Iran Updates November 2024

Iran Update, November 30, 2024

Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City on November 30.[i] Opposition forces have made this progress after launching their surprise offensive only three days prior.[ii] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) acknowledged that its forces have withdrawn from Aleppo City to “strengthen” defensive lines and “prepare for a counterattack.”[iii] The SAA also acknowledged that opposition forces have entered “large parts of Aleppo [City].”[iv] A pro-Syrian regime social media account reported that the SAA suffered command-and-control problems in Aleppo City, possibly leading to the rapid collapse of SAA defenses.[v] Fateh Mubin—one of the main opposition groups leading the offensive—announced on November 29 that opposition forces had separately taken control of Khan Sheikoun, which is about 20 miles from Hama City.[vi] Geolocated footage posted on November 30 similarly showed opposition forces advancing through towns en route to Hama City.[vii] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether opposition forces are operating in Hama City at the time of this writing.

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. The Syrian regime and affiliated sources claimed that the SAA was preparing defensive lines in northern Hama Province on November 30. It appears that opposition forces have advanced past northern Hama Province at this time, however.[viii] Russian forces have separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City.[ix] Russian and Syrian airstrikes have continued to target opposition positions in the Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib countrysides as well.[x]

Syrian opposition forces have likely captured valuable military equipment that the SAA and other pro-regime forces abandoned amid disorderly withdrawals.[xi] Social media accounts claimed that opposition forces have captured armored vehicles and heavy artillery pieces.[xii] Opposition forces also entered the Abu al Duhur and Nairab military airports in Idlib Province and Aleppo City, respectively.[xiii]

 

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a separate operation into Syrian regime-controlled territory on November 30.[xiv] The SNA is currently operating northeast of Aleppo City, reportedly with the intent of capturing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the joint control of the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces.[xv] The SNA captured Kuweires military airport east of Aleppo City along with several other villages.[xvi]

The opposition offensive in northern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of Syria, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces. Unidentified fighters targeted the Syrian Regime Military Intelligence building in central Suwayda City with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) on November 30.[xvii] Local groups have historically targeted this symbol of the Syrian regime in Druze-majority Suwayda City during periods of unrest.[xviii] Local media separately reported small arms engagements between Syrian regime forces and unspecified actors in multiple areas of Daraa Province.[xix] The Syrian regime has faced constant opposition in southern Syria since 2011 and especially since August 2023.[xx]

The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede any pro-regime counteroffensives. Hezbollah is in the midst of force regeneration and reorganization after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon.[xxi] Israel’s intense monitoring of the Syria-Lebanon ground line of communication could furthermore disrupt Hezbollah efforts to move materiel and personnel to support the Syrian regime.[xxii] Iran could still send conventional units and Iraqi militias to support the Syrian regime against the opposition forces, however. Russia is separately constrained by its operations in Ukraine, which are a higher priority than operations in Syria. It is unclear to what extent Russia can divert any attention and resources toward Syria. Russia withdrew S-300 air defense systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine, highlighting the de-prioritization of operations in Syria.[xxiii] Russian air assets are likewise heavily engaged in Ukraine.

A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo on November 29 for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[xxiv] Egyptian officials are separately discussing a new proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxv] The proposal involves pausing fighting for at least 60 days, opening the Rafah border crossing, and increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 200 trucks entering daily.[xxvi] The Palestinian Authority would assume control of the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing, according to the proposal.[xxvii] The IDF would then monitor traffic through the border crossing. Wall Street Journal added that Egypt and Hamas have indicated that they will drop their demand that the IDF withdraw from the area around the Rafah border crossing.[xxviii] Hamas may be increasingly willing to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal since Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire in Lebanon.  Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[xxix] Hamas may calculate that negotiations are necessary to ensure its survival. Yahya Sinwar previously calculated that Hamas could survive if the October 7 War expanded and thus compelled the IDF to reduce military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[xxx] That scenario is less likely since Hezbollah exited the war.

Hamas published on November 30 a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony.[xxxi] The publication of the video is likely meant to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip. The hostage, Edan Alexander, called on Israeli citizens to demonstrate daily against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxxii] Alexander also called on US President-elect Donald Trump to cut military support to Israel and to pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas. This video is the latest of several that Hamas and other Palestinian militias have published of hostages in recent months as part of an information operation meant to degrade Israeli willingness to sustain military operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxxiii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City. Pro-Syrian regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the opposition offensive.
• Syria: The Turkish-backed SNA launched a separate offensive into Syrian regime-held territory. The SNA captured a military airport from the joint control of the SAA and SDF.
• Syria: The opposition offensive in northeastern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of the country, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces.
• Syria: The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede pro-regime counteroffensives.
• Gaza Strip: A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations and has indicated that it will drop its demand for the IDF to withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas published a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony in order to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire.

Iran Update, November 29, 2024

Syrian opposition forces continued their offensive into Syrian regime-held territory and advanced into Aleppo City. The opposition forces have continued expanding their offensive eastward since launching the surprise offensive on November 27. Thousands of fighters and armored elements advanced quickly eastward, seizing several villages within a few hours of launching the offensive.[i] Fateh Mubin—an opposition group based in HTS-controlled Idlib Province—announced on November 28 that they had seized control of another 13 villages and achieved the “complete liberation” of the countryside to the west of Aleppo City.[ii] Fateh Mubin designated the western Aleppo countryside a ”closed military zone.”[iii] Local Syrian sources reported that opposition forces seized armored vehicles and weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defense systems, belonging to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[iv] Fateh Mubin claimed that opposition forces also detained over 20 pro-regime fighters.[v] The opposition forces advanced into the western parts of Aleppo City on November 29, marking the first time that the city has been contested since pro-regime forces captured it in late 2016.[vi] Opposition forces then advanced into the city center and declared a curfew over the city, according to local reports and geolocated footage.[vii] Social media accounts posted videos of opposition fighters entering a military hospital, a police headquarters, and the Aleppo municipal building.[viii]

The opposition forces killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer, Brigadier General Kiomars Pour Hashemi, as they advanced.[ix] The IRGC acknowledged his death and described him as a military adviser to the Syrian regime.[x] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami attended a ceremony for Pour Hashemi in Tehran on November 29.[xi]

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. A SAA-affiliated social media account claimed that opposition forces outnumber the SAA forces around Aleppo City and suggested that the SAA may be unable to respond until reinforcements arrive.[xii] Other social media users reported that SAA units retreated toward al Safirah, southeast of Aleppo City, although CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports.[xiii] Russian forces separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces.[xiv] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on November 29 that the opposition offensive is a violation of Syrian sovereignty and that Moscow supports Bashar al Assad in reclaiming the territory.[xv]

Iranian officials and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias blamed the United States and Israel for the opposition offensive. Iranian leaders called for “coordinated action” to defeat the offensive and accused the United States and Israel of supporting opposition activity against Assad.[xvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sayyida al Shuhada released statements claiming that Israel is responsible for offensive because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was defeated in Lebanon.[xvii] An official from Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada vowed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—will defeat the opposition forces.[xviii]

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has continued to hold since it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has not conducted any attacks into Israel and the IDF and Hezbollah have not engaged in any ground combat. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem gave a public speech to acknowledge the end of fighting on November 29, saying that Hezbollah would abide by the ceasefire “with our heads held high.”[xix] Qassem emphasized that the ceasefire includes a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.[xx] The IDF still has a force presence in southern Lebanon for now in order to counter any potential violations of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.[xxi] Qassem also vowed that Hezbollah would retain a role in Lebanese politics and support reconstruction in Lebanon.[xxii]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began post-war operations across Lebanon. The LAF is clearing roads, detonating unexploded ordinance, and installing checkpoints, especially in southern Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon.[xxiii] The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon on November 27—one day after the ceasefire into effect.[xxiv] Hezbollah Secretary General Qassem said that Hezbollah will engage in “high-level coordination” with the LAF to implement the ceasefire.[xxv]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in response to militant activity.[xxvi] The IDF struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site in Bisariya, near Sidon, after detecting unspecified activity at the site.[xxvii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF detected a ”non-immediate threat” at the site that the IDF needed to neutralize.[xxviii] Axios reported that the United States assessed that Hezbollah was trying to relocate rockets to new sites.[xxix] The IDF separately struck two fighters who had entered a Hezbollah site and began moving rocket launchers.[xxx] The LAF accused Israel on November 28 of violating the ceasefire.[xxxi]

The IDF continued trying to prevent displaced citizens from returning to their homes in southern Lebanon.[xxxii] The IDF conducted a drone strike as a “warning” to deter individuals in vehicles from approaching Markaba.[xxxiii] The IDF similarly shelled targets near al Wazzani likely to deter individuals from approaching the area.[xxxiv] A Hezbollah commander told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah fighters who live in southern Lebanon will remain in the area and retain their small arms.[xxxv]

A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting attack targeting Israelis in the West Bank, highlighting the threat that Hamas poses outside the Gaza Strip. The Hamas fighter wounded eight Israelis on a bus near Ariel settlement in the northern West Bank on November 29.[xxxvi] Israeli forces then killed the fighter and assessed that the fighter acted on behalf of a cell rather than as an individual.[xxxvii] The IDF assessed that attacks in the West Bank will increase in the coming weeks. This attack comes after the IDF assessed in September 2024 that it had defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[xxxviii]

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas designated an interim successor should he die or leave office.[xxxix] Abbas, who has been president since 2005 and is 89 years old, designated on November 28 the Palestinian National Council (PNC) chairman to serve as interim president for no more than 90 days after Abbas leaves office. The PNC is the 747-member legislative body under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and represents Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and diaspora.[xl] The current PNC chairman is Rawhi Fattouh, who had been PA President for two months after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004.[xli] Fattouh has served as Abbas’ personal representative since 2006.[xlii]

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity significantly. These plans include installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating others at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.[xliii] This notification is consistent with the Atomic Energy Organization announcing on November 27 that it began injecting gas into "thousands of advanced centrifuges.”[xliv] Iran is retaliating for the IAEA Board of Governors passing on November 21 a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). The resolution condemned Iran for failing to cooperate fully with the IAEA over outstanding questions about the Iranian nuclear program. The activation and installation of additional centrifuges comes as Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons program in early 2024.[xlv]CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess that Iranian leaders have decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Syrian opposition forces continued their offensive into Syrian regime-held territory and advanced into Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive.
• Lebanon: The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has continued to hold. The LAF began post-war operations, including clearing roads, detonating unexploded ordinance, and installing checkpoints across Lebanon.
• West Bank: A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting attack targeting Israelis in the West Bank, highlighting the threat that Hamas poses outside the Gaza Strip. This threat remains despite the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Iran notified the IAEA that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity by installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating others at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.

Iran Update, November 27, 2024

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has claimed no attacks into northern Israel nor any against Israeli targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah continues to falsely claim that it defeated the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and that its forces will continue to ensure that the IDF adheres to the ceasefire.[i] The IDF similarly stated on November 27 that it will remain in its positions in Lebanon for multiple weeks to ensure that Hezbollah complies with the agreement.[ii] The IDF is required to withdraw from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.

The IDF fired artillery and small arms at unidentified individuals who approached IDF positions around the Israel-Lebanon border after the ceasefire went into effect.[iii] The IDF also detained four Hezbollah fighters, including a local commander, who entered a restricted area along the border.[iv] Neither Hezbollah or Israeli officials have claimed that these incidents constitute violations of the ceasefire. CTP-ISW assessed on November 12 that Hezbollah would likely experience command-and-control challenges and struggle to immediately enforce widespread compliance with a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament among its rank-and-file members.[v] These isolated incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border may reflect those command-and-control challenges rather than Hezbollah leaders‘ intent to violate the ceasefire.

The IDF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) warned Lebanese civilians against returning to villages where the IDF is deployed on November 27.[vi] Western and Lebanese media reported a large-scale movement of displaced Lebanese civilians to villages in southern Lebanon.[vii] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the IDF would inform Lebanese civilians when it was safe to return.[viii] The LAF similarly told Lebanese residents of towns near the Israel-Lebanon border to delay returning to their homes until after the IDF withdraws.[ix] Senior Israeli officials said that the IDF has yet to have a policy regarding how to address civilians returning to these areas.[x]

The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.[xi] The LAF announced on November 27 that it had begun to “strengthen its deployment” south of the Litani River in cooperation with UNIFIL. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon.[xii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. An unspecified source in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee told Iraqi media that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will continue to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.[xiii] The source claimed that Ansar Allah al Awfiya, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada will continue to attack Israel until the IDF ends its operations in the Gaza Strip.[xiv] Kataib Hezbollah similarly released a statement on November 26 claiming that “new parties” will enter the conflict with Israel following Hezbollah’s “break. . . from the Axis of Resistance.”[xv] Kataib Hezbollah emphasized that it will not “abandon [its] people in Gaza.”[xvi]

Syria opposition forces, including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), seized at least 19 villages and military sites in western Aleppo from the Syrian regime in a surprise offensive on November 27.[xvii] Thousands of opposition fighters and armored elements have advanced within five kilometers of Aleppo City, seizing territory from the Syrian regime.[xviii] The frontlines southwest of Aleppo have remained largely stagnant since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire, which ended an offensive by pro-regime forces, including Iranian-backed militias.[xix] Fateh Mubin, an opposition group based in Idlib, stated that its forces seized the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 46th Regiment front line base and called it one of the “largest positions“ of the Syrian regime west of Aleppo.[xx] Local reports indicated that the opposition forces have advanced to the M-5 highway south of Aleppo, seizing a crucial ground line of communication to the city.[xxi] It remains unclear whether HTS and its partner groups can retain control of the territory seized in the past several hours. Syrian regime and Russian forces have attacked HTS command-and-control sites in Idlib and along the lines of advance in response to the offensive.[xxii] Fateh Mubin stated that its offensive was preemptive and meant to ”deter the enemy, defeat its gathered forces, and keep its fire away from our people.”[xxiii]

Israeli forces interdicted a significant shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in Jenin in the West Bank.[xxiv] The IDF announced on November 27 that it seized the shipment, which included explosive devices, remote detonators, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and sniper rifles, and other military equipment.[xxv] Israeli media reported that the shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets as well.[xxvi] This shipment is especially noteworthy given that it included weapons, such as mortars and rockets, that are more advanced than what Palestinian militias in the West Bank typically use.[xxvii] CTP-ISW has observed no previous instances of Palestinian militias in the West Bank using rockets since the October 7 War began, though this shipment of only three rockets is relatively minor. The interdiction of this shipment comes as Israel has observed renewed Iranian efforts to smuggle materiel into the West Bank in recent months.[xxviii] Israeli forces thwarted two other weapons smuggling attempts into the West Bank in recent days.[xxix] Iran may be intensifying its efforts to arm proxy and partner militias in the West Bank to compensate for the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.
• Syria: Syrian opposition forces launched a surprise offensive into regime-held territory in northeastern Syria, seizing several military sites and villages around Aleppo.
• West Bank: Israeli forces interdicted a shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in the West Bank. The shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets.

