection of all displaced Syrians to their villages, likely in an effort to assuage these Kurdish concerns.[xlii]

Damascus will take over key physical sites currently controlled by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria under the agreement.  The SDF gave the interim government control over all border crossings, airports, and petroleum resources in northeastern Syria.[xliii] Regional media reported that the interim government would also take over the administration of currently SDF-controlled detention facilities holding 10,000 ISIS fighters and displaced persons camps holding around 46,000 ISIS supporters and refugees in northeastern Syria.[xliv] Neither the SDF nor Damascus have confirmed this report.   The interim government’s control over the camps will not solve the repatriation and deradicalization issues, however. Damascus will probably have similar—if not more—difficulty repatriating the fighters and camp residents because it has less leverage than the United States and many countries around the world have little incentive to repatriate their nationals who joined or supported ISIS.

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on March 9 that Lebanese government efforts to establish a state monopoly on violence do not apply to Hezbollah.[xlv] Qassem stated that he did not believe Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s recent statements that called on the government to establish a state monopoly over weapons are directed at Hezbollah.[xlvi] Qassem argued that Hezbollah serves as a ”necessary” deterrent against Israeli attacks into Lebanon, which is a long-running Hezbollah claim to justify its existence as a non-state militia in Lebanon.[xlvii] Qassem said that the Lebanese government should pursue reconstruction efforts in southern Lebanon without the conditions that ”some are talking about.” Qassem is likely referring to Lebanese parliamentarians who recently emphasized that international reconstruction aid is contingent on Hezbollah demilitarization.[xlviii] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah will allow the Lebanese state to pursue diplomatic solutions with Israel as long as it does not “make us lose Lebanon.” This position on diplomatic solutions with Israel is likely deliberately vague to enable Hezbollah to justify military action against Israel if Hezbollah feels military action is necessary, with or without the acquiescence of the Lebanese state. Qassem admitted that the Israel-Lebanon war weakened Hezbollah.

Key Takeaways:

• Pro-Assad Insurgency: Current Syrian interim government counterinsurgency operations are insufficient to defeat pro-Assad insurgent cells across Syria. The decrease in rate of insurgent attacks during major counterinsurgent operations is more likely due to insurgents withdrawing from an area for the duration of the operation rather than a reflection of the operation’s success in destroying cells.
• Syrian Government Response to Insurgency: The interim Syrian government has not addressed outstanding grievances within the Alawite community. Damascus will need to address these grievances to build the stability and confidence in government institutions necessary to defeat the insurgency. The government did appoint two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to investigate crimes in the coastal areas. It has also arrested some of those responsible for extrajudicial killings.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his rejection of negotiations with the United States. Khamenei also addressed Iran’s economic challenges during his speech and tried to downplay the impact of sanctions. It is unlikely that new Iranian policies would outweigh the effects of US sanctions on the Iranian economy or solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy.
• Energy Waivers in Iraq: The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity as part of the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran. The removal of the waiver will likely threaten political stability in Iraq and damage Iran’s economy further.
• Damascus-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Agreement: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian interim government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10. The March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF’s military and civil organizations will integrate into the Syrian state, but it is unclear how the integration will occur in practice.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on March 9 that Lebanese government efforts to establish a state monopoly on violence do not apply to Hezbollah. Qassem argued that Hezbollah serves as a ”necessary” deterrent against Israeli attacks into Lebanon, which is a long-running Hezbollah claim to justify its own existence as a non-state militia in Lebanon.

Iran Update, March 7, 2025

Insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region.[i] Syrian government reinforcements deployed across to Tartous and Latakia on March 6 in response to coordinated attacks by Assadist insurgents on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Latakia Province.[ii] Clashes between Syrian government forces and insurgents spread overnight to other parts of Latakia and Tartous provinces.[iii] The Syrian government deployed armored units, helicopters, and drone units to locate and target insurgents in the area.[iv] Insurgents attempted to take control of hospitals across the coastal region and continued to attack security personnel as government forces advanced into coastal cities.[v] The Syrian government deployed armor, helicopters, and drone units to locate and target insurgents in the area.[vi] Syrian government forces have killed or captured over 150 pro-Assad insurgents captured since March 6.[vii]     

The heaviest bouts of fighting between insurgent cells and government forces took place in Jableh, south of Latakia City, where insurgent cells launched coordinated attacks on March 6.[viii] Insurgents attacked security forces as government forces advanced north on the coastal highway towards Jableh and targeted security forces with mortars and small arms within the city.[ix] Security forces prevented pro-Assad insurgents from besieging a hospital on the Jableh outskirts and re-secured the Naval College in Jableh after several hours of clashes.[x]  It does not appear that government forces have fully re-secured the city, however. Likely insurgents continued to conduct attacks in the city, including an attack that sabotaged a high voltage line that caused a power outage in Latakia Province.[xi]

Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. Syrian government forces have secured most of the region’s larger towns but still have not fully eliminated insurgent cells in Tartous and Latakia’s Alawite-majority mountainous countryside.[xii]  Insurgents also do not wear uniforms and can quickly blend back into the population when they come under pressure from security forces, making them very difficult to defeat in one clearing operation.[xiii] Security forces advanced into some towns in the Latakia countryside and engaged insurgents, including Qardaha—Assad’s hometown—in order to free dozens of security personnel that insurgents had taken hostage.[xiv] Security personnel expanded the campaign to pursue insurgents into the southern Hama countryside, suggesting that these insurgent cells have a presence outside of coastal heartland or that insurgents have fled the area.[xv]

Government control over most populated areas will not necessarily prevent insurgents from returning, however. That cells of pro-Assad fighters were able to organize amongst themselves and respond quickly to the initial clashes in Jableh suggests that anti-government sentiment is relatively strong. Hardcore Assadists have been able to successfully exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. A Syrian near Beit Ana in Latakia said that many young men volunteered to shoot at government personnel after an unknown individual provided them with rifles.[xvi] Insurgencies against the interim government will likely continue to emerge in these areas until the government addresses the root causes of the Alawite community’s feelings of disenfranchisement and secures the population against abuses from incompetent government security forces.

It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells, however. Syrian government forces captured several well-known Assad-era commanders, including Assad’s former head of Air Force Intelligence Ibrahim Huwaija, but there is no clear evidence that they were involved in the inception or planning of coordinated attacks.[xvii] Several organized insurgent groups have also been tied to the current clashes, including Assadist groups like the Syrian Popular Resistance, ex-Republican Guard commander Muqdad Fataha’s Shield of the Coast Brigade, and ex-Fourth Division member Ghiath Dalah’s recently-announced Military Council for the Liberation of Syria.[xviii] Dalah called for restraint from his followers in a statement on March 7, condemning instances of sectarian-motivated violence and stating that he seeks to negotiate with the government.[xix] It does not appear that Dalah or any other former regime elements fully control the coastal insurgents, despite his call to his followers. Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids and searches for former Assad regime members in former regime strongholds since coming to power in December 2024. It is unlikely that a single large, organized, unified insurgent organization has been able to form and coordinate the majority of the targeted attacks against government forces on March 6.  

The Syrian Popular Resistance, a pro-Assad group, claimed numerous attacks targeting government forces in the coastal region.[xx] The Syrian Popular Resistance claimed it engaged government forces in several towns and villages along the coast, including along the M4 highway north of Latakia.[xxi] Footage posted on social media on March 7 confirmed heavy fighting between unknown insurgents and the government forces along the highway.[xxii]  The exact reach or strength of the Syrian Popular Resistance is unclear, but it does appear to be in communication with insurgents operating on the ground. The group claimed on March 7 that it had taken control of numerous villages in Jabal al Alawiyin and expanded the scope of its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside.[xxiii]

Military reinforcements, including newly formed Syrian army units, deployed to the coastal region from across Syria to support counterinsurgency efforts.[xxiv] Government reinforcements from Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs, Damascus, Deir ez Zor, and some southern provinces travelled to the coastal region on March 6.[xxv] These reinforcements included units from several new Syrian army divisions that deployed from their respective areas of responsibility, including forces from the 62nd Division based in Hama, 118th Division based in Palmyra, and unspecified forces from Deir ez Zor.[xxvi] The government has formed these divisions within the last two months.[xxvii] The counterinsurgency campaign along the coast is likely the first large-scale operation for many of these units. This is also the first time that multiple divisions are coordinating division-level operations, but it remains unclear how formalized these division structures are and if they are structured like conventional military forces.

The tensions on the coast also appear to have drawn in armed groups that may or may not have fully integrated into Syrian army units. Syrian media posted footage that showed a large convoy from the Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade travelling to the coast.[xxviii] The Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade is part of the Syrian National Army’s First Corps and has been involved in fighting against the SDF along Manbij frontlines in recent weeks.[xxix]  

Emerging reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities perpetrated by interim government forces increase the likelihood that insurgent cells will expand in size, geographic distribution, and Alawite support. Widely circulated videos show that likely interim government forces massacred about 30 individuals in Mukhtariya, Latakia Province.[xxx] Pro-Assad forces reportedly ambushed interim forces near the town on March 6, leading the interim government to deploy there and fight throughout the night.[xxxi] This incident and others occurring at a smaller scale across coastal Syria appear to be poorly executed counter-insurgency operations that transform into extrajudicial executions by HTS-affiliated forces in Alawite towns.[xxxii] These heavy-handed operations will further alienate and inspire fear in the coastal minority populations. The insurgents probably hope to trigger violent government reprisals to generate support for their insurgency. Alawite activists have reportedly warned that the attacks on interim government forces in Latakia Province on March 6 aimed to elicit a harsh response from the Syrian government.[xxxiii]  There is a climate of distrust between Alawites in the coastal regions and the government, with pro-government sources blaming Alawites for the executions, and Alawites considering the initial attacks on interim government forces to be ”false flag attacks.”[xxxiv]

