Iran Updates October 2024

Iran Update, October 31, 2024

Israeli state-owned broadcaster Kan published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon.[i] The draft proposes that international mediators determine a date to begin the ceasefire and commence a 60-day “implementation period.” During this period, Lebanese Hezbollah would cease attacks against Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would cease offensive operations in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would gradually deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon before the implementation period ends. The LAF would be responsible for monitoring the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings. The LAF would also dismantle all non-state military infrastructure and confiscate arms.

The United States, Israel, and Lebanon, according to the proposal, would establish a "monitoring and enforcement mechanism” to address reported ceasefire violations. The United States will administer the mechanism, which would—in addition to Israel and Lebanon—include the United Nations and European and regional countries. The mechanism would develop measures to address ceasefire violations, such as sanctions packages. The mechanism would assess progress at the end of the implementation period and institute a permanent ceasefire. The IDF would at this point conduct a complete withdrawal from Lebanon within seven days. The United States and United Nations would separately facilitate Israel-Lebanon negotiations to achieve the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Hezbollah from operating south of the Litani River. Hezbollah has violated UNSCR 1701 repeatedly over many years.

US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials are currently discussing the ceasefire proposal. Senior US officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk met with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem on October 31 to that end.[ii] Hochstein previously spoke with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on October 30.[iii] Israeli Army Radio reported that there has been ”real progress” toward an agreement.[iv]

The success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation.[v] The proposal, in its current form, requires Hezbollah to cease attacks against Israel but does not explicitly require Hezbollah to disarm—only that the LAF must dismantle military infrastructure and confiscate weapons. The agreement could still be viable, however, so long as Hezbollah leaders accept the agreement and get their lower echelons to adhere to it. There is a risk that Hezbollah leaders cannot ensure that some of the rank-and-file militants stop attacks and surrender their weapons to the LAF, especially given the severe disruption to the Hezbollah command-and-control network. There may even be some exchanges of fire during the implementation period. This fighting would not necessarily mean that the ceasefire failed.

The LAF would need to disarm other non-state militias in southern Lebanon based on the text of the proposal. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain cells in Lebanon, particularly in the south, and Hezbollah commonly allows these and other Palestinian groups to launch attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory.[vi] The presence of these armed groups could complicate Hezbollah efforts to honor the ceasefire.

The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah forces to withdraw from south of the Litani River.[vii] The proposal instead stipulates that the LAF should be the only military force in the area.[viii] This language is remarkably similar to that of UNSCR 1701, which calls for southern Lebanon to be “free any armed personnel, assets, and weapons” other than those of the Lebanese state.[ix] UNSCR 1701 called in spirit for a Hezbollah withdrawal but fell short of providing for it explicitly.[x] Requiring Hezbollah to leave southern Lebanon would be extremely complicated given that many of Hezbollah militants were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails.[xi] The United States agreed to give Israel a “side letter” that would give assurances of US support if the LAF or UNIFIL fails to meet their respective obligations.[xii] Maintaining the option to operate in Lebanon is consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu saying on October 31 that the main Israeli priorities are to “enforce security, thwart attacks against [Israel], and act against the arming of our enemies despite all the pressures and constraints.”[xiii]  The side letter requests that Israel consult the United States before any Israeli strikes in Lebanon and that the strikes try to minimize harm to civilians.[xiv] The United States also requested that Israeli flights over Lebanon be used only for intelligence collection and refrain from breaking the sound barrier.[xv]

Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire. Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati said on October 30 that a deal could be announced “in the coming hours or days.”[xvi] Lebanese officials are reportedly avoiding criticizing any parts of the proposal publicly in order to provide space for continued negotiations.[xvii] The proposal published by Israeli media is dated October 26, but anonymous officials familiar with the negotiations have said that no major changes have been made since then.[xviii]

The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border.[xix] The division will include a quick reaction force to counter anti-Israel militancy in the Jordan Valley and to interdict weapons smuggling. The division will be subordinate to the IDF Central Command and cooperate with the Jordanian Army to secure the border region.[xx] The establishment of this new division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli media published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon. The success of the proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation. The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah to withdraw from south of the Litani River.
• Lebanon: Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails. Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire.
• Israel: The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border. The establishment of this division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.

Iran Update, October 30, 2024

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem reiterated normal Hezbollah themes and ideological points in his first speech as secretary general on October 30, suggesting his appointment will not spur drastic organizational change. Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Qassem on October 29 to replace Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed on September 27.[i] Qassem’s speech echoed similar topics to his speeches delivered after Nasrallah’s death but before Qassem’s appointment.[ii]

Qassem continued to attempt to obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon. Qassem bragged about Hezbollah's capabilities and fighting prowess, stating his intent to continue to “implement the war plan” against Israel that Nasrallah created.[iii] Qassem called on Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon to “reduce [Israeli] losses” and threatened that Israel would soon pay an “unprecedented price.”[iv]  Qassem continued to assert that Hezbollah fighters were successful on the battlefield and that “all the required capabilities are available to the resistance fighters on the front lines, and they are steadfast and capable.”[v] He also noted that Hezbollah fighters continue to launch attacks into northern Israel despite the widespread airstrikes targeting launch sites.[vi] He emphasized that Hezbollah is ”hurting” Israel, using the Binyamina base drone attack that killed four IDF personnel and injured 60 others as proof.[vii] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Northern Command said on October 21 that Hezbollah ”fails to carry out effective reinforcements and does not fight as a system” in southern Lebanon border villages where the IDF is operating, however.[viii] It is also notable that though Hezbollah is firing between 100 and 200 rockets into Israel every day, pre-war estimates indicated Hezbollah would be able to fire well over 1,000 rockets into Israel every day.[ix] This indicates that Hezbollah is either unwilling or unable to launch rockets into Israel at a higher rate.

Read more about Hezbollah’s efforts to disguise its military failure: Hezbollah’s Military Forces are Failing in Lebanon, by Brian Carter.

Qassem hinted at a possible shift in Hezbollah policy that would allow a Lebanon ceasefire to be separated from Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The new secretary general was less absolute regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip than Nasrallah had been before his death. Nasrallah had previously said that a ceasefire in Lebanon would have to be contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem appeared less resolute by saying that Hezbollah would accept ”appropriate” ceasefire conditions but insisted that "the basis for any negotiations is a ceasefire first."[x] Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[xi] Nasrallah had previously been very explicit that Hezbollah would not stop indirect fire attacks into Israel until the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip.[xii] Nasrallah held this unambiguous position before Israel began ground operations in southern Lebanon, however. The shift in Hezbollah’s position may be a result of both new Hezbollah leadership and the escalation of a war that has temporarily degraded Hezbollah's command, control, and logistical networks. Qassem said he believes that Hezbollah, not an international resolution, expelled Israel from Lebanon in 2006 and 2000, suggesting his reluctance to enter into a ceasefire agreement.[xiii]

Qassem expressed considerable skepticism that Israel would abide by a ceasefire agreement, citing what he sees as past Israeli violations of UNSCR 1701 and Israel’s vision for Lebanon. Qassem alleged that Israel regularly violated UNSCR 1701, but Hezbollah has violated the resolution since the end of the 2006 war by building massive military sites south of the Litani River that Israeli forces are now operating inside of Lebanon to destroy.[xiv] Qassem described Hezbollah's activities in southern Lebanon as a “proactive defense” against an Israeli intent to “eliminate” the resistance and “our people in the region.”[xv] A ”proactive” Hezbollah defense including ground forces designed to attack Israel is a violation of UNSC Resolution 1701. He claimed that Israel always intended to invade Lebanon and that Hezbollah ”harass[ment]” of northern Israeli towns with daily rocket and drone attacks did not cause Israel’s current operation.[xvi] This statement by Qassem is false. Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[xvii] Tens of thousands of Israeli civilians left northern Israel border villages and towns shortly after Hezbollah began attacking Israel with rockets, drones, and other systems on October 8, 2023.[xviii]

Qassem distanced himself and Hezbollah from Iran, stating that Hezbollah is not pursuing an Iranian project but is executing its plan to protect and liberate Lebanese land.[xix] He praised Iran for its “financial, media, and political support” and the “heavy price” that it pays for that support and its stance on Palestine.[xx] Emirati media cited an Iranian source that said that Qassem fled Lebanon on October 5 aboard the Iranian foreign minister’s plane.[xxi] CTP-ISW is unable to independently confirm this report. Qassem also thanked other Axis of Resistance groups for their support of Hezbollah and Palestine, singling out the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxii] Qassem’s praise for these groups is particularly notable given that several Houthi and Iraqi fighters have died in southern Lebanon since the Israeli campaign accelerated in late September 2024.[xxiii]

Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 significantly degraded Iran's integrated air defense system and made subsequent Israeli strikes on Iran easier and less risky. Senior US and Israeli officials confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[xxiv] The S-300 is the collective name for a number of individual platforms. Destroying the radars that the S-300 uses to engage targets, for example, would render the entirety of the S-300 system unable to engage air targets. The strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft in Iranian airspace.[xxv] It is not clear how well or how reliably these passive array detection radars can detect stealth aircraft in particular. Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the Lebanese Hezbollah attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 19.[xxvi] The damage to Iran's air defenses has likely seriously degraded Iran’s ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.

The IDF is signaling that it is preparing to end its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon. IDF officials told senior Israeli officials that it is an opportune time to obtain a diplomatic solution to end fighting with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and avoid a longer conflict in Lebanon during an Israeli cabinet meeting on October 29, according to unspecified Israeli officials.[xxvii] The Israeli officials said that the IDF is ”very close” to ending its initial phase of ground operations in Lebanese border villages.[xxviii] This reporting is consistent with recent reports that the IDF Northern Command expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks.[xxix] Israel and Lebanon are reportedly currently “in advanced stages” of ceasefire negotiations, which would involve a 60-day ceasefire followed by negotiations for a new mechanism to supervise southern Lebanon.[xxx] Senior US officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk will arrive in Israel on October 31 to meet with Israeli officials to discuss the most recent ceasefire proposal.[xxxi]

Israeli movement to secure a ceasefire suggests that the IDF believes it has achieved the military objectives dictated to it by Israeli political leadership, not that the ground operation has “failed.” Israeli ground and air operations have degraded Radwan special operations forces (SOF) assets to eliminate the threat of a Hezbollah ground infiltration into Israel. The IDF began its ground operations in southern Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities to conduct an October 7-style offensive and direct fire attacks into northern Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. The IDF said that the Radwan forces aimed to ”infiltrate Israeli territory and occupy [Israeli territory] near the northern border."[xxxii] Israeli operations along the Israel-Lebanon border have focused on removing Hezbollah Radwan SOF infrastructure that could have been used to launch ground attacks into Israel.[xxxiii] These raids have likely severely degraded if not destroyed Radwan infrastructure in border towns. The IDF recently announced that it “destroyed” Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a ground infiltration into Israel from Kfar Kila.[xxxiv] Israeli forces have destroyed at least seven major Radwan SOF sites during operations in southern Israel.[xxxv] 

The IDF Air Force also struck and killed Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF deputy commander Mustafa Ahmed Shahadi in the Nabatieh region of southern Lebanon on October 30.[xxxvi] The IDF said that Shahadi managed the Radwan Force’s combat plans in southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] Shahadi is the latest of at least ten Radwan SOF leaders that Israel has killed in Lebanon in 2024.[xxxviii] The IDF has also detained Radwan fighters during ground operations in southern Lebanon.[xxxix]

The IDF continues to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain along the Lebanese border to disrupt Hezbollah artillery observers’ ability to support indirect rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel.[xl] Israeli armor advanced towards Khiam on October 28, which is located on hilly terrain that would enable Hezbollah to direct these types of attacks with a view of northern Israel.[xli] Israeli forces are currently continuing clearing operations in Kfar Kila, Aitaroun, Dahyra, and Oum Touteh.[xlii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around 80 percent of Hezbollah’s pre-October 7 rocket capabilities.[xliii] Gallant said that Hezbollah is not currently organized in a way that would allow it to fire large barrages of rockets at northern Israel.[xliv] Pre-war IDF estimates from 2016 suggested that Hezbollah may launch up to 1,500 rockets and missiles daily into northern Israel in the event of an Israel-Hezbollah war.[xlv] Hezbollah's volume of rocket fire does not approach pre-war estimates of Hezbollah’s capabilities, although Israeli estimates have reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[xlvi] CTP-ISW estimates that Hezbollah has launched a daily average of 75 rockets into northern Israel between October 22 and October 29.[xlvii] This suggests that Israeli operations degraded Hezbollah’s rocket assets, which is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. An Israeli think tank estimated on October 28 that Hezbollah still likely retains up to 25,000 short-range rockets and up to 2,000 rockets and medium-range missiles.[xlviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah: Qassem continued to attempt to obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon. Qassem alleged that Israel regularly violated UNSCR 1701, but Hezbollah has violated the resolution since the end of the 2006 war by building massive military sites south of the Litani River that Israeli forces are now operating inside of Lebanon to destroy.
• Israeli Airstrikes Targeting Iran: Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 significantly degraded Iran's integrated air defense system and made subsequent Israeli strikes on Iran easier and less risky.
• Ceasefire in Lebanon: The IDF is signaling that it is preparing to end its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon. Israeli movement to secure a ceasefire suggests that the IDF believes it has achieved the military objectives dictated to it by Israeli political leadership, not that the ground operation has “failed.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain along the Lebanese border to disrupt Hezbollah artillery observers’ ability to support indirect rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel.

Iran Update, October 29, 2024

The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted precise and calculated strikes targeting Iranian military and defense industrial infrastructure to avoid collateral damage and casualties. The result of these precise strikes is that the damage to Iranian military infrastructure appears minimal. The Israeli strikes could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture advanced ballistic missiles and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.[i] Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 28 shows that the IDF likely struck a Ghadir radar site approximately 15 kilometers north of Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[ii] The Ghadir radar system, along with the Russian-made S-300, is an important component of the Iranian integrated air defense system.[iii] The Ghadir radar system can reportedly detect ballistic missiles from a distance of 1,100 kilometers and aircraft from a distance of 600 kilometers.[iv]

Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 29 separately shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, which is used to build solid-propellant ballistic missiles and launch Space Launch Vehicles (SLV) into orbit.[v] The IRGC previously launched the Soraya and Chamran-1 satellites into orbit from the Shahroud Missile Facility using the Ghaem-100 SLV in January and September 2024, respectively.[vi] A missile expert told AP News on October 29 that the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility is likely involved in “solid propellant mixing and casting operations.”[vii] The same missile expert reported on October 28 that the Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) factory that Israel struck on October 25 in Tehran has designed and developed “mixers for high-viscosity materials” since the early 1990s.[viii] The expert noted that the company could use this technology to produce solid-propellant mixers. The fact that Israel targeted mixing equipment used to make solid fuel highlights that Israel sought to degrade Iran’s ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly. Unspecified Israeli sources previously told Axios that Iran will likely need at least a year to acquire new mixing equipment.[ix]

An Israeli official stated on October 26 that the IDF hit approximately 20 targets in Iran.[x] Below are the confirmed locations in Iran that the IDF hit in its October 25 retaliatory strikes:

Tehran Province

• Parchin Military Complex, Tehran.[xi] Parchin is one of Iran’s most expansive and sensitive defense industrial sites. Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[xii] Iran has reportedly produced and tested chemical and nuclear weapons at the Parchin complex.[xiii] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found particles of man-made uranium at the Parchin site in 2015, indicating the presence of a larger quantity of uranium at one point, although Iran denied that the facility was tied to the nuclear program.[xiv] Former UN Weapons inspector David Albright said the buildings that the IDF hit at Parchin were used for mixing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[xv]
• Khojir Military Complex, Tehran.[xvi] Khojir is a missile production complex tied to the Parchin facility that is involved in the production of liquid- and solid-fuel missiles for the IRGC. Reuters reported satellite imagery revealed significant expansions at the site in July 2024.[xvii] The Khojir site is tied to various state-owned defense companies including Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG).[xviii] SHIG is one of Iran’s “primary entities responsible for ballistic missile development and production,” according to the US. SHIG has been sanctioned by the US, EU, and the UN for its role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[xix] Commercially available satellite imagery showed that the IDF destroyed two buildings in the Khojir complex.[xx]
• S-300 surface-to-air missile battery, Imam Khomeini International Airport, Tehran.[xxi] The Russian-made S-300 air defense system at the Imam Khomeini International Airport provides air defense cover for Tehran city.[xxii]
• S-300 surface-to-air missile battery, Hazrat Amir Brigade Air Defense Site, Elamshahr.[xxiii] The IDF struck an S-300 site near the Hazrat Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Amir ol Momenin Air Defense Brigade manages the S-300 equipment at the site.[xxiv] The brigade is part of the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military.
• Parand Military Site, Tehran.[xxv] Unspecified Iranian and Israeli officials told the New York Times that the IDF targeted the Parand military site with drones.[xxvi] Western media reported that the IDF hit this site, but there is no publicly available information on the purpose of this site at the time of writing.[xxvii]
• Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) Factory, Shams Abad.[xxviii] See above for details.

Khuzestan Province

• Abadan oil refinery, Khuzestan.[xxix] This is Iran’s largest oil refinery located near the Persian Gulf.[xxx] The United States Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Abadan Oil Refining Company, located at the Abadan oil refinery, in 2020 for facilitating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[xxxi]
• Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical Complex, Khuzestan.[xxxii] The IDF struck Iranian defense systems at the Petrochemical Complex.[xxxiii] This complex is Iran’s largest petrochemical compound and generates ”millions of tons of petroleum-based products” for exporting purposes annually.[xxxiv]
• Bandar Imam Khomeini Port, Khuzestan.[xxxv] The IDF struck the Port adjacent to the Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical Complex. This port serves as a major economic port on the Persian Gulf.
• Ghadir Early Detection Radar, Ahvaz.[xxxvi] See above for details.

Ilam Province

• Tang-eh Bijar Gas Field, Ilam.[xxxvii] The IDF struck air defense systems at the refinery for the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[xxxviii]

Semnan Province

• IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility / Shahroud Space Center, Semnan. See above for details.

Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[xxxix] Israeli media reported that the IDF strikes into Iran on October 25 were only in response to the large-scale Iranian ballistic missile attack against Israel on October 1 and that Israel is preparing a separate retaliation for the Hezbollah attack that targeted Netanyahu.[xl] The Israeli security cabinet reportedly convened for six and a half hours on October 27 to discuss, among other topics, the October 19 Hezbollah attack.[xli] An Israeli journalist emphasized that the Israeli response to the October 19 Hezbollah attack “is not expected to be similar” to the Israeli strikes in Iran on October 25.[xlii]

Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29.[xliii] Qassem replaces former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed on September 27.[xliv] Qassem is a founding member of Hezbollah and has been Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general since 1991.[xlv] Qassem focused on political issues while serving as deputy secretary general but he has assumed a more public-facing role since Nasrallah’s death.[xlvi] Emirati media cited an Iranian source that said that Qassem fled Lebanon on October 5 aboard the Iranian foreign minister’s plane.[xlvii] CTP-ISW is unable to independently confirm this report. The IDF killed Nasrallah’s presumed successor Hashem Safi ed Din on October 3, likely increasing the urgency for Hezbollah and Iran to move possible leaders out of Beirut.[xlviii] The IDF has killed the majority of Hezbollah’s senior leadership by airstrike in Beirut. Qassem is a less popular and charismatic figure than Nasrallah but will likely have success in consolidating internal support to effectively lead the movement due to his long history with the movement.

Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war.[xlix] Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”[l] He also dismissed Israeli claims that Hezbollah fighters are failing to defend against Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon.[li] Qassem indicated that Israel’s ground and air operations have not changed Hezbollah’s willingness to negotiate a political settlement or ceasefire.[lii] Qassem announced a new war “phase” designed to inflict high casualties on Israel. Hezbollah has likely implemented this phase, given that it conducted a record number of attacks for the war on October 25 and struck Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's home with a drone.[liii] Qassem’s statements suggest that Hezbollah will not temper its goals or military operations under his leadership.

Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam.[liv] This is the IDF’s deepest advance into Lebanon since ground operations began on October 1. Lebanese media reported that numerous IDF tanks entered Lebanon from near Metula on October 28 and advanced north to Tal al Hamamis and into Khiam’s southeastern outskirts.[lv] Geolocated footage also showed an IDF vehicle driving north on the southeastern outskirts of al Khiam on October 29.[lvi] Lebanese state media reported that Israeli tanks advanced at least six kilometers into Khiam’s outskirts, although CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.[lvii] Lebanese sources reported that IDF airstrikes, artillery shelling, and illumination rounds targeted the Khiam area during the IDF’s advance, which would have supported Israeli ground forces’ movements.[lviii] The IDF 98th and 91st divisions have operated south of Khiam in recent weeks.[lix]

Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Observers can directly view a large swath of territory in the Galilee panhandle, Shebaa Farms, and Golan Heights from Khiam, including several IDF Northern Command bases. Positions in Khiam and on nearby hills could enable Hezbollah artillery observers to direct rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The IDF has likely already seized terrain on Tal al Hamamis, located between Metula and Khiam, which would prevent Hezbollah from using the elevated terrain to conduct direct fire or support indirect fire attacks into the Upper Galilee from there.[lx] The IDF began ground operations to eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into northern Israel from positions in Lebanon. The IDF has previously seized hills in southern Lebanon that would enable Hezbollah to direct attacks targeting Israel to this end, including in Maroun al Ras, Mays al Jabal, and Odaisseh.[lxi]

Hezbollah and Lebanese media reported a high volume of engagements between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli armor advancing towards Khiam.[lxii] Hezbollah fighters reportedly fired anti-tank guided missiles, rockets, and mortars at Israeli forces advancing in numerous locations, including south, southeast, and southwest of Khiam.[lxiii] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces in Khiam’s southern neighborhoods.[lxiv]

Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement.[lxv] Senior Israeli officials speaking to Ynet said on October 29 that the deal would begin with a 60-day “acclimation period” ceasefire during which mediators would consider a “new mechanism” to supervise southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military infrastructure there.[lxvi] The IDF would withdraw most of its forces from southern Lebanon and only remain in certain areas where it still needs to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure.[lxvii] This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.[lxviii] To enforce UNSCR 1701 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy thousands of additional soldiers to southern Lebanon.[lxix] UNIFIL forces would be increased and bolstered by additional French, German, and British troops.[lxx] The plan proposes that Israel retains the right to take “prolonged action” in Lebanon to remove Hezbollah threats that Lebanese and international forces fail to address.[lxxi] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[lxxii] The agreement would finally include a ban on military imports to Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from rearming.[lxxiii]  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office has previously insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” near the Israel-Lebanon border and to maintain “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[lxxiv] Israeli media did not include Israeli access to Lebanese airspace in their most recent reporting about the proposal.[lxxv]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a security meeting with senior military officials on October 29 to discuss the possible ceasefire terms.[lxxvi]  Hezbollah has not commented on the negotiations and has not indicated if it would accept the deal. Hezbollah had previously made stopping its operations against Israeli forces contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[lxxvii] Hezbollah’s new Secretary General Naim Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[lxxviii] A successful implementation of the above ceasefire framework that pushes Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure north of the Litani River would reduce the threat of a Hezbollah October 7–7-style offensive into northern Israel. The terms would likely be insufficient to stop rocket fire into Israel due to the range of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal, however.[lxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strike on Iran: The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran and Hezbollah: Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Hezbollah’s New Leader: Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29. Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war. Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam. Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement. This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update, October 28, 2024

Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes "severely damaged” Iran’s air defense and missile production capabilities.[i] Unspecified sources within the Israeli defense establishment reported that Israel’s attack destroyed all of Iran’s long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and long-range detection radars, leaving Iran with only domestically produced short-range defense batteries.[ii] Western reporting has confirmed damage at a storage unit within the Abadan oil refinery in Khuzestan province and a TIECO oil and gas machinery factory in Tehran province, among others, following the IDF strikes.[iii] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called the strikes on Iran the most significant IDF Air Force operation since the Six-Day War in 1967, emphasizing that their impact represents "a change in the balance of power.”[iv] Gallant stated that the damage from the strikes puts Iran at a “huge disadvantage” when it comes to future Israeli attacks.[v]

Unspecified Iranian sources told Israeli media that Israel also targeted and breached Iranian radar systems in Syria before launching its attack on Iran.[vi] The sources noted that the radar screens in Iran’s defense systems “froze“ before the IDF strikes.[vii] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF likely targeted Iran’s early detection network in Syria and Iraq that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack.[viii]

Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. The Russian-made S-300 is the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.

Ssenior Iranian defense and political officials are downplaying the extent of the strike’s damage while simultaneously threatening a response.[xi] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed on October 28 that the Israeli attack caused only “minor” damage that Iran has since repaired.[xii]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in an attack on a police patrol unit in Taftan County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26.[xiii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces regional headquarters responsible for Sistan and Baluchistan Province “destroyed” the team responsible for the attack on October 27.[xiv] The IRGC Ground Forces regional headquarters reported that its forces killed four Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested four additional fighters. IRGC Ground Forces troops injured an unspecified number of fighters as they attempted to withdraw. This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since Decemb23.[xv]

Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[xvi] Israeli media reported that mediators attempted to combine a “small” Egyptian proposal with a comprehensive, multi-stage US-Qatar settlement.[xvii] CTP-ISW has not seen the details of this US-Qatar settlement. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi publicly proposed an initial two-day ceasefire in which four Israeli hostages would be exchanged with an unidentified number of Palestinian prisoners.[xviii] This would be followed by 10 days of further negotiations. Sisi’s proposed plan bears a resemblance to the proposal of Egyptian General Intelligence Service head Hassan Rashad on October 22 for a “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would facilitate negotiations for a more comprehensive ceasefire-hostage deal.[xix] A Palestinian source close to the negotiations told Reuters that Hamas would ”listen” to new offers but remains committed to achieving a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[xx] Hamas likely believes that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip by waiting out the Israelis, making it unclear why a smaller ceasefire-hostage deal would facilitate successful talks.[xxi]  

An Israeli source told Israeli media on October 27 that Netanyahu is willing to conclude the IDF operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in exchange for a diplomatic resolution that guarantees Israel’s war aims are achieved.[xxii] Israeli media reported that Israeli officials intend to host a follow-up summit soon to continue negotiations, with the involvement of Egyptian Intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, and potentially Hamas.[xxiii]

Hamas has attempted to coerce Palestinian civilians against leaving the northern Gaza Strip since IDF operations in Jabalia resumed on October 6, including by shooting civilians in the legs. The IDF said that civilian evacuations have taken longer than expected due to Hamas physically preventing Palestinians from leaving the north, including by shooting some civilians in the legs.[xxiv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson similarly said on October 23 that Hamas is physically assaulting Palestinian civilians evacuating Jabalia to discourage them from evacuating the area.[xxv] Israeli media reported on October 28 that 50,000 Palestinian civilians from the northern Gaza Strip have evacuated south since the IDF began clearing operations in Jabalia on October 6.[xxvi] The IDF has repeatedly warned civilians to travel to al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip and expanded the humanitarian zone eastward on October 26, likely to accommodate an increased flow of internally displaced Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip.[xxvii]

The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.[xxviii] Israel must approve an extension to allow Palestinian banks in the West Bank to maintain ties with Israeli banks by October 31. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and seven foreign counterparts wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25 and warned that Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s decision to not approve the extension may lead to the collapse of the Palestinian economy.[xxix] Smotrich has threatened to withhold his approval to extend a waiver that allows payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority for the import of food, water, electricity, and other services in the West Bank.[xxx] The restriction on the extension would cut Palestinian banks off from over $13 billion in trade with Israel, thus “damaging Israel’s economy and exacerbating an already dire economic situation in the West Bank,” according to the letter.[xxxi] Yellen and her counterparts also added that the collapse of the Palestinian economy would threaten Israeli security interests in the region.[xxxii] Smotrich has so far refused to renew the waiver but has until October 31 to do so.[xxxiii] US officials told Axios that the Biden administration recently told Israel that it had determined that Palestinian banks met Smotrich’s conditions for renewal.[xxxiv]

A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.[xxxv] A Yemeni journalist reported on October 26 that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah.[xxxvi] The Houthi fighters killed in southern Lebanon are from Saada Governorate in Yemen. Houthis from Saada Governorate are often given preferential treatment due to their close family ties and long-time service within the Houthi movement.[xxxvii] Fighters from Saada, given their loyalty, would be the most likely choices for important foreign missions like advising Hezbollah.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. Some Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s S-300s on October 25.
• Gaza Strip: Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.
• West Bank: The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.
• Yemen: A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.

Iran Update, October 27, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network during its strikes on Iran on October 25. The IDF struck and disabled air defense command-and-control sites and radars, including at some S-300 sites.[i] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF struck three or four S-300 sites, including one at the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran.[ii] Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times that the IDF strikes have caused major alarm among Iranian leaders.[iii]

Some of the air defense sites that the IDF struck were protecting critical energy infrastructure in western and southwestern Iran. Western media confirmed that IDF struck air defense sites around the Abadan oil refinery, Bandar Imam Khomeini energy complex and port, and the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[iv] Degrading the air defenses around these sites could leave them more vulnerable to future strikes.

CTP-ISW previously reported on how the IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and transfer them to partners abroad, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The IDF strikes—in addition to targeting air defense sites—hit drone and missile production facilities across Iran.[v] Commercially available satellite imagery revealed significant damage at the Parchin military complex, for example. The Parchin complex is one the most expansive and secretive Iranian missile production facilities. Some of the targets that the IDF targeted at the missile facilities were sophisticated mixing machines used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[vi] Iran will likely need months or possible a year or more to acquire new mixing equipment.[vii]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that, despite Israeli efforts to "magnify these actions for its own specific agenda”, it would be “misguided” for Iran to overlook the attacks during a speech in Tehran on October 27.[viii] Khamenei emphasized that Iranian officials will “assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done” to show Israel "who the Iranian people are.” The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called on October 26 for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council.[ix] UN Security Council President Pascale Christine Baeriswyl announced that the council will convene on October 28 to discuss the IDF strikes on Iran.[x]

Hamas has rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip. Mossad Director David Barnea proposed the deal in a recent meeting with Egyptian officials.[xi] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya rejected the proposal and reiterated Hamas’ intent to continue fighting for influence in the Gaza Strip.[xii] Hamas is exploiting the lack of a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip by lobbying for the establishment of a national unity government with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas likely calculates that it could slowly coopt and control any unity government with the PA and thereby retain a prominent role in post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas rejecting the deal that would protect its leaders supports CTP-ISW's assessment that the death of Yahya Sinwar is unlikely to prompt a shift in Hamas strategy in the war. Sinwar similarly rejected a deal with Israel that would grant him safety in September 2024.[xiii] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sinwar would almost certainly reject the deal due to his deep commitment to fighting and destroying Israel.[xiv] Hamas will likely continue to engage in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel in order to secure its maximalist demands, such as the IDF withdrawing completely from the Gaza Strip. Hamas officials and international negotiators are currently in Doha for further talks.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network in its strikes on October 25. This is in addition to the disruption that the IDF may have imposed on the Iranian ability to build missiles.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover from the war.

Iran Update, October 26, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three waves of strikes into Iran on October 25. The strikes were in response to the large-scale ballistic missile attack that Iran launched against Israel on October 1. The IDF targeted around 20 locations around Tehran and western Iran, including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs.[i]  The IDF in particular struck four S-300 air defense batteries, which are Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.[ii] That the IDF hit these batteries highlights the relative vulnerabilities of the S-300, especially against advanced platforms like the F-35 fighter jet. The IDF separately struck prominent defense industrial sites, such as the Parchin and Khojir complexes outside Tehran.[iii] These complexes are managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The regime uses these facilities to develop and manufacture advanced weapons systems, including solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran has used the Parchin complex previously for high explosives testing in support of its nuclear weapons program.[iv] International inspectors found traces of uranium there in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[v] Although there are no known nuclear activities currently at the Parchin and Khojir complexes, the IDF strikes could impede Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, given the role that these complexes could play in building a delivery system.

The IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that the IDF targeted sophisticated mixing equipment used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[vi] Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed that the IDF destroyed several buildings at the Parchin and Khojir complexes. The imagery shows no signs of secondary explosions, which is consistent with the IDF targeting industrial mixers rather than weapons storage facilities. The IDF strike on the Khojir complex comes after the regime began expanding the facilities there in August 2023 in order to increase the Iranian capacity to build missiles.[vii] The Israeli sources speaking to Axios said that Iran will need to buy new mixers from China.[viii] Doing so could take months or possibly a year or more, hampering the Iranian ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and those of its allies in the Axis of Resistance.

The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria immediately before launching strikes into Iran.[ix] The IDF was likely targeting early warning radars and sensors that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack. Iran has in recent years worked to build an early detection network across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in order to better defend against Israeli airstrikes.

Iranian officials and state media have downplayed the amount of damage that the IDF inflicted. The regime boasted that it prevented IDF aircraft from entering Iranian airspace and that the strikes caused only limited damage. The strikes did kill four Artesh officers, however, presumably at the air defense sites that the IDF struck.[x] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the IDF strikes saying that Iran has the ”right and duty to defend itself against foreign acts of aggression.”[xi]

A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence on October 25.[xii] The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it launched a drone attack targeting an unspecified ”vital site” in Israel. The naming of the group appears inspired by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has conducted regular drone and missile attacks on Israel in recent months. The IDF has not commented on the claimed drone attack at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF conducted three waves of strikes in Iran targeting air defenses and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. These strikes could disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
• Saudi Arabia: A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence. The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it fired a drone toward Israel.
• Lebanon: The IDF destroyed a large underground Lebanese Hezbollah complex in southeastern Lebanon. The location, size, sophistication, and structure of the complex suggested that it was meant for offensive operations against Israel.

Iran Update, October 25, 2024

Four unspecified Iranian officials outlined to Western media how Tehran could retaliate in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[i] These comments were likely an information operation meant to coerce Israel into limiting its strike on Iran. The Iranian officials, which included two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers, told the New York Times that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian armed forces to develop multiple retaliatory options.[ii] The officials claimed that, if Israel inflicts ”major harm,” such as by targeting energy and nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials, the retaliatory options would include firing as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles at Israel, increase Iranian-backed militia attacks across the Middle East, and disrupting commercial traffic in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[iii] The threat against global shipping comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to start an “energy war“ in the Middle East.[iv] The Iranian officials also claimed that Tehran could refrain from retaliating if Israel only strikes military targets—rather than energy or nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials.[v]

US Air Force F-16s from the 480th Fighter Squadron arrived in the Middle East on October 25.[vi]

Two unspecified Hamas officials claimed that Hamas will replace its leader, Yahya Sinwar, with a five-person committee based in Doha.[vii] The committee was reportedly formed after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. The committee was meant to facilitate decision-making when Sinwar was out of contact in the Gaza Strip, which happened regularly. The committee is led by Khalil al Hayya, who represents Hamas in the Gaza Strip on the committee. The committee also includes Zaher Jabarin, who represents the West Bank, Khaled Meshal, who represents the Palestinian diaspora, Mohammad Darwish, who is the Hamas Shura Council head, and the secretary of the Hamas Political Bureau, whose identity is unknown.

Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Israel on October 24, reflecting how Hamas strategy is unlikely to change significantly following the death of Sinwar.[viii] Hayya discussed the maximalist demands in a meeting with Egyptian intelligence director Hassan Mahmoud Rashad. The meeting comes as Egypt proposed a new “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would require Hamas to release a “small” number of Israeli hostages for a “few” days ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[ix]

Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks targeting international shipping, according to the Wall Street Journal.[x] The IRGC reportedly facilitated the transfer of the Russian intelligence to the Houthis at some unspecified point in 2024, helping the Houthis to target vessels that had deactivated their radio signals. The US Maritime Administration in March 2024 advised vessels to deactivate their radios when transiting near Yemen in order to protect themselves from Houthi attacks.[xi] Iran has separately tried to broker a deal between Russia and the Houthis that would transfer Russian anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis, further enabling attacks on international shipping.[xii] There is no evidence that Russia has sent missiles to the Houthis at this time, however, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xiii]

Lebanese Hezbollah have killed nine Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers in southern Lebanon since October 24.[xiv] The IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade (Res.) (146th Division) encountered Hezbollah militants during clearing operations in a forested area in southwestern Lebanon on October 24.[xv] The Hezbollah militants emerged from a tunnel shaft and threw grenades at Israeli forces.[xvi] Hezbollah killed four reservist soldiers in an exchange of fire and injured six others.[xvii] The IDF assessed that the Hezbollah militants were also killed in the exchange.[xviii] The IDF has continued to encounter and directly engage Hezbollah forces, typically in small groups of fighters, during clearing operations.[xix] Hezbollah also conducted an indirect fire attack and killed five reservists from the 8th Armored Brigade (91st Division).[xx] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets targeting an area near a building where 8th Armored Brigade soldiers were staying.[xxi] An IDF logistics convoy unit was also present in the building.[xxii] The attack injured 24 other IDF soldiers.[xxiii] Hezbollah has primarily targeted Israeli forces in southern Lebanon with indirect fire.[xxiv]

Iran Update, October 24, 2024

Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[i] Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk met with Deputy Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow on October 23 to request that Russia pressure PA President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Hamas over a national unity government.

Hamas is likely responding to the Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[ii] The plan would involve appointing a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister to administer the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas excluded from post-war governance. Negotiating a national unity government with the PA, on the other hand, would allow Hamas to retain a role in post-war governance. Hamas would likely exploit the establishment of a national unity government to gradually expand its control and influence in the Gaza Strip.