Iran Update, November 26, 2024

Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. The ceasefire is set to come into effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT.[i]  The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025.[ii]  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas.[iii] The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there.[iv] The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed.[v] US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.[vi]   Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.[vii] The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.[viii]

This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims.[ix] Hezbollah initiated its attack campaign targeting Israel in October 2023 to support Hamas, and Hezbollah’s leaders have said repeatedly that it would not end its attacks without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[x]  This ceasefire does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Current Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has also previously expressed opposition to any stipulations giving Israel freedom of action inside Lebanon.[xi]

Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire.Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.[xii] Israel began its ground campaign in Lebanon to create safe conditions to return Israelis to their homes in northern Israel.[xiii] IDF operations in Lebanese border towns have eliminated the threat of an October 7-style offensive attack by Hezbollah into northern Israel, and the Israeli air campaign has killed many commanders and destroyed much of Hezbollah’s munition stockpiles.[xiv] Destroying Hezbollah’s military organization—which is the only military objective that would prevent all attacks into Israel permanently—was never the stated objective of Israeli military operations.[xv] A ceasefire deal, however, will prevent attacks into Israel through diplomatic means.

The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement.[xvi] The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. Neither the LAF nor the UN proved willing or able to prevent Hezbollah from reoccupying southern Lebanon and building new infrastructure. Some LAF sources, for example, have expressed a lack of will to enforce this ceasefire because they believe that any fighting with Hezbollah would risk triggering ”civil war.”[xvii] Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon, however.[xviii] LAF units have been in southern Lebanon since 2006, but have failed to prevent Hezbollah from using the area to attack Israel.

The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so. Netanyahu noted that Israeli operations in Lebanon had “pushed [Hezbollah back] decades.”[xix] The group retains fighters, weapons, and political control throughout Lebanon, however.[xx] Hezbollah will almost certainly attempt to reoccupy southern Lebanon because Hezbollah’s stated raison d’etre is to end Israel’s control over the Shebaa Farms, which it sees as Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. The group also supports Iran’s efforts to destroy the Israeli state.[xxi] Hezbollah will be unable to accomplish this task if it is forced to disarm in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah refused to abide by the last disarmament and withdrawal agreement, and it is unlikely that this war has changed Hezbollah leadership’s willingness to abandon its aspirations for southern Lebanon.

The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.[xxii] The IDF expanded evacuation orders throughout Beirut ahead of its airstrikes.[xxiii] The IDF Air Force attacked over 20 Hezbollah military and financial targets across Beirut.[xxiv] The IDF struck facilities used by Hezbollah’s Coastal Missile Unit and various Hezbollah military headquarters and infrastructure.[xxv] The IDF Air Force also destroyed al Qard al Hassan's financial management and storage facilities.[xxvi] Lebanese media has reported approximately 16 separate Israeli airstrikes in Baalbek and the Bekaa Valley since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 24.[xxvii] Hezbollah maintains advanced weapons systems, weapons storage, and military infrastructure across the Bekaa Valley. This intensified activity comes as Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire agreement to take effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT.

Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a report on November 26 stating that Iran continues to develop capabilities to produce and deliver pharmaceutical-based chemical agents (PBAs) for offensive purposes.[xxviii] The report cites research conducted from 2005 to 2023 by individuals affiliated with Iran’s defense establishment, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense. PBAs are dual-purpose chemicals that can be used in medical settings but also be weaponized for offensive purposes.[xxix] The ISIS report focuses on research on fentanyl and medetomidine, which are both agents capable of incapacitating victims by targeting the central nervous system. ISIS identified Iranian research in three key areas: developing large-scale cost-effective methods to synthesize these compounds, exploring techniques to aerosolize these agents for propellant purposes, and creating delivery systems to disperse the agents through grenades, bullets, and drones.[xxx] The report noted that Iran could use its drones to deliver ammunition containing PBAs. Iranian media released a video in June 2023 showing a multirotor drone dropping rounds of smoke grenades and a bomb, likely containing tear gas.[xxxi]

Iran can use its PBA weapons program both internally and externally. Iranian media confirmed that Iran extensively used grenades against civilians during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022.[xxxii] Civilian reports indicated symptoms consistent with both fentanyl and medetomidine exposure, rather than traditional riot control gases. Iran has also likely supplied its partners and proxy groups with weaponized PBAs, which the Axis of Resistance could deploy in future military conflicts.[xxxiii] Member states of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are meeting in The Hague from November 25 to 29 to discuss CWC implementation and treaty compliance.[xxxiv]

Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26.[xxxv] Israeli forces operated about four kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border in the closest part of the Litani River to Israel. Geolocated footage posted on November 26 shows the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade inside the St. Mema Church in Deir Mimas and Israeli forces operating near Arnoun.[xxxvi] Several IDF brigades destroyed thousands of Hezbollah rockets and missiles and engaged Hezbollah fighters at close range in the area.[xxxvii] Hezbollah claimed a rocket attack targeting Israeli forces attempting to remove a damaged tank from the outskirts of Deir Mimas on November 24, indicating that Israeli forces have been operating in this general region for the past several days.[xxxviii] IDF Northern Command Commander Ori Gordin accompanied Israeli forces to the Litani.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire in Lebanon: Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims. Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.
• Shortcomings of the Ceasefire: The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement. The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.
• Iranian Use of Pharmaceutical-based Agents: Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran.
• Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon: Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26. The IDF elements also operated about 10km from Israeli territory in Wadi Saluki, making this advance the deepest penetration into Lebanon since Israeli forces began operations in early October 2024.

Iran Update, November 25, 2024

Israel and Lebanon are expected to reach a ceasefire agreement within the next few days that would achieve stated Israeli war aims.[i] The US-proposed ceasefire stipulates that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL will be the only armed actors operating south of the Litani River, thus requiring Hezbollah fighters south of the Litani to disarm or relocate. The agreement also gives the Lebanese government the sole authority to purchase or produce weapons in Lebanon, “dismantles” any armed group infrastructure south of the Litani River that does not belong to the LAF or UNIFIL, and requires all Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanese territory.[ii]

The current Israeli operation was designed only to create the military conditions that would enable Israeli civilians to return to northern Israel. Destroying Hezbollah’s military organization—which is the only military objective that would prevent all attacks into Israel—was never the stated objective of Israeli military operations.[iii] The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) operation in Lebanon has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to conduct large coordinated indirect fire attacks and ground attacks in Israel.[iv] The IDF operation appears to prioritize destroying the Hezbollah capabilities that pose the greatest threats to northern Israeli residents, such as short-range direct fire and October 7-like ground terrorist attacks.[v] A campaign to destroy all Hezbollah attack capabilities—including the group’s long and intermediate-range rockets, missiles, and drones, would be a far greater military undertaking than the current operation, and tantamount to a campaign to destroy Hezbollah’s military organization. The fact that the IDF is preparing to return residents to the north after a ceasefire suggests that the IDF designed the campaign to create the conditions required to prevent another October 7-like attack.[vi] The air campaign has degraded some of Hezbollah’s long-range capabilities, but the ceasefire will create conditions that enable residents to return home. The ceasefire would not mean that Hezbollah cannot conduct attacks targeting northern Israel again in the future, however.

The US-proposed ceasefire agreement, if followed, disarms Hezbollah south of the Litani River and ensures that it cannot rapidly rebuild its destroyed capabilities along the Israel-Lebanon border to threaten northern Israel.[vii] Maintaining these conditions in southern Lebanon requires that the LAF or UNIFIL ensure Hezbollah does not move materiel or fighters south of the Litani River.[viii] Neither UNIFIL nor the LAF prevented Hezbollah from deploying fighters and moving materiel south of the Litani River after 2006, and it is unlikely either organization is willing to do so in 2024.[ix] The ceasefire does enable Israel to take military action in southern Lebanon if the LAF and UNIFIL fail to intervene against Hezbollah.[x]

The IDF Air Force intensified its air campaign in Beirut and on strategically significant Hezbollah targets across Lebanon. The IDF struck over 25 Jihad Council-related targets across Lebanon and assessed that the resulting damage degraded Hezbollah’s command and control and intelligence-gathering capabilities.[xi] The IDF struck Hezbollah intelligence collection centers and command-and-control sites used to inform senior Hezbollah leadership and direct military activities.[xii] These resources would be used to support Hezbollah’s rearmament following a potential ceasefire agreement.

The IDF Air Force struck over 12 Hezbollah military headquarters in Beirut since CTP-ISW's data cut off on NOV 24.[xiii] The IDF struck Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters, its coastal missile unit headquarters, and its Unit 4400 headquarters, which is the unit responsible for weapons smuggling from Syria into Lebanon.[xiv] The IDF probably calculated that destroying these headquarters would further inhibit Hezbollah’s ability to reconstitute its military capabilities by degrading organizations that inform Hezbollah’s decision-making and planning.

Israeli forces thwarted a small arms smuggling attempt from Jordan into the West Bank on November 25. The IDF seized 14 pistols and 65 unspecified weapons parts from several unspecified smugglers near Damiyah Bridge in the Jordan Valley.[xv] The weapon parts are wrapped in plastic, though some pieces protruding from the plastic are visually consistent with M4/M16 upper receivers.[xvi] The West Bank-Jordan border is a crucial arms supply route for Palestinian militias operating in the West Bank.[xvii] Iran and its Palestinian partners like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad facilitate arming West Bank militias through funding and cash transfer.[xviii]

Iran and its partners in the West Bank likely seek to exploit these smuggling networks, even if they do not control the networks themselves. It is unclear if Iranian-backed militias are facilitating the actual act of smuggling across the West Bank-Jordan border, but Iranian-backed militias are key elements of Syria-Jordan drug and weapons smuggling networks. Jordanian officials stated there has been an increased effort by drugs and arms smugglers linked to Iranian-backed militias based in southern Syria to cross the border into Jordan over the past few weeks.[xix] Both Israeli and Jordanian police have thwarted numerous attempts over the past year by Iran and its partners to transport small arms, explosives, mines, and rockets across the Jordan-West Bank border.[xx] Israeli Defense Minister said on November 25 that he would ”intensively promote” the construction of a Jordan-West Bank border fence to counter Iran’s ” institutionalized and organized” effort to establish an eastern front against Israel.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon Ceasefire: Israel and Lebanon are expected to reach a ceasefire agreement within the next few days that would achieve stated Israeli war aims. The current Israeli operation was designed only to create the military conditions that would enable Israeli civilians to return to northern Israel. Maintaining the ceasefire conditions in southern Lebanon will require that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or UNIFIL ensure Hezbollah does not move materiel and fighters south of the Litani River. Neither UNIFIL nor the LAF prevented Hezbollah from deploying fighters and moving materiel south of the Litani River after 2006, and it is unlikely either organization is willing to do so in 2024. The ceasefire would not mean that Hezbollah cannot conduct attacks targeting northern Israel again in the future, however.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The Israeli Air Force intensified its air campaign in Beirut and on strategically significant Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including by striking 12 Hezbollah military headquarters in Beirut. The IDF probably calculated that destroying these headquarters would further inhibit Hezbollah’s ability to reconstitute its military capabilities by degrading organizations that inform Hezbollah’s decision-making and planning.
• West Bank Smuggling: Israeli forces thwarted a small arms smuggling attempt from Jordan into the West Bank on November 25. Iran and its partners in the West Bank likely seek to exploit these smuggling networks, even if they do not control the networks themselves. It is unclear if Iranian-backed militias are facilitating the actual act of smuggling across the West Bank-Jordan border, but Iranian-backed militias are key elements of Syria-Jordan drug and weapons smuggling networks.

Iran Update, November 24, 2024

A top adviser to the Iranian supreme leader discussed Lebanon and ceasefire negotiations, nuclear policy, and a potential Iranian response to Israel’s October 25 strike. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, specifically discussed Iran’s role in Lebanon. The interview was published in Iranian media on November 24.[i] Larijani confirmed Iran’s support for all Lebanese people, alongside Hezbollah, throughout Lebanon’s ceasefire negotiations with Israel. Larijani also reaffirmed support for Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s path of diplomacy. Larijani underlined, however, that Hezbollah must be part of Lebanon’s post-war decision-making process. Larijani’s statements underscore the importance that Iran assigns to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon.[ii]

Larijani stated that Iran will not “take any steps” to address the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) concerns about Iran’s nuclear program in the recent IAEA censure resolution if there is no compromise with the IAEA.[iii] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[iv] Iran will meet with the E3 countries, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, for nuclear negotiations in Geneva on November 29.[v] Iranian media reported on November 23 that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution, and Iran‘s parliamentary speaker confirmed that Iran activated the centrifuges on November 24.[vi]  Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi told Iranian media on November 23 that the AEOI will activate thousands of centrifuges that will increase Iran’s uranium enrichment rate over the next four to six months.[vii]

Larijani said that Iran would respond to Israel’s October 25 attack on Iran, but did not confirm any details. Larijani added that the ”relevant officials will make the right decision.”[viii] Larijani agreed that Iran’s response’s goal is to deter Israel from attacking Iran again.[ix]

An unknown gunman fired on a Jordanian police patrol near the Israeli embassy in Amman, Jordan, on November 23.[x] The gunman injured three Jordanian police officers in the attack. An unspecified security source stated that Jordanian security forces shot and killed the attacker after pursuing him on foot for at least an hour.[xi] Jordanian Communications Minister Mohammad Momani called the attack a ”terrorist attack” targeting Jordanian security forces.[xii] The Israeli ambassador to Jordan left Jordan shortly after the October 7, 2023, attacks.[xiii]