Thousands of Syrians not associated with organized military structures have expressed their intent to fight against regime remnants in coastal areas.[xxxv] Sources in the Interior Ministry blamed violence and disorder on ”unorganized popular crowds [that] headed to the coast” and called attacks ”individual violations" that the government forces were working to stop.[xxxvi] These statements suggest that the Syrian government lacks command-and-control over some formations along the coast. A heavy-handed approach that fails to clearly distinguish between insurgents and civilians can be a feature of poor command and control within a military organization. Some Assad remnants have shed their fatigues and are reportedly mixing with the civilian population, which creates additional problems for the government forces as they attempt to identify and kill combatants.[xxxvii]  

Harsh counter-insurgency operations undermine government efforts to reestablish control over an area by exacerbating fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians or specific confessional or ethnic groups in particular. This fear can in turn drive popular support and recruitment for insurgent groups even beyond the group‘s initial power base and community.[xxxviii]  Such a dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked.

Syrians across most provinces demonstrated in support of the interim government’s operation against Assadist insurgents on March 7. Over 25 municipalities in nine provinces held demonstrations.[xxxix] Assadist insurgents reportedly opened fire on demonstrators in Homs on March 6.[xl] This substantial showing across Syria suggests that HTS retains popularity across broad swathes of the country.

US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.[xli]  Trump told reporters in Washington, DC, on March 7 that he would prefer to pursue a nuclear deal, but that ”the other option will solve the problem.”[xlii] Trump is presumably referring to a military strike targeting Iran‘s nuclear facilities.[xliii] Trump warned that ”something is going to happen very soon” regarding Iran.

Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump’s letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Western media on March 7 that Iran will not resume negotiations with the United States while the United States continues to impose its ”maximum pressure” policy.[xliv] Several Friday prayer leaders across Iran rejected negotiations with the United States in sermons on March 7.[xlv] Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader, which indicates that their comments are a coordinated messaging campaign.  Khamenei previously categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech on February 7.[xlvi] Khamenei may choose to negotiate with the United States indirectly through European, Russian, or Qatari intermediaries, for example. Khamenei is scheduled to meet with senior military officials and civil servants for Ramadan on March 8 where they will likely discuss the letter.[xlvii]

Iran’s refusal to negotiate with the United States will further deteriorate Iran’s economic situation, which could trigger internal unrest. Iran is facing dire economic conditions, with inflation reaching approximately 35 percent in February 2025 and the Iranian rial regularly reaching record-low exchange rates.[xlviii] Trump re-instituted ”maximum pressure“ sanctions, which target Iranian oil exports to discourage Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, on February 4.[xlix] The United States is also considering a plan under which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, which will help impose the “maximum pressure“ policy at sea.[l] Iranian officials are insisting that Iran should increase its ideologization efforts, such as countering alleged US-instituted soft war and psychological operations, rather than addressing economic concerns.[li] Increased maximum pressure sanctions, combined with ideologization efforts, could stoke unrest and lead to protests in Iran.

Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon.[lii] Iranian officials continue to suggest that Iran could change its nuclear strategy to address growing external security threats as Iran continues to increase its enriched uranium stockpile.[liii] It is unclear at this time whether the Supreme Leader has made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon or a nuclear deal. Khamenei’s decision will likely depend on whether Iran calculates that the greatest threat to regime survival is internal or external.

Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk."[liv] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi said on March 3 that Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[lv] Western media reported on March 4 that Russia offered to mediate talks between the United States and Iran.[lvi] Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.[lvii]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened on March 7 to resume attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea on March 7 if Israel does not restart aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip by March 11.[lviii] These attacks are aimed at disrupting trade to Israel in support of Hamas after October 7, 2023.[lix] The Houthis paused their attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in November 2024.[lx] The Houthis continued launching drone and missile attacks on US military vessels and Israeli territory until Israel and Hamas implemented the ceasefire on January 19, 2025.[lxi] The Houthis have regularly threatened to restart their campaign against Israel in the event the Houthis felt that Israel was not adhering to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire terms.[lxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Insurgency in Syria: Insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region. Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells.
• Sectarianism in Syria: Emerging reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities perpetrated by interim government forces increase the likelihood that insurgent cells will expand in size, geographic distribution, and Alawite support.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump’s letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead.
• Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program: Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk." Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.
• Houthis and the Red Sea: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened on March 7 to resume attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea on March 7 if Israel does not restart aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip by March 11.

Iran Update, March 6, 2025

Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members conducted coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province on March 6.[i] Interim government forces deployed to the area and cordoned off the area, presumably ahead of a clearing effort.[ii] Interim government forces suppressed fighters in Beit Ana and Daliyah but continue to engage former Assad regime members in the Latakia countryside at the time of this writing.[iii] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor this developing situation. Former Assad regime members have killed at least 13 Syrian soldiers on March 6.[iv] Former Assad regime loyalists have announced their intent to restore Assad’s rule in Syria. It is unlikely that all of the individuals who participated in the attacks on interim government forces joined in the fighting to topple the government and restore Assad, however.[v]

Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. Former Assad regime members already have the preexisting networks that they can leverage to rapidly organize insurgent cells. These networks are military, intelligence, and political networks and criminal syndicates who were regime supporters and lost significant economic and political influence in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. These networks could enable former Assad regime members to coordinate attacks across wider areas. This is particularly true in former regime stronghold areas in coastal Syria.