US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days.[iii] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamad bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced the plans on October 24. Al Thani added that Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.[iv] A Hamas delegation separately traveled to Egypt on October 24.[v] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position on October 18.[vi]

PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank in recent weeks in order to crack down on the Palestinian militias there.[vii] This PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank in response to Iranian efforts to empower the militias and undermine the PA. PA forces have arrested at least three Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in Tubas during this period.[viii] Residents have reported violent clashes between PA forces and militias there in recent weeks as well.[ix] Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have accused the PA of serving Israeli interests and called on militants to confront the PA forces in Tubas.[x] The PA operation into Tubas came as Israeli forces conducted their own campaign in August and September 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia across the West Bank in recent months.[xi]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake its assigned tasks, which includes enforcing UNSCR 1701.[xii] Berri reportedly made the assertion that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701 during a meeting with senior US official Amos Hochstein in Beirut on October 21.[xiii] Hochstein has reportedly suggested amending UNSCR 1701 by expanding the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon.

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati separately announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[xiv] The LAF currently has about 5,000 personnel in southern Lebanon.[xv] It is unclear whether the 8,000 number is the envisioned end strength for the LAF in southern Lebanon or would be in addition to the 5,000 soldiers already there. Increasing the LAF force size is unlikely to improve the enforcement of UNSCR 1701, however, so long as the Lebanese state and LAF are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah activity in the area.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the PA to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is responding to an Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, which would marginalize Hamas.
• Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days. Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.
• West Bank: PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank to crack down on Iranian-backed militias there. The PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon. Berri ignored the decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily there.

Iran Update, October 23, 2024

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[i] Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[ii] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[iii] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[iv]

It is within Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities—which now appear disrupted by Israeli action at a minimum—have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[v] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[vi]   The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s ”neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[vii] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.

Pezeshkian also met with PRC President Xi Jinping on October 23.[viii] This meeting’s details are not publicly available, but the officials probably discussed regional developments and growing Sino-Iranian strategic partnership, including Iranian oil exports to the PRC.[ix] Iranian Energy minister Abbas Aliabadi separately discussed trade and foreign capital investment with member countries of the Belt and Road Forum in Qingdao, China.[x]

Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.[xi] It is unlikely that Pezeshkian’s conversations with Putin and Xi Jinping will result in BRICS taking any tangible steps to undermine the US dollar in the near future. Russian and Iranian officials have used this de-dollarization rhetoric before, but this rhetoric has historically not resulted in any tangible movement against the dollar.[xii] Pezeshkian underlined the urgency in which BRICS countries need to create an integrated trade system with new mechanisms and technologies, which is a reference to an alternative to the SWIFT international messaging system, as proposals in his speech at the summit.[xiii] Pezeshkian explicitly stated that these would address sanctions and prevent future sanctions and even to counter the US dollar.[xiv]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3.[xv] Safi ed Din was leader of Hezbollah’s executive council and a member of Hezbollah’s political-military Shura Council.[xvi] Hezbollah confirmed his death on October 23, several hours after Israel released its statement.[xvii] Hezbollah similarly only confirmed the deaths of other senior Hezbollah leaders, like Hassan Nasrallah and Fuad Shukr, after Israel confirmed their deaths.[xviii] Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have alluded to Safi ed Din’s death over the past three weeks.[xix] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi accused Hezbollah of hiding the deaths of top commanders on October 18.[xx]

Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further effect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. Safi ed Din was dead for 20 days before both sides formally acknowledged his fate, meaning Hezbollah leadership has very likely recovered from the initial disorder caused by Safi ed Din’s death and adapted to his absence.[xxi]  Safi ed Din was very well positioned to take over control of Hezbollah from Nasrallah given the IDF reports that Safi ed Din “carried out [Nasrallah’s] duties” when Nasrallah was outside of the Lebanon or out of communication.[xxii] Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said on October 8 that Hezbollah would wait to appoint a new Secretary General but that there is not a leadership vacuum.[xxiii] Another Hezbollah leader said that the group had a “joint command in place.”[xxiv]

The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high-level Hezbollah commanders in the October 3 strike in Beirut. The IDF said that over 25 Hezbollah intelligence personnel were present in the underground bunker during the strike.[xxv]  Several senior Hezbollah intelligence officers died in the strike, including Hezbollah’s aerial intelligence collection leader and intelligence head in Syria.[xxvi] The overall chief of Hezbollah’s intelligence staff, Ali Hussein Hazima, also died in the strike.[xxvii] The deaths of Hezbollah’s top intelligence officers were more likely to have an immediate impact on Hezbollah’s operations in southern Lebanon and northern Israel than Safi ed Din’s death, though Hezbollah has presumably adapted to the loss of these leaders. Safi ed Din’s death will have ramifications for Hezbollah’s long-term trajectory, however.

The 146th Division continued to locate and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons during clearing operations in Marwahin, southwestern Lebanon on October 23.[xxviii] The 205th Armored Brigade (Res.) located a large cache of weapons inside a mosque. The IDF reported that the cache of weapons included long-range sniper equipment, night vision goggles, rocket-propelled grenades, various grenade launchers, shoulder-fired missiles, and Kornet missiles.

Hezbollah fighters, if they withdrew from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly withdrawing—instead fled their positions. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[xxix] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23. Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3. Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further effect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high level Hezbollah commanders in the October 4 strike in Beirut.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: An IDF armored brigade captured a large stock of high-end Hezbollah equipment, including night vision goggles and Kornet missiles, in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters, if they withdrew from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly executing an orderly delay—instead fled their positions
   

Iran Update, October 22, 2024

A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.[i] The source stated that Israeli operations targeting key Hezbollah leadership and the Israeli air campaign have significantly disrupted Hezbollah funding. The official stated that Iran used Syria as a conduit to provide Hezbollah with $50 million in cash each month prior to the start of the Israeli operations in Lebanon. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Iran transfers money to Hezbollah through the transfer of oil and money from Iran to Syria through Hezbollah’s Unit 4400.[ii] Hezbollah Unit 4400 is responsible for the transfer of funds and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.[iii] Israel killed the commander of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, and his subsequent replacement on October 1 and October 21.[iv] This report follows recent IDF airstrikes targeting branches of a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Beirut in recent days.[v]

Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers.[vi] The spokesperson noted in a press conference on October 22 that Hezbollah fighters had come “close” to seizing Israeli soldiers over the past several days but had not yet succeeded.[vii] Hezbollah has a long history of taking Israeli soldiers prisoner to exchange for Hezbollah fighters held by Israel.[viii] The spokesperson confirmed that Israel had detained Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations in southern Lebanon.[ix] The IDF said that it has detained many Radwan fighters and has published clips of their testimony, including statements from fighters that many Hezbollah fighters fled southern Lebanon after Hassan Nasrallah’s death.[x] The Hezbollah official said that ”after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations.[xi]

Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.[xii] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[xiii] Hezbollah’s Operations Room also noted on October 17 that Hezbollah would ”escalate” its attacks in the coming days.[xiv] Hezbollah has since expanded the scope and pace of operations into Israel, including by targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s home in Tel Aviv with an attack drone on October 19.[xv] Hezbollah has consistently claimed ground engagements in southern Lebanon at a higher rate since the first week of Israeli ground operations, although this may be a result of increased proximity between Israeli and Hezbollah forces as Israeli forces operate in additional areas of southern Lebanon.[xvi]  Hezbollah has conducted at least 39 attacks on Israeli forces, towns, and air assets over the past day.[xvii] Hezbollah officials have consistently argued that Hezbollah command, control, and logistical networks have returned to full operational capacity after being degraded by Israel’s air campaign in late September 2024.[xviii]

Hezbollah formally claimed responsibility for the October 19 drone attack on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel.[xix] Hezbollah took ”full and sole responsibility” for the attack.[xx]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[xxi] Blinken urged Netanyahu to “capitalize” on Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death to secure a ceasefire and hostage release deal in the Gaza Strip.[xxii] Blinken and Netanyahu also discussed ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon and enable civilians to return to their homes along the border.[xxiii] 

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Araghchi said that the Iranian military is monitoring all US troop movement in the ground and air regionally.[xxiv] Araghchi’s warning probably seeks to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces based in Arab countries to support Israeli retaliation against Iran and Israeli defense against Iranian attacks. This effort also supports Iran’s larger grand strategic objective of expelling US forces from the Middle East by subtly prodding these countries to constrain US efforts in the region. Araghchi also met with Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa and Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani in Manama, Bahrain, on October 21.[xxv] Araghchi met with Kuwaiti Prince Sheikh Sabah Khaled al Hammad al Dabah and Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali al Hiyaya in Kuwait City on October 22.[xxvi] Araghchi warned during a press conference in Kuwait that Israel knows what Iran can do in response if Israel attacks Iran’s critical infrastructure.[xxvii]

The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.[xxviii] The Shin Bet and Israeli Police stated in a joint statement that Iran directed the suspects to assassinate a senior Israeli nuclear scientist and the mayor of an undisclosed large city in central Israel.[xxix] Iran also instructed the individuals to photograph various undisclosed locations, vandalize sites in Jerusalem, and post graffiti calling for the release of the Hamas-held Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. This is likely part of an Iranian effort to sow division in Israeli society and increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The joint statement confirmed that Israeli security forces arrested the 23-year-old ”leader of the ring” who had recruited the six additional members.[xxx] A security official stated that the seven individuals worked as an “organized cell.“[xxxi] Six of the suspects are Israeli citizens, and the seventh suspect is an Israeli permanent resident.

This report comes one day after Israeli authorities arrested a separate Iranian spy network comprised of seven Israeli citizens who were given ”hundreds of tasks” including observing Israeli military facilities.[xxxii] Israeli police arrested an Israeli citizen in September accused of participating in an Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[xxxiii] Israeli media reported that this is the fifth public case of Iranian espionage attempts in Israel in the past month.[xxxiv]

Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.[xxxv]  The 460th Armored Brigade (162nd Division) engaged Palestinian fighters on October 14 who used the former UNRWA medical facility as a weapons storage and base of operations.[xxxvi] The IDF reported that it detained Palestinian fighters who were attempting to retreat south by hiding among civilians as they evacuated south.[xxxvii] The IDF reported that ”thousands” of civilians were evacuated from the area south to Gaza City.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Air Campaign: A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers. The Hezbollah official said that "after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations. Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.
• Blinken’s Regional Visit: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.
• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran.
• Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.
• Gaza Strip: Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.

Iran Update, October 21, 2024

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Axios reported that Israel insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.[i] Israel also demanded that the IDF Air Force enjoy “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[ii] US special envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Beirut on October 21 to discuss Israel’s conditions with senior Lebanese officials.[iii]

Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.[iv] Hezbollah is equally unlikely to accept these conditions, and Hezbollah leadership has previously indicated that it remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[v] This would rule out an agreement to return to UNSC Resolution 1701 without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[vi] An unspecified Israeli official said that Israel’s conditions resemble UN Resolution 1701 with “increased enforcement.”[vii]

UNIFIL has largely failed to undertake the tasks given to it under its mandate. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[viii] CTP-ISW has previously stated that Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are already in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701 and should have been enforced by UNIFIL.[ix] UNIFIL has failed to execute this mandate and prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing military infrastructure south of the Litani River. US officials, such as Amos Hochstein, have reportedly expressed interest in amending UN Resolution 1701 by expanding the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon.[x] Increasing the LAF’s force size is unlikely to enable the LAF to better enforce UN Resolution 1701, however, if Lebanese soldiers and their government (of which Hezbollah is a part) are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah fighters from operating in the area.

The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting at least nine branches of al Qard al Hassan in Beirut’s southern suburbs and across Lebanon on October 20.[xi] Al Qard al Hassan is one of Hezbollah’s main financial assets in Lebanon, providing financial services such as loans or ATM deposits and withdrawals to over 300,000 members of Lebanon‘s Shia population.[xii] Israeli Army Radio reported that al Qard al Hassan also manages Hezbollah’s banking system, including its payroll for Hezbollah fighters.[xiii] Al Qard al Hassan reportedly receives direct funding from Iran.[xiv] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF targeted al Qard al Hassan branches in Laylaki, Chiyah, and Burj al Barajneh in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in Nabatieh, Tyre, Shehabieh, Baalbek, Hermel, and Rayak, in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[xv] An unspecified senior Israeli official said that the objective of Israel’s ”broad wave of attacks” targeting al Qard al Hassan is to undermine Hezbollah’s economic stability and erode the trust that the Lebanese Shia community, including Hezbollah’s rank-and-file, holds in Hezbollah.[xvi] This will degrade Hezbollah’s ability to function during the war and ability to “rebuild and rearm on the day after,” according to the Israeli official.[xvii] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously expressed that Israel seeks to obtain a postwar agreement that would prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming and from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.[xviii]

The IDF’s effort to erode the Shia population’s trust in Hezbollah is consistent with previous Israeli efforts to do so. Netanyahu recently asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah, for example.[xix] It is unclear at this time if this strategy has successfully diminished public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.[xx] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the IDF targeted the head of Hezbollah’s financial arm responsible for “funneling cash from Iran to Hezbollah.”[xxi] Hagari did not state the specific individual’s name or position but stated that the individual had only been in the position for a “few weeks since his predecessor was killed.”  IDF has conducted various strikes targeting the Hezbollah financial system in Lebanon in recent days. Syrian state media stated that the airstrike killed at least two people.[xxii]

Military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30.[xxiii] The IDF Northern Command said that Hezbollah continues to fire from its ”residual rocket capabilities” but that this is not ”significant” fire.[xxiv] The IDF air campaign has concentrated its efforts on targeting Hezbollah rocket assets and weapons stockpiles. Degrading Hezbollah’s rocket assets is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah has continued to fire large barrages of daily rockets into northern and central Israel despite IDF operations targeting its rocket capabilities, however.[xxv] Hezbollah launched over 170 rockets on October 20, for example.[xxvi] An Israeli think tank reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[xxvii]

Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.[xxviii] Israeli forces have raided and seized terrain in border towns and areas over the past three weeks to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[xxix] While these raids have led to the likely severe degradation of Hezbollah capabilities in border towns, it is unclear how IDF strikes deeper into Lebanon have succeeded in degrading Hezbollah’s longer-range rocket and missile assets. These capabilities will continue to threaten residents of northern and central Israel.

The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on Jabal Kahil on October 20, north of Maroun el Ras, indicating that Israeli forces had seized and were operating on the hill.[xxx] The IDF has similarly seized hills in Mays al Jabal, Odaisseh, and Blida. A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces have conducted operations in some border villages that are only visible from Israeli territory and ”not seen” by Hezbollah forces.  These positions on hills and in towns overlooking northern Israel would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The correspondent claimed that Hezbollah fighters have conducted rocket attacks that have deterred Israeli forces from seizing the ”second line” of border towns.[xxxi] Israeli forces have entered one “second-line“ village but have not attempted to seize other ” second-line” towns.[xxxii] The fact that Israeli forces have entered one of these villages indicates that the IDF is not ”deterred.” It is highly unlikely that intermittent shelling would deter a combat-experienced force such as the IDF units operating in southern Lebanon.

Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. The Shin Bet and Israeli police arrested seven Israeli Jewish citizens of Azeri heritage in Haifa and northern Israel on charges of espionage for “hundreds of tasks” for Iranian intelligence agencies in a counterintelligence operation.[xxxiii] The suspects had been in contact with Iranian agents, and the Israeli State Attorney’s Office called this the most serious case they have investigated in recent years.[xxxiv] The suspects were reportedly recruited using financial inducements that were routed through Russian intermediaries who traveled to Israel.[xxxv]

The suspects reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones. Prosecutors stated that police and the Shin Bet accused the suspects of photographing and collecting information on Israeli energy and port infrastructure, IDF base and facilities, including the Kirya defense headquarters in Tel Aviv, Nevatim and Ramat David air bases, and Iron Dome battery sites, for Iran for around two years.[xxxvi] The suspects’ handlers also sent maps of certain sites to the suspects, including a map of the Golani Training Base, which Hezbollah struck with a drone on October 13.[xxxvii] The fact that the base’s dining facility was struck at dinner time with a Hezbollah drone suggests that some intelligence asset had observed patterns of life and understood the exact layout of the base and specific buildings within the base. Hezbollah has also targeted Iron Dome batteries with drone attacks, which this Iranian-led intelligence effort may have enabled.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 21 that the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in Israel is “in place.”[xxxviii] Austin declined to confirm if the anti-missile system was fully operational but said that it could be put into operation ”very quickly.” The US deployed the THAAD anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[xxxix]

The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened. White House spokesperson John Kirby claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom border crossing, which connects Israel and Rafah Governorate.[xl] The presence of armed gangs and criminal groups controlling the flow of aid could indicate decreasing Hamas internal control and governance capabilities, given that controlling the movement of humanitarian aid and distributing it to Hamas supporters is one way by which Hamas could maintain control in the Gaza Strip. Armed gangs and criminal groups could still cooperate with Hamas, however. Kirby noted that Israel had allowed 120 trucks of aid into the Gaza Strip over the last few days.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an increase in humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 250 trucks per day on October 19.[xli] Netanyahu’s decision followed a letter from the United States to senior Israeli officials on October 13 warning that the Biden administration would be forced to take unspecified steps, implying the withholding of military aid to Israel, if aid was not delivered to non-combatants in the Gaza Strip.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Goals in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.
• Israeli Air Campaign: The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.
• Israeli Military Assessments of Ground Operations: Israeli military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30. Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. Israel arrested seven suspects who reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel for Iranian handlers, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones.
• Gaza Strip: The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened.

