Iran Updates May 2024

Iran Update, May 31, 2024

US President Joe Biden urged Hamas to agree to the latest Israeli ceasefire and hostage-release proposal on May 31.[i] Ceasefire talks have been largely stalled since Egypt unilaterally altered an Israeli proposal without notifying international mediators and then sent the altered text to Hamas in early May 2024. Israel submitted the most recent proposal to international mediators on May 27.[ii] Biden said that Qatar sent the proposal to Hamas on May 29.[iii] Hamas stated on May 30 that it refused to return to indirect negotiations until there is an end to the war.[iv] Biden said he has urged Israeli leaders ”to stand behind this deal despite any political pressure,” emphasizing that Israel’s pursuit of “an unidentified notion of total victory will. . . only bog down Israel in Gaza.”[v] Biden also appealed to the Israeli people, saying that Hamas “no longer is capable” of conducting another attack like the one on October 7, 2023.[vi] 

Biden outlined the three phases of the Israeli proposal:  

1. Phase one involves a six-week ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would release an unspecified number of hostages, including Americans, women, and elderly and sick individuals, in exchange for “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners in this phase. Displaced Palestinian civilians would return to their homes, including those in the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid would “surge with 600 trucks [entering the Gaza Strip] per day,” which is a notable increase from the 500 trucks in an earlier Israeli proposal.[viii] Negotiations for a permanent ceasefire would continue during this phase.
2. Phase two involves Hamas and other Palestinian militias releasing all remaining living hostages, and the IDF withdrawing from the Gaza Strip completely. Biden said that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would ensure that negotiations continue during this phase.
3. Phase three involves major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. It also involves Hamas and the other militias returning the bodies of all hostages to Israel.

Biden did not offer specific details on the number of Israeli hostages or Palestinian prisoners that would be released in this proposal, nor did he specify the length of phases two and three. The intent of each phase largely resembles the proposal that Israel made in early May 2024.[ix] The Israeli proposal offers flexibility on the number of living hostages released in phase one, according to anonymous sources speaking to Axios.[x] The proposal also includes “a willingness” to discuss a "sustainable calm" in the Gaza Strip—a phrase that both Israel and Hamas included in recent ceasefire proposals.[xi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on May 31 that its units withdrew completely from Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.[xii] This confirmation comes after local Palestinian sources reported that some IDF units were leaving Jabalia on May 30.[xiii] The IDF reentered Jabalia on May 11 after assessing that Hamas and other Palestinian militias were rebuilding their capabilities and networks there.[xiv] The IDF published a summary of its activities in Jabalia, which included destroying over 10 kilometers of tunnels, some of which were 500 meters from the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[xv] Israeli forces also recovered the bodies of seven Hamas-held hostages and killed several militia commanders, including the commander of Hamas’ Beit Hanoun Battalion.[xvi] CTP-ISW previously observed Hamas has organized its military wing like a conventional military and has developed a deep bench of experienced military commanders to run it.

The IDF withdrawal from Jabalia follows some of the most intense fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the war. The IDF stated that Hamas turned civilian infrastructure in Jabalia into a “fortified combat complex.”[xvii] This description is consistent with previous reports that Palestinian fighters have established “fighting compounds” that enable them to rapidly traverse through buildings rather than exposing themselves in the streets to Israeli forces.[xviii] Israeli Army Radio reported that 341 "operational incidents" occurred in the first week of fighting in Jabalia. These incidents involved Palestinian fighters firing upon Israeli forces or attacking them with explosives.[xix] This count of 341 is significantly higher than the roughly 100 engagements that occurred between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the first week of Israeli operations in Khan Younis in December 2023.[xx] Palestinian militias sustained an unusually high rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout IDF clearing operations in Jabalia.[xxi] IDF officers described the fighting there as some of the most intense of the war.[xxii] These points taken together reflect the degree to which Hamas and other Palestinian militias remain combat effective in and around Jabalia. Hamas and the other militias will almost certainly resume their efforts to reconstitute there as the IDF units have left.

Candidates have continued registering for the upcoming Iranian presidential election.[xxiii] Among the candidates who registered on May 31 are two prominent moderate politicians: Ali Larijani and Abdol Nasser Hemmati. Presidential candidates have until June 3 to register, after which the Guardian Council will vet and approve candidates. The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures during this period to advantage hardliners in the race.

The following individuals registered on May 31:

• Ali Larijani. Larijani is a prominent moderate politician who served as the Iranian parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020.[xxiv] Larijani also served as both the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and lead nuclear negotiator from 2005 to 2007.[xxv] Larijani previously ran for president in 2005 and 2021. The Guardian Council allowed him to run in 2005 but barred disqualified him in 2021 on unclear grounds.[xxvi] Ali is part of the influential and well-connected Larijani family in Iran. Ali’s brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, is the current head of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is an advisory board to the supreme leader. Sadegh Amoli Larijani also served as the judiciary chief from 2009 to 2019.
• Abdol Nasser Hemmati. Hemmati is a moderate politician who served as the governor of the US-sanctioned Central Bank of Iran from 2018 to 2021 under then-President Hassan Rouhani.[xxvii] Former President Hassan Rouhani appointed Hemmati to the Central Bank Governor position. Hemmati ran for president in 2021.[xxviii] He received the third most votes after Ebrahim Raisi and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei.[xxix]  
• Mahmoud Ahmadi Bighosh. Bighosh is a hardline politician who represented Markazi Province in Parliament from 2009 to 2012 and additionally from 2020 to 2024.[xxx] Bighosh was part of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee while in Parliament. Bighoush also served as the governor of North Khorasan Province from 2012 to 2013.[xxxi]
• Mohammad Khoshchehreh. Khoshchehreh is a hardline politician who represented Tehran Province in Parliament from 2004 to 2008.[xxxii] Khoshchehreh previously supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but became an outspoken critic of Ahmadinejad three months into his presidency.[xxxiii] Khoshchehreh is a well-known economist and urban planner.

Larijani could be a particularly strong contender for the presidency given his deep connections in the Iranian political and security establishment. Those connections could prove useful, given that the Iranian regime manipulates elections to install favored candidates. Larijani has framed his candidacy in recent days around bolstering Iranian defense and national security, improving the economy, and managing US sanctions.[xxxiv] An anonymous Iranian official told Reuters that the Guardian Council would allow Larijani to run despite disqualifying him during the 2021 race.[xxxv] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council could permit Larijani to run to diversify the field of candidates beyond just hardliners and encourage voter participation, which has hit record lows repeatedly in recent years.

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Negotiations: US President Joe Biden urged Hamas to accept the latest Israeli ceasefire and hostage-release proposal. The proposal includes three phases to end the war, release Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and begin reconstruction in the Gaza Strip.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF withdrew completely from Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip after weeks of intense fighting there. Hamas and the other Palestinian militias will almost certainly begin reconstituting their forces there as Israeli forces leave.
• Iran: Candidates have continued registering for the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Among the candidates are prominent moderate politicians, some of whom could be particularly strong contenders for the presidency.
• Iraq: The UN Security Council voted unanimously to end the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq at the end of 2025.
• Yemen: The United States and United Kingdom struck 21 Houthi targets in Yemen and over the Red Sea.

Iran Update, May 30, 2024

Israel withdrew some IDF units from Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on May 30, according to local Palestinian sources.[i] The local authorities from Hamas’ Emergency Committee told displaced Palestinian civilians to avoid returning to Jabalia at this time because “there are still dangerous remnants.”[ii] A local Palestinian journalist said that Israeli forces remain in the northern and eastern parts of Jabalia.[iii] The IDF confirmed on May 30 that at least one of the three brigades that were in Jabalia is still there.[iv] Palestinian militias claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around Jabalia, further indicating that Israeli forces are still in the area.[v]

The partial Israeli withdrawal from Jabalia follows some of the most intense fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the war. The IDF reentered Jabalia on May 11 after assessing that Hamas and other Palestinian militias were rebuilding their capabilities and networks there.[vi] Hamas was able to do so despite the IDF killing Hamas’ local battalion commander there in October 2023.[vii] The IDF assessed two weeks into the Jabalia operation that three Hamas battalions are active there rather than just one.[viii] Palestinian militias conducted an unusually high rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia during this period. IDF officers described the fighting there as some of the most intense of the war.[ix]

Hamas and other Palestinian militias will almost certainly resume their efforts to reconstitute in Jabalia as Israeli forces withdraw. There are remaining pockets around Jabalia that Israeli forces have not cleared.[x] Hamas and other militias have probably moved into some of these areas to preserve their forces.[xi] Hamas will capitalize on these remaining forces to rebuild their capabilities and networks in and around Jabalia as Israeli forces leave. US and Israeli officials have expressed concerns that Hamas will survive in the Gaza Strip without a post-war plan that involves an alternative to Hamas rule.[xii]

The registration period for the Iranian presidential election began on May 30.[xiii] Only one prominent individual, hardliner Saeed Jalili, has registered thus far. Presidential candidates have until June 3 to register, after which the Guardian Council will vet and approve candidates. The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures during this period in order to advantage hardliners in the race.

The following individuals have registered thus far:

• Saeed Jalili. Jalili is a prominent hardliner, who serves as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[xiv] Jalili previously served as the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013.[xv] Jalili is also a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) and Strategic Foreign Relations Council, both of which are advisory boards to the supreme leader.[xvi] An Iranian opposition outlet reported on May 21 that elements in the regime tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from competing in the election.[xvii] These elements include some moderates, such as Ali Larijani, as well as several hardliners, such as EDC Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani.[xviii]
• Mohammad Reza Sabaghian Bafghi. Bafghi represents Bafgh, Yazd Province, in Parliament and is a member of the Parliamentary Internal Affairs Committee.[xix] Bafghi previously headed the passive defense office in Yazd Province.[xx]
• Mostafa Kavakebian. Kavakebian is a reformist candidate, who previously served as a representative for Tehran in Parliament.[xxi] The Guardian Council disqualified Kavakebian in the 2005, 2013, 2017, and 2021 presidential elections.[xxii] Kavakebian stated on May 30 that he would facilitate the removal of all international sanctions on Iran and establish relations with all countries except Israel if he becomes president.[xxiii]
• Abbas Moghtadaei. Moghtadaei is a hardline candidate, who represents Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, in Parliament and previously served as the deputy chairman of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[xxiv] Moghtadaei is a faculty member at the Islamic Azad University.[xxv]
• Ghodrat Ali Hashemtian. Hashemtian registered for the 2017 presidential election but later withdrew his candidacy.[xxvi]

Syrian President Bashar al Assad traveled to Tehran to meet with senior Iranian officials on May 30. The visit may be part of recent efforts by Iran and its-called “Axis of Resistance” to coordinate their actions vis-a-vis the Israel Hamas war.[xxvii] Assad met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Interim President Mohammad Mokhber, Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani, and Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, among other Iranian officials.[xxviii] The presence of Bazrpash, who also heads the Iran-Syria Joint Economic Commission, indicates that Assad discussed Iranian investment and reconstruction projects in Syria in at least some of the meetings.[xxix]

Assad’s visit comes shortly after the Axis of Resistance held a meeting of its Joint Operations Room in Tehran on May 23.[xxx] The operations room is meant to align and coordinate Iranian and Iranian-backed campaigns against the United States and Israel. The May 23 meeting included senior officials from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, and several Iraqi and Palestinian militias, such as Hamas.

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters entered Bat Hefer in Israel to kill an IDF officer there on May 29.[xxxi] The militia said that its fighters entered the officer’s home and seized weapons but left once they realized that children were present.[xxxii] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, as Israel has not confirmed that there was any militia activity around Bat Hefer at the time of this writing. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also threatened to attack Israeli civilians in the same way that Hamas did in October 2023.