These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. Insurgent groups often attract supporters who hold a range of social, economic, and political grievances.[vi] Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids in former regime strongholds targeting former Assad regime members since coming to power in December 2024.[vii] These raids, while resulting in the arrest of many mid- to high-level Assad regime officials, have also fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[viii] Members of the Alawite community have expressed their belief that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised by Sunnis as part of a broader effort to marginalize the Alawite community.[ix] This is not true; all of Syria is economically devastated, but Alawites believe they are ”uniquely” experiencing economic issues nonetheless.[x] Former Assad regime members have reportedly used Alawite fears of attacks on the community to mobilize young men to take up arms.[xi] Interim government forces have also launched a campaign to interdict drug smuggling in western Syria, cutting off a once-steady revenue stream for some criminal syndicates and their beneficiaries.[xii] Insurgent groups can leverage these grievances against the interim government to increase their supporter base, and have already begun to do so.

Poorly executed counter-insurgency operations risk fueling a cycle of violence and increased local support for insurgent groups if not conducted carefully. Insurgent groups seek to exploit insecurity and abuses to establish themselves as the primary security guarantor in a community.[xiii] Insurgent groups conduct attacks on government security forces to elicit a strong response, which insurgent groups can then frame as government attacks on civilians.[xiv] Alawite activists have reportedly warned that the attacks on interim government forces in Latakia Province on March 6 aimed to elicit a harsh response from the Syrian government and thereby instigate an insurgency.[xv] Former Assad regime members attacked an ambulance that was attempting to evacuate Syrian soldiers from Jableh with the expectation that the interim government would respond to the attack with a large operation.[xvi] A heavy-handed approach that fails to clearly distinguish between insurgents and civilians undermines government efforts to reestablish control over an area by exacerbating fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians. This fear can in turn drive popular support for insurgent groups.[xvii]

Former senior Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Fourth Division officer Brigadier General Gaith Dalah announced the formation of a “military council to liberate Syria” on March 6.[xviii] Dalah announced that the group’s objectives include the “liberation” of Syrian territory from the “terrorist, jihadist organizations” that control it, in reference to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham-led Syrian interim government.[xix] The group also seeks to dismantle the Syrian interim government’s “deeply rooted sectarian structures.” Dalah is a former Fourth Division general.[xx] The United States designated Dalah as a specially designated national (SDN) in 2020 for his efforts to prevent a ceasefire in Syria.[xxi] It is unclear if Dalah actually established this military council or if the group is claiming him as their leader due to his reputation in the Assad regime. It is notable and likely not a coincidence that the group announced its formation on the same day that regime-affiliated clashes broke out in coastal Syria.

The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6.[xxii] Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf. The plan is part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal.[xxiii] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized on March 6 that the United States seeks to “shut down” Iran’s oil sector and drone manufacturing capabilities.[xxiv] Iran has developed several ways to evade US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers in Malaysia to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil shipments to China.[xxv] Under the plan that Reuters reported on March 6, the United States would ask allies to inspect Iranian tankers transiting chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait off the coast of Malaysia, to prevent illicit Iranian oil exports.[xxvi]  Iran has previously seized commercial tankers in response to Western seizures of Iranian tankers. Iran seized a tanker carrying Chevron oil in the Strait of Hormuz in April 2023 in response to the United States confiscating Iranian oil shipments, for example.[xxvii] This incident resulted in a steep increase in crude oil prices.[xxviii]

Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. A US-sanctioned, Barbados-flagged tanker arrived at the coast of Baniyas, Tartous Province, Syria, on March 6.[xxix] The United States sanctioned the vessel in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[xxx] Reuters reported that the vessel departed from the Russian port of Primorsk for Syria on February 8 carrying 37,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulphur diesel.[xxxi]  It is unclear whether the vessel has offloaded the diesel fuel at the time of this writing. The Syrian interim government has sought to obtain oil since Iran halted oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian government recently reached a deal with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in February 2025 to transport oil from SDF-controlled oil wells to government territory for refinement and use.[xxxii] Russian oil exports to Syria would suggest that Russia seeks to reestablish its economic relationship with Syria, possibly to gain favor with the interim government and try to secure military basing rights in Syria.

Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[xxxiii] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 5 that Syrian officials have sought to renegotiate the terms of several contracts that the Assad regime signed with Russia. These contracts cover Russian investments in phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert, a fertilizer plant in Homs, and the port of Tartous.[xxxiv] A security force would be needed to protect Russian assets at mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert given that ISIS regularly attacks facilities in this area. It is unclear whether the Syrian interim government would commit to protecting Russian assets or allow some Russian security presence at these sites. Russo-Syrian economic cooperation can take place without an agreement between the interim government and Russia about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia could try to use its economic support for Syria as leverage to secure a "reduced” military presence in Syria, however.