Iran Update, October 20, 2024

Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters recently detonated a pre-planted improvised explosive device (IED), killing IDF 401st Armored Brigade Commander Colonel Ehsan Daqsa.[i] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Daqsa is the most senior IDF officer killed in the Gaza Strip since the October 7 war began.[ii] Daqsa, the 52nd Battalion commander (401st Armored Brigade), and two other officers activated a trip wire after they moved about 20 meters from their tanks towards an observation post in Jabalia. The trip wire detonated an IED that killed Daqsa.[iii] The 52nd Battalion commander was seriously injured and the other two officers sustained light to moderate injuries.[iv] The IDF appointed 162nd Division Deputy Commander Colonel Meir Biderman as the acting commander of the 401st Brigade.[v]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.[vi] Araghchi discussed recent ceasefire efforts in a meeting with Hamas’ Shura Council head Mohammad Ismail Darwish.[vii] Darwish thanked Araghchi for Iran’s continued support and stated that the Palestinian militias will continue their fight against Israel. Araghchi separately met with Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya and senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk.[viii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[ix] Araghchi stated in an interview with Turkish media following the meetings that Iran has already identified its targets in Israel for a potential retaliatory strike should Israel attack Iran.[x] Araghchi implied that Iran would only target military targets in Israel in such a retaliation. Araghchi traveled to Turkey to attend the 3+3 meeting with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials to discuss the south Caucasus in Istanbul on October 18.[xi]

The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.[xii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF intercepted a small quadcopter drone that crossed into Israel from Egypt.[xiii] The IDF reported that the drone was ferrying eight handguns and an unspecified amount of ammunition.[xiv]

Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.[xv]

The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[xvi]  The Israeli security cabinet met in the command bunker in the Kirya instead of in its normal meeting room inside the base.[xvii] The cabinet discussed several ”sensitive issues including the Iranian issue.”[xviii] Earlier reports stated that the security cabinet was expected to discuss increasing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and vote on whether to approve finding an armed contracting group to distribute humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.[xix] This meeting also comes as Israel continues preparations for a possible retaliation to Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack.[xx]

An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon.[xxi] The LAF announced on X that the airstrike targeted an LAF vehicle on a road between Ain Ebel and Hanine in Bint Jbeil District.[xxii] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF confirmed that it conducted the airstrike.[xxiii] The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck.[xxiv] The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”[xxv]

The IDF targeted and killed three senior Hezbollah officers in Tibnin, Bint Jbeil District, on October 20.[xxvi] The IDF killed a senior member of Hezbollah's southern front headquarters Hajj Abbas Salameh.[xxvii] Salameh conducted operations in the Bint Jbeil area and has held several positions previously on the southern front.[xxviii] The IDF also killed Hezbollah radio communications expert Reza Abbas Awada and Ahmad Ali Hussein, the head of Hezbollah’s strategic weapon production unit.[xxix] The IDF said that Hussein had completed "in-depth training" in Iran.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip.
• Iran and Hamas: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.
• Weapons Smuggling on the Egypt-Israel Border: The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.
• Ceasefire Talks: Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.
• Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Israeli Operations in Lebanon: An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon. The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck. The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”

Iran Update, October 19, 2024

Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Three drones crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 19.[i] The IDF said that one of the drones "hit a building“ in Caesarea with no casualties.[ii] Israeli residents reported hearing a large explosion following the drone’s impact.[iii] Neither Netanyahu nor his wife were at the residence at the time of the impact, according to the Prime Minister’s Office.[iv] Leaked images of the residence show damage to the side of a building.[v] Netanyahu warned in a statement that the Iranian-backed groups that tried to ”assassinate” him made a ”grave mistake.”[vi]

Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Drones pose substantial challenges for IDF air defenses, though the IDF is gradually improving its counter-drone capabilities. The IDF intercepted the other two drones that crossed from Lebanon and triggered warning alarms in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.[vii] CTP-ISW is unable to assess what the targets of these two drones may have been. Hezbollah most recently penetrated Israeli air defenses when a drone struck the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade’s training camp south of Haifa on October 13. Hezbollah combined short-range, imprecise rockets with drones and missiles during the October 13 attack. There have not been indications that Hezbollah also used imprecise indirect fires, such as rockets, in the October 19 attack targeting Netanyahu. Hezbollah has used single drones to penetrate Israeli air defenses in the past, however, by flying the drones at a low altitude and through challenging terrain to prevent radar detection.[viii]

Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders. These Israeli operations resulted in the deaths of Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah has not claimed or acknowledged the attack as of this writing, but Hezbollah’s operations did announce on October 18 that it would “transition to a new and escalating phase” in its attacks on Israel.[ix] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem also said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[x]

Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, according to an unspecified Israeli official. An unspecified Israeli intelligence official told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah drone attacks are increasing in frequency following a brief lull caused by the death of Hezbollah’s drone unit commander in an Israeli strike in Beirut on September 26.[xi] The Israeli intelligence official said that Unit 127—Hezbollah’s drone unit—is composed of a “few dozen” fighters and that the unit ”suffered” after Israel killed its commander.[xii] CTP-ISW observed a brief interval for six days after the commander’s death on September 26 in which Hezbollah fired no drones or a single drone into Israeli territory.

Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander. Hezbollah drone attacks have increased in recent days in both frequency and deadliness. Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah has launched about thirty drones into Israel in the past week.[xiii] A Hezbollah drone killed four IDF personnel and injured over 60 more in Binyamina on October 13, and another drone attack could have killed Netanyahu on October 19.[xiv] The IDF has continued targeting tactical-level Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon, which CTP-ISW has assessed may be diminishing the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units.[xv] The effects generated by the removal of Hezbollah commanders is a temporary effect, however. Hezbollah forces remain structured as a conventional fighting force. Military organizations are designed to absorb casualties and rapidly replace commanders to overcome temporary disruptions caused by the loss of leaders.[xvi]

Some recent Hezbollah attacks, such as the drone strike on the 1st Infantry Brigade’s base, indicate that Hezbollah has rebuilt at least some of its communications structure that the IDF campaign previously severely degraded. Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of rockets, missiles, and drones in the 1st Infantry Brigade attack, suggesting that Hezbollah had restored some communication between its rocket, missile, and drone units in order to coordinate the simultaneous launches.[xvii]

Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement.[xviii] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[xix] The Hamas officials said that Hamas will begin discussions to determine Yahya Sinwar’s successor “very soon.”[xx] 

A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.[xxi] Hayya and an accompanying Hamas delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on October 19 to discuss the October 9 meeting between Hamas and Fatah in Cairo addressing post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and recent "developments.”[xxii] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders.
• Hezbollah Drone Operations: Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, but Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander.
• Sinwar Succession: Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement. A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The 91st Division continued operations in Mhaibib, southern Lebanon, on October 19. The IDF 8th Armored Brigade and Yahalom combat engineers demolished a Radwan SOF tunnel north of Mhaibib. Part of the complex ran underneath a Lebanese school.

Iran Update, October 18, 2024

The IDF Chief of Staff estimated that Israeli forces have killed at least 1,500 Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations against the group, which is consistent with CTP-ISW estimates.[i] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces in southern Lebanon that 1,500 is a conservative estimate.[ii] CTP-ISW has independently tallied about 1,450 Hezbollah fighter deaths since October 8, 2023.[iii]  IDF operations, including the widespread September pager and radio attacks, have almost certainly seriously injured thousands of other Hezbollah fighters and rendered them unable to fight.[iv] Halevi said that Israeli operations had struck Hezbollah’s entire senior leadership to ”wipe out” the chain of command.[v] The IDF has exclusively killed Hezbollah’s senior leadership through airstrikes.[vi] Halevi added that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon were decimating Hezbollah’s local leadership.[vii] This pattern of targeting means that Hezbollah very likely retains tactical-level commanders in its rear areas away from Israel’s current ground operations, particularly in the northern Bekaa Valley. The IDF Air Force frequently targets sites in the Bekaa Valley but the intensity of operations against Hezbollah’s northern units is significantly less than along the Israel-Lebanon border.[viii]

Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position during a speech mourning Yahya Sinwar on October 18.[ix] Hayya declared that Hamas would not release the Israeli hostages until the IDF completed a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and released Palestinian prisoners.[x] Hamas’ maximalist position has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s border with Egypt, which Hamas has used to develop its military capabilities over the past decades.[xi] Hamas has also insisted on a permanent ceasefire, the release of high-value Palestinian prisoners, the unimpeded return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, and full reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Israel and US officials confirmed on October 18 that mediators are not close to resuming talks in Doha or Egypt.[xii] Unspecified Israeli officials said that Israel would likely need to wait for Hamas to appoint a new leader before resuming negotiations.[xiii] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[xiv] Hayya was reportedly one of only a few exiled leaders whom Sinwar trusted, and he has played a key role in ceasefire negotiations.[xv] Hayya has a much stronger relationship with Hezbollah and Iran than other options for the top Hamas leadership role, like Khaled Meshaal.[xvi] Hayya also presumably took over many of Haniyeh’s duties—such as engaging with foreign partners—that Sinwar could not perform due to his physical position in the Gaza Strip.

Israeli officials are considering the impact of Yahya Sinwar’s death on hostage negotiations.[xvii] Israeli officials are reportedly concerned that Yahya Sinwar’s death will inspire Hamas to execute the Israeli hostages that it holds.[xviii] Israeli media reported that senior Israeli officials spoke with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about how to prevent Hamas from retaliating against Israeli hostages for Sinwar’s death.[xix] Hamas previously used its execution of Israeli six hostages to conduct a series of information operations designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.[xx]

Israeli military operations over the last year, particularly Israeli subterranean operations, deliberately created the conditions that led to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16. Sinwar had previously hid underground in Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Khan Younis until January 2024 and then in tunnels in Rafah until at least August 2024.[xxi] IDF clearing operations throughout the last year have attempted to destroy these tunnel networks throughout the Strip.[xxii] These operations enabled the IDF to force Sinwar from his tunnel complex in Khan Younis in January 2024 and then caused Sinwar to move above ground in Rafah after IDF operations there destroyed a number of tunnels.[xxiii] Forcing Hamas leaders like Sinwar above ground by destroying the tunnel networks was part of a deliberate IDF operational design. The discrete tactical engagement that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, but the broader Israeli campaign was intentionally designed to force Hamas rank-and-file and leaders above ground where they could be sought out and destroyed. Sinwar’s death was therefore not a matter of chance, but rather the outcome of a deliberate campaign designed to eventually eliminate all of Hamas’ senior leadership.

The IDF stated that Mohammed Sinwar assumed the duties of Hamas’ military wing after the IDF killed Mohammad Deif in July 2024.[xxiv] Read more CTP-ISW analysis of Yahya Sinwar’s succession here: Sinwar’s Death Will Not End Israeli Operations in the Gaza Strip by Brian Carter.

Two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members infiltrated Israeli territory near the Dead Sea and fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 18. The involvement of two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrates potential opportunities for Iran and the Axis of Resistance to recruit Jordanians to target Israel.[xxv] The Jordanian fighters infiltrated multiple meters beyond the Jordan-Israel border.[xxvi] Israeli forces killed the Jordanian fighters following an exchange of fire that injured two Israeli soldiers near Neot Hakikar, south of the Dead Sea.[xxvii] The Israeli Army Radio reported that the fighters carried a map, a compass, and an Arabic-Hebrew dictionary.[xxviii] The IDF blocked roads near the area and conducted aerial and ground scans to confirm that additional fighters did not also infiltrate Israeli territory.[xxix] The fighters reportedly wore Jordanian military uniforms but were not Jordanian soldiers.[xxx]  Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson Moaz al Khawaldeh claimed that the fighters were Muslim Brotherhood members who regularly participated in events in support of Gaza and the resistance.[xxxi] Multiple Palestinian militias have released statements praising the attack.[xxxii]

This attack, like the Jordanian truck driver attack that killed three Israeli citizens at the Allenby border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8, reflects anti-Israel sentiments in Jordan that can be manipulated by Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[xxxiii] Both Jordanian and Israeli police have thwarted several attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to conduct attacks within the kingdom or smuggle weapons into the West Bank.[xxxiv] Iranian efforts to manufacture weapons, arm Jordanian agents, and undermine the Jordanian state are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[xxxv] It is also notable that this attack occurred one day after the IDF announced it had killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, given Hamas’ historic and ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF Chief of Staff estimated that Israeli forces have killed at least 1,500 Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations against the group, which is consistent with CTP-ISW estimates.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position during a speech mourning Yahya Sinwar on October 18.
• The Death of Yahya Sinwar: Israeli military operations over the last year, particularly Israeli subterranean operations, deliberately created the conditions that led to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16. The discrete tactical engagement that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, but the broader Israeli campaign was intentionally designed to force Hamas rank-and-file and leaders above ground where they could be sought out and destroyed.
• Jordan: Two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members infiltrated Israeli territory near the Dead Sea and fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 18. The involvement of two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrates potential opportunities for Iran and the Axis of Resistance to recruit Jordanians to target Israel.

Iran Update, October 17, 2024

Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully. Israeli officials confirmed on October 17 that the IDF 828th Infantry Brigade killed Sinwar in Tal al Sultan, Rafah Governorate.[i] IDF soldiers located three fighters inside of a building, one of whom was later identified as Sinwar, and fired a tank round at the building. The IDF had previously assessed that Sinwar was likely using Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip as a “human shield” after Israeli forces found Sinwar’s DNA samples in a tunnel where six hostages were killed on August 31.[ii] The IDF did not report the presence of Israeli hostages with Sinwar at the time of his death, however.

Sinwar’s death is unlikely to meaningfully change Hamas’ negotiating position because Hamas aims to exploit the hostages it still holds to compel Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire that would enable Hamas to rebuild. Hamas executed six hostages who had been traveling with Sinwar in late August 2024 and publicized propaganda videos of the hostages.[iii] These videos were intended to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu in order to compel his government to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas. Khalil al Hayya, Sinwar’s deputy and chief negotiator, will probably take over Hamas’ political affairs in the interim period.[iv] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.

Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders.[v] Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Strip right now.[vi] Mohammad Sinwar’s military control of the group would at least in theory give him control over the hostages, though given the severely degraded state of Hamas’ command and control, it is far from clear that any single Hamas commander could be aware of the locations of hostages. Other commanders, like Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad, will also probably assume some of Yahya’s and former Hamas military wing commander Mohammad Deif’s responsibilities if they have not done so already.[vii] Mohammad Sinwar also has the requisite experience as a military commander that would enable him to rebuild Hamas, however, if allowed to do so. Mohammad Sinwar has served in many capacities for Hamas’ military wing, including as logistics and manpower chief and a brigade commander.[viii] He was also part of Yahya’s inner circle as a war planner and strategist.[ix] These skills will be extremely sought-after by Hamas’ leadership if it emerges from this war able to rebuild in the Gaza Strip.

The death of Yahya and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however. Israeli ground and air operations in the Gaza Strip have defeated or severely degraded Hamas units across the Gaza Strip.[x] This reality means that Mohammad Sinwar and others, like Izz al Din al Haddad, will be unable to immediately influence dynamics on the ground. Hamas fighters are currently fighting in small cells. The value of Mohammad Sinwar and Izz al Din al Haddad will come if they manage to survive this war and if the end of this war enables Hamas to reinvest in its military wing in the Gaza Strip to rebuild. Their military experience under those conditions would be invaluable to a rebuilding Hamas.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014.[xi] Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[xii] Araghchi and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi discussed the need to “intensify efforts towards ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.”[xiii] Araghchi separately called on regional countries to “redouble” their efforts to stop Israeli “aggression” in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Lebanon during a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty.[xiv] Egypt—along with Qatar and the United States—has mediated ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas in recent months. Araghchi’s visit to Egypt is noteworthy given that Iran and Egypt do not have formal diplomatic ties. Iran has increased its efforts to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt in recent years, however.[xv]

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi appointed Hassan Rashad as chief of the General Intelligence Service on October 16.[xvi] Rashad replaced Abbas Kamel, who had served as the Egyptian intelligence chief since 2018.[xvii] Kamel worked closely with the heads of the CIA and Mossad, as well as the Qatari prime minister, to try to secure a ceasefire and hostage deal between Israel and Hamas throughout the October 7 War.[xviii] Rashad has a long history of working in Egypt’s intelligence services and previously served as Kamel’s deputy.[xix]  Rashad has also overseen Egypt’s relationship with Iran and its proxies.”[xx]

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16 targeting Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.” [xxi]  CTP-ISW reported on October 15 that Houthi efforts to build an extensive tunnel network in the Houthi-controlled mountainous region between Sanaa and Sa’ada have intensified.[xxii] This was the first time that the US Air Force used B2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers against Houthi targets. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III called the CENTCOM strikes ”a unique demonstration of the United States’ ability to target facilities that our adversaries seek to keep out of reach.”[xxiii] Austin added that the US will continue to “degrade Houthis‘ capability to continue their destabilizing behavior“ attacking vessels in the Red Sea.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully.
• Sinwar’s Succession: Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders. Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Strip right now. The death of Yahya and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however, given the degraded state of Hamas’ military organization.
• Iranian Diplomatic Efforts: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014. Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.
• Yemen: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes using B2 Spirit stealth bombers in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16. The strikes targeted Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli media reported on October 17 that Hezbollah fighters killed five 1st Infantry Brigade soldiers during clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 16.

Iran Update, October 16, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Israeli forces have previously seized or partially secured terrain in Maroun al Ras, Yaroun, and Blida in southeastern Lebanon. Geolocated footage and commercial satellite imagery on October 16 show that Israeli forces have recently seized terrain along the western axis of advance in Mhaibib and along the eastern axis of advance in Ramyeh.[ii] A Lebanese social media user confirmed imagery and other reports that the IDF had “taken control” over the two villages.[iii] Israeli forces continued to operate in both areas on October 16.[iv] A force seizes terrain by killing or capturing all enemy forces and preventing the enemy from firing on the area. Israeli forces are likely currently conducting clearing operations in Mhaibib and Ramyeh, as indicated by engagements with Hezbollah fighters and the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli armor in Ramyeh, and Lebanese media reported heavy exchanges of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in the village on October 16.[vi] The IDF 91st Division destroyed an underground Radwan tunnel complex beneath Mhaibib on October 16 that Radwan forces used as a headquarters.[vii] Israeli forces are seizing and clearing terrain in border towns and areas to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.

Hezbollah fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in unsecured border areas. Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces exchanged small arms fire in Qouzah and Aita al Shaab, near Ramyeh, according to Hezbollah-affiliated sources.[viii] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting Israeli personnel between Markaba and Odaisseh.[ix] A Lebanese social media user noted that Hezbollah continues to control Odaisseh, which is in a small valley that runs east-to-west away from the Israeli border and is overlooked by two steep hills.[x] The IDF operated on the southern hill and engaged Hezbollah fighters there earlier in the war. IDF officers have consistently remarked that their forces are engaging Hezbollah fighters at longer ranges or that Hezbollah fighters have fled altogether, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem claimed on October 16 that this is an intentional strategy on Hezbollah’s part and that the group intends to rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces when they enter Lebanese territory rather than confront them as a regular standing army might.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm.[xii] Netanyahu told French President Emmanuel Macron that Israel would not accept a ceasefire agreement that would allow for Lebanon’s “security situation” to return to how it was before the IDF’s offensive.[xiii] [xiv] Netanyahu has previously declared that Israel seeks to return its citizens to the north by “defeat[ing] Hezbollah.”[xv] Israeli ground and air operations are presumably designed to defeat Hezbollah by rendering it unable or unwilling to continue the fight, thereby forcing Hezbollah to end its attacks and allowing Israeli citizens to return to the north. The Hezbollah that would emerge from such a war would be severely damaged and unable to execute the activities it traditionally has—at least for a time. Netanyahu’s demands for ceasefire stipulations to prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming would prevent Hezbollah from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.

Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. UN Resolution 1701 requires the disarmament of armed groups between the Litani River and the Israel-Lebanon border.[xvi] The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to ”take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[xvii] Hezbollah’s investment in military infrastructure in southern Lebanon was designed to be used in future wars against Israel. Several of these Hezbollah positions, including the tunnel complex the 91st Division destroyed in Mhaibib on October 16, were located within a few kilometers of UNIFIL outposts.[xviii]

Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16.[xix] The IDF presented a list of potential targets to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and began finalizing preparations including “sensitive coordination” with other regional countries. The report stated that Israel ”described its general attack plans” to the United States without providing an update on specific targets. An unspecified source stated that Israel could change its targeting decisions “at the 11th hour.”[xx] Unspecified American officials told CNN that they expect Israel will retaliate before the US presidential election on November 5.[xxi]

A senior Iranian defense official downplayed the US decision to send a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to Israel. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh dismissed this deployment as “psychological warfare” and claimed that the system does not present a “particular problem” for Iran.[xxii] An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated outlet similarly argued on October 13 that the THAAD system will not be effective against Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Fatah missile used in Iran’s October 1 attack.[xxiii] The American-made THAAD system is ”highly effective” and ”combat-proven” against short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, according to US manufacturer Lockheed Martin.[xxiv] The THAAD system successfully intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles targeting the United Arab Emirates in 2022.[xxv]

An unspecified “informed” source told Iraqi news outlet Baghdad Today that an American delegation arrived in Baghdad unannounced on October 16 to prepare for “indirect negotiations” with Iran.[xxvi] The source claimed that Washington has pressured Iraqi mediators to open negotiations with Iran amid concerns of potential regional escalation.[xxvii] The source also claimed that members of the US delegation are holding meetings with “elite” Iraqis on an ongoing basis to advance negotiations. These reports come as Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[xxviii] Senior Israeli officials guaranteed senior American officials that Israel will target Iranian military and defense sites instead of nuclear or oil facilities in its retaliatory strike on Iran.[xxix]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran.[xxx] Araghchi met with the Jordanian King Abdullah II and the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ayman Safadi separately in Amman on October 16 to discuss ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, humanitarian aid, and Israel‘s retaliation against Iran[xxxi] Safadi reiterated that Jordan will not allow Jordanian airspace to be violated.[xxxii] Iran’s two attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1 resulted in many Iranian projectiles violating Jordanian airspace.[xxxiii] Jordan is not to prevent Israel from launching an attack over Jordanian airspacKing Abdullah II also met with a US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee delegation led by Representative Mike Rogers in Amman on October 15.[xxxiv] This committee is responsible for designating funds for the US defense authorization bill, including financial assistance abroad.[xxxv] Jordan receives financial assistance money through the defense authorization bill. Araghchi will similarly meet Egyptian officials in Cairo on October 17.[xxxvi] Araghchi will attend the 3+3 Summit in Istanbul on October 18, where he will meet with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials.[xxxvii]

Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear .[xxxviii] Nakhaei Rad emphasized that “time and place” affects fatwas and “Shia jurisprudence is dynamic,” suggesting that current regional conditions could justify a shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine. Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons."[xxxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the letter was likely sent to the SNSC to encourage them to persuade Khamenei to reconsider his fatwa, as he has ultimate authority to revoke it.[xl]

US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. Axios reported on October 16 that the Israeli strategic affairs minister and Emirati foreign affairs minister met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to discuss a UAE-proposed plan for the Gaza Strip after the war.[xli] Blinken is now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel. The UAE plan, which was initially laid out in July 2024, would include the deployment of a temporary international mission to the Gaza Strip that would ”deliver humanitarian aid, establish law and order, and lay the groundwork for governance in the Strip.”[xlii] Part of the UAE’s plan involves appointing a reformed Palestinian Authority led by an independent prime minister to govern the post-war Gaza Strip.[xliii] The Palestinian Authority dismissed the UAE proposal because it is in conflict with the Chinese-mediated Hamas-Fatah deal that would establish a ”national unity government” including Hamas that would govern both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[xliv] The United States views UAE’s plan as a potential alternative that aims to lay out a possible path forward to the post-war governance structure for the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in unsecured border areas.
• Israeli Policy in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm. Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to ”take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran.
• Iranian Nuclear Policy: Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear . Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons."
• Postwar Plans in the Gaza Strip: US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. US officials are now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel.

Iran Update, October 14, 2024

Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah conducted a drone attack on October 13 targeting a training camp south of Haifa for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade that killed four IDF soldiers and injured 61 others.[i] Hezbollah said that the strike was targeting soldiers as they prepared for operations in Lebanon, and the IDF assessed that Hezbollah deliberately targeted an IDF dining facility during a period in which Hezbollah expected soldiers to be eating.[ii] This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon. The Israeli air campaign has severely disrupted Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures, and Israeli forces have observed Hezbollah fighters fleeing or only observing Israeli troops from a distance rather than decisively engaging IDF units.[iii] The IDF continues to seize terrain and towns, demonstrating that it can act with impunity in southern Lebanon.[iv] Hezbollah attacks into Israel allow it to claim that it is ”resisting” Israeli forces despite being unable or unwilling to defend southern Lebanon.[v]

This attack is part of a possible broader campaign that Hezbollah described on October 12. Hezbollah claimed on October 12 that its fighters continued to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[vi] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations, though it is unclear what military effect these attacks will have if any at all. Hezbollah’s decision to target a training camp for the 1st Infantry Brigade—a unit currently operating in southern Lebanon—likely falls within this framework.[vii] These attacks also could have an outsized effect in the Israeli domestic political space as well, and Hezbollah may calculate that continued attacks on rear IDF bases that kill even small numbers of IDF soldiers will cause Israeli public support for the ground campaign in Lebanon to decline. Hezbollah’s October 13 attack demonstrates that Hezbollah can precisely target IDF rear positions in northern Israel. The attack also demonstrates that Hezbollah‘s command-and-control network is sufficiently intact to order and execute these sorts of coordinated rocket and missile attacks (see below).

Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023. A preliminary IDF Air Force investigation indicated that Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of drones, rockets, and three precision missiles targeting Haifa at the same time it launched the drone targeting Binyamina.[viii] The IDF Navy and Iron Dome intercepted two of the drones near Nahariya and Acre but detection systems lost track of a third drone, a Shahed 107—which ultimately impacted in Binyamina.[ix] This tactic of using imprecise indirect fires to distract air defenses and then using precision weapons to strike targets has become common across Iran and its Axis of Resistance in recent years. Hezbollah has used this tactic to distract Israeli air defenses on numerous occasions to allow low-flying drones to enter northern Israel during its year-long campaign.[x] These drone attacks have previously proved difficult for Israeli air defenses to intercept. [xi]

Hezbollah likely attempted to replicate the successful October 13 attack by launching three surface-to-surface missiles targeting central Israel at the same time it launched dozens of rockets toward northern Israel on October 14.[xii] All three of these missiles were intercepted, but the missiles caused 182 red alerts across central Israel.[xiii]

The IDF vowed to respond by targeting Hezbollah’s drone unit and drone production infrastructure in response to the October 13 attack. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on October 13 that Israel would engage in a “forceful response” against Hezbollah.[xiv] Israeli Army Radio reported that IDF Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar instructed the IDF to prioritize airstrikes targeting Hezbollah's drone unit, which is responsible for drone production and operations.[xv] Bar said that the IDF Air Force set the goal to target every Hezbollah fighter, “from junior to senior,” in Hezbollah’s drone unit.[xvi] Israeli airstrikes have primarily targeted Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities but have occasionally targeted Hezbollah drone assets. The IDF recently struck drone warehouses in southern Lebanon on October 8 and 9, for example.[xvii]

Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.[xviii] Iran sent a high-resolution imaging ”Kowsar” satellite and a small ”Hodhod” communications satellite to Russia.[xix] Russia was originally scheduled to launch these satellites in December 2023 but was delayed.[xx] Russia previously launched two Iranian satellites in August 2022 and February 2024.[xxi] Russia will launch these satellites using the Soyuz space launch vehicle, which Russia also used in the February 2024 launch.[xxii]  Iran could use the ”Kowsar” satellite to collect imagery on US or allied troop positions and bases in the region. CTP-ISW has not observed acknowledgment of the satellite delivery in Russian media.

An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxiii] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim. The source claimed that Fallah Zadeh would help ”manage the current war” with Israel and secure logistical and communications support. The source reported that Fallah Zadeh will not advise Hezbollah in political matters or change the political structure of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has not announced its next Secretary General following airstrikes that killed Hassan Nasrallah and his presumed successor Hashem Safi el Din.[xxiv] Al Jarida has previously made unsubstantiated claims citing unspecified IRGC Quds Force officials that CTP-ISW also could not independently verify. No other reputable news organization independently reported similar claims corroborating al Jarida’s previous reports.

Iranian media published the full text of the “Development Plan for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology” on October 14.[xxv] A parliamentary presidium member recently announced the plan on October 6.[xxvi] The plan calls for the establishment of an “Atomic Energy Council” comprised of 19 members, including the Iranian president and the ministers of energy, foreign affairs, and defense.[xxvii] The plan also stipulates that the National Development Fund must invest at least $1 billion in Iranian nuclear power projects annually.

Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Baghdad on October 13 to discuss the “special and dangerous conditions” in the Middle East with senior Iraqi officials.[xxviii] Araghchi may have warned Iraqi officials against allowing Israel to use Iraqi airspace to attack Iran. Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein described “[Israel's] exploitation of Iraqi airspace” to attack Iran as “completely unacceptable” during a press conference with Araghchi.[xxix] Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid separately emphasized that Iraq “will never serve as a launching pad” for attacking Iran during a meeting with Araghchi.[xxx] Western media previously reported that Israel likely used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on April 18 in retaliation for the April 13 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[xxxi] Previous Iraqi governments have also warned Iran and the United States against using Iraq as a ”launching pad” for regional conflict, though these governments in practice are unable to prevent Iranian-backed groups in particular from using Iraqi territory to target US forces and Israel.[xxxii]

Araghchi separately met with senior Omani officials and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam in Muscat, Oman, on October 13.[xxxiii] Araghchi told reporters in Muscat that Iran has stopped indirect talks with the United States, likely referring to indirect talks that US and Iranian officials have held in Oman in recent months to try to avoid escalation in the region.[xxxiv] Oman and Iraq have historically served as intermediaries between Iran and the United States, and Araghchi may have called on the Omani and Iraqi governments to pressure the United States to restrain Israel’s response to the October 1 Iranian attack.[xxxv] Unspecified sources told CNN on October 12 that Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[xxxvi] The sources added that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike in Israel: Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Tactical Adaptation: Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023.
• Iran-Russia: Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.
• Iranian Support to Hezbollah: An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim.
• Iranian Preparations for Israeli Strike: Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran.

Iran Update, October 13, 2024

The United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel.[i] The THAAD system is a “ground-based interceptor designed to shoot down ballistic missiles.”[ii] Iran fired approximately 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in its April 13 attack and approximately 180 ballistic missiles in its October 1 attack.[iii] The Wall Street Journal reported on October 13 that less than 100 US military personnel will operate the THAAD system in Israel.[iv] The Pentagon stated that the deployment of the THAAD system underscores the United States’ “ironclad commitment” to defending Israel.[v] The United States previously deployed a THAAD system to the Middle East following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack into Israel.[vi] The United States also deployed a THAAD system to Israel in 2019 for “training and an integrated air defense exercise.”[vii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi responded to the deployment of the anti-missile system on October 13, warning that the United States is “putting [the] lives of its troops at risk by deploying them to...Israel.”[viii] Araghchi added that Iran has “no red lines” in defending its interests and people.[ix]  

US officials told NBC on October 12 that they believe Israel has “narrowed down” its targets for a retaliatory attack on Iran.[x] The officials stated that the targets include Iranian military and energy infrastructure and added that there is “no indication” that Israel will attack Iranian nuclear facilities or conduct targeting killings.[xi] The officials emphasized that Israel has not finalized “how and when to act,” however.[xii] An Israeli journalist separately reported on October 12 that Israel will delay its retaliatory attack until a US Army THAAD anti-missile battery arrives in Israel.[xiii] These reports come as Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[xiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and Oman on October 9, 10, and 13, respectively.[xv] Unspecified sources told CNN that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the Israeli retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[xvi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely trying to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike by threatening to start an “energy war.”[xvii]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with Iran over financial support for a larger-scale attack on Israel in 2021, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the October 7 attacks.[xviii] The Washington Post reported that Sinwar requested funding and military support from numerous senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, in order to ”destroy Israel completely in two years.”[xix] Iran reportedly agreed to allocate $10 million to the al Qassem Brigades, and several weeks later, Sinwar requested an additional $500 million to be allocated in monthly dividends over two years.[xx] Iran’s financial support of Hamas and the al Qassem Brigades has been well-established and Western officials have previously estimated that Iran provides Hamas with around $100 million in annual funding for Hamas’ military activities.[xxi] This funding was instrumental for Hamas to be able to marshal the capabilities required to carry out the October 7 attacks.[xxii] Sinwar's direct coordination and communication with senior Iranian officials, along with meetings between Hamas and Iranian officials in July 2023, underscore that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks.[xxiii] It remains unclear if Iran had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing.

An unspecified IDF division began a new ground operation near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 13.[xxiv] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported the IDF Air Force and artillery conducted a ”massive” bombardment before Israeli forces began ground maneuvers.[xxv] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with improvised explosive devices, small arms, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortars in Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh.[xxvi]

Israeli forces entered a UNIFIL position in Ramyeh, southern Lebanon, after sustaining injuries in a Hezbollah attack close to the UNIFIL position on October 13.[xxvii] The IDF reported that Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with “a massive anti-tank missile” during an operation in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon, injuring several soldiers.[xxviii] Israeli media reported that over 25 Israeli soldiers were injured in combat in southern Lebanon on October 13.[xxix] This casualty count is high for Israeli operations. The IDF reported that Israeli forces had to come within a few meters of a UNIFIL position to evacuate the wounded soldiers.[xxx] The IDF said that it was in constant contact with UNIFIL forces during the maneuver.[xxxi] UNIFIL stated two Israeli tanks destroyed ”the main gate and forcibly entered” the UNIFIL position in Ramyeh on October 13.[xxxii] UNIFIL also reported Israeli munition emissions caused skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions to 15 peacekeepers.[xxxiii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appealed to the UN Secretary General to remove UNIFIL forces from combat areas in southern Lebanon on October 13.[xxxiv] Netanyahu accused Hezbollah of using UNIFIL sites and personnel as “human shields” and ”hostages.”[xxxv]

Hezbollah conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF training camp in Binyamina, south of Haifa, and injured at least 67 Israelis on October 13.[xxxvi] Hezbollah said it launched multiple drones targeting a training camp for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade.[xxxvii] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched two or three drones in the attack and the IDF Navy intercepted one of the drones over Israeli territorial waters.[xxxviii] The drone that impacted in Binyamina reportedly did not trigger any warnings or register on Israeli detection systems.[xxxix] Israeli media reported that the drones were fired at the same time as a barrage of rockets from Lebanon.[xl] Hezbollah claimed a rocket attack targeting an IDF base in the Golan Heights shortly after the drone impacted Binyamin.[xli] The Home Front Command loosened restrictions over the targeted area prior to the attack.[xlii] Israeli medics said that the attack wounded over 67 people.[xliii] Hezbollah said it conducted the drone attack in response to two IDF airstrikes on Basta and al Nuwairi neighborhoods in central Beirut on October 10.[xliv] The IDF reportedly targeted senior Hezbollah official and Jihad Council member Wafiq Safa in one of the October 10 strikes.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: The United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. US officials told NBC on October 12 that they believe Israel has “narrowed down” its targets for a retaliatory attack on Iran.
• Hamas: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with Iran over financial support for a larger-scale attack on Israel in 2021, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the October 7 attacks.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: An unspecified IDF division began a new ground operation near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 13. Israeli forces entered a UNIFIL position in Ramyeh, southern Lebanon, after sustaining injuries in a Hezbollah attack close to the UNIFIL position on October 13. The IDF reported that Israeli forces had to come within a few meters of a UNIFIL position to evacuate the wounded soldiers.
• Hezbollah Attacks into Israel: Hezbollah conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF training camp in Binyamina, south of Haifa, and injured at least 67 Israelis on October 13.

Iran Update, October 12, 2024

Lebanese Hezbollah is falsely presenting Israeli ground operations as a failure in order to degrade Israeli will and underscore Hezbollah’s own resilience in the face of massive Hezbollah losses since mid-September.  Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces have failed to take control of any tactically significant hills or ridgelines in southern Lebanon.[i] Hezbollah asserted that Israeli forces have only advanced to the outskirts of Lebanese towns and are using propaganda images to misrepresent military successes. Geolocated footage and commercially available satellite imagery show Israeli forces are operating in the center of southern Lebanese towns, however.[ii] CTP-ISW observed on October 11 that Israeli forces Israeli forces also appear to have at least partially secured some villages in southern Lebanon given the presence of Israeli journalists and unarmored engineering vehicles.[iii] Securing a village would require Israeli forces to prevent Hezbollah from using direct or observed indirect fire weapons against the villages.[iv] An Israeli military correspondent further reported that Israeli forces seized territory along ridges and hills just inside of Lebanon within a few days of the ground operation starting on October 1.[v]

Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces are in contact in the areas surrounding UNIFIL position 1-31 south of Labbouneh, southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it has repelled repeated IDF attempts to advance from Ras Naqoura and Jal al Alam, northwest Israel, to Labbouneh, southwest Lebanon since October 7.[vi] Hezbollah said that its fighters engaged Israeli forces moving northwards from areas close to UNIFIL position 1-31 near Labbouneh. Commercially available satellite imagery and UNIFIL reports confirm that Israeli forces have advanced to UNIFIL position 1-31 as of October 11.[vii] The ongoing fighting close to UNIFIL position 1-31 is likely the cause of recent UNIFIL reports that multiple unspecified explosions have occurred close to the outposts and injured several peacekeepers.[viii] UNIFIL is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 which requires Hezbollah fighters to remain north of the Litani River and to ”take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities.[ix]

Hezbollah claimed that its fighters continue to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[x] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations. CTP-ISW has recorded Hezbollah attacks on IDF military targets along the Israel-Lebanon border but has not observed any effect on Israeli ground operations.

The New York Times reported that Hamas asked for Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah participation in the October 7 attacks in July 2023, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the operation.[xi] Hamas initially sought to attack in Fall 2022, according to minutes from Hamas meetings that the IDF captured in the central Gaza Strip in late January 2024. Hamas delayed the planned Fall 2022 attack to convince Iran and Hezbollah to participate. Hamas Political Bureau member and current Deputy Hamas leader Khalil al Hayya met with the head of the IRGC Quds Force Palestinian Affairs Office and a senior Hezbollah official in July 2023. Hayya specifically requested Hezbollah and Iran target sensitive Israeli sites as the Hamas attack began.  The IRGC Quds Force official reportedly told Hayya that Iran and Hezbollah supported the attack in principle but needed time to “prepare the environment.”

This meeting demonstrates that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks, but it remains unclear if Iran or Hezbollah had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing. Iran and Hezbollah’s hesitation may reflect the reality that Iran and Hezbollah would have needed to prepare their own operational plans to support Hamas’ plans successfully, which could take many months. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported the theory of ground attacks into Israel from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah had prepared to undertake such an attack if necessary.[xii]

Hamas’ decision to move forward with the attacks despite a lack of Iranian and Hezbollah full-scale involvement reflects differences in the relative prioritization of objectives within the Axis of Resistance. The New York Times reported that Hamas leaders felt pressure to attack Israel due to a variety of factors including Israel’s deployment of a new air defense system, ongoing Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization discussions, and Israeli actions in the West Bank and with the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[xiii] Israeli forces in Summer 2023 conducted a series of operations against Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas elements in the West Bank.[xiv] This divergence in prioritization of specific objectives further underscores the reality that the Axis of Resistance is not a monolithic system of Iranian proxies but rather an unconventional alliance network of like-minded actors across the Middle East led and dominated by Iran.