The claimed infiltration into Bat Hefer comes amid an uptick in activity around Bat Hefer, which is near the Israel-West Bank border and immediately adjacent to Tulkarm, in recent days. Hamas fighters fired small arms from the West Bank targeting Bat Hefer on May 27 and May 29.[xxxiii] Around 30 unarmed Palestinians separately tried to cross the border from the West Bank into Bat Hefer on May 27. The IDF said on May 30 that it is increasing operations in the area in response to attacks targeting Bat Hefer.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel reportedly withdrew some IDF units from Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas will almost certainly try to exploit these withdrawals to continue reconstituting its forces.
• Iran: The registration period for the Iranian presidential election began. One only prominent individual, hardliner Saeed Jalili, has registered thus far. The registration period lasts until June 3.
• Syria: Syrian President Bashar al Assad traveled to Tehran to meet with senior Iranian officials. The visit may be part of recent efforts by Iran and its-called “Axis of Resistance” to coordinate their actions vis-a-vis the Israel Hamas war.
• West Bank: The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters entered Bat Hefer in Israel to kill an IDF officer there. The claim comes amid an uptick in activity around the Israel-West Bank border, specifically around Bat Hefer.

Iran Update, May 29, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on May 29 that it established “operational control” of the Philadelphi Corridor on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.[i] Israeli officials have described Israeli operations along the corridor as meant to disrupt some of Hamas’ primary smuggling routes into the Gaza Strip.[ii] Israeli forces have uncovered around 20 tunnels that connect Egypt to the Gaza Strip in recent days.[iii] Israel was aware of some of these tunnels beforehand but not all of them.[iv] The IDF said that it has communicated with Egypt regarding the tunnels, however, an unspecified Egyptian official speaking to Egyptian media disputed this assertion.[v]

Israeli forces are currently operating along most of the corridor, excluding a small area near the Gazan coast. The IDF said that it controls the corridor with ”surveillance and fire power.”[vi] The IDF previously controlled about 70 percent of the corridor on May 22—two weeks after first advancing into Rafah on May 7.[vii] The IDF said that Hamas has used the corridor to launch rocket attacks in recent weeks because Hamas assumed that the IDF would avoid the corridor so as to not inadvertently hit Egyptian territory.[viii]

Israeli officials reportedly expect that controlling the Philadelphi corridor will prevent Hamas from importing weapons into the Gaza Strip.[ix] Hamas will continue its efforts to reconstitute throughout the Gaza Strip, despite these efforts.

Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi said on May 29 that he expects fighting in the Gaza Strip to last for the remainder of 2024.[x] Hanegbi said that Israel needs that time to destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ is one of several Iranian-backed Palestinian militias that has fought alongside Hamas in the war.[xi]

Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari traveled to Tehran on May 29 to discuss internal security cooperation with senior Iranian military officials. Shammari met with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan, and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi.[xii] These Iranian officials are responsible for overseeing significant portions of the Iranian internal security apparatus and domestic repression. They are all involved to varying degrees, for instance, in controlling the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), which is the premier Iranian internal security service and heavily involved in suppressing political dissent. Radan emphasized in his meeting with Shammari that Iran is ready to share law enforcement experiences with Iraq.[xiii] Radan also called for greater cooperation between the LEC anti-riot and cyber units and the Iraqi federal police, which Shammari oversees.[xiv]

Shammari will also meet with Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam during his visit to discuss the SNDU training Iraqi officers.[xv] Moghaddam—like Radan—has a long history of leading crackdowns in Iran, as Moghaddam served as Iranian law enforcement commander from 2005 to 2015.[xvi] He was instrumental in the crackdown on the Green Movement in 2009. The United States sanctioned Moghaddam in 2011 for human rights abuses.[xvii] Shammari previously met Moghaddam when the latter visited Baghdad in December 2023.[xviii] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Moghaddam may have discussed his experience suppressing civil unrest during his meetings with Iraqi officials.[xix]

Mohammad Bagheri separately called on the Iraqi federal government to fully implement the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq during his meeting with Shammari.[xx] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate Kurdish opposition groups away from the border with Iran.[xxi]

Iran is broadcasting that it has helped the Houthis develop anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published English-language and Persian-language articles on May 29 discussing how Iran has provided technical knowledge and materials to the Houthis to help them build anti-ship ballistic missiles.[xxii] Tasnim News Agency specifically touted that the Houthis have based their Muhit missiles on the Iranian Ghadr anti-ship ballistic missile.[xxiii] Tasnim News Agency added that the Houthis present serious challenges to the United States and Israel because of these capabilities. The publication of these articles is unusual in that Iran rarely acknowledges its provision of material support to the Houthis. The IRGC almost certainly published these articles in order to broadcast the Iranian role in empowering the Houthis and the so-called “Axis of Resistance” more broadly.

Key Takeaways:

• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF announced that it established “operational control” of the Philadelphi Corridor on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
• Iraq: Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari traveled to Tehran to discuss internal security cooperation with senior Iranian military officials.
• Yemen: Iran is broadcasting that it has helped the Houthis develop anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have expanded their clearing operations in Jabalia in recent days.
• Humanitarian Aid: The United States suspended operations at its temporary pier in the Gaza Strip due to damage sustained at sea.
• West Bank: Palestinian fighters fired small arms at two towns in Israel from the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel.
• Iran: Policy adviser to the Iranian supreme leader, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, appears to be re-entering public Iranian discourse ahead of the Iranian presidential election in June 2024.

Iran Update, May 28, 2024

Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels amid recent statements from Iranian officials about Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[i] The Associated Press reported on May 27 that Iran possesses 142.1 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, citing a confidential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[ii] This amount marks a 20.6 kilogram (16.95 percent) increase in Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since the IAEA published its last quarterly report in February 2024.[iii] Weapons-grade uranium is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity.[iv] The IAEA report follows repeated statements in April and May from senior Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to the Supreme Leader, that have begun to normalize discussions about Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[v] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi recently expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program after visiting Tehran from May 6 to May 8, stating that Iranian cooperation with the agency is “not at the level it should be.”[vi]

The IAEA report added that Iran’s overall stockpile of enriched uranium is currently 6,201.3 kilograms, a 675.8 kilogram (12.23 percent) increase since February 2024 when Iran’s total stockpile was 5525.5 kilograms.[vii] A US weapons expert noted on May 28 that, based on the confidential IAEA report, Iran could produce enough weapons grade uranium (WGU) for almost eight nuclear weapons in the first month after breakout.[viii]

Iranian parliamentarians re-elected hardline politician Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[ix] Ghalibaf has served as parliament speaker since May 2020.[x] Ghalibaf received 198 out of 287 votes, while his competitors, former Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Mojtaba Zonnour and former Foreign Affairs Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, won 60 and five votes, respectively.[xi] Ghalibaf will serve a one-year term.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division expanded clearing operations into western Rafah on May 28. The IDF Nahal and 401st Brigades operated overnight on the Philadelphi Corridor to target Palestinian fighters and militia sites based on “intelligence” of Palestinian fighters in the area.[xii] Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armor advanced to Tel Zaroub and the southern Tel al Sultan neighborhoods, which are along the Philadelphi Corridor.[xiii] The IDF moved into western Rafah with its left flank against the Egypt-Gaza Strip border. Eyewitnesses speaking to Reuters indicated that the IDF may have used unmanned ground vehicles in the advance into western Rafah.[xiv] Local sources reported intense gunfire in western Rafah as Israeli forces advanced.[xv] Palestinian civilians sheltering in western Rafah evacuated north into the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, according to video and journalist accounts. [xvi]

Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces operating in southern and central Rafah on May 28. Hamas fighters detonated a building that it rigged with explosives while Israeli forces were inside the building in Shuwat refugee camp in central Rafah.[xvii] Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces with mortar and rocket fire along the Philadelphi Corridor.[xviii]

The IDF has uncovered over ten smuggling tunnels that cross into Egypt from the Gaza Strip, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[xix] Israeli forces are in the process of destroying the tunnel routes.[xx] The IDF 162nd Division uncovered additional tunnels in its overnight operations along the Philadelphi Corridor on May 28.[xxi] The IDF Nahal Brigade also seized hundreds of weapons, including long-range rockets, from Hamas warehouses in Rafah in the past week.[xxii]

Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr demanded that the Iraqi government expel US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and close the US Embassy in Baghdad in retaliation for US support for Israel.[xxiii] Sadr argued on May 28 that removing the United States from Iraq through diplomatic means will prevent any use of military force by the United States. He contrasted diplomatic efforts with the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia’s attack campaign to expel the United States, which he said triggered a US response.

The Houthis damaged a Marshall Islands-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea on May 28.[xxiv] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a vessel was targeted with missiles and sustained damage approximately 31 nautical miles southwest of Hudaydah.[xxv] A British maritime security company separately stated that the vessel sustained damage to its cargo hold and took on water approximately 54 nautical miles southwest of Hudaydah, Yemen. The damaged vessel sailed to a nearby port to assess the damage. The Houthis have not claimed the attack on the vessel at the time of this writing.

Israel submitted a new ceasefire and hostage-release proposal to international mediators on May 27.[xxvi] Hamas negotiators were expected to receive the proposal from the Qatar on May 28 but have not acknowledged the proposal at the time of writing.[xxvii]  The Israeli proposal offers ”flexibility” on the number of living hostages released in the deal’s first phase, according to sources with knowledge of the negotiations speaking to Axios.[xxviii] The proposal also includes “a willingness” to discuss a "sustainable calm" in the Gaza Strip, a phrase that both Israel and Hamas included in the last round of ceasefire proposals.[xxix]

Iran's continued support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia's technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published a report on May 28 detailing Russian efforts to produce Shahed-136/131 drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan using Iranian-provided technologies and a labor force recruited largely from eastern Africa.[xxx] WSJ cited the international hacking group Prana Network, which reportedly hacked an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) email server in February 2024 and revealed that Russia intends to produce 6,000 Shahed drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 alone. The Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) assessed that the Alabuga SEZ has already produced 4,500 Shaheds as of the end of April 2024, ahead of schedule, and could produce all 6,000 by mid-August 2024.[xxxi] WSJ found that Russia is currently producing more advanced models of Iranian Shaheds domestically and intensively using them to strike Ukraine.[xxxii] WSJ also noted that Russian authorities are recruiting from African countries, particularly Uganda, and especially enticing young women to participate in work-study programs at Alabuga to produce Shahed drones. Russia would not be able to operate the Alabuga SEZ without Iran's consistent support for the Russian war effort—Iranian production models for Shahed drones and Iranian drone technologies are at the center of the entire Alabuga enterprise.[xxxiii] German outlet BILD similarly reported on May 27 that Iran has also likely supplied Russia with Qaem-5 television-guided air-to-ground bombs, which Iran started producing as recently as 2019.[xxxiv] BILD noted that an Iranian-provided Mohajer-6 drone carrying the Qaem-5 bombs crashed in Kursk Oblast for an unknown reason but that Russian forces may have intended to strike Sumy Oblast. ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has used these projectiles in Ukraine, but their use would be consistent with the pattern of continued and intensified Iranian military support to Russia.[xxxv] 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s Nuclear Program: Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels amid recent statements from Iranian officials about Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon.
• Iranian Parliament: Iranian parliamentarians re-elected hardline politician Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as parliament speaker, with Ghalibaf receiving 198 of 287 votes.
• Rafah: IDF has so far identified ten smuggling tunnels that cross into Egypt from the Gaza Strip.
• Iraq: Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr demanded that the Iraqi government expel US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and close the US Embassy in Baghdad in retaliation for US support for Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis damaged a Marshall Islands-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Israel submitted a new ceasefire proposal that offered “flexibility” on the number of living hostages to be released in the deal’s first phase. Hamas has not acknowledged the proposal as of the data cutoff.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iran's continued support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia's technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Iran Update, May 27, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Elections: The Iranian supreme leader reportedly appointed his policy adviser, Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani, in March 2024 to lead nuclear negotiations with the United States. The publication of this information now may be meant to boost Shamkhani’s political position ahead of Iran’s presidential election.
• Iranian Presidential Candidates: Prominent Iranian hardliner Saeed Jalili announced his candidacy for the Iranian presidential elections in June 2024. Iranian journalists reported that several other prominent political figures are planning to run.
• Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly considering resuming attacks on US forces days after a meeting between Iranian-backed militia leaders from throughout the region and the IRGC in Tehran.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF is fighting three Hamas battalions that are defending Jabalia camp. Two of the battalions were previously “dismantled,” which underscores the requirement for a sustainable political and military end state in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Strike in Rafah: An IDF airstrike killed two Hamas officials in Rafah on May 26, but the strike also caused a fire that killed 35 Palestinian civilians.
• Rafah Border Crossing: Israeli and Egyptian forces exchanged small arms fire at the Rafah border crossing.
• Lebanon: A Likud minister said that Israel will conduct a military operation targeting Hezbollah to return displaced residents from northern Israeli if political efforts to stop Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel fail. This statement echoes previous Israeli statements about the possibility of operations into Lebanon.

