Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments, September 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 30, 2024

The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian government submitted a bill on the federal budget for 2025 to 2027 to the State Duma on September 30.[i] The bill projects federal revenues to be 40.3 trillion rubles ($433 billion) in 2025 and federal expenditures to amount to 41.5 trillion rubles ($446 billion). The budget calls for 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) to go towards "National Defense" expenditures in 2025 and projects that defense spending will decrease to 12.8 trillion rubles ($137 billion) in 2026 but increase to 13 trillion rubles ($139 billion) in 2027.[ii] The 2025 budget also calls for 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) towards "National Security" — meaning that Russia plans to commit about 41 percent of its expenditures in 2025 to combined "defense" and "security" expenses. The budget notably allocates 14.03 billion rubles ($151 million) annually from 2025 to 2027 to the creation of a mobilization reserve in the Russian Armed Forces.[iii] The bill calls for about 40 billion rubles ($430 million) in 2025 to fund the "Defenders of the Fatherland Fund," which supports Russian veterans and their families.[iv] The Russian government is also earmarking significant funding towards developing new technologies. The 2025–2027 budget allocates 6.1 trillion rubles ($65 billion) for measures to "achieve technological leadership," 234.4 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) for machine-tool production, 112.1 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) for the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" production project, 46.9 billion rubles ($504 million) for the development of new nuclear and energy technologies, and 175.3 billion rubles ($1.8 billion) for the development of radio and microelectronics.[v] Increases in defense spending do not necessarily equate to increased military capabilities, however, especially when significant funding is going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families.

The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pro-natalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of these programs. The "Social Policy" section of the 2025 budget accounts for 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion).[vi] The bill allocates about 4 trillion rubles ($43 billion) between 2025 and 2027 for payments to people with children and about 1.7 trillion rubles ($18 billion) for Russia's maternity capital program through 2030. The budget accounts for 1.57 trillion rubles ($16 billion) for education in 2025, and healthcare spending accounts for 1.86 trillion rubles ($20 billion) in 2025 and 2026. The Russian government has allocated 824 billion rubles ($8.8 million) for the payment of state pensions in 2025 and 1.36 trillion rubles ($14 billion) for recently announced pension increases.[vii] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that the Russian government press release highlighted funding for pregnant women, families with children, national projects, and regional support but did not mention defense spending.[viii] Kremlin officials similarly highlighted social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending on September 29 when the Cabinet of Ministers initially approved the draft federal budget, likely due to the Kremlin's wariness about war fatigue among the Russian population.[ix] Sustained high levels of defense spending in the coming years during a protracted war in Ukraine and continued military preparations for a possible conflict with NATO will make it more difficult for the Kremlin to sustain funding for the social programs that the Russian population cares about, such as pension increases and healthcare. Increased defense spending will also affect the long-term effectiveness of the Kremlin's efforts to use financial incentives to increase Russia's birth rate and reverse Russia's demographic crisis.[x] Popular demands for increased social and decreased defense funding in the future may also hamper the Kremlin's ability to sustain its war in Ukraine as Russian President Vladimir Putin must take his regime's stability and domestic support into account.

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted presidential aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council alongside three other officials.[xi] Putin signed a decree on September 30 updating the membership of the Russian Security Council — a key Russian consultative body that informs Putin’s decisions on national security issues. Putin added Dyumin, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, Head of the Russian Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA) Veronika Skvortsova, and Head of the Kremlin’s Main Directorate for Special Programs (GUSP) Alexander Linets to the Russian Security Council.[xii] Putin removed First Deputy Speaker of the Russian Federal Council Vladimir Yakushev from the Russian Security Council after removing Yakushev from his role as the Kremlin Representative to the Urals Federal District on September 24.[xiii] Dyumin is the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council at 52 years old and has been a loyal supporter of Putin's regime since he served as Putin’s bodyguard beginning in 1999.[xiv] The Russian Security Council is mostly composed of officials of Putin’s generation (with most born in the 1950s), and Dyumin's appointment suggests that Putin is preparing a new generation of officials.[xv] Putin has been steadily promoting Dyumin since the Wagner Group armed rebellion in June 2023, with Dyumin becoming the presidential aide for the defense industrial base (DIB) and secretary of the advisory State Council in May 2024.[xvi] Putin later tasked Dyumin with supervising the Russian response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[xvii] Putin also recently promoted Manturov (who is 55 years old) to the position of first deputy prime minister in May 2024, despite previously using Manturov as a scapegoat for Russian DIB problems and the inadequate response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[xviii] Skvortsova (63 years old) previously served as the Russian Minister of Health between 2012 and 2020 before becoming the head of FMBA, and Putin recently reappointed Skvortsova to the position of FMBA head in late June 2024.[xix] Linets (61 years old) previously served as the deputy chief of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of the 20th Combined Arms Army and as head of FSB Directorate for the Southern Military District (SMD) before assuming his current role in 2015.[xx] Linets has also served as a member of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission since 2015.