Hamas executed a sophisticated military deception campaign in support of the October 7 attacks, which contributed to the lack of Israeli preparedness for the attack. This deception effort was likely explicitly designed to exploit pre-existing Israeli biases toward believing Israel had deterred Hamas. The US military defines military deception as actions taken to deliberately mislead adversary decisionmakers to contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.[xv] The New York Times reported that Hamas deliberately avoided major engagements with Israel from 2021 to 2023 and conserved ammunition as a part of a deception campaign that would give the impression that Israeli military might had deterred Hamas.[xvi] Top Israeli officials, including the prime minister, believed that Israel had deterred Hamas.[xvii] Hamas’ decision to purposefully give the impression it was deterred would have reinforced these biases.   

Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made an unannounced visit to Beirut on October 11 as he traveled to Switzerland.[xviii] Ghalibaf told reporters in Beirut that he changed his travel plans to convey a message of support from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to the Lebanese people and government. Ghalibaf discussed Iranian efforts to secure a ceasefire that would end Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip during a meeting with Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[xix] Mikati emphasized the Lebanese government‘s commitment to implementing UN Resolution 1701 and strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces presence in southern Lebanon.[xx] This UN resolution, which ended the 2006 Lebanon war, requires Hezbollah forces to remain north of the Litani River.[xxi] Ghalibaf expressed further support for the Lebanese government and people in a joint press conference with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.[xxii] Ghalibaf is the second Iranian politician to visit Beirut since the start of Israeli ground operations in Lebanon following the October 4 visit of Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[xxiii]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s visit to Beirut also likely seeks to message Iranian commitment to its supporters and partners in Lebanon–including Lebanese Hezbollah–given that Iranian military operations have not deterred or disrupted Israeli operations in Lebanon. Ghalibaf visited areas recently targeted in Israeli airstrikes in central and southern Beirut and expressed sympathy to the families affected by the strikes.[xxiv] Ghalibaf stated that Iran will help rebuild central and southern Beirut.[xxv] Ghalibaf also met with unspecified ”heads of Palestinian parties” at the Iranian embassy in Beirut.[xxvi] Ghalibaf vowed to convey the ”message” of the Palestinian and Lebanese people as he left Beirut to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Geneva, Switzerland.[xxvii]

Senior Iranian officials are messaging Iran’s willingness to alter its nuclear doctrine, likely in an attempt to pressure the United States to discourage an Israeli strike targeting Iranian nuclear facilities while attempting to deter the Israelis. A senior political advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Brigadier General Rasoul Sanaei Rad, indicated in a recent interview on October 9 that Iran may reconsider its nuclear doctrine if Israel targets Iranian nuclear facilities.[xxviii] Certain factions within the Iranian regime have recently voiced support for changing Iran’s nuclear doctrine. These statements and actions in support of changing the doctrine are likely aimed both at the United States and Israel. The recent statements and actions in support of changing the doctrine, which include a call by 39 Iranian parliamentarians to revise Iranian defense doctrine to allow for an enhanced nuclear capacity, are the latest in a series of statements since May 2024 that suggest at least some elements within the regime are agitating against the current nuclear policy.[xxix] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set the current policy in 2003 when he issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons. Khamenei holds the ultimate authority over the nuclear issue and the fatwa will remain in effect unless he decides otherwise.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Information Operations: Lebanese Hezbollah is falsely presenting Israeli ground operations as a failure to degrade Israeli will and underscore Hezbollah’s resilience in the face of massive Hezbollah losses since mid-September.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces are in contact in the areas surrounding UNIFIL position 1-31 south of Labbouneh, southwestern Lebanon. The ongoing fighting close to UNIFIL position 1-31 is likely the cause of recent UNIFIL reports that multiple unspecified explosions have occurred close to the outposts and injured several peacekeepers.
• Hamas: The New York Times reported that Hamas asked for Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah participation in the October 7 attacks in July 2023, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the operation. This ask demonstrates that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks, but it remains unclear if Iran or Hezbollah had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing.
• Iran: Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made an unannounced visit to Beirut on October 11 as he traveled to Switzerland.
• Iranian Nuclear Doctrine: Senior Iranian officials are messaging Iran’s willingness to alter its nuclear doctrine, likely in an attempt to pressure the United States to discourage an Israeli strike targeting Iranian nuclear facilities while attempting to deter the Israelis.

Iran Update, October 11, 2024

The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[1] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli forces seized territory along ridges and hills just inside of Lebanon within a few days of the ground operation starting on October 1.[2] The military correspondent reported on October 10 that Israeli forces were continuing to clear Hezbollah military infrastructure from rural areas. Hezbollah fighters have previously used rural territory along the Israeli border to fire direct-fire weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank guns, targeting Israeli forces and civilians.[3] Preventing Hezbollah from using these areas for its direct-fire weapons does not mean that Israel has achieved its objective of returning Israeli civilians to their homes in the north because Hezbollah can still fire longer-range indirect weapons, such as rockets and mortars.[4] These operations do, however, disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to use some of its weapons systems to target Israeli border towns.[5]

Israeli forces also appear to have at least partially secured some villages in southern Lebanon given the presence of Israeli journalists and unarmored engineering vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) guided Israeli journalists through towns in southern Lebanon on October 10 to report on the status of Israeli operations in the area.[6] Securing a village would require Israeli forces to prevent Hezbollah from using direct or observed indirect fire weapons against it.[7] A commander usually only secures an area for a time-limited period. The presence of these journalists and unarmored vehicles suggests some villages are at least partially secured given that the IDF would presumably employ armored engineering vehicles, as it has in the Gaza Strip, and would not allow civilian journalists access during major operations.[8] The IDF would need to meet these conditions prior to allowing Israeli civilians to visit Lebanese towns.

It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[9] Israeli forces have also observed that Hezbollah fighters have preferred to engage Israeli forces from a distance or have fled outright during the IDF’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon.[10] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[11] Even isolated tactical units should be capable of fighting effectively on their own for some time, however. Hezbollah could have made a deliberate choice to intentionally hold back its fighters, given that tactical elements would likely defend against Israeli forces absent direction from above.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. The Iranian foreign minister reportedly threatened senior Saudi officials that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets if Saudi Arabia were to support an Israeli attack on Iran.[12] Reuters reported on October 10 that Gulf countries are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[13] This reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.[14] Kataib Hezbollah spokesman Abu Ali al Askari released a statement on October 10, threatening to start an energy war with the aid of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthis in the Bab al Mandab.[15] Askari’s statement characterized Arab and Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, as “evil regimes” for their support of Israel.[16] Askari also threatened to target US forces in Iraq and the region if Iraq is attacked or if Iraqi airspace is used to attack Iran, likely to pressure the United States to deter Israel from attacking Iran.[17] These threats support Iran’s efforts to deter a more costly Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.[18] Pezeshkian expressed hope that Iran and Russia will sign the comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement during Pezeshkian’s upcoming trip to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, from October 22-24.[19] This is a 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia that will replace previous cooperation agreements, but the exact specifics of the agreement are not publicly available.[20] Putin and Pezeshkian both said that Russia and Iran frequently share positions and coordinate regarding international events.[21] Putin approved the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran on September 19.[22] Pezeshkian stated that he asked Putin to act ”more effectively” in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.[23] Putin said that he was satisfied with the volume of trade between Iran and Russia.[24] Russian media reported that Pezeshkian accepted Putin’s invitation for an official visit to Russia at an unspecified time in the future.[25]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow in Turkmenistan on October 11.[26] Pezeshkian expressed readiness to increase cooperation with Uzbekistan in scientific, industrial, and cultural fields.[27] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Turkmenistan made agreements in the industries of gas and electricity that will be finalized in an upcoming joint economic cooperation commission in Tehran.[28]

The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.[29] An unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media that the cabinet did not make any “big decisions.” An unspecified Israeli security official stated that the cabinet seeks to postpone the vote to decrease the length of time between approval and execution of the Israeli retaliation.[30] Three US and Israeli officials separately told Axios that US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “moved closer to an understanding” on the scope of Israel’s response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack during a phone call on October 9.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations.
• Iran and Iranian-backed Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. Current reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.
• Israeli Strike on Iran: The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.

Iran Update, October 10, 2024

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened senior Saudi officials, warning that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets and infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack on Iran, according to anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters.[i] Araghchi traveled to Riyadh on October 9 to discuss the October 7 War with senior Saudi officials.[ii] Araghchi said that Iran “sent a clear message” to Saudi Arabia that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or the Houthis could “respond” if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack.[iii] Reuters separately reported that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have told the United States that they will deny Israel use of their respective airspaces to attack Iran, citing three unspecified Gulf sources. The sources added that the Gulf states are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[iv] Araghchi traveled to Doha following his one-day visit to Riyadh and met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani on October 10, presumably to convey a similar warning.[v]

Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on October 10 that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[vi] Boroujerdi said that a withdrawal "could be necessary to defend [Iranian] interests." Boroujerdi suggested that Iran could then build a nuclear weapon in this scenario. Iran ratified the NPT, which prohibits nuclear weaponization, in 1970 and has repeatedly threatened to withdraw to impose pressure on the West.[vii]

Lebanese Hezbollah has likely lost under five percent of its original fighting force over the past year. Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[viii] Now-dead Hezbollah Secretary General Hassam Nasrallah claimed in 2021 that Hezbollah had 100,000 fighters, which was very likely an exaggeration.[ix] CTP-ISW has tallied over 600 Hezbollah fighter and commander death announcements over the past year.[x] The majority of these fighters died from the IDF air campaign to degrade Hezbollah capabilities in Lebanon. Hezbollah had issued timely mourning posts of its fighters throughout the conflict until Israel began its intensive air campaign against the force in late September 2024.[xi] Local sources have continued to announce fighter deaths even after Hezbollah stopped distributing notices.[xii] The IDF spokesperson separately said on October 5 that Israeli forces have killed 440 Hezbollah operatives since beginning ground operations in southern Lebanon, bringing the Hezbollah death toll to around 1,100.[xiii] The IDF has killed additional fighters since October 5, though the number is unclear.[xiv] IDF operations, including the widespread September pager and radio attacks, have almost certainly seriously injured thousands of Hezbollah fighters and rendered them unable to fight, moreover.[xv] While the IDF has significantly degraded Hezbollah leadership, Hezbollah still retains the bulk of its rank-and-file forces capable of conducting attacks into northern Israel and engaging Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Israeli journalists reported on October 10 that the IDF has taken control of some border areas in southeastern Lebanon.[xvi] Israeli journalists recently visited the IDF 91st Division in an unspecified village in southeastern Lebanon.[xvii] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli forces took control of Lebanese villages in the area “within a few days” and are now operating within the villages to clear them of Hezbollah military infrastructure.[xviii] Several journalists noted that the recent Israeli ground maneuvers have made travel on the Israel-Lebanon border easier and safer from Hezbollah attacks.[xix] Journalists posted photos of Israeli tanks, bulldozers, Humvees, and other machinery in southern Lebanese villages.[xx] Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be conducting significant resistance to Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[xxi] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah fighters at one point tried to reach a warehouse that had been seized by Israeli forces and were killed.[xxii] An Israeli commander previously noted some Hezbollah militants have withdrawn deeper into Lebanon while others have fled from Israeli forces.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened senior Saudi officials, warning that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets and infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack on Iran, according to anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters.
• Iran: Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on October 10 that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has likely lost under five percent of its original fighting force over the past year.
• Lebanon: Israeli journalists reported on October 10 that the IDF has taken control of some border areas in southeastern Lebanon.

Iran Update, October 8, 2024

Israeli political leaders indicated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4.[i] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a video statement on October 8 that Israel killed “Nasrallah himself, and Nasrallah’s replacement, and the replacement of his replacement,” which Israeli media has framed as confirmation of the killing of Safi ed Din.[ii] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant similarly said on October 8 that the IDF probably killed Safi ed Din.[iii] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, on the other hand, said that the IDF is still investigating the results of the airstrike targeting Safi ed Din.[iv] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem released a video statement on October 8 in which he said that Hezbollah would select a new leader based on its approving mechanisms, noting that the war made the succession to Nasrallah ”difficult and compromised.”[v] Qassem may be among the candidates considered to replace Nasrallah given that he has formal seniority in the organization and has appeared as the public face of the group in these difficult circumstances.

Netanyahu in his own video statement addressed the Lebanese people directly, saying that Hezbollah is “weaker today than it has been for many years.”[vi] Netanyahu asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah.[vii] Gallant similarly noted that Hezbollah is “without a leader” and that Israel should ”take advantage” of this situation in order to safely return displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel.[viii]

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Qassem separately in his video statement praised Hezbollah’s resilience and vowed to continue attacks into Israel.[ix] Qassem described the Israeli killing of Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders as a ”painful blow” but said that new leaders have capably filled these vacant positions.[x] Qassem also observed that numerous Israeli cities are within the range of many Hezbollah weapons systems and said that Hezbollah would ”expand the ranges” of its attacks.[xi] Qassem separately tried to build domestic Lebanese support for Hezbollah by asserting that Hezbollah began attacking Israel in October 2023 to support the Gaza Strip and to “defend Lebanon and its people.”[xii]   

Qassem also expressed Hezbollah supports for Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s efforts to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.[xiii] Qassem did not condition Hezbollah support for a ceasefire on first securing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, as Nasrallah consistently did.[xiv] Qassem refrained from elaborating on what a ceasefire in Lebanon would involve. Berri, who is a Hezbollah political ally, has met recently with Arab, Iranian, and Western officials to discuss a potential ceasefire in Lebanon.[xv] A ceasefire would require Hezbollah to at least cease its near constant attacks that Qassem vowed to continue and expand in northern Israel.

The IDF deployed a fourth division—the 146th Reservist Division—to southwestern Lebanon on October 8 for “focused and delimited" ground operations against Hezbollah.[xvi] The 2nd infantry, 205th armored, and 213th artillery brigades are currently operating under the 146th Division.[xvii] This division joins the 91st, 36th, and 98th divisions in southern Lebanon shortly after Israel announced that it would expand ground operations against Hezbollah and created a new closed military zone in Western Galilee.[xviii] An Israeli military corresponded estimated that there are likely over 15,000 Israeli soldiers deployed to fight in southern Lebanon.[xix]

The IDF destroyed a Hezbollah tunnel that crossed the Israel-Lebanon border on October 8.[xx] The IDF stated that the rudimentary tunnel crossed into Israel near Zarit but that Israeli forces blocked the tunnel exit into Israel several months ago and had maintained “full operational control” over the area.[xxi] Israeli forces seized weapons, including anti-tank missiles, inside the tunnel.[xxii] The IDF added that it has not found any other Hezbollah tunnels that cross into Israel.[xxiii]

US Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said on October 7 that Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in around a week.[xxiv] Burns also said that the United States has observed no evidence that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has ordered the regime to build a nuclear weapon. Burns added that the United States and its partners should be able to detect “relatively early on” if Iran begins building a nuclear weapon.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli political leaders indicated that the IDF killed Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem lauded the resilience of Hezbollah and vowed to continue and even expand attacks into northern Israel.
• Lebanon: The IDF deployed a fourth division—the 146^th Reservist Division—to southwestern Lebanon as part of its expansion of ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Iran: US CIA Director William Burns said that Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in around a week but does appear to have yet made the decision to do so.

Iran Update, October 7, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed a third division—the 91^st Division—to southern Lebanon on October 7 for “focused and delimited” ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.[i] The 91st Division joins the 36^th and 98^th divisions in southern Lebanon shortly after Israel announced that it would expand ground operations against Hezbollah.[ii] The IDF 3rd, 8th, and 288th reserve brigades are operating under the 91st Division.[iii] The division is ordinarily responsible for the entire Israel-Lebanon border and has conducted hundreds of attacks from Israel targeting Hezbollah.[iv] Hezbollah reported that it fired upon Israeli forces around the border near Yiftah.[v] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 7 similarly indicates troop movements in the area.

The IDF created a fourth closed military zone in Western Galilee on October 7.[vi] The new zone encompasses Rosh Hanikra, Hanita, Admit, Arab al Aramshe, and Shlomi, which is the western-most section of the Israel-Lebanon border.[vii] Most of the border is now a closed military zone. The IDF created closed military zones to the east over the Metula area on September 30, over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1, and over Manara and Yiftah on October 6.[viii]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 7.[ix] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[x] The spokesperson also ordered Lebanese civilians to keep off the sea and shoreline south of the Awali River.[xi] He said that the IDF Navy would soon operate off the coast against Hezbollah.[xii] Local Lebanese sources reported that Israeli naval ships fired artillery targeting Ras Naqoura in southwest Lebanon.[xiii] The IDF Navy has provided fire support to ground forces operating in the Gaza Strip over the past year.[xiv]

US Central Command Commander General Michael Erik Kurilla met with senior Israeli defense officials on October 5 and 6.[xv] Kurilla spoke with Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and other commanders about the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel and other threats facing Israel.[xvi] The IDF reported that Kurilla and Halevi discussed Israeli ground operations into southern Lebanon as well.[xvii]

Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is alive but have not yet provided evidence.[xviii] Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Ghaani in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4. IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi said on October 4 that Ghaani is “in good health.”[xix] The host of a Palestinian conference in Tehran similarly read a message that was purportedly written by Ghaani on October 7.[xx] Anonymous Israeli military sources told Israeli media that Ghaani was not the target of the IDF airstrike on Beirut and that the IDF was unaware of whether Ghaani was at the location of the airstrike.[xxi]

Hamas issued a statement commemorating the anniversary of its October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and celebrating the other Iranian-backed actors that have begun attacking Israel regularly over the past year.[xxii] This framing is consistent with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s reported desire to ignite a regional war against Israel in order to alleviate Israeli military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, in its statement, praised Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and West Bank fighters for their regular attacks on Israel.[xxiii] Hamas also boasted that a recent terror attack on the Israel-Jordan border has inspired ”an authentic Jordanian Arab front.”

Hamas separately claimed that it conducted its October 7 attack into Israel in order to preempt an Israeli attack.[xxiv] This appears to be the first time that Hamas has made this claim, raising the question of why it waited until now to make this assertion if it were true. Hamas also threatened to execute more Israeli hostages in its statement commemorating its indiscriminate killing, torture, and abduction of Israeli civilians.

The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is preparing legislation that would formalize parts of the Axis of Resistance as an alliance.[xxv] The proposed legislation would establish a "security defense agreement" or ”resistance pact” among Iran and its regional allies, likely Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The agreement would require alliance members to provide “comprehensive economic, military, and political support to each other” in the event of a US or Israeli attack. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council would be responsible for admitting members into the alliance. The legislation also proposes establishing a headquarters to “coordinate operations and military decisions” across the alliance. The legislation finally mentions holding combined military exercises and developing military infrastructure together. The committee will send the legislation to the Iranian Parliament for voting ”soon.” This notional alliance would formalize much of what Iran already tries to do with the Axis of Resistance. Iran views itself as a member and the leader of this informal alliance and coordinates military activities across the alliance through a network of headquarters dispersed across the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF deployed a third division for ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The IDF also created another closed military zone in Western Galilee.
• Iran: Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani is still alive but have not yet provided evidence.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas released a statement commemorating the anniversary of its October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and celebrated other Middle Eastern actors’ attacks on Israel.
• Iran: The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is preparing legislation that would formalize parts of the Axis of Resistance as an alliance.