Iran Update, May 26, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF withdrew its Givati Brigade from Rafah, leaving four IDF brigades in Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in three locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted 13 attacks into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea.

Iran Update, May 25, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF is moving “more deliberately” in Rafah, according to Israeli officers who recently left Rafah who spoke to the New York Times on May 25.
• Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: A US Army landing craft and part of the US-constructed pier in the Gaza Strip was swept away by waves to Ashdod, Israel.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank on May 25.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel.

Iran Update, May 24, 2024

An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officer described particularly intense fighting between the IDF and Hamas in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip in recent days.[i] This fighting highlights that Hamas remains active and combat effective in Jabalia, despite the IDF killing Hamas’ Jabalia Refugee Camp Battalion commander in October 2023.[ii] The IDF officer said that Palestinian fighters are bolder in Jabalia than in other parts of the Gaza Strip and that Palestinian fighters have established “fighting compounds” that enable them to rapidly traverse through buildings rather than exposing themselves in the streets to Israeli forces. Israeli officers have said in recent days that the fighting in Jabalia has been some of the “most violent” in the war.[iii] Palestinian militias have sustained an unusually high rate of attacks there since IDF sent units to Jabalia on May 11 to clear the area.[iv] The fighting since then indicates that Hamas is conducting a deliberate defense of the area against the IDF.[v]

The fighting in Jabalia indicates that Hamas could remain combat effective in other parts of the Gaza Strip even after the IDF kills local Hamas commanders. Hamas has organized its military wing like a conventional military and has developed a deep bench of experienced military commanders to run it. Hamas therefore has junior commanders that can and are ready to assume command of units after their senior commanders are killed. Hamas uses this conventional military structure to continue fighting, despite intense Israeli military pressure.

Israeli negotiators and international mediators will reportedly convene in Paris to restart negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns will meet Mossad Chief David Barnea and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani in Paris, according to anonymous US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios.[vi] An Israeli official speaking to CNN similarly said that an Israeli delegation would soon travel to Paris.[vii] A US official said that Egypt remains heavily involved in the negotiations, although it is unclear whether any Egyptian officials will participate in the meetings in Paris.[viii]

Egypt has dismissed Western reports that an Egyptian intelligence official secretly modified the most recent ceasefire deal before sending it to Hamas.[ix] Israel had approved the deal before the Egyptian intelligence official, Ahmed Abdel Khaleq, altered the text and sent it to Hamas. Khaleq currently leads the Egyptian mediation efforts in the ceasefire talks.[x] Khaleq was the first individual in his position to participate in a Hamas-organized event in Khan Younis in July 2018, during which he met Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar.[xi] Khaleq also participated in the 2011 deal that involved Israel releasing over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including Sinwar.[xii]

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Israel to halt its clearing operation into Rafah on May 24.[xiii] The Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry and National Security Council responded with a joint statement saying that Israel will continue its efforts to bring humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip and that Israel has and will continue to avoid conducting military operations that harm Gazan civilians.[xiv]

Iran’s political factions have begun to maneuver and prepare for the Iranian presidential election in June 2024 to replace Ebrahim Raisi. Iranian reformist politicians, including former President Mohammad Khatami, have argued in recent days that the election needs political diversity to encourage voter turnout.[xv] These reformists are responding to how Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has allowed hardliners to marginalize moderates and reformists to an unprecedented level in recent years. Moderate and reformist figures argued that Khamenei allowing them to compete in elections would drive electoral participation, which has dropped to record lows in recent years. Reform Front spokesperson Javad Emam stated that reformist politicians will convene on May 26 to discuss the upcoming election.[xvi] Social media accounts have suggested that former Parliament Speaker and prominent moderate Ali Larijani plans to run as a candidate in the election.[xvii]

Iranian hardliners appear to be similarly organizing themselves ahead of the election. Social media accounts reported on May 24 that prominent hardliner Saeed Jalili plans to register as a candidate.[xviii] This rumor comes after an Iranian opposition outlet reported that elements in the regime have tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from running.[xix] These elements include some moderates, such as Ali Larijani. They also include several hardliners, such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and adviser to the supreme leader Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani.

Members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance are continuing to coordinate their actions vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war. Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, who is the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH), held a phone call with Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi on May 24 to discuss the war.[xx] The two discussed coordination and force readiness, according to the KH readout. Hamidawi and Abdulmalik may have discussed efforts to impose an unofficial economic blockade on Israel, given that Abdulmalik gave a speech on May 16 calling on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to join the Houthis in attacking international shipping around the Mediterranean Sea.[xxi] The call also comes after CTP-ISW observed on May 23 that Iran is capitalizing on the presence of senior Axis of Resistance officials in Tehran for Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral to coordinate and cohere their approaches to the war.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: There is particularly intense fighting between the IDF and Hamas in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, despite the IDF killing the local Hamas commander there in October 2023.
• Iran: Iran’s political factions have begun to maneuver and prepare for the presidential election in June 2024 to replace Ebrahim Raisi.
• Yemen: The Houthis are coordinating their actions vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian militias in at least three locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel.

Iran Update, May 23, 2024

Iran is capitalizing on the presence of senior Axis of Resistance officials in Tehran for Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral to coordinate and cohere their approaches to the Israel-Hamas war. Iranian leaders held two meetings with senior Axis of Resistance officials in Tehran on May 23.[i] The first meeting included senior IRGC officers and representatives from several Palestinian militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis.[ii] The participants discussed the “continuation of the jihad and struggle until the complete victory of the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip.” Photos published by Iranian state media indicate that the following individuals were in that meeting:

• IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani
• Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Deputy Secretary General Mohammad al Hadi
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mezher
• Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem
• Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdul Salam

The second meeting involved the following individuals based on photos published by Iranian state media:

• Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani
• Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh
• Hamas founder Mousa Abu Marzouk
• Hamas Deputy Leader in the West Bank Zaher Jabarin
• PIJ Deputy Secretary General Mohammad al Hindi
• PIJ Leader in Lebanon Ihsan Ataya
• PFLP Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mezher

The publication of this information is especially noteworthy, given that Iranian state media does not typically report on such meetings in such detail. Iran likely published the information to signal the close alignment and cooperation between Tehran and its regional partners and proxies.

The IDF found tunnels used by Palestinian militias during a two-day operation into Jenin City in the West Bank.[iii] The IDF announced that hundreds of Israeli personnel participated in the operation to destroy militia infrastructure, including tunnels, and kill Palestinian fighters. The IDF engaged fighters from Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades during the operation.[iv]

The IDF targeted tunnels in Jenin City as part of an Israeli effort to destroy militia capabilities and infrastructure, especially tunnels, in the West Bank before Palestinian militias can use them to attack Israel. IDF Chief of Staff Major General Herzi Halevi framed the operation into Jenin City in such terms on May 22.[v] The IDF seeks to prevent Palestinian militias from building tunnels around the Israel-West Bank border that would support offensive cross-border attacks like what Hamas did in October 2023. The IDF has targeted other tunnels around the Israel-West Bank border in recent months to this end. The IDF discovered and destroyed a tunnel that was dozens of meters long in the Jenin refugee camp in July 2023, for instance.[vi] Israeli media separately reported in March 2024 that the IDF has found tunnel shafts in the Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, which like Jenin is close to the border with Israel.[vii]

Palestinian militias building offensive tunnels in the West Bank could be at least partly based on how Iranian leaders are planning to destroy Israel in the long term. Senior Iranian military officers are arguing that their Axis of Resistance should launch surprise ground attacks into Israel from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.[viii] Their thinking proceeds from the theory that protracted ground campaigns into Israel would disrupt the Israeli political and social order and compel Jewish citizens to flee Israel. Major General Gholam Ali Rashid, who is a senior Iranian military decisionmaker responsible for joint operations, asserted on May 4 that a force of 10,000 fighters from Lebanon, 10,000 fighters from the Gaza Strip, and 2,000-3,000 from the West Bank would be enough to destabilize Israel in this manner.[ix] The tunnels that the IDF is targeting could facilitate attacks along the lines that Iranian leaders have described by helping Palestinian fighters move into Israel and stage follow-on ground attacks.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran is capitalizing on the presence of senior Axis of Resistance officials in Tehran for Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral to coordinate and cohere their approaches to the Israel-Hamas war.
• West Bank: The IDF found militia tunnels in Jenin as part of an Israeli effort to destroy militia capabilities and tunnels in the West Bank before they can be used to attack Israel.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced that Israel would deploy additional military assets to Rafah.
• Yemen: The Houthi supreme leader announced that the Houthis attacked international shipping in the Mediterranean Sea in recent days. There is no evidence to support this claim.

Iran Update, May 22, 2024

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presided over the funeral for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and others in Tehran on May 22.[i] Ebrahim Raisi, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and six other passengers and crew members died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19.[ii] Heads of state and senior leaders from dozens of countries attended the funeral.[iii] Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Chairman of the Russian Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, and Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing, among others, attended the funeral in Tehran.[iv] Senior Axis of Resistance leaders—including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem, member of Hamas Political Bureau Osama Hamdan, and two Popular Mobilization Forces officials—also attended the funeral.[v] Many senior Iranian officials attended the ceremony. Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council Sadegh Larijani, hardline cleric and Raisi’s father-in-law Ahmad Alam ol Hoda, Assembly of Experts First Deputy Chairman Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, and Assembly of Experts member Mohsen Qomi sat in the front row next to Khamenei during the ceremony.[vi] Notable individuals who CTP-ISW did not observe attending the funeral include former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts Ahmad Khatami. IRGC-affiliated media published images of thousands of citizens in the streets of Tehran in mourning.[vii]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the prayers over the bodies of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian at Tehran University.[viii] Khamenei recited a Quranic mourning prayer over the bodies of the deceased.[ix] Ismail Haniyeh gave a speech as part of the funeral ceremony. Haniyeh praised Raisi’s support for the Palestinian resistance and claimed that Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel created a “global transformation.”[x] Iran will hold two additional funeral ceremonies in other cities on May 23.[xi] Raisi will be buried in Mashad on May 23.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stressed the continuity of Iranian foreign policy in meetings with several foreign dignitaries who attended Raisi’s funeral. Khamenei held separate meetings with senior officials from Armenia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Qatar as well as Hamas officials to emphasize Iran’s commitment to preserving ties with these actors.[xii] Iranian media claimed that officials from over 90 countries attended Raisi’s funeral procession, making Khamenei’s meeting with these seven actors particularly noteworthy.[xiii] Interim President Mohammad Mokhber and Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani attended the meetings that Khamenei held with Iraqi, Hamas, and Pakistani officials, suggesting that Khamenei is particularly concerned about projecting continuity to these actors.[xiv] It is possible that Mokhber and Bagheri Kani attended other meetings as well. Khamenei emphasized Mokhber’s presidential powers and Iran‘s uninterrupted commitment to its partnerships in several of these meetings.[xv] Iran may delay some diplomatic processes, such as negotiations, however, until it elects its next president.