Jordanian forces disrupted a drug smuggling attempt from Syria, underscoring the risk that Iranian-backed militias could use these smuggling networks to further their efforts to destabilize Jordan. Jordanian security forces killed one drug smuggler and arrested six others who were attempting to cross the Syrian-Jordanian border into Jordan on November 24.[xiv] Jordanian officials stated there has been an increased effort by drugs and arms smugglers linked to Iranian-backed militias based in southern Syria to cross the border into Jordan over the past few weeks. Iranian-backed militias, which support drug smuggling into Jordan, can also use those routes to smuggle arms from Syria into Jordan.[xv] Iran has increasingly prioritized building its militia networks in the West Bank in recent years. Iranian leaders could conclude that they need to invest further in building their networks in Jordan to develop their militia infrastructure in the West Bank more effectively. The Jordanian armed forces have conducted multiple airstrikes into Syria targeting Iranian-affiliated smuggling networks since the October 7 war began, suggesting either a change in Iranian-backed smuggling patterns and/or a change in Jordanian tolerance of them.[xvi] Both Israeli and Jordanian police have thwarted numerous attempts over the past year by Iran and its partners to transport small arms, explosives, mines, and rockets across the Jordan-West Bank border.[xvii]

Several Israeli settlers attempted to attack a senior IDF commander in Hebron, in the West Bank, on November 22.[xviii] Dozens of Israeli settlers attempted to attack IDF Central Command Commander Major General Avi Bluth during a religious pilgrimage to Hebron. The IDF Central Command is responsible for the West Bank, and its relationship with the Israeli settler community in the West Bank is usually strained because Israeli settlers oppose IDF authority in the area.[xix] Israeli security forces arrested five individuals who attempted to attack Bluth.[xx] At least one attacker was previously held in administrative detention before being released in July 2024.[xxi] Defense Minister Israel Katz announced the end to administrative detention for settlers in the West Bank on November 22.[xxii] This decision would result in Israeli security forces only issuing administrative detention orders for Palestinians accused of terrorism in the West Bank.[xxiii] Administrative detention is the controversial policy of holding suspects without charge in the West Bank.[xxiv] The United States warned Israel on November 23 that its decision to stop issuing administrative detention orders against West Bank settlers could increase violence in the West Bank.[xxv]

Israeli media reported on November 24 that the Israeli government is planning to extend reserve duty for 320,000 IDF reservists until March 2025.[xxvi] An Israeli opposition leader criticized this move by citing the burden on IDF reservists and called for broader recruitment, including recruiting ultra-Orthodox Israelis.[xxvii]

The UAE Interior Ministry arrested three unspecified individuals for the murder of Israeli-Moldovan Rabbi Zvi Kogan in the UAE.[xxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel will use ”all means necessary...to the fullest extent of the law" to deal with the individuals, and those who dispatched them, involved with the murder of Kogan.[xxix] Emirati forces found Kogan's body in al Ain, near the Emirati-Omani border, on November 24 after he had been reported missing for several days.[xxx] Kogan worked in Dubai on behalf of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish organization.[xxxi] An unspecified person familiar with the investigation stated that Israel suspects that Uzbek nationals with ties to Iran were involved with the murder.[xxxii] Israel did not directly accuse Iran of involvement. Iran has previously used foreign nationals to conduct attacks and kidnappings targeting Israeli, Jewish, and dissident Iranian targets outside of Israel.[xxxiii]

Lebanese Hezbollah is likely firing large numbers of rockets at Israel to pressure the Israeli government during ongoing ceasefire negotiations. Hezbollah fired about 250 rockets at civilian and military targets in Israel over seven hours on November 24, according to IDF reports.[xxxiv]  Some of the rocket fire targeted central Israel, but the majority of Hezbollah’s attacks on November 24 targeted northern Israeli towns.[xxxv] Hezbollah is likely attempting to demonstrate to the Israeli government and people that continuing the IDF’s military operations will not create entirely safe conditions to return northern Israelis to their homes and that a ceasefire deal is the only viable way to accomplish Israeli war aims. One of Israel’s stated war aims is to return Israeli civilians to their homes in the north.

Hezbollah conducted three rocket attacks targeting IDF bases and targets in Tel Aviv, Yavne, and Ashdod that it claimed were in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on northern and central Beirut.[xxxvi] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah fired four barrages of 17 launches into central Israel.[xxxvii] These attacks follow Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s promise in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in response to the Israeli airstrikes.[xxxviii] Hezbollah claimed that ”Beirut law applies to Tel Aviv” in a graphic published shortly after the attacks.[xxxix]

Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement.Financial Times (FT) reported on November 24 that Houthi-affiliated intermediaries recruited "hundreds" of Yemeni men since as early as July 2024 to travel to Russia after promising them lucrative jobs in the "security" and "engineering" fields and eventual Russian citizenship.[xl] Russian authorities reportedly instead forcibly conscripted the largely inexperienced recruits into the Russian army and sent them to fight in the war upon their arrival in Russia. FT also highlighted growing ties between the Kremlin and the Houthis, citing US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, who confirmed that Russia is actively engaging with the Houthis and discussing weapons transfers. CTP-ISW has assessed that the Kremlin has in part sought to offset heavy battlefield losses and personnel shortages by enlisting migrants and foreign nationals while avoiding another partial involuntary reserve callup in Russia.[xli] CTP-ISW also observed growing engagement between Kremlin officials and Houthis amid enhanced Russia-Iran cooperation and Iranian support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: A top adviser to the Iranian supreme leader discussed Lebanon and ceasefire negotiations, nuclear policy, and a potential Iranian response to Israel’s October 25 strike. Larijani stated that Iran will not “take any steps” to address the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) concerns about Iran’s nuclear program in the recent IAEA censure resolution if there is no compromise with the IAEA.
• Jordan: An unknown gunman fired on a Jordanian police patrol near the Israeli embassy in Amman, Jordan, on November 23.
• West Bank: Several Israeli settlers attempted to attack a senior IDF commander in Hebron, in the West Bank, on November 22.
• Israeli Reservists: Israeli media reported on November 24 that the Israeli government is planning to extend reserve duty for 320,000 IDF reservists until March 2025.
• Israeli Murdered in the UAE: The UAE Interior Ministry arrested three unspecified individuals for the murder of Israeli-Moldovan Rabbi Zvi Kogan in the UAE. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel will use ”all means necessary...to the fullest extent of the law" to deal with the individuals responsible for Kogan’s murder.
• Hezbollah Operations: Lebanese Hezbollah likely fired large numbers of rockets at Israel to pressure the Israeli government during ongoing ceasefire negotiations. Hezbollah fired about 250 rockets at civilian and military targets in Israel in seven hours on November 24, according to IDF reports. Hezbollah is likely attempting to demonstrate to the Israeli government and people that continuing the IDF’s military operations will not create entirely safe conditions to return northern Israelis to their homes and that a ceasefire deal is the only viable way to accomplish Israeli war aims. One of Israel’s stated war aims is to return Israeli civilians to their homes in the north.
• Houthi-Russia Cooperation: Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement.

Iran Update, November 23, 2024

Iranian media reported that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed on November 21.[i] The IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Hardline newspaper Khorasan reported on November 23 that Iran is activating around 5,000 centrifuges, including IR-6, IR-4, and IR-2m centrifuges, by injecting uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) into them.[ii] The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed but not yet activated eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow.[iii] The IAEA also confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed 10 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[iv] Iran has installed six additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz since August 2024, bringing the total number of cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz to 37.[v] Only 15 out of these 37 cascades had been activated as of November 2024.[vi] Khorasan reported that activating the 5,000 centrifuges will increase Iranian uranium enrichment at the Natanz and Fordow nuclear facilities to 40,000 separative work units (SWU).[vii] SWU measure the effort required to separate U-235 and U-238 isotopes in the uranium enrichment process.[viii] Iran currently has a total installed enrichment capacity of around 52,900 SWU per year and an enriching centrifuge capacity of around 31,400 SWU per year, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.[ix] Iran currently has around 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[x]

Iranian hardliners are continuing to lobby Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons to restore deterrence against Iran’s “enemies.” The Pardisan, Qom Province, Friday prayer leader “desperately requested” on November 23 that Khamenei “reconsider” his nuclear fatwa because “[Iran’s] enemies have rows of nuclear warheads” and threaten to use nuclear weapons against Iran.[xi] The Friday prayer leader argued that possessing nuclear weapons would “bring [Iran] security.”[xii] Hardline Parliamentarian Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani separately claimed on November 23 that “a large part” of the Iranian population supports acquiring a nuclear weapon.[xiii] Ardestani added that possessing a nuclear weapon would increase Iran’s “deterrence power.”[xiv] These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks would similarly fail to restore deterrence. These statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[xv]

The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee chairman threatened to withdraw from the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  The chairman, Ebrahim Azizi, threatened on November 23 that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if the United States acted “coercively” against Iran.[xvi] Azizi likely made this statement after some Trump administration transition officials, including former Special Envoy for Iran Brian Hook, said that the incoming administration will reimpose “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran.[xvii] Lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi separately threatened on November 22 that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if the E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) triggers the “snapback” mechanism in the JCPOA.[xviii] Iranian officials have long threatened to withdraw from the NPT, but these statements are noteworthy given the current standoff between Iran and the West over Iranian nuclear activities.

Iran has reportedly intervened in Lebanon ceasefire negotiations to ensure any agreement aligns with Iran’s objective to rebuild Hezbollah after the current Israeli campaign. Iran has been secretly intervening in the negotiations aimed at establishing a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, according to informed sources speaking to Sky News Arabia on November 23.[xix] This intervention aims to secure Hezbollah‘s position and capabilities in Lebanon by ensuring that Iran can rebuild the group after the war, according to Sky News Arabia‘s sources. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister’s Special Envoy to West Asia, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, has reportedly held secret meetings and discussions that bypassed official Lebanese channels.[xx] Sheibani publicly met with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on November 5 and discussed national unity, internal cohesion, and Iran's readiness to provide humanitarian aid to Lebanon.[xxi]

This report is consistent with recent Iranian activity in Lebanon and CTP-ISW's assessment of Iranian intentions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior adviser, Ali Larijani, met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 15 to discuss a ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xxii] The New York Times also reported on November 16 that Khamenei urged Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire and remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Larijani delivered this message during his Beirut visit. [xxiii] The Sky News Arabia and New York Times reports are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran may plan to rearm and rebuild Hezbollah in southern Lebanon following a ceasefire by utilizing the Axis of Resistance’s established weapons transfer routes through Syria.[xxiv] It does not follow that Iran will choose to support Hezbollah by rebuilding it in the same way that Iran and Hezbollah built the group between 2006 and the present, however.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla spoke with senior Israeli officials about Israeli military operations and objectives in Lebanon on November 23.[xxv]  Austin spoke with Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz and reaffirmed the US commitment to reaching a diplomatic solution in Lebanon to return Israeli and Lebanese civilians to their homes on the Israel-Lebanon border.[xxvi] Austin also highlighted the need to ensure the safety of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL peacekeepers in Lebanon. Austin’s statement follows three incidents in the past week in which Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters fought in the vicinity of UNIFIL’s position in Chama.[xxvii] Some of these engagements resulted in Hezbollah rocket fire striking the UNIFIL position.

Kurilla held a situational assessment with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi at the IDF Northern Command Headquarters in Safed, northern Israel, on November 23.[xxviii] Kurilla and Halevi reviewed ongoing Israeli operations in Lebanon within the context of Israel’s broader strategic objectives. These discussions come as senior Israeli political officials review a potential Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement to achieve stated Israeli war aims.

Unspecified Israeli defense officials cited by The New York Times reported that Hezbollah has manufactured copies of Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles that it had captured in previous wars.[xxix] Israeli and Western defense officials reported that Hezbollah shipped the Israeli-made weapons to Iran during the 2006 war to replicate them. Iran replicated the Spike and produced the Almas anti-tank missile, which has a 16-kilometer range. The Almas anti-tank missile does not require a clear line of sight to launch. The missile’s trajectory allows the munition to strike targets from above, making targets like Merkava tanks more vulnerable because the top armor on most tanks is relatively weak. The Almas can carry either a tandem-charged warhead to penetrate armor or a thermobaric warhead. Hezbollah has developed its own Almas manufacturing capabilities since 2006, which would enable it to rebuild its Almas stockpiles after the war with greater ease than if it could only acquire new Almas stocks from Iran via Iraq and Syria.

Hamas blamed Israeli airstrikes for the death of a female hostage in the Gaza Strip, likely to degrade Israeli domestic support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Hamas released images of the body of a female Israeli hostage who Hamas claimed died in an Israeli airstrike in the northern Gaza Strip[xxx] The IDF said it is currently investigating the incident and is unable to verify or refute Hamas’ claim.[xxxi] Palestinian militias have previously released propaganda content about the hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[xxxii]

Hamas is also likely setting information conditions to blame Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip for the deaths of other hostages there. Hamas claimed that Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip threaten another hostage in the area.[xxxiii] This effort presumably seeks to stop Israeli operations by generating Israeli public demands to stop the operation.

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian media reported that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed on November 21.
• Iranian Nuclear Weaponization: Iranian hardliners are continuing to lobby Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons to restore deterrence against Iran’s “enemies.” The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman threatened to withdraw from the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
• Lebanon Ceasefire: Iran has reportedly intervened in Lebanon ceasefire negotiations to ensure any agreement aligns with Iran’s objective to rebuild Hezbollah after the current Israeli campaign. Iran’s intervention aims to secure Hezbollah‘s position and capabilities in Lebanon by ensuring that Iran can rebuild the group after the war, according to regional media. This report is consistent with recent Iranian activity in Lebanon and CTP-ISW's assessment of Iranian intentions.
• US-Israel Discussions: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla spoke with senior Israeli officials about Israeli military operations and objectives in Lebanon on November 23. Kurilla held a situational assessment with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi at the IDF Northern Command Headquarters in Safed, northern Israel, on November 23.
• Hezbollah Capabilities: Unspecified Israeli defense officials cited by The New York Times reported that Hezbollah has manufactured copies of Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles that it had captured in previous wars. Hezbollah has developed its own Almas manufacturing capabilities since 2006, which would enable it to rebuild its Almas stockpiles after the war with greater ease than if it could only acquire new Almas stocks from Iran via Iraq and Syria.
• Hamas Exploits Israeli Hostages: Hamas blamed Israeli airstrikes for the death of a female hostage in the Gaza Strip, likely to degrade Israeli domestic support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is also likely setting information conditions to blame Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip for the deaths of other hostages there. Hamas claimed that Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip threatened another hostage in the area.

