November 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2023

A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not. Independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles stated that data from its October 17-22, 2023, telephone survey indicates that respondents who are “consistent” supporters of the war - those who expressed support for the war, do not support a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and think that Russia should prioritize military spending - decreased from 22 percent to 12 percent between February 2023 and October 2023. Chronicles stated that 40 percent of respondents supported a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and that this number has remained consistent at about 39 to 40 percent throughout 2023. Chronicles stated that 33 percent of respondents did not support a Russian withdrawal and favored a continuation of the war and noted that this number has been consistently decreasing from 47 percent in February 2023 and 39 percent in July 2023. Recent polling by the independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published on October 31 indicated that 55 percent of respondents believed that Russia should begin peace negotiations whereas 38 percent favored continuing the war.

The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts. Relatives of mobilized personnel continue making widespread complaints and appeals for aid for mobilized personnel despite reported Russian efforts to censor such complaints. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 29 that Russians have sent over 180,000 complaints about issues concerning the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian Presidential Office for Working with Citizens’ Appeals since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The majority of these complaints reportedly concern payments to soldiers, mobilization status, missing persons, and poor medical care. The Kremlin has also been capitalizing on recent ethnic tensions in Russia to support ongoing force generation measures and appeal to Russian ultranationalists, establishing a cycle that keeps these tensions at the forefront of ultranationalist dialogue. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that protest activity and social tension are increasing in Russia, particularly in western Russia, due to the war in Ukraine and that the top echelons of Russian leadership are discussing these tensions. The GUR noted that increasing crime, alcohol abuse, inflation, and high consumer goods prices also contribute to rising social tensions, and many of these factors are likely exacerbated by the continued Russian war in Ukraine. The Kremlin has consistently failed to place Russian society on a wartime footing to support the Russian war effort, and the shifting poll numbers and exacerbated social tensions indicate that this failure is having a tangible effect on Russian society ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

The Kremlin is likely concerned about how changing Russian perceptions of the Russian war in Ukraine will affect the outcome of the March 2024 Russian presidential election and is implementing measures to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actual electoral support does not rest on Russian battlefield successes. Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly center his presidential campaign on Russia’s alleged domestic stability and increased criticism of the West instead of focusing on the war. Putin and other Russian government officials have already signaled their intention to intensify censorship efforts by claiming that some Russian citizens who left Russia and others still in Russia have begun efforts to discredit the upcoming Russian presidential elections and that Russia will do “everything necessary” to prevent election meddling. Russian authorities have also attempted to consolidate control over the Russian information space and have intensified measures encouraging self-censorship. Russian milbloggers suggested that Russian political officials financing Telegram channels ordered milbloggers to cease debates and criticisms about the Russian military prior to the Russian presidential elections. The Kremlin has likely attempted to shore up popular support for Putin throughout Russia by establishing a network of “proxies” to campaign on Putin’s behalf.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov confirmed on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14. Putin will likely use the tandem event to roll out his still unannounced presidential campaign following the official start of the Russian presidential campaign season on December 13.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably did not promote Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations during his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in North Macedonia on November 30, and instead promoted escalatory rhetoric about Moldova. Lavrov claimed that the OSCE is turning into an appendage of NATO and the European Union (EU) and said that the organization is "on the brink of an abyss.” Lavrov’s speech notably did not include a long-standing Russian information operation aimed at portraying Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine. Lavrov previously claimed on November 27 that the West is currently trying to "freeze" the war to gain time and rearm Ukraine for future attacks on Russia. The OSCE is meant to serve as a neutral platform in negotiations, among other functions, and would have provided an appropriate diplomatic forum for Lavrov to promote negotiations with the West, but Lavrov notably made no such overture. Russia previously weaponized the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to support Russian information operations to obfuscate Russia’s participation in its initial hybrid war against Ukraine, which Russia began in 2014, and to support Russian operations. Russian forces reportedly commandeered OSCE off-road vehicles to support Russian combat operations in Luhansk Oblast in January 2023. Lavrov’s criticism of the OSCE reflects Russia’s continuing unwillingness to engage in serious cooperation with the OSCE that would be necessary to start meaningful negotiations. Lavrov used his speech to threaten Moldova by claiming that it would become the “next victim in the West’s hybrid war against Russia.”

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov also argued that negotiations with Ukraine would be disadvantageous to Russia on November 29 due to Russia’s more "strategically and economically advantageous position.” Kadyrov claimed that Russia must make Ukraine’s leadership surrender. Kadyrov does not speak for the Kremlin, but his statement reflects a wider shift in Russian rhetoric portraying a pause in Russian offensive operations as detrimental to the prospects for a Russian victory in Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted multiple series of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine that struck civilian infrastructure on November 29 and 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched eight S-300 missiles and 20 Shahed-131/136 drones on the night of November 29-30. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces downed 14 of the drones. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed the first wave of Shahed drones over Odesa Oblast and that Russian forces then launched drones in several directions towards northern and western Ukraine, including Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ihnat continued to praise the work of Ukrainian mobile fire groups in shooting down Russian drones. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that a Russian drone damaged a historic preserved building in Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated that S-300 missiles struck residential buildings and police departments in Pokrovsk, Novohrodivka, and Myrnohrad in Donetsk Oblast. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on November 29 that there were several explosions near the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant within a 20-minute period and warned that several nuclear sites in Ukraine are exposed to Russian strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched seven Shahed drones during the day on November 30 and that Ukrainian forces shot down five of the drones.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian military bureaucracy is impeding Russian drone usage and acquisition among Russian forces operating on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) warehouses storing various types of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment are full despite drone shortages among Russian forces operating on the left bank of Kherson Oblast. The milblogger claimed that Russian authorities are not interested in reading through applications and filling out the paperwork associated with sending new drones to the frontline. The milblogger also complained that Russian personnel have to “go through seven circles of hell” in order to request a replacement drone. Another prominent milblogger outlined the seven pieces of information that Russian units need to submit to the Russian military to record the destruction of a drone and request a replacement, which include proving that the drone had been destroyed during normal weather conditions and that Russian forces were not using electronic warfare systems at the time of the drone’s destruction. Other Russian milbloggers recently complained on November 25 that military bureaucracy at the brigade and division level is preventing Russian frontline soldiers from applying for drones directly from the MoD. ISW has previously reported that Russian milbloggers have complained about various problems among Russian forces operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but has observed that these alleged problems do not necessarily translate into significant battlefield effects. The founder of a Ukrainian drone company, Maksym Sheremet, told Forbes Ukraine in an article published on November 29 that Russian companies manufacture approximately 300,000 first-person viewer (FPV) drones per month.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) was reportedly involved in an explosion that caused disruptions on a section of the East Siberian Railway connecting Russia and China on the night of November 29. Russian Railways and the East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office stated that a freight train caught fire in the Severomuysky Tunnel on the Itykit-Okusikan section of the East Siberian Railway in the Republic of Buryatia on the night of November 29. Russian Railways stated that the fire did not interrupt train traffic, but Russian opposition outlet Baza stated that 10 trains were delayed. Baza reported that two railway cars carrying diesel fuel detonated, igniting six total railway cars. Several Ukrainian outlets reported that Ukrainian intelligence sources stated that four explosive devices detonated on the railway as part of an SBU operation and that the railway line, which is the only major railway line between Russia and China and is used to transport military supplies, is “paralyzed.” Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Russia uses the railway to transport weapons from North Korea. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that disruptions in railway lines in Russia are becoming more frequent and are causing serious logistics complications due to the resulting delays.

The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic slow-burn effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State structure. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Belarusian Ministry of Economy agreed to a new package of Union State integration measures for 2024-2026 to advance the Kremlin’s effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State on November 29. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely sign the integration package during an upcoming Union State Supreme State Council meeting, possibly in 2024. Lukashenko has previously resisted the Kremlin’s efforts to further integrate Belarus into the Union State, although recent events, including the death of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the collapse of the June 24, 2023 agreement between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko that gave Wagner sanctuary in Belarus, have likely degraded Lukashenko’s ability to resist further Union State integration efforts. Lukashenko recently portrayed himself as the guarantor of Belarusian statehood ahead of Belarusian parliamentary elections in 2024 and presidential elections in 2025, stating on November 10 that incoming young Belarusian leaders should ascend to office with the goal of “saving the country [Belarus].”

Key Takeaways:

• A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not.
• The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts.
• The Kremlin is likely concerned about how changing Russian perceptions of the Russian war in Ukraine will affect the outcome of the March 2024 Russian presidential election and is implementing measures to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actual electoral support does not rest on Russian battlefield successes.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov confirmed on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably did not promote Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations during his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in North Macedonia on November 30, and instead promoted escalatory rhetoric about Moldova.
• Russian forces conducted multiple series of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine that struck civilian infrastructure on November 29 and 30.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian military bureaucracy is impeding Russian drone usage and acquisition among Russian forces operating on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank.
• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) was reportedly involved in an explosion that caused disruptions on a section of the East Siberian Railway connecting Russia and China on the night of November 29.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic slow-burn effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State structure.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
• A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian authorities’ plan to form two tank battalions in about four months using equipment from two long-term weapons and equipment stores indicates a lack of combat-ready weapons and military equipment.
• Occupation and Russian government officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2023

The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) are refusing to conduct assaults on Ukrainian positions due to a lack of artillery coordination, tactical intelligence transmission, and proper communication about the location of Russian minefields.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that maps of the Russian minefields are classified and that Russian commanders have not properly coordinated with assault units about the locations of these minefields, leading to 50 casualties among elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in the last month.[2] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry brigade arrived in the Krynky area in early October 2023 and appear to have taken over responsibility for the immediate Krynky area from elements of the newly created 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) following the start of Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of the Dnipro in mid-October 2023.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 18th CAA’s 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is currently operating in Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[4] Additional elements of the 18th CAA and the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly hold positions in near rear areas on the east bank, and the joint command of these formations is likely overseeing much of the current Russian response to the Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.[5] The reported minefield incident suggests that the command of the 18th CAA did not share relevant tactical details with the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s command, suggesting that higher-level Russian commanders responsible for the defense of the east bank have yet to remedy this failure in coordination.

The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and 177th Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla) transferred to the Kherson direction likely after sustaining heavy casualties defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast in the summer of 2023.[6] The majority of the 7th VDV Division’s combat elements are currently still defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast, although the 7th VDV’s 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) and 104th Separate Tank Battalion are reportedly operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[7] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one of its brigades to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[8] The newly created 18th CAA’s 70th Motorized Rifle Division and 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) are operating on the east bank.[9] Elements of the newly created 104th VDV Division’s 328th VDV Regiment are reportedly defending in the Krynky area, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that additional elements of the 104th VDV Division are currently deploying to the Kherson direction.[10] ISW previously observed elements of the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) operating on the left bank in July 2023, and November 28 reports of 14th Army Corps Deputy Commander Major General Vladimir Zavadsky’s death in the Kherson direction suggests that these elements may still be in the area.[11] Elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) reportedly transferred from the Kupyansk direction to Kherson Oblast in early October and may be defending on the east bank.[12]

The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, therefore, appears to be comprised of elements of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, the Southern Military District, the Central Military District, the Northern Fleet, and the VDV. Russia’s other grouping of forces in Ukraine largely correspond with Russia’s military districts reinforced in some cases with VDV units, making the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces a notable aberration. The unnamed force grouping in charge of the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast is primarily comprised of elements of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) reinforced with elements of several VDV regiments but has not suffered any of the apparent coordination issues that the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces has faced. The Russian military command should be able to form groupings of forces interchangeably between formations from different military districts and combined arms armies. Persistent Russian issues with sharing situational awareness between units and creating common operating pictures and coherent command structures throughout Ukraine have likely incentivized the creation of groupings of forces comprised of formations and units largely from the same military districts as mitigations.[13] The recent arrival of likely degraded, understaffed, and undertrained Russian elements to the Kherson direction and their immediate commitment to defensive operations has likely further complicated Russian efforts to create a coherent command structure for the disparate elements of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces.[14] The Russian military command appointed VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander on October 29, 2023, and one of Teplinsky’s main objectives is likely to establish a more unified command for the grouping.[15] The Russian military command is unlikely to remedy the “Dnepr” Grouping of Force’s command issues in the short term, however, and the continuation of Ukrainian ground operations on the left bank will likely only complicate these efforts. It is not yet clear if the command-and-control challenges facing Russian forces in Kherson will generate notable battlefield effects.

Russian forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 28 to 29. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 29 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59 missiles, primarily targeting Khmelnytskyi City, and 21 Shahed-131/-136 drones at targets in Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian air defenses destroyed two of the three Kh-59s and all of the Shahed drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that the third Kh-59 missile did not reach its target.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff later reported that Russian forces also launched a Kh-31 missile and two S-300 missiles targeting civilian infrastructure in an unspecified location.[18] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces are flying drones over riverbeds and highways to avoid Ukrainian mobile fire groups that have deployed throughout Ukraine.[19]

Russian authorities plan to extend criminal liability for crimes against the law on military service to participants in volunteer formations, a measure that would impact many irregular military formations and personnel on which the Russian military relies for manpower in Ukraine. Russian media reported on November 29 that the Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading extending criminal liability for crimes against regular military service to volunteer servicemen.[20] Russian volunteer servicemen are currently exempt from existing legislation that holds Russian conscripts, contract servicemen, and reservists liable for crimes committed while performing combat missions. The new bill empowers Russian military courts to try volunteer servicemen for select crimes including desertion, failure to comply with an order, resistance to or violent actions against a superior, unauthorized leaving of a place of service, evasion of duties by feigning illness, and intentional or accidental destruction, damage, or loss of military property. Russian senators previously called for the introduction of criminal penalties for volunteer servicemen for “improper performance of their contractual duties” and desertion.[21] This legislation may impact the Kremlin’s ongoing volunteer recruitment efforts if the threat of criminal liabilities outweighs incentives for volunteer service such as high salaries and additional social benefits.[22]

Russian officials proposed laws that would restrict the actions of foreign citizens in Russia, likely to support continued efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Russian Duma deputies Alexei Zhuravlev, Mikhail Matveev, and Dmitri Kuznetsov proposed a bill that would consider migration violations an aggravating circumstance in a criminal offense.[23] Zhuravlev, Matveev and Kuznetsov cited figures that Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin released on September 25 claiming that the number of serious crimes that foreign citizens committed in Russia increased by 32 percent from 2022 to 2023.[24] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on November 28 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) proposed a bill that would require all foreigners entering Russia to sign a ”loyalty agreement” banning them from discrediting Russian domestic and foreign policy, denying Russian family values, or “disrespecting the diversity of regional and ethnocultural ways of life” in Russia among other restrictions.[25] The proposed measures likely seek to increase Russian law enforcement’s ability to investigate and arrest migrants with foreign citizenship as part of an effort to coerce them into Russian military service. Russian authorities are also continuing efforts to coerce migrants with Russian citizenship into the Russian military by threatening to revoke their citizenship and forcibly issuing them military summonses.[26]

The NATO–Ukraine Council (NUC) met at the foreign minister-level for the first time on November 29 and discussed steps to increase weapons and ammunition production. NATO reported that it is developing a roadmap for full Ukrainian interoperability with NATO and reaffirmed its support for Ukraine’s democratic and security sector reforms “on its path toward future membership in NATO.”[27] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that the NUC discussed increasing the production of weapons and ammunition and noted on the sidelines of the NUC that the European Union (EU) has provided Ukraine with 300,000 rounds of ammunition of the promised 1 million.[28]

Poland is reportedly considering sending military advisors to Finland in response to Russia's ongoing attempts to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish-Russian border as part of a known Russian hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU. Polish Secretary of State and Head of the Polish National Security Bureau Jacek Siewiera stated on November 28 that during Finnish President Sauli Niinistö's official visit to Poland, Niinistö requested "allied support" against the hybrid Russian attack on the Finnish border.[29] Siewiera reported that Poland intends to respond to the request by sending a team of military advisors to Finland to provide "on-site knowledge on border security" and other unspecified operational support.[30] Finnish authorities announced on November 28 that Finland will close the last open border checkpoint at midnight on November 30 until at least December 13, following Russia's artificial creation of a migrant crisis on the Finnish border that started on November 18.[31] Russian sources, including Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, responded negatively to Siewiera's announcement and claimed that it is "excessive" and meant to prepare Finland for a confrontation against Russia in the Arctic.[32] Poland has experienced the impacts of Russian hybrid warfare firsthand on its borders from a Russian-orchestrated migrant crisis on the Poland-Belarus border in fall of 2021, and Finland likely seeks to leverage Poland's knowledge of such crises to address the current situation on the Finnish border.[33] Poland and Finland both belong to a number of military, political, economic, and diplomatic organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) formally announced Russia’s termination of a nuclear reduction pact with Japan on November 28.[34] The Russian MFA stated that the bilateral agreement with Japan on cooperation in nuclear weapons reduction, initially signed in 1993, will terminate on May 21, 2024, six months after Russia’s formal notification of termination.[35] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on November 9 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order approving Russia’s termination of the bilateral agreement with Japan.[36] Japanese news outlet the Japan Times reported that the agreement allowed Japan to support the decommissioning of weapons, including Russian nuclear submarines.[37] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia is withdrawing from the agreement against the backdrop of ”the openly anti-Russian policy of [Japanese Prime Minister Fumio] Kushida’s administration” including Japanese sanctions against Russia and alleged increasing Japanese military activity near the Japanese-Russian border.[38] The Japan Times also noted that Russia has withdrawn from several other bilateral negotiations and initiatives following the imposition of Japanese sanctions against Russia after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[39]

Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)'s Central Asian service Radio Azattyk reported on November 28 that a Kazakh court sentenced Kazakh citizen Alexei Shompolov to six years and eight months in prison on charges of mercenarism.[40] Shompolov reportedly fought in a Wagner Group artillery unit near Bakhmut.[41] Shompolov's case represents the second charge of mercenarism pursued by a Central Asian country against a combatant who fought for Russia in Ukraine—an Uzbek court similarly sentenced an Uzbek man who fought with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) troops in Ukraine in 2014–2015 on October 31.[42] Russian milbloggers responded to Shompolov's sentencing by criticizing Kazakh leadership for taking an "anti-Russian" stance and questioned if Kazakh authorities would similarly charge Kazakh citizens who fought in the Ukrainian army.[43] Russia's continued insistence on leveraging Central Asian populations for force-generation purposes, both within Central Asian countries and in Central Asian migrant communities in Russia itself, is likely to create friction between Russia and its neighbors as Central Asian countries use mercenarism laws to punish residents who fought for Russia.[44]

Adam Kadyrov, younger son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, will reportedly “oversee” the newly formed “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalion in a new unspecified position, possibly further indicating Ramzan Kadyrov’s desire for Adam to succeed him as head of Chechnya. Chechen Republic Parliament Deputy Magomed Daudov claimed on November 29 that Adam will “oversee” the battalion but did not provide additional information regarding Adam’s official title, although the role may be more ceremonial than combat- or command-oriented given Adam’s age.[45] Daudov stated that Adam also received the star of the “Sheikh Mansur” Battalion award. Ramzan Kadyrov has previously appeared increasingly favorable to Adam in recent months, including appointing Adam to a prominent yet unspecified “important position” in the Chechen secret service.[46]

Key Takeaways:

• The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities.
• The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure.
• Russian authorities plan to extend criminal liability for crimes against the law on military service to participants in volunteer formations, a measure that would impact many irregular military formations and personnel on which the Russian military relies for manpower in Ukraine.
• Russian officials proposed laws that would restrict the actions of foreign citizens in Russia, likely to support continued efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• The NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) met at the foreign minister-level for the first time on November 29 and discussed steps to increase weapons and ammunition production.
• Poland is reportedly considering sending military advisors to Finland in response to Russia's ongoing attempts to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish-Russian border as part of a known Russian hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU.
• The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) formally announced Russia’s termination of a nuclear reduction pact with Japan on November 28.
• Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors.
• Adam Kadyrov, younger son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, will reportedly “oversee” the newly formed “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalion in a new unspecified position, possibly further indicating Ramzan Kadyrov’s desire for Adam to succeed him as head of Chechnya.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
• Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky proposed a bill on November 28 that would grant war correspondents "combat veteran" status and associated social support benefits.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to erase Ukrainian culture and identity in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 28, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated a two-part conception of Russian identity in a speech on November 28: a “Russian nation” – claimed to include Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians – at the center of Russian identity; and a wider “Russian world” including other non-East Slavic ethnicities in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire. Putin made a lengthy speech on Russian identity at the World Russian People’s Council on November 28. Putin reiterated his previous false claims that the “Russian nation” and people are composed of ethnic Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians who were artificially and violently divided via policy miscalculations during and after the fall of the Soviet Union, arguing Russia (the state) should unify this “Russian nation.”[1] Putin defined the concept of the Russkiy Mir as a union of people who feel a spiritual connection to the “Motherland,” consider themselves to be native Russian speakers, and are carriers of Russian history and culture regardless of their national or religious affiliation. Putin, however, pointed out that there cannot be Russia (as a state) or the Russkiy Mir without ethnic Russians and implied that current Russian citizens and “all other peoples who have lived and are living in [Russia]” make up Russia. Putin geographically defined the Russkiy Mir as the Ancient Rus’ (Kyivan Rus), the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation, indicating that the Kremlin’s concept likely also includes “Russian compatriots” in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Putin also expanded his definition of “Western Russophobia” to include claimed aggression against other ethnicities such as Tatars, Chechens, Yakuts, and Buryats, in addition to ethnic Russians. Putin also called on Russian federal subjects to strengthen and protect Russia’s cultural and religious diversity. Putin previously outlined similar definitions of “ethnically Russian people” in his “Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay in July 2021.[2] Putin’s November 28 speech draws a clear distinction between Putin’s vision of the Russian nation as a “triune people“ composed of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, while other regional identities in Russia make up Russia as a country and shared “Russian world.“ Putin’s articulation of a Russian nation (including Ukrainians and dominated by Moscow) reiterates longstanding Kremlin justifications for its invasion of Ukraine and aggression toward its neighbors, and Putin’s claim that “western Russophobia” affects all the ethnicities in the Russian state is likely intended to rally support among Russian citizens who are not ethnically Russian for Putin’s war.

Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia needs to “significantly adjust” its migration policies for the “preservation of Russian culture,” highlighting the perceived superiority of ethnic Russians to other regional ethnicities. Kirill argued during a speech at the World Russian People’s Council on November 28 that Russia’s current migration policies allow self-segregated migrant communities in Russia to create “closed ethnic enclaves” that “are a breeding ground for corruption, organized ethnic crime, illegal migration, terrorism, extremism, and tension within Russian society.”[3] Kirill stated that a migrant’s economic productivity or Russian citizenship does not free them from the requirement to respect Russian society, people, and traditions. Kirill warned that migrants are “changing the appearance of Russian cities” and “deforming” Russia’s singular linguistic, cultural, and legal traditions. Kirill added that Russian companies’ profits cannot be more important than the values of the Russian state. Kirill’s remarks follow several weeks of increasingly frequent anti-migrant rhetoric within Russian society and presentations of anti-migrant legislation by Russian officials.[4] Patriarch Kirill’s anti-migrant and xenophobic rhetoric is more closely aligned with Russian government policies towards migrants and non-Russian ethnicities in Russia than Putin’s claimed inclusivity under the ”Russian world.”