The US and Israeli air forces conducted a joint exercise on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and prepare for "a range of scenarios.”[xxxv] The drill involved Israeli F-15Is, F-35Is, and a US B-52 bomber.[xxxvi] The exercise comes after senior Iranian military commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel. These threats likely aim to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[xxxvii]

Prominent Druze militias and the Syrian government agreed to establish Suwaydawi-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province. The Men of Dignity Movement announced on March 6 that it and other prominent Druze groups, including Mudafa al Karama and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, reached an agreement with the interim Syrian Interior Ministry.[xxxviii] The Men of Dignity said that Suwaydawi-led security forces will oversee security and fight criminal activity and drug trafficking in Suwayda with logistical support from the Interior Ministry.[xxxix] The Interior Ministry sent eight police vehicles to Suwayda for the new security force to use and pledged to provide further support in the coming days.[xl]

The Druze militias and interim government agreed that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although it is unclear if Suwaydawis will have a majority presence in the units or if the units will only be comprised of Suwaydawis.[xli] The Syrian government has not reached a similar security arrangement with any other minority group in Syria. The Men of Dignity have called for a decentralized system of government from Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.[xlii] Shara has, for the most part, rejected minority groups’ calls for any type of federalist system. His acquiescence to the presumably Druze demand that security forces in Suwayda Province be comprised of Suwaydawis—likely Druze militia members—suggests that Shara is willing to relax his position under certain conditions. Shara could seek to make a similar agreement with the Kurds in northeastern Syria, who have similarly called for a decentralized governance system.

The Men of Dignity Movement’s agreement with the Syrian government is a departure from its previous position, in which the group prevented the entry of government forces into Suwayda Province. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations briefly deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12 to contain tensions surrounding the murder of a local man, but it is unclear if government forces remained in the area or if they coordinated their operations with Druze militias.[xliii] The Syrian government has not forcibly deployed security forces to areas in Suwayda Province and has prioritized negotiations with local Druze authorities, likely to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents and the Druze community. A delegation of Druze officials, including Ahrar al Arab Gathering leader Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi and former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous, met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation in southern Syria.[xliv] Rising tensions in Suwayda over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s demand to ”demilitarize” southern Syria may have contributed to the Men of Dignity’s willingness to cooperate with the Syrian government.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Emerging Syrian Insurgency: Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad.
• Iranian Sanctions Evasion: The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6. Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf.
• Russia in Syria: Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks.
• US-Israeli Exercises: The US and Israeli air forces conducted a joint exercise on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and prepare for "a range of scenarios.”
• Druze in Syria: Prominent Druze militias and the Syrian government agreed to establish Suwaydawi-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province. The Druze militias and interim government agreed that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although it is unclear if Suwaydawis will have a majority presence in the units or if the units will only be comprised of Suwaydawis.

Iran Update, March 5, 2025

US sanctions on Houthi officials for coordinating with Russia demonstrate how Russia facilitates Iranian-backed groups’ terrorism in the Middle East. The United States designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization and sanctioned eight Houthi officials for facilitating attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.[i] Houthi officials threatened unspecified military actions in response to US sanctions.[ii] Russia has both provided intelligence for attacks on international shipping and attempted to recruit Yemenis to fight in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to Western reporting.[iii] The US Treasury stated that Russia and China colluded with the Houthis to ensure that the Houthis would not attack Russian and Chinese-flagged vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[iv] The Kremlin reportedly provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on US and international vessels. This activity, which includes the provision of intelligence to the Houthis that can improve the Houthis’ ability to damage US or international vessels and kill US Navy sailors or third country merchant mariners, demonstrates how Russia seeks to undermine US interests in the Middle East. Russia, given its role supporting Iranian-backed Houthi campaigns in the Middle East, would not help secure US interests in the Middle East as a mediator between the United States and Iran.[v]

Interim government forces engaged a militia consisting of former pro-Assad fighters on February 5 in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa.[vi] Anti-Assad media said that a militia led by Mohsen al Haymed killed two interim government security personnel in al Sanamayn, which caused the interim government to deploy forces to al Sanamayn in response[vii] Haymed’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[viii] HTS-led forces previously deployed to al Sanamayn on January 4 in response to fighting between Mohsen al Haymed’s armed faction and other local factions.[ix] Haymed’s group turned over heavy weapons to the HTS-led forces but was allowed to retain personal small arms.[x]

Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah set forest fires that it claimed targeted Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province.[xi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements that warned it would target Alawites for crimes committed under Assad and that the group would continue its attacks until the Alawites and Shia were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[xii] It is not clear whether the group is conducting these attacks itself or if it is falsely claiming security incidents.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is also active in other areas of Syria. Unknown fighters detonated an explosive that damaged the Nasser Ibrahim Asaad Shrine in Tel Abdul Aziz, Hama Province.[xiii] This is the third sectarian-motivated attack close to Tel Abdul Aziz in the last month. Unspecified gunmen reportedly executed five Syrians in al Anz, 11km northwest of Tel Abdul Aziz, on January 27, and Saraya Ansar al Sunnah executed four Syrians in Tel Dhihab, 5km south of al Anz, on February 2.[xiv] The gunmen in al Anz targeted a local mayor responsible for reconciliation in the area with the Assad Regime.