The regime may seek to leverage perceived international sympathy for Raisi’s death to forge ties with new strategic partners. Iranian media and regime-affiliated social media users boasted that some Egyptian and Tunisian officials traveled to Iran for the first time to attend Raisi’s funeral and celebrated international turnout.[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presided over the funeral for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and others in Tehran.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stressed the continuity of Iranian foreign policy in meetings with several foreign dignitaries who attended Raisi’s funeral.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Jabalia.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are advancing along the Philadelphi Corridor in Rafah.
• West Bank: The IDF continued an operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in Jenin.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel’s military readiness on its northern border with several senior IDF commanders.
• Yemen: Houthi media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting the Hudaydah International Airport in Yemen.

Iran Update, May 21, 2024

The Iranian Assembly of Experts elected its leadership board on May 21, marking a new era for the body responsible for selecting the next supreme leader.[i] The Assembly of Experts is an Iranian regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor. Assembly of Experts leadership board members serve two-year terms. This is the first time since 2016 that the Assembly of Experts has not been led by influential cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.   

This Assembly of Experts leadership board election is particularly significant given Khamenei’s old age and Raisi’s recent death. Khamenei is 84 years old and will be 92 by the time of the next Assembly of Experts election in 2032.[ii] The 88 representatives elected to the Assembly of Experts in March 2024 will at least formally choose Khamenei’s successor if he dies or otherwise leaves his post before then.[iii] Other powerbrokers within the regime—such as the IRGC—will undoubtably informally influence supreme leader succession as well. It is also possible, but not certain, that one of the newly chosen Assembly of Experts leaders could succeed Khamenei as supreme leader. All of the chairmen and secretaries hold the rank of Ayatollah—a prerequisite to become supreme leader—and all of them, besides Kermani, are in their 60s.

The Assembly of Experts elected the following individuals to leadership positions:

• Chairman: Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani.[iv] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Kermani as an interim Tehran Friday prayer leader in December 2012.[v] Kermani also served as Khamenei’s representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) for 14 years between February 1992 and January 2006.[vi] Kermani previously served as the second deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts until February 2023.[vii] 55 out of 83 Assembly of Experts members voted for Kermani to become chairman.[viii] Kermani is 93 years old.[ix]
• First Deputy Chairman: Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini Bushehri.[x] Bushehri is the Qom Friday prayer leader and the head of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.[xi] The Assembly of Experts elected Bushehri to replace Kermani as the second deputy chairman in February 2023.[xii] Bushehri’s tenure as second deputy chairman overlapped with former President Ebrahim Raisi’s tenure as first deputy chairman.[xiii] Bushehri is 68 years old.
• Second Deputy Chairman: Ayatollah Ali Reza Arafi.[xiv] Khamenei appointed Arafi as the director of all seminaries across Iran in 2016.[xv] Khamenei later appointed Arafi as a member of the Guardian Council—a 12-member regime body responsible for supervising elections, vetting candidates, and approving legislation—in 2019.[xvi] Arafi has not previously held a leadership position in the Assembly of Experts. Arafi is 68 years old.
• Secretary: Ayatollah Mohsen Araki.[xvii] Khamenei appointed Araki as a member of the Expediency Discernment Council in 2022.[xviii] He has served as a member of the Assembly of Experts since 1998.[xix] The Assembly of Experts elected Araki as a cultural manager in February 2023.[xx] Araki replaced Guardian Council member and Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami as one of the Assembly of Experts secretaries.[xxi] Araki is 68 years old.
• Secretary: Ayatollah Abbas Kaabi.[xxii] Kaabi is continuing his role as a Secretary of the Assembly of Experts.[xxiii] Kaabi is 62 years old

Two anonymous sources told Reuters on May 21 that the Assembly of Experts removed former President Ebrahim Raisi from the list of potential supreme leader successors in November 2023 due to his declining popularity.[xxiv] There is reportedly a three-member committee in the Assembly of Experts that is responsible for preparing a list of potential candidates to succeed Khamenei.[xxv] Raisi was reportedly a member of this committee, so it is unclear how the Assembly of Experts could have removed his name from the list.[xxvi] One of the sources told Reuters that clerics who supported Raisi lobbied “intensively” to have his name added back to the list.[xxvii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these claims. It is notable that the sources told Reuters Raisi was no longer in the running to become supreme leader at a time when it is convenient for the Iranian regime to assure its people and those within the regime that Raisi’s death did not disrupt the supreme leader succession process.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The Iranian Assembly of Experts elected its leadership board on May 21, marking a new era for the body responsible for selecting the next supreme leader. This election is particularly important given the supreme leader’s age (84) and the recent death of the Iranian president. The assembly formally chooses the supreme leader and informally influences supreme leader succession.
• Gaza Strip: The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the IDF’s failure to hold territory after clearing it is allowing Hamas to return to previously cleared areas.
• Humanitarian Aid: The United States said that no humanitarian aid from the US-constructed temporary pier in the central Gaza Strip has reached the broader Palestinian population.
• West Bank: The IDF intentionally detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device on May 20 in Tubas.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF intercepted a “suspicious aerial target” over Syria before it entered Israeli territory.

Iran Update, May 20, 2024

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19.[i] His death upends Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s multi-year project grooming Raisi to become the next supreme leader. Khamenei has invested tremendous energy and time in preparing Raisi in recent years, appointing him to key positions and engineering the presidential election in 2021 to ensure that he won.[ii] Raisi’s death is a shock to both the day-to-day management of the Iranian government as well as to Khamenei’s long-term vision for the regime.

There is no obvious top contender to become the next supreme leader since Raisi died. One of Khamenei’s sons, Mojtaba Khamenei, is widely considered a leading candidate. Mojtaba has significant influence in the regime, especially in the internal security apparatus. Though Mojtaba certainly could replace his father, it is premature to say that he is the most likely option. Khamenei and other powerful factions that have supported Raisi for years must now reconsider who they would like to become the next supreme leader. They will not necessarily support Mojtaba. A member of the Assembly of Experts stated in February 2024 that Khamenei opposes hereditary succession, in fact.[iii]

The regime must fill several key positions in the coming days and weeks, which could provide insight into how Khamenei and other factions are considering succession since Raisi died. The Assembly of Experts, which is the regime body responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader, is scheduled to elect its leadership board on May 21.[iv] That board includes the chairman and deputy chairman, which are both currently vacant. Raisi was the previous deputy chairman. Parliament is similarly scheduled to elect a new speaker on May 27.[v] Iran will also hold a presidential election on June 28.[vi]

Khamenei will need to decide whether to interfere in any of these elections’ outcomes to prepare for succession. Any prominent cleric in one of these positions would become a natural contender for supreme leadership even though there is no legal requirement for the supreme leader to hold such offices beforehand. Khamenei could, on the other hand, refrain from making an immediate decision on who he would like to succeed him.

An indicator that Khamenei is positioning an individual to succeed him would be Khamenei allowing a cleric to become the next president or parliament speaker. This indicator would be especially strong if that cleric is in their 60s or 70s. Khamenei would probably avoid supporting a cleric much older, given that they would have a higher risk of dying and triggering another succession crisis sooner.

Iranian Interim President Mohammad Mokhber appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as head of the administration's Foreign Relations Council, making Bagheri Kani the de-facto acting foreign affairs minister, on May 20.[vii] Bagheri Kani replaces Hossein Amir Abdollahian, who died alongside Ebrahim Raisi in the helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19.[viii] Bagheri Kani will serve in his new position until the next Iranian president enters office. Bagheri Kani has held several key roles in the Iranian regime. He had been most recently the deputy foreign affairs minister for policy and lead negotiator in the nuclear talks since 2021.[ix] Bagheri Kani also served as the deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) from 2008 to 2013.[x] The SNSC is comprised of senior military and political officials and responsible for advising the supreme leader on foreign policy and national security.

The Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, has submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar, Hamas military wing commander Mohammed Deif, and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh on May 20 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity involving extermination, murder, torture, and sexual violence.[xi]

The Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, has submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on May 20 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity involving the starvation of civilians.[xii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran. His death upends Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s multi-year project grooming Raisi to become the next supreme leader.
• Israel: The International Criminal Court submitted applications to obtain arrest warrants for several Hamas and Israeli officials.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have continued to expand the extent of their clearing operation in eastern Rafah.
• Syria: Israel was likely responsible for two airstrikes targeting pro-Syrian regime targets in Syria in recent days.
• Yemen: The Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile into the Gulf of Aden.

Iran Update, May 19, 2024

A helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian crashed near Uzi, East Azerbaijan Province, Iran, on May 19.[i] It remains unclear at the time of this writing whether Raisi and Abdollahian survived the crash. First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber would temporarily serve as president if Raisi died in the crash, according to the Iranian constitution.[ii] Mokhber, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei would then have 50 days to organize a presidential election.[iii] Mokhber previously served as the head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO)—a parastatal organization directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—between 2007 and 2021.[iv] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Mokhber and the EIKO in January 2021.[v] Mokhber also previously served as the chairman of the US-sanctioned Sina Bank and as the Mostazafan Foundation’s vice president for commerce and transportation.[vi] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Sina Bank in October 2018 for financially supporting the Basij—a paramilitary organization responsible for civil defense and social control in Iran—and sanctioned the Mostazafan Foundation in November 2020.[vii]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wields ultimate decision-making authority in Iran, but Raisi still holds significant power within the regime. Raisi is the deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, a regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor.[viii] Iranians re-elected Raisi to serve as a representative of South Khorasan Province in the Assembly of Experts during the recent March 2024 Assembly of Experts elections.[ix] Raisi also holds numerous ex officio positions. He is a member of the Expediency Discernment Council and the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, and Supreme Cyber Space Council.

Raisi’s death would have serious implications for supreme leader succession. Raisi is considered one of the top contenders—along with Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei—to succeed Khamenei as supreme leader. Khamenei appointed Raisi to the position of judiciary chief in 2019 and endorsed Raisi during the August 2021 presidential elections.[x] The next several days have the potential to reshape the immediate and long-term dynamics of the regime, including supreme leader succession. Raisi’s death would ultimately not change the regime’s current trajectory toward more hardline and conservative domestic policies and more aggressive regional policies, however.

Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz threatened to leave Israel’s coalition government if the three-member war cabinet does not approve a new strategy for the war in the Gaza Strip by June 8.[xi] Gantz appealed for a strategy that prioritizes the release of hostages over the destruction of Hamas and allows residents in northern Israel to return home by September 1.[xii] Gantz also called for Israeli security control of the Gaza Strip alongside the formation of a US-European-Arab-Palestinian group to take charge of civilian administration in the Gaza Strip. This civil administration would exclude both Hamas and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[xiii] Gantz also called for an Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization deal.[xiv] The normalization deal currently calls for Palestinian statehood.[xv]  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office responded to Gantz’s ultimatum saying that Netanyahu is “determined to eliminate the Hamas battalions [and he] opposes the introduction of the Palestinian Authority into Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state.”[xvi] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant—the third member of the war cabinet—also publicly called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to define a political end state in the Gaza Strip on May 15.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: A helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian crashed in East Azerbaijan Province, Iran.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Three IDF brigades continued operations in Jabalia.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed an additional reservist brigade to Rafah.
• Gaza Strip Post War: Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz threatened to leave Israel’s coalition government if the three-member war cabinet does not approve a new strategy for the war in the Gaza Strip by June 8. Gantz appealed for a strategy that prioritizes the release of hostages over the destruction of Hamas and allows residents in northern Israel to return home by September 1.
• West Bank: Israel’s Central Command conducted a previously unannounced training exercise to prepare Israeli forces in the West Bank for “extreme scenarios.”
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 18.