Russian officials appear to be attempting to further disenfranchise migrants living in Russia, likely to support ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into military service while also appeasing increasingly xenophobic Russian ultranationalists. Kremlin news wire TASS reported on November 28 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) drafted a proposed bill that would create a “controlled stay” regime in Russia for migrants who do not have legal grounds for staying in the country, including those with expired or nullified migration documents and those who have illegally entered Russia.[5] The bill will reportedly propose the following restrictions on migrants in Russia on the controlled stay regime: a ban on the migrants’ ability to register legal entities and as individual entrepreneurs, engage in real estate transactions, purchase and sell vehicles, drive a car, obtain a driver’s license, open a bank account, transfer money, or get married.[6] The draft bill will reportedly require migrants living under the regime to notify authorities about their residence and travel from Russia and will subject migrants who violate the restrictions to deportation or detention in a special facility.[7]

The restrictions of the proposed migration status likely aim to further alienate large numbers of migrants from economic and social life in Russia and make military service one of the few avenues for remaining in the country. Russian authorities are engaged in an ongoing widespread effort to coerce both migrants and naturalized Russian citizens into signing military contracts by threatening deportation and loss of citizenship.[8] Russian authorities are also engaged in a parallel effort to compel migrants to fight in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship.[9] The proposed bill also likely aims to appease Russian ultranationalists who have increasingly called for harsh crackdowns on migrant communities and have bemoaned Russian migration policies.[10] One Russian ultranationalist called the restrictions half-measures and urged Russian authorities to enact even more restrictive policies on migrants.[11] The Kremlin appears to be continuing to struggle to reconcile efforts to increase Russian industrial capacity while also coercing migrants into military service and disincentivizing them from working in Russia.[12] Efforts to appease Russian ultranationalists may explain the increasingly inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies concerning the coercion of migrants into military service and the growing strains on the Russian domestic labor force.[13]

The Kremlin continues to focus heavily on setting informational conditions for the upcoming 2024 Russian presidential elections and will likely formally commence Putin’s “campaign” on December 14. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 28 that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko held a closed meeting in November 2023 with the heads of occupation administrations and unspecified Russian federal subjects during which he delivered directives for strengthening preparations for elections.[14] These directives reportedly include allocating social assistance to voters from regional budgets and the intensifying rhetoric about supposed positive trends in the Russian economy.[15] This reported focus on economic well-being is consistent with previous reports that the Kremlin intends to downplay the Russian war in Ukraine ahead of the elections.[16] Kiriyenko reportedly ordered occupation heads to issue Russian passports to 85 percent of residents in occupied Ukraine before the presidential elections in March 2024, likely to support efforts to falsely claim large voter turnout and legitimize the Kremlin’s control of occupied territories.[17] Russian Communist Party Head Gennady Zyuganov stated on November 28 that the Russian Federation Council will officially announce the start of the Russian presidential campaign on December 13, 2023.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the official start of the campaign on December 13 further suggests that the Kremlin plans to use the tandem event as the rollout for Putin’s presidential campaign.[19]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 28 that unspecified actors poisoned GUR Head Kyrylo Budanov’s wife Marianna Budanova.[20] Yusov stated that Budanova is currently undergoing treatment and could not confirm or deny reports of the poisoning of GUR employees.[21] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing unspecified sources, that unspecified actors also poisoned other GUR employees who are now undergoing treatment.[22] An unspecified Ukrainian special services official told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine that Budanov had not been poisoned.[23]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law significantly increasing Russian federal expenditures in 2024, reportedly including a record level of defense spending. Putin signed the law on the 2024 federal budget and the planned budgets for 2025 and 2026 on November 27.[24] The 2024 federal budget accounts for 36.66 trillion rubles ($412.5 billion) in state expenses and a budget deficit of 1.6 trillion rubles ($9.5 billion).[25] The Russian Finance Ministry estimated in October 2023 that 2023 budget expenditures amounted to 32.5 trillion rubles ($365.7 billion), suggesting that the 2024 budget will account for a roughly 13 percent increase in overall expenditures.[26] Russian business journalists Farida Rustamova and Maksim Tovkalyo stated on November 15 that Russian authorities plan to spend 14 trillion rubles ($157.5 billion) on defense and law enforcement, representing 39 percent of all federal government spending.[27] Reuters reported on October 2 that the 2024 budget would allocate 10.78 trillion rubles ($121.3 billion) to national defense, representing 29.4 percent of the national budget.[28] The Russian Finance Ministry reportedly allocated 6.41 trillion rubles ($72.1 billion) to defense in 2023, although this number is likely higher given that a substantial portion of the Russian federal budget is still classified.[29] The roughly third or more of the federal budget going to defense spending, if true, will represent a record level of Russian defense spending.[30] The federal budget does not amount to the entirety of Russian spending on defense, however, as the Kremlin has relied on regional budgets and private business entities to augment funding for the ongoing war effort.[31] The draft budgets for 2025 and 2026 have roughly just as large expenditures as the 2024 budget, 34.38 trillion rubles ($387.9 billion) and 35.59 trillion rubles ($400.4 billion) respectively, and suggests that the Kremlin is planning to allocate large portions of its expenditures to support a long war effort in Ukraine.[32]

A prominent Russian milblogger continued to highlight mid-level command problems among Russian forces operating on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities and the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian personnel in smaller units such as the 1822nd Battalion did not know their commanding officers or details about their supervisory structure “for a long time.”[33] The Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified company commanders in the 1822nd Battalion continually ordered units to capture islands in the Dnipro River Delta despite suffering heavy losses and conducting minimal casualty evacuations and that the 1822nd Battalion’s personnel could not contact a higher-level commander to address their complaints.[34] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command ordered elements of the 1822nd Battalion to capture islands in the Dnipro River as a punishment while contract soldiers remain on the east bank, suggesting that the 1822nd is mainly staffed with mobilized personnel.[35] The milblogger claimed that ”respected authorities” are investigating problems in the 1822nd Battalion and that mid-level Russian commanders are attempting to identify the personnel who originally voiced their complaints.[36] The milblogger concluded that Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “inherited a difficult legacy” in reference to persistent problems among Russian forces operating in the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[37]

A Russian insider source claimed on November 28 that Russian authorities detained at least three additional Moscow-based Federal Security Service (FSB) employees in connection with a 5-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribery case. The insider source claimed that Russian authorities detained “Ushakov” and two unnamed “Directorate M” employees.[38] The source claimed that Russian authorities are also holding two of the FSB’s “Directorate T” employees in a pre-trial detention center and are investigating other senior FSB employees as part of the same investigation. ISW reported on November 17 that Russian authorities detained several FSB employees on November 10 and 16 for accepting a bribe to dismiss a corruption case against the Merlion Group of Companies, a Russian IT company and technology distributor.[39] ISW cannot confirm the most recent detentions, but they are consistent with the previously reported detentions.

Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Mehdi Farhi announced on November 28 that Russia and Iran finalized the purchase of Russian aircraft.[40] Iranian news agency Tasnim, citing Farhi, reported that Russia will provide Iran with an unspecified number of Su-35 fighter jets, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Yak-130 combat training aircraft. Iranian media and the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technology reported in early September that the Iranian Air Force had received Russian Yak-130s based on social media footage.[41] Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty observed that Iran last bought foreign aircraft from the Soviet Union in 1990.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated a two-part conception of Russian identity in a speech on November 28: a “Russian nation” – claimed to include Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians – at the center of Russian identity; and a wider ‘Russian world” including other non-East Slavic ethnicities in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.
• Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia needs to “significantly adjust” its migration policies for the “preservation of Russian culture,” highlighting the perceived superiority of ethnic Russians to other regional ethnicities.
• Russian officials appear to be attempting to further disenfranchise migrants living in Russia, likely to support ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into military service while also appeasing increasingly xenophobic Russian ultranationalists.
• The Kremlin continues to focus heavily on setting informational conditions for the upcoming 2024 Russian presidential elections and will likely formally commence Putin’s “campaign” on December 14.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 28 that unspecified actors poisoned GUR Head Kyrylo Budanov’s wife Marianna Budanova.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law significantly increasing Russian federal expenditures in 2024, reportedly including a record level of defense spending.
• A prominent Russian milblogger continued to highlight mid-level command problems among Russian forces operating on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities and the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) on the east bank.
• A Russian insider source claimed on November 28 that Russian authorities detained at least three additional Moscow-based Federal Security Service (FSB) employees in connection with a 5-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribery case.
• Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Mehdi Farhi announced on November 28 that Russia and Iran finalized the purchase of Russian aircraft.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk and Avdiivka.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced on November 27 that Chechnya formed two new regiments and one battalion subordinated under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and an operational battalion subordinated under Rosgvardia.
• Occupation administrations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts signed an agreement to develop closer economic ties with Rostov and Voronezh oblasts on November 28.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, 2023

A cyclone in the Black Sea and southern Ukraine caused infrastructure damage in many areas of coastal southern Russia and occupied Ukraine and is impacting the tempo of military operations along the frontline in Ukraine, but has notably not stopped military activity entirely. Russian sources posted images and footage of the impact of the cyclone on civilian and transportation infrastructure in coastal areas of Krasnodar Krai, including near Sochi, Anapa, Gelendzhik, Novorossiysk, and Taupse.[i] Ukrainian and Russian sources also noted that coastal areas of occupied Crimea, occupied Kherson Oblast, and much of Odesa Oblast were heavily impacted by heavy snow and high winds, leaving large swaths of the population without electricity.[ii] The Ukrainian Navy and Ukraine's Southern Operational Command notably reported that dangerous weather in the Black Sea forced Russia to return all of its naval vessels and missile carriers to their base points.[iii] A prominent Russian milblogger warned that the threat of mines in the Black Sea will increase for both military and civilian vessels in the coming days because the storm has broken boom nets and dispersed minefields, causing mines to drift throughout the northwestern Black Sea.[iv] Several sources also reported that the storm damaged rail lines in coastal areas, which may have logistical ramifications for Russian forces in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.[v]

Despite the challenging weather conditions, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are continuing ground attacks throughout Ukraine, albeit at a slightly slower pace due to snow and resulting poor visibility. Russian milbloggers noted that heavy snow and winds have reduced visibility and complicated aerial reconnaissance and artillery correction in the Kherson direction, but noted that Ukrainian forces have taken advantage of low visibility conditions to consolidate positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[vi] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Russian forces in the Tavriisk direction (ranging from Avdiivka all the way through western Zaporizhia Oblast) have reduced artillery use by one and a half times and drone use six times due to the weather but emphasized that Russian forces continue to heavily use aviation in the Avdiivka direction.[vii] Challenging winter conditions will force both sides to rely more heavily on infantry-led ground attacks in the absence of aerial reconnaissance and artillery correction capabilities.[viii]

Key Takeaways:

• A cyclone in the Black Sea and southern Ukraine caused infrastructure damage in many areas of coastal southern Russia and occupied Ukraine and is impacting the tempo of military operations along the frontline in Ukraine, but has notably not stopped military activity entirely.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and several Russian milbloggers stated that Russia must maintain active operations in Ukraine and expressed worry over the prospect of further Western military support to Ukraine.
• Some milbloggers additionally expressed increased discontent with the perceived lack of articulated Russian war aims and stated Russia must clarify its war aims before discussing any pause or end to the war.
• Ukrainian National Defense and Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that the Kremlin has activated a network of sleeper agents in Ukraine in the past few months to destabilize Ukrainian society.
• Russia’s attempt to artificially create a migrant crisis at the Finnish border appears to be failing due to Finnish authorities’ swift response.
• The Kremlin appears to be shifting responsibility for potential future austerity measures onto Russian occupation heads and the heads of four select Russian republics.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances.
• Deputy Commander of the Russian Navy Lieutenant General Viktor Astapov confirmed on November 27 that the Russian navy is reorganizing naval infantry brigades into divisions in order to increase their combat capabilities.
• Likely Ukrainian partisans continue to target Russian occupation elements throughout occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2023

Russian forces launched the largest drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion overnight on November 24 to 25 using a new modification of the Iranian Shahed 131/136 drones.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 75 Shahed drones that mainly targeted Kyiv City from the southeast (Primorsko-Akhtarsk) and northeast (Kursk Oblast) and that Ukrainian forces shot down 74 drones.[2] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Kh-59 cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that air defenses activated in at least six regions, including Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force officials stated that mobile fire groups enabled Ukrainian forces to shoot down a significant number of drones.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky observed that Russian forces launched the drone attack on the Ukrainian remembrance day of the 1932-1933 Holodomor man-made famine.[5]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces attacked Kyiv with a new modification of Shahed drones and noted that these drones were black in color and contained a material that absorbs radar signals, making them more difficult to detect.[6] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces used “black Geran” or “Feran” (the Russian name for Shaheds) drones for the first time and claimed that these drones are more challenging to detect in the night sky.[7] Iranian media published footage on November 19 showing the Iranian Ashura Aerospace University of Science and Technology presenting the new Shahed-238 jet-powered modification of the Shahed-136 drone.[8] The presented Shahed-238 appeared to be black in color, but it is unknown if Russian forces used the Shahed-238 modification during the November 25 strike.

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to grapple with the challenges electronic warfare (EW) systems pose on the front. The Economist reported on November 23 that superior Russian EW systems are impeding Ukrainian reconnaissance, communication, and strike capabilities.[9] The Economist, citing Western experts, stated that Russia has placed a “huge focus” on producing and developing superior EW capabilities and that Ukraine is struggling to produce equivalent EW systems and EW-resistant weapons domestically. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed in his essay “Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It” that Ukrainian forces need to introduce necessary command and control (C2) processes for EW complexes, increase EW production capabilities, streamline engagements with volunteer organizations that provide smaller EW complexes to Ukrainian forces, improve Ukraine’s counter-EW measures, and develop new drones with EW in mind.[10] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 25 that it is working to develop drone variants more resistant to Russian EW systems and produce successful variants at scale.[11] Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Deputy Director of Analysis Margarita Konaev and CSET Fellow Owen Daniels reported on September 6, 2023, that Russian adaptations to the deployment of EW systems continue to present challenges for Ukrainian drones transmitting targeting information and securing Ukrainian signals.[12] Russian sources previously credited superior Russian EW capabilities for aiding Russian forces’ defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine in June 2023.[13]

Russian sources have also repeatedly expressed concerns and complaints about perceived inadequacies in Russian EW systems, however.[14] Russian sources credited superior Ukrainian EW and aerial reconnaissance systems for Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut in September 2023 and claimed that Ukrainian EW systems were significantly disrupting Russian communications in western Zaporizhia Oblast in August 2023.[15] ISW reported on November 25 that the effectiveness of Russian EW systems is inconsistent across the front, allowing the Ukrainians to continue to use drone-based reconnaissance-strike complexes to disrupt Russian offensive operations.[16] Russian milbloggers have been inconsistent in their assessments of which side has “superior” EW systems, indicating that neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has a decisive advantage over the other.[17] Western aid in support of Ukrainian efforts to destroy, disrupt, or bypass Russian EW systems would increase Ukraine’s ability to strike targets near the front precisely, disrupting Russian advances, and setting conditions for further Ukrainian offensive operations.[18]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on November 25 that Ukraine’s Western partners agreed to transfer warships to Ukraine to protect Ukraine’s grain corridor in the Black Sea.[19] Zelensky stated during a speech at the “Grain from Ukraine” conference in Kyiv that Ukraine and unspecified international partners reached an agreement to enable Ukraine to provide sea escorts for merchant ships transporting grain from Ukrainian ports in the near future. Zelensky added that Ukraine’s partners also agreed to provide “very powerful” air defense systems to defend Odesa Oblast. Zelensky noted that the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative has delivered more than 170,000 tons of grain to Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen in the past year.[20] Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Swiss President Alain Berset, and Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte also attended the conference and expressed their support for the initiative.[21]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Russia has not fulfilled arms export deals to Armenia and offered an alternative arrangement that would allow Russia to keep the weapons against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations. Pashinyan stated on November 24 that Armenia has paid Russia for arms shipments but that Russia has not delivered the weapons or returned the money to Armenia.[22] Pashinyan offered the reduction of Armenia’s outstanding debt to Russia in the amount of the arms purchase as a solution, possibly as a means to decrease Armenia‘s economic ties to Russia. The Defense Ministry of India similarly reported a delay in Russia’s delivery of an S-400 missile system due to the war in Ukraine in 2022.[23] The head of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Dmitry Shugaev, stated on August 14 that Russia will deliver the S-400 system to India on time by the end of 2024, however.[24] 

Infighting among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, likely exacerbated by ethnic tensions, has compelled a prominent milblogger to close his Telegram channel. The milblogger announced on November 25 that he is temporarily closing his Telegram channel on November 25, and another milblogger claimed that supporters of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces subordinate to Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov threatened the first milblogger’s parents and admonished the “full-time military bloggers and journalists” for making the threats.[25] The second milblogger later claimed that readers began threatening him to avoid repeating the “fate” of the first milblogger and that he will apologize “sooner or later,” and the milblogger also claimed that he is confident that Akhmat commanders are not behind the attacks but mid-level “sheep.”[26] A third milblogger responded in support of the other two milbloggers, claiming that another user offered him money to take down his post in support of the first milblogger but to “think hard” because he is a “good person.” The milblogger disdained the request as “dishonorable.”[27] The first milblogger first drew the wrath of the “public relations people of Akhmat and Kadyrov” in early November when he criticized rumors that Wagner Group personnel were transferring to Akhmat units, drawing some support from other milbloggers when the Akhmat-affiliates targeted this milblogger in a defamation campaign.[28] These attacks allegedly from supporters of Kadyrov come during a period of especially high ethnoreligious tensions in Russia and as Kadyrov is increasingly attempting to curry and display Russian Vladimir Putin’s favor.[29]

Other milbloggers attributed increased infighting among ultranationalist voices about the war in Ukraine to Russian politics and the coming 2024 Russian presidential elections. One milblogger claimed that the “war” on Telegram and in the Russian media will temporarily end as Russian political “towers” - or political officials financing Telegram channels to advance their political goals - temporarily stop feuding until after the Russian presidential elections in March 2024.[30] The milblogger claimed that the “towers” may sacrifice some overzealous “pawns” as bargaining chips and noted that milbloggers and other prominent voices will either need to stop fighting or move to the sidelines.[31] Another milblogger claimed that this infighting is the result of Russian leadership playing politics and that Russia is fighting an enemy that wants to win the war at any cost.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched the largest drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion overnight on November 24 to 25 using a new modification of the Iranian Shahed 131/136 drones.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to grapple with the challenges electronic warfare (EW) systems pose on the front.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on November 25 that Ukraine’s Western partners agreed to transfer warships to Ukraine to protect Ukraine’s grain corridor in the Black Sea.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Russia has not fulfilled arms export deals to Armenia and offered an alternative arrangement that would allow Russia to keep the weapons against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
• Infighting among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, likely exacerbated by ethnic tensions, has compelled a prominent milblogger to close his Telegram channel.
• Other milbloggers attributed increased infighting among ultranationalist voices about the war in Ukraine to Russian politics and the coming 2024 Russian presidential elections.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 25 and advanced in some areas.
• Russian military commanders are reportedly ignoring frontline units’ requests for drones.
• Ukraine’s Ministry of Reintegration reported on November 24 that over 13,500 Ukrainians returned to Ukraine from Russia via a humanitarian corridor in Sumy Oblast since its establishment in July 2023.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2023

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on November 23 that Russian forces launched a “third wave” of assaults as part of the Russia offensive operation in the Avdiivka direction, and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that this “third wave” began on November 22.[i] Shtupun reported a 25 to 30 percent increase in Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka on November 22 and stated that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian columns of roughly a dozen armored vehicles in total during assaults.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 50 Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction on November 23 and 24.[iii] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations on Avdiivka’s northern and southern flanks but did not characterize any Russian assaults as heavily mechanized.[iv] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance north of Avdiivka and made further gains in the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka but did not make any territorial claims consistent with a successful renewed large-scale Russian offensive push.[v]

Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian tanks and seven armored fighting vehicles on November 22, suggesting that Russian forces are currently conducting a smaller set of mechanized assaults than in October.[vi] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces lost 50 tanks and 100 armored vehicles in renewed assaults on Avdiivka on October 19 and 15 tanks and 33 armored vehicles during the initial large, mechanized assaults on October 10.[vii] Russian forces have lost a confirmed 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles in offensive operations near Avdiivka since October 9, and the Russian military appeared to spend the end of October and all of November preparing for a wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults to compensate for these heavy-equipment losses.[viii] Large infantry-led ground assaults will likely pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces defending in the Avdiivka direction but will not lead to a rapid Russian advance in the area.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.
• High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children.
• Ukraine’s Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia’s continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises.
• Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea.
• European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders.
• The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin’s inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance.
• Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• The Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced in some areas.
• The Russian aviation industry is likely under significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin reframed the Kremlin’s stance on the Israeli-Hamas war to a much more anti-Israel position in an attempt to demonstrate the supposed hypocrisy of Western condemnations of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Putin stated that attendees of the G20 summit who expressed shock at the continued Russian war in Ukraine should instead be “shocked” by the “bloody” 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent war that the “Kyiv regime waged against its own people” in Donbas and by the “extermination of the civilian population in Palestine, in the Gaza sector.”[1] Putin’s November 22 statement on the Israel-Hamas war referring to the “extermination of the civilian population of Palestine” was a departure from previous Kremlin framing that largely focused on calling for peace and claiming that the Israel-Hamas war will distract from the provision of Western military aid to Ukraine.[2] Putin’s November 22 framing of the Israeli-Hamas war continues to exploit that war to undermine Western support for Ukraine, as ISW has previously assessed, and also signals potentially increasing support for Iranian interests in the region and an increased willingness to antagonize Israel.[3]

Putin also reiterated boilerplate rhetoric falsely portraying Russia as willing to engage in meaningful negotiations, likely to pressure the West into prematurely pushing Ukraine to negotiate with Russia. Putin stated that the world must “think about how to stop this tragedy [the Russian-initiated war in Ukraine],” falsely signaling a willingness to engage in meaningful peace negotiations in Ukraine.[4] Putin and other Russian officials have routinely falsely claimed that the Kremlin is ready to negotiate to end the war while signaling that the Kremlin maintains its maximalist objectives, including territorial claims and regime change.[5] Kremlin officials have pushed this narrative while claiming that Ukraine is unwilling to negotiate with Russia, likely to coerce Western officials into prematurely offering concessions favorable to Russia rather than engage in meaningful, good faith negotiations.[6] Ukrainian officials have routinely expressed their willingness to negotiate with Russia as soon as Russia removes its forces from Ukraine’s internationally-recognized territory, including Donbas and Crimea.[7] ISW has observed no indications that Putin does not retain his maximalist objectives and continues to assess that a premature cessation of hostilities in Ukraine greatly increases the likelihood of renewed Russian aggression on terms far more favorable to the Kremlin in the near future.[8]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on November 21 that Iran is supplying Russia with glide bombs and that Iran may be preparing to transfer short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[9] ISW has observed Russian forces increasingly using glide bombs, particularly modified FAB-500, KAB-500, and RPK-500 aerial bombs equipped with glide bomb structures, in the Lyman and Kherson directions.[10] It is unclear whether Kirby meant that Iran is supplying Russia with glide bomb components or with fully constructed glide bombs. The Critical Threats Project (CTP)-ISW’s Iran Update reported on August 14 that Iran produces a variety of glide bombs domestically, such as the Ghaem glide bombs, Yasin long-range glide bombs, Sadid glide bombs, and Balaban glide bombs.[11] Iran commonly uses these bombs with its various drone platforms, likely including the Shahed-131/136 drones that Iran supplies to Russia. A Russian milblogger previously amplified claims that Russian Su-25 aircraft may be compatible with Iranian glide bombs.[12] Iran presented several glide bomb variants at the Russian Army-2023 Forum in Moscow in August 2023 and possibly during Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Tehran in September 2023.[13] Kirby added that Iran also continues to supply Russia with drones and artillery ammunition.[14] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on November 6 that Iran may continue to send small batches of Shahed-131/136 drones to Russia despite increased Russian efforts to produce Shahed drones domestically and Iran’s fulfillment of its first Shahed supply contracts with Russia.[15] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and Russia may conclude a drone and missile sale agreement following the expiration of UN missile restrictions against Iranian missile and missile-related technology exports on October 18, 2023.[16]

The Kremlin appears to be inexplicably concerned about the outcome of the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential elections, despite apparent widespread Russian approval of Putin. Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova stated on November 21 that some Russian citizens who left Russia and others still in Russia have already begun efforts to discredit the upcoming Russian presidential elections.[17] Pamfilova’s statement suggests that the Russian government will continue to intensify censorship efforts under the guise of fighting attempted internal election meddling ahead of the presidential elections. Putin also stated on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference at a meeting with Russian election commission representatives.[18] Two unnamed sources from Russian federal and regional authorities told Russian opposition outlet Verstka in an article published on November 22 that the Kremlin instructed Russian regional authorities to stop relatives of mobilized personnel from protesting by paying them.[19] The sources added that the Kremlin advised Russian regional governments to “make every effort” to ensure that the governments issue payments to the relatives of mobilized personnel and address other complaints about poor treatment of mobilized personnel in response to rising dissatisfaction among the relatives.[20] The sources also told Verstka that the Kremlin considers the relatives of mobilized personnel a social group that may pose one of the greatest threats to the beginning of Putin’s still unannounced presidential campaign.[21]

The Kremlin may also be concerned about a perceived lack of support for Putin from the Russian veteran community.[22] This veteran community is a subsection of the Russian ultranationalist community and has routinely argued in favor of full mobilization and continued Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, as opposed to freezing the current frontlines.[23] The Kremlin’s apparent concern about Putin’s support is odd given that the Levada Center - an independent Russian polling organization - found that 82 percent of Russians approve of Putin's performance as of October 2023.[24] The Kremlin may also want Putin to receive an even higher percentage of the vote and may be attempting to placate specific groups that vocally express dissatisfaction with Putin’s decisions.

Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin called for Russia to codify an unspecified state ideology in the Russian constitution, suggesting that some Russian officials may want to explicitly end nominal constitutional protections for civil rights, democratic pluralism, and ethnic equality. Bastrykin made the call on November 22 during a conference about the Russian constitution at the Russian Ministry of Justice in Moscow and argued that dismissing his call would not work.[25] Bastrykin previously called on Russian Constitutional Court Chairperson Valery Zorkin to look into ways of establishing an unspecified state ideology in May 2023, although Zorkin rebuffed Bastrykin by noting that the current constitution contains a set of values that protect civil society.[26]  The Russian constitution declares that Russia is a democratic state in which Russia’s multinational people should exercise power directly and that the “supreme direct expression” of that power are referendums and free elections.[27] The constitution establishes that the Russian state’s obligation is to recognize, observe, and protect human and civil rights.[28] Article 13 of the Russian constitution notably forbids Russia from proclaiming a state ideology and commits the Russian state to recognize ideological diversity, political diversity, and a multi-party system.[29] Bastrykin's calls would require Russian officials to amend or even repeal Article 13 of the Russian constitution, and possibly would require more extensive amendments depending on the potential new state ideology. Russia adopted its current constitution in 1993 and laid out codified state protections for multiethnic democratic pluralism and human and civil rights to mark a definitive break with the Soviet system of autocratic one-party ideological rule. Bastrykin, who has previously advocated for Stalinist-era domestic policies, may hope that a new ideology enshrined in the Russian constitution would further weaken or outright cancel Russia’s existing constitutional commitment to democratic pluralism and human and civil rights.[30] Bastrykin may be voicing this position on behalf of a wider group of Russian officials wishing to end these nominal constitutional projections, but the Kremlin has shown no indication that it wishes to do away with the veneer of legitimacy that these nominal constitutional protections offer.[31]

Bastrykin has yet to detail what a potential Russian state ideology should be, although the Kremlin’s support for Russian ultranationalism would likely heavily influence any potential Russian state ideology. The Kremlin has heavily courted the Russian ultranationalist community against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, a community that supports Russian imperial goals, efforts to Russify and ethnically cleanse occupied territories, and nationalist demands to protect ethnic Russian communities.[32] The focus on protecting and enforcing the Russian ethnic identity would likely be a key component of any state ideology should the Kremlin entertain Bastrykin’s calls. Bastrykin himself may have had this Russian ultranationalism in mind when he called for a state ideology given that he has heavily sought to capitalize on heightened ethnic tensions in Russia and is increasingly casting himself as a prominent anti-migration figure.[33] Bastrykin and the Russian Investigative Committee have reportedly directly engaged in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced placement of Ukrainian children into Russian military training programs — parts of a campaign to destroy Ukrainian ethnic identity and Russify Ukraine.[34] The Kremlin’s support for Russian ultranationalism is also heavily focused on promoting Russian Orthodoxy and appeals to “traditional” social values. Putin most recently signed a decree on November 22 declaring 2024 the “Year of the Family” to focus on preserving traditional family values.[35] ISW has previously assessed that the war in Ukraine is likely exacerbating an emerging identity crisis within Russian society resulting from tensions between Russian identity and Russian nationalism.[36] This crisis as well as pronounced ethnoreligious tensions will likely worsen if the ultranationalist Kremlin decides to pursue codifying a state ideology. Putin and elements of the Kremlin, highly aware of the potential for these ethnic, religious, and national tensions to prompt instability and discontent, are unlikely to support Bastrykin’s calls to codify an explicit state ideology in the short term.

Bloomberg reported on November 21 that the European Union (EU) proposed a plan to strengthen security commitments from EU member states to Ukraine.[37] Bloomberg reported, citing a draft proposal, that the EU’s proposal would build on existing bilateral agreements established within the framework of the Group of Seven’s (G7) declaration on security guarantees for Ukraine. The proposal reportedly includes mechanisms for: long-term military aid; training of Ukrainian forces; cooperation with Ukraine’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB); strengthening Ukraine’s ability to counter cyber and hybrid threats; demining assistance; support for Ukraine’s reform agenda as part of the EU accession process; assistance for Ukraine’s energy transition and nuclear safety efforts; and the sharing of intelligence and satellite imagery. EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell stated on November 13 that Ukraine is the EU’s top priority and that the EU’s commitment to Ukraine will not waiver.[38] Bloomberg reported that EU member states are expected to consider the EU’s draft proposal in December 2023.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 14 Shahed-131/136 drones that Russia launched at Ukraine.[39] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces also launched two missiles, of which one Kh-22 cruise missile fell in an unpopulated area in Zaporizhia Oblast.[40] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on November 21 that Russian forces have paused their use of cruise and ballistic missiles and began using KAB glide bombs and Kh-59 and Kh-31 missiles to conduct strikes against Ukraine.[41]

Russian milbloggers appear to be focusing renewed complaints against the Russian military command for what milbloggers perceive as poor choices that contribute to Russian casualties. Russian milbloggers expressed anger on November 21 and 22 after a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on Kumachove, Donetsk Oblast (37km southeast of Donetsk City and 61km from the frontline) allegedly killed over 25 and injured over 100 personnel of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) who were attending a concert for a Russian military holiday on November 19.[42] The milbloggers largely focused on poor security measures, criticizing the Russian command for allowing a large gathering of people within HIMARS range of the frontline in violation of operational security principles.[43] The milbloggers largely called for the Russian military to ban such events and expressed frustration that the Russian military command has not learned this lesson despite nearly two years of war and multiple instances in which publicly available information facilitated Ukrainian strikes.[44]

Though this strike does not affect the battlefield situation in Ukraine, the Russian milbloggers’ reaction to this strike reflects the Russian ultranationalist community’s continued frustration with the Russian military command’s management of the war. Russian milbloggers have recently begun to complain about the Russian military command following a period of self-censorship likely prompted by the death of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the arrests of highly critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers in summer 2023.[45] The milbloggers’ complaints have largely focused on how the Russian military command’s poor conduct of the war and poor discipline have led to poor treatment of Russian military personnel and casualties instead of focusing on the success or failure of Russian military operations. Russian milbloggers have routinely complained that the Russian military command’s orders to use "meat assaults” to push Ukrainian forces from positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast have led to extensive Russian casualties, for example.[46]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reframed the Kremlin’s stance on the Israeli-Hamas war to a much more anti-Israel position in an attempt to demonstrate the supposed hypocrisy of Western condemnations of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Putin also reiterated boilerplate rhetoric falsely portraying Russia as willing to engage in meaningful negotiations, likely to pressure the West into prematurely pushing Ukraine to negotiate with Russia.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on November 21 that Iran is supplying Russia with glide bombs and that Iran may be preparing to transfer short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.
• The Kremlin appears to be inexplicably concerned about the outcome of the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential elections, despite apparent widespread Russian approval of Putin.
• Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin called for Russia to codify an unspecified state ideology in the Russian constitution, suggesting that some Russian officials may want to explicitly end nominal constitutional protections for civil rights, democratic pluralism, and ethnic equality.
• Bastrykin has yet to detail what a potential Russian state ideology should be, although the Kremlin’s support for Russian ultranationalism would likely heavily influence any potential Russian state ideology.
• Bloomberg reported on November 21 that the European Union (EU) proposed a plan to strengthen security commitments from EU member states to Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 21 to 22.
• Russian milbloggers appear to be focusing renewed complaints against the Russian military command for what milbloggers perceive as poor choices that contribute to Russian casualties.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, northwest of Horlivka, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and advanced east of Synkivka.
• The Russian Federation Council approved the Russian 2024-2026 federal budget on November 22, and Russian officials continue to emphasize social spending over defense expenditures.
• The Russian government and occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under medical treatment schemes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2023

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct offensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine despite rainy and snowy weather conditions. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on November 20 that Russian shelling of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast had decreased due to poor weather conditions.[i] Ukrainian 14th Mechanized Brigade Spokesperson Nadiya Zamryha stated on November 21 that Russian forces continue to conduct assaults in the Kupyansk direction despite the snow and frost.[ii] Zamryha added that the number of Russian attacks will likely decrease due to weather conditions but that Russian forces will not stop offensive operations completely. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized the need to strengthen Ukrainian capabilities before the winter period during a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on November 20.[iii] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 20 and 21 that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are struggling to operate drones, including for artillery fire adjustment, in the poor weather conditions throughout the front.[iv] Russian milbloggers also claimed that muddy conditions are complicating vehicle movements but that both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to maneuver and operate in all directions.[v] ISW continues to assess that freezing weather conditions during the winter will likely prompt the resumption of more active combat operations, and ongoing rainy weather is unlikely to halt Ukrainian or Russian attacks.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian officials are struggling to subdue Russian hysteria around Ukrainian operations in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian MoD Collegium on November 21 and claimed that Russian forces prevented all Ukrainian attempts to conduct successful “amphibious operations in the Kherson direction.”[vi] Shoigu further claimed that Russian forces are inflicting “colossal” losses on Ukrainian forces.[vii] Shoigu’s statement is likely an attempt to downplay some Russian milbloggers’ concerns over Russia’s inability to decisively repel Ukrainian attacks on the east bank of the Dnipro River but is unlikely to calm the ever-growing complaints in the Russian information space.

Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge a Ukrainian presence in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and complain that Russian forces are unable to suppress Ukrainian operations in the area.[viii] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Ukrainian forces killed an entire Russian assault group near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[ix] A Russian insider source claimed on November 17 that a Ukrainian strike killed 76 Russian personnel in the 1st Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) attempting to conduct a “distraction maneuver” in Skadovskyi Raion, east bank Kherson Oblast on November 10.[x] A Russian soldier reportedly in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Krynky claimed in a video amplified on November 21 that the Russian military is forcing personnel who are still recovering from wounds to conduct assaults and that there are three Ukrainian drones for each Russian soldier operating in the Krynky area.[xi] A Russian milblogger published a letter purportedly from a Russian soldier operating near Krynky on November 21 who claimed that Russian forces in the Krynky area lack reconnaissance drones, slowing their movements and putting them at risk of Ukrainian attacks.[xii] The purported Russian soldier claimed that Russian forces in the Krynky area also lacked fire support because artillery and mortar units quickly changed locations after firing “a few shots” in order to evade counterbattery fire.[xiii] The Russian soldier claimed that his unit has practically no interaction with other Russian units operating nearby and that the Russian command headquarters in the Kherson direction devises unsuccessful plans because the headquarters receives incorrect and delayed information.[xiv] The Russian soldier also claimed that the Russian command in the Kherson direction had failed to implement changes resulting in increased Ukrainian attacks.[xv] A milblogger claimed that some Russian Telegram channels are unsuccessfully attempting to focus criticism of Russian operations in the Kherson direction toward Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[xvi] The milbloggers do not appear to be responding to Shoigu’s claims nor has ISW observed any significant changes in Kherson Oblast that would prompt these milblogger complaints.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes overnight on November 20-21 and on November 21 targeting port and civilian infrastructure, including a hospital in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-131/136 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk; one Iskander-K ballistic missile from Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea; and four S-300 missiles in the Donetsk direction on the night of November 20-21.[xvii] Ukrainian forces shot down nine Shahed drones and the Iskander missile.[xviii] Ukrainian officials reported that the overnight Russian strike hit the civilian Central City Hospital in Selydove, Donetsk Oblast; the Kotlyarevska mine in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast; and other civil infrastructure.[xix] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Russian forces also launched an unspecified number of Kh-31P medium-range supersonic anti-radiation missiles on November 21, which struck port infrastructure and administrative buildings in Odesa City and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion, Odesa Oblast.[xx]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on November 21 that the Wagner Group is preparing to provide an air defense system to either Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran.[xxi] Kirby stated that the Wagner Group would provide the system to either Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran under the Russian government’s direction but did not specify the origin or type of system.[xxii] ISW previously observed Russian claims that the Russian MoD is using the Syrian government’s agreements to supply weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah to subsume the remnants of the Wagner Group in Syria and seize their air defense systems.[xxiii]

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement has generated some discourse in the Russian information space, but most Russian milbloggers refrained from discussing Girkin’s campaign likely due to self-censorship. A Russian milblogger who previously amplified praise of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov and Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bastrykin praised Girkin’s decision to run in the 2024 Russian presidential campaign.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed that Girkin will not become president but that he may become a “[bright energetic figure] in the Russian political arena” who at best could galvanize a new healthy political opposition within Russia, but that Girkin’s decision to run is at minimum interesting.[xxv] Another milblogger who has been critical of the Russian conduct of the war amplified Girkin’s campaign announcement.[xxvi] Mainstream Russian milbloggers have largely not acknowledged Girkin since the arrest of Girkin and Andrei Kurshin, the “Moscow Calling” Telegram channel administrator who frequently amplified Girkin’s complaints, on July 21 and August 31 respectively, and are likely self-censoring to avoid a similar fate.[xxvii] Girkin’s presidential platform may provide him a chance to reenter the broader Russian information space. Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, also acknowledged Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement on November 21 and stated that she supports Girkin as his wife but that she has her own goals, including freeing Girkin from prison and supporting Russian frontline soldiers in Donbas.[xxviii] Reginskaya’s response likely reflects the risk associated with opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin and danger to her ability to secure Girkin’s release if she maintains a strong association with this opposition.

Washington, D.C.-based analytics company Gallup found that Russian society’s confidence in the Russian military has marginally decreased in 2023. Gallup observed that 75 percent of Russians interviewed in the summer of 2023 expressed confidence in the Russian military compared to 80 percent of Russians who expressed a similar opinion in the early months of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[xxix] Gallup added that Russians’ confidence in the police, financial institutions, and the judicial system has increased, however – making confidence in the Russian military the only observed decline in public trust among all surveyed age, gender, and financial status groups. Gallup concluded that the root of Russians’ waning faith may be a result of the growing disconnect between the perception of the Russian military and the political leadership, noting that confidence in the Russian military remained at around 90 percent among Russians who approve of their political leadership but decreased to 40 percent among Russians who disapprove of the Russian political leadership – the lowest approval rate since 2006. Gallup noted that overall approval of leadership in Russia remained high and stable at 68 percent, which is on par with the 66 percent approval rate in 2022. Gallup stated that the survey indicates that support for the Russian military is still high despite the five percent decline. ISW has observed some Russian milbloggers and ultranationalists express low confidence in Russian military leadership throughout the full-scale invasion, which may have impacted how certain Russians who closely monitor the progress of the war feel about trusting the Russian military.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package to Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on November 21. Pistorius announced that the package valued at 1.3 billion euros includes four IRIS-T SLM air defense systems; 20,000 155mm artillery shells, and anti-tank mines.[xxx]

The Armenian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied Russian allegations that Armenia is planning to supply Ukraine with weapons. Russian sources have recently alleged that Armenia is planning to provide Ukraine with missiles and missile launchers, and Armenian MoD Spokesperson Aram Torosyan officially denied these claims on November 21.[xxxi]

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the West of destabilizing the South Caucasus region by supplying weapons to Armenia. Aliyev claimed at the “Decolonization: Women’s Empowerment and Development” international conference in Baku on November 21 that France is arming Armenia and that this is destabilizing the South Caucasus, “encourag[ing] revanchist forces in Armenia,” and “prepar[ing] the ground for the start of new wars in [the] region.”[xxxii] Russian sources have also recently alleged that France supplied Armenia with ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers, which Ukraine had rejected due to the vehicles’ deficiencies.[xxxiii] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan previously stated on November 18 that he believes that Azerbaijan’s rhetoric indicates that Azerbaijan is organizing a new round of military activity against Armenia.[xxxiv]

A former Russian Investigative Committee departmental head who was serving sentences for accepting bribes from the Russian mafia died in prison on the night of November 20-21, allegedly by suicide. BBC Russia reported on November 21 that Russian authorities found the former head of the Department of Interdepartmental Cooperation and Internal Security of the Russian Investigative Committee, Mikhail Maksimenko, dead in a prison colony.[xxxv] A Russian law enforcement source told Russian state outlet TASS that authorities found Maksimenko’s body in a storage room in Correctional Colony 11 in Bor, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[xxxvi] Russian state outlet RBK reported that a source close to the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service stated that Maksimenko committed suicide on the night of November 20-21 in the psychiatric hospital in which he was receiving treatment following a previous suicide attempt.[xxxvii] Russian authorities sentenced Maksimenko to 13 years in prison in April 2018 for accepting a $500,000 bribe in return for his assistance in the release of Andrei Kochuykov, an assistant to Russian mafia boss Zakhary Kalashov.[xxxviii] Russian authorities also sentenced Maksimenko to 14 years in prison in March 2020 for accepting a one million dollar bribe from Russian businessman Dmitry Smychkovsky, who was also working to release Kochuykov.[xxxix] A member of Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council, Yeva Merkachyova, stated that Maksimenko’s death was “strange” and that Maksimenko had previously told her that he would not commit suicide under any circumstances.[xl] A Russian insider source claimed that Maksimenko had recently filed a petition to serve the remainder of his sentence in a correctional labor camp but that the decision-making commission instead issued a penalty on November 20 that would deny his request.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct offensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine despite rainy and snowy weather conditions.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian officials are struggling to subdue Russian hysteria around Ukrainian operations in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes overnight on November 20-21 and on November 21 targeting port and civilian infrastructure, including a hospital in Donetsk Oblast.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on November 21 that the Wagner Group is preparing to provide an air defense system to either Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran.
• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement has generated some discourse in the Russian information space, but most Russian milbloggers refrained from discussing Girkin’s campaign likely due to self-censorship.
• Washington, D.C.-based analytics company Gallup found that Russian society’s confidence in the Russian military has marginally decreased in 2023.
• German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package to Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on November 21.
• The Armenian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied Russian allegations that Armenia is planning to supply Ukraine with weapons.
• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the West of destabilizing the South Caucasus region by supplying weapons to Armenia.
• A former Russian Investigative Committee departmental head who was serving sentences for accepting bribes from the Russian mafia died in prison on the night of November 20-21, allegedly by suicide.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 21 and advanced in some areas.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on November 21 and announced the that the Russian MoD is increasing its military training efforts across Russia.
• US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller commented on November 20 about a report that found that Russian officials in collaborations with Belarusian officials transported more than 2,400 Ukrainian children between ages six and 17 to Belarus.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2023

Russia appears to be employing a known hybrid warfare tactic to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish border. Finnish authorities closed four border checkpoints on Finland’s southeastern border with Russia on November 18 after the Finnish Border Guard reported that an influx of about 300 asylum seekers, mostly from Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, had arrived at the Finnish border from Russia since September 2023.[i] Finnish Border Guards recorded 89 migrant crossings during a two-day period between November 7 and 14 — a sharp increase from the 91 crossings recorded from mid-July to November 12.[ii] Four checkpoints currently remain open on Finland’s northeastern border with Russia with only two open for asylum applicants.[iii] Reuters reported on November 19 that dozens of migrants arrived at the closed Finnish Nuijamaa and Vaalimaa crossings on November 18 and gathered around a campfire in sub-zero temperatures.[iv] Finnish outlet Iltalehti reported on November 20 that Finnish authorities are considering closing the entire border with Russia on the night of November 21.[v] Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated on November 14 that Russian border guards are escorting or transporting migrants to the Finnish border, and the Finnish government stated on November 16 that there are indications that “foreign authorities or other actors” have played a role in helping people illegally cross the border.[vi] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on November 19 that Jouko Kinnunen, head of the Finnish Vartius checkpoint that currently remains open, stated that Russian border guards pushed migrants to the Finnish side of the barrier and then closed the Russian border barriers behind them.[vii] It is unlikely that these migrants would continue to remain at the Finnish border in sub-zero temperatures of their own volition after Finnish border authorities denied their entrance into Finland, suggesting that Russia is likely involved in the situation in some way.