The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced announced on March 5 that Iraq will not repatriate Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp in northeastern Syria for four to six months.[xv] Ministry Spokesperson Ali Abbas said that Iraq will resume repatriating Iraqi citizens once Iraq rehabilitates 3,500 Iraqi citizens in al Jada camp, Ninewa Province. The Iraqi federal government last repatriated Iraqi citizens from al Hol in early February 2025.[xvi] Abbas told Kurdish media on February 15 that the Iraqi government may suspend repatriation from al Hol due to a lack of US funding as a result of the USAID funding freeze.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Sanctions for Houthi-Russian Collusion: US sanctions on Houthi officials for coordinating with Russia demonstrate how Russia facilitates Iranian-backed groups’ terrorism in the Middle East. The United States designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization and sanctioned eight Houthi officials for facilitating attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.
• Pro-Assad Militias: Interim government forces engaged a militia consisting of former pro-Assad fighters on February 5 in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa.
• Sectarian Sunni Militias in Syria: Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed that it set forest fires targeting Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is also active in other areas of Syria, particularly in Hama Province.
• Iraqi Repatriation: The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced announced on March 5 that Iraq will not repatriate Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp in northeastern Syria for four to six months. Abbas told Kurdish media on February 15 that the Iraqi government may suspend repatriation from al Hol due to a lack of US funding as a result of the USAID funding freeze.

Iran Update, March 4, 2025

Russia offered to mediate talks between the United States and Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to Bloomberg.[i] Russian mediation would reportedly cover Iranian nuclear activities and support for the Axis of Resistance. It is far from clear that Russia would help secure US interests through this mediation, however, especially regarding Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance. Russia has cooperated extensively with the Axis of Resistance over the past decade. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East. Russian and Iranian-backed forces conducted a combined attack on US forces in Syria in 2018, for example.[ii] Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel throughout the October 7 War. The Kremlin provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[iii] Moscow and Tehran signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, underscoring further their close collaboration and their alignment in working to erode US global influence.[iv]

Russia’s support for the Axis of Resistance does not necessarily mean that Russia has leverage over its behavior. Russia has historically been the dominant partner in the Russo-Iranian relationship, but this relationship has become more balanced in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia relies heavily on Iranian military support, such as drones, to sustain its war against Ukraine.[v] These shifting dynamics have made Iran a more equal partner in its strategic partnership with Russia. Moscow trying to coerce Tehran into curbing its regional activities would risk damaging their partnership, which is critical to sustaining Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024 likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. Reuters reported on March 4 that seven senior Russian weapons experts, including one with a background in advanced weapons development and one with a background in missile testing, traveled to Iran in April and September 2024.[vi] A senior Iranian defense ministry official stated that unspecified Russian missile experts conducted multiple visits to Iranian missile production sites, including at least two underground missile facilities, in 2024. The September 2024 visit notably occurred days after Iran began sending short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[vii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles in October 2024, which could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia in the near future.[viii]  

The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel. The visit occurred five days after the IDF struck the tombstone engagement radar of a Russian-made S-300 air defense system in Iran. The strike rendered the S-300 inoperable by destroying its ability to track and engage targets.[ix]

Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly supports the participation of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Shia National Movement in the October 2025 parliamentary elections in order to diminish Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s political influence.[x] Iraqi media reported on March 4 that the Shia Coordination Framework expects Sudani’s Euphrates Movement to win between 40-55 seats in the upcoming election.[xi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Unidentified Shia sources previously told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani has allied with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors.[xii] Maliki reportedly believes that the participation of Sadr’s Shia Nationalist Movement in the elections would decrease the number of seats that Sudani’s party wins.[xiii] Sudani notably left Maliki’s State of Law Coalition in 2019.[xiv]

Iraqi media suggested on March 4 that Sudani could ally with political figures who oppose Maliki, including former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[xv] Abadi attempted to form a political party with Hakim in 2020 that supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[xvi] Hakim has recently fought with Maliki over his outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework and involvement in the removal of the Dhi Qar governor, who is a member of Hakim’s party.[xvii] A National Wisdom Movement official said on March 4 that the party remains close to Sudani.[xviii] A potential Sudani-Hakim-Abadi alliance could hurt the Shia Coordination Framework’s performance in the upcoming elections.