Iran Update, May 17, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Jabalia.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in eastern Rafah.
• Political Negotiations: US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said that the United States believes Hamas withdrew from the latest ceasefire negotiations in the hopes of increasing pressure on Israel to end the war.
• West Bank: The IDF Air Force killed a PIJ Jenin Battalion Commander in an airstrike on a PIJ “operations room” in Jenin refugee camp.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 14 attacks into northern Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that the Houthis struck the Wind, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek-owned oil tanker, with one anti-ship ballistic missile in the Red Sea.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Council of Representatives failed to elect a new speaker.

Key Takeaways:

• Post-War Governance: Hamas is continuing to discuss its desired political end state in which a Hamas-influenced government governs the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu separately suggested he would be open to a post-war Gaza that excludes the Palestinian Authority. Several senior Israeli officials have recently criticized Netanyahu for his unwillingness to define a post-war plan.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces described the fighting in Jabalia as some of the most intense of the war.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in several areas of eastern Rafah.
• Humanitarian Aid: Aid trucks began transporting supplies from the US-constructed offshore pier into the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel.
• Iran: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed that Iran launched 162 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 100 ballistic missiles during its April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel.
• Yemen: Houthi Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi air defenses shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over a Houthi-controlled area of Ma’rib Governorate, Yemen.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting Israel.

Iran Update, May 15, 2024

The Israeli defense minister publicly called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to define a political end state in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on May 15 that “governance by non-Hamas Palestinian entities, accompanied by international actors, is in Israel’s interest.”[i] Gallant added that he rejected Israeli civil or military governance in the Strip. Gallant said that his statement was necessary because “the gains of the war are being eroded and Israel’s long-term security is at stake.”[ii] Gallant was responding to an earlier statement by Netanyahu in which Netanyahu argued that it would be irrelevant to discuss the post-war plans until Hamas is destroyed.[iii]

This public disagreement between Netanyahu and Gallant comes after IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi privately demanded a post-war plan from Netanyahu and called current Israeli re-clearing operations a “Sisyphean task.”[iv] Halevi made these comments during a cabinet meeting sometime between May 10 and 12.[v] The Washington Post reported that Halevi’s private comments reflected the opinions of “many Israeli security officials.”[vi] Other senior IDF officials also demanded ”political leaders...make decisions and formulate a strategy,” according to Israeli media.[vii] Israeli media also reported that Israeli cabinet officials told the prime minister that his failure to make decisions was ”risking lives.”[viii] These disagreements come as the IDF reentered Zaytoun, a neighborhood in southern Gaza City, for the third time since February 2024 and other IDF units began a major, division-sized operation in Jabalia.[ix] The IDF previously fought in Jabalia in December 2023 before withdrawing.[x]

Military action should be designed and executed with a defined political end state to guide military operations and avoid actions that will undermine the successful achievement of the political end state. This is particularly important when the requirement for a military operation’s success is the development and stability of a new government in the area of operations. The political echelon should define a political end state to enable military commanders to design military operations to successfully meet the political end. Military commanders planning operations that lack a political end state will be unable to plan and execute effective operations because the commanders will not understand how their mission fits into the political objective of eliminating Hamas’ government. Destroying Hamas is a military task, but it is not necessarily a political end state without a vision for the post-war Gaza Strip. Some actions that could destroy Hamas’ military capabilities may fail to support the establishment of a new government. Other actions could ultimately undermine Israel’s ability to replace Hamas with a new governing authority in the Gaza Strip. The articulation of a political end state is important to avoid the risks of such outcome.

CTP-ISW continues to assess that there is no sustainable end to this conflict if Hamas remains a political and military entity in the Gaza Strip. Hamas aims to destroy Israel and replace it with an Islamist Palestinian state controlling all Israeli territory. Hamas has said publicly that it can “accept the interim liberation of parts of Palestine” and an “interim truce” but that these interim steps only “serve as a warrior’s rest stop.”[xi] ”Parts of Palestine“ in this context refers to the Gaza Strip. A ceasefire that leaves Hamas in power would serve Hamas’ purposes by allowing the group to prepare for the next round of fighting. Hamas started the current war by breaking a period of relative calm between itself and Israel on October 6, and there is no reason to believe Hamas will honor a future “truce.”

Reuters reported on May 15 that Jordanian security services thwarted an attempt by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons to a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell in Jordan in late March 2024.[xii] Jordanian security services arrested an unspecified number of Jordanians of Palestinian descent who were “members of the Brotherhood cell” and seized a cache of unspecified smuggled weapons, according to two anonymous Jordanian sources. The Brotherhood cell members intended to use the weapons to conduct “acts of sabotage” to destabilize Jordan, according to the sources. The unspecified Jordanian sources also claimed that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell is linked to Hamas’ military wing. An anonymous senior Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood representative claimed that senior Hamas leader Saleh al Arouri—who the Israelis killed in January 2024—recruited the arrested cell members.[xiii] Hamas denied on May 15 that it planned to stoke instability in Jordan.[xiv] The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood acknowledged that Jordanian security forces arrested some of its members and that these members possessed smuggled weapons but claimed that Brotherhood leadership did not approve the smuggling of weapons to Jordan.[xv] It is nonetheless notable that Iranian-backed militias and a senior Hamas leader were able to recruit and then smuggle weapons to a cell in Jordan.

The Iranian-backed attempt to arm a Muslim Brotherhood cell in Jordan supports CTP-ISW's previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[xvi] Jordan has thwarted numerous attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to smuggle weapons—including Claymore mines, C4 and Semtex explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, and 107mm Katyusha rockets—to the West Bank and Jordan.[xvii]

Bloomberg reported on May 15 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s understanding of Iranian "nuclear ambitions" has deteriorated, citing the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report.[xviii]. The IAEA released the report to diplomats who will attend the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on June 3. The report stated that the IAEA's understanding of Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentration has decreased despite an eight percent increase in the number of IAEA inspections in Iran in 2023. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in the report that there has been little progress in resolving outstanding safeguards issues. Grossi added that the IAEA cannot provide ”assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program” unless Iran resolves the outstanding safeguards issues. Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium increased by 145 kilograms in the last quarter.

Grossi separately stated on May 15 that Iranian officials “must stop” normalizing discussions about procuring a nuclear weapon. Some Iranian officials have warned in recent weeks that Iran could change its nuclear doctrine, as CTP-ISW has repeatedly noted.[xix]  Grossi stated that Iran must "meaningfully engage” with the IAEA so that the IAEA can guarantee that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in nature.

Key Takeaways:

• Post-War Plan for the Gaza Strip: Senior Israeli officials are publicly disagreeing over a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip. The Israeli defense minister demanded a post-war plan from Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the IDF chief of staff called current Israeli operations a “Sisyphean task” unless a post-war plan is established.
• Military action should be designed and executed with a defined political end state to guide military operations and avoid actions that will undermine the successful achievement of the political end state. Destroying Hamas is a military task, but it is not necessarily a political end state without a vision for the post-war Gaza Strip.
• CTP-ISW continues to assess that there is no sustainable end to this conflict if Hamas remains a political and military entity in the Gaza Strip. A ceasefire that leaves Hamas in power would serve Hamas’ purposes by allowing the group to prepare for the next round of fighting.
• Jordan: Jordanian security services arrested several Jordanians of Palestinian descent and seized a weapons cache that Iranian-backed militias had smuggled from Syria into Jordan with the involvement of the apprehended Jordanians. The Brotherhood cell members reportedly intended to use the weapons to conduct “acts of sabotage” to destabilize Jordan.
• Iran: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s understanding of Iranian "nuclear ambitions" has deteriorated, according to the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report. The IAEA Director General said that Iranian officials “must stop” normalizing discussions about procuring a nuclear weapon
• Lebanon: The IDF killed a senior Hezbollah field commander in a drone strike in Tyre, southern Lebanon, on May 14.

Iran Update, May 14, 2024

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations on May 14 into areas of Jabalia refugee camp that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had not previously cleared. Two IDF brigades advanced into the center of the Jabalia refugee camp.[i] Israeli forces initially conducted clearing operations in Jabalia city and refugee camp in November 2023, but the IDF had not advanced into center of the camp before this operation.[ii]

Palestinian militias have sustained the highest number of claimed attacks per day around Jabalia since the war began. Palestinian militias have claimed 86 attacks (an average of roughly 28 attacks per day) targeting Israeli forces since the IDF advanced into eastern Jabalia on May 11.[iii] This rate of attack exceeds the level seen during a similar operation in Zaytoun, when the militias claimed 92 attacks (an average of roughly 10 attacks per day) over a nine-day period during the IDF’s first re-clearing operation in Zaytoun.[iv] The militias have preserved or rebuilt the personnel and material required to contest Israeli raids in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas will likely be able to compensate for any losses it takes during this Israeli operation by rebuilding its units in the Jabalia refugee camp after the IDF withdraws, given the IDF’s clear-leave-repeat strategy.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are sustaining a very high daily rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia. The IDF is currently conducting two re-clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli operations continued in eastern Rafah and around the Rafah border crossing.
• Iran: Iranian media identified former Iranian Ambassador to Iraq and IRGC Quds Force Brig. Gen. Eraj Masjedi as the IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy for the first time on May 14. The coordination deputy is the third highest-ranking officer in the IRGC Quds Force.
• West Bank: Israeli civilians set fire to two humanitarian aid trucks bound for the Gaza Strip at a checkpoint between Israel and the West Bank.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah fired several anti-tank guided missiles targeting an Israeli surveillance balloon and equipment associated with it in successive attacks.

Iran Update, May 13, 2024

Palestinian militias, including Hamas, claimed an unusually high number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on May 13, demonstrating that these militias remain combat effective and retain a significant force presence there. This supports CTP-ISW’s assessment that Hamas and the other Palestinian militias remain active beyond just Rafah in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias claimed 33 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia, marking the most attacks claimed in a single day in 2024.[i]

Hamas has exploited Israeli withdrawals from the northern Gaza Strip to begin reconstituting there, which has in turn led Israeli forces to return to areas to re-clear them. Israeli forces moved back into Jabalia on May 11 after the IDF assessed that Hamas and other Palestinian militias were rebuilding their capabilities and networks there. There had been until now few claimed Palestinian attacks in Jabalia since January 2024 likely due to an absence of Israeli targets—rather than because the militias were destroyed.[ii] Israeli forces have also launched a clearing operation into Zaytoun neighborhood on May 8, marking the third time that the IDF has conducted a clearing operation there.[iii] Hamas exploits the fact that these Israeli clearing operations involve targeted raids. Hamas moves away into other areas during the Israeli operation, allowing Hamas to preserve some of its forces.[iv] Hamas and the other Palestinian militias will almost certainly resume their reconstitution efforts in these neighborhoods after Israeli forces complete their current clearing operations there.