The Kremlin has denied Finland’s accusations about Russia’s involvement in creating an artificial influx of migrants. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded on November 17 to the announcement of the closure of the four checkpoints, stating that Finland had chosen a path of confrontation, which Peskov labeled as a “big mistake.”[viii] Peskov also stated on November 20 that Finland’s possible decision to close the entire border “causes nothing but deep regret” and claimed that Finland’s “Russophobic” position has harmed Finnish-Russian relations of the past.[ix]

Russia’s apparent hybrid warfare tactic on the Russian-Finnish border is similar to Russia’s and Belarus’ creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 and is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin enabled, or possibly directly controlled, Belarus’ artificial creation of a migrant crisis on its border with Poland in 2021, when Belarusian security personnel aided thousands of Middle Eastern migrants in crossing the Belarusian border to Poland.[x] The Kremlin exploited the manufactured crisis in 2021 to falsely accuse NATO of aggression against Belarus.[xi] Peskov responded to Finland’s accession into NATO on April 4, threatening that Russia would take any “countermeasures [deemed necessary] to ensure [Russia’s] own security.”[xii] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs similarly stated on April 4 that Russia will be “forced to take retaliatory measures” and that Finland’s accession to NATO “cannot but have a negative impact on Russian-Finnish bilateral relations.”[xiii] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may be attempting to set information space conditions to destabilize the NATO states on Russian borders and distract from the war in Ukraine.[xiv] ISW has also consistently assessed that one of Putin’s goals in launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was to break up NATO – a goal he continues to pursue.[xv]

Russian milbloggers expressed continued anger at deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations as Armenia appears to distance itself further from Russia while entering further agreements with Western governments. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov claimed in Minsk on November 20 that Armenia asked to remove provisions on assistance to Armenia from the agenda of the upcoming CSTO Summit’s agenda.[xvi] Russian media also reported that Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan and the European Union (EU) Ambassador to Armenia Vassilis Maragos signed an agreement that increases “legal certainty” surrounding the EU Mission to Armenia (EUMA)’s “rights and obligations” within Armenia, and creates easier conditions for EUMA observers to operate in the country.[xvii] Russian milbloggers latched onto Tasmagambetov’s claim and the Armenia-EU agreement, reamplifying a thus-far unsubstantiated claim from November 19 that Armenia is preparing to leave the CSTO and provide missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine.[xviii] The milbloggers accused Armenia of “betrayal” for growing closer to the West and distancing itself from Russia and expressed bitterness at Armenia’s alleged provision of weapons to Ukraine while doing nothing “besides throwing mud” at Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.[xix] ISW has observed no indications to substantiate the milblogger claim of Armenia providing missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine.[xx]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly started public recruitment for the Russian “Africa Corps” aimed at subsuming Wagner Group operations in Africa after alleged failed MoD attempts to directly recruit former Wagner personnel. A Russian milblogger posted an advertisement for contract service in the Russian “Africa Corps” on November 20.[xxi] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD decided to form the Russian “Africa Corps” in Libya after Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Libyan National Army Commander Marshal Khalifa Haftar, likely referencing their August 22 meeting.[xxii] The milblogger claimed that the formation of the Russian “Africa Corps” in Libya is part of wider Russian-Libyan agreements established at the Moscow International Security Conference and Army-2023 Forum.[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that the starting salary for “Africa Corps” personnel is 280,000 rubles (about $3,160), significantly higher than the salaries that the Russian MoD reportedly offered former Wagner fighters and that the Wagner Group offered recruits for its operations in Africa in 2023.[xxiv] ISW previously observed a Russian insider source’s claim that the Russian MoD unsuccessfully attempted to recruit former Wagner Group personnel to Russian MoD operations in Africa.[xxv] The need to publicly advertise recruitment into the Russian “Africa Corps” supports the insider source’s claim that the MoD's attempt to directly recruit former Wagner personnel for operations in Africa were largely unsuccessful.

The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) predictably backed Girkin’s November 19 formal announcement of his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential election. The RDS stated on November 20 that its first congress as an official political movement began in Moscow on November 18 and reiterated that its current main priority is to secure Girkin’s release from prison and the dismissal of all charges against him. The RDS also emphasized that the RDS Congress fully supports Girkin’s nomination and is creating an organizing committee to support Girkin’s campaign.[xxvi] The RDS reiterated its main political tenets that it first announced on June 26, which center around supporting the Russian military and veterans and pursuing military and governmental reforms.[xxvii] Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, has not yet acknowledged Girkin’s presidential campaign or the RDS’ support of the campaign as of this publication.[xxviii]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to distinguish himself in the Russian information space, infringing on the generally accepted boundaries between Russian federal subject (region) heads and Russian President Vladimir Putin. During a video conference on the renewal of the Russian public transport fleet in the Russian regions, Kadyrov publicly invited Putin, who was also on the call, to visit Chechnya.[xxix] Kadyrov told Putin that Chechen elders had “scolded” Kadyrov because Putin has not visited Chechnya in a long time.[xxx] Putin did not directly respond to the invitation and instead thanked Kadyrov and the Chechen people for their hard work in restoring the republic. Kadyrov’s public invitation to Putin, who has notably not visited Chechnya since 2011, places Putin in a difficult position, as he either ignores the invitation and risks snubbing Kadyrov, or he accepts the invitation and risks looking as though he is amendable to Kadyrov’s pressure.[xxxi] This implicit veiled challenge to Putin in a public forum is unusual and represents a clear attempt at informational posturing on the part of Kadyrov, who has recently tried to balance an apparent desire to curry favor with Putin while also appealing to his own Chechen constituency.[xxxii]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package to Ukraine during US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's visit to Kyiv on November 20. Austin met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and reiterated long-term US support for Ukraine.[xxxiii] The new DoD package contains military equipment valued at up to $100 million, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; one HIMARS system and additional ammunition; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and artillery and small arms rounds.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia appears to be employing a known hybrid warfare tactic to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish border.
• Russia’s apparent hybrid warfare tactic on the Russian-Finnish border is similar to Russia’s and Belarus’ creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 and is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO.
• Russian milbloggers expressed continued anger at deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations as Armenia appears to distance itself further from Russia while entering further agreements with Western governments.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly started public recruitment for the Russian “Africa Corps” aimed at subsuming Wagner Group operations in Africa after alleged failed MoD attempts to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.
• The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) predictably backed Girkin’s November 19 formal announcement of his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential election.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to distinguish himself in the Russian information space, infringing on the generally accepted boundaries between Russian federal subject (region) heads and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package to Ukraine during US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's visit to Kyiv on November 20.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced in some areas.
• A Russian federal subject (region) and occupation officials are reportedly planning to work together to provide drones to Russian forces.
• A Ukrainian official reported that Ukraine successfully returned 45 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities forcibly deported to Russia in the past six months.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2023

Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to defend against a strong group of Russian forces attacking near Avdiivka and that Ukrainian forces maintain the initiative in southern Ukraine. The milblogger added that it is premature to declare any Russian victories to avoid creating any false impressions about the situation on the battlefield. Another Russian milblogger observed that poor weather is impeding the use of armored vehicles in western Zaporizhia Oblast but that Ukrainian forces are still attacking Russian positions with infantry units. The United Kingdon (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed on November 18 that neither side has achieved any substantial progress in the Kupyansk and Avdiivka directions, or in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast — where the most intense battles are ongoing. The UK MoD added that there are fewer immediate prospects of major changes on the frontlines as colder winter weather begins to set in. Ukrainian military officials anticipate that Russia will launch a third wave of assaults on Avdiivka. Freezing weather conditions during the winter will likely prompt the resumption of more active combat operations, and ongoing rainy weather is unlikely to halt Ukrainian or Russian attacks.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes primarily targeting Kyiv, Poltava, and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 19 that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 15 of the 20 Russian Shahed-131/-136 drones. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated the strike series did not result in any casualties or critical damages and that this was an “excellent result.” The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian ammunition depots in Kirovohrad City, Kirovohrad Oblast and Olshanytsya, Kyiv Oblast and a fuel storage facility at the Kanatove airfield, Kirovohrad Oblast.

Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin formally announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential elections despite his imprisonment. Girkin acknowledged that his August 30 post claiming that he is better than Russian President Vladimir Putin aimed to attract attention before formally announcing his intent to run for president as an independent candidate. Girkin claimed that the current Russian government fears his nomination because it would disrupt the Kremlin’s plans to have sham candidates run against Putin, as Putin is the “only winner [of the presidential election] already known in advance.” Girkin acknowledged that running in the Russian presidential election is “like sitting down at a table to play with cheaters” but that bringing like-minded “patriots” together through the election is a defeat for the Russian officials living on the delusional “planet of the pink ponies.” Girkin appealed to the Russian Strelkov (Girkin) Movement (RDS), which has supported Girkin’s defense against his criminal case for allegedly discrediting the Russian military, to help canvas to receive the necessary number of signatures to run as an independent candidate.

Girkin’s presidential announcement indicates a possible rift between the RDS and his wife, Miroslava Reginskaya. Reginskaya has been the first to transcribe Girkin’s prior letters from prison to post on Telegram but did not claim to post Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement on November 19 and has not yet acknowledged Girkin’s presidential announcement on her own Telegram channel. Reginskaya has been a staunch advocate for Girkin’s release since the first day of his imprisonment in July 2023 and appears to maintain ties with Russian veterans who support Girkin’s release, so her silence regarding Girkin’s most recent announcement is notable. Reginskaya and the RDS contradicted each other on November 8 when the RDS called for character witnesses to speak for Girkin at his trial, but Reginskaya stated that witness recruitment on ”other channels and by other persons is not coordinated with the general defense and can be dangerous for Igor [Girkin].” The RDS announced on November 15 that it had found several such witnesses for Girkin, despite Reginskaya’s November 8 statement.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be censoring irregular Russian armed formations as part of its ongoing efforts to formalize Russia’s irregular forces and establish greater control over the Russian information space. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion claimed on November 19 that the DNR's Internal Affairs Ministry issued a censorship order, prohibiting the battalion from “showing its life and work.” The “Vostok” Battalion is currently serving in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and provides near-daily updates on the situation in their sector of the front. The DNR Internal Ministry may be administering the censorship order as part of the Russian MoD’s ongoing efforts to formalize the DNR/Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militias into the Russian armed forces, which has previously trigger backlash within the Russian information space. ISW has extensively reported on the Kremlin’s ongoing censorship efforts targeting Russian milbloggers and state media.

Ukrainian officials announced on November 19 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a teenage Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, returned to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Yermokhin’s return occurred within the framework of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “Bring Kids Back UA” program. Yermak and Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets stated that Qatar and UNICEF mediated the return, and Lubinets noted that this was the first time UNICEF was involved in efforts to return Ukrainian children back from Russia. Russia dictated that Yermokhin travel to a third country to meet a relative once he turned 18 years old, and Yermokhin turned 18 on November 19 and met his sister in Belarus before returning to Ukraine. Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to dispute Russia‘s practice of illegally deporting Ukrainian children to Russia and claimed on November 19 that the Russian military found Yermokhin “neglected” in Mariupol in 2022 and took him to “safety” with a Russian foster family.

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed anger on November 19 about Armenia’s decisions to distance itself from Russia against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used a Tochka-U missile to strike Belgorod Oblast on November 19, and a prominent Russian milblogger used the opportunity to allege that Armenia, possibly with assistance from the US, agreed to give Tochka-U launchers and missiles to Ukraine. The milblogger offered no evidence in support of this allegation, and ISW has not observed anything to substantiate it. The milblogger speculated about the number of weapons Armenia could possibly transfer to Ukraine but did not offer any specifics or the sourcing of his information. The milblogger also claimed that the Armenian government has begun to prepare to withdraw from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). ISW has not observed any confirmation of the milblogger’s claim that Armenia is planning to leave the CSTO, and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told journalists on November 9 that Armenia is not discussing the legal process of leaving the CSTO. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated on November 18 that Armenia and Azerbaijan were able to agree on the basic principles for a peace treaty but that the two countries are speaking “different diplomatic languages” and that there is an atmosphere of mistrust.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes primarily targeting Kyiv, Poltava, and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19.
• Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin formally announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential elections despite his imprisonment.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be censoring irregular Russian armed formations as part of its ongoing efforts to formalize Russia’s irregular forces and establish greater control over the Russian information space.
• Ukrainian officials announced on November 19 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a teenage Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, returned to Ukrain
• A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed anger on November 19 about Armenia’s decisions to distance itself from Russia against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on November 19.
• Regional Russian officials continue to fear the emergence of localized protests in response to the Russian military’s refusal to return some mobilized personnel from the frontlines.
• Occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2023

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 17 to 18. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 18 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 29 of 38 Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones over multiple unspecified oblasts.[i] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian Shaheds struck an energy infrastructure facility and administrative building in Odesa Oblast.[ii] The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported that Russian Shaheds also damaged infrastructure facilities in Chernihiv Oblast.[iii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck an oil depot in Altestove, Odesa Oblast, the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast.[iv]

A Kyrgyzstan government official called on the Russian government to help Kyrgyz migrants in Russia against the backdrop of recent proposals from Russian government officials to decrease migrant work opportunities in Russia. Deputy Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Edil Baisalov met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Social Policy, Labor, Health, and Pension Provision Tatyana Golikova on November 17 and reiterated the importance of Russia providing families of Kyrgyz citizens working in Russia with compulsory health insurance in accordance with Eurasian Economic Union standards.[v] Baisalov stated that this would help create favorable conditions for Kyrgyz citizens in Russia. Prominent voices in the Russian ultranationalist information space responded to Baisalov’s statements by complaining that the Russian government’s migrant policy is too lenient and that Russian government officials either are not aware of the problem or do not want to fix it.[vi]

Russian federal subjects and government officials have been increasingly introducing and proposing bills restricting migrants’ rights in the fall of 2023. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy proposed a measure on November 14 that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language.[vii] Russian political party A Just Russia-For Truth introduced three bills to the Duma on November 15 that would abolish work certificates for foreign workers, require Russian organizations to obtain permission from the Russian government to hire foreign workers, and require foreign workers to acquire a separate Russian work permit.[viii] A Just Russia head Sergei Mironov stated that these measures will create order and ensure that the government “clearly understand[s] who is on the territory of the Russian Federation and why they are there.”[ix] Several Russian federal subjects have banned migrants from driving minibuses and taxis, offering catering services, and selling alcohol and tobacco in Russia.[x]

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly continue to charge participants of the October 29 antisemitic riots with minor administrative crimes, while select Russian ultranationalists call for increased government control in order to curb the alleged spread of Islamic extremism in Dagestan. Russian authorities have reportedly charged 412 people for violating various articles of the Russian Administrative Code, including 394 people charged with violating procedures on holding assemblies and 18 people charged with organizing a mass gathering in public places.[xi] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 17 that a radical Salafi preacher spoke about the unrest in Dagestan and alleged that there are over 100,000 supporters of Salafism in Dagestan – an allegation that the milblogger rejected.[xii] The milblogger also claimed that radical ideologues have become more active on the internet following the riots in Dagestan and that extremists are attempting to take advantage of the confusion caused by the spontaneity of the unrest.[xiii] Another Russian milblogger added that the Russian government needs to establish strict control over Dagestan in order to curb future unrest.[xiv] ISW previously assessed that the Russian leadership is likely avoiding more serious punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.[xv] Russian authorities also recently detained a Dagestani government official on corruption charges, likely in an effort to placate those calling for an increased federal government response to the unrest.[xvi]

The Russian government continues efforts to restrict citizens’ access to the internet and to strengthen its control over the Russian information space. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on November 17 allowing the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) to block sites that publish information about methods to bypass sites blocked by the Russian government.[xvii] The Russian State Duma previously adopted a bill on October 17 that stipulates that presidential election campaign materials cannot be shown on sites restricted by Roskomnadzor, and the November 17 decree is likely in part related to controlling the Russian information space before the 2024 presidential elections.[xviii]

The European Commission will reportedly include sanctions on the sale of petroleum tankers to Russia in an upcoming sanctions package in an effort to curb Russian schemes to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Reuters reported on November 17 that the European Union’s upcoming sanctions package against Russia will ban the sale to Russia of tankers for crude oil and other petroleum products and will stipulate contractual clauses in the sale of tankers to third countries prohibiting the re-sale of tankers to Russia and the transfer of Russian crude oil and petroleum products that violate the G7’s price cap.[xix] The Financial Times reported on November 14 that Western officials stated that Russia is likely currently selling almost all of its crude oil at or above the G7’s $60 per barrel price cap.[xx] The Financial Times added that Russian export data for crude oil suggests that Russia sold crude oil at an average of roughly $80 a barrel in October.[xxi] Only 37 of the 134 vessels that reportedly ship Russian oil held insurance from Western countries, and Russia has reportedly increasingly relied on aging oil tankers with obscure ownership to build a ”shadow fleet” to sell crude oil and petroleum products above the G7 price cap.[xxii] European economic think tank Bruegel reported on October 11 that by July 2023 over 60 percent of tankers carrying Russian crude oil were covered by insurance from an unknown country of origin, whereas less than 20 percent of the tankers carrying Russian crude oil had been covered by unknown insurance at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 17 to 18.
• A Kyrgyzstan government official called on the Russian government to help Kyrgyz migrants in Russia against the backdrop of recent proposals from Russian government officials to decrease migrant work opportunities in Russia.
• Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly continue to charge participants of the October 29 antisemitic riots with minor administrative crimes, while select Russian ultranationalists call for increased government control in order to curb the alleged spread of Islamic extremism in Dagestan.
• The Russian government continues efforts to restrict citizens’ access to the internet and to strengthen its control over the Russian information space.
• The European Commission will reportedly include sanctions on the sale of petroleum tankers to Russia in an upcoming sanctions package in an effort to curb Russian schemes to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
• Russia has reportedly frozen prisoner of war (POW) exchanges with Ukraine since the summer of 2023.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2023

Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces have established bridgeheads on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting ground operations aimed at pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. The Ukrainian Marine Corps Command and the Ukrainian General Staff stated on November 17 that Ukrainian marines have secured several “bridgeheads” on the east bank following successful actions and are conducting actions to expand these positions.[i] US military doctrine defines a bridgehead as “an area on the enemy’s side of the water obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security to crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack.”[ii] The doctrinal definition of a bridgehead does not stipulate a certain size for the crossing force, the extent of the secured positions, or the ability to transfer and operate heavy military equipment from those positions. The necessary size of a bridgehead depends on the operations it is meant to support, and the official Ukrainian acknowledgment of these positions as bridgeheads indicates that the Ukrainian command assesses that these positions are sufficient for continuing ground operations on the east bank.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that one of the main operational objectives for Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank is to prevent Russian shelling of Ukrainian civilians on the west bank of Kherson Oblast, particularly near Kherson City. The 152mm tube artillery systems that Russian forces widely operate in Ukraine have an approximate range of 25km, although Russian forces are unlikely to deploy these systems to immediate frontline areas due to the threat of Ukrainian counterbattery fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces on the east bank are conducting diversionary actions, raids, and reconnaissance and are particularly surveilling Russian positions for intelligence on Russian logistics and ammunition concentrations.[iii]

Russian forces appear to be applying lessons learned from attempts to man Russian multilayered defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive to current Russian defensive operations in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces have a “fairly serious” line of fortifications in Kherson Oblast.[iv] A Ukrainian soldier operating on the left (east) bank of Kherson Oblast characterized Russian defensive positions as “elaborate dugouts that [Russian forces] constructed over months” in an interview with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published on November 15.[v] The WSJ also reported that Russian forces heavily mined the area around Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River), where Ukrainian forces currently maintain positions.[vi] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Russian forces are not deploying their forces in a “pillar formation” at the immediate frontline on the east bank, likely in an effort to protect concentrations of Russian forces from Ukrainian artillery fire and drone strikes.[vii]  Mashovets claimed on November 12 that the Russian command in the Kherson direction has refused to commit additional forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) and 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division beyond elements of single regiments and battalions to the frontline, opting instead to maintain the remainder of these formations in near rear areas and secondary echelons of defense.[viii]

This tactical deployment of forces in Kherson is reminiscent of changes that Russian forces made to Russian tactical defensive deployments in western Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW observed Russian forces concentrating personnel along the defensive layer closest to Ukrainian offensive operations at the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[ix] ISW observed a shift in Russian defensive operations as Ukrainian forces began penetrating Russian defensive layers in mid-September, wherein Russian forces shifted personnel away from manning immediate frontline defensive positions in order to man defensive layers further from the frontline from which more combat effective forces would counterattack.[x] Russian forces have not constructed extensive visible defensive fortifications similar to those that Russian forces established in western Zaporizhia Oblast prior to the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and appear to have opted for more discrete fortifications set further from the frontline. The discrete fortifications located away from the frontline in Kherson Oblast will likely only be fully effective if they remain concealed, however. Fall and winter weather conditions may reveal some concealed positions as foliage and natural ground cover die.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces have suffered roughly a brigade’s worth of casualties since Ukrainian forces started ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17, reportedly forcing Russian forces to transfer combat power from elsewhere in Ukraine to Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have killed 1,216 Russian personnel and wounded 2,217 since starting “measures” on the east bank.[xi] These manpower losses are roughly equivalent to a brigade’s worth of personnel, although these losses are likely spread out across the Russian formations and units operating in the Kherson direction. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 24 Russian tanks, 48 armored combat vehicles, 89 artillery systems, 29 ammunition warehouses, and 14 aircraft since starting "measures” on the east bank.[xii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have transferred unspecified units from other unspecified sectors of the front to Kherson Oblast due to these losses.[xiii] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat-effective reinforcements at scale to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.[xiv] The scale of Russian reinforcements required, however, depends heavily on how much effort Ukrainian forces put into the Kherson direction and how much progress they make.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 17 that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-131/136 drones primarily targeting Khmelnytskyi Oblast and several S-300 missiles in the Donetsk direction.[xv] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed nine Shahed drones over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[xvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck targets in Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts.[xvii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Israel-Hamas war has negatively affected Ukraine’s shell supplies. Zelensky stated during an interview with Bloomberg on November 16 that Israel has sought large quantities of the global supply of 155mm artillery shells and that this has slowed deliveries of artillery shells to Ukraine at a critical moment.[xviii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to dismiss criticisms of the Russian government and the war in Ukraine as inevitable yet unfounded and urged Russian citizens to self-censor. Putin stated at the International Cultural Forum in St. Petersburg on November 17 that people who are critical of the war have the right to their own point of view.[xix] Putin added that “the head is not only a tool for speaking but is also for thinking before you say something.”[xx] Putin commented that many educated, knowledgeable, and talented adults do not follow or understand what is happening, presumably in Ukraine, but acknowledged that “the mood in society and the opinion of a country’s people...is an objective factor that no one can escape.”[xxi] Peskov similarly stated in a video interview published on November 17 that there should be a level of censorship during wartime that would be unacceptable during peacetime.[xxii] Peskov stated that the line between criticizing the Russian military and discrediting the Russian forces is very thin and advised those who want to “indiscriminately” speculate about and criticize the Russian military to “think ten times” before doing so.[xxiii]

Peskov also stated that he believes Putin will announce his presidential campaign and that he "does not doubt” that Putin will win the 2024 presidential elections.[xxiv] Peskov also responded to a question about Russian leadership after Putin and the characteristics that Putin’s eventual successor should have, stating that Putin’s successor should be someone exactly like Putin.[xxv]

Russian authorities detained several Federal Security Service (FSB) employees on November 16 for accepting a five-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribe in connection with the dismissal of a corruption case. Russian outlet RBC reported that the FSB employees were involved in the dismissed investigation into the Merlion Group of Companies, a Russian IT company and technology distributor that the FSB previously investigated for corruption.[xxvi] Russian authorities also arrested former head of the Russian Investigative Committee for the North-Western District of Moscow Sergei Romodanovsky, current head of the Russian Investigative Committee’s Khoroshevsky Investigative Department Rustam Yusupov, and former investigator Andrei Zhiryutin in connection to the case’s dismissal on November 10.[xxvii] RBC reported that Russian authorities suspect that additional FSB employees, Romodanovsky, Yusupov, and Zhiryutin accepted a five-billion-ruble bribe to dismiss the case against the Merlion Group. A Russian insider source claimed on November 17 that Russian authorities are also investigating former Director of Russia’s Federal Migration Service Konstantin Romodanovsky (father of Sergei Romodanovsky), who has connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and suggested that Russian authorities may intend to blame Konstantin Romodanovsky for Russia’s migration issues to appease Putin’s ultranationalist base.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces have established bridgeheads on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting ground operations aimed at pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces appear to be applying lessons learned from attempts to man Russian multilayered defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive to current Russian defensive operations in Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces have suffered roughly a brigade’s worth of casualties since Ukrainian forces started ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17, reportedly forcing Russian forces to transfer combat power from elsewhere in Ukraine to Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Israel-Hamas war has negatively affected Ukraine’s shell supplies.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to dismiss criticisms of the Russian government and the war in Ukraine as inevitable yet unfounded and urged Russian citizens to self-censor.
• Russian authorities detained several Federal Security Service (FSB) employees on November 16 for accepting a five-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribe in connection with the dismissal of a corruption case.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in several sectors of the front.
• The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on November 17 that the Russian military is likely using updated surveillance aircraft due to concerns over Ukraine deploying Western-provided combat aircraft.
• Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (Yale HRL) reported on November 16 that Russian and Belarusian authorities have forcibly deported at least 2,442 Ukrainian children between the ages of six and 17 to Belarus via Russia since February 24, 2022.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2023

