Israel is Defeating Hamas, But Destroying Hamas Will Require a Post-War Vision

Israel has likely defeated Hamas in Khan Younis and is in the process of doing so in Rafah. Hamas forces in both locations have suffered heavy attrition and are no longer operating as effective military units. Defeat occurs when an enemy force has “temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight” and is forced to yield to the friendly commander’s will.[1] Defeating an enemy force is a much less resource- and time-intensive activity than destroying that force. Destroying an enemy force requires damaging it to such a degree that it can no longer function without being entirely rebuilt.[2] Translating the defeat of Hamas’ brigades into the destruction of the organization will require additional Israeli or international measures to prevent Hamas from recovering.

Hamas organized a deliberate but ultimately unsuccessful defense against Israeli advances in Khan Younis during the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) first clearing operations there between December 2023 and April 2024. Hamas attacks targeting the IDF in Khan Younis in the summer of 2024 in contrast appeared opportunistic and lacked tactical sophistication. These attacks did not appear to pursue a coordinated campaign plan across multiple command echelons. The IDF’s public reporting corroborates this judgement. The IDF’s media arm reported in July that the IDF did not encounter “significant resistance” when entering Khan Younis.[3] This IDF report is consistent with the low rate of attacks in Khan Younis during July. Hamas only claimed 31 of the attacks that targeted Israeli forces in Khan Younis during July and August 2024, compared to 72 attacks during February and March.[4] The Khan Younis Brigade also failed to execute one of its key missions—preventing the IDF from rescuing Israeli hostages—in the summer of 2024 when the IDF retrieved six Israeli hostage bodies from Khan Younis.[5]

The decrease in Hamas’ effectiveness in Khan Younis during the summer of 2024 is consistent with the brigade commander’s own account of his forces’ ability. Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salameh reported to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in an undated letter authored before his death on July 13 that the brigade had suffered 50 percent casualties, with another 25 percent of its remaining fighters mentally or physically unfit for combat.[6] Salamah also wrote that the brigade had lost 60 percent of its small arms and between 65 and 70 percent of its anti-tank weapons.[7] He wrote his letter prior to the new Israeli operations in Khan Younis in July, meaning that Hamas has almost certainly lost additional fighters and materiel in Khan Younis since he authored the letter.[8] The brigade has similarly lost a series of top commanders—including Salamah—who will be difficult to replace.[9]  It does not appear that the Khan Younis Brigade’s subordinate commands can communicate with each other or with higher headquarters, given the lack of a coordinated defense against Israeli operations.

Hamas’ recent low rate of attacks and unsophisticated operations in Rafah indicate that the Rafah Brigade is severely degraded and is no longer operating as an effective military unit. The weekly rate of Hamas attacks in Rafah has steadily declined since the IDF entered Rafah in May 2024.[10] The attacks no longer appear to have clear tactical or operational objectives, suggesting a breakdown in command and control. IDF statements corroborate this assessment.[11] Hamas fighters in Rafah have also failed to guard Israeli hostages, leading to the rescue of a living hostage and the retrieval of six hostage’s bodies this summer.[12]

Hamas remnants in Khan Younis and Rafah could rebuild under the right circumstances, despite the brigades’ defeat. These remaining fighters will likely continue to conduct opportunistic attacks on Israeli forces if the IDF re-enters Khan Younis. These attacks will not be effective, however, unless a lifting of Israeli pressure affords Hamas the opportunity to rebuild its military organization. The Khan Younis Brigade very likely does not have a functioning command structure or communication system and lacks the ability to train, arm, and redistribute forces. The IDF’s current air and ground operations restrict Hamas command centers from operating, small cells from receiving orders, and fighters from accessing stores of weapons from other areas of the Gaza Strip.[13] A break in the IDF’s airstrikes and the free movement of goods and personnel around the Gaza Strip would enable the remaining fighters to conduct more effective and organized attacks on Israeli forces. The surviving Hamas fighters would act as the cadre that ensures continuity across the organization to rebuild its capacity to its previous levels.

Hamas’ other three brigades in the central and northern Gaza Strip are probably facing varying levels of degradation, but CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess that these units are defeated. Each brigade has certainly lost access to large amounts of weapons, rockets, personnel, and tunnel networks. The IDF has destroyed the tunnel network used to facilitate the underground cooperation and movement of Hamas units between brigades in the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[14] The IDF’s isolation of Hamas’ Gaza City and Northern Gaza Brigades above ground by the Netzarim Corridor similarly restricts the brigades’ ability to reconstitute by severely hindering the redistribution of fighters and supplies. Hamas' Central Brigade likely retains the largest proportion of its original strength of all five Hamas regular brigades, given that the IDF has not systematically cleared the entire central Strip. The brigades’ remaining capabilities will likely accelerate the reconstitution of the Khan Younis and Rafah brigades if Israel and the international community fail to enable an alternative power structure in the Strip.

Hamas’ defeat in Khan Younis or other areas in the Gaza Strip does not mean that Hamas’ allied Palestinian militias are also defeated, however. Smaller militias allied with Hamas are frequently shelling IDF positions and conducting isolated small arms attacks targeting the IDF. Three smaller militias in Khan Younis claimed nearly double the number of attacks that Hamas claimed in Khan Younis in July and August 2024, demonstrating the continued relevance of these smaller groups.[15] These militias, though smaller and less well organized than Hamas, could still be able to disrupt Israeli or international efforts to establish a political authority that could replace Hamas. Over time—and under the right conditions such as an unsecured Philadelphi Corridor—Iran and others could back these groups rather than a severely weakened Hamas.[16]

Defeat is a temporary military effect that will require additional Israeli or international efforts designed to prevent Hamas’ reconstitution by interdicting Hamas resupply in order to prevent regeneration. Reconstitution is a very time- and resource-intensive task even under ideal conditions in which the reconstituting force is out-of-contact with the opposing force. It includes tasks such as the large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.[17] Many conditions necessary for even minimally effective reconstitution—including relative safe havens for training and adequate supplies—do not currently exist in the Gaza Strip.  Hamas would need to restore its domestic weapons manufacturing capabilities through materials smuggled through the IDF-controlled Gaza-Strip Egyptian border, also known as the Philadelphi Corridor. An Israeli withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor without another mechanism to interdict Hamas supplies would allow Hamas to resupply itself over time.  Hamas similarly lacks safe havens to train new recruits due to current Israeli air superiority and Hamas’ severely degraded tunnel network. In the event of a ceasefire without a political and security alternative to Hamas, however, Hamas will be able to train its new recruits and potentially rebuild a weapons arsenal capable of threatening Israel again. Preventing Hamas’ regeneration over the long term would also require a capable security force that could prevent Hamas training and other military efforts without an IDF Air Force or ground presence in perpetuity.

Hamas’ military and political destruction requires the articulation of a political end state and the application of the necessary means to achieve that end state. Israel officially seeks to destroy Hamas as both a political and military organization, not merely to defeat its military wing.[18] Hamas can indeed be militarily defeated and even militarily destroyed, but the IDF will need a defined political end state in order to set the conditions necessary to destroy the group as a whole. The IDF’s military success in defeating Hamas’ military organizations can provide Israel an opportunity to begin implementing a post war vision in the Gaza Strip, if Israel’s political leadership defines an end state in the Gaza Strip.