Iran Update, November 22, 2024

Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment.[i] Iran is responding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21.[ii] The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.[iii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi said on November 22 that Iran will “significantly increase” its uranium enrichment capacity in response.[iv] Iran could activate some of the IR-6 or IR-2m centrifuges that it has installed at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities, respectively, in recent months. The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed but not yet activated eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow.[v] The IAEA also confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed of 10 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[vi] Iran has installed six additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz since August 2024, bringing the total number of cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz to 37.[vii] Only 15 out of these 37 cascades had been activated as of November 2024.[viii] Iran currently has around 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[ix]

Lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi threatened on November 22 that Iran would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if the E3 triggers the “snapback” mechanism in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows its signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[x] The E3 censure resolution requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[xi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose “snapback” sanctions.[xii] UK media reported in early November 2024 that the United Kingdom is prepared to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran.[xiii] Iranian officials have long threatened to withdraw from the NPT, but Gharib Abadi’s warning is noteworthy given the current standoff between Iran and the E3. Gharib Abadi’s warning also comes amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[xiv]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division Commander Brigadier General Nadav Lotan as the IDF Ground Forces commander on November 22.[xv] The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi appointed Lotan after the former IDF Ground Forces commander resigned in September 2024, citing personal reasons.[xvi] Halevi also reassigned several high-ranking IDF positions, including appointing new commanders for the 162nd Division, currently operating in the northern Gaza Strip, and the 887th Division, which operates in the West Bank.[xvii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution against Iran.
• Iran: A senior Iranian official threatened that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if the JCPOA signatories trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors censure resolution could set conditions for the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran.
• Israel: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of a new IDF Ground Forces commander. The new commander, Brigadier General Nadav Lotan, previously commanded the IDF 162^nd

Iran Update, November 21, 2024

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran on November 21.[i] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[ii] The resolution requires that the IAEA to produce a "comprehensive report" on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[iii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran--known as "snapback" sanctions.[iv] The censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[v] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami responded to the censure resolution by ordering the activation of a ”large collection of new and advanced centrifuges of various types."[vi] The AEOI stated that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA, though it remains unclear to what extent. CTP-ISW will provide further assessments and details in the coming days.

 

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), prior to the IAEA Board of Governors vote on the censure resolution, called on Iran to "immediately dispose" of its highly enriched uranium stockpile on November 21. US Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate said that Iran should stop producing uranium enriched up to 60 percent and "downblend its 60 percent [enriched uranium] stockpile entirely."[vii] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium.[viii] The E3 issued a joint statement similarly requesting that Iran “immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.”[ix] Iran previously offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA Board of Governors rejecting the censure resolution.[x] The E3 stated that a cap of 185 kilograms would mean Iran still "retain[s] an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60 percent at any point," however.[xi] 185 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium is enough, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[xii]

 

Lebanese officials have reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[xiii] Unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese media outlet al Akhbar claimed that Lebanese officials requested that the ceasefire agreement refer to the Blue Line—the UN-drawn provisional border—as the official Israel-Lebanon border. Lebanese officials demanded that a date for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw be announced in conjunction with the ceasefire and that the IDF conduct a “complete, simultaneous, and rapid withdrawal” from Lebanon. The Lebanese officials also demanded that the IDF release all Hezbollah fighters detained in southern Lebanon. Al Akhbar claimed that the language regarding Israel-Lebanon border and clauses on whether Israel would retain the right to respond to ceasefire violations with force in Lebanon remain sticking points between the parties. The US-proposed ceasefire agreement initially allowed Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[xiv] Hezbollah has rejected the possibility that the IDF retain the right to operate in Lebanon, however.[xv]

 

A senior Israeli security source said that Hamas wants ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[xvi] Israeli military correspondents, citing the source, reported that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even if it fails to meet Hamas’ repeated demand for a permanent end to the war.[xvii] The source added that the deal being considered includes a 42-day ceasefire, the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and other “heavy prices that Israel will be required to pay.”[xviii] This report marks the first suggestion that Hamas may break from the maximalist demands that it has maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Hamas last reiterated its maximalist demands on November 10.[xix]

 

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III said on November 20 that the Houthis increasingly see themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate.[xx] This framing is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is more accurately described as an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East. Iran considers itself a core part and the leader of the Axis of Resistance but does not outright command many of the other members. Rather, they often compromise and negotiate with one another. Iran does, however, frequently leverage its materiel support to the Axis of Resistance to leverage the decision-making of other members.

 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the starvation of civilians.[xxi] ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in May 2024.[xxii]

 

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for deceased Hamas military leader Mohammad Deif on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, torture, and sexual violence.[xxiii] The ICC stated that it issued this arrest despite reports that Deif died. The IDF has stated that it killed Deif in an airstrike in the southern Gaza Strip in July 2024.[xxiv] ICC Chief Prosecutor Khan submitted an application to obtain arrest warrants for deceased Hamas leaders Deif, Yahya Sinwar, and Ismail Haniyeh in May 2024.[xxv]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IAEA Board of Governors approved a censure resolution against Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with international nuclear inspectors. This resolution could lead to the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran. Iran responded to the resolution by ordering the activation of recently installed advanced centrifuges at its nuclear facilities.
• Lebanon: Lebanon reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported that one of the main sticking points is whether Israel will retain the right to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli security source told Israeli military correspondents that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the Gaza Strip. The source added that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even without a guarantee of a permanent ceasefire, which has been a continuous Hamas demand throughout talks.
• Yemen: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the Houthis increasingly view themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate. This characterization is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East.

 

Iran Update, November 20, 2024

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem announced in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would require a permanent ceasefire and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty in any agreement with Israel.[i] Qassem clarified that maintaining Lebanese sovereignty requires preventing Israel from operating in Lebanon “whenever [Israel] wants” and refuted that Israel could “impose its conditions” on Hezbollah.[ii] Qassem is referring to the current US-proposed ceasefire agreement that would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[iii] The draft agreement includes a clause that states that Israel retains its right to self-defense, and the United States sent to Israel a side letter that stipulates US support for the Israeli right to respond with force to Hezbollah threats.[iv] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar and Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on November 20 that Israel requires that it retain its ability to “act and defend Israeli citizens from Hezbollah” in any agreement.[v]

Removing these clauses from the ceasefire agreement would likely enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench itself in southern Lebanon. The current ceasefire agreement provides no other sufficient mechanisms to ensure that Hezbollah remains disarmed in southern Lebanon.[vi] UNIFIL and the LAF would be the only other parties responsible for observing and enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing or able to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament given their previous failures to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The LAF, which would be responsible for dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure and enforcing disarmament, is particularly unlikely to directly confront Hezbollah.[vii]

US special envoy Amos Hochstein met with Lebanese Parliament speaker Nabih Berri for a second day in Beirut to discuss the Hezbollah response to the US-proposed agreement.[viii] Hochstein returned to Israel and will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for further consultations on November 21.[ix]

Qassem, in his speech, continued trying to project Hezbollah strength and resilience against Israeli operations in Lebanon.[x] Qassem promised to attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes in northern and central Beirut.[xi] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah is not a regular standing army and that the group will rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces as they enter Lebanon.[xii] Qassem also continued to grossly exaggerate the success of Hezbollah operations in Israel and the number of IDF casualties and material damage.[xiii] Qassem asserted that Hezbollah would survive politically after the war and work with the LAF and people to rebuild Lebanon.[xiv]

Iranian officials are continuing to broadcast their enduring support for Hezbollah. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a message of support to the Lebanese people on November 19.[xv] Separately, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani during his trip to Beirut on November 15 reportedly promised continued Iranian support and a commitment to help the Hezbollah rebuild its forces as they recover from the war.[xvi]

Documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hezbollah and Hamas. An Israeli think tank close to the Israeli defense establishment released a report on November 18 detailing the Iranian role in establishing the "Palestinian project" in Lebanon, citing documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip.[xvii]  Senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal met with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force officer responsible for Palestine in May 2022, during which they agreed to begin working to establish a Hamas presence in Lebanon. Two thousand Hamas fighters, according to the plan, would have integrated into Hamas special operations forces (SOF) units that would have participated in any Hezbollah ground assault into Israel. The IRGC and Hamas ultimately sought to expand the number to ten thousand Hamas fighters integrated into Hezbollah SOF. Hamas would be tasked with recruiting fighters from the Sunni population in Lebanon, according to the documents.[xviii] Iran would be primarily responsible for funding Hamas activities in Lebanon, including armament and training.[xix] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the 2,000 Hamas fighters ever deployed to Lebanon, but Hamas does have a limited presence in southern Lebanon. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—has claimed at least 20 attacks into Israel from Lebanon since October 2023.[xx]

Hamas still retains small forces outside the Gaza Strip that its external leaders can use as a cadre to rebuild Hamas militarily. Hamas' severely degraded position in the Gaza Strip and the failure of its war against Israel suggest that both Iran and Hamas may recognize that accomplishing their objective of destroying Israel is not feasible from the Gaza Strip.[xxi] Hamas will want to rebuild after the October 7 war, and it has several potential avenues for doing so. The Iran-Hamas project outlined in the letter indicates that both parties could view Lebanon as a viable option for Hamas’ reconstitution.[xxii] Iran’s financial support for Hamas in Lebanon and its strong ties with Hezbollah would give Iran significant influence over Hamas’ military wing there. Promoting cohesion between Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon are part of broader Iranian efforts to increase interoperability across the Axis of Resistance.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on November 19 in response to Iran not fully cooperating with the IAEA.[xxiii] The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to vote on the resolution on November 21.[xxiv] The proposed censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[xxv] The IAEA reported that Iran possessed 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent as of late October 2024.[xxvi] This amount marks a 17.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent since August 2024.[xxvii] The IAEA added that Iran possessed a total of 6,604.4 kilograms of enriched uranium, which marks an 852.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian total enriched uranium stockpile since August 2024.[xxviii] A US weapons expert reported on November 19 that Iran’s breakout timelines have thus reduced significantly since August 2024.[xxix] The expert stated that Iran can make enough weapons grade uranium, which is uranium that is enriched to 90-percent purity, to produce almost 10 nuclear weapons in a month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.[xxx]

Iran is trying to prevent the IAEA Board of Governors from approving the censure resolution by offering to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent and threatening unspecified consequences if the IAEA censures Iran. Iran offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA rejecting the censure resolution.[xxxi] Iran notably did not offer to reduce the amount of 60 percent enriched uranium that it currently possesses but instead only offered to not further increase its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile. 185 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[xxxii] Senior Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have warned that Iran will respond “appropriately and proportionately” if the IAEA censures Iran.[xxxiii] An Iranian outlet claimed on November 19 that Iran could retaliate by activating a “significant number” of advanced centrifuges.[xxxiv] The outlet may have been referring to the IR-6 centrifuges that Iran has installed at Fordow in recent months.[xxxv] The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow but that the centrifuges were not yet operational.[xxxvi] Iran previously installed new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow in response to an IAEA censure resolution in June 2024.[xxxvii]

The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent additional Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Israel in order to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Saudi media reported on November 20 that an Israeli attack targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is “imminent” unless the Iraqi federal government prevents further militia attacks on Israel, citing unspecified sources.[xxxviii] Saudi media added that the United States informed the Iraqi federal government that it has “exhausted all levers of pressure” to try to prevent Israel from striking Iraq.[xxxix] This report comes after Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18 in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[xl] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani chaired an emergency National Security Ministerial Council meeting on November 19 during which he ordered Iraqi security forces to “prevent and pursue any military activity outside the control of the state.”[xli] Iraqi security forces reportedly secured sites used by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch drones and missiles at Israel following the meeting.[xlii] It is unclear whether the Sudani administration can prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel given that it has thus far failed to reign in these militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, increased its rate of attacks by nearly 150 percent between September and October 2024 and has claimed 59 attacks in November 2024 thus far.[xliii]

Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in the wake of increased looting of humanitarian aid trucks by armed groups. Axios reported on November 20 that a US-based national security consulting company, Orbis, has proposed a plan to Israel to securely deliver humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[xliv] Orbis outlined a pilot project that includes establishing a humanitarian aid hub in an area cleared of Hamas.[xlv] The aid hub will be established by a private aid organization, according to Orbis. The project would also involve a third-party private contractor securing the aid hub in coordination with the IDF.[xlvi] The proposed p project is likely aimed at establishing the humanitarian aid hub in Jabalia, in the northern Gaza Strip, where the IDF has been conducting clearing operations since October 6.[xlvii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz reviewed the proposed plan.[xlviii] The establishment of the aid hub will require additional IDF operations in Jabalia that could take three months to fully clear the area of Hamas and secure the area.[xlix] Israel is exploring methods to distribute aid in the northern Gaza Strip following a rise in armed groups looting humanitarian aid trucks in the strip in the recent days.[l] The IDF has taken several steps in the recent days to increase the flow of aid in the Gaza Strip following pressure from the United States, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[li]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the Netzarim Corridor to conduct a situational assessment on November 20 and announced a reward of five million US dollars and safe passage out the Gaza Strip to any individual who frees an Israeli hostage.[lii] Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, and IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi met with the commanders of the IDF 99th Division IDF Southern Command in the corridor to review IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[liii]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is trying to remove a clause in a US-proposed ceasefire agreement that allows Israel to strike Hezbollah targets if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire. Removing these clauses would enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench in southern Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
• Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran refusing to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. These considerations come amid an uptick in armed Palestinian gangs interdicting aid convoys and looting them.

Iran Update, November 19, 2024

Hamas and other unidentified Palestinian militias have formed a combined force to stop armed gangs from looting humanitarian aid, which indicates that Hamas has only limited control of the Gaza Strip.[i] It remains unclear if Hamas distributes the aid equitably after it recovers stolen aid. Reuters reported on November 19 that Hamas and other militias created a force called the Popular and Revolutionary Committees in November 2024 to address rising Palestinian civilian anger at aid seizures and price gouging. Palestinian sources claimed that this newly created force has conducted multiple operations this month, killing several armed looters. The IDF has repeatedly said that armed groups loot humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. Armed criminal groups seized 98 out of 109 aid trucks in an incident in the southern Strip on November 16.[ii] A Hamas official told Reuters that the force shows Hamas’ continued control of governance in the Gaza Strip. The reality that criminal organizations are capable and willing to interdict these aid shipments indicates that these groups no longer fear Hamas to the degree they did pre-war.[iii] This suggests that Hamas’ ability to maintain control over the Strip has weakened considerably. The creation of a combined organization to counter this loss of control indicates Hamas is taking steps to regain control over the Strip, however.