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-131/136 drones of which Ukrainian forces destroyed 16.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched S-300 missiles targeting Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Kh-59 cruise missile over Poltava Oblast on the evening of November 15.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on November 16 that Russian forces changed the timing of the November 16 drone attack from their normal strike pattern by conducting the drone strikes until around 9:30am local time, as opposed to conducting the attacks at their usual time from around 10:00pm to 3:00-4:00am.[3] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the Russian military has concentrated over 800 missiles, including Kalibr and Onyx missiles, in occupied Crimea and intends to use all of them against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter 2023.[4]

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced on November 16 that Russian authorities are strengthening Russian air defense over Russia’s Central Federal Okrug, likely in response to Ukraine’s recently implied intent to conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in rear areas during the winter. Patrushev also announced that Russian authorities have organized patrols to protect critical infrastructure facilities to prevent attacks and that the Russian government is funding the creation of “territorial defense lines” for oblasts bordering Ukraine.[5] Patrushev added that Russian authorities are updating a list of all critical infrastructure facilities – including fuel and energy facilities and important transportation objects – that require protection from unspecified threats.[6] The Central Federal Okrug consists of 18 federal subjects including Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts, which border Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk stated on November 13 that Ukraine needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles to strike Russian rear areas.[8] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces’ current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[9]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize actors in the Russian information space for distorting the reality of the Russian war effort, highlighting an emerging cyclical dynamic in the Russian information space in which the majority of Russian sources coalesce around a particular predominant narrative and, in turn, a subset of different sources coalesces to criticize the majority’s prevailing opinion. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian state media may have falsely convinced the Russian people that “everything is fine” in Russia’s war in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger claimed that he does not understand why Russian state media devotes so much time to promoting narratives about the “imminent collapse of Ukraine" and portrays the Russian war effort so positively that Russian viewers think that signing a military service contract is unnecessary. Another Russian milblogger who previously served throughout the front in Ukraine and correctly assessed Russia’s foundational problems in Kharkiv Oblast in spring 2022 criticized several unnamed Russian milbloggers for their recent overly positive reporting about Russian counterattacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[11] The milblogger claimed that the other milbloggers preemptively claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on the east bank and criticized them for setting unrealistic expectations for Russian forces. The milblogger noted that such overoptimistic claims are forcing Russian servicemen to “catch up” to these Russian politicians’ and commanders’ unrealistic expectations of Russian battlefield successes. The milblogger’s complaint suggests that the situation in Kherson Oblast remains very ambiguous and is dynamic. The milblogger’s complaint mirrors recent reports that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality and that local Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align with the Russian General Staff’s inaccurate maps.[12] Disjointed Kremlin efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space and report overly optimistic news are likely creating these cycles of coalescence and backlash among Russian sources. The Russian information space may grow increasingly volatile as the rift between the Kremlin optimists and their critics expands.

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded a prominent Russian milblogger who was previously critical of Russia’s military performance during its full-scale invasion with a prestigious state honor, continuing the Kremlin’s long-standing effort to coopt milbloggers and make them loyal to the Kremlin. Putin awarded founder of Rybar Telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, the Russian Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class for his efforts supporting the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on November 16.[13] Other Russian milbloggers congratulated Zvinchuk and praised him for launching the first awarded Telegram channel in Russia.[14] Putin had previously engaged Zvinchuk by recruiting him to join the Kremlin working group on mobilization problems on December 20, 2022, which ISW assessed was Putin’s first concerted attempt to regain control over the segment of Russia’s domestic audience that turned to the Telegram information space for war coverage independent of Russian state media.[15]

Zvinchuk’s Rybar project amassed an audience of over 1.2 million followers by covering Russian military operations in Ukraine and is frequently cited by Russian and Western media alike (including ISW). Russian investigative outlet The Bell reported that Rybar was originally a personal blog from its creation in 2018 until Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly began sponsoring the channel from 2019 to 2021.[16] The Bell observed that Rybar frequently published posts that may have advanced Prigozhin’s business interests in Syria during their partnership. Rybar frequently published contradictory posts since the start of the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Rybar’s posts and tone used to loudly criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) only to then defend disgraced Russian Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin against attacks on his command from Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and Prigozhin.[17] The Bell also found that Rybar amplified numerous videos that supported the Russian MoD’s information operation efforts to present partial mobilization in Russia in a more favorable light. Rybar claims to sustain its four million ruble ($44,800) monthly production cost via donations, although the channel also profits from showing advertisements for companies associated with First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and Russian state media.[18]

ISW had observed a significant shift in the style and focus of Rybar’s war coverage since the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in fall 2022 during which Russian state propagandists were unable to explain away Russia’s military failures and a deeply unpopular mobilization of 300,000 reservists.[19] Zvinchuk began appearing on Russian state television and the Russian state media began heavily relying on Zvinchuk’s content at this time. Rybar’s coverage since fall 2020 has significantly reduced its criticism of the Russian MoD. This observed content and tonal shift is significant and is likely the result of Putin’s efforts to coopt prominent Russian milbloggers to reestablish Kremlin dominance over the Russian language online information space, carry out information operations against Western audiences, and prevent other influential Russian officials from buying milbloggers’ loyalties. Zvinchuk’s award also likely serves as an effort to incentivize other milbloggers to offer their loyalty to the regime in exchange for accolades and Kremlin recognition.

Ukraine stated that the continued Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has resulted in equipment and maintenance failures that threaten the plant’s security. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on November 16 that Russian ZNPP authorities transferred reactor no. 5 to a hot shutdown state from a cold shutdown state in violation of Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory orders, resulting in a leak of a boric acid solution that entered all the reactor’s steam generators.[20] Energoatom reported that Russian ZNPP authorities’ “incompetence” in bringing reactors from cold shutdowns to hot shutdowns has resulted in a radioactive coolant leak from the first to second circuit of reactor no. 4 and a similar situation involving reactor no. 6.[21] Energoatom also reported that unspecified “incompetent” Russian actions resulted in reactor no. 6 experiencing a temporary blackout on November 14, forcing the reactor to rely on emergency diesel generators.[22] Energoatom stated that equipment at the ZNPP is constantly degrading and that the frequency of such dangerous instances are increasing.[23]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet commented on these incidents but expressed concern on November 13 over the extent and effectiveness of maintenance on ZNPP safety systems and its own ability to monitor ZNPP operations.[24] The IAEA reported that these maintenance issues became apparent in July and August 2023 when the steam generator of reactor no. 4 experienced a leak that contaminated the reactor’s safety systems that had to be recleaned. The IAEA reported that ZNPP operators have not granted its contingent at the ZNPP access to all six reactor turbine halls to assess their safety and that operators restricted IAEA access during recent walkthroughs of the halls in October and on November 10. The IAEA reported that the ZNPP planned maintenance of transformers of reactors no. 4, 5, and 6 after recently completing maintenance of transformers of reactors no. 1, 2, and 3 and noted that reactors no. 4 and 5 are in hot shutdown mode in violation of the Ukrainian regulatory agency’s orders.

The Ukrainian and IAEA reports indicate that Russia’s presence and exclusive control over the ZNPP is increasing, suggesting that similar failures may escalate under continued Russian occupation. The IAEA announced on November 13 that its staff visited a Russian training center for the ZNPP on November 7 and that Russian nuclear regulatory agency Rostekhnadzor is establishing a permanent presence at the ZNPP.[25] This announcement indicates the normalization of the Russian occupation of the ZNPP despite Russian forces’ documented reckless conduct near the plant.[26] In addition to the recent equipment and mechanical failures, Russian forces deployed military equipment on and inside ZNPP facilities in summer-fall 2022 to protect these assets from Ukrainian strikes, while setting conditions to blame Ukrainian forces for any incidents at the ZNPP.[27] The ZNPP has completely lost access to external power sources seven times during its service history – all seven incidents occurring while under Russian occupation.[28]

Cyprus has reportedly been complicit in helping Russian elites, sanctioned for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, launder money. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) reported on November 14 that Russians who have been under Western sanctions since 2014 owned or controlled almost 800 companies and trusts secretly registered in various countries and territories including Cyprus, Lichtenstein, the British Virgin Islands, and Hong Kong.[29] The ICIJ also stated that Cypriot professional services firms have worked on behalf of 25 Russians sanctioned after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and on behalf of an additional 71 Russians sanctioned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[30] The ICIJ found that the Cypriot branch of an international professional service firm helped a Russian billionaire transfer a $1.4 billion in investments out of his name to evade European Union (EU) sanctions.[31] The ICIJ cited figures from the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, Bulgaria, reporting that Russian businessmen have “invested” over $200 million in Cyprus as of 2020, comprising half of all Russian investments in Europe, and that about 300 Russian-owned companies constituted 80 percent of Cyprus’ wealth at one point in time.[32]

Gazprom Media Holdings, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, announced on November 16 that it acquired the majority share of a large Russian blogger agency, likely in an effort to expand its already extensive control over the Russian media space. Gazprom Media Holdings announced that it bought 51 percent of shares in Insight People, reportedly the largest blogging agency in Russia.[33] Gazprom Media Holdings already owns Russian video streaming platform RuTube, Russian social media network VKontakte, and several prominent Russian TV channels and radio stations.[34] Gazprom Media is headed by Alexander Zharov who previously served as the head of Russian state censor Roskomnadzor from 2012 to 2020.[35] Long-time Gazprom Head Alexei Miller notably has associates throughout various power structures, and Gazprom Media's recent media acquisitions indicates a possible rise in Miller’s influence. Miller is a long-time associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin and likely has ties to former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, as Patrushev’s sons previously held senior positions at Gazprom.[36]

Russian authorities discovered former Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army Commander Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov dead in his home in Stavropol Krai on November 15. Russian sources reported that authorities found Sviridov dead with a woman, likely his wife, and suggested that the couple likely died around November 9. Russian sources reported that Russian authorities have not yet determined Sviridov’s and the woman’s cause of death but have ruled out carbon monoxide poisoning and “violent” deaths.[37] Sviridov reportedly resigned from his position as commander of the 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army in 2009.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced on November 16 that Russian authorities are strengthening Russian air defense over Russia’s Central Federal Okrug, likely in response to Ukraine’s recently implied intent to conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in rear areas during the winter.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize actors in the Russian information space for distorting the reality of the Russian war effort, highlighting an emerging cyclical dynamic in the Russian information space in which the majority of Russian sources coalesce around a particular predominant narrative and, in turn, a subset of different sources coalesces to criticize the majority’s prevailing opinion.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded a prominent Russian milblogger who was previously critical of Russia’s military performance during its full-scale invasion with a prestigious state honor, continuing the Kremlin’s long-standing effort to coopt milbloggers and make them loyal to the Kremlin.
• Ukraine stated that the continued Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has resulted in equipment and maintenance failures that threaten the plant’s security.
• The Ukrainian and IAEA reports indicate that Russia’s presence and exclusive control over the ZNPP is increasing, suggesting that similar failures may escalate under continued Russian occupation.
• Cyprus has reportedly been complicit in helping Russian elites, sanctioned for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, launder money.
• Gazprom Media Holdings, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, announced on November 16 that it acquired the majority share of a large Russian blogger agency, likely in an effort to expand its already extensive control over the Russian media space.
• Russian authorities discovered former Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army Commander Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov dead in his home in Stavropol Krai on November 15.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, near Robotyne, and northeast of Vasylivka and advanced near Avdiivka.
• The Russian Ministry of Education issued a draft order establishing a course called “Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Motherland” for Russian middle and high school students starting in September 2024.
• The Russian government and Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under the rubric of educational programs.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2023

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia. The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) given precision machine tools’ importance in industrial manufacturing. Bloomberg reported on November 15 that the EU’s 12th sanctions package proposes a ban on the export of precision machine tools and machinery parts that Russia uses to make weapons and ammunition, such as welding machines, lithium batteries, thermostats, motors, and drone motors.[i] Bloomberg reported that Russia has been importing precision machines and precision machine tools from Europe to sustain its ammunition production and other DIB production efforts. Bne Intellinews reported in June 2021 that Russia’s near total reliance on European- and US-produced precision machine tools makes Russia particularly vulnerable to such sanctions and noted that at the time Russia imported almost all of the precision machines it required.[ii]

Russia has been increasingly attempting to develop import substitution solutions for sourcing Western-made precision machine tools in 2023, likely in preparation for Western sanctions targeting this vulnerability. The Russian government approved in May 2023 the “Concept of Technological Development until 2030,” which encourages domestic production of high-tech products such as precision machine tools and mandates that domestic enterprises produce at least 75 percent of Russia’s high-tech products by 2030.[iii] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reported in August 2023 that Russia’s STAN group, the country’s largest domestic precision machine manufacturer, which Rostec purchased in 2019, is a major element of Russia’s import substitution program.[iv] Rostec subsidiary RT-Capital’s head, Semyon Yakubov, told Kommersant on October 26 that Rostec hopes to use the STAN Group to meet Russia’s “great need” for modern precision machines in the absence of Western imports.[v] Yakubov stated that Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine have sharply increased Russia’s military and civilian demand for domestically produced machine tools. Yabukov noted that STAN was unable to meet even a third of the total volume of Russia’s orders for precision machines in 2023, worth around six billion rubles (approximately $67.1 million). Yabukov stated that Russia’s demand for precision machines is “much greater” than its current production abilities.

Key Takeaways:

• The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia.
• Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union’s (EU) insurance regulations.
• The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference.
• Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations.
• Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which presented a limited number of former Wagner fighters with the certificates of their combat veteran status, is coercing former Wagner fighters into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2023

Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front. Several Ukrainian officials noted that the situation along the frontline is complex but that Ukrainian forces maintain control of the battlespace.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on November 13 during a conversation with US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown that the Avdiivka, Kupyansk, and Marinka directions are the most intense but noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions in unspecified sectors of the front.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi emphasized that Russian forces are pursuing simultaneous offensive actions in several directions and trying particularly to regain the initiative north and south of Bakhmut.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are reporting an increase of Russian assaults in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk directions.[4]

Ukrainian officials’ statements about the current tempo of Russian operations along the frontline are consistent with ISW's assessment about ongoing Russian offensive operations, particularly in the Kupyansk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka directions.[5] Russian forces will likely struggle to fully regain the initiative across the theater, however, and Ukrainian forces are continuing their own offensive operations and making tactical-level gains along the front, particularly in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[6] The Russian military command will likely have to decide whether to keep certain Russian elements on certain sectors of the front to defend against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations or to redeploy them to support offensive operations elsewhere that will likely culminate without reinforcements. These choices will likely hinder Russia's ability to fully regain the initiative in the coming weeks.

Ukrainian President's Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on November 13 that Ukrainian forces have established a "foothold" on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[7] In a speech at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, Yermak emphasized that despite the challenging battlefield situation, Ukrainian forces have "gained a foothold on the left bank of the Dnipro" and continue counteroffensive operations in unspecified sectors of the front.[8] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast since mid-October 2023 and that Ukrainian forces appear to be able to maintain and supply their current positions on the Russian-controlled side of Kherson Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the Russian federal election law on November 14 that increase the Kremlin's control over the conduct of elections and reduce election transparency ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.[11] The amendments allow the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) to control the specifics and conduct of elections in areas under martial law, which notably includes occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and stipulates that voting in these areas will only occur following coordination among the regional occupation administrations, the CEC, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Federal Security Service (FSB). The amendments also restrict media access to polling places and election commission meetings exclusively to Russian-accredited journalists and media organizations. Russian-accredited journalists who seek access to polling areas in the jurisdiction of Russian military units require the approval of the unit’s commander to visit the areas. The amendments also necessitate that any actor legally designated as a “foreign agent” who speaks during a campaign event must announce that designation at the start of the speech and further prohibits presidential campaigning on blocked online platforms, such as opposition outlets Meduza and Vazhnye Istorii. These amendments allow the Russian federal government to increasingly control election campaigning and coverage of polling in Russian media to set conditions for additional Kremlin controls over Russian elections to help re-elect Putin in 2024. The Russian government may also postpone or cancel presidential elections in occupied Ukraine depending on the frontline situation and their ability to convincingly portray Putin as the winning candidate in these areas.

Russian forces conducted another wave of missile, air, and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of November 13–14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 14 that overnight Russian forces launched nine Shahed-131/-136 drones from the direction of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; an Iskander-M ballistic missile from the direction of Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea; and Kh-35 cruise missiles from the direction of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[12] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down seven of the nine Shaheds.[13] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command clarified that a ballistic missile, presumably the Iskander-M, struck an open area near Chornobaiivka, Kherson Oblast, and Russian forces launched Kh-59s at Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts.[14] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces are using ballistic missiles more frequently because they are more challenging for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept.[15] Russian sources claimed that Russian strikes hit military assets and critical infrastructure in Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts, as well as the Shebelinsky gas processing plant in Kharkiv Oblast, although ISW has not observed visual evidence for all of these strikes.[16]

Ukraine's Western partners announced new efforts to continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid. Germany announced a new aid package to Ukraine on November 13 that includes 10 Leopard tanks, 14 Bandvagn 206 tracked all-terrain vehicles, and 1,020 155-mm shells, and Reuters reported on November 12 that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s governing coalition has agreed in principle to double Germany’s military aid to Ukraine next year to €8 billion.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 13 that Ukrainian pilots began training at the F-16 training center in Romania.[18] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized on November 14 that sustained NATO support for Ukraine is important as the current situation on the battlefield is difficult.[19] EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell stated on November 13 that Ukraine is the EU’s top priority and that the EU’s commitment will not waver.[20] Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba highlighted the importance of speeding up the EU’s plan to supply Ukraine with one million shells by March 2024 during a meeting with the EU Council of Foreign Ministers on November 13, but Politico reported on November 14 that German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed doubt that the EU would be able to meet this target.[21] Politico also reported that Borrell stated that the European defense industry is exporting about 40 percent of its current production to third countries and urged European countries to shift exports to Ukraine as “priority one.”[22] Borrell stated that the EU’s ability to supply Ukraine with one million shells “will depend on how quickly orders come to the industry and how quickly the industry reacts.”[23] Stoltenberg also reiterated on November 14 that NATO has put in place framework contracts worth €2.4 billion, including €1 billion worth of firm orders, and stated that NATO countries are increasing production in order to reach the target of one million shells by March 2024.[24] Politico reported that Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur also announced that Estonia offered five European companies a procurement offer for €280 million worth of 155-mm artillery ammunition.[25]

The Russian government is likely attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia. The Moscow Magistrate’s Court fined Google 15 million rubles (roughly $165,745) on November 14 for the repeated failure to localize the personal data of Russian citizens in Russia.[26] Russian state censor Roskomnadzor requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021, and Russian courts previously fined Google 15 million rubles in June 2022 for failing to adhere to this law.[27] The Russian government has previously fined Russian internet giant Yandex for also failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding disclosing users’ personal data to the government, likely forcing Yandex to split its Russian entity from its international entity to adhere to Russian laws and allowing the Russian government to exercise increased control and surveillance over Russians’ usage of Yandex.[28] The Russian government previously banned certain Western social media sites and demanded that Google remove “false information” about the Russian war in Ukraine in early 2022.[29] The Russian government likely aims to force Russians to utilize search engines and other internet services of Russian companies that the government can control better than international entities like Google.

Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Russian–Armenian relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan informed Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on November 14 that he would not participate in the Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) meeting in Minsk on November 23.[30] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded to Pashinyan’s announcement, stating that the Kremlin understands that heads of state have their own events in their work schedules but that this is regrettable as meetings like the CSTO meeting are a “very good occasion for exchanging opinions” and coordinating ideas.[31] Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told journalists on November 9 that Armenia is currently not discussing the legal process of leaving the CSTO.[32]

Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy suggested a measure that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Tolstoy proposed restricting migrants from working in service sector jobs if they are not citizens from a country that designates Russian as a state language at a Federation Council meeting on state policy in the field of preservation, protection, and development of Russian language on November 14.[33] Tolstoy claimed that post-Soviet countries are teaching English and “trying to supplant Russian with their national language.”[34] If Tolstoy’s measure is officially proposed and passed, it would allow Russian authorities to limit work opportunities for migrants from Central Asia and the south Caucasus, potentially making it easier for Russian authorities to coerce migrants into serving in the Russian military due to a lack of other labor alternatives. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan designate Russian a state language while the titular languages are their state languages.[35] Tajik law designates Russian as a language of “interethnic communication.”[36] The Russian language does not have a legally designated status in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Armenia.[37] Russian authorities may also be attempting to pass laws restricting migrant work in Russia in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalists who are often critical of migrants working in Russia ahead of the Russian presidential elections in 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front.
• Ukrainian President's Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on November 13 that Ukrainian forces have established a "foothold" on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the Russian federal election law on November 14 that increase the Kremlin's control over the conduct of elections and reduce election transparency ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.
• Russian forces conducted another wave of missile, air, and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of November 13–14.
• Ukraine's western partners announced new efforts to continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid.
• The Russian government is likely attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia.
• Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
• Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy suggested a measure that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 14 and advanced in some areas.
• The Russian government discussed amendments that would more strictly penalize those who evade mobilization as well as volunteer servicemen who “improperly” perform their duties.
• Russian occupation officials are beginning to announce that occupied areas of Ukraine will not hold significant public Christmas and New Years’ celebrations due to security concerns.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2023

Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank. Kremlin press wire TASS and Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti published reports claiming that the command of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces (currently active in east bank Kherson Oblast) decided to transfer troops to unspecified “more advantageous positions” east of the Dnipro River and that the Russian military command would transfer elements from the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces to other directions for offensive operations following the regrouping.[i] TASS and RIA Novosti withdrew the reports within minutes and TASS later issued an apology wherein it claimed that it had “erroneously” released its report.[ii] Russian state-affiliated outlet RBK reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) called the reports of a regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast “false” and a ”provocation.”[iii] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question about the situation in Kherson Oblast by stating that only the Russian military can and should comment on the situation.[iv]

The Russian MoD has not acknowledged persisting Ukrainian positions on the east bank or ongoing larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations in recent weeks. Russian milbloggers have increasingly reported on Ukrainian activity on the left bank, however, sharply contrasting with the continued lack of acknowledgement from Russian state media and Russian officials.[v] The Russian command has previously struggled to establish a coordinated informational approach to developments in Ukraine, particularly when the Russian command failed to set informational conditions for defeats during the Kharkiv 2022 counteroffensive.[vi] Previous failures to set coordinated informational approaches have led to chaotic fractures and pronounced discontent in the Russian information space, and the Russian command risks repeating these incidents with the situation on the east bank, which has drawn notable concern from Russian ultranationalists.[vii] The reports‘ references to Russian “offensives“ elsewhere on the front suggests that the uncoordinated informational approach may be more widespread than the east bank, since the Russian command has not explicitly recognized any current Russian operations in Ukraine as an offensive effort.[viii]

The now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military. Russian media outlet RBK reported that the original TASS and RIA Novosti reports stated that the commander of the joint Russian group of forces in Ukraine (unnamed in the article, but in reference to Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov) heard and agreed with arguments from the "Dnepr" group command (also unnamed in the article, but known to be Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky) and ordered the "Dnepr" group to redeploy and free up forces for offensive operations in other unspecified directions.[ix] The suggestion that two high-ranking military commanders would have a discussion on reallocating Russian forces away from a certain sector of the front to another is not outlandish or improbable. RBK’s report further suggests that the Russian military command has assessed that the situation in Kherson Oblast is not overtly threatening to Russian forces. Despite near-constant anxiety about the Kherson direction on the part of milbloggers, the Russian military command itself seems to be preoccupied with other sectors of the front, namely the Avdiivka direction, where Russian forces are pursuing renewed offensive operations.[x] Gerasimov and Teplinsky may have weighed the costs of maintaining frontline units in Kherson Oblast with the benefits of redeploying these units to other areas of the front and decided that the current Russian grouping in rear areas of Kherson is sufficient to defend against Ukrainian operations on the east bank. Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets remarked on November 12 that the Russian command in the Kherson direction has refused to commit to the front lines additional forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) and 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division beyond the elements of single regiments and battalions, opting instead to maintain the remainder of these formations in near rear areas and secondary echelons of defense.[xi] Mashovets noted that the Russian presence in frontline areas of Kherson Oblast is "limited."[xii] The suggestion that Russian forces have a stronger rear-area presence in Kherson Oblast largely tracks with purported discussions between Gerasimov and Teplinsky to free up these frontline elements and commit them to other areas of the front.