Senior US officials have indicated concerns that Hamas will survive in the Gaza Strip. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned on May 12 that without an alternative to Hamas, Israel will achieve unsustainable successes and ultimately Hamas would return to power.[v] US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told CNN that the United States doesn’t believe that Israel’s goal of a total victory over Hamas is ”likely or possible.”[vi]

Iran is continuing to signal publicly that it could pursue a nuclear weapon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi stated during an annual Arab-Iranian dialogue conference on May 13 that Iran would need to change its nuclear doctrine if it faced threats from nuclear-armed countries.[vii] This threat is particularly noteworthy given that Kharrazi is a senior adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kharrazi similarly stated during an interview with al Jazeera on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened Iran existentially.[viii] That Kharrazi made both comments to Arabic-speaking audiences suggests that he meant to signal to Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in particular. CTP-ISW has observed that Iranian officials have normalized public discussion about pursuing a nuclear weapon in recent months.[ix]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias, including Hamas, claimed an unusually high number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip, demonstrating that these militias remain combat effective and retain a significant force presence there.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to signal publicly that it could pursue a nuclear weapon.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct a clearing operating in eastern Rafah and at the Rafah border crossing with Egypt.
• Political Negotiations: US President Joe Biden said that there would be a “ceasefire tomorrow” in the Gaza Strip if Hamas would release the remaining Israeli hostages.
• West Bank: The Israeli Tsav 9 group organized protesters to block humanitarian aid trucks bound for the Gaza Strip at a border crossing between Israel and the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: A Lebanese newspaper reported that Hezbollah is evading Israeli air defenses by using drones in its attacks into northern Israel, citing Iranian-backed sources.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani requested that the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) permanently end its mission in Iraq by the end of 2025.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted a Houthi drone over the Gulf of Aden.

Iran Update, May 12, 2024

• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli ground forces advanced into Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued a "precise operation" targeting Hamas in eastern Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Iran Update, May 11, 2024

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians around Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, due to Hamas reconstituting militarily there.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF issued expanded its evacuation orders for civilians around Rafah, extending the evacuation zone to two refugee camps and nearby neighborhoods.
• West Bank: CTP-ISW did not record any engagements between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one attack targeting Israel.

Iran Update, May 10, 2024

Palestinian militias conducted at least 17 attacks targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Zaytoun on May 10, suggesting that Hamas was able either to preserve or reconstitute military capability in Zaytoun despite IDF operations there.[i] The IDF launched a re-clearing operation into Zaytoun neighborhood, southern Gaza City, on May 8, marking the third time that the IDF has conducted a clearing operation there.[ii] Hamas infiltrated and began reconstituting itself in the northern Strip after the IDF withdrew from the area in December 2023.[iii] Hamas fighters used snipers, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars in five of the 17 attacks in the Zaytoun area.[iv] This high rate of attacks is not consistent with a destroyed military force. A destroyed military force temporarily or permanently loses the will or means to fight.[v] Palestinian militias retain the will and the means to continue disrupting and defending against IDF raids, as evidenced by the rate of Palestinian militia attacks during this raid.

The resilience of Hamas and other Palestinian militia groups in Zaytoun is a strong indicator that an IDF operation in Rafah will not destroy Hamas. Hamas has survived as a military entity in the remainder of the Strip, including throughout the north.  Hamas is active outside of Zaytoun in areas the IDF has not attempted to re-clear.[vi] The group has conducted attacks targeting Israeli forces east of Jabalia, six kilometers north of Zaytoun.[vii] These attacks indicate that Hamas cells have a rear area from which they can mount attacks on IDF units operating along the Gaza Strip-Israel border. These safe areas are probably in Jabalia or northern Shujaiya.[viii] The IDF has not conducted operations in either of these areas since it began drawing down its forces in the Gaza Strip.

Iranian hardliners are continuing to discuss Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon. A hardline Iranian parliamentarian speculated that Iran had developed nuclear weapons in an interview on May 10.[ix] Newly-elected Parliamentarian Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani told the moderate-aligned Rouydad 24 outlet that Iran had obtained nuclear weapons but had not and would not announce that it had nuclear weapons. Ardestani’s comments were speculative in nature, and he is likely unable to such information in his current role. Ardestani’s comments follow Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi‘s comment in an al Jazeera interview on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatens Iran’s existence.[x] These statements align with International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Rafael Grossi’s May 8 comments that the agency was working ”very hard with [Iran] to prevent [nuclear weaponization] from happening,” suggesting that Iran has already obtained or is close to obtaining the ability to procure nuclear weapons.[xi]

These discussions coincide with an April 2024 report that claimed that Iran is attempting to obtain 300 tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger.[xii] A French investigative outlet reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger have been negotiating a deal since late 2023 for Iran to provide military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake. This quantity is significant given that Iran announced in 2019 that it intended to produce 300 tons of yellowcake per year by 2024. A Nigerien delegation notably traveled to Tehran in January 2024 and signed unspecified agreements with Iranian officials, including Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani. Ashtiani is responsible for managing the Iranian defense industry, including arms procurement and sales. Niger ended its counterterrorism partnership with the United States in March 2024 after US officials accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to Nigerien uranium reserves. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the new Iranian ambassador to Niger the same day that Niger suspended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.

Iranian-Zimbabwean cooperation has also increased in recent weeks amid Iranian hardliner comments about the Iranian nuclear program, as CTP previously reported.[xiii] Zimbabwe participated in the inaugural Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Conference, for example, in Esfahan City between May 6-8.[xiv] The Times claimed in 2013 that Zimbabwe had signed an agreement with Iran to sell materials for Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which Zimbabwe has since denied.[xv] No further reporting has corroborated The Times’ 2013 report.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The large number of Palestinian militia attacks in Zaytoun targeting Israeli forces suggests that Hamas was able either to preserve or reconstitute military capability in Zaytoun despite previous IDF operations there.
• Iran: Iranian hardliners are continuing to discuss Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon.
• Rafah: The Israeli cabinet reportedly unanimously approved an expansion of the Rafah operation, but the IDF operations in Rafah remained limited on May 10.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed five attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on May 9.

Iran Update, May 9, 2024

Israeli forces are re-clearing parts of the northern Gaza Strip, demonstrating that Hamas remains active beyond just Rafah.[i] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a clearing operation into Zaytoun neighborhood, southern Gaza City, on May 8, marking the third time that the IDF has conducted a clearing operation there.[ii] The IDF began by conducting airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia observation posts, sniper positions and tunnels.[iii] Three IDF brigades subsequently entered the area.[iv] These brigades have since then engaged Palestinian militias, including Hamas, in Zaytoun as well as in nearby Sabra neighborhood and along the Netzarim corridor.[v] A Palestinian social media account reported that civilians are evacuating areas in and around Zaytoun since the Israeli clearing operation began there.[vi]

This most recent Israeli clearing operation highlights that Hamas remains active and combat effective in the northern Gaza Strip, despite repeated Israeli clearing efforts there. Hamas infiltrated and began reconstituting itself in the northern part of the strip after the IDF withdrew from the area in December 2023.[vii] Hamas has since then conducted dozens of attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the northern Gaza Strip.[viii] Hamas is almost certainly trying to reconstitute around Khan Younis since the IDF left there in April 2024.

Hamas’ remaining presence throughout the Gaza Strip supports CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas expects that it would survive an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[ix] Hamas likely calculates that it could rebuild itself in Rafah in the same way that it is currently in the northern Gaza Strip. This confidence has informed Hamas’ decision to maintain its maximalist ceasefire demands since December 2023.

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the IDF will need to continue to conduct clearing operations around the Gaza Strip until there are serious conversations about a replacement to Hamas as a local governing authority.[x] The absence of a governing authority, including a local security force besides Hamas, will provide Hamas space and time to reassert itself in the strip.

Iran and Zimbabwe have held a flurry of meetings in recent weeks to discuss economic, military, and political cooperation. Zimbabwean Science and Technology Minister Amon Murwira has most recently led a delegation to attend an international technology exhibition in Tehran between May 7-10.[xi] The exhibition is at least ostensibly meant to promote business cooperation between Iranian and foreign companies. The Iranian Defense Industries Training and Research Institute is participating in the exhibition, suggesting that Iran wants to use the event to promote military cooperation as well.[xii] The institute, which operates under the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, is responsible for designing military equipment and systems and working with foreign partners to gain technical knowledge of advanced weapons systems.[xiii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami previously served as the head of this institute.[xiv] Murwira met with the Iranian vice president for science, technology, and the knowledge-based economy on the sidelines of the exhibition on May 8.[xv]

This exhibition follows other recent engagements between Iran and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, among other Iranian officials, in Tehran in late April 2024.[xvi] Zimbabwe also participated in the inaugural Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Conference in Esfahan City between May 6-8.[xvii] [xviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are re-clearing parts of the northern Gaza Strip, demonstrating that Hamas remains active beyond just Rafah.
• Iran: Iran and Zimbabwe have held a flurry of meetings in recent weeks to discuss economic, military, and political cooperation.
• Southern Gaza Strip: US President Joe Biden said that the United States will stop supplying Israel with certain weapons if Israel conducts a major military operation into Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three attacks targeting Israel.
• Syria: Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike targeting a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba site in Sayyida Zeinab, Syria.
• Yemen: Houthi supreme leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said during a speech that the Houthis would escalate attacks against Israel following Israel’s limited operation into Rafah.

Iran Update, May 8, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ leaders have very likely calculated that Hamas will survive a Rafah operation and that Hamas should therefore pursue its maximalist ceasefire demands without major concessions. Both Hamas and Israel said on May 8 that talks are stalled.
• Hamas After Rafah: Hamas will likely survive a major Israeli operation in Rafah if a major operation occurs because Hamas continues to control and operate from territory in the Gaza Strip outside of Rafah.
• United States-Israel Relations: The limited Israeli operation to seize the Rafah crossing does not require a shift in US policy toward the war, according to US officials. The US Secretary of Defense confirmed that the United States paused a munitions shipment bound for Israel, however.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued a limited operation targeting Hamas fighters and infrastructure in eastern Rafah on May 8.
• Iraq: The IDF confirmed that it intercepted an “aerial target” approaching Israel from the east after Iranian-backed militias in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting southern Israel.
• Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis conducted four attacks targeting maritime shipping on May 6 and 7

Iran Update, May 7, 2024

Israeli forces launched a limited ground operation to control the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces advanced into eastern Rafah and took control of the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it began a “precise, intelligence-based counterterrorism operation” aimed at eliminating Hamas military infrastructure in eastern Rafah.[i] The IDF reported that Hamas fired mortars from the Rafah crossing into Israel on May 5, killing four Israeli soldiers and wounding others.[ii] Israeli forces advanced along the Egyptian border with the Gaza Strip to the Rafah border crossing and took “operational control” of the area.[iii] Israeli media reported that the IDF chose to capture the crossing given its role in smuggling advanced weapons between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in the past.[iv] CTP-ISW has not observed instances of weapons smuggling between the Gaza Strip and Egypt during the current war.