Israeli media reported on November 18 that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Turkey on November 16 to discuss efforts for a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[iv] Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey after Qatari officials reportedly ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar.[v] Hamas and an anonymous Turkish diplomat both denied on November 18 that Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[vi]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 19 that the 36th Division has advanced northwest from Chama to a hilltop overlooking the Lebanese coast.[vii] Geolocated imagery posted on November 19 showed that Israeli forces have advanced to al Bayyada Hill overlooking the Lebanese coast.[viii] Hezbollah claimed two separate rocket and mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating on the outskirts of Chama and al Bayyada, which is consistent with reports of Israeli troop movements.[ix] Al Bayyada Hill overlooks UNIFIL position 1-26 and a nearby Hezbollah military site.[x] It is not clear that Hezbollah can continue operating from this position, but CTP-ISW has observed dozens of airstrikes in the areas close to the Hezbollah military position. Al Bayyada Hill provides Israeli forces with an advantageous position to monitor Hezbollah activity along the coast. Lebanese and Hezbollah-controlled media claimed Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters continue to engage in small arms combat in Chama suggesting that elements of the 36th Division are continuing operations to secure Chama.[xi]

US special envoy Amos Hochstein discussed Hezbollah’s response to the US-drafted ceasefire agreement with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut on November 19.[xii] Berri is Hezbollah‘s go-between in ceasefire negotiations. Hochstein called the meeting “constructive” and noted that talks are continuing.[xiii] One of Berri’s aides told Reuters on November 19 that Lebanon and Hezbollah agreed to the proposal with several comments on its contents.[xiv] Unspecified US officials similarly characterized Hezbollah’s response to the draft agreement as a “yes, but” to Axios.[xv] Hezbollah and the Lebanese government remain concerned about a clause in the agreement that says that Israel has the right to defend itself against threats from Lebanon, according to a Lebanese government source and Lebanese media.[xvi] Hochstein is expected to travel to Israel in the next few days depending on the progress of negotiations in Lebanon.[xvii]

Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that a recent intensification of Israeli air operations and expansion of ground operations in Lebanon is intended to increase pressure on Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire.[xviii] The IDF struck over 50 targets in Beirut’s southern suburbs over the previous week and conducted at least three strikes in central and northern Beirut.[xix] The IDF also recently began operating in ”second-line” Lebanese towns and villages.[xx]

The Lebanese Armed Force's (LAF) unwillingness to directly confront Hezbollah in the south will complicate the success of the ceasefire agreement. The LAF would be the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon and would deploy to the south in the days following the ceasefire, according to leaked copies of the proposal in late October.[xxi] The LAF will need Hezbollah’s approval to deploy troops to the south to enforce a ceasefire deal and will avoid confronting Hezbollah fighters directly to avoid “trigger[ing] internal strife,” according to sources close to the army and unspecified officials talking to Reuters.[xxii] An unspecified diplomat said that Lebanese personnel “storming into houses looking for Hezbollah weapons” could lead to a civil war in Lebanon.[xxiii] The LAF's unwillingness to confront Hezbollah directly would complicate its efforts to enforce the proposed ceasefire agreement. CTP-ISW has previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.

Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage toward Israel that hit a UNIFIL site in Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon, on November 19. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors” fired a barrage of rockets that hit UNP 5-42 and injured four Ghanian peacekeepers.[xxiv]  The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon. The peacekeepers were transferred to a hospital in Tyre for treatment.[xxv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said that Hezbollah launched the rocket barrage from Deir Aames.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Humanitarian Aid: Hamas and other unidentified Palestinian militias have formed a combined force to stop armed gangs from looting humanitarian aid, which indicates that Hamas has only limited control of the Gaza Strip. The reality that criminal organizations are capable and willing to interdict these aid shipments indicates that these groups no longer fear Hamas to the degree they did pre-war. This suggests that Hamas’ ability to maintain control over the Strip has weakened considerably. The creation of a combined organization to counter this loss of control indicates Hamas is taking steps to regain control over the Strip, however.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli media reported on November 18 that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Turkey on November 16 to discuss efforts for a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 19 that the 36th Division has advanced northwest from Chama to a hilltop overlooking the Lebanese coast.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: US special envoy Amos Hochstein discussed Hezbollah’s response to the US-drafted ceasefire agreement with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut on November 19. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that a recent intensification of Israeli air operations and expansion of ground operations in Lebanon is intended to increase pressure on Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire.
• Lebanese Armed Forces-Hezbollah Relations: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s unwillingness to directly confront Hezbollah in the south will complicate the success of the ceasefire agreement. The LAF will need Hezbollah’s approval to deploy troops to the south to enforce a ceasefire deal and will avoid confronting Hezbollah fighters directly to avoid “trigger[ing] internal strife,” according to sources close to the army and unspecified officials talking to Reuters.
• UNIFIL: Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage towards Israel that truck UN Position 5-42 near Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors” fired a barrage of rockets that hit the base and injured four Ghanian peacekeepers. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update, November 18, 2024

The continued looting of humanitarian aid trucks demonstrates that Hamas’ internal control remains limited and severely weakened. Armed groups looted 98 of 109 humanitarian aid trucks that entered the southern Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing on November 16.[i] It is unclear if these armed groups are affiliated with any Palestinian militia group, but the armed men were likely part of organized criminal groups that have replaced Hamas’ police forces in much of the Strip.[ii] Hamas claimed that it conducted a joint operation with local family groups in which Hamas and locals killed 20 individuals who had looted the vehicles.[iii] The fact that Hamas had to cooperate with these local groups indicates that Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip remains weak. Hamas has long fought local families and organized criminal groups for control over the Gaza Strip. The UNRWA spokesperson said that the aid convoys are not allowed to maintain any armed guards and that they usually attempt to drive fast to avoid ambushes by armed groups.[iv] The IDF has recently taken several steps to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing and facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[v] CTP-ISW has not observed the IDF escorting any aid itself, however.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that he would reject any ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that requires a full IDF withdrawal.[vi] Netanyahu reiterated this position after a meeting with his security chiefs. Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, Mossad Director David Barnea, and the IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi recommended that the government agree to a ceasefire including an IDF withdrawal to return the hostages.[vii] Netanyahu said that Hamas only wants a deal so that the IDF will leave and Hamas can regain power, which Netanyahu said he would not allow.[viii] Netanyahu said that the IDF had not sufficiently degraded Hamas’ governance capabilities. Netanyahu further emphasized the need to maintain complete operational control over the Gaza Strip, especially the Philadelphi Corridor, to retain IDF’s freedom of movement across the strip.[ix]

Hamas denied that it has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[x] An unspecified Turkish diplomat also rejected claims that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[xi] Israeli media reported on November 17 that unspecified Arab and Israeli sources claimed that Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[xii]

Hezbollah responded to a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel.[xiii] Hezbollah officials delivered the group's response on November 17 to Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is reportedly discussing the proposed changes with Lebanese Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[xiv] Sources ”close to Hezbollah” told Al Jazeera that Hezbollah is approaching the draft in a ”positive manner” and with flexibility.[xv] A Lebanese government source added to Al Jazeera that the clause allowing Israel’s right to self-defense needed to be less vague.[xvi] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu desires a ceasefire deal that keeps Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, preserves Israeli freedom of action in Lebanon, and stops Hezbollah from re-arming through Syria.[xvii]  Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said in early November that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[xviii] US presidential envoy Amos Hochstein traveled to Beirut on November 18 to review the proposal.[xix] US officials told Axios that Hochstein would only travel if there were ”greater clarifications about the Lebanese position,” indicating mediators think that there is progress on the deal.[xx] It is unclear at the time of writing when Israel will receive Hezbollah’s response.

Israel has continued air interdiction operations in the Qusayr area of Syria that are designed to disrupt Hezbollah supply lines. Satellite imagery confirms that Israeli airstrikes have destroyed 15 bridges along the Syria-Lebanon border. These 15 bridges are crucial to Hezbollah’s ground line of communication that transports weapons and fighters from Syria and Iraq.[xxi] The Syrian regime confirmed on November 13 that Israeli airstrikes destroyed several bridges over the Orontes River in Qusayr. [xxii] Local Syrian sources said that Israeli strikes destroyed all seven river-spanning bridges.[xxiii] The IDF’s destruction of these bridges is designed to impede Hezbollah’s resupply of its depleted munitions stocks. Hezbollah and Iran could presumably use other routes, though some routes may be less optimal and more dangerous. The IDF said that its airstrikes in Syria harm Hezbollah‘s weapons transfer apparatus, particularly Hezbollah Unit 4400, which works with Iran to arm Hezbollah.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas Control in the Gaza Strip: The continued looting of humanitarian aid trucks demonstrates that Hamas’ internal control remains limited and severely weakened. Armed men, likely part of criminal organizations, looted 98 of 109 humanitarian aid trucks that entered the southern Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing on November 16.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that he would reject any ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that requires a full IDF withdrawal. Netanyahu reiterated this position after a meeting with his security chiefs in which the chiefs argued in support of a ceasefire.
• Hamas Relocation: Hamas denied that it has relocated from Qatar to Turkey. An unspecified Turkish diplomat also rejected claims that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: Hezbollah responded to a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel.
• Israeli Interdiction of Hamas Supplies: Israel has continued air interdiction operations in the Qusayr area of Syria that are designed to disrupt Hezbollah supply lines. Satellite imagery confirms that Israeli airstrikes have destroyed 15 bridges along the Syria-Lebanon border. These 15 bridges are important to Hezbollah’s ground line of communication that transports weapons and fighters from Syria and Iraq.

Iran Update, November 17, 2024

The IDF killed the head of Hezbollah’s media office, Mohammad Afif, in central Beirut on November 17.[i] The IDF conducted a strike targeting Afif in a residential building in Ras al Nabaa, a neighborhood in central Beirut.[ii] Hezbollah confirmed Afif’s death.[iii] Afif was reportedly visiting a Syrian Ba’ath Party in Lebanon branch office at the time of the strike, according to the office’s head.[iv] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported the strike killed one and injured three others.[v]

Afif’s killing is a continuation of the IDF’s campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah’s command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah‘s strategic- and operational-level military leadership.[vi] Afif had served as Hezbollah’s spokesperson since 2014 and facilitated Hezbollah’s news coverage and media relations.[vii] Afif managed Hezbollah’s attack claims and documentation related to attack claims and coordinated Hezbollah‘s messaging with Lebanese media.[viii] Afif played a role in Hezbollah’s October 19 drone attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's house in Caesarea.[ix] He was a close adviser to Nasrallah and had become the highest-ranking Hezbollah official to hold public conferences in Beirut over the past month.[x] Afif’s killing is likely intended to further disrupt Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures and its attempts to rehabilitate those structures by having other officials step into previous commanders' roles.

The IDF’s ground operation in Lebanon has enabled the IDF to begin taking steps to return Israelis to their homes. Israeli operations in Lebanon have done this by reducing the threat of anti-tank fire and other munitions to northern Israeli towns. Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF has removed all military checkpoints and roadblocks on roads near the Israel-Lebanon border that have been closed to civilians over the past year.[xi] The IDF’s re-opening of roads along the border indicates that the IDF has assessed that Israeli operations have significantly reduced the threat of anti-tank fire and other short-range munitions enough to allow civilians to return to previously targeted areas.[xii] An unspecified IDF official told Israeli Army Radio that civilian movement in the north is ”free” because of the ”IDF’s control of Lebanese territory.” The IDF has disrupted Hezbollah’s ability to conduct direct fire—including anti-tank fire—and observed indirect attacks targeting northern Israel by seizing key terrain north of the border. Hezbollah's rate of anti-tank fire attacks has significantly dropped since the IDF began ground operations on October 1, suggesting that Israeli operations successfully pushed Hezbollah fighters back from the immediate border and disrupted Hezbollah’s ability to conduct these attacks.[xiii] Hezbollah may still be able to conduct attacks with direct line-of-sight into Israel from further back from the Israel-Lebanon border, however. Israeli forces are currently operating in ”second-line” Lebanese villages to prevent additional attacks from longer range.

Re-opening northern roads is a part of the IDF‘s efforts to prepare for the return of northern residents to their homes.[xiv] The IDF also plans to soon withdraw IDF soldiers based in northern towns and return them to IDF outposts and bases.[xv] This is consistent with recent comments from unspecified senior IDF officers that said that the IDF was considering returning displaced civilians to the north even without a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah.[xvi]

Likely Hezbollah fighters fired at UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on November 16.[xvii] UNIFIL reported that an armed group prevented a patrol of French and Finnish peacekeepers from conducting a patrol in Bedias, Tyre District. The patrol continued along its planned route into the village of Maarakeh. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors“ fired upon the patrol about 40 times. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon. Some patrol vehicles had bullet impacts but no peacekeepers were injured. UNIFIL said it is unacceptable that peacekeepers are routinely targeted while conducting UN Security Council-mandated tasks. UNIFIL stated that it is the responsibility of Lebanese authorities to ensure that UNIFIL peacekeepers can carry out their mandated tasks without fear or threats.

The IDF is changing the length of time it activates reserve forces. This change appears designed to enable the IDF to sustain a longer war. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 17 that the IDF is planning to standardize the service duration of IDF reserve brigades to one period of 70 consecutive days every year.[xviii] The IDF has activated multiple reserve brigades several times since October 7, with at least one brigade serving for more than 200 days out of the year. The long and repeated call-ups to meet the needs of the IDF during the October 7 War has reportedly caused ”burnout” among IDF reservists.[xix] This has caused a decrease in the number of reservists reporting for duty. These changes to the IDF’s policies regarding reserve call-ups presumably seek to address this burnout and make a longer war more sustainable for the force.

Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[xx] Qatar previously ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Doha, according to US officials and Israeli media.[xxi] The United States reportedly pressured Qatar to expel Hamas’ political leadership after the group rejected the latest ceasefire-hostage agreement proposed by international mediators.[xxii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF strike that killed Hezbollah media chief Mohammad Afif is a continuation of the IDF’s campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah’s command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah‘s strategic- and operational-level military leadership.
• Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF’s ground operation in Lebanon has enabled the IDF to begin taking steps to return Israelis to their homes. The IDF has removed all military checkpoints and roadblocks on roads near the Israel-Lebanon border that have been closed to civilians over the past year. The IDF’s re-opening of roads along the border indicates that the IDF has assessed that Israeli operations have significantly reduced the threat of anti-tank fire and other short-range munitions enough to allow civilians to return to previously targeted areas.
• UNIFIL: Likely Hezbollah fighters fired at UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on November 16. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors“ fired upon a patrol about 40 times. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon.
• IDF Reserve Policies: The IDF is changing the length of time it activates reserve forces. This change appears designed to enable the IDF to sustain a longer war. The IDF is planning to standardize the service duration of IDF reserve brigades to one period of 70 consecutive days every year. The long and repeated call-ups to meet the needs of the IDF during the October 7 War has reportedly caused ”burnout” among IDF reservists.
• Hamas Moves to Turkey: Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.