Alternatively, the Russian military command may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 13 that Ukrainian officials have not observed any Russian forces withdrawing from positions on the east bank and that the TASS and RIA Novosti reports are a part of a Russian information operation to distract Ukrainian forces.[xiii] Ukrainian forces are very unlikely to make any operational-level decisions based on limited media reports of a Russian regrouping, however, and if the reports are a part of an information operation, they will likely fail to deceive the Ukrainian command.

It is unlikely that an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets. Several Russian sources suggested that an unspecified actor posing as the Russian MoD from a fake account could have provided the information to Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti.[xiv] It is very unlikely that an outside actor posing as the Russian MoD could deceive Russian state media outlets as Russian state media is closely connected to Russian government bodies including the Russian MoD.

Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro. The published reports use relatively neutral language and notably do not announce a "retreat" or "withdrawal," instead discussing a "transfer" and "regrouping."[xv] The Russian media frenzy that followed, including the immediate retraction of the statements, a direct response from the Kremlin, and emphatic milblogger refutations, reflects the fact that any mention of the Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast generates near-immediate information space neuralgia.[xvi] It also appears that the Russian information space has not yet determined how to discuss the operational situation on the east bank of the Dnipro, and that any inflection in the situation there can generate an informational shock.  The Russian MoD falsely framed the Russian retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September of 2022 as a "regrouping," and that word and general concept apparently remains highly neuralgic for the Russian information space.

Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo noted on November 13 that rain and mud in Donbas impede the speed of ground maneuver advances.[xvii] Ukrainian 14th Mechanized Brigade Spokesperson Nadiya Zamryha stated on November 12 that fog and rain complicate both Russian and Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance efforts and lead to reduced numbers of attacks.[xviii] Zamryha added that the falling leaves complicate efforts to hide equipment and personnel. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian aviation has been less active in southern Ukraine due to weather conditions and that Russian forces are attempting to launch as many glide bombs as possible with each sortie.[xix] A Ukrainian reserve officer assessed that mud will make many roads near Avdiivka impassable, complicating logistics for both sides.[xx] Russian milbloggers claimed that recent heavy rains led to reduced shelling and that strong winds and rain interfere with Russian drone operations and complicate offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[xxi] Russian sources also circulated footage purporting to show mud and rain filled Ukrainian trenches.[xxii] ISW continues to assess that fall weather conditions will decrease the tempo of Russian and Ukrainian operations but not halt them entirely, and that fighting will continue on both sides throughout the winter months as it did in the winter of 2022-2023 and in the years between 2014-2022.[xxiii]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk responded on November 13 to the forecasted large-scale Russian strike series against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the upcoming winter and stated that Ukraine is preparing air defense capabilities and needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles, such as ATACMS, to hit Russian rear areas.[xxiv] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces’ current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that these disruptions, coupled with the onset of inclement weather, will “freeze” Russian offensive operations.[xxv] Fityo also stated on November 13 that Ukrainian disruptions of Russian GLOCs will create issues for the supply of food, water, ammunition, and winter materials to Russian forces.[xxvi] Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily Black Sea Fleet assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine, and Ukraine may intend to intensify and widen this interdiction campaign in the coming months.[xxvii]

A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets. A Russian milblogger claimed that all types of Russian units work together to identify, record, direct, and confirm Russian strikes on Ukrainian targets.[xxviii] The milblogger complained that the Russian information space barely covers these events, which creates a “false impression of [Russian forces’] inaction.” The milblogger claimed that the Russian information space instead devotes more coverage to Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory and that Russian milbloggers have to search for information about the alleged Russian strikes on their own. The milblogger urged other milbloggers and “ordinary pro-Russian residents of Ukraine” to offer “brighter” coverage of Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and military targets in order to “create the spirit of victory in the media space.” The milblogger offered an example of the alleged insufficient coverage, claiming that Russian forces struck five unspecified Ukrainian railway junctions on an unspecified date in response to the Ukrainian operation that derailed a Russian freight train in Ryazan Oblast on November 11. The milblogger did not report on these five alleged Russian strikes previously but did report on the Ukrainian operation in Ryazan Oblast.[xxix] The wider Russian information space has also not reported on these alleged five retaliatory strikes, and the Russian milblogger did not specify where they got this information.[xxx]

Russian forces have used many of their long-range weapons to target Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure and have recently increased glide bomb strikes against populated areas of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[xxxi] One critical Russian milblogger, whom Russian authorities later arrested, complained in July 2023 that the Russian strike campaign was more “retaliatory” than “operationally sound” and blamed the Russian General Staff for wasting Russian efforts on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure rather than military infrastructure.[xxxii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 12 that Ukraine will focus on responding to the large-scale Russian series of strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure that are likely to occur in the winter, and Ukrainian officials have signaled their intent to strike military and energy targets within Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.[xxxiii]

US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor. Brink also stated that Ukraine has used the corridor to export 3.7 million tons of food and other goods, presumably since the first civilian vessel successfully departed from a Ukrainian port through the corridor on August 15.[xxxiv] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined water areas to disrupt and discourage civilian maritime traffic through the corridor.[xxxv]

Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa. A Russian insider source claimed on November 13 that the Russian MoD, led by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), has been attempting to recruit former Wagner personnel at the former Wagner base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Russian MoD operations in Africa since September 2023.[xxxvi] The insider source claimed that the Russian MoD is offering former Wagner personnel 110,000-ruble (about $1,200) salaries, “promising” positions and ranks, and the formation of a separate unit capable of operating in Libya, Syria, Mali, and Burkina Faso.[xxxvii] The insider source also claimed that the reported leader of Redut private military company (PMC), Konstantin Mirzoyants, denied the MoD’s offers on November 8 and claimed that the Russian MoD would not form a separate unit and that all personnel would go to Burkina Faso, which caused over 120 former Wagner personnel to reject contracts with the Russian MoD and leave Molkino.[xxxviii] ISW cannot confirm any of the insider source’s claims.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.
• There are three hypotheses of varying likelihood for the release of the now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast: They may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military; the Russian military command alternatively may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast; or an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets.
• Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter.
• A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets.
• US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor.
• Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas of the frontline.
• Ukrainian officials continued to discuss Russian forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continued to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under vacation schemes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2023

Ukraine appears to be intensifying attacks against Russian military, logistics, and other high-profile assets in rear areas in occupied Ukraine and Russia. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 12 that Ukrainian partisans attacked a Russian military headquarters in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11, killing at least three Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Rosgvardia officers.[1] The GUR’s November 12 announcement follows a Ukrainian partisan attack against a former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia head on November 8; strikes against a Russian military base in occupied Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast and Black Sea Fleet assets in Crimea on November 9; and three rear-area strikes and partisan attacks in Russia on November 11.[2] Ukrainian forces have conducted a strike campaign specifically targeting occupied Crimea since summer 2023.[3]

The Russian government is attempting to downplay the extent of its efforts to strengthen control over the Russian information space. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development claimed on November 12 that it will only block specific virtual private network (VPN) services that an “expert commission” identifies as threats, likely aiming to prevent Russians from bypassing Russian censorship efforts and anonymizing themselves online.[4] The Ministry of Digital Development had responded to an inquiry from the “Novyi Lyudi” faction expressing concern over the Russian government’s efforts to restrict access to information on the internet and fears that the Russian government will simply identify all VPN services as threats and block them.[5] The Russian government recently announced a ban on services that provide virtual and temporary mobile numbers starting on September 1, 2024, and Russians can use these mobile numbers in conjunction with VPN services to form anonymous online personas to evade Russian censorship efforts.[6] The Russian government is very unlikely to allow any VPNs to operate within Russia that would allow Russians to bypass censorship efforts and remain anonymous from the Russian government.

Russia continues to posture itself as a prominent security guarantor for authoritarian countries in Africa. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin stated during a television interview with the “Voyennaya Priemka” program on November 12 that Russia will sign military cooperation agreements with six additional African countries in the near future.[7] Fomin stated that Russia currently has military agreements with 30 of the 54 African countries and added that Russia is “very active” on the African continent. Fomin did not specify which African countries Russia will sign agreements with, although Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov have met with delegations from Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Libya in recent months.[8] French-language outlet Jeune Afrique reported on November 11 that a group of Russian servicemen arrived in Burkina Faso to protect President Ibrahim Traore from future coup attempts, which Russian sources credited as an outcome of Shoigu’s November 7 meeting with Burkinabe Minister of Defense and Veteran Affairs Brigadier General Kassoum Coulibaly.[9] The Kremlin appears to be using military agreements with Sahelian juntas to insert itself into the power vacuums created by the withdrawal of Western actors from the region, such as the UN's withdrawal from Mali.[10]

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on November 12. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles and an Iskander ballistic missile at targets in southern Ukraine.[11] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted a Kh-59 cruise missile over Mykolaiv Oblast and that the second Kh-59 missile and the Iskander missile struck unpopulated areas.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine appears to be intensifying attacks against Russian military, logistics, and other high-profile assets in rear areas in occupied Ukraine and Russia.
• The Russian government is attempting to downplay the extent of its efforts to strengthen control over the Russian information space.
• Russia continues to posture itself as a prominent security guarantor for authoritarian countries in Africa.
• Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on November 12.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces made a marginal gain on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 12 amid ongoing ground operations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2023

Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 11 that Russian forces launched 31 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, one Kh-31 missile, one P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile, and an S-300 missile against various targets in Ukraine, and specifically targeted Kyiv Oblast with either an Iskander-M or an S-400 missile.[i] Ukrainian air defenses downed 19 Shaheds (primarily targeting front line areas), one Kh-59 missile, and used a Patriot air defense system to destroy the ballistic missile targeting Kyiv Oblast.[ii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were targeting an air defense system at the Boryspil Airport near Kyiv City.[iii] The Kyiv City Administration stated that it has been 52 days since Russian forces last launched a missile strike against Kyiv Oblast.[iv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11.
• Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• Russian authorities have reportedly launched another large-scale crypto-mobilization wave.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to fill out the workforce and artificially alter the demographics of occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2023

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10. The GUR published satellite imagery and reported that the Ukrainian surface attack drone strike on Uzka Bay near Chornomorsk, occupied Crimea sunk one Project 1176 Akula-class small landing ship and one Project 11770 Serna-class small landing ship.[i] The GUR reported that the Serna-class ship was carrying a crew and was loaded with armored vehicles, including BTR-82 armored personnel carriers, and that Russian forces previously used Serna-class ships to provide cover for Russian BSF ships during raids when Russian forces lacked naval air-defense equipment.[ii] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike on Uzka Bay with four unmanned boats and that it was one of three series of Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea on November 10.[iii] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attempted to conduct a drone strike on an oil depot in Feodosia and a Neptune cruise missile strike on BSF and Federal Security Service (FSB) bases in Chornomorsk.[iv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Neptune missile over the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea and intercepted two drones over Crimea.[v] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[vi]

Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger reiterated common complaints about inadequate Russian counterbattery fire, electronic warfare, air defense, and assault operations along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[vii] The milblogger especially complained about improper usage of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) to conduct frontal assaults like standard infantry against Ukrainian positions on the east bank even though these frontal assaults are ineffective in this area. The milblogger expressed concerns about possible future Ukrainian operations in the Kherson direction, but other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to achieve a breakthrough in this direction.[viii]

Russian milbloggers are likely hyperfocusing on east bank Kherson Oblast due to the significant Russian information space neuralgia about Russian military issues in the area. Some Russian milbloggers appear to be less concerned about the possible near-term threat of Ukrainian operations on the east bank and are more upset about the poor Russian conduct of the war and mistreatment of military personnel.[ix] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces struggle with the “ossification” of poor habits and conduct within the Russian military. These habits include poor communications, lack of proper preparations before or support during assault missions, conducting rotations in columns, Russian commanders selling frontline aid, and uninterest in learning from military mistakes and acknowledging poor battlefield realities.[x] The milblogger specifically emphasized the importance of Russian military professionalism and becoming the best army in the world. Other Russian milbloggers reiterated standard complaints about Russian military capabilities in Kherson Oblast but claimed that Russian forces still inflict high casualties on Ukrainian forces operating on the east bank.[xi] Another prominent milblogger claimed that the situation near Krynky, Kherson Oblast is a “tactical problem” for Russian forces but not a strategic threat.[xii]

Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on November 10 that Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 500 Shahed-131/-136 drones in September 2023 and several hundred drones in October 2023 but are currently launching drone strikes with fewer Shaheds almost every night.[xiii] Russian milbloggers noted on November 9 that Russian forces conducted large-scale Shahed strikes against Ukraine almost every night from the end of summer until mid-October 2023.[xiv] The milbloggers claimed that Russia’s Shahed strikes have been notably smaller and less frequent in the past month due to Russian forces planning to synchronize a new wave of intense combined strikes with the beginning of future large-scale ground operations. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 10 that Russian forces launched six Shaheds, a Kh-31 missile, and a Kh-59 missile at targets in Ukraine on the night of November 9 to 10.[xv] Ukrainian air defenses downed five of the six Shaheds and the Kh-59 missile. Ihnat reported that the Kh-31 missile did not strike its target.[xvi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and other unnamed commanders briefed Putin on the progress of the invasion and presented new models of Russian military equipment.[xvii] Russian state outlets published footage of Shoigu and Gerasimov showing Putin the Desertcross 1000-3 all-terrain vehicle.[xviii] Russian opposition outlet Meduza observed that an information stand displaying data about the Desertcross 1000-3 in the video claimed that the all-terrain vehicle is intended for patrol, reconnaissance, raid, search, and rescue operations, alongside transporting materiel in difficult road conditions.[xix] The information stand also claimed that Russian forces are already using 537 Desertcross 1000-3 vehicles in combat and that Russia plans to purchase an additional 1,590 Desertcross vehicles in December 2023 and in the first quarter of 2024. Meduza noted that US-registered brand Aodes (which is headquartered in China) manufactures the Desertcross vehicles and advertises them as vehicles for hunters, farmers, and forestry workers.

Russian milbloggers have been consistently complaining about the lack of military equipment and vehicles in the Kherson direction, and it is possible that Putin is trying to appeal to Russian personnel fighting in this direction by providing them with hunting and farming vehicles rather than dedicated military vehicles.[xx] A prominent Russian milblogger, for example, celebrated the news that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would provide Russian servicemen with light frontline vehicles.[xxi] Putin’s November 10 visit marks his fifth visit to the SMD headquarters since December 2022 after he last visited the headquarters on October 19.[xxii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign. Russian news outlet RBK stated on November 10 that sources familiar with the matter indicated that the “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference will likely occur in tandem on December 14.[xxiii] Russian opposition media outlet Verstka stated that sources within the Federation Council indicated that the upper chamber will announce the beginning of the campaign period for the 2024 Russian presidential elections on December 13, as required by Russian law.[xxiv] Verstka stated that presidential candidates have 25 days to complete the nomination procedures after the Federation Council’s announcement.[xxv] Although it is unclear when Putin will announce his presidential campaign, he will likely use the “Direct Line” forum and press conference to promote his candidacy and platform, which a Russian opposition source has indicated will widely avoid highlighting the war in Ukraine.[xxvi] The Kremlin likely decided to hold the two events at once in order to more tightly control and regulate the questions asked. Putin has consistently run as an independent candidate despite his affiliation with the United Russia party, and Russian law dictates that independent candidates must gather at least 300,000 signatures in order to submit their candidacy.[xxvii] Russian opposition media outlets stated on November 10 that the United Russia party is preparing to collect signatures to demonstrate its support for Putin’s candidacy and asked employees of the Kursk Oblast Multifunctional Service Center, a state and municipal service provider, to fill out a survey with their personal information and up to three suggestions about how to improve IT services in Russia.[xxviii] The employees reportedly received a letter with the survey stating that they could write one suggestion three times but to fill out the form by hand.[xxix]

Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.[xxx] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian authorities forcibly deported Yermokhin from Mariupol after Russian forces took occupied the city in May 2022 and placed him with a foster family in Moscow Oblast.[xxxi] Yermokhin’s lawyer published a video on his behalf on November 9 pleading for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s help after Yermokhin received a summons for military service on November 8, weeks ahead of his 18th birthday.[xxxii] Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed that Yermokhin testified in writing in August 2023 that he did not plan to return to Ukraine, but Yermokhin’s lawyer stated that Russian authorities forced the teenager to write the statement.[xxxiii] Meduza reported that Yermokhin previously attempted to escape Russia in March 2023, but that Russian border guards detained him.[xxxiv] Lubinets stated that Ukrainian authorities will reunite Yermokhin with his sister in Ukraine in the coming days.[xxxv]

The United Kingdom–led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Operation Interflex, which initially included the United Kingdom but has added Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, and Sweden as partners since its launch in summer 2022, achieved its goal of 30,000 Ukrainian military personnel trained ahead of time on November 10.[xxxvi]  The Ukrainian General Staff and UK government stated that the UK has trained over 52,000 Ukrainian soldiers since 2014.[xxxvii] The UK government stated that Operation Interflex is the largest military training program on UK territory since the Second World War.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10.
• Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign.
• Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.
• The United Kingdom-led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on November 10 along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline.
• Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2023

The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 9 that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and conducted assaults towards Russian positions south and southwest of the settlement.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are reports that Ukrainian forces advanced to forest areas south of Krynky.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and are trying to establish positions between Pidstepne and Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[3] Ukrainian military observer Konstyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have established continuous control of positions from the Antonivsky railway bridge north of Poyma to the Antonivsky roadway bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson and 4km from the Dnipro River) as of November 9 and have cut the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka (53km northeast of Kherson City) road in at least two areas.[4]

Elements of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA) 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) and 70th Motorized Rifle Division as well as the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) appear to be the main Russian forces responding to Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[5] The Russian military reportedly formed the 18th CAA from other units previously operating in the Kherson direction, and it is unlikely that new units of the 18th CAA are comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[6] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment previously defended positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast for almost the entirety of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 5 that unspecified elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Kherson direction, although the bulk of the 7th VDV Division appears to be committed to defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Mashovets claimed on November 2 and 9 that elements of the 7th VDV Division's 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) are operating near Pishchanivka and Poyma, but it is unclear if these reported elements have been present in the Kherson direction since the start of the counteroffensive or recently redeployed to the area.[9] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one its brigades to the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[10] Mashovets claimed that elements of the 49th CAA still comprise the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in the Kherson direction, and elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade appeared to be operating on the left bank as of late August 2023.[11]

The Russian command will likely face significant challenges in redeploying units from other sectors of the front should relatively combat ineffective Russian formations and currently uncommitted Russian forces in the Kherson direction prove insufficient to respond to the Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Redeployments of considerable elements of the 7th VDV Division or other VDV formations and units in western Zaporizhia Oblast would likely disrupt Russian defensive operations there. Russian forces reportedly continue to accumulate forces for sustaining the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka and localized offensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts.[12] Any potential Russian redeployment to the Kherson direction will likely degrade the Russian ability to sustain these other operations and efforts.

Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted nearly 30 attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut between November 8 and November 9, which is notably a higher number of attacks than the Ukrainian General Staff typically reports for the Bakhmut area.[13] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces entered Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and pushed Ukrainian troops back from the railway that runs northeast and east of the settlement.[14] Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces have advanced towards Klishchiivka and hold positions just east of the settlement and west of the railway line.[15] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also drove Ukrainian forces out of positions in and around Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual evidence to substantiate these claims.[16] Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bakhmut in the Berkhivka-Bohdanivka direction (directly northwest of Bakhmut to 5km northwest of Bakhmut) south of the Berkhivka Reservoir towards the Vilyanova plant nursery.[17] Geolocated footage from around November 7 shows that Russian forces have advanced south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, about 3km northwest of Bakhmut.[18]

These localized offensive operations northwest and southwest of Bakhmut are likely opportunistic tactical ground attacks intended to take advantage of the reported reallocation of Ukrainian resources away from Bakhmut. Several milbloggers noted that the pace of Ukrainian artillery fire and ground activity in the Bakhmut direction has decreased in recent days, with some Russian sources remarking that this is partially because Ukrainian forces have redeployed to other areas of the front.[19] Russian forces are likely taking advantage of a decrease in Ukrainian activity on this sector of the front to launch localized and successful attacks.  Russian forces are unlikely to be able to translate offensive efforts near Bakhmut into wider and more meaningful offensive operations, as the Russian force grouping around Bakhmut is weak and disorganized because Russian forces have been committing more manpower and materiel to deliberate and larger-scale offensive operations near Avdiivka and on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.

Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Kh-31P missile struck a civilian ship flying the flag of Liberia in a port near Odesa City, Odesa Oblast, injuring several people and killing the ship’s pilot.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 and 9 in an attempt to justify the strike that the ship was carrying military cargo.[21] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.[22]

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.[23] The Kremlin canceled Putin's annual press conference in December 2022, which ISW assessed was likely in order to preempt the informational risks of Putin addressing difficult questions about the war and international situation live.[24] Similarly, in early June of 2023, Putin postponed the "Direct Line" until November or December 2023.[25] The vagueness with which Peskov announced the two live events suggests that the Kremlin may desire to have the flexibility to cancel them if they deem the informational risks of holding them to be too great. The Kremlin may hope for a wider operational victory in Ukraine to frame both the "Direct Line" and the press conference in a positive light and is likely trying to leave itself room to mitigate if Russian forces cannot secure meaningful battlefield success in Ukraine in the coming month.

Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan. Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara that Russia currently transports gas to Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan and seeks to further develop this transport.[26] Russia began exporting natural gas to Uzbekistan for the first time in October 2023, and Uzbekistan notably still exports its own domestically produced natural gas, including to Russia as recently as 2021, despite suffering domestic shortages in recent years.[27] Uzbekistan‘s continued export of gas while importing Russian gas for the first time suggests that Uzbekistan may not be the final destination for all its Russian gas imports. Uzbekistan is capable of providing Iran with direct access to other Central Asian as well as Russian and Chinese markets, as ISW-CTP previously reported.[28] Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, discussed reviving Iranian-Uzbek economic relations and signed agreements to increase bilateral trade with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tehran on June 18, 2023.[29] Iran has also increased its economic diplomacy efforts, including on gas supplies, with other countries in Central Asia. Raisi discussed increasing the volume of gas swaps with Turkmenistan during a meeting with Turkmenistan People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Tehran on May 30.[30] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on May 30 that Iran and Turkmenistan will soon sign an agreement for Iran to import 10 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan each day, which will allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heat to its northern provinces.[31] Iran has consistently struggled with natural gas shortages in winter and summer 2023, and Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to secure further military cooperation with Iran.[32]

Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children. A Russian insider source claimed that Moscow authorities are investigating and charging members of the inner circle of an unspecified nephew of Kadyrov for various crimes including kidnapping, extortion, and organizing a criminal community in both Moscow and Chechnya.[33] The insider source claimed that two high-ranking Chechen security officials lead this inner circle, and that its other members include Chechen police officers and bureaucratic officials.[34] The source claimed that Russian authorities allowed this circle to commit these crimes for “quite a long time” but that “apparently, something is starting to change.”[35] It is possible that Russian authorities are targeting Chechen organized crime activities. This insider source’s specific reference to Kadyrov, however, suggests either that some Russian authorities may seek to target Kadyrov’s affiliates through criminal charges or that some actors may seek to target Kadyrov informationally by using this insider source to discredit him and his family. Kadyrov has notably awarded his children, many of whom are underage, with prominent Chechen governmental positions and awards in recent weeks following the Kremlin’s refusal to become involved when his 15-year-old son Adam was filmed beating a detained man in September 2023, sparking domestic outrage.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days.
• Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8.
• Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.
• Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan.
• Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
• Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas.
• Occupation authorities reportedly continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2023

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[i] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne), and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a video address to the Reuters NEXT conference in New York on November 8 that Ukrainian forces have a battlefield plan for 2024 that he cannot disclose.[iii] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have several paths for future advances in southern Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, and Kherson Oblast. There are also plans to advance to specific occupied cities.[iv] Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations without interruption in several sectors of the front, and Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that these operations will continue into this winter.[v]

Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality in response to another milblogger who questioned why Russian forces were not striking alleged large Ukrainian force concentrations close to the frontline.[vi] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian personnel on the front have access to the “real” map and that Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align the “real” map with the Russian General Staff’s map.[vii] A separate milblogger claimed that there had been previous individual cases of Russian battalion and regiment-level assault operations aimed at achieving compliance with inaccurate maps of the frontline but that this is the first time that he has heard of a wider operational imperative to make advances that comply with a reported General Staff map.[viii] A milblogger claimed that Russian commanders are incentivized to make the tactical gains depicted in the General Staff’s maps because the General Staff increasingly requires positive reports from frontline commanders.[ix] Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized Russian commanders throughout the chain of command for delivering false and overly positive reports to their superiors and have identified the Russian General Staff as fostering this widespread institutional dishonesty.[x]

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.[xi] Putin promoted Kuzmenko to the rank of colonel general following Kuzmenko’s meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during Shoigu’s visit to the Eastern Grouping of Forces command post in the south Donetsk direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) on October 25.[xii] Shoigu’s visit confirmed Kuzmenko's position as the Eastern Grouping of Forces commander and likely the Eastern Military District (EMD) commander. This promotion is likely routine and intended to give Kuzmenko a rank appropriate to his position. Putin also promoted three Russian officers to the rank of lieutenant general, 11 officers to the rank of major general, and 29 internal affairs officers to the rank of major general and lieutenant general.[xiii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.[xiv] Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported on November 8 that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the presidential campaign aims to paint Putin as a leader who made Russia an “island of calm.”[xv] Meduza sources claimed that Putin’s ratings increase after speeches in which he criticizes the West and that Russian state propaganda will encourage this by increasingly publishing stories about “difficulties” in Western countries and the United States’ alleged inability to support Ukraine and Israel simultaneously. A Meduza source also reportedly stated that the campaign would only discuss the war in Ukraine if there were a “very serious [Russian] success” on the front instead of continued “positional warfare.” Putin is reportedly preparing to announce his campaign this month, and Russian sources have consistently indicated that the campaign will not prominently promote the war in Ukraine.[xvi] Putin previously downplayed the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka, referring to it as “active defense,” which would be consistent with these reports.[xvii] The Kremlin-backed United Russia Party also reportedly realized that using the war in Ukraine in their election campaigns in the run up to the September 2023 State Duma elections was ineffective and counterproductive.[xviii] Concerns within the Kremlin and United Russia over domestic support for the war are not indications that United Russia or Putin’s dominance of Russian politics faces a legitimate threat in the upcoming presidential election, however. This campaign framing, if it occurs, would double down on Putin’s refusal to mobilize Russian society to a wartime footing and may increase the informational cost necessary to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine.

Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine. Russian and occupation officials reported on November 8 that a car bomb killed LNR People’s Council member and the LNR Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Colonel Mikhail Filiponenko in occupied Luhansk City.[xix] Filiponenko previously headed the LNR People’s Militia and the LNR’s Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC).[xx] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR agents and Ukrainian partisans conducted the attack.[xxi] GUR stated that Filiponenko organized torture camps for Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) and that Filiponenko personally participated in the torture.[xxii] These accusations would be an apparent violation of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8.
• Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.
• Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8 and advanced in some areas.
• Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus.
• Russian occupation administrations continue to create new administrative bodies meant to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance systems.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2023

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly battalion size. Russian milbloggers amplified a picture on November 6 purporting to show a Ukrainian tracked amphibious transport (PTS) vehicle carrying an infantry fighting vehicle onto the east bank near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River). Other milbloggers claimed on November 7 that a Ukrainian amphibious infantry fighting vehicle crossed the Dnipro River on its own near Krynky and amplified separate footage on November 7 purporting to show a destroyed Western amphibious armored personnel carrier in an unspecified location on the east bank. Select Russian milbloggers claimed that either one or two Ukrainian PTS vehicles crossed the Dnipro near Krynky, while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred several unspecified armored vehicles to the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that more than 300 Ukrainian personnel (about a battalion’s worth) are operating on the east bank in the Krynky area and continue to claim that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Krynky and nearby areas. One milblogger claimed that several hundred Ukrainian personnel are operating throughout east bank Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that combat engagements continued near Krynky, as well as near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), but did not claim that Ukrainian attempts to advance on November 6 and 7 were particularly larger than in previous days.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted initial company-sized assaults across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17 and 18. The reported battalion-size Ukrainian force grouping on the east bank suggests that heavy Russian interdiction efforts along the Dnipro River have not prevented Ukrainian forces from transferring additional personnel and materiel to positions on the east bank. ISW will not speculate on the prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 6 that Ukrainian forces crossed the railway near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut). A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are entrenched in forest areas near Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and that a lack of Russian control of the airspace in the area is complicating Russian artillery fire on these positions.

A prominent pro-war Russian milblogger who is typically optimistic about Russian capabilities expressed a relatively pessimistic assessment of the war and emphasized the need for the Kremlin to fully mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to a wartime footing to win. The milblogger claimed on November 7 that Ukraine is committed to an “exhausting war” against Russia and that Russian needs “enormous combat potential” and an “accurate calculation” of its capabilities to beat Ukraine. Another Russian milblogger expressed surprise that a milblogger who was previously so positive in his assessments of the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine would openly admit to the need for a wider mobilization of the Russian economy in the face of a long war. The Kremlin has largely appeared unwilling to conduct wider economic mobilization, and the milblogger's call to change this line is noteworthy. Yet another Russian milblogger claimed that Russia is ”paying terribly” for the Kremlin’s unwillingness to fully commit to the war. The milbloggers’ suggestion to further mobilize the Russian economy appears to be part of recent discussions in the Russian information space about operational changes that could help Russian forces overcome challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s recent essay on the subject of “positional warfare.” Zaluzhnyi’s essay appears to have prompted even the most positive Russian milbloggers to make more straight and honest assessments about the Russian war effort.

Russian authorities detained Republic of Dagestan's deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on the pretext of corruption charges, likely in an effort to demonstrate that the federal government is taking action in Dagestan without drawing further attention to the interethnic and interreligious tensions and the propensity for destabilization in the region. Russian state media outlet TASS stated on November 7 that Russian security forces detained Dagestani Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Rufat Ismailov and are currently conducting searches of his home and office. Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti further reported that a source within the Russian security forces stated that Ismailov is preliminarily suspected of bribery. A Russian insider source claimed that Ismailov is believed to have received a 100-million-ruble (about $1,085,770) bribe from an insurance company. The insider source and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities transferred Ismailov to Moscow, and the milblogger claimed that this indicates that there are risks of high-level officials at the federal subject level “escaping responsibility.” Russian opposition media outlet SOTA reported that Russian authorities, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), are also investigating the deputy head of the investigative department of the Dagestani Ministry of Internal Affairs, Dalgat Abdulgapurov. Russian authorities previously removed multiple ineffective air defense officials in charge of the defense of Moscow on the pretext of corruption charges after increasing drone strikes on rear Russian cities, showing that there is a recent pattern of Russian authorities using corruption charges to circumvent publicly disciplining Russian officials for not performing their duties well and thereby admitting to their ineptitude. Although ISW has no reason to doubt the charges against Ismailov his detention suggests that Russian authorities are attempting to create a semblance of federal government control over the situation in Dagestan while avoiding highlighting the recent antisemitic riots. ISW similarly assessed that the Russian leadership likely avoided meting out more severe punishments for more serious charges for participants of the antisemitic riots out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.

The Ukrainian strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel. Russian and Ukrainian sources posted photos on November 7 showing significant damage to the Askold Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette that will likely render it inoperable for the foreseeable future. ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly battalion size.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7.
• A prominent pro-war Russian milblogger who is typically optimistic about Russian capabilities expressed a relatively pessimistic assessment of the war and emphasized the need for the Kremlin to fully mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to a wartime footing to win.
• Russian authorities detained Republic of Dagestan's deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on the pretext of corruption charges, likely in an effort to demonstrate that the federal government is taking action in Dagestan without drawing further attention to the interethnic and interreligious tensions and the propensity for destabilization in the region.
• The Ukrainian strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas.
• A Russian battalion comprised of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) will likely deploy to Ukraine in the near future in an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
• Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova advertised several benefit schemes targeting children in occupied Ukraine as part of the "A Country for Children" strategic program.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 6, 2023

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin argued that Russian forces will be “even less capable of offensive operations than they are now” by spring 2024 given the current nature of Russian offensive operations along the frontline.[1] Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, published a hand-written letter from Girkin dated October 26, in which he summarized the frontline situation in Ukraine for the month of October. Girkin claimed that the situation for Russian forces is “gradually deteriorating” and that Russian forces are showcasing “growing weakness (compared to [Ukraine’s] capabilities,” despite Russia’s “generally successful repulsion” of the Ukrainian offensive over the summer and fall of 2023. Girkin argued that Russian forces were not only unable to start broad offensive operations at the beginning of the fall season but were also unable to complete even limited offensive operations to achieve operationally significant goals – namely around Kupyansk, Lyman, and Avdiivka. Girkin claimed that Russian forces failed to advance in the Kupyansk direction and are now impaled in battles on “the distant approaches to the city,” while also failing to change the situation in the Lyman direction. Girkin added that tactical advances around Avdiivka led to significant losses in Russian manpower and equipment and did not lead to the further development of the Russian offensive. Girkin observed that the Avdiivka offensive demonstrated Russian forces’ inability “to achieve superiority on a very narrow sector of the front” despite Russia’s careful preparations, good coordination of strike forces and means for the initial stage of the offensive, and the abundance of ammunition “unheard of since the assault on Bakhmut.”

Girkin suggested that Russian efforts to repel Ukrainian localized attacks across the frontline and simultaneous fall-winter offensive operations will likely degrade Russian offensive and defensive potential by spring 2024. Girkin noted that Russian forces would need to spend the rest of the fall-winter campaign on the defensive to try to eliminate emerging operational crises – such as the Ukrainian presence in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Girkin argued that Russian forces will continue to be “incapable of any broad offensive actions” even if Ukrainian forces are unable to “knock out” Russian frontline units, fail to achieve a breakthrough over the fall-winter season, and are exhausted. Girkin, however, added that such a “positional scenario” is not guaranteed and that he fears that Ukrainian forces may be successful in breaking Russian forces that have already been exhausted by months of combat. Girkin’s suggestion that ongoing Russian offensive operations are harming the prospects for future Russian operations is notable because Russian forces still must repel Ukrainian offensive operations while attempting to initiate their own offensives. The timing of current Russian offensives around Avdiivka was also somewhat odd and suboptimal because the rainy and muddy weather has predictably hindered Russian operations.[2] ISW continues to assess that fall and winter weather conditions are unlikely to preclude Russian or Ukrainian offensives.[3]

Girkin implied that additional Western military aid to Ukraine and the lack of mobilization in Russia could allow Ukraine to end positional warfare and conduct successful offensive operations in 2024. Girkin stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to use Western-provided materiel to target the Russian rear and even destroy the Berdyansk airfield in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast against the backdrop of Russian offensives in Avdiivka. Girkin implied that Ukrainian forces would continue to devastate the Russian rear over the winter as Russian forces continued to push for limited offensive operations. Girkin stated that once Ukraine receives Western-provided F-16 fighter jets, Ukrainian forces could have localized advantages for a short period of time on any section of the frontline. Girkin added that Ukraine could be “seriously strengthened in military-technical terms” with Western military equipment. Girkin also claimed that Ukraine currently has superiority in manpower over Russian forces due to a lack of mobilization in Russia and that the Kremlin is unlikely to call up mobilization before spring 2024 due to upcoming presidential elections. Girkin noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is unlikely to recruit “hundreds of thousands” of new contract servicemen because Russia has exhausted the recruitment potential for new contract servicemen and volunteers. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s long essay, “Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It,” similarly argues that Western-provided military equipment and air superiority among other things will allow Ukraine to overcome positional warfare.[4]

Russian milbloggers appear to be grappling with how Russian forces can overcome wider operational challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s recent essay on the subject of “positional warfare.”  Select milbloggers argued that specific changes in battlefield tactics will allow Russian forces to achieve their desired operational objectives in the current difficult operational environment.[5] Another milblogger argued that Russia should not celebrate Zaluzhnyi’s discussion of Ukrainian difficulties with positional warfare and that Russian forces need to prepare for a long, challenging war.[6] The milblogger argued that Russia is currently no closer to victory in Ukraine and expressed concerns that Russian forces will likely face a renewed Ukrainian counteroffensive in the winter.[7] The milblogger’s discussion of a large Ukrainian counteroffensive effort in the winter suggests that he expects that Russian forces will not completely seize the initiative in the coming months and therefore will not be able to launch a larger offensive effort that would preclude Ukrainian forces from committing resources to counteroffensive operations. The wider Russian information space has offered a relatively muted response to Zaluzhnyi’s essay, and Russian ultranationalists appear to be applying Zaluzhnyi’s discussions about the challenges of the operational environment in Ukraine to Russia’s offensive campaign and not coming to very optimistic conclusions.[8]

Select Russian milbloggers specifically argued that the use of small infantry assault groups will allow both Russian and Ukrainian forces to better achieve operational objectives along the front. Russian milbloggers argued on November 3 and 6 that concentrated attacks with large forces attempting to break through a stable defense to full depth is increasingly ineffective and suggested that small infantry groups with comprehensive support may be more effective at achieving significant operational effects in the current operational environment.[9] One of the milbloggers argued that the initial phases of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive and the ongoing Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka are similar in that both operations made some initial advances at the cost of irretrievable manpower and equipment losses.[10] The milblogger argued that throughout the war in Ukraine, heavy losses during such large, mechanized assaults have prompted Russian and Ukrainian forces to increasingly rely on smaller ad-hoc infantry groups in subsequent operations.[11] The Ukrainian command changed tactics to rely more on infantry assaults following early setbacks in the counteroffensive in June 2023, and Ukrainian forces proceeded to make significant advances in the following months.[12] It remains to be seen if Russian forces will show the same adaptability near Avdiivka, especially since repeated offensive failures suggest that the Russian General Staff has failed to internalize and disseminate lessons learned from previous costly large, mechanized assaults.[13] The milblogger argued that it would be more advantageous to prepare specialized small infantry assault groups with sufficient technological capabilities, specifically in reconnaissance and communication, ahead of offensive operations instead of switching to small infantry assault tactics only after larger, mechanized assaults prove too costly to continue.[14]

Russian sources suggested that some Ukrainian forces may already be fielding the small infantry assault groups that these sources are advocating for. A Russian milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces already appear to be employing this adaptation in ongoing ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, where the milblogger claimed that small Ukrainian assault groups operating at the operational-tactical level have been able to divert considerable Russian combat resources and attention from elsewhere along the front.[15] The milblogger argued that lower-level Russian commanders have previously made some progress in preparing such small infantry groups south of Bakhmut but that the Russian command’s insistence on manpower-intensive frontal assaults quickly rendered these groups combat ineffective.[16] The milblogger’s observations suggest that Ukrainian forces may be once again successfully adapting to aspects of the battlefield in Ukraine while Russian forces struggle to do so. Select elements of the Russian military have shown the propensity for successful adaptation, particularly in defensive operations during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but the Russian command will likely continue to struggle with instituting any successful change in tactics and capabilities writ-large throughout the theater.[17]   

The war in Ukraine is likely exacerbating an emerging identity crisis within Russian society resulting from tensions between Russian identity and Russian nationalism. Russian "Vostok" Battalion Commander and Russian Orthodox ideologue Alexander Khodakovsky wrote two long Telegram posts on November 6 about what it means to be "Russian," acknowledging a schism in Russian national identity that has largely resulted from the ideological arguments advanced to justify and mobilize support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[18] Khodakovsky shared an anecdote of an unidentified Chechen general who, he claimed, conducted a "genetic study" to identify "the ethnic composition " of his Russian friends and found out that "Russian genes" were not dominant.[19] Khodakovsky used this anecdote to offer commentary on what it means to be "Russian," and concluded that it is not "ethnogenetic," but rather a matter of morals and ideologies, observing that Russian nationalism is "hysteria" resulting from a lack of consolidated Russian identity.[20] Khodakovsky thereby appears to offer the suggestion that when one fixates on a genetic definition of what it means to be Russian, the destructive and toxic ideologies of nationalism appear and erase broader and more socio-cultural and linguistic definitions of identity. Khodakovsky warned that a population that lacks a coherent identity can easily destroy itself from within.[21]

Khodakovsky's musings offer insight into some socio-cultural implications of Russia's pursuit of ideological goals in its war in Ukraine. In several ways, the war has narrowed the conception of what it means to be Russian among Russian ideologues, particularly as concepts of identity are increasingly defined by hyper-nationalist and pro-war information space voices who amplify the Kremin's ideological line on the war and redirect it at domestic audiences.[22] Whereas Russian identity was largely defined before the war linguistically and culturally as enshrined in the Russian concepts of "compatriots abroad" and "Russkyi Mir," the war has focused Russian identity more narrowly on Russian ethnonationalism that echoes the Kremlin's ideological justifications for the war.[23] Russia's deliberate campaign to "Russify" Ukraine through the invasion has generated clear social impacts within Russia itself, particularly aimed at ethnic minority and migrant communities, which have paradoxically been forced by the Russian government to bear the brunt of force generation efforts for the war.[24] Russian nationalist commentators have increasingly fixated on demographic transitions facing Russia particularly relating to the balance between “Russians” and “minorities” within the Russian population, further reinforcing concepts of what it means for Russia to be a fundamentally "Russian" state.[25] Khodakovsky responded to this apparent schism in Russian society by underlining some of the inherent dangers of defining what it means to be Russian as a matter of genetics and notably drew criticism from some more virulently nationalist commentators for being "Russophobic" in his conclusions.[26] Both Khodakovsky's observations and the immediate response to his conclusions underline a fundamental dilemma facing Russia as it continues its war in Ukraine—the dilemma of how to reconcile the hyper-nationalist ideologies on which the Kremlin increasingly relies to justify the war and demand greater sacrifices from its people with Moscow’s desire to continue to increase the burden of mobilization on disenfranchised minority communities, while also maintaining a sense of Russian identity that society can coalesce behind as the war continues.