Maliki remains concerned that Sadr’s lack of participation in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Maliki said that Sadr’s participation is “crucial” for Iraqi political stability in an interview on March 2.[xix] CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to mitigate the risk of Sadr calling for protests, as he did after the 2021 elections.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to Bloomberg. Russian mediation would reportedly cover Iranian nuclear activities and support for the Axis of Resistance. It is far from clear that Russia would help secure US interests through this mediation, however, especially regarding Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024 likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly supports the participation of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Shia National Movement in the October 2025 parliamentary elections in order to diminish Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s political influence.\

Iran Update, March 3, 2025

Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024. Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, who commands the Artesh Air Defense Force and Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters, said on March 1 that the armed forces plan to change their air defense “tactics” in response to “current threats.”[i] Sabahi Fard was likely referring to the possibility of a conventional strike on Iran. Iranian officials have conducted a flurry of activities in recent months that further reflect their concern about a potential strike on Iran. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters in early February 2025.[ii] This headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Sabahi Fard’s appointment highlights the regime focus on strengthening Iran’s air defense capabilities and improving air defense coordination between the Artesh and IRGC. The Artesh Air Defense Force and IRGC Aerospace Force have also conducted a series of exercises, particularly around Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in recent weeks.[iii] These exercises have tested indigenous Iranian air defense systems, such as the Bavar 373.[iv] Iran may recognize that Russia’s constrained manufacturing capacity and demand for ground-based air defense systems will likely prevent Iran from acquiring new S-300s in the near future, and Iran may therefore prioritize the development of its indigenous systems. Sabahi Fard announced on March 2 that Iran will soon unveil a new version of the Bavar 373.[v]

Iranian leaders are responding to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes into Iran in its April and October 2024 that neutralized the S-300s.[vi] These Russian-sourced S-300s were the most advanced Iranian air defense capability to this point. The loss of the S-300s has forced Tehran to develop new ways to counter aerial threats, though it is far from clear that it will develop any seriously viable solutions.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz directed the IDF on March 3 to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in response to fighting in Jaramana, Rif Dimashq.[vii] It is unclear what political end state the Israeli government seeks to achieve with these plans. The Israeli government has yet to release further details or articulate a clear vision of what a victory would encompass. Netanyahu said on February 23 that the Israeli government will “not tolerate any threat to the Druze community” and called for southern Syria to fully demilitarize.[viii] Protests erupted across Syria, particularly in majority Druze areas, on February 25 and 26, rejecting Israeli intervention.[ix] The Druze community is highly diverse and loyalty to a particular leader within the community varies across Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[x] Prominent Lebanese Druze politician Walid Jumblatt claimed on March 2 that Israel was attempting to stoke sectarian divisions within Syria.[xi]

Growing tensions in southern Syria risk destabilizing the interim Syrian government, which would create opportunities for ISIS and the IRGC to expand their presences in Syria, contrary to Israeli objectives. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on February 25 that Israel would attack the interim Syrian government or “terrorist organizations” if they try to establish themselves in southern Syria.[xii] Such fighting could distract the interim government and create opportunities for the IRGC and ISIS to make inroads in other places in Syria.[xiii]

The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria. Druze Jaramana Shield Brigade fighters attacked HTS-led forces at a checkpoint to Jaramana, Rif Dimashq, on March 1, killing one fighter and kidnapping another.[xiv] A delegation of Druze officials led by former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous negotiated the release of the hostage and permitted HTS-led forces to enter Jaramana to arrest the wanted fighters.[xv] Balous accompanied a delegation of Druze officials to Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation within Suwayda Province and southern Syria.[xvi] Jaramana is a former Assad regime stronghold with several regime-aligned Druze militias.[xvii] HTS-led forces have faced resistance from former Assad regime members, as they attempt to consolidate territorial control over Syria.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced an immediate ceasefire with Turkey on March 1.[xviii] The PKK Executive Committee stated that it would disarm in line with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call to dissolve on February 27.[xix] The PKK’s People’s Defense Center Command Headquarters ordered a ceasefire that is ”valid for all our forces,” including ”all autonomous units.”[xx] It remains unclear at this time the extent that sub-national PKK affiliate groups will observe the ceasefire. The PKK command headquarters ordered forces to redeploy exclusively on a ”defensive basis.”[xxi] The PKK demanded that Ocalan oversee the ceasefire and be allowed personal freedoms.[xxii] Turkey has imprisoned Ocalan since 1999 and allowed him little contact with the outside world. Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[xxiii]

The PKK ceasefire does not appear to include the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently fighting Turkish and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria, although fighting has stalled in recent days. Kinetic engagements between the SDF and Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have declined since the PKK announced the ceasefire on March 1. Fighting has completely halted around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo, where the forces have fought for about three months.[xxiv] The rate of Turkish airstrikes has decreased as well. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as “PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[xxv] AKP spokesperson Omer Celik said that the AKP expects the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria to dissolve on February 28.[xxvi] The YPG is the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF. Turkey often conflates the SDF and YPG with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected the idea that Ocalan’s call for disarmament applies to the SDF in Syria on February 27.[xxvii]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven Syrians to draft a non-permanent
“constitutional declaration” that Shara himself will approve.[xxviii] Shara announced on March 2 that the members of the committee will draft the document that will “regulate“ Syria‘s transitional phase.[xxix]  The newly appointed committee told Syrian state media on March 3 that the constitutional declaration will set ”general foundations” for a system of government and will define the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.[xxx] The committee said that the document will eventually be supplanted by a permanent constitution.[xxxi] Shara himself has estimated that writing the permanent constitution could take up to three years.[xxxii] The constitutional declaration is therefore expected to provide a legal framework for the Syrian state over the next few years. The systems of governance and values enshrined in the document will likely significantly influence the trajectory of the future permanent Syrian state. Committee member Ismail al Khalfan said that the declaration will be announced within a few days.[xxxiii] The committee will then submit their draft to Shara, who will approve the final declaration.[xxxiv]