Iran Update, November 16, 2024

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[i] Two individuals affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times on November 16 that senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani conveyed this message to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut.[ii] The message emphasized that Khamenei supports “ending the war with Israel” and that Iran will help Hezbollah recover from the war.[iii] It is in Iran’s interest to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to prevent Israel from further weakening Hezbollah.[iv] Iran could also calculate that it could help rearm and reconstitute Hezbollah in southern Lebanon after a ceasefire takes effect. Iran has historically transferred weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, which means that preventing this rearmament and reconstitution process would require some form of interdiction effort against Iran.[v] This report, assuming it is accurate, highlights the extent to which Iran lacks the capability or willingness to defend the Axis of Resistance against Israel. Iran failed to prevent Israel from defeating or severely degrading Hamas units across the Gaza Strip, and it now similarly appears opposed to helping Hezbollah fight Israel.[vi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran Encourages Hezbollah to Accept Ceasefire: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi reaffirmed that the IDF would continue to degrade Hezbollah and that Hezbollah’s “chain of command has collapsed.”
• Iranian Nuclear Program: A hardline Iranian parliamentarian called for acquiring a nuclear weapon to restore Iranian deterrence with Israel.
• Houthi Attack Campaign: US Undersecretary for Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante said on November 14 that the Houthis’ missile and technology production is comparable to that of advanced countries.

Iran Update, November 15, 2024

Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program in the past year. This assessment is based on publicly reported US and Israeli intelligence about Iranian research activity at the Parchin Military Complex outside Tehran in recent months.[i] Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 15 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25 destroyed an active, top-secret nuclear weapons research facility—Taleghan 2—at the Parchin Military Complex.[ii] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[iii] International inspectors found traces of uranium at the Parchin Military Complex in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[iv] Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that the IDF destroyed “sophisticated equipment” dating back to before 2003 that is “needed to design and test plastic explosives that surround uranium in a nuclear device and are needed to detonate it.”[v] The officials added that due to the Israeli strike on October 25, Iran would have to acquire new equipment if it decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.

US and Israeli intelligence began detecting suspicious research activity, including computer modeling, metallurgy, and explosive research, at the Parchin Military Complex earlier in 2024.[vi] US and Israeli intelligence services obtained intelligence in March 2024 showing that Iran was running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons.[vii] Iran dismissed a warning from the United States in July 2024 about its suspicious research activities.[viii] Each one of these activities—computer modeling, metallurgical research, and explosive research—could theoretically have a civilian application. However, when taken together, there is no plausible explanation for these research activities other than that they are meant to support Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal.

Computer modeling could reduce the amount of time it would take Iran to conduct a successful real-world nuclear test if Iran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Computer modeling would enable Iran to simulate a nuclear test before conducting a real-life test. Iran—if it decided to do so—could then build multiple nuclear weapons before a real-life test revealed that Iran had achieved weaponization. Building multiple nuclear weapons would allow Iran to test one weapon while still possessing multiple operational weapons to deter adversaries, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's long-standing assessment that Iran has developed a nuclear program that it intends to use to produce a nuclear arsenal. Iran possessed 164.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (uranium enriched up to 60 percent) as of August 2024, which is equivalent to 3.95 significant quantities.[ix] The IAEA defines a significant quantity as the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[x]

According to Axios, The IDF targeted the Taleghan 2 facility because it is not part of Iran’s declared nuclear program and Iran could therefore not acknowledge the significance of the IDF strikes on the site without admitting that it had violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[xi] The IDF’s strike also avoided targeting a nuclear facility that the IAEA was actively monitoring by hitting an undeclared site.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi visited the Natanz nuclear plant and the Fordow enrichment site in Iran on November 15.[xii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi accompanied Grossi.[xiii] The IAEA reported in August 2024 that Iran had installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[xiv]

The Lebanese government is considering a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri confirmed to Saudi Arabia-outlet Asharq al Awsat that he received a proposal from the United States on November 15.[xv] Reuters first reported that the Lebanese government received the proposal on November 14, citing two senior Lebanese political sources.[xvi] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the terms under negotiation.  Israeli public broadcaster Kan published the same draft that it originally leaked on October 30 in its discussion of the proposal.[xvii] It remains unclear if Kan’s reporting reflects the current draft under consideration. Kan’s text requires Israel to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon within seven days and stipulates that the Lebanese army would backfill IDF positions.[xviii] The supposed draft agreement gives Lebanon and Israel the right to self-defense if necessary and requires Hezbollah to withdraw from southern Lebanon in order to make the Lebanese Armed Forces and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon the only armed forces in the south.[xix] Kan’s report would also have Lebanon commit to disarm all unofficial military groups within sixty days of signing the ceasefire.[xx] The Lebanese army would supervise all weapons transport into Lebanon as well as dismantle all unauthorized weapons production facilities and unofficial military infrastructure.[xxi]

Parliament Speaker Berri expressed reservations about the current proposal. He denied that the proposal allows freedom of movement in Lebanon for the IDF.[xxii] Berri also said that the text contains terms unacceptable to Lebanon, including creating a new mechanism involving Western countries to oversee the implementation of UNSCR 1701.[xxiii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[xxiv] Hezbollah would likely interpret Israeli freedom to operate in Lebanon or a new mechanism to ensure security in southern Lebanon as a ”reduction” of Lebanese sovereignty.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior security adviser Ali Larijani met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 15 to discuss a ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xxv] Larijani emphasized Iran’s support for the Lebanese government and Hezbollah during a meeting with Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Larijani‘s visit to Beirut comes as the United States continues its efforts to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon.[xxvi]  Berri has served as the main mediator between the United States and Israel and Hezbollah in those talks.

The head of airport security at Rafic Hariri International Airport reportedly detained the Iranian Embassy in Beirut’s security team while it was escorting Larijani.[xxvii] The report did not specify how long airport security held the security team. A Lebanese media outlet run by a Christian businessman claimed that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Brigadier General Fadi Kfoury ordered the closure of all gates leading to the VIP lounge after the Iranian Embassy's security team, which was escorting Larijani, cited diplomatic immunity and refused to undergo ”thorough inspection.”[xxviii] Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese outlet al Akhbar accused Kfoury of being close to the United States when Kfoury assumed his position, suggesting that Hezbollah is opposed to Kfoury’s role as head of airport security.[xxix] Kfoury’s decision to detain Larijani’s security team may indicate an increased willingness among some Lebanese government officials to challenge Hezbollah and Iran’s influence in Lebanon while the group is weakened by Israeli strikes.

Israeli forces have advanced to the town of Chama, approximately five kilometers into southwestern Lebanon, as of November 15. Geolocated footage posted on November 15 shows Israeli forces operating at the Shrine of the Prophet Shimon in Chama.[xxx] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 14 and 15 showed that Israeli forces have advanced from Yarine and Oum Touteh northwest through Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa. Lebanese media reported Israeli artillery shelling in Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa during this time.[xxxi] Artillery fire support is meant to ”destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy” to ensure freedom of maneuver for ground forces, which could suggest that Israeli forces were maneuvering near Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa between November 14 and 15.[xxxii] Hezbollah claimed two separate rocket and anti-tank fire attacks on November 15 targeting Israeli forces in western Tayr Harfa and Jebbayn, suggesting Israeli forces continue to operate in these areas.[xxxiii] Lebanese media separately claimed Hezbollah and Israeli forces engaged in small arms combat between Tayr Harfa, Jebbayn, and Chama.[xxxiv]

Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Seyyed Abolhasan Mahdavi, stated that the Assembly has confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for leadership succession.[xxxv] Mahdavi asserted that this is a regular duty of the Assembly. Khamenei said on November 7 that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and ensures its continuation to achieve the revolution's “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people's lives."[xxxvi] The current Assembly, elected in March 2024, will serve until 2032 and is expected to be responsible for selecting Khamenei's successor upon his passing.[xxxvii] Mahdavi also stated that identifying a successor within a confidential commission is not a new issue.[xxxviii]

Israeli Defense Minister Israeli Katz decided that the IDF would soon begin issuing conscription orders to Israeli ultra-Orthodox.[xxxix] Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant decided to conscript 7,000 ultra-Orthodox before he was fired, and Katz confirmed this decision.[xl] The IDF will send conscription orders to 1,000 ultra-Orthodox beginning on November 17 and will gradually send the remaining 6,000 orders over the next six weeks.[xli] Katz’s decision comes after the Israeli Army Radio published data on November 14 showing that the IDF currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower it requires.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program in the past year. This assessment is based on publicly reported US and Israeli intelligence about Iranian research activity at the Parchin Military Complex outside Tehran in recent months. US and Israeli intelligence began detecting suspicious research activity, including computer modeling, metallurgy, and explosive research, at the Parchin Military Complex earlier in 2024.
• Ceasefire in Lebanon: The Lebanese government is considering a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel. The Lebanese parliamentary speaker expressed reservations about the current proposal.
• Senior Iranian Official in Lebanon: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior security adviser Ali Larijani met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 15 to discuss a ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. The head of airport security at Rafic Hariri International Airport reportedly detained the Iranian Embassy in Beirut’s security team while it was escorting Larijani.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli forces have advanced to the town of Chama, approximately five kilometers into southwestern Lebanon, as of November 15.
• Supreme Leader Succession: Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Seyyed Abolhasan Mahdavi, stated that the Assembly has confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for leadership succession.
• Israel Drafts Ultra-Orthodox: Israeli Defense Minister Israeli Katz decided that the IDF will soon begin issuing conscription orders to Israeli ultra-Orthodox.

Iran Update, November 14, 2024

Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and have decreased by half in the past week.[i] The IDF also reported that it is targeting stockpiles of observed and unobserved indirect fire systems that are difficult to reach with airstrikes.[ii] The IDF added that approximately 60 percent of Hezbollah indirect fire launches use small single- or triple-barreled launch systems.[iii] The stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced citizens safely to their homes in northern Israel requires stopping Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. The recent relaxation of IDF restrictions for gatherings in northern Israel indicates the reduced threat of Hezbollah rocket fire.[iv] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has also struggled to conduct large, coordinated rocket attacks into Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah is cannot easily communicate across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.[v] Israeli forces continue to exploit this disruption and have expanded clearing operations up to five to six kilometers into “second line” of Lebanese towns.[vi]

Unknown gunmen shot at a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol in southern Lebanon after the patrol discovered an ammunition cache on November 14.[vii] UNIFIL stated that its forces informed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and shortly thereafter came under fire from two or three individuals.[viii]  UNIFIL requested that Lebanese authorities fully investigate the incident.[ix] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing the disarmament of Hezbollah during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[x]

The IDF reported that it is facing a severe shortage of soldiers.[xi] The IDF published data showing that it is currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires. The IDF accordingly urged the government to increase the required time for mandatory IDF regular military service to three years, a jump from the current requirement of two and a half years for men and two years for women.[xii] The IDF also urged the government to approve a service extension law. The IDF added that recruitment of ultra-Orthodox soldiers has increased in recent years but that it still fell short of the IDF goal of recruiting 1,300 ultra-Orthodox Israelis in the July-October 2024 recruitment cycle. The IDF reported that combat unit reservists served an average of 136 days in 2024 and are projected to serve an average of 70-72 days in 2025. The IDF data revealed that approximately 40,000 reservists in combat and combat-support roles did not respond to reserve duty call ups during an unspecified period. Senior Israeli officers previously attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war.[xiii] Israeli media  reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduced reservist responses to the call ups.[xiv]

Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[xv] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm--as previous IAEA reports have already--Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xvi] The sanctions would target Iran’s nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[xvii] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[xviii] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[xix] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[xx] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[xxi] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[xxii]

Iran’s clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[xxiii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran’s nuclear affairs will face Iran’s immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[xxiv] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran's seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[xxv] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[xxvi]

The United States sanctioned on November 14 a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Houthis.[xxvii] The sanctions targeted 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the al Qaterji Company.[xxviii] The company finances and maintains a militia in Syria and is connected to Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling.[xxix] The IDF killed one of the company’s founders in an airstrike in July 2024.[xxx] The United States previously designated al Qaterji Company as a terrorist financing entity in 2022 after it facilitated trade between the Syrian regime and Islamic State.[xxxi] The United States stated that al Qaterji Company executives met directly with senior IRGC Quds Force officers as well as a sanctioned Iranian-backed Houthi financial official, Said al Jamal.[xxxii] The United States previously sanctioned al Jamal and affiliated companies facilitating Iranian oil trade to support the funding of Iranian proxy and partner militias.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has likely disrupted the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to fire into Israel. Hezbollah is struggling to conduct coordinated, large-scale attacks into Israel, suggesting challenges communicating across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.
• Iran: Iranian leaders appear concerned that the E3 could trigger international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 has expressed concern, as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA.
• Syria: The United States sanctioned a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Houthis. Some of the designated entities are tied to Syria militias and Lebanese Hezbollah arms smuggling.

Iran Update, November 13, 2024

The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[i] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[ii]  These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[iii] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has “several hundred long-range missiles” and that Iran is “unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[iv] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.

US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[v] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently met with US Special Envoy for Lebanon Amos Hochstein and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[vi] An unspecified US official said that Dermer’s meetings with Hochstein and Sullivan were “productive” and narrowed the gaps between US and Israel on the language of the ceasefire proposal and a “side letter” that would guarantee US support for Israeli freedom of military action against threats from Hezbollah.[vii] Hochstein told Axios on November 12 that he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon.[viii]  Hochstein is expected to travel to Beirut to discuss the proposal draft with Lebanese officials once US and Israeli negotiators have finalized the proposal and side letter’s language.[ix]

Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal. Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[x] This suggests that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate. If indirect negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel break down, the IDF is likely to continue its air and ground campaign, as Israeli military and political officials have indicated in recent days.[xi]

Hezbollah may choose accept Israel’s ceasefire terms in order to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began. The ceasefire terms, if consistent with current US and Israeli discussions, would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah fighters and targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the LAF fail to enforce the ceasefire’s terms.[xii] Hezbollah may calculate, however, that agreeing to a ceasefire soon would allow it to preserve its forces and infrastructure north of the Litani, enabling it to rebuild its forces and ensure its survival in the long term. It is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The details of the speed of the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon following a ceasefire are reportedly still up for discussion, with Lebanese sources indicating that the LAF may not be able to deploy as quickly as the US would prefer.[xiii] Slow LAF deployment would only make it more difficult for the LAF and UNIFIL to support any ceasefire.

Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.[xiv] Lavrentyev said that monitoring Iranian-backed efforts to transfer materiel is the responsibility of Lebanese and Syrian authorities.[xv] These authorities are fully unwilling and unable to block these Iranian-backed and Hezbollah-enabled efforts. Lavrentyev’s comments follow Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s recent visit to Russia to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[xvi] Israeli Army Radio reported on November 12 that Israel is seeking for Russia to guarantee that the Syrian regime will prevent Iranian-backed networks from transferring weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[xvii] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[xviii]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Russian hostage Alexander “Sasha” Turbanov urged Israelis to demonstrate weekly against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in the video that was filmed under PIJ coercion.[xix] The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[xx] Gallant identified his support for a ceasefire deal that would return the hostages as one of three reasons that caused Netanyahu to dismiss him. Gallant‘s firing caused an initial, short wave of protests, and 55% of Israelis opposed Netanyahu’s move to fire Gallant.[xxi] An earlier Netanyahu attempt to fire Gallant during the 2023 Judicial Protests failed after protesters demonstrated in support of Gallant. Hamas has previously released propaganda videos of hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[xxii] PIJ is likely releasing this video now to capitalize on the renewed Israeli domestic discontent over the lack of a ceasefire-hostage deal after Netanyahu’s dismissal of Gallant.[xxiii]

An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria.[xxiv] The IDF spokesperson was responding to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF’s Chief Mission Support Bernard told the BBC on November 12 that Israel had dug two major lines of trenches along the Israeli border with the demilitarized zone.[xxv] UNDOF said that some of the trenches cross into the demilitarized zone and that Israeli armor and personnel had crossed into the zone during the construction of the trenches.[xxvi] Commercially available satellite imagery confirms UNDOF’s characterizations of the Israeli construction. Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[xxvii]

Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[xxviii] Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting such attacks.  The IDF recently captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria.[xxix] This Iranian-led intelligence effort was likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to conduct small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however.
• Lebanon Ceasefire Talks: US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials. Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal.
• Hezbollah’s Ceasefire Considerations: Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel’s ceasefire terms to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began.
• Russia in the Middle East: Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.
• Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.
• Syria: An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting ground attacks into Israel, and a recent Israeli raid captured a Syrian man who had been collecting intelligence on Israeli border security along the Israeli-Syrian border.

 

Iran Update, November 12, 2024

Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission.[i] Katz made these comments during a meeting with the IDF General Staff. Katz replaced Yoav Gallant as defense minister on November 8 and was formerly foreign minister.[ii] Katz affirmed that Israel would “continue to hit Hezbollah with full force” to capitalize on past successes like the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and “realize the fruits of victory.”[iii] He stressed that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own,” in addition to other war aims of disarming Hezbollah, forcing a Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River, and returning northern Israeli residents safely home.[iv]  Katz’s vision is largely consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has said that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” and that any agreement must include measures to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament.[v]

Israel’s limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s outlined goals. The IDF has especially focused on degrading the Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces during the clearing operations.[vi] Eliminating the threat of ground attacks is critical to achieving the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. Eliminating the threat of ground attacks will not move Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River or prevent rocket attacks from longer-range systems, however. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[vii] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel recently informed the United States that its operation in southern Lebanon is “coming to an end” and that Israel is interested in reaching an agreement within a few weeks.[viii]  US special envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein also said on November 12 that "there is a chance to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon soon."[ix] Hezbollah does not yet appear willing to agree to a ceasefire on terms desirable to Israel, however. Hezbollah leadership would moreover likely experience command and control challenges and struggle to enforce a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament terms among its rank-and-file members—many of whom live south of the Litani River.[x]

A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties.[xi] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF alert system did not sound in Nesher but did activate in neighboring areas.[xii] Hezbollah did not claim a drone attack at the same time or area as the strike, nor did it explicitly acknowledge the strike. Hezbollah similarly did not claim its rocket attack that struck a soccer field of Druze children in Majdal al Shams on July 27.[xiii] It is more likely that Hezbollah’s Majdal al Shams strike was unintentional and caused by technical failures inherent to rockets. One-way-attack drones, however, are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rockets, one-way attack drones, and anti-tank guided missile systems increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[xiv]

Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced on November 11 that Iran and Russia have implemented a new interbank network to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[xv] Iran’s Shetab interbank network now works with Russia’s Mir system, which means Iranians can now use Iranian bank cards and withdraw money in Russia.[xvi] The Shetab-Mir network will also enable Iranians to make online purchases in Russia. Iranian state television channel IRINN stated that this plan will be implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey as well.[xvii] The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.

Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The New York Times published an article on growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus that included an interview with the Iranian ambassador to Armenia.[xviii] The ambassador argued that Iran and Russia ”are not allies” and that they have ”some differences” and  ”some mutual interests.” This is in part a reference to the disagreements between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor project, which is a Turkish project that seeks to connect Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[xix] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia at a time when Iran hopes to expand trade with Armenia and Europe.[xx] This disagreement is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties, however. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.

 

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli War Aims in Lebanon: Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission. Katz said that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own.” Israel’s currently limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s vision.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.
• Iran and Russia in the Caucasus: Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The disagreements between the two countries over the Caucasus is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation through a stronger Russo-Iranian relationship over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties. One-way-attack drones are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception.

Iran Update, November 11, 2024

Hezbollah officials continue to claim that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon are filing to achieve Israeli objectives. The head of Hezbollah’s media office, Mohammad Afif, claimed in a November 11 press conference in Beirut that Israel has been unable to hold terrain in any Lebanese villages.[i] Afif denied recent Israeli claims that Israeli operations have destroyed 80 percent of its rocket stockpiles, claiming that Hezbollah could “outlast” Israel in a long war.[ii] Afif’s statements are similar to Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s statement, which have grossly exaggerated the number of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[iii] Both Afif and Qassem's statements obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon.[iv]

 

The head of Hezbollah’s media office also emphasized Hezbollah's friendly relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[v] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s disarmament during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[vi] Afif said during the conference that Hezbollah’s relationship with LAF is “strong and solid” and will always remain so.[vii] Afif named Lebanese soldiers who had recently been killed in Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon as “heroes” and “martyrs.”[viii] He also condemned unspecified actors who have attempted to sow divisions between Hezbollah and the LAF.[ix] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently implicitly threatened the LAF against collaboration with the IDF on November 6 and implied that the LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid targeting Batroun, northern Lebanon.[x] Afif’s comments are likely an attempt to strengthen Hezbollah’s relationship with the LAF, particularly after Qassem’s implicit threats. Afif’s comments are particularly notable given that the LAF would be the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a ceasefire proposal in late October.[xi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF.[xii]

 

Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf confirmed Iran’s political support regarding the ceasefire talks in Lebanon in a phone call with his Lebanese counterpart Nabih Berri on November 11.[xiii] Ghalibaf held separate meetings with Berri and Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati during his visit to Beirut on October 11, where Ghalibaf discussed Iranian efforts to secure a ceasefire that would end Israeli operations in both Lebanon and the Gaza strip.[xiv] Iranian media reported that Ghalibaf only spoke with Berri on November 11 about a ceasefire in Lebanon.[xv] Berri has also previously stated that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon.[xvi] CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake the tasks that the United Nations has set for it, which includes preventing Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon.[xvii]

 

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar stated on November 11 that there has been “certain progress” in ceasefire talks to end the fighting in Lebanon.[xviii] Saar stated that Israel will agree to a ceasefire if the ceasefire pushes Hezbollah an unspecified distance back from the border and prevent Hezbollah‘s rearmament.[xix] These comments are consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s public demands that a ceasefire agreement include measures to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament.[xx] Israeli media reported that the Israeli security cabinet convened on November 10 to discuss the latest ceasefire proposal after US special envoy Amos Hochstein exchanged ceasefire drafts with Lebanese officials.[xxi]

 

Hamas reaffirmed its maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage exchange deal on November 10 in response to the emergency Organization of Islamic States and Arab League summit. Hamas said that it would “deal positively” with proposals that achieve a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the return of all displaced Gazans to their homes, an increase in humanitarian aid, and full reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[xxii] Hamas also called upon the Arab leaders at the summit to form an international Arab-Islamic alliance to pressure Israel and its allies to end the war in the Gaza Strip.[xxiii] Newly appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said in a press conference on November 11 that he does not think that a Palestinian state is a “realistic” goal to come out of the October 7 War.[xxiv] Saar added that a Palestinian state would be a “Hamas state.”[xxv] Ceasefire mediator Qatar confirmed on November 9 that it had ”stall[ed]” its mediation efforts due to frustration with both side’s lack of willingness and seriousness to end the conflict.[xxvi]

 

Top Saudi officials are continuing to criticize Israel in order to placate Iran without promising concrete action against Israel. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman called on the international community to “compel Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty and not to attack its territory” during the opening remarks for the emergency Organization of Islamic States (OIC) and Arab League summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on November 11.[xxvii]  Mohammad bin Salman did not comment on Iranian attacks into Israeli territory, however.[xxviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who did not attend the summit due to ”executive matters,” expressed hope that Iran and Saudi Arabia will increase cooperation in a phone call with Mohammad bin Salman on November 11.[xxix] Saudi Armed Forces General Staff Chief General Fayyad al Ruwaili separately discussed increasing ”defense diplomacy” and military cooperation with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran on November 10.[xxx] Bagheri invited Saudi Arabia to participate in joint naval exercises in the future.

 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted strikes against nine Iranian-backed militia targets in Syria since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 10.[xxxi] A local Syrian journalist reported that US forces conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militias in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.[xxxii] A Syrian regime-aligned National Defense Forces fighter died in the airstrikes.[xxxiii] CENTCOM said that the strikes targeted two unspecified locations in response to attacks on US personnel in Syria in the last day.[xxxiv] Pro-Iran sources reported that Iranian-backed militias fired rockets targeting US forces at al Omar oil field base on November 10.[xxxv] CENTCOM said that the strikes will degrade Iranian-backed militias ability to attack US and Coalition forces.[xxxvi]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah: Hezbollah officials continue to claim that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon are failing to achieve Israeli objectives. The head of Hezbollah’s media office also emphasized Hezbollah's friendly relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The LAF would be responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s disarmament during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.
• Lebanon Ceasefire Talks: Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar stated on November 11 that there has been “certain progress” in ceasefire talks to end the fighting in Lebanon. Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government.
• Saudi Arabia: Top Saudi officials are continuing to criticize Israel in order to placate Iran without promising concrete action against Israel.
• Syria: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted strikes against nine Iranian-backed militia targets in Syria since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 10.

Iran Update, November 10, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has destroyed the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to conduct ground attacks into Israel, according to unspecified senior IDF officers.[i] The IDF has conducted clearing operations targeting Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure across southern Lebanon to this end since October 1. These clearing operations have involved destroying Hezbollah sites and seizing tens of thousands of weapons.[ii] The IDF announced on November 10, for instance, that it destroyed a major underground complex near the Israel-Lebanon border that was meant to support Hezbollah incursions into northern Israel.[iii] The IDF has especially focused on degrading the Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces during the clearing operations.[iv] Eliminating the threat of ground attacks is critical  to achieving the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel.

Several senior IDF officers calculate that displaced civilians can return even without a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah.[v] The IDF officers told Israeli Army Radio that, without a ceasefire agreement, three Israeli divisions would deploy to the Israel-Lebanon border after concluding clearing operations in southern Lebanon.[vi] These divisions would give the IDF the option to attack and disrupt any Hezbollah efforts to re-entrench in southern Lebanon.[vii] This Israeli plan is similar to the US-drafted ceasefire proposal, which would permit the IDF to operate in southern Lebanon against any Hezbollah activity there.[viii]

Hezbollah continues to threaten civilians in northern Israel with relatively long-range weapons, however. Unspecified senior IDF officers acknowledged this enduring threat in remarks to Israeli Army Radio.[ix] The IDF officers said that, while Hezbollah can no longer conduct a ground attack in Israel, Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border must be prepared to intercept Hezbollah fire into northern Israel.[x] Some of the anti-tank missiles that Hezbollah has, such as Kornet missiles, have ranges up to five kilometers.[xi] Under CTP-ISW's layer of current assessed Israeli advances, the IDF would need to clear areas of southern Lebanon that it has not yet cleared in order to push Hezbollah more than five kilometers from northern Israel.[xii]

Longer-range Hezbollah munitions, such as drones, missiles, and rockets, similarly continue to threaten residents of northern Israel, even though Israeli operations have likely diminished Hezbollah stockpiles considerably. Hezbollah rocket attacks injured at least six Israeli civilians in northern Israel on November 10, for example.[xiii] IDF officers have estimated that Israeli air operations have degraded Hezbollah missile and rocket capabilities to the point that Hezbollah has to be ”economical” in its use of munitions. The IDF also recently estimated it has destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah’s pre-October 7, 2023 drone stockpile.[xiv] Although Hezbollah has launched a daily average of 44 rockets into Israel in November 2024, the volume of rocket fire is short of pre-war estimates of Hezbollah’s capabilities, which had indicated that Hezbollah may launch up to 1,500 missiles and rockets daily in the event of war.[xv]

Hezbollah appears to still be suffering from the internal disruption imposed by Israeli operations. The IDF has continued targeting tactical-level Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon, which CTP-ISW has assessed may be diminishing the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units.[xvi] Unspecified Arab and Israeli officials told the Wall Street Journal that Israel has killed several Hezbollah commanders before they were able to reach their field positions in southern Lebanon.[xvii] The replacements to these commanders are less familiar with southern Lebanon’s terrain and their units’ fighters, according to the officials.[xviii] This disruption has likely impeded Hezbollah’s ability to conduct effective and organized defenses against advancing Israeli forces. Israeli soldiers said that Hezbollah fighters are still offering resistance but are leaning into “guerilla tactics” by waiting inside homes and tunnels—rather than operating at a greater scale across large groups of fighters.[xix]

The IDF has seized over 66,000 Hezbollah weapons, including almost 6,000 explosive devices and over 3,000 anti-tank guided missiles.[xx] IDF officers and other personnel said that the equipment was all “relatively new” and included new night-vision goggles and medical kits.[xxi] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the discovery of high-end weapons systems and equipment suggests that Hezbollah fighters fled their positions rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly withdrawing.[xxii]

Israeli Army Radio reported on November 10 that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer had traveled to Russia in recent days to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[xxiii] The visit reportedly occurred after the IDF strikes into Iran on October 25.[xxiv] Israeli Army Radio reported that Russia is expected to play a crucial role in the implementation of a potential ceasefire agreement by preventing Hezbollah from rearming.[xxv] Israeli media reported that a Russian delegation previously visited Israel on October 24, according to a source in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office.[xxvi] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[xxvii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has destroyed the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to conduct ground attacks into northern Israel, according to senior IDF officers. Hezbollah continues to threaten civilians in northern Israel with relatively long-range weapons, however.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah appears to still be suffering from internal disruption imposed by Israeli operations. This disruption has likely impeded the ability of Hezbollah to conduct an effective and organized defense against IDF operations in southern Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Russia is expected to contribute to the implementation of a possible ceasefire in Lebanon. It is unclear why Russia would do so given that it has enabled Hezbollah to arm itself by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.