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against rear areas in southern Ukraine on the evening of November 5 and on the night of November 5 to 6 as well as the largest series of glide bomb strikes to date against targets in Kherson Oblast on November 5. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched a Kh-59 cruise missile at Dnipro City and a Kh-31P anti-radar missile at Odesa City on November 5.[27] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian air defenses shot down the Kh-59 missile and that the Kh-31P missile struck an infrastructure facility in Odesa City.[28] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also conducted missile and drone strikes on the night of November 5 to 6 with a Kh-31 anti-radar missile and a Kh-59 cruise missile launched from occupied Kherson Oblast, a P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile and an Iskander-M ballistic missile launched from occupied Crimea, and 22 Shahed-131/136 drones launched from Cape Chauda, occupied Crimea.[29] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Kh-59 missile and 15 drones.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian strikes targeted port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Kherson City and damaged residential buildings, port infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, and other civil infrastructure.[31] Ukrainian Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that a Russian strike partially damaged the Odesa National Art Museum.[32] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated that Russian forces launched 87 glide bombs on populated areas in Kherson Oblast on November 5 - the largest number of glide bombs that Russian forces have launched to date since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[33]

The Russian military appears to have increased its stock of high-precision missiles due to reported increases in Russian missile production more rapidly than previous forecasts had suggested. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi stated on November 6 that Russian forces have a total of 870 high-precision operational-strategic and strategic missiles in reserve. Skibitskyi previously stated on August 28 that Russian forces had a total of 585 long-range missiles in reserve, indicating that Russian forces have increased their missile reserves by 285 missiles since August.[34] Skibitskyi added on November 6 that Russian forces produced a total of 115 long-range high-precision missiles in October: 30 Iskander-M cruise missiles, 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, 20 Kalibr cruise missiles, 40 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 9 Kh-32 cruise missiles, and 4 Kinzhal ballistic missiles.[35] Skibitiskyi stated on August 28 that Russian defense enterprises were struggling to produce several dozens of specific types of missiles a month due to foreign component shortages, and the increase of 285 missiles in Russian reserves since late August — with 115 of that total being produced in October alone — indicates that Russia has increased its domestic production of missiles faster than had been forecasted.[36]

Skibitskyi also commented on Russian domestic drone production on November 6, stating that the GUR has not observed the movement of Shahed drones from Iran to Russia as Iran has fulfilled its first Shahed supply contracts with Russia.[37] Skibitskyi stated that Iran may still send small batches of Shaheds to Russia, however.[38] Skibitskyi also stated that Russia has begun to increase the domestic assembly of Shahed drones with components from Iran including at the factory in Alabuga, Tatarstan Republic.[39] Skibitskyi added that predicted Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the upcoming winter will likely not be as “primitive” as the strike series during the winter of 2022-2023.[40] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has recently commented on Ukraine’s urgent need for air defense systems.[41]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[42] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Krasnohorivka (6km northwest of Avdiivka) between November 3 and November 5, thereby forcing Russian troops to withdraw from part of the railway track in the area.[43]  The Russian “Russkiy Legion” (BARS-13) irregular armed formation claimed that Ukrainian forces were successfully pressuring Russian forces near Stepove and the "Tsarska Okhota" restaurant south of Avdiivka.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin argued that Russian forces will be “even less capable of offensive operations than they are now” by spring 2024 given the current nature of Russian offensive operations along the frontline.
• Russian milbloggers appear to be grappling with how Russian forces can overcome wider operational challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s recent essay on the subject of “positional warfare,” and not coming to optimistic conclusions.
• Select Russian milbloggers specifically argued that the use of small infantry assaults groups will allow both Russian and Ukrainian forces to better achieve operational objectives along the front. Russian sources suggested that some Ukrainian forces may already be fielding the small infantry assault groups that these sources are advocating for.
• The war in Ukraine is likely exacerbating an emerging identity crisis within Russian society resulting from tensions between Russian identity and Russian nationalism.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drones strikes against rear areas in southern Ukraine on the evening of November 5 and on the night of November 5 to 6 as well as the largest series of glide bomb strikes to date against targets in Kherson Oblast on November 5.
• The Russian military appears to have increased its stock of high-precision missiles due to reported increases in Russian missile production more rapidly than previous forecasts had suggested.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on November 6.
• Russian occupation officials are expanding military recruitment and registration offices in occupied territories, likely in support of coercive mobilization efforts.
• Russian officials continue to weaponize youth engagement programs to consolidate social control of occupied areas of Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2023

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. The Ukrainian Amed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes on Russian marine and port infrastructure at the Zalyv Shipyard in Kerch on the evening of November 4.[i] Satellite imagery from November 4 shows that the strike damaged a Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette at the shipyard, although the extent of the damage to the ship is currently unclear.[ii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 13 of 15 Ukrainian missiles targeting the shipyard and acknowledged that two missiles damaged an unspecified ship.[iii] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian cruise missiles damaged the Askold missile carrier, a Karakurt-class corvette that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) launched in 2021.[iv] The Zalyv shipyard reportedly planned to construct 14 warships intended for the BSF between 2016 and 2021, including eight Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvettes.[v] ISW has only confirmed that three Project 228000 Karakurt-class corvettes have launched from the Zalyv shipyard as of 2023, however.[vi] The Zalyv shipyard is the largest shipyard in Eastern Europe and is likely the main repair facility for the BSF in Crimea following a successful Ukraine strike on the Russian state-owned ship repair facility Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol on September 13, 2023.[vii] The extent of damage to the repair facilities at the Zalyv Shipyard is unclear, although the available satellite imagery suggests that the Ukrainian strike has likely not caused damage that will disrupt its operations in the medium-to-long term, unlike the previous strike on the Sevmorzavod facility.[viii] Radio Free Europe/Free Liberty (RFE/RL) has reported that Russian forces have three active shipyards, including the Zalyv facility, in occupied Crimea.[ix] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[x]

Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk, occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of November 4-5.[xi] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also disabled Ukrainian drones targeting a railway at an oil refinery in Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea on November 5.[xii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow missile strike on Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5.[xiii] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoria Halitsyna stated that locals reported two explosions in the city but that the Ukrainian General Staff was clarifying information.[xiv] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of the Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov notably stated in an interview with the Independent published on November 4 that Ukrainian forces intend to “capitalize” on their learned experiences and conduct large-scale drone strikes on Russian targets when fighting slows in the winter.[xv] The Independent reported that Baranov stated that Ukraine intends to build on its “significant successes” with recent drone strikes that targeted critical Russian military assets and naval sites.[xvi]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to NBC and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate. Zelensky emphasized that the situation on the battlefield remains very challenging but noted that he does not believe that the war is at a "stalemate." He described it instead as a "check on the part of the Russian army," suggesting that Ukraine can resume making significant advances when it resolves the military parity with Russian forces described by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.[xvii] Zelensky noted that Ukraine continues to destroy Russian Black Sea Fleet assets and continued to reiterate Ukraine’s urgent need to receive air defense systems from Western partners. Zelensky further noted that Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia until or unless Russia entirely withdraws from Ukrainian territories, concluding that Ukraine is not ready to concede its freedom to the "f###ig terrorist Putin."[xviii] ISW continues to assess that external pressure to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia is harmful and counterproductive as long as Putin maintains his maximalist objectives and believes that he can attain them on the battlefield.[xix]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[xx] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have made limited advances west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast), as well as on the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Pidstepne (12km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[xxi]

Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov’s exact position. Chechen Duma Chairperson Magomed Daudov, Chechen Republic Press Head Akhmed Dudaev, and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov stated that Adam holds an unspecified “important position” in the security service of the Head of the Chechen Republic.[xxii] Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs special regiment commander Zamid Chalaev and Health Minister Adam Alkhanov claimed that Adam Kadyrov was appointed as the head of this security service.[xxiii] Ramzan Kadyrov has not yet commented on his son’s appointment. Ramzan Kadyrov notably headed the security service of his father, former Chechen Republic President Akhmat Kadyrov, in the early 2000s until Akhmat Kadyrov’s death in 2004.[xxiv] Adam Kadyrov will turn 16-years-old on November 24, 2023.[xxv]

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments. Russian authorities reportedly charged many of the antisemitic riot participants with using obscene language, disobedience of police orders, petty hooliganism, and violations of procedures for holding a rally.[xxvi] Dagestani courts sentenced rioters to six to 10 days of administrative arrest or compulsory labor. ISW previously assessed that the Russian leadership is likely avoiding wider punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.[xxvii]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2023

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that the war in Ukraine is not a “stalemate” in a comment to the media about Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s essay on the positional nature of warfare in Ukraine.
• Zaluzhny’s long essay, “Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It,” outlines Zaluzhnyi’s consideration of the changes Ukraine must make to overcome the current “positional” stage of the war more clearly than the shorter op-ed and Economist article it accompanied.
• Zelensky also denied Western reports that US and European officials are pressuring Ukrainian officials to discuss the possibility of peace negotiations.
• NBC added that US officials have no indication that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to negotiate with Ukraine or doubts that Russia can continue its war until Western aid for Ukraine falters.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) allegedly used claims that the Syrian government agreed to supply weapons to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah to subsume remnants of the Wagner Group in Syria and seize their air defense systems.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on November 3 and 4.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 4.
• English-language Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the Russian government dismissed TASS General Director Sergei Mikhailov on July 5 due to TASS’s failure to align with Kremlin narratives while reporting on the Wagner Group rebellion.
• The Russian government is testing an electronic voting system ahead of the 2024 presidential elections, likely to further support efforts to manipulate the results in favor of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, north and south of Bakhmut, around Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, near Vuhledar, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast, and advanced in various sectors of the front.
• The BBC and Russian opposition media outlet Mediazona confirmed that at least 35,780 Russian servicemen have died in the war in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, as of November 3, 2023, including 923 deaths in the past two weeks.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to settle Russian citizens in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2023

• Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on November 3, primarily aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for failing to establish long-term training capabilities because it is keeping skilled commanders and soldiers at the front and leaving inexperienced careerists to train new recruits and officers.
• Alleged long-time allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin are reportedly financing two Russian Ministry of Defense–subordinated private military companies that have subsumed former Wagner Group operations in Africa.
• Wagner elements in Syria will reportedly transfer Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to provide to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Dagestani officials claimed they would punish those who participate in and organize alleged future demonstrations, in contrast to calls for leniency for those participating in the October 29 antisemitic riots.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s continued appeals to Chechen nationalists likely aim to solidify domestic support without disrupting his appearance as a steadfast supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, near Vuhledar, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers began advertising recruitment into an “elite regiment” in Moscow Oblast and offering recruits one-million-ruble (about $10,900) salaries.
• Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to discredit information about Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children.

Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four dozen Shahed-131/-136 drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and a Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Kherson Oblast at targets in Ukraine.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down the Kh-59 cruise missile and 24 of the Shahed drones.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces intercepted over half of the roughly 40 drones that Russian forces launched at Ukraine.[iii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck targets in Kharkiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Odesa oblasts, and Zelensky stated that Ukrainian air defenses activated in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Lviv oblasts.[iv] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces primarily struck civil infrastructure, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Military Administration Head Svitlana Onyshchuk stated that Russian forces struck an unspecified military facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[v] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched small groups of Shaheds to identify the locations of Ukrainian air defenses and then launched several waves of drones to complicate the Ukrainian response.[vi] Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, stated that Russian forces plan to launch more damaging strikes throughout Ukraine as winter approaches.[vii]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on November 3, primarily aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses. The US DoD announced an aid package of military materiel support for Ukraine valued at $125 million, including munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and over three million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades.[viii] The US DoD will also allocate $300 million to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses over the long term. The US DoD will provide Ukraine laser-guided munitions to counter UAVs under USAI.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[ix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled eight Ukrainian assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast and several Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut from October 28 to November 3.[x]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for failing to establish long-term training capabilities because it is keeping skilled commanders and soldiers at the front and leaving inexperienced careerists to train new recruits and officers. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russia continues to only learn from its mistakes at the cost of significant losses and that the Russian military command fails to teach effective tactics employed by competent commanders and servicemen to new personnel.[xi] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command commits the most capable commanders and servicemen to the most dangerous frontlines in Ukraine instead of using them to train the incoming class of Russian soldiers. The milblogger added that Russia needs to resolve this problem on a systemic level, otherwise newly formed units will repeat prior Russian mistakes on the frontline. Another Russian milblogger responded to the milblogger’s critiques, noting that Russia needs to have experienced servicemen teach graduating classes at Russian military schools since graduates only study theory and do not receive any practice in modern warfare.[xii] The milblogger implied that there are problems with Russian military theory and a lack of proper officer training because generals and officers who receive teaching positions do not have combat experience and only care about their own career growth. The milblogger concluded that the poor command of Russian operations in the Avdiivka direction and near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) indicates that Russian generals do not think about the wellbeing of the Russian Armed Forces in the long-term.

Alleged long-time allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin are reportedly financing two Russian Ministry of Defense–subordinated private military companies that have subsumed former Wagner Group operations in Africa. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), including Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), is continuing efforts to subsume Wagner Group activities in Africa under the MoD-subordinated Redut and Convoy private military companies (PMCs).[xiii] WSJ reported that Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko, two Russian billionaires who have known Putin for decades and are in Putin’s inner circle, are financing Convoy and Redut, respectively. This decision is likely an attempt to prevent a single PMC and single financier from again gaining the power and influence to potentially threaten Putin and the Russian central leadership. ISW has previously assessed that Putin routinely appoints people to positions such that no one figure amasses too much political influence.[xiv] WSJ also reported that Konstantin Pikalov leads Convoy PMC and that Konstantin Mirzayants leads Redut PMC. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartopolov stated on November 3 that Wagner has “completely disbanded” and that some Wagner fighters continue to operate in Africa but under a “different brand” under the Russian MoD.[xv]

Wagner elements in Syria will reportedly transfer Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to provide to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah. (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) November 3 Iran Update) CNN reported on November 3 that two people familiar with US intelligence stated that Assad agreed to provide the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah and tasked Wagner with their delivery during joint conversations between the three actors.[xvi] WSJ reported on November 2 that US intelligence indicated that Wagner itself would give the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah.[xvii] Israel frequently conducts airstrikes on Iranian weapons shipments into and through Syria, and Assad may have asked Wagner to deliver the air defense systems to Hezbollah to act as a deterrent to potential Israeli interdiction efforts.[xviii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia may be able to facilitate weapons shipments in Syria without risking Israeli airstrikes, and the Kremlin may believe that this Israeli reluctance will extend to Wagner.[xix] Russia and Israel have a complex relationship in Syria, as Israel has historically relied on Russia to curb Iranian activities in Syria.[xx]

Dagestani officials claimed they would punish those who participate in and organize alleged future demonstrations, in contrast to calls for leniency for those participating in the October 29 antisemitic riots. The office of the Mayor of Makhachkala called on local residents to refrain from participating in unauthorized rallies, including one allegedly planned for November 5, and preemptively threatened that participants and "those who provoke the population” will face “serious consequences.”[xxi] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Telegram channels continue to call on Dagestani residents to attend a November 5 demonstration to demand the release of those detained for the October 29 antisemitic riots.[xxii] A Russian milblogger continued to criticize the weak official response to the recent riots, stating that “to have mercy means to show weakness.”[xxiii]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s continued appeals to Chechen nationalists likely aim to solidify domestic support without disrupting his appearance as a steadfast supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kadyrov announced on November 3 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree assigning original Chechen names to eight Chechen villages that suffered from Stalin-era deportations and that Soviet authorities disbanded.[xxiv] Russian officials have increasingly suppressed acknowledgements of Stalinist deportations, yet the Kremlin’s support for reversing Stalin’s 1944 order disbanding these Chechen villages suggests that Kadyrov is coordinating his rhetorical appeals with the Kremlin.[xxv] This likely rhetorical overture follows similar allusions to Chechen national history from Kadyrov, who recently named two new Chechen volunteer battalions after 18th and 19th Century Chechen fighters who resisted Russian imperial rule.[xxvi] These allusions to Chechen national history are a low stakes approach to currying favor with Chechen nationalists who may have negative attitudes towards the Kremlin and Kadyrov’s avowed support of Putin. Kadyrov’s rhetorical support for historical Chechen nationalism diverts conversations away from his current support of the increasingly ultranationalist Kremlin, while only drawing temporary ire from select Russian ultranationalists.[xxvii]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2023

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces headquarters in Kherson Oblast on November 1.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 2.
• The Russian information space’s reaction to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s November 1 interview and essay about the current operational environment in Ukraine was relatively muted.
• South Korean officials reported that North Korea is reportedly increasing its weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia and has reportedly delivered more than one million artillery rounds to date.
• The Wagner Group is reportedly planning to provide Hezbollah with Pantsir-S1 air defense systems.
• A Russian State Duma official attempted to deny ongoing claims that Rosgvardia will structurally absorb the Wagner Group private military company (PMC), rather than individually recruit former Wagner personnel.
• Select Russian milbloggers accused Chechen officials and Akhmat Spetsnaz of attempting to defame and censor milbloggers who criticized Wagner’s integration into Rosgvardia.
• Russian officials appear to be pursuing limited punishments for the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan, which several Russian officials and Russian state media have called “pogroms.”
• Russian authorities elsewhere in the North Caucasus have indicated concerns about the potential for similar riots.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Russian irregular forces are continuing to form new assault detachments and are incentivizing recruitment by offering recruits semi-independence from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Recent Russian border restrictions are reportedly complicating the return of Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces headquarters in Kherson Oblast on November 1.[i] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched Storm Shadow cruise missiles and Neptune anti-ship missiles targeting Strilkove, Kherson Oblast, on the Arabat Spit and that Russian air defenses only intercepted half of the missiles.[ii] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, the recently named commander of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces operating in the Kherson direction, was uninjured.[iii] Russian opposition media outlet Astra reported that four Ukrainian missiles struck the “Aura” recreation center near Strilkove that served as the Russian Dnepr Grouping’s headquarters.[iv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 2. Geolocated footage published on November 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further northeast of the railway line near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[v] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[vi]

The Russian information space’s reaction to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s November 1 interview and essay about the current operational environment in Ukraine was relatively muted. Several Russian sources simply summarized Zaluzhnyi’s points, while others suggested that Zaluzhnyi was primarily acknowledging the superiority of Soviet-era military strategy over NATO doctrine.[vii] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed disagreement with Zaluzhnyi’s conclusions and stated that the war has not reached a “dead end.”[viii]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2023

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace.[i] In an essay entitled "Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It" and an interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi outlined the current operational environment in Ukraine and noted that, despite several previously successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2022, the war is now "gradually moving to a positional form."[ii] Zaluzhnyi heavily stressed that the current positional nature of the war is largely a result of military parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces, noting that a deep and dramatic Ukrainian penetration of Russian lines will likely not be possible with the relative technological and tactical equilibrium currently between Ukrainian and Russian forces.[iii] In his interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that technological and tactical parity between opposing forces in Ukraine has resulted in a "stalemate" similar to the case of the First World War.[iv] In the more extensive essay on the subject, Zaluzhnyi notably refrained from classifying the situation as a full stalemate and instead framed it as a "positional" war resulting from aspects of this technological-tactical parity.[v] According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine's ability to overcome this technological-tactical parity will be contingent on Ukraine's ability to secure five main operational components that have become particularly significant since the summer of 2023 — gaining air superiority; breaching Russian mine barriers in depth; increasing the effectiveness of counterbattery combat; creating and training the necessary reserves; and building up electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.

Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces. Regarding the issue of air superiority, Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to significantly improve drone capabilities to gain air superiority along the frontline.[vi] Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to overload Russian air defenses, neutralize Russian strike drones, and degrade Russian visibility over the front by deploying cheap drones en masse, developing specific drones meant to target Russian strike drones, and employing EW complexes throughout the front.[vii] Zaluzhnyi argued that to overcome the challenges of EW use on the frontline, Ukrainian forces need to introduce necessary command and control (C2) processes for EW complexes, increase EW production capabilities, and streamline engagements with volunteer organizations that provide smaller EW complexes to Ukrainian forces.[viii] Zaluzhnyi also recommended that Ukrainian forces improve counter-EW measures and develop new drones with EWs in mind.[ix] To gain counterbattery superiority, Zaluzhnyi recommended that Ukrainian forces use more reconnaissance and strike drones to improve Ukrainian counterbattery fire and argued that Ukrainian forces need to strengthen GPS support for Ukrainian counterbattery units and increase the number of counterbattery assets.[x] Zaluzhnyi stated that improved sensors, more widespread and varied mine clearing capabilities, and anti-drone equipment will allow Ukrainian forces to more successfully breach Russian mine barriers in depth while under concealment.[xi]

Zaluzhnyi also highlighted wider administrative adaptations and domestic developments in addition to his specific tactical battlefield solutions. Zaluzhnyi specifically called on Ukraine to introduce a Unified State Register for draftees, reservists, and those liable for military service to prepare a necessary reserve for Ukrainian forces.[xii] Zaluzhnyi more broadly called on Ukrainian officials to incentivize Ukrainian citizens to join the military reserve and expand the number of citizens that Ukrainian forces are allowed to train.[xiii] Zaluzhnyi also noted that improving Ukrainian C2 and logistics support will be critical to improving operations writ large.[xiv] Zaluzhnyi stated that the formation of a "single information environment" for C2 through the use of modern information technology will allow Ukrainians to get ahead of Russian forces in terms of situational awareness.[xv] Zaluzhnyi particularly highlighted the need for Ukraine to develop its own defense industry to sustain operations, long-range strike capabilities, and an asymmetric munitions arsenal to break out of military parity with Russian forces.[xvi]

Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces near Avdiivka have largely slowed the pace of ground attacks north and south of Avdiivka in favor of heavy indirect fire against Ukrainian frontline positions and near rear areas. Russian forces may be conducting an interdiction campaign against Ukrainian assets in the Avdiivka area, but this heavy fire is more likely air and artillery preparation for the battlefield ahead of another wave of Russian assaults.[xvii] Other milbloggers also characterized the current Russian operations as “preparatory support,” presumably for later assaults.[xviii] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun also notably stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct “meat assaults” (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training “Storm-Z” assault units made largely of convict recruits for future assaults without equipment.[xix]

Russian forces may be preparing to transition to such infantry-led frontal assaults following heavy artillery preparation to compensate for heavy materiel losses in Avdiivka over the course of October. Open-source geolocation project GeoConfirmed used commercially available satellite imagery to verify that Russian forces have suffered at least 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles since October 9, losing 99 vehicles during the first wave of assaults between October 9 and 13, 94 vehicles during the second wave between October 14 and 23, and four confirmed and 18 potentially lost vehicles between October 24 and31.[xx] GeoConfirmed characterized the Russian effort near Avdiivka as the costliest Russian effort thus far in the war in Ukraine.[xxi]

The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater. Various Russian elements have engaged in similarly catastrophic mechanized attacks with infantry-led frontal assaults on fortified Ukrainian positions along several different axes over the course of 2022 and 2023, suggesting that the ultimate fault in the lack of strategic adaptation lies with the General Staff. Russian forces previously suffered significant personnel and materiel losses during an unsuccessful offensive against Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast in winter 2022-2023, which was characterized by multiple waves of mechanized attacks against fortified Ukrainian positions.[xxii] These infantry-heavy assaults completely destroyed the Russian units involved in them, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), which reportedly had to reconstitute several times due to losses suffered near Vuhledar.[xxiii] By contrast, elements of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps, operating under the command of the Southern Military District's 8th Combined Arms Army, and elements of the Central Military District's 41st Combined Arms Army, have recently conducted analogous costly mechanized assaults near Avdiivka.[xxiv] The fact that two very distinct groupings of forces have engaged in similarly ineffective operations suggests that the Russian military command is struggling to learn and disseminate lessons across the theater or, in the case, even within the same military district.[xxv] The Russian General Staff is in principle responsible for learning lessons, adapting Russian doctrine, and disseminating lessons and new approaches throughout the force. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for this failure both in his capacity of chief of the Russian General Staff and as overall theater commander. The contrast between Gerasimov’s failure in this regard and General Zaluzhnyi’s thoughtful and public evaluation of the challenges facing Ukraine and the solutions to them is notable.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[xxvi] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Zelenopillya (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and along a section of the railway line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[xxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced from Shcherbaky (18km west of Orikhiv) towards Myrne (16km southwest of Orikhiv) and made gains west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[xxviii]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu stated during a conference call on November 1 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson directions, grouping Ukrainian activity in the Kherson direction with directions recognized as currently part of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts.[xxix] Putin described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the “next [Ukrainian] counteroffensive” and dismissed all Ukrainian offensive operations as failures during a press conference in Beijing on October 18.[xxx]

Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 1 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59 missiles and 20 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian air defenses downed all three of the Kh-59 missiles and 18 Shahed drones.[xxxi] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck an oil refinery in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[xxxii] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also struck the Myrhorod airfield in Poltava Oblast.[xxxiii] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces are targeting “weak points” in Ukrainian air defenses.[xxxiv] Ihnat added that Russian forces are looking at several different courses of action to replenish weapons stocks for continued strikes this fall and winter.

The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on November 1 that sources close to the Russian military leadership stated that the Russian Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets and Caspian Flotilla will return to direct subordination under Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolai Evmenov on December 1.[xxxv] The Russian Northern Fleet (NF) will also lose its status as a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district effective December 1, and its ground, aviation, and air defense forces will be transferred to the newly re-created Leningrad Military District. TASS noted that this information has not been officially confirmed. The Russian federal portal of draft regulator legal acts published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which proposed stripping the NF of its status as a joint "strategic territorial association,” signaling that this change would happen in the future but not specifying a date. [xxxvi] It remains unclear how Russia intends to mobilize, train, and organize forces previously under its fleets into new military district-level formations, but this restructuring writ large suggests that Russia intends to reconsolidate control of ground forces under the military district structure, including the newly re-created Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, while separating the naval assets under the Russian Navy.

Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia. Russian regional news outlets reported on November 1 that the Wagner Group has resumed recruiting in Perm and Novosibirsk oblasts under Pavel’s leadership.[xxxvii] Russian outlet Ngs.ru reported that a Wagner representative in Novosibirsk stated that Wagner is no longer recruiting criminals or people with illnesses.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Pavel is the new leader of the remnants of Wagner and expressed hope that Pavel’s appointment is an indication that Wagner will survive its subordination to Rosgvardia.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace. Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces.
• Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area.
• The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.
• The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy.
• Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in various sectors of the front.