Hamas reported that its fighters fired a rocket-propelled grenade at an Israeli tank and proceeded to fire small arms at Israeli soldiers in al Shoka al Sufi neighborhood north of the Rafah crossing.[v] Several other Palestinian fighters fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces advancing in eastern Rafah.[vi] The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters drove an explosive-laden car toward an IDF tank before Israeli forces struck it.[vii] Israeli forces killed approximately 20 Palestinian fighters overnight and located three tunnel shafts.[viii]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on May 7 that Israeli forces are operating in Rafah and will continue “until the absolute victory.”[ix] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz said the Israeli military operation in Rafah will ”continue and expand as necessary.”[x] The US State Department spokesperson said that the Israeli operation to the Rafah crossing appears to be limited at this time, but that it ”does look like prelude of a major military operation.”[xi] The operation followed Israeli evacuation orders for approximately 100,000 Gazans in eastern Rafah. These evacuation orders instructed the Gazans to temporarily evacuate to the humanitarian zone north of Rafah.[xii] Israeli tanks entered the Gaza Strip after Hamas altered and then approved the ceasefire agreement on May 6.[xiii]

Hamas acknowledged that the deal it “accepted” on May 6 satisfied its maximalist demands.[xiv] Indirect ceasefire negotiations continued between Israel and Hamas in Cairo on May 7. Israel did not receive the proposal on May 6 until an hour after Hamas “accepted” the deal.[xv] Hamas and Israel both sent delegations to the May 7 indirect talks.[xvi] The ongoing talks suggest that Hamas’ May 6 “accepted” proposal is better understood as a new counterproposal for a maximalist ceasefire. Hamas has not changed its maximalist demands in negotiations since December 2023. Hamas senior official Osama Hamdan acknowledged on May 7 that Hamas had not altered these maximalist demands in its latest proposal and that it had “set red lines that cannot be touched or given up.”[xvii] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz said that the Israeli delegation “doesn’t just have a mandate to listen—it has an obligation to turn over every stone and act to bring about an outline.”[xviii]

Hamas’ high-level delegation arrived in Cairo on May 7 after Israeli forces began a limited ground operation in Rafah.[xix] Hamas threatened on May 6 to halt negotiations if Israeli forces began a ground operation into Rafah.[xx]

Iranian officials appear increasingly confident in their view that the Axis of Resistance has the advantage against Israel and will ultimately destroy Israel. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said during a speech commemorating the April 1 death of senior IRGC commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in an Israeli airstrike that Israel is “approaching the end of its political life” despite the West’s support for Israel.[xxi] Salami added that Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel represented a complete intelligence failure by Israel that showed how “vulnerable some countries are to a limited invasion.” Salami added that the October 7 attack pushed Israel to the “brink of death.” Salami’s statement follows an interview from Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid, who is the commander of the Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, in which Rashid described a multi-front ground attack into Israel that could destroy the Israeli state.[xxii] Salami, in an earlier interview in August 2022, described a very similar concept that included successive ground attacks into Israel on multiple fronts with increasing frequency.[xxiii]

Iranian and Axis of Resistance officials are also placing increasing emphasis on operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Salami stated that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are “closing the way for the enemy” in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[xxiv] Other Iranian and Axis of Resistance officials have made similar claims recently. The Houthi movement announced on May 3 that it commenced the ”fourth phase” of escalation against Israel by targeting ships in the Mediterranean Sea.[xxv] A top Iranian military adviser to the supreme leader said in March that the Mediterranean Sea is part of Iran’s strategic depth and that Tehran must accordingly “increase [its] strategic depth [by] 5,000 kilometers.”[xxvi] Five thousand kilometers from Iran would extend to the Strait of Gibraltar. These statements suggest that Iran and its regional partners are putting an increased emphasis on the Mediterranean as an arena in which it could pressure Israel and others as needed.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces launched a limited ground operation to control the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas acknowledged that the deal it “accepted” on May 6 satisfied its maximalist demands. Israel did not receive the proposal that Hamas accepted until one hour after Hamas accepted the deal on May 6.
• Iranian Views of the War: Iranian officials appear increasingly confident in their view that the Axis of Resistance has the advantage against Israel and will ultimately destroy Israel.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Kurdistan Region president is on a rare visit to Tehran and met with the IRGC commander.
• Lebanon: The IRGC Quds Force commander reportedly traveled to Lebanon in April, possibly to coordinate with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah after the death of the primary Quds Force interlocutor with Hezbollah in an Israeli airstrike in April.

Iran Update, May 6, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began conducting targeted airstrikes against Palestinian militias in eastern Rafah on May 6.[i] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated on May 6 that the IDF Air Force struck 50 targets around Rafah in the past day as part of preparations for a clearing operation into Rafah.[ii] Local journalists posted geolocated footage from May 5 and 6 showing extensive Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire into eastern Rafah.[iii] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported that the airstrikes killed at least 30 Palestinians in Rafah overnight.[iv] The IDF Air Force has previously conducted airstrike waves as part of shaping efforts to enable ground maneuvers necessary to clearing operations.[v]

Israeli officials suggested on May 6 that an Israeli clearing operation into eastern Rafah is imminent. The Office of the Israeli Prime Minister announced on May 6 that Israel would “continue the operation in Rafah to exert military pressure on Hamas” to achieve Israeli war aims.[vi] An official in the Israeli war cabinet told Israeli media that the Rafah operation will likely start ”this week.”[vii] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, and the head of the IDF Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk, discussed ”the IDF’s expected operational plans in the Gaza Strip, with an emphasis on the Rafah area” on May 6.[viii] Gallant previously told Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on May 5 that he anticipates ”a powerful operation in Rafah in the near future" because Israel has ”identified signs that Hamas does not intend” to reach a ceasefire agreement with Israel.[ix] A Hamas senior official said on May 6 that an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah would ”put negotiations in jeopardy” and threatened a strong military response.[x]

The IDF issued evacuation orders on May 6 for the parts of eastern Rafah targeted by the Israeli air campaign.[xi] The IDF estimates that 100,000 Gazans are currently in this area.[xii] The evacuation order directed the evacuees to an expanded “humanitarian services area” in Khan Younis.[xiii] The IDF first announced the expansion of the al Mawasi humanitarian zone on April 28 but announced additional details on May 6 about the services available in the expanded area.[xiv] The IDF says the zone north of Rafah “includes field hospitals, tents, and increased amounts of food, water, medicine, and other supplies.”[xv] Israeli ground forces have cleared much of the area to which evacuees are instructed to move. The IDF also warned Gazans against approaching the Egyptian or Israeli borders and that north of Wadi Gaza is “still a dangerous combat zone.”[xvi] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the evacuation zone covers three Hamas battalions' areas of responsibility.[xvii]

Iran Update, May 5, 2024

The Israeli defense minister said that Israel does not believe Hamas will agree to a ceasefire. The Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on May 5 that he anticipates ”a powerful operation in Rafah in the near future" because Israel has ”identified signs that Hamas does not intend” to agree to a ceasefire.[i] Gallant made the comment during a visit to the Netzarim Corridor.[ii] The IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi visited the central Gaza Strip on May 3 to tour IDF positions and discuss IDF operations with IDF Southern Command commander Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and 99th Division commander Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram.[iii] Halevi told the IDF 2nd Infantry Brigade and 679th Armored Brigades that "we have many more tasks ahead of us."[iv]

Hamas highlighted its maximalist ceasefire demands in two official statements on May 5.[v] A Hamas negotiating delegation left Cairo to consult with Hamas leadership about the ceasefire talks on May 5.[vi] An unspecified official with knowledge of the negotiations told Israeli media on May 5 that talks are ”near collapse” after the Hamas delegation left Cairo.[vii] Hamas did acknowledge that the talks are continuing. Hamas said that it delivered its response to Egyptian and Qatari mediators and held “in-depth and serious discussions” about the response.[viii] Hamas’ May 5 statement reiterated the group’s maximalist and unchanged negotiating position, which maintains that any ceasefire needs to “completely” end the war, accomplish a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, return displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip, intensify aid and reconstruction, and complete a hostage-for-prisoner swap.[ix] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on May 5 that Hamas is interested in reaching a ”comprehensive interconnected agreement” but questioned the function of an agreement ”if a ceasefire is not its first outcome.”[x]

Hamas fighters targeted Israeli forces near Kerem Shalom with indirect fire from Rafah on May 5.[xi] Hamas fired at least 10 short range 114mm rockets and mortars.[xii] A Hamas military wing source told Palestinian media that the attack targeted an IDF ”operational headquarters responsible for coordinating artillery attacks on Rafah.“[xiii] Local Israeli government officials said that the rockets struck an open area near a military position and caused injuries.[xiv] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the attack injured at least 10 people.[xv] The IDF said that Hamas fired the rockets from a site about 350 meters from civilian shelters. The IDF Air Force struck the launch site shortly after the attack.[xvi]  The IDF closed the Kerem Shalom crossing and inspection point in response to the rocket attack.[xvii] The Kerem Shalom crossing functions as the main entry point of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. It remains unclear how long the IDF will keep the crossing closed.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: A Hamas rocket attack forced the IDF to pause operations at a key aid inspection site in southern Israel.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Israeli defense minister said that Israel does not believe Hamas will agree to a ceasefire. Hamas highlighted its maximalist ceasefire demands in two official statements on May 5.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank on May 4 after CTP-ISW's last data cut off.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 4.

Iran Update, May 4, 2024

• Gaza Strip: Four Palestinian militias conducted at least eight indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim corridor on May 3 and 4.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas is expected to present an official response to the proposal during the current ceasefire talks. A senior Hamas official said that Hamas is skeptical Israel will implement the ceasefire given internal Israeli politics.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 3.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 3.

Iran Update, May 3, 2024

The Houthi movement said it will expand targeting of maritime shipping into the Mediterranean Sea, which is probably part of an Iranian-led effort to impose an unofficial economic blockade on Israel. The Houthi movement announced on May 3 that it will begin targeting ships in the eastern Mediterranean that are bound for Israel. The Houthi military spokesperson called this the “fourth phase of escalation.” The Houthis' Shahed-136 can reach the eastern Mediterranean.[i] Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have repeatedly called for an unofficial blockade on Israel in recent months.[ii] Tehran and its allies appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said in recent months that part of their theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel.[iii]

The Houthis will likely fail to disrupt trade around Israel’s Mediterranean ports in the same way that the Houthis did around the Red Sea. The Houthis have been somewhat successful in decreasing the amount of imports entering Israel from Eilat port. Eilat saw an 80 to 85% drop in revenue between November and December 2023.[iv] The Houthis can achieve this effect because the movement can launch dozens of short-range drones and missiles into the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The distances involved in targeting the Mediterranean Sea means that the Houthis have a much more limited suite of munitions to choose from and thus a more limited stockpile of individual systems to use. The Houthis also presumably lack a robust targeting regime in the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the Iranian Behshad supports Houthi targeting in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[v]

The same capabilities that enable the Houthis to target the Mediterranean to impose costs on Israel can be used in future conflicts—including or excluding Israel—to threaten maritime shipping and impose costs on the West. Both the Houthis and Iran have expressed aspirations to improve their capabilities to enable attacks into the Indian Ocean and Straits of Gibraltar, thus preventing shipping from entering the Mediterranean Sea or traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[vi] Attacks targeting these shipping lanes could severely impact global shipping prices. The Houthis or Iran could improve upon the capabilities they are currently employing in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to impose economic costs on the West in the future. The Houthis and Iran could impose these costs at times and for reasons of their own choosing.

Hamas is delaying its response to an Egyptian-proposed ceasefire that satisfies Hamas’ maximalist demands. The ceasefire proposal includes a three phased plan for the release of Israeli hostages, a ceasefire lasting up to five years, and the gradual withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Hamas believes any ceasefire is an interim “rest” before Israel’s ultimate destruction.[vii] The head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, is the key decisionmaker in the negotiations because he has control over Hamas’ forces in the Gaza Strip. Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 3 that Sinwar has not yet responded to the proposal.[viii] Sinwar has previously refused ceasefire proposals.[ix] US and Israeli officials have noted since April 2024 that Hamas has been intransigent on negotiations and refusing to agree to a ceasefire despite Israeli concessions.[x]

The Netanyahu government is seeking regional involvement in a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu’s government is considering shared “oversight” of the Gaza Strip with the United States and some Arab countries after the war according to Israeli officials cited by the New York Times.[xi] The United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates would share responsibility for redevelopment, education, and security in the Gaza Strip for a period lasting between seven to ten years. Gazans would vote to join a unified Palestinian state with the West Bank after the oversight period. The proposal does not specify if the unified government would constitute a sovereign Palestinian state according to the New York Times. Unspecified Arab officials have rejected the plan because it does not outline a clear path towards a Palestinian state. Israel would share these responsibilities in exchange for diplomatic normalization with Saudi Arabia.