Iran Update, October 6, 2024

Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani on October 4. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have been unable to contact Ghaani since Israel conducted an airstrike targeting Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in Beirut on October 4.[i] Ghaani was in Beirut at the time of the Israeli airstrike, according to the New York Times and Reuters. He was reportedly helping Hezbollah recover from recent Israeli attacks on the group.[ii] An Iranian security official told Reuters that Ghaani was not meeting with Safi ed Din when the Israeli airstrike targeted the latter. Ghaani was last seen publicly when he visited the Hezbollah representative office in Tehran on September 29.[iii] Ghaani has been notably absent from high-profile regime events since then. He was not seen at Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Friday prayer sermon on October 4 or when Khamenei met with Iranian military leadership on October 6.[v]

Some Iranian officials and state-affiliated media have called on the regime to confirm whether Ghaani is alive. An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on October 6 that Ghaani is “in perfect health” and called on the IRGC to address the rumors of his death or injury in Beirut.[vi] An outlet tied to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei similarly called on the regime to publish “news that our general is alive and well.”[vii] An IRGC member stationed in Beirut told the New York Times that the regime silence about Ghaani’s status has created “panic among rank-and-file members.”[viii]

Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said during a visit to the IDF Nevatim airbase that Israel will respond to Iran at an appropriate place and time and in a manner of its choosing.[ix] The Nevatim airbase was one of the sites that Iran targeted in its recent missile attack.[x] Several missiles hit the base, causing minor damages.[xi] Gallant added that the Iranian attack “didn’t even scratch” the capabilities of the IDF Air Force.[xii] Israeli President Isaac Herzog separately said that the Iranian attack “obviously deserves a response” in an interview with Saudi media.[xiii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant will reportedly travel to the Washington, DC, to meet with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III on October 9.[xiv] Gallant and Austin are expected to discuss US-Israel security cooperation vis-a-vis Iran.[xv]

Iran appears to be preparing for an Israeli retaliation amid reports that Israel may strike sensitive Iranian sites, such as energy and nuclear infrastructure.

• The Iranian State Civil Aviation Organization cancelled all civilian flights in Iran from 2100 local time on October 6 to 0600 local time on October 7.[xvi] These times equate to 1400-2300 ET on October 6.
• The Iranian National Tanker Company has vacated empty oil tankers from the main Iranian oil export terminal on Kharg Island.[xvii] Many vessels that had been docked at Bandar Abbas have left as well.[xviii]
• Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad met with IRGC Navy officers in Bushehr City to discuss the security of the South Pars gas field, which is the largest Iranian gas field.[xix] Paknejad also visited Kharg Island.[xx]

The IDF continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh in southern Lebanon. The IDF 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) engaged Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces (SOF), killing some and destroying military headquarters and warehouses south of Bint Jbeil .[xxi] The brigade commander said that the IDF is focusing on destroying Hezbollah surface and sub-surface infrastructure in order to prevent Hezbollah attacks into Israel.[xxii] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade (36th Division) destroyed tunnel shafts and ammunition depots near Maroun al Ras.[xxiii] The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade (98th Division) seized ”hundreds” of weapons and a vehicle used by Hezbollah Radwan SOF.[xxiv] An anti-aircraft gun was mounted atop the vehicle, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[xxv]

Israeli forces separately located a Hezbollah Radwan SOF warehouse and weapons storage facility in a tunnel complex beneath a civilian home in Odaisseh along the Israel-Lebanon border.[xxvi]

The IDF created a third closed military zone in the Upper Galilee on October 6.[xxvii] The new zone encompasses Malkia, Manara, and Yiftah, which is between the two existing closed zones. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1.[xxviii] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces tried to cross into Blida, which is adjacent to newly closed Yiftah on October 5.[xxix] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 6 indicates that Israeli forces operated near Blida. An Israeli military correspondent reported on October 4 that the IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[xxx]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 6.[xxxi] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[xxxii]

The IDF launched a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza City, on October 6 in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[xxxiii] The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024, during which the IDF encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.[xxxiv] Hamas has reportedly re-armed and re-organized itself in the four months since the IDF withdrew.[xxxv] An Israeli military correspondent said that the IDF assesses that there are thousands of original Hamas fighters and thousands of new but poorly trained Hamas recruits in the northern Gaza Strip.[xxxvi] The IDF stated that it would operate around Jabalia for as long as is required in order to thoroughly destroy Hamas infrastructure there.[xxxvii] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia sites around Jabalia as the IDF 401st and 460th armored brigades encircled the camp.[xxxviii] Israeli forces have engaged dozens of Palestinian fighters around Jabalia since entering the area.[xxxix] The 401st and 460th armored brigades are operating under the command of the 162nd Division, which had been leading operations in Rafah since May 2024.[xl] The IDF Gaza Division will now lead the Givati and Nahal brigades in clearing operations in Rafah.[xli]

Anonymous Iraqi officials claimed that the United States sent “strongly worded” messages to the Iraqi federal government following an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad.[xlii] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacked the US Diplomatic Support Complex near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[xliii] The Iraqi officials claimed that the United States threatened to attack Iranian-backed militias if they continued to attack US positions or escalated further against Israel.[xliv] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks targeting Israel since September 17.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani in an airstrike in Beirut. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have reportedly been unable to contact Ghaani since the airstrike.
• Iran: Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the recent Iranian ballistic missile attack. Iran appears to be preparing for an imminent Israeli strike, possibly targeting Iranian energy and nuclear infrastructure.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued clearing Lebanese Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh. The IDF also created a third military zone in the Upper Galiliee, amid Israeli reports that the IDF will expand its ground operations into Lebanon.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF launched a new clearing operation into the Jabalia refugee camp in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts. The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024 and encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.

Iran Update, October 5, 2024

An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is preparing to expand its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[i] The IDF plans to send more forces, according to the correspondent, which would build upon the two divisions already operating in southern Lebanon. These divisions have primarily operated around Lebanese villages immediately along the border with Israel.[ii] The expansion of Israeli operations would be meant to help achieve the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. The near daily Lebanese Hezbollah attacks in northern Israel have compelled thousands of civilians to evacuate.

The IDF continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon on October 5. The IDF 1st Golani Brigade (36th Division) raided Hezbollah positions and destroyed hundreds of weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles, grenades, and small arms.[iii] A Hezbollah-affiliated outlet described the activity as an ”intensive combing operation.”[iv] Hezbollah claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) and fired rocket-propelled grenades targeting Israeli forces around Maroun al Ras and Yaroun on October 4.[v]  The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade and 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) also engaged Hezbollah militants and raided Hezbollah infrastructure in mountainous and urban areas.[vi] These brigades and Israeli engineering elements destroyed underground infrastructure, including tunnels. One of the sites was a Hezbollah compound 300 meters from the Israel-Lebanon border.

Hezbollah appears to be trying to avoid decisive engagements with the IDF. Israeli sources reported that Hezbollah is trying to keep its forces at a distance and will withdraw shortly after making contact with the IDF.[vii] Hezbollah is fighting primarily through ambushes and the use of anti-tank missile fire and IEDs.[viii] Hezbollah has also kept the bulk of its forces deep inside Lebanon rather than deploying them to the front.[ix] This behavior indicates that Hezbollah retains effective command-and-control at least at the tactical level and possibly higher, despite the extensive Israeli killing of Hezbollah commanders. The IDF has observed some indications that the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah forces has been reduced, however.[x] The IDF announced on October 5 that it has killed about 440 Hezbollah militants since launching ground operations into Lebanon.[xi]

The IDF separately stated on October 5 that some Hezbollah militants have fled combat zones.[xii] Israeli media similarly reported that some Hezbollah militants have moved toward Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) positions in order to evade Israeli attacks.[xiii]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The IDF conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Beirut on October 4 and October 5, including infrastructure affiliated with the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus and weapons depots.[xiv] The IDF warned residents to evacuate from specific buildings before some of the strikes.[xv] The IDF also struck Hezbollah militants in a mosque adjacent to Salah Ghandour Hospital in Bint Jbeil.[xvi] The IDF said that the Hezbollah militants used the headquarters to plan attacks against Israeli forces and into Israel.[xvii] The IDF said that it called local authorities in Bint Jbeil to demand that Hezbollah activities within the hospital end immediately prior to the strike.[xviii]

The IDF also continued to target Palestinian militia networks in Lebanon.[xix] The IDF said that it killed Hamas official Muhammad Hussein Ali al Mahmoud in Saadnayel in the Bekaa Valley.[xx] The IDF said that Mahmoud was a senior official in Hamas’ wing in Lebanon and played a significant role in growing Hamas’ presence there, providing Hezbollah with weapons to attack Israel, and directing attacks in the West Bank.[xxi] The IDF also killed senior Hamas member Saeed Alaa Nayef Ali Mahmoud in a Palestinian refugee camp in Tripoli, Lebanon.[xxii] The IDF said that Ali led attacks against Israel and recruited Hamas fighters in Lebanon.[xxiii] Hamas mourned the two fighters.[xxiv] Hezbollah commonly allows Palestinian groups to launch attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon.[xxv] The IDF has targeted numerous members of Palestinian militias in Lebanon since beginning its intensified air campaign on September 21, including militants from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).[xxvi]

Hezbollah has continued its attack campaign targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 4.[xxvii] Hezbollah launched Fadi-1 missiles targeting the Ramat David airbase southeast of Haifa.[xxviii] Hezbollah separately launched rockets at the Maale Golani Barracks in the northern Golan Heights.[xxix] Hezbollah also claimed to launch rockets at civilian targets, including Sasa and Safed.[xxx] Hezbollah also continued to attack Israeli troops concentrated around the Israel-Lebanon border, including by firing large barrages of rockets at Dan and Katzrin. [xxxi] The IDF intercepted a suspicious aerial target that crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 5.[xxxii] The IDF conducted ”many interceptions” of Hezbollah rockets in the Karmiel area on October 5.[xxxiii] Some rockets fell in open areas.[xxxiv] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah rockets lightly injured three people in Deir al Asad near Karmiel.[xxxv] Hezbollah claimed to target the Elta Military Industries Company in Sakhnin near Karmiel.[xxxvi]

Iran Update, October 4, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on an underground bunker in Beirut on October 3. The airstrike targeted a meeting of senior Hezbollah officials, including the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah, Safi ed Din.[i] Neither the IDF nor Hezbollah have provided any information on the outcome of the strike. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said on October 1 that Hezbollah will choose a new leader as soon as possible and according to the approved mechanisms.[ii] The chief of Hezbollah intelligence may have also died in the airstrike.[iii] 

Iran Update, October 3, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued advancing into southern Lebanon on October 3. Geolocated imagery indicates Israeli troop movements around the western axis of advance, specifically around Aitaroun and Yaroun.[i] The IDF Golani Brigade (36th Division) coordinated with the IDF Air Force to strike Hezbollah militants in nearby buildings.[ii] Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces as they advanced.[iii] Hezbollah claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting the IDF around Maroun al Ras and that it detonated a “barrel bomb” targeting the IDF around Yaroun.[iv] A Hezbollah-affiliated reporter claimed that Hezbollah prepared ambushes beforehand.[v] The IDF previously announced on October 1 that it would soon operate in this general area to clear it of Hezbollah militants and infrastructure and asked civilians to evacuate.[vi] Hezbollah-affiliated sources separately reported that the IDF is operating around Kfar Kila around the eastern axis of advance.[vii] The IDF reportedly estimated that it has killed over 100 Hezbollah militants since launching ground operations into Lebanon on October 1.[viii] Hezbollah appears to have stopped posting obituaries for its militants in this time.[ix] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited the Israeli forces on the Israel-Lebanon border and vowed to continue efforts against Hezbollah.[x]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) said that an Israeli strike killed an LAF soldier in southern Lebanon on October 3.[xi] The LAF said that Lebanese soldiers returned fire after the strike.[xii] A Lebanese security source told Reuters that this incident marked the first time that the LAF has fired at Israeli forces in the war.[xiii]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns in southern Lebanon.[xiv] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River, which is 30 miles north of the Litani River.[xv] The 25 towns that the IDF identified are all north of the Litani River.[xvi] The IDF conducted several airstrikes in at least two of the specified towns on October 3.[xvii]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership across Lebanon on October 3.[xviii] The IDF Air Force struck over 200 Hezbollah targets, including Hezbollah militants and infrastructure, including observation posts and weapons depots.[xix] The IDF 210th Division directed an airstrike that targeted and killed the local Hezbollah commander for the Shebaa Farms and Mount Hermon area.[xx] The IDF said the commander was responsible for the Hezbollah attack that killed 12 children in the Golan Heights in July 2024.[xxi] The commander also oversaw hundreds of rocket and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting IDF positions on Mount Dov, Mount Hermon, and the northern Golan Heights.[xxii]

The IDF conducted numerous strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and intelligence networks in Beirut on October 3. The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson asked residents of the Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, and Hadath West neighborhoods to evacuate at least 500 meters from specific buildings that the IDF identified as “Hezbollah facilities.”[xxiii] Local sources reported that the IDF then conducted strikes targeting across several neighborhoods in southern Beirut.[xxiv] The IDF also conducted a strike that targeted an apartment complex in Bachoura, Beirut, marking the second time that the IDF has struck a target within Beirut city limits.[xxv] The IDF said that it struck several targets affiliated with Hezbollah's intelligence branch in Beirut, including intelligence unit members, collection instruments, and other infrastructure.[xxvi] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that nine people were killed and 14 injured in Israeli strikes on Beirut.[xxvii]

The IDF stated that Hezbollah has used a civilian border crossing near Damascus as its “main” route for receiving military equipment and weapons from Syria to deliver to southern Lebanon.[xxviii] The IDF stated that the transfer of weapons through Masnaa border crossing follows the IDF airstrikes on seven border crossings along the Syria-Lebanon border on September 26.[xxix] The IDF urged the Lebanese government to conduct strict inspections of trucks passing through civilian crossings and to turn weapons carrying trucks back to Syria.[xxx] The Lebanese Transport Minister Ali Hamieh said that the Lebanese government will monitor all border crossings following the accusations.[xxxi]

A senior aide to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei traveled to Beirut and met with Lebanese officials on October 3.[xxxii] Mohsen Ghomi, who is the international relations deputy in the Office of the Supreme Leader, met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, among others, to discuss the war against Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel.[xxxiii] Khamenei is expected to honor Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, both of whom died in the Israeli airstrike targeting the Hezbollah central military headquarters in Beirut on September 27. Khamenei will also commemorate the coming anniversary of Hamas’ brutal attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and typically reserves this right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic. The last time that Khamenei did so was shortly after the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[xxxiv] CTP-ISW will report on this event further in future updates.

The Axis of Resistance has continued to signal its solidarity with Hezbollah and readiness to escalate further against Israel. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source claimed that there is an Iranian-backed Iraqi “combat reserve” that is near Lebanon and ready to support Hezbollah once given approval to do so.[xxxv] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—separately fired an ”advanced” drone targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel on October 3[xxxvi] The IDF intercepted the drone.[xxxvii] Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed the Houthis fired multiple Jaffa drones targeting Tel Aviv on October 3.[xxxviii] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik separately vowed to continue attacks in retaliation for US and Israeli airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF continued advancing into southern Lebanon. The IDF reportedly estimates that it has killed over 100 Lebanese Hezbollah militants during its ground operation. The IDF also issued calls for further evacuations.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The IDF conducted several strikes in Beirut specifically targeting the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and reserves the right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic.

Iran Update, October 2, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has advanced into southern Lebanon along at least two axes. Geolocated imagery shows Israeli forces separately approaching Odaisseh and Maround al Ras.[1] The IDF 36^th and 98^th divisions participated in these advances and both have elements that fought in the Gaza Strip.[2] The Lebanese Armed Forces claimed that Israeli forces went around 1,300 feet into Lebanon around Odaisseh and Khirbet Yaroun and that the Israeli forces retrograded after a ”short period.”[3] This activity comes after the IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation into southern Lebanon on October 1. This effort—paired with the IDF air campaign—is meant to degrade Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities and destroy much of the military infrastructure that Hezbollah has built in southern Lebanon in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[4] These military effects are meant, in turn, to achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel.[5] Thousands of Israeli civilians have fled their homes, as Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023.[6]

Hezbollah engaged the IDF as it advanced into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces in Odaisseh and Maround al Ras in southern Lebanon.[7] Hezbollah also claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces near Kfar Kila and Yaroun.[8] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah fighters and destroyed military infrastructure in unspecified locations.[9] The IDF also reported that Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers in four separate engagements.[10]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 24 towns in southern Lebanon.[11] The spokesperson asked residents to travel north of Awali River, which is 30 miles north of Litani River. The spokesperson separately asked residents to avoid traveling by vehicle from north of Litani River to anywhere south of it.[12]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership.  The IDF struck Hezbollah militants as well as observation posts and weapons depots, among other military infrastructure sites, across Lebanon.[13] The IDF reported that it has struck Hezbollah munitions production sites around Beirut in recent days.[14] The IDF also reported that it has destroyed over 150 Hezbollah infrastructure sites in airstrikes over an unspecified period of time[15]

Hezbollah has continued its attack campaign targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Avivim for the second consecutive day on October 2.[16] The IDF reported that two rockets landed in an open area near Avivim.[17] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets at Haifa in response to Israeli advances into southern Lebanon.[18] Hezbollah has fired rockets at Haifa almost daily since September 21. Hezbollah separately attacked IDF personnel around the Israel-Lebanon border on October 2. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli troops near Adamit, Avdon, Misgav Am, Shtula, and Yaara.

The IDF released new information on Hezbollah planning to launch a ground attack into Israel in the days after Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023. Israel military correspondent reported that over 3,000 Iranian-backed fighters deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border after Hamas’ October 7 attack in preparation for their own possible ground attack into Israel.[21] This force included 2,400 militants from Hezbollah‘s Radwan special operations forces and 500 Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. The correspondent added that these forces were equipped with ”thousands of guns, anti-tank missiles, mines, [and] RPGs.”[22] The forces also had equipment, including aerial photographs, binoculars, night-vision goggles, and protective vests.[23] The correspondent lastly said that the force planned to use explosives to destroy the border walls between Israel and Lebanon and also use tunnels in order to enter Israel.

The Iranian missile attack into Israel on October 1 appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its strike packages against Western and Israeli air defenses. Though Israel intercepted most of the missiles that Iran launched on October 1, some of the missiles managed to impact. These missiles caused minor damage to dozens of homes north of Tel Aviv, a major road near the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, a school in central Israel, and the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev Desert.[24] In contrast, the United States, Israel, and their regional partners intercepted almost all of the drones and missiles that Iran launched in April 2024.[25]

Several factors could have led to the increased damage in the most recent Iranian attack. One factor could be that Iran meaningfully increased its volume of fire, launching 180-200 ballistic missiles compared to the 120 that it launched in April 2024.[26] Iran also refrained from launching slower moving cruise missiles and drones in the April 2024 attack.[27] Former Israeli Missile Defense Organization head Uzi Rubin said that the April 2024 attack was “easier to defend [against]” because the cruise missile and drones gave the IDF “plenty of warning.”[28] The ballistic missiles took about 15 minutes to fly from Iran to Israel.[29] Iran separately appeared to concentrate much of its fire around densely populated central Israel in the most recent attack, whereas Iran exclusively attacked remote areas in April 2024. Israeli air defenses are designed to avoid intercepting projectiles that will land in open areas. But the concentration of fire on central Israel, where there is a high risk of collateral damage, may have been designed to overwhelm Israeli air defenses by saturating the airspace with a large number of projectiles over relatively small and densely populated areas.

Outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reported that Iran used a combination of missiles to achieve different effects in the attack.[30] The outlet stated that the liquid-fueled Emad missiles were meant to engage Israeli interceptors, while the more advanced Fattah and Kheybar Shekan missiles were meant to strike precision targets.

Iranian military leaders threatened that they would launch larger attacks on Israel if Israel retaliated for the October 1 missile attack.[31] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri warned that Iran would repeat its October 1 attack with “greater intensity” and target “all [Israeli] infrastructure” if Israel attacks Iranian territory.[32] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi similarly warned that Iran would attack unspecified Israeli infrastructure if Israel retaliates against Iran for the October 1 attack.[33] Mousavi added that future Iranian attacks would be “stronger and multiple times [larger].”[34]

These Iranian threats come amid reports that Israel will conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days.[35] Anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that Israel may target Iranian air defense sites or energy infrastructure or conduct a targeted killing similar to the killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[36] The officials said that the Israeli retaliation will be “much more significant” than the Israeli response to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack.[37] Israel at the time conducted an airstrike targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan, Iran, in retaliation.[38] The Israeli officials added that Israel could attack Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran launched another attack.[39]

Adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, Ebrahim Jabari, claimed on October 2 that Iran conducted a cyber attack targeting Israeli air defense systems at the same as its ballistic missile attack on October 1.[40]

Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah, citing anonymous Iranian sources.[41] The report stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei offered to relocate Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to Iran in response to concerns of Israeli infiltration and the possibility that Israel would try to kill Nasrallah. Nasrallah declined the offer, according to the report, and Khamenei sent IRGC Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan to Beirut to persuade Nasrallah. Nilforoushan died in the Israeli airstrike that killed Nasrallah in Beirut. The airstrike follows several other Israeli operations killing high-profile officials in the Axis of Resistance, such as Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Fuad Shukr, and Ismail Haniyeh. Reuters reported that the killings—coupled with Israel detonating thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios—has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, including Khamenei. Iran, according to Reuters, launched investigating possible Israeli agents in the Iranian security apparatus, focusing on individuals traveling or with family abroad. Reuters also reported that Iran has arrested several individuals on suspicion that they helped Israel kill Nasrallah.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three drone attacks targeting three unspecified locations in northern Israel on October 2.[42]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened on October 1 to attack US forces in the Middle East if the United States attacks or helps Israel attack Iran in retaliation for the October 1 Iranian missile attack. Kataib Hezbollah threatened to attack US forces and interests in Iraq and across the region if the United States participates in “any hostile action” against Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.[43] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba similarly threatened to attack US forces if the United States or Israel attack Iran.[44] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately criticized Jordan for helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.[45]

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched three Quds-5 cruise missiles at unspecified locations in Israel on October 2.[46] Sarea claimed that the missiles hit their targets and added that the Houthis are ready to join any combined military operations against Israel. CTP-ISW cannot verify whether these attacks occurred.

Hamas claimed responsibility for the terror attack in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[47] Hamas claimed that two fighters managed to infiltrate into Israeli territory from the West Bank to conduct the attack. The two Hamas fighters reportedly stabbed and killed an Israeli security officer and seized his firearm.[48] The two attackers then shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa and wounded 16 others before Israeli forces killed both attackers.[49] The IDF identified the two Hamas fighters as residents of Hebron in the West Bank and identified their homes for demolition.[50] The IDF also detained and interrogated several “suspects,” who were likely assisted the two Hamas fighters in the attack. [51]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—has increased its rate of attacks targeting security forces in southeastern Iran in recent days. This uptick coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Bloody Friday,” when Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protests in Zahedan, Sistan and Balochistan Province.[52] Jaish al Adl has claimed the following attacks.

September 28

• An attack killing the deputy police chief of the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) in Sib and Suran.[53]
• An attack targeting two LEC officers at a police station in Zahedan.[54]

September 29

• A small arms and IED attack targeting two patrol vehicles in Rask.[55]
• An attack targeting an LEC officer in Khash.[56]
• An attack targeting an LEC base at Iranshahr.[57]

October 1

• An attack on the “Festival of Affections” ceremony at a school in Bent, killing a local IRGC commander and the head of the city council.[58]
• An attack targeting an IRGC Intelligence Organization vehicle, killing two agents in Rask.[59]
• An attack targeting a security patrol, killing two officers in Khash.[60]

This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[61] Jaish al Adl has conducted numerous attacks targeting Iranian security forces in this time, at times demonstrating unprecedented coordination and organization.[62] Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni ordered Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Police Affairs Brigadier General Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian and the Sistan and Baluchistan governor to conduct an investigation into the recent attacks.[63] Iranian leaders could interpret some of this activity through the lens of their fight against the United States and Israel, as they have long accused both countries of stoking anti-regime militancy in Iran.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has advanced into southern Lebanon along two axes. Hezbollah engaged the IDF as it advanced, killing at least eight Israeli soldiers. The IDF called on civilians across southern Lebanon to evacuate immediately and move northward.
• Iran: The recent Iranian missile attack on Israel appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its attacks against Western and Israeli defenses.
• Iran: Israel will reportedly conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days. Iranian military leaders threatened that they would respond by conducting an even greater attack on Israel.
• Iran: Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah. Israeli operations, including the killing of senior Axis of Resistance officials, has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to attack US forces if the United States supports an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Militia officials also criticized Jordan for purportedly helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.
• Iranian internal security: There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran in recent days. This coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Blood Friday,” when Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protesters in southeastern Iran.

Iran Update, October 1, 2024

Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1.[1] Iran claimed to launch this attack in response to Israel’s killing of senior Axis of Resistance leaders including Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[2] Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles, including Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles, from Iranian territory.[3] Iran claimed to launch its domestically produced hypersonic medium-range “Fattah-2” ballistic missile for the first time in the October 1 attack.[4] The IRGC claimed it launched Fattah missiles to destroy Israel's Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile interception systems.[5] The IRGC conducted the October 1 operation with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council and ”with the knowledge of” the Armed Forces General Staff.[6] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed that Iran targeted Israeli ”military, operational and intelligence” centers associated with the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, which occurred in Tehran, Iran in July 2023.[7] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media claimed that Iran targeted the following airbases.[8]

• The Nevatim Airbase, which houses Israeli F-35s, located outside of Beersheba, Israel.[9] Most of Israel’s F-35s were presumably airborne at the time of the attack, given that most of Israel’s aerial refuelers were airborne during the attack. This would have enabled Israel to keep most of its aircraft airborne during the strike both to prevent any damage to the aircraft and to intercept projectiles if needed and possible. Pro-Hezbollah media claimed this base was used in the Israeli killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[10] Geolocated footage showed impacts to the base from missiles.[11]
• The Hatzerim Airbase in the Negev Desert.[12]
• The Tel Nof Airbase 20 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.[13] Geolocated footage showed missiles impacting at or near the Tel Nof Airbase.[14]

Geolocated footage also showed Iranian ballistic missiles impacting in at least three other locations:

• An area south of Herzliya, Israel.[15] The geolocated footage depicts an area located near the IDF Glilot Intelligence Base, which houses IDF Unit 8200, which is the IDF’s signals collection unit, and the Mossaf Headquarters.[16] Israel evacuated the Glilot Intelligence base before the attack.[17]

• An area near the Ayalon Mall, Ramat Gan, Israel.[18] Ayalon Mall is immediately west of Yarkon Park, where Shin Bet is headquartered.[19]

• A school in Gedera, Israel, located near the Tel Nof Airbase.[20]

The Iranian attack killed one Palestinian near Jericho in the West Bank, and shrapnel lightly injured two Israelis in Tel Aviv.[21]

Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel. Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles targeting Israel on October 1, compared to the approximately 120 ballistic missiles it fired at Israel in April 2024.[22] The April attack focused on Israeli positions in northern and southern Israel, with several ballistic missiles striking Nevatim Airbase.[23] This attack focused on at least three possible targets between Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, and Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. Rehovot and Tel Aviv are 29km apart. Some portion of the strike package focused on Nevatim and Hatzerim Airbases in southern Israel, but a large number of missiles targeted a very small geographic area in densely populated central Israel. All missiles in this area would presumably need to be intercepted because the IDF will only intercept missiles that fall in populated areas. This is not the case in Nevatim and Hatzerim, which are surrounded by relatively unpopulated desert. The increase in ballistic missiles may have been designed to overwhelm the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense system by saturating it with large numbers of systems in relatively small and densely populated areas.  The large quantity of ballistic missiles also represents a significant Iranian investment that Iran is unlikely to willingly forfeit in an attack for show.

The IDF reported that Israel and its allies intercepted the “majority” of the Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel. IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the missiles impacted some areas in central and southern Israel, but that the IDF and the US-led defensive coalition intercepted the majority of projectiles.[24] United States National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan separately described the Iranian attack as “defeated and ineffective.”[25] An unspecified US defense official stated that US destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea helped intercept the Iranian ballistic missiles.[26]  The USS Arleigh Burke, USS Cole, and USS Bulkeley are currently deployed to the eastern Mediterranean region.[27] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) claimed that 90 percent of the missiles hit their intended targets without providing any evidence for these claims.[28]  

Israel vowed to retaliate against Iran for the October 1 attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated at the beginning of the Israeli cabinet meeting that Iran “made a big mistake and will pay.”[29] Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would attack anyone who attacks them. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Israel’s operational plans are ready and vowed that Israel will respond ”wherever, whenever, and however we choose.”[30] Israel previously conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[31] The IRGC warned on October 1 that it would conduct further attacks on Israel if Israel retaliates against Iran for its ballistic missile attack.[32]

The IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation in southern Lebanon. The IDF 98th Division began a “focused activity” on October 1 in what the IDF described would be a “targeted and delimited” operation in southern Lebanon.[33] The IDF said that a special operations brigade, a paratrooper brigade, and an armored brigade subordinate to the 98th Division have been preparing in recent weeks for the ground operation.[34] These units previously fought under the 98th Division for months in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli security cabinet approved the "targeted ground entry” on the evening of September 30.[35]

It is not immediately clear where the 98th Division began operations in southern Lebanon. The IDF did not specify where its forces began operations. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvi’on, and Malkia areas on October 1.[36] An unspecified UNIFIL source told Western media that the Israeli forces have staged ”sporadic raids” into Lebanon but have not ”remained on Lebanese soil.“ [37] Lebanese sources reported that Israeli artillery units continued to bombard border towns, particularly targeting Kafr Kila, Tal al Nahhas, and areas near Khiam.[38] Artillery units serve the primary role of providing indirect fire support to ground forces’ maneuvers.[39] Lebanese sources also reported that the IDF fired illumination rounds over Rmeish and Aita al Shaab.[40]

Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units in Lebanon as of the time of writing. Hezbollah may not engage Israeli forces while Israeli forces are only staging “sporadic raids” that do not remain in Lebanon. Unspecified security officials confirmed to Western media that Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units.[41] An unspecified soldier from the 98th Division told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah has not yet engaged Israeli forces but that one Israeli unit spotted Hezbollah observers and directed artillery units to push them back.[42] Hezbollah, however, claimed at least six attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated along the Israel-Lebanon border but inside Israel.[43] A correspondent from the Hezbollah-affiliated channel Al Manar reported that Hezbollah units attempted to confront Israeli attempts to penetrate the border by targeting gatherings of Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side of the border.[44]

Israeli officials maintained on October 1 that the IDF’s ground operation will remain “limited.”[45] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli Army Radio that the “limited ground operation” will remove threats near or along the Israel-Lebanon border.[46] Israeli forces are expected to operate about three miles deep into Lebanese territory, according to the Wall Street Journal.[47] Three miles would encompass many border villages, including those that the IDF fought in in 2006. The IDF Arabic spokesperson issued a call to residents of 27 southern Lebanese towns on October 1 and asked residents to “evacuate [their] homes immediately.”[48] The spokesperson asked residents to immediately travel north of the Awali River, which is 30 miles north of the Litani River the spokesperson told residents to leave.[49] An unspecified security official told Western media that there is currently no thought of operations moving up to Beirut, however.[50] Evacuating up to the Awali would, however, move these individuals out of areas targeted in IDF strikes designed to interdict Hezbollah reinforcements or resupplies. The IDF also mobilized four additional reserve brigades and unspecified other forces for “operational tasks” in Lebanon on October 1.[51]

The current IDF ground operation is a continuation of a year-long, previously undisclosed Israeli special operations campaign that sought to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[52] The IDF announced on October 1 that Israeli forces destroyed about 700 Hezbollah targets in cross-border raids since October 2023, including underground compounds, military targets, weapons warehouses, explosives, and headquarters. The IDF’s cross-border operations, often led by the Egoz Unit, sometimes lasted multiple days and focused on destroying infrastructure belonging to Radwan forces located close to Israel.[53] The Egoz Unit was originally established in the 1990s as a raiding force specifically trained for operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah.[54] Unspecified Israeli officials said that the IDF’s current ground incursion into southern Lebanon will be ”an extension of the previous” raids with more units deployed to destroy infrastructure that smaller special forces could not.[55]

Hezbollah began its cross-border firing campaign in support of Palestinians in Gaza in October 2023. Israeli Army Radio reported that over 3,000 of Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces deployed along the Israel-Lebanon border following the October 7 attacks to conduct a long-planned ground infiltration into northern Israel.[56] Hezbollah pioneered the idea of ground attacks into Israel, and it developed the Radwan Force to this end.[57]

The IDF Air Force continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's leadership and capabilities on October 1. The IDF continued to target Hezbollah weapons launchers, weapons storage facilities, and other military infrastructure across Lebanon.[58] The IDF’s air campaign concentrated airstrikes primarily on southern Lebanon but also continued to target sites in the Bekaa Valley. The IDF targeted and killed Hezbollah Unit 4400 commander Mohammad Jaafar Qasir in an airstrike in Beirut on October 1.[59] The IDF said that Unit 4400 is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and its proxies to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[60] Qasir was a senior Hezbollah member who had been in his position for 15 years and was one of the ”most dominant” figures behind Iran’s ground line of communication through Syria to Hezbollah.[61] The IDF also killed commander of the Syria-based Imam Hussein Division al Faqar Hinawi in Beirut on October 1.[62]  The IRGC formed the Imam Hussein Division in 2016.[63] The IDF said that the Imam Hussein Division had moved its headquarters to southern Lebanon since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war and operates closely with Hezbollah’s southern command units.[64]

The IDF Air Force likely struck multiple Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria on October 1, possibly to suppress SAA air defenses.[65] The IDF also struck multiple locations in eastern Daraa and western Suwayda on October 1.[66] Syrian sources reported that the IDF targeted and eliminated the radar systems of five Syrian Arab Army (SAA) battalions, including those located at the al Thaala and al Khalkhala military airports in western Suwaida.[67] A Syrian outlet noted that the number of systems targeted, and Israel’s use of drones differentiates these strikes from Israel’s previous attacks targeting radar systems in southern Syria.[68]

The IDF has previously conducted airstrikes targeting SAA sites in southern Syria in response to SAA's cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah.[69] The IDF has repeatedly targeted sites in Quneitra and Daraa provinces that Hezbollah fighters use as reconnaissance and observation points to observe the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[70] The IDF likely struck SAA sites in Suwayda and Daraa provinces on October 1 due to ongoing SAA-Hezbollah cooperation and possibly to continue to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive weapons from Syrian territory. Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the Lebanon-Syria border for this purpose.[71]

Hezbollah fired “Fadi-4” medium-range rockets targeting the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on October 1.[72] This is the second time that Hezbollah targeted Mossad Headquarters near Tel Aviv in the recent days.[73] Hezbollah also reported that it fired a Fadi-4 rocket targeting Unit 8200 headquarters near Tel Aviv for the first time on October 1.[74] Unit 8200 is an Israeli Intelligence Corps unit responsible for signals intelligence and similar activities.[75] Hezbollah separately claimed that it fired medium-range rockets targeting Sde Dov Airport, which closed in 2019, near Tel Aviv on October 1.[76] Hezbollah said that these attacks are part of “Operation Khaybar,” which is Hezbollah’s response to the Israeli airstrike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27.[77] The IDF has not commented on either attack at this time.

Hezbollah continued its attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military sites in Israel on October 1.  Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Metula.[78] The IDF said that it detected several projectiles over Metula and intercepted some of them.[79] Hezbollah also mortared Israeli forces in Avivim on October 1.[80] The IDF said that it also identified individual projectiles that fell in open areas in Avivim.[81] Hezbollah claimed on October 1 that the latest attack campaign against Israel is in response to Israel’s ”invasion” of Lebanese towns and villages.[82]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a rocket attack targeting a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[83] The US ambassador to Iraq announced that an attack took place at the Diplomatic Support Complex, which is a US State Department facility.[84] The attack occurred hours before the Iranian ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. Iraqi media reported that ”elements outside the law” launched three Katyusha rockets from al Amiriya in Baghdad toward the complex.[85] Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants recently attacked the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[86]

A security source separately told Al Jazeera on October 1 that unspecified militants conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.[87] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—denied responsibility for the attack.[88] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened in recent days to resume attacks targeting US forces if Israel launched a ground campaign into Lebanon.[89] Iranian state media claimed on October 1 that the United States has “officially entered” the war and that all US bases in the region are “legitimate targets” for the Axis of Resistance.[90] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, separately warned on October 1 that Iraqi militias will target “all US bases and interests” in the region if the United States attacks Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran in retaliation for the Iranian attack on Israel.[91]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three Arqab cruise missile attacks targeting unspecified locations in Israel on October 1.[92]

Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched one drone at Tel Aviv and four “Sammad 4” drones targeting unspecified sites in Eilat, Israel, on October 1, before Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel.[93] Israeli media did not acknowledge the attack. CTP-ISW cannot verify if these attacks took place.

Two unidentified individuals shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[94] The gunmen also wounded seven other civilians before Israeli security forces killed both gunmen.[95] Palestinian militias including the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement praised the attack, calling it a “natural response” to Israeli military operations in Gaza and the West Bank.[96] No Palestinian militias have taken responsibility for the shooting attack at the time of this writing, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack in Israel: Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1. Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units in Lebanon as of the time of writing. Hezbollah may not engage Israeli forces while Israeli forces are only staging “sporadic raids” that do not remain in Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Attacks Targeting Northern Israel: Hezbollah fired “Fadi-4” medium-range rockets targeting the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on October 1.
• Iraq: Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a rocket attack targeting a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.
• Houthis: Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched one drone at Tel Aviv and four “Sammad 4” drones targeting unspecified sites in Eilat, Israel, on October 1, before Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel.
• Terrorist Attack in Israel: Two unidentified individuals shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.