Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development (Page 7)

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Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of IAEA Inspection Reports

GOV/2008/15 (26 May 2008): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 

This report documents continuing Iranian progress in centrifuge installation and operation, and nuclear enrichment, as well as new construction at its heavy water reactor at Arak. In addition, the IAEA reports the Iranian intention to install a new generation of centrifuges. The IAEA reports that between March 2004 and May 2008 Iran produced 320 tons of UF₆. When confronted by the IAEA with documents both detailing conversion of uranium dioxide to UF₄ and development and testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment and exploding bridgewire, Iranian officials denied the authenticity of the documents and said the documents did not show that Iran had been working on nuclear weapons. 

In conclusion, the IAEA summarized, “The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter of serious concern,” and that “The Agency’s overall assessment of the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme also requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications by Iran concerning some procurement activities of military related institutions.” 

GOV/2008/4 (22 February 2008): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Outstanding issues resolved in this report: (1) The source of uranium particle contamination; (2) Polonium-210; (3) Gchine Mine administration and uranium production; (4) The IAEA received a 15-page document outlining the procedures for “reducing UF₆ to uranium metal and machining of enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons.” The IR-40 (Iran Nuclear Research Reactor) is still under construction but operating, and satellite imagery shows that the Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The report finds that Iran has not stopped the enrichment process and that the green salt project, the testing of high explosives, and missile re-entry vehicle are of major concern seeing as how they relate to the possible military dimension of the program.

GOV/2007/58 (15 November 2007): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

The report establishes a working plan to answer questions for resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues. These issues include the acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges and their origins, the history surrounding fuel cycle facilities and technology, heavy water reactor related projects, uranium conversion, questions of source of contamination, and additional issues that are resolved in GOV/2008/4.

GOV/2007/48/Corr.1 (7 September 2007): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

The IAEA affirms that Iran has been cooperating on the level of declared nuclear material, but it is not able to ascertain the scope and nature of its nuclear program. The report outlines that Iran has not complied with the UN Security Council due to the fact that Iran did not suspend enrichment activities; it continued the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and the construction of the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the construction of the IR-40, and finally the operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

GOV/2007/22 (23 May 2007): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

This report parallels UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007). Iran continues uranium enrichment and declared that it has reached enrichment levels of 4.8 percent; the IAEA in GOV/2007/48 indicates that enrichment is actually at 3.7 percent. Outstanding issues include: Uranium contamination at the Physics Research Centre, P-1/P-2 centrifuges, and uranium casting into hemispheres. The construction of the IR-40 and the operation Heavy Water Production continue.

GOV/2007/8 (22 February 2007): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Issues include the finding that contamination on centrifuges in Iran and Libya originate from the same country; acquisition of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology; continuing work on PFEP, FEP, and heavy water projects; many inconsistencies concerning Iran’s plutonium experiments. Iran did not agree to transparency measures involving the “Green Salt Project,” which deals with the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF₄, high explosive testing, or missile re-entry systems.

GOV/2007/7 (9 February 2007): Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006):

An agreement made unilaterally by Mohammed El Baradei from outside his immediate mandate, it outlines the direction in which technical cooperation will take place between Iran and the IAEA. No technical cooperation will be provided to Iran that relates to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities that coincide with the provisions of Resolution 1737. The report also enables the IAEA to provide technical cooperation under its auspices to eleven national, twenty regional, and two interregional projects.

GOV/2006/64 (14 November 2006): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

The IAEA reports that Iran has not enabled the IAEA to monitor remotely the PFEP. The IAEA also found no ongoing reprocessing activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX), and at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40). No progress reported on determining the contamination described in GOV/2006/53. Iran did not give new information concerning P-1/P-2 centrifuge programs, uranium metal enrichment, or plutonium experiments, nor did Iran express the possibility of discussing studies related to the Green Salt Project or the design of a missile re-entry vehicle. 

GOV/2006/53 (31 August 2006): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Report coincides with UN Security Council Resolution 1696. The IAEA reports that Iran has cooperated by granting the IAEA access to nuclear material and facilities, but that the Iranian authorities have denied the IAEA certain operating records at PFEP. Iran continues to test P-1 centrifuges in the PFEP. Iran neither has suspended enrichment activities, nor has it acted in accordance with the Additional Protocol. Iran did not respond to IAEA requests to investigate the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), the Green Salt Project, high explosive testing, and Tehran’s design work of missile re-entry vehicles, nor did Iranian authorities grant the IAEA permission to place remote monitoring equipment at PFEP. Report also discussed continuing construction work at IR-40 in Arak and FEP at Natanz. No indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at TRR, the MIX Radioisotope Production Facility, or hot cells at IR-40. No progress on contamination issues stated in GOV/2006/27, paragraphs 8-9. There is uranium particle contamination at the technical university. Iran still has not given the IAEA a 15-page document on the reduction of UF₆.