The committee includes the following individuals:

• Abdul Hamid al Awak. Awak is from Hasakah Province and is a faculty member at Mardin Artuklul University in Turkey.[xxxv] Awak holds degrees in constitutional law, administrative law, and public law.[xxxvi] Awak previously participated in several regional legal forums addressing constitutional governance and democratic transition and advised a Turkish-based non-profit organization that promoted social services and political reform in northern Syria.[xxxvii]
• Yasser al Huwaish. Huwaish is from Deir ez Zor Province and is a dean at Damascus University’s College of Law.[xxxviii] Huwaish specializes in international economic law.[xxxix]
• Ismail al Khalfan. Khalfan is a dean at the University of Aleppo’s College of Law.[xl] Khalfan previously taught at universities in Gaziantep, Turkey, and in the Aleppo countryside.[xli] Khalfan specializes in international law.[xlii]
• Rian Kuhaylan. Kuhaylan is from Barzeh, Damascus.[xliii] Kuhaylan is the head of the public law department at Damascus University.[xliv] She specializes in constitutional and criminal law.[xlv]
• Mohammad Reda Jalakhi. Jalakhi is a dean in the political science department at Damascus University.[xlvi] Jalakhi previously worked in the administration of Idlib University. Jalakhi was appointed as a board member of the Syrian Development Organization after the fall of the regime.[xlvii]
• Ahmed Qarbi. Qarbi is the director of the Shared Identity and Consensus Unit at the Syrian Dialogue Center.[xlviii] This organization aimed to promote a “culture of dialogue” among segments of Syrian society in order to encourage political and societal cooperation.[xlix] Qarbi specializes in public law and previously lectured at Aleppo University.[l]
• Bahia Mardini. Mardini is a journalist and lawyer who previously worked as a media representative for the Syrian National Coalition.[li] Mardini is reportedly Kurdish.[lii] Kurdish media reported that it was unable to verify Mardini’s involvement with any Kurdish political parties active in Syria.[liii] Mardini advocated for Syria to hold free and fair multi-party elections in Syria in 2018.[liv]

The extent to which this committee will incorporate the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference remains unclear. The National Dialogue Conference published a list of recommendations calling on the constitutional committee to draft a new Syrian constitution that ensures a balance of power and enshrines justice, freedom, and equality as Syrian values.[lv] The committee said on March 3 that it is “keen” to draw ideas from discussions at the National Dialogue Conference and will not contradict the conferences’ final recommendations.[lvi] The committee is not legally required to consider these recommendations, however. The constitutional committee also does not appear to represent Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity.

Unspecified sources told al Jazeera on March 3 that Shara will soon appoint 100 members to a transitional legislative body to serve two-year terms.[lvii] The sources said that Shara will appoint members of the “People’s Assembly” within two months after the constitutional declaration is adopted.[lviii] Shara will reportedly appoint these members from “fair representation of components and competence.”[lix] The sources said that constitutional declaration will allow national parties to be formed later on in the transition.[lx]

Shara’s direct control and supervision of these interim governing structures could allow him to co-opt them to solidify his personal power during Syria’s years-long transition. Shara’s direct hand in the formation of these structures may be necessary in order to centralize Syria’s transitional government during an unstable period in its formation and set in motion interim frameworks to govern the country. Shara's control over the creation of the constitutional declaration leaves Syrian citizens few instruments through which they can influence the direction of the Syrian transitional government beyond the committee’s promises that it will consider the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference. Shara’s reported appointment-by-decree of People’s Assembly members also demonstrates that he could appoint HTS loyalists or other allies, thereby consolidating his own power over the interim legislature.[lxi] It remains unclear how much power the People’s Assembly will have during the transition period though, and this will presumably be defined within the constitutional declaration. Shara’s oversight and control over those who comprise the constitutional committee and People’s Assembly could allow him to prevent internal checks against his power or keep political rivals out of positions of influence in the government in the long-term. It remains unclear if Shara would seek to pursue such actions in the short-term while dependent on the support of minority groups and the West in order to keep Syria stable.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel has neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024.
• Syria: Israeli leaders ordered the IDF to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in southern Syria. It is unclear what political end state they seek to achieve.
• Syria: The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria.
• Syria: The PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkey. It remains unclear how this ceasefire will affect the SDF.
• Syria: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven individuals to draft a non-permanent “constitutional declaration” for him to approve.