The Kremlin continues to use state and regional awards to co-opt previously critical milbloggers as part of wider efforts to gain control over the information space. Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Russian milblogger and Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny with the Hero of Russia award on September 30 for "demonstrating heroism" while performing official duties.[xxi] Putin personally called Poddubny in August 2024 after Poddubny sustained injuries while reporting from Kursk Oblast.[xxii] Poddubny served as a "trusted person" in Putin's presidential campaigns in 2018 and 2024.[xxiii]  The Kremlin had been increasingly trying to use Poddubny to disseminate official narratives in the Russian ultranationalist information space by appointing him to Kremlin-run initiatives and highlighting his reports on Russian state media since late 2022.[xxiv]

Russian milblogger Roman Alekhin claimed on September 30 that Russian authorities awarded him the "Defender of Kursk Oblast" medal, thanked Kursk Oblast Governor Alexey Smirnov for trusting him, and proclaimed that he serves Russia and the Russian people.[xxv] Alekhin has long been critical of Russian authorities and rhetorically attacked Smirnov on his Telegram channel in July 2024.[xxvi] Smirnov appointed Alekhin as a volunteer advisor following these July 2024 attacks, at which point Alekhin claimed that he is taking responsibility for and acting upon his previous criticisms of the Kursk Oblast government.[xxvii]  Alekhin's September 30 statements suggest that Russian authorities have successfully used appointments and awards to coopt a critical voice. The Kremlin has used similar methods in the past, such as by including Alexander "Sasha" Kots in the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights in 2022 and awarding Mikhail Zvinchuk of the Rybar Telegram channel with presidential and Ministry of Defense (MoD) honors in late 2023.[xxviii]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran on September 30 to meet with various Iranian officials and highlight Russo–Iranian economic cooperation.[xxix] Mishustin met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and stated that he expects that Russia and Iran will sign the anticipated comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement at the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, from October 22 to 24.[xxx] Mishustin also met with Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref to talk about opportunities for Russian investment in "various fields" in Iran and notably met with Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad.[xxxi] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali reported that Mishustin's visit to Iran will particularly focus on developing trade and economic ties between the two countries.[xxxii] Russian and Iranian officials likely view expanded economic and financial cooperation as a necessary component of generally intensified Russo–Iranian relations.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pronatalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of these programs.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Presidential Aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council alongside three other officials.
• The Kremlin continues to use state and regional awards to coopt previously critical milbloggers as part of wider efforts to gain control over the information space.
• Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran on September 30 to meet with various Iranian officials and highlight Russo-Iranian economic cooperation.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkvosky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on September 30 the decree on Russia’s usual semi-annual fall conscription for 133,000 draftees.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2024

Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD), in collaboration with the Danish DIB, announced on September 29 the establishment of a defense industrial hub at the Danish embassy in Kyiv with the aim of enhancing Danish-Ukrainian defense industrial cooperation.[1] The Danish initiative aims to support Danish defense and dual-use companies that want to establish production or partnerships with Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Troels Lund Poulsen also signed a Letter of Intent on September 29 that pledges Danish financial support for defense production in Ukraine.[2] Denmark will allocate a total of 575 million euros ($641 million) for investment in the Ukrainian DIB, with 175 million euros ($195 million) coming directly from the Danish budget and an additional 400 million euros ($446 million) from profits from frozen Russian assets.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners.[4] ISW has assessed the importance of sustained and timely Western military support for Ukraine, particularly Western assistance to develop Ukraine’s DIB, so that Ukraine can become more self-sufficient and reduce its reliance on Western military aid in the long-term.[5]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian media reported on September 29 that drone operators of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the facility and suggested that a shipment of an unspecified number of Iranian missiles recently arrived at the facility.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the strike caused a fire and secondary ammunition denotations at the facility. Satellite imagery captured on September 29 shows that the strikes likely caused a fire just northwest of the facility, and data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies in this area.[7] Kotluban Head Igor Davydenko stated that Ukrainian drones attempted to strike the area but did not cause any damage to the facility, although a local Volgograd Oblast outlet reported that firefighters extinguished a fire caused by falling drone debris near an unspecified military facility.[8] Russian opposition outlet Astra noted that internet sources are falsely attributing footage from a 2021 explosion in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to the Kutluban strike.[9] Astra also reported that its sources in Rostov Oblast's emergency services stated that Russian forces shot down over 20 Ukrainian drones targeting the Millerovo Air Base on the night of September 28 to 29 and noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies near the air base.[10] Footage published on September 29 purportedly shows a fire near the Millerovo Air Base.[11] A Russian insider source published footage purportedly showing a fire near the Yeysk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, but ISW cannot confirm the authenticity of this footage.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 125 Ukrainian drones on the night of September 28 to 29, including 67 drones over Volgograd Oblast, 17 drones over Voronezh Oblast, and 18 drones over Rostov Oblast.[13]

The Russian government is reportedly planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved on September 29 a draft federal budget for 2025 to 2027 and will submit the budget to the State Duma by October 1.[14] The draft budget states that Russia's federal revenues are expected to grow by almost 12 percent in 2025 compared to 2024 and that the share of non-oil and gas revenues in the federal budget is expected to increase to 73 percent. Bloomberg reported on September 23 that it viewed draft proposals of the three-year draft budget, which showed that the Russian government plans to spend 13.2 trillion rubles (about $140 billion) on defense in 2025 — an increase from 10.4 trillion rubles (about $110 billion) projected for 2024.[15] Bloomberg stated that Russia plans to spend roughly 40 percent on national defense and domestic security in 2025 — more than spending for education, health care, social policies, and the federal economy combined. The Kremlin will reportedly increase spending on classified items from 11.1 trillion rubles (about $117 billion) in 2024 to 12.9 trillion rubles (about $136 billion) in 2025.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on September 24 that the government plans to fulfill "all social obligations to citizens" and highlighted planned funding for medical care, pensions, and national projects.[16] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged that "significant resources" are going towards Russia's "special military operation," but emphasized that 40 trillion rubles (about $424 billion) will go towards 19 national projects over six years — twice as much as the funding allocated for the period of 2019 to 2024.[17] Siluanov also highlighted that Russia plans to spend 180 billion rubles (about $1.9 billion) on modernized public utilities infrastructure and preferential mortgage programs. Kremlin officials are likely wary of war fatigue among the Russian population and are attempting to maintain public support for the war by highlighting the Kremlin's attention to social projects.

Key Takeaways:

• Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29.
• The Russian government is reportedly planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2024

Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The Times reported on September 27 that Western officials revealed that an unspecified PRC company is sending a range of military drones to Russia for testing and eventual use by Russian forces in Ukraine.[1] A Western official reportedly stated that the PRC company signed the agreement with Russia in 2023 and that there is "clear evidence that PRC companies are supplying Russia with deadly weapons for use in Ukraine." The Times reported that the Western official confirmed a September 25 report from Reuters about Russia's secret weapons program in the PRC to develop long-range attack drones for use in Ukraine.[2] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on September 27 that roughly 70 percent of Russian imports of machine tools and 90 percent of microelectronic imports come from the PRC and Hong Kong and that Russia is using these imports to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions.[3] Blinken stated that the PRC's actions do not "add up" since the PRC speaks about wanting peace in Ukraine but is allowing PRC companies to take actions that are helping the Russian war effort. The PRC has repeatedly attempted to depict itself as a neutral mediator in the war in Ukraine, and continued reports of PRC aid to Russia's war effort undermine this claim.[4]

Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.[5] GUR stated that Kolomeystev was involved in training Russian drone operators, including operators and support staff for Shahed-type kamikaze drones.[6] GUR posted a photo of Kolomeystev's body but did not acknowledge any involvement in the killing.[7] Russian officials have not officially acknowledged the assassination.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.[8] The Russian MFA responded to the Israeli airstrike on Beirut, Lebanon that killed Nasrallah and advocated for an immediate cessation to hostilities, stating that Israel will bear full responsibility for any subsequent escalation in the Middle East. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also issued a joint condemnation of Israel’s airstrikes in Syria on September 28 during a meeting with the Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Selydove, and Vuhledar.
• Russia is reportedly implementing legislation that allows Russian authorities to release those accused of crimes from criminal liabilities if the accused signs a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26, 2024

Germany, France, and the US announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26. The German Ministry of Development announced on September 25 that it will provide support to Ukraine this winter for heat and energy in a package totaling around 70 million euros ($78.2 million).[1] Germany will provide Ukrainian cities and municipalities with combined heat and power plants, boiler systems, generators, and solar-power systems to support communities that have been most affected by heat and electricity shortages resulting from heavy Russian strikes. The German Bundestag also announced on September 25 a 400 million euro ($447 million) increase in military funding for Ukraine to enable the purchase of additional air defense systems, tanks, drones, ammunition, and spare parts.[2] French President Emmanuel Macron said during a meeting with Zelensky on September 25 that France will train and fully equip a Ukrainian brigade in the "near future."[3]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on September 25 that the Pentagon will send an additional military assistance package to Ukraine worth roughly $375 million and that the package will include: air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; M1117 armored security vehicles; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; light tactical vehicles; armored bridging systems; small arms, patrol boats; demolitions equipment and munitions; and other miscellaneous equipment and support materiel.[4] US President Joe Biden announced on September 26 that he directed the DoD to allocate all of the remaining security assistance funding to Ukraine (roughly $8 billion) by the end of Biden's presidential term, including funding from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and that he authorized $5.5 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority to fund the drawdown of US equipment for Ukraine and replenish US stockpiles.[5] Biden stated that the DoD will also announce an additional assistance package worth $2.4 billion to provide Ukraine with additional air defense systems, unmanned aerial systems, and air-to-ground munitions; strengthen Ukraine's defense industry; and support Ukraine's maintenance and sustainment requirements. Biden also announced that the US will provide Ukraine with Joint Standoff Weapon (JOW) long-range munitions, a refurbished Patriot air defense battery, and additional Patriot missiles and will expand F-16 training capabilities to accommodate training 18 additional Ukrainian pilots in 2025. Biden noted that he will also convene a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in October 2024 to coordinate further Western support for Ukraine.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. Russian exiled opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on September 25 that it identified an FSB Spetsnaz servicemember who died fighting in Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — confirming that elements of FSB Spetsnaz are fighting in Kursk Oblast.[6] Novaya Gazeta Europe reported that an FSB officer stated that the FSB has tasked FSB Spetsnaz, including elements of the Alpha and Vympel groups, with identifying and destroying Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in Kursk Oblast.[7] The FSB officer reportedly stated that the Alpha and Vympel groups are ill-suited for combined arms battles involving heavy equipment against regular military forces, however.[8] FSB Spetsnaz has typically conducted counterterrorism operations against small terrorist groups and likely lacks the training and equipment needed to respond to Ukrainian units conducting combined arms assaults. Another source close to Russian special services reportedly told Novaya Gazeta Europe that the FSB's Special Operations Center does not have a "common connection" with Russian military units and that there is still no common headquarters for coordinating combat tasks between the FSB and the Russian military.[9] Putin tasked the FSB with conducting a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 following the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, but then proceeded to assign overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), FSB, and Rosgvardia.[10] The Kremlin and the Russian military command have struggled to establish a cohesive and effective command and control (C2) structure during the response to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast, and it remains unclear what responsibilities fall under the purview of the FSB's counterterrorism operation or the MoD's Coordination Council.[11] ISW has previously assessed that overlapping tasks and poor C2 structures will likely continue to generate friction between the FSB and the Russian MoD.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• Germany, France, and the US announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast but neither side made further advances in the area.
• Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Chasiv Yar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for holding joint military exercises with Laos, arguing that such exercises demonstrate that Russia is not learning from its battlefield experience in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia. Putin claimed during the first public meeting of the Russian Security Council's standing conference on nuclear deterrence on September 25 that Russia is adjusting its nuclear doctrine to introduce "clarifications" regarding necessary preconditions for Russia to use a nuclear weapon.[1] Putin shared two "clarifications" to the nuclear doctrine: that the Kremlin will consider using nuclear weapons in the case of "aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state with support or participation from a nuclear state" or in the case of  "the receipt of reliable information about the massive launch of air and space weapons" against Russia and these weapons crossing Russia's borders. Putin specified that these "air and space weapons" that could justify Russian nuclear weapons use include strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones, and/or hypersonic missiles. Putin likely intends for the hyper-specificity of his nuclear threats to breathe new life into the Kremlin's tired nuclear saber-rattling information operation and generate a new wave of panic among Western policymakers during a particularly critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons. Kremlin officials routinely invoke thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political debates regarding further military assistance to Ukraine — such as the ongoing debate about Ukraine's right to use Western-provided systems to conduct long-range strikes against Russian military objects — to induce fear among decision makers.[2] US Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned Western policymakers on September 7 against fearing boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, and ISW has long identified Russia's nuclear saber-rattling as part of the Kremlin's effort to promote Western self-deterrence and not as indicative of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[4]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people. Zelensky gave speeches to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25 stating that Ukrainian intelligence found that Russia aims to target Ukraine's three operational nuclear power plants in order to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and power generation capacity before winter 2024–2025 and cause “nuclear disaster.”[5] Zelensky recently noted that Russia is using unspecified Chinese satellites to photograph Ukraine’s nuclear power plants in preparation for strikes and emphasized in his UNGA speech that Russia's previous winter strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure have already destroyed Ukraine's thermal power generation capacity and severely degraded its hydroelectric power generation capacity.[6] Russian authorities and sources have repeatedly falsely accused Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian and Russian-occupied nuclear power plants likely as part of Russia’s overarching informational effort to falsely paint Ukraine and the Zelensky government as illegitimate actors and war criminals with whom Russia cannot engage in peace negotiations.[7] Zelensky’s UN speeches also emphasized the principles of international law and the UN Charter as the main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia’s war under international law alongside Russia’s ongoing destabilizing global efforts to enhance its war in Ukraine.[8]