GOV/2006/38 (8 June 2006): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Reported no resolution to a contamination issue that was discussed in GOV/2006/26. Iran did not make any information available to the IAEA regarding P-1 and P-2 centrifuges. Construction at IR-40 continues. Iran did not implement the provisions of the Additional Protocol. Iran did not respond to the IAEA’s request to carry out environmental sampling at PHRC. Iran also did not respond to the agency’s request to interview a former head of the PHRC. Iran will not reveal information concerning the Green Salt Project, high explosives testing, and the design of a missile re-entry system.

GOV/2006/27 (28 April 2006): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Addresses a letter that Iran sent to IAEA stating their actions and position on issues related to the nuclear program. Iran declined to show the IAEA a handwritten document pertaining to an offer made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary to assist Iran’s nuclear program. Iran did not provide the IAEA with any documentation concerning 500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components acquired in the mid-1990s. Additional issues: transparency of PHRC, interviewing a former head of PHRC, and Iranian denial of the existence of a Green Salt Project.

GOV/2006/15 (27 February 2006): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Discusses developments since November 2005 in the areas of contamination, P-1/P-2 centrifuge technology acquisition, plutonium experiments, and continued work at IR-40 in Arak. Iran requested that the IAEA remove seals applied at various facilities, all of which were involved in the enrichment process, and removed the seals in the presence of IAEA inspectors on 10 and 11 January 2006.

GOV/2005/87 (18 November 2005): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

While Iran suspended uranium enrichment through the gas centrifuge and laser programs, uranium conversion is continuing at UCF. Construction of IR-40 is continuing. Iran has provided additional documentation on the 1987 offer regarding P-1 and P-2 centrifuges but has not provided enough documentation for the IAEA on the mid-1990s offer to ensure that the centrifuge program was not conducted between 1995 and 2002.

GOV/2005/67 (2 September 2005): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Report briefly outlines Iran’s nuclear status in November 2004 and summarizes subsequent developments. Enrichment activities were renewed in August 2005 but were suspended again later that month.   Contamination and P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs continue to be major outstanding issues. Evidence supports Iran’s assertion that HEU contamination came from foreign sources, but the origin of LEU contamination is unknown. Iran has continued to withhold information concerning the centrifuge programs, and the IAEA is unable to determine the extent or duration of the programs.

GOV/2004/83 (15 November 2004): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Report offers responses to the requests of resolution GOV/2004/79 and offers details into the chronology surrounding the enrichment of uranium since 1985. Two issues that can assure the IAEA that there is no undeclared enrichment activity include resolution of the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination and P-1 and P-2 centrifuges. Also elaborates on Iran’s uranium mining programs at Saghand, Yazd, and Gchine. The report emphasizes that Iran concealed its enrichment program by denying access to the Kalaye Electric Company, moving equipment to Pars Trash, and by submitting incomplete declarations to the IAEA. From 1989 to 1993 Iran attempted to extract polonium from two bismuth targets at TRR.

GOV/2004/60 (1 September 2004): Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

This report corresponds to Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment, resolution GOV/2004/49, and inspections of nuclear program sites in June 2004. Iran claims that contamination of LEU and HEU particles found at Natanz, the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, Farayand Technique, and Pars Trash came from imported P-1 centrifuges. The IAEA questions this explanation for technical reasons. Paragraphs 47-55 discuss Iran’s suspension of uranium at PFEP Natanz. This report also has an annex which discusses “Verification Activates” related to uranium conversion and enrichment, plutonium separation, Polonium-210 production, laser enrichment, the heavy water reactor program, and finally IAEA monitoring activities. 

GOV/2004/34/Corr.1 (18 June 2004) and GOV/2004/34 (1 June 2004): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Summarizes IAEA progress in Iran from March to June 2004. Iran has suspended most enrichment work, but some private facilities are continuing production. Iran continues UF₆ generation, claiming this was not included in the suspension agreement. Iran has resisted divulging information on the origin of uranium contamination at Natanz, Kalaye, and Farayand, as well as the import, manufacture, and use of P-2 centrifuge components. IAEA also finds that Iran understated the amount and age of plutonium produced in plutonium separation experiments.