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The Houthi movement said it will expand its attacks into the eastern Mediterranean. The Houthis' Shahed-136 can reach the eastern Mediterranean, but Houthi attacks into the Mediterranean will probably be less effective than their attacks into the Red Sea.
• The same capabilities that enable the Houthis to target the Mediterranean to impose costs on Israel can be used in future conflicts—including or excluding Israel—to threaten maritime shipping and impose costs on the West.
• Ceasefire Negotiation: Hamas is slowing its response to an Egyptian-proposed ceasefire that satisfies Hamas’ maximalist demands.
• Post-War Gaza Strip: The Netanyahu government is seeking Saudi, Emirati, US, and Egyptian involvement in the post-war Gaza Strip.
• Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias conducted indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Netzarim corridor.
• West Bank: Israeli security services seized a shipment of smuggled M4/M16 rifle components. These components cannot be assembled into complete rifles, but their existence implies additional shipments with the remaining components for a complete rifle.
• Iran: The Tehran interim prayer leader said that Iran’s April 13 attack targeting Israel served as a useful cross-border exercise between Iran and its regional partner and proxy militias. This suggests that Iran is learning from the April 13 attack to improve its capabilities for future operations.

Iran Update, May 2, 2024

A Lebanese media outlet published on May 1 the purported text of the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire agreement that Hamas is considering.[i] The reported proposal addresses all of Hamas’ maximalist demands except for a permanent ceasefire.[ii] Hamas would not likely adhere to a permanent ceasefire, however, given that Hamas has violated previous ceasefires and that Hamas remains committed to destroying Israel.[iii]

The purported Egyptian-proposed ceasefire agreement contains three phases and meets Hamas’ demands for a temporary ceasefire, the release of Palestinian prisoners, the delivery of more humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and the reconstruction of the strip.[iv] The first 40-day phase would require Hamas to release at least 33 living Israeli hostages who are elderly, female, or injured in exchange for a temporary pause in fighting. The first phase also stipulates that the IDF withdraw eastward away from the populated areas of the Gaza Strip. The IDF would conduct a phased withdrawal from most of the Netzarim corridor to allow displaced Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip. Israel would furthermore allow the entry of 500 aid trucks into the Gaza Strip daily and cease aerial surveillance of the strip for parts of the day. Israel and Hamas would enter indirect negotiations to “restore sustainable calm” after the 16th day of the pause in fighting. Egyptian sources indicated to Western media that the “sustainable calm” could last up to a year.[v] The second phase of the proposed ceasefire reportedly stipulates that Hamas would release the remaining male Israeli civilians and soldiers in exchange for a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the release of an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners. The third phase includes both sides exchanging dead bodies and the implementation of a five-year rehabilitation plan for the Gaza Strip. Hamas would be barred from rebuilding its military infrastructure during the five-year period, according to the Lebanese report.

Hamas has repeatedly refused to accept any ceasefire that does not meet its maximalist demands.[vi] Hamas has not changed these demands since December 2023.[vii] Hamas Political Bureau member Osama Hamdan said in an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on May 2 that Hamas’ position on the ceasefire proposal is “negative” and that Hamas would stop negotiating if Israel launches a clearing operation into Rafah.[viii]

Accepting the ceasefire is inherently contradictory to Hamas’ objective of destroying Israel.[ix] Hamas initiated the current war by breaking a period of relative calm in its attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. A “permanent” truce would provide Hamas time to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its political authority in the Gaza Strip, which CTP-ISW has previously assessed Hamas is trying to do.[x]

An Iranian-backed Bahraini militia claimed to have conducted a drone strike on the Israeli port city of Eilat on April 27.[xi] Saraya al Ashtar claimed the strike on May 2 and said that it targeted the headquarters of Israeli transportation company Trucknet Enterprise in Eilat.[xii] There is no definitive evidence at this time that the group conducted an attack, though Saraya al Ashtar published a video of its fighters launching a drone in an unspecified location.[xiii] Saraya al Ashtar suggested that it was part of a larger group called the Islamic Resistance in Bahrain and vowed that it would continue its attacks until Israel ends its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[xiv] This statement marks the first time that Saraya al Ashtar has signaled its participation in the Israel-Hamas war.

The claimed attack is part of the Iranian-led campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. Saraya al Ashtar emphasized the role of Trucknet Enterprise in facilitating Israeli overland trade.[xv] Trucknet Enterprise signed several agreements with Emirati companies in December 2023 to organize overland trade to the Persian Gulf and to mitigate the impact of Houthi attacks on international shipping.[xvi] Houthi attacks have reduced commercial operations at the port of Eilat and thus driven Israel to rely more on land routes through Jordan and the Gulf states to the Persian Gulf.[xvii] Saraya al Ashtar likely claimed the attack, regardless of whether it occurred, to deter companies and the Gulf states from supporting overland Israeli trade.

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have repeatedly called for an unofficial blockade on Israel in recent months.[xviii] Houthi attacks on international shipping are part of this effort. Iran has also threatened the United Arab Emirates for cooperating with Israel, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have emphasized the need to severe the Israeli “land bridge” that passes through Jordan.[xix] Tehran and its allies appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said in recent months that part of their theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel.

Saraya al Ashtar claiming a drone attack marks the first time that the group has indicated that it has drone capabilities. Some observers noted that the drone that Saraya al Ashtar showed in its video resembles the Houthi Samad-2/3 drones, which have a range of around 1,500 kilometers.[xx] Saraya al Ashtar could threaten numerous US and partner positions throughout the Arabian Peninsula with that capability.

The Houthi supreme leader emphasized that the Houthis would continue their attacks against Israel and its interests until the destruction of the Israeli state. His remarks demonstrate that the Houthis will remain a serious threat to international shipping even in the event of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi gave a speech on May 2 reaffirming his grand strategic objective of destroying Israel and describing the key role that he sees the Houthis having in achieving this goal.[xxi] Abdulmalik stated that a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip would only mean the “completion of this round of escalation” and that the long-term conflict against Israel would continue. Abdulmalik added that the Houthis will continue to support the Palestinian militias fighting Israel until “the end of [Israeli] control over Palestine and the cleansing” of Israeli people from Israeli territory.[xxii]

Iran is trying to use its military exports as a vehicle for expanding its influence in Africa. A French investigative outlet reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger have been negotiating a deal since late 2023 for Iran to provide military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake.[xxiii] This quantity is especially significant given that Iran announced in 2019 its intent to produce that much yellowcake—300 tons—per year by 2024.[xxiv] A Nigerien delegation notably traveled to Tehran in January 2024 and signed unspecified agreements with Iranian officials, including Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani.[xxv] Ashtiani is responsible for managing the Iranian defense industry as well as arms procurement and sales. Niger ended its counterterrorism partnership with the United States in March 2024 after US officials accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to Nigerien uranium reserves.[xxvi] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the new Iranian ambassador to Niger, Ali Tiztak, the same day that Niger suspended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.[xxvii]

The Iranian negotiations with Niger come after Tehran similarly tried to use its defense exports to expand its influence in Sudan. Iran has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6, to use against the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces.[xxviii] Western media reported in March 2024 that Iran requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea in return for a helicopter-carrying warship.[xxix] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.[xxx]

The Iranian effort to expand its influence in Africa is especially noteworthy given that Iran recently hosted representatives from over 40 African countries during its second annual Iran-Africa Trade Summit from April 26-29.[xxxi] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, among other Iranian officials, met with the prime minister of Burkina Faso and vice president of Zimbabwe on the sidelines of the summit.[xxxii] The Zimbabwean vice president also discussed expanding military cooperation during a meeting with the Iranian defense minister, Ashtiani, on April 29.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: A Lebanese media outlet published the purported text of the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire deal that Hamas is considering. The agreement addresses almost all of Hamas’ demands except for a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would likely violate a permanent ceasefire, however.
• Bahrain: An Iranian-backed Bahraini militia claimed to have conducted a drone strike on the Israeli port city of Eilat. The claimed attack is part of the Iranian-led campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. The Bahraini militia claiming a drone attack marks the first time that the group has indicated that it has drone capabilities.
• Yemen: The Houthi supreme leader emphasized that the Houthis would continue their attacks against Israel and its interests until the destruction of the Israeli state. His remarks demonstrate that the Houthis will remain a serious threat to international shipping even in the event of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
• Africa: Iran is trying to use its military exports as a vehicle for expanding its influence in Africa. Iran and Niger are negotiating over a deal that would send Iranian weapons to Niger in exchange for Iranian access to Nigerien uranium reserves. Iran previously tried to use its military exports to Sudan to receive Sudanese permission to establish an Iranian naval base on the Red Sea.

Iran Update, May 1, 2024

Several Iranian military leaders boasted on May 1 that they could strike Israel with a drone and missile attack much larger than what they launched on April 13 and thus inflict greater damage on Israel.[i] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami suggested that Iran could have launched two or three additional waves of drones and missiles against Israel and that each successive wave would have reduced the efficacy of US and partner air defenses.[ii] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh similarly asserted that his service used “only 20 percent of [its] strength” in the April 13 drone and missile attack.[iii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran modeled its April 13 attack on recent Russian attacks in Ukraine and that Iran designed its strike package to defeat Israeli air defenses, even though the United States and its partners intercepted around 99 percent of the projectiles. Iranian leaders are almost certainly studying the April 13 attack to learn lessons and understand how to defeat US and partner air defenses in the future.[iv]
Several senior Iranian military officers, including Salami, separately framed the April 13 drone and missile attack as successful in that it demonstrated Iranian willingness to now attack Israel directly.[v] These statements echo similar remarks from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on April 22, during which he praised senior military commanders for their role in the attack and said that “the willpower of the Iranian nation and armed forces” matters more than how many munitions Iran launched or how many munitions hit their target.[vi] These statements are also consistent with Salami and other regime officials saying in recent weeks that Iran has adopted a new policy of targeting Israel directly in retaliation for Israeli attacks on Iranian interests.[vii]

Hamas asked international mediators to clarify the terms of two sections of the new Egyptian-proposed ceasefire proposal, according to an Egyptian official speaking to Israeli media.[viii] Hamas requested assurances that the second stage of the deal would facilitate the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and requested clarification on the unconditional return of displaced Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip.[ix] Egyptian sources speaking to a United Kingdom-based, Qatari-owned outlet said that an Israeli delegation arrived in Cairo on April 30 to discuss Hamas’ concerns and amendments to the deal.[x] The Egyptian officials expect that Hamas will deliver its final response to the deal ”at the end of the week.”[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian military leaders emphasized that they could hit Israel with a drone and missile attack much greater than what they launched on April 13. Iranian leaders are likely studying their April 13 attack to learn lessons and understand how to more effectively penetrate US and partner air defenses.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas is considering an Egyptian-proposed ceasefire deal and has requested clarification on some of its contents. Egyptian officials expect a Hamas response to the deal in the coming days. Hamas has not changed its maximalist demands since December 2023.
• West Bank: Jordan accused Israeli settlers of attacking a humanitarian aid convoy traveling through the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. The IDF afterward imposed a “closed military zone” where the attack occurred.
• Yemen: The United States conducted a preemptive strike targeting a Houthi uncrewed surface vessel in Yemen. The United States determined that the vessel posed an imminent threat to US forces and nearby commercial traffic.