Iran Update, November 9, 2024

• Gaza Strip: The IDF continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF also allowed aid trucks to enter the northern Gaza Strip for the first time in several weeks.
• West Bank: Israeli forces conducted raids in the northern West Bank, killing a Palestinian fighter, as part of an effort to degrade Palestinian militia networks there.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued clearing operations and its air campaign, targeting Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure in Lebanon.
• Iran: Iranian and Israeli social media users claimed that the IRGC conducted a missile test in central Iran. Iran has not acknowledged any test at the time of this writing.

Iran Update, November 8, 2024

Qatar instructed Hamas political leadership to relocate from Doha, according to US officials and Israeli media.[i] The Qatar-based members of the Hamas Political Bureau would in this case need to find a new base of operations, which could be Iraq.  The United States reportedly pressured Qatar to expel Hamas political leadership after the group rejected the latest ceasefire-hostage agreement proposed by international mediators.[ii] Emirati media reported in June 2024 that Hamas was considering moving its headquarters to Iraq.[iii] Hamas later established its first political office in Baghdad at some point in summer 2024.[iv]

Hamas political leadership moving to Iraq would be consistent with the growing importance of Iraq in Iranian strategy in the Middle East, as the IDF has degraded Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have increasingly used Iraq as a center for coordination and cooperation in recent months.[v] Iran and the Axis of Resistance, as they reevaluate their regional approach, could place greater emphasis on building their strength in Iraq and Syria given to compensate for the losses in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. Iran‘s proximity and over two decades developing proxy and partner militias in Iraq make it an appealing non-Iranian base of operations for the Axis of Resistance.

A journalist embedded with the IDF and traveled into Jabalia on November 5.[vi] That a journalist entered the area safely reflects, on one hand, the heavy concentration of the IDF in the area and, on the other hand, the extent to which Hamas has been severely degraded there. The IDF has deployed three brigades to Jabalia in recent weeks, highlighting the heavy securitization of the area.[vii] These units include the 900th Infantry Brigade, which is the largest IDF brigade with five battalions.[viii] The journalist entered Jabalia in a Humvee that would be vulnerable to attacks relative to a more heavily armored vehicle.[ix]

Iran Update, November 7, 2024

Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the IDF from October 28 to 31.[i] Hezbollah’s Operations Room claimed that the group prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.[ii] This requires a certain level of preparation by Hezbollah but it is limited because a small amount of infantry could not hope to hold Khiam against an Israeli mechanized assault. Hezbollah fighters conducted 70 attacks over the IDF’s three-day advance towards Khiam. Most of these attacks were indirect fire attacks using rockets, thus supporting the theory that Hezbollah planned a defense centering on indirect fire.[iii] Hezbollah did not claim small arms engagements with Israeli forces during this period, suggesting that Hezbollah commanders used light infantry fighters sparingly, if at all. Lebanese sources reported small arms engagements between Hezbollah fighters and the IDF but did not specify at what range the engagements occurred.[iv] The low number of small arms engagements suggests that Hezbollah commanders were either unwilling or unable to deploy many infantrymen during the IDF advance into Khiam and preferred to deplete stocks of rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortar shells.

Hezbollah’s prepared fire-heavy defense also suggests that Hezbollah commanders were focused on inflicting casualties rather than holding ground. This would be consistent with a defense that prioritizes the attrition of enemy forces and thus the enemy’s will to fight over holding ground. The IDF advanced at least five kilometers from Israel towards and into Khiam during the three-day operation. Hezbollah claimed that the IDF withdrew into northern Israel from Khiam on October 31 but did not provide additional evidence.[v]

Hezbollah’s defense of Khiam has been the most organized defense of a southern Lebanon village since the IDF began its ground operation in Lebanon in early October. Hezbollah commanders may have chosen to defend this area given that Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle. The IDF never confirmed that it operated in Khiam and did not publicize Hezbollah equipment or infrastructure seized there. Geolocated footage posted on November 6 showed the IDF 8th Armored Brigade (res.) (91st Division) operating in Khiam in recent days, however.[vi]  Israeli forces destroyed firing points aimed toward northern Israeli towns and located and destroyed weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosives in Khiam.[vii] The IDF killed the commander of Hezbollah’s local unit in Khiam unit on November 3 after the IDF withdrew from the town.[viii] The IDF continued artillery shelling of Khiam and its outskirts post-withdrawal.[ix]  The fact that Hezbollah’s tactical command echelons near Khiam managed to execute a defense is not a strong indicator that Hezbollah’s higher command echelons have recovered from the severe degradation caused by Israeli air and ground operations. The defense of Khiam could be planned and executed at a relatively low echelon of command.

Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. These IRGC commanders have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel. “True Promise Operation” refers to the previous large-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which Iranian officials refer to as True Promise Operation 1 and True Promise Operation 2, respectively.[x] Senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi and IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli, have recently warned that Iran will “certainly” launch a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel.[xi]

Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 in order to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile. Iran used a total of around 300 long-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Israel earlier this year.[xii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) damaged mixing equipment and facilities used to produce long-range ballistic missiles in its strikes into Iran on October 25, which will likely disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.[xiii] This disruption could cause the Iranian regime to refrain from conducting a large-scale missile attack on Israel since it might currently lack the capability to readily replace the missiles it would use in such an attack. Iran could conduct a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel in order to preserve its long-range missile stockpile, however. Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 5 that the IRGC has been transferring drones and ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israeli strikes on October 25.[xiv]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.[xv] Khamenei stated that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and carries it forward to maintain the revolution’s “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people‘s lives.”[xvi] Khamenei notably did not reveal any specific details about his successor. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. The newest Assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[xvii] This iteration of the Assembly will likely be the Assembly that chooses the next Supreme Leader following Khamenei’s death.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel.[xviii] Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels and US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea.[xix] He also said that the Houthis would continue direct attacks on Israel. Abdulmalik added that they have experienced Trump before.[xx] CTP-ISW has observed over 270 Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels since November 2023.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the IDF from October 28 to 31. The group said that it prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.
• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
• Houthi Response to US Election: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel. Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels, US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea, and Israel itself.

Iran Update, November 6, 2024

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6.[i] Qassem said that Hezbollah was “ready” for a war of attrition and that Israel would “not win, even if it takes a long time.”[ii] The speech marked the 40-day death anniversary of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and was Qassem’s second public statement since taking over as head of Hezbollah.[iii]

 

Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.[iv] Qassem said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks through Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabhi Berri, who is a Hezbollah ally.[v] Qassem said that the ”ceiling” for negotiation would be the ”full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction,” suggesting that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate.[vi]

 

Qassem implicitly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[vii] Qassem implied that LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid into Batroun, north of Beirut by saying that “today I will not accuse” but ”demand” an answer.[viii] Qassem further demanded that the LAF protect Lebanese maritime borders.[ix] Qassem appears to be implying that Hezbollah would not sit idle while the LAF coordinates with the IDF and could set the tone for LAF activities in southern Lebanon after the end of the Israeli ground operation. Israeli Army Radio reported that senior Hezbollah naval official Imad Amhaz surrendered without resistance to Israeli naval special operations forces in Batroun on November 1.[x] Qassem’s comments are notable given that the LAF is the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a late October ceasefire proposal.[xi] The leaked text stipulates that LAF would deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon, monitor the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings, and dismantle all non-state military infrastructure while confiscating arms.[xii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF, making Qassem’s threats notable.[xiii]

 

Qassem grossly exaggerated the number of IDF injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[xiv] He falsely claimed that Hezbollah has killed and wounded over a thousand Israeli soldiers over the last 40 days.[xv] The IDF has announced that it has suffered 38 soldiers killed in action in southern Lebanon and northern Israel since the start of the ground operation.[xvi]

 

Qassem continued to extol Hezbollah’s strength after Israeli operations without providing any evidence. Qassem said that Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles are not low.[xvii] The IDF has seized tens of thousands of anti-tank guided munitions from Hezbollah warehouses near the Israel-Lebanon border.[xviii] The IDF said that it had destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah drones and 80 percent of Hezbollah rockets through its ground and air campaign.[xix] Qassem also claimed that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of fighters in reserve who are ready to engage the IDF.[xx] The IDF assessed that it has killed at least 3,000 Hezbollah fighters since October 7, 2023.[xxi] Israeli operations, including the pager and radio attacks, have injured thousands of additional Hezbollah fighters.[xxii] Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[xxiii]

 

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[xxiv] Halevi said that the IDF will develop plans to “expand and deepen” ground operations and activate those plans as needed.[xxv] Halevi noted that these plans will be formulated alongside efforts to pursue a diplomatic agreement in Lebanon.[xxvi]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to pressure the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Council leader Sheikh Ali al Asadi threatened that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—would target US bases in Iraq and Syria if the Iraqi government discovered that Israel used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.[xxvii] The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria on October 25 before launching strikes into Iran.[xxviii] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias falsely believe that the United States can control Israeli actions and have often attacked US bases in Iraq and Syria as a retaliation against Israeli action. Both Israel and the United States have reportedly warned Iraq that Israel may strike targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi groups target Israel from Iraqi territory.[xxix] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi militias to attempt to deter Israel, including by pressuring the United States under the false assumption that the United States can prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq.

 

The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory. The US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that Israel will almost certainly strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory, according to Axios.[xxx] Sullivan and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also pressured Sudani to limit Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria, something Sudani has so far failed to prevent.[xxxi]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Ali al Fatlawi also told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on November 5 that the Iraqi militias have the right to support the Iranian response against Israel, further underscoring Sudani’s failure to prevent militia attacks.[xxxii]

 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory. Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 1 that Iraqi militias may soon attack Israel using ballistic missiles and drones.[xxxiii] The IRGC has probably shipped some of these missiles and drones in components to Iraqi militias, allowing the groups to assemble the systems themselves possibly with Houthi support, as CTP-ISW suggested on November 5. This collaboration could have also extended into rudimentary drone production.

 

Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.[xxxiv] Jaish al Adl acknowledged that two high-ranking commanders and 12 fighters were killed in what it said was a joint Iranian-Pakistani airstrike.[xxxv] The Pakistani officials have not confirmed the joint military action with Iran, however. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes in January 2024 on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, on January 16 without Pakistan's permission. Pakistan responded by launching combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[xxxvi] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan on November 4 to meet with high-ranking Pakistani officials. Araghchi's trip likely aimed, in part, to express Iran's concerns regarding border security.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to compel the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory.
• Iran in Iraq: The IRGC is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6. Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.

Iran Update, November 5, 2024

Iran Update, November 4, 2024

Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack on Israel in retaliation for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran.[i] Unspecified Arab and Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the upcoming Iranian attack will include drones and missiles and that some will have heavier payloads than those which Iran has previously fired at Israel. Western and Iranian analysts have noted that Iran could use the Khorramshahr-4 liquid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile, which purportedly carries a payload of 1,500 kilograms and has a range of 2,000 kilometers.[ii] The Arab and Iranian officials also told the Wall Street Journal that Iran will use other weapons beyond drones and missiles and will include the conventional Iranian military, known as the Artesh, in the attack. The inclusion of the Artesh would mark the first time that it has attacked Israel; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken lead on attacking Israel up until this point. The Artesh would participate presumably because the IDF killed four Artesh officers in its recent strikes on Iran.[iii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly told senior regime officials that the IDF strikes were ”too large to ignore.”[iv] The Artesh has some means of supporting an attack on Israel, such as one-way attack drones, decades-old combat aircraft, and ship-launched missiles, though it remains far from clear that these systems would perform well against Israeli defenses.[v]

Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo on November 2 to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs.[vi] Hamas in the meeting reportedly presented a detailed blueprint for organizing the committee and comprising it of technocrats.[vii] Fatah reportedly agreed in principle and asked to review the plan further, particularly who would lead the committee. This meeting comes as Hamas and Fatah have negotiated for months over establishing a national unity government in the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian source told Reuters in October 2024 that Hamas and Fatah may explore the possibility of forming a committee to govern the Gaza Strip if they failed to agree on a national unity government.[viii] Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip as an alternative to an Emirati-proposed plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance. Hamas likely calculates that it could subvert, infiltrate, and ultimately control a national unity government and thus allow Hamas to remain politically dominant in the Gaza Strip. That Hamas developed the plan for an administrative committee indicates that Hamas still this approach as viable toward preserving its influence in the strip. This Cairo meeting notably comes after Hamas asked Russia to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) into negotiating further over a national unity government.[ix]

A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces on campus.[x] The student, named Ahoo Daryaei, was targeted for improperly adhering to the mandatory hijab law. Some Iranian sources stated that Daryaei removed her clothing after security forces tore it.[xi] Security forces arrested Daryaei, and Iranian media later reported that she has been hospitalized for being mentally ill.[xii] This incident is one of several in which the regime has labeled women mentally ill for protesting the hijab requirement.[xiii] Human rights organizations called for the immediate and unconditional release of Daryaei.[xiv] She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population. This protest movement has a long legacy of strong female icons, especially following the regime killing Mahsa Amini in September 2022.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Israel conflict: Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack in retaliation for the recent IDF strikes on Iran. Tehran reportedly plans to use drones and missiles, some of which will have heavier payloads than what Iran has previously fired at Israel. The upcoming attack will reportedly include the IRGC and conventional Iranian military.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs. Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government that Hamas can ultimately control as an alternative to a UAE plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance in the strip.
• Iran: A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces. She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population.