GOV/2004/11 (13 March 2004): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Summarizes IAEA progress in Iran from November 2003 to March 2004. Iran has been mostly compliant with suspending enrichment and providing documentation on facilities and material, though more information is needed in many areas. Iran has provided no information regarding the P-2 centrifuges, and the source of contamination at Kalaye and Natanz remains unresolved. Other outstanding issues are Iran’s laser isotope enrichment research and production of Polonium-210.

GOV/2003/75 (10 November 2003): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Focuses on progress made since GOV/2003/63. Declares that Iran’s existing nuclear program consists of a “practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle.” Uranium centrifuge enrichment has been in development for 18 years and laser enrichment programs for 12. Iran has not reported the processing and use of nuclear materials or facilities but pledges to do so, and claims to have adopted a policy of full disclosure.

GOV/2003/63 (26 August 2003): Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Assesses progress made on the Safeguards Treaty and establishment of an Additional Protocol with Iran since GOV/2003/40. Iran’s cooperation in providing information to the IAEA increased, but “information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental and… some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran.” Some issues regarding Iran’s enrichment program remain unresolved.

GOV/2003/40 (6 June 2003): Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

This report expands on a 17 March 2003 discussion of safeguards programs operating in Iran and further actions needed to enforce them. As of the March meeting, Iran had failed to report the import, processing, and use of uranium supplies, or the facilities where nuclear material was used, stored, or discarded. Iran subsequently supplied information on the import of some uranium supplies, but not their processing or use, and has provided design information and access only to some of its nuclear facilities.

Appendix B: Summary of U.S. National Intelligence Estimates

November 2007

The U.S. press has often mischaracterized “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” the controversial National Intelligence Estimate. The NIE found that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but manipulated the definition of weapons design and uranium enrichment to a point that diverged with technical norms and reality. 

Overt work to master uranium enrichment continues, however, to constitute the greatest technological challenge to construction of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. The Intelligence Community found with “moderate-to-high confidence” that “Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” and assessed with “high confidence” that the Islamic Republic has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate reported that the Islamic Republic halted its weapons program in 2003 because of international pressure, and found that Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit analysis rather than a rush to weaponize irrespective of political, economic, and military costs.   The Estimate did not, however, provide data to support its assertion, nor did it provide evidence to support its recommendation that a policy in which diplomats provides opportunities for Iran to achieve security, prestige, and regional influence might ameliorate Iranian excesses.

May 2005

The May 2005 Intelligence Community Estimate found with high confidence that the Islamic Republic sought to develop nuclear weapons regardless of international obligations and pressure. It projected that the Iranian government would not likely achieve a nuclear weapon before the early-to-mid 2010s, but also found that under certain circumstances, Iran could produce enough fissile material for a weapon by the end of 2010.

Appendix C: Summary of UN Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/1803: 3 March 2008

UN Security Council Resolution 1803 adds entities and persons involved in Iran’s illicit nuclear program subject to asset freezes and to voluntary restrictions on their travel by U.N. member states. In addition, the Resolution bans outright travel for five named Iranian individuals.   The Resolution suggests that Bank Melli and Bank Sedarat are involved in Iran’s proliferation activities, and calls upon U.N. member states to “exercise vigilance” over the activities of these banks, thereby giving authority to any country to ban the processing of transactions with these banks. The Resolution also gives member states the authority to inspect the cargoes of Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line when there is reason to believe that these entities are carrying goods considered contraband under Resolutions 1737 and 1747. As did the previous Resolutions, 1803 gave Iran 60 days to comply.

S/RES/1747: 24 March 2007

UN Security Council Resolution 1747 augmented UNSCR 1737 by prohibiting Iranian sale of weapons outside its territory and by calling upon international financial institutions not to offer grants, assistance, or loans to Iran unless they are for humanitarian or developmental purposes.  As did the previous Resolution, UNSCR gave Iran 60 days to comply with the provisions on suspension of uranium enrichment and heavy water projects. The Resolution calls on U.N. member states not to sell arms to Iran but does not require a ban.   UNSCR 1747 greatly expanded the number of entities and persons that were sanctioned in UNSCR 1737.   Among the most significant additional entities and persons sanctioned were: Bank Sepah; several Iranian manufacturers of equipment for the IRGC; the deputy commander of the IRGC; the Chief of the IRGC Joint Staff, the Commander of the IRGC Navy; the Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces; the Commander of the Basij (a volunteer militia under the IRGC involved in internal security); and the Commander of the IRGC “Qods Force,” – the unit of the IRGC that supports Iranian protégé movements abroad, such as Lebanese Hezbollah. In an annex, the Resolution also details and reiterates an incentive offer to Iran presented in June 2006, which would be negotiated in earnest if Iran complies with the Resolution’s demands.      

S/RES/1737: 27 December 2006

UN Security Council Resolution 1737 calls upon Iran to comply with the IAEA Board of Governors resolution (GOV/2006/14) and to suspend both uranium enrichment and all heavy water projects within 60 days. UNSCR 1737 places sanctions on Iran to stop the transfer of materials, training/knowledge, technology, and nuclear weapon delivery systems that might assist Iran’s enrichment or heavy water work, but welcomes outside assistance to help Tehran develop a peaceful nuclear project, so long as Iran first halts enrichment. UNSCR 1737 also freezes the assets of ten named Iranian entities that are involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and 12 named persons involved in those programs, including Yahya Rahim Safavi, then the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Resolution also calls on United Nations member states to disallow travel to their territories of the named persons. The Resolution was worded to not require cessation of work on the Russian-built civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr.  

S/RES/1696: 31 July 2006

UN Security Council Resolution 1696 calls “on Iran to without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14” and suspend its uranium enrichment by August 31, 2006 or face possible diplomatic and economic sanctions. 

Appendix D: Basics of Uranium Isotope Separation

The majority of elements consist of two or more isotopes, atoms that have the same number of protons but differing numbers of neutrons. The different isotopes of an element all have approximately the same chemical properties but can have quite different nuclear properties. Natural uranium has two principal isotopes, U-235 and U-238. The isotope U-235 is desirable for processes involving nuclear fission. However, U-235 represents only about 0.7 percent of natural uranium; 99.3 percent is U-238. To harness uranium for nuclear reactions, uranium must be enriched to increase the percentage of U-235. When technicians describe uranium as a certain percentage enriched, the percentage refers to the proportion of U-235.

To enrich uranium by centrifuge, technicians feed uranium into the plant, which outputs two streams. The product stream has uranium with a higher enrichment than the feed, while the tails stream consists of uranium with a lower enrichment than the feed. For example, to produce one kilogram of 4.8 percent enriched product requires 6.98 kilograms of natural uranium feed and also produces 5.98 kilogram of tails if the tails enrichment is 0.287 percent. The sum of the product and tails will equal the feed. 

Uranium hexafluoride is used in centrifuges because uranium fed into a centrifuge must be gaseous at near room temperature. Since flow through a single centrifuge is low, an enrichment plant consists of a number of centrifuges—the so-called stage—that operate in parallel. An enrichment plant consists of a number of stages connected in series. Such a series-connected group is known as a cascade. 

The portion of the cascade between the feed point and the product end is the enriching section. Since uranium has significant economic value, stages are used to reduce the enrichment of the tails produced by the enrichment plant. These stages are known as the stripping section, and are located between the feed point and the tails end. The use of a stripping section reduces significantly the amount of feed required. 

Plants must operate for a while to create the internal enrichment gradient in the plant so that the product with desired enrichment can be produced. This time is the equilibrium time, which for many enrichment processes can be long, but is shorter for a centrifuge enrichment plant. 

Appendix E: Participant Biographies 

Daniel Coats, co-chair of the Steering Committee, is a senior counsel in King & Spalding's Government Advocacy and Public Policy Practice Group. He was a member of the U.S.  House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, where he served on both the Senate Armed Services and the Senate Intelligence Committee.  He subsequently served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.  Coats was a leading voice in the Senate for military reform and transformation and an advocate of a bi-partisan approach to national security issues.  He is a former member of the Defense Policy Board, the Defense Panel on Globalization and Privatization, and the Joint Forces Command Board of Visitors.

Charles S. Robb, co-chair of the Steering Committee, is a former Governor and U.S. Senator from Virginia with service on the Armed Services, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations Committees. He spent the 1960s on active duty with the U.S. Marine Corps (including command of an infantry company in Vietnam) before receiving a law degree from the University of Virginia and a Federal Appellate Clerkship. In 2004, he was appointed by President George W. Bush as co-chairman of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and served subsequently on the Iraq Study Group. He is currently on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, the Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Board and the FBI Director’s Advisory Board.

Ashton B. Carter is chair of the International Relations, Security, and Science faculty at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.  He is also Co-Director (with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry) of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Harvard and Stanford Universities.  Dr. Carter served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during President Clinton’s first term. 

Gregory "Grog" Johnson joined the Bipartisan Policy Center as a Senior Military Fellow at the BPC in February 2008. A retired 4-star admiral, whose last military post was commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Joint Force Command, Naples, 2001-2004. He retired from active duty in December 2004.He is founder of Snow Ridge Associates,a member of the Energy Security Leadership Council, sits on the board of directors of Integrian, and is an Outside Director of CACI International.

Kenneth Katzman, a consultant to the project, is a specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service where he advises members of congress on Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A New York University Ph.D., Dr. Katzman wrote a dissertation on “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Radical Ideology despite Institutionalization in the Islamic Revolution.” His book, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was published in 1992. In 1998, he contributed several expert working papers on the ballistic missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the “Rumsfeld Commission”). He is a regular contributor to the policy website of the Abu-Dhabi-based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

Ronald Keys is an independent consultant (RK Solution Enterprises) and joined the Bipartisan Policy Center as a Senior Military Fellow at the BPC in February 2008. Gen. Keys’ last assignment was as Commander, Air Combat Command, the Air Force’s largest major command. He was responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining combat-ready forces for rapid deployment and employment for more than 1,200 aircraft, 27 wings, 17 bases and 200 operating locations worldwide with 105,000 active-duty and civilian personnel. He retired from the U.S. Air Force in 2008.General Keys holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Kansas State University and a Master’s degree in business administration from Golden Gate University.

Michael Makovsky is Foreign Policy Director of the Bipartisan Policy Center and director of this project. He was a special assistant in the Office of Secretary of Defense, 2002-2006, and worked for over a decade as a senior energy market analyst for energy trading companies and exchanges. He is author of Churchill’s Promised Land (Yale University Press, 2007) and has a PhD in diplomatic history from Harvard University, a MBA from Columbia Business School, and a BA from the University of Chicago.

Edward Morse is a Managing Director and Chief Energy Economist at Lehman Brothers. Before joining Lehman in July 2006, Morse spent seven years at Hess Energy Trading Company. For the decade before that he was publisher of Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and other industry newsletters as well as CEO of Energy Intelligence Group. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University, where he taught for six years before joining the senior research staff at the Council on Foreign Relations. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, Morse was Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Energy Policy and represented the United States at the International Energy Agency.

Stephen Rademaker is Senior Counsel to BGR Holding, LLC. He served previously as Policy Director for National Security Affairs and Senior Counsel to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist. From 2002 to 2006 he was an Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for arms control and non-proliferation. From 1993 to 2002 he held various staff positions in the U.S. House of Representatives. He also has served as General Counsel of the Peace Corps, Associate Counsel to the President in the Office of Counsel to the President, and as Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council.

Dennis Ross is The Washington Institute's counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow. Ambassador Ross was U.S. point man on the peace process in both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. Prior to his service as special Middle East coordinator under President Clinton, Ambassador Ross served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff during the George H. W. Bush administration.

Michael Rubin, drafter of this report, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School. He also edits the Middle East Quarterly. He is co-author, with Patrick Clawson, of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave, 2005). In 1999, Rubin received his Ph.D. in history with a focus on Iranian history from Yale University.

Henry Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. From 1989 to 1993, he served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, prior to which he was Senior Military Legislative Aide to Senator Dan Quayle.

Chuck Wald, is Vice President – International for L-3 Communications, a retired four-star general, a current board member of the Bipartisan Policy Center and former Senior Military Advisor at the BPC. General Wald was the Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command, 2002 to 2006, when he retired from active duty. His prior assignment was air commander of U.S. Central Command, when he headed the allied air campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. He has combat time as an O-2A forward air controller in Vietnam and as an F-16 pilot over Bosnia. Other duties include Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations at the Pentagon, Chief of the U.S. Air Force Combat Terrorism Center, and director of Strategic Planning and Policy at the U.S. Air Force headquarters.

Kenneth R. Weinstein is CEO of Hudson Institute, the international strategic policy research organization based in Washington, DC.  Weinstein, who directs the institute’s research, project management, and outreach, writes on American foreign policy and strategy, has published op-eds and articles in such major publications as the Wall Street Journal, Le Figaro and the Asahi Shimbun. He holds a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University. In 2006, he was awarded an honorary knighthood by the French government as a Chevalier of Arts and Letters for his work promoting improved U.S.-French relations.