A Russian company is reportedly collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for Russia's war in Ukraine. Reuters, citing two European intelligence sources and documents it reviewed, reported on September 25 that Russia has established a secret weapons program in the PRC through Russian and PRC business entities in order to develop long-range attack drones for use in Ukraine.[9] Russian weapons manufacturer IEMZ Kupol reportedly developed and tested the long-range “Garpiya-3” attack drone in collaboration with PRC specialists and informed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that it can produce these drones at a factory in the PRC. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied knowledge of such a project to Reuters and emphasized the PRC’s strict drone export controls. The White House expressed concern to Reuters about the prospect of a PRC-based entity providing lethal assistance to a sanctioned Russian company and noted that, while it has no evidence that the PRC government is aware of this assistance, the PRC has an obligation to act against such assistance. Reuters reported that IEMZ Kupol has delivered at least seven Garpiya-3 drones to Russia for testing. The Garpiya-3 drones reportedly have a range of 2,000 kilometers and a 50-kilogram payload and are upgraded versions of the Russian-produced Garpiya-A1 attack drones (which have some PRC components). The Reuters report comes amid enhanced Chinese assistance to Russia's war effort.[10] Bloomberg previously reported that unspecified Russian and PRC companies are collaborating in the development of a drone similar to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition for Russian use in Ukraine.[11] The PRC has repeatedly attempted to depict itself as a neutral mediator in the war in Ukraine, and reports of increased military cooperation between Russia and the PRC as well as other assistance to Russia's war effort undermine this claim. Repeated reports of joint Russia-PRC endeavors to enhance military cooperation in areas such as drone production and the ongoing Russia-PRC “Beibu/Interaction-2024” joint naval exercise that started on September 21 represent significant avenues for military knowledge sharing between the two countries.[12] Russian-PRC cooperation may be aimed at countering Western-made air defense systems used in Ukraine and elsewhere and at diminishing Western military influence globally.

Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to Yemen's Houthi rebels. Reuters reported on September 25, citing Western and regional sources, that Iran has brokered "secret talks" between Russia and the Houthis to transfer Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.[13] Reuters' sources noted that Russia has not yet made the decision to transfer the missiles. CNN reported on August 2 that the Kremlin had planned to transfer missiles to the Houthis but reneged due to diplomatic pressure, although Iran's role in brokering the Russia-Houthi talks, or the specifics of the missiles, were unknown at the time of CNN's original reporting.[14] Russia's hypothetical transfer of Yakhont missiles to the Houthis would likely bolster the Houthis' ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against commercial vessels and threaten the security of the Red Sea.[15] Russia has substantial experience employing Yakhont missiles against various targets in Ukraine, and the Houthis could learn from such experience if they are able to procure the missiles.[16] ISW-CTP have recently reported on Russia's efforts to align itself more explicitly with both Iran, on which Russia is reliant for military aid, and with Iran's Axis of Resistance.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people.
• A Russian company is reportedly collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to Yemen's Houthi rebels.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to regain positions in Vovchansk.
• Russian forces advanced northwest of Kreminna, in Toretsk, and southeast of Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces reportedly advanced within and around Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive efforts to seize the settlement.
• Veterans of Russia's war in Ukraine continue to commit crimes upon returning to Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2024

Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 24 shows that Russian forces advanced into eastern Vuhledar up to 12 Desantnykiv Street, confirming reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources that Russian troops broke into eastern Vuhledar between September 23 and 24.[i] Russian forces are additionally trying to advance on Vuhledar's northeast flank via Vodyane and southwestern flank via Prechystivka, likely in an effort to encircle the Ukrainian grouping in Vuhledar and force it to withdraw. ISW geolocated footage published on September 24 that additionally indicates that Russian forces, likely assault elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]), seized the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 3 in western Vodyane, which creates a sharper salient about five kilometers north of Vuhledar in the area west of Vodyane.[ii] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have fire control (the ability to prosecute close-range artillery fires on an area to inhibit movement) over the C-051134 Vuhledar-Bohoyavlenka road, which is reportedly Ukraine's final supply route into Vuhledar.[iii] Western media and Ukrainian military experts and journalists widely warned on September 23 and 24 that constant Russian assaults and advances on the flanks of Vuhledar are threatening to encircle the Ukrainian garrison within the settlement, which may force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area, which has been an important Ukrainian stronghold for over two years.[iv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear.
• Russia continues to expand and leverage its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to support its war effort in Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community by downplaying the Russian military command’s responsibility for its insistence on misusing technical specialists in infantry-led frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of the Kursk Oblast salient.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and in eastern Toretsk.
• Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing its own conversations with various unspecified Russian officials close to the Russian Presidential Administration, an interlocutor in the federal government, and regional officials, reported on September 24 that mobilization is a very sensitive topic among Kremlin officials.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2024

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance. Zelensky visited the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania and discussed the need for timely delivery of Western aid to Ukraine, the importance of starting joint American-Ukrainian weapons production in Ukraine as well as the possibility of US investments in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).[1] The Scranton plant significantly increased its production of 155mm artillery shells in 2024, and Zelensky noted that the plant employs 400 people. Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia  Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov met with Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro and signed a cooperation agreement between Zaporizhzhia  Oblast and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that calls for interaction between state bodies, scientific institutions, civil society organizations, and businesses in the fields of energy, agriculture, digital technologies, and defense.[2] The agreement also calls for Pennsylvania to support the reconstruction of Zaporizhzhia  Oblast. Ukraine has signed five similar agreements with US states previously: between Kyiv Oblast and Washington and Utah, between Zhytomyr Oblast and Indiana, and between Chernihiv Oblast and Minnesota.

The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state. Zelensky stated in an interview with the New Yorker about Ukraine’s “Victory Plan” published on September 22 that Russia is not interested in ending the war on any reasonable terms and is feigning interest in negotiations.[3] Zelensky highlighted that Ukraine invited Russia to attend Ukraine's second peace summit but that the Kremlin had not demonstrated any interest in participating. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably stated on September 22 that there is "no alternative" to Russian victory in Ukraine, reiterating Russia's unwillingness to negotiate on terms other than Ukrainian capitulation.[4] Peskov also identified NATO and the West as a “collective enemy.” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently announced that Russia will not participate in the second Ukrainian peace summit or any "such summits."[5] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin will only invoke the concept of “peace plans” and “negotiations” to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[6]

Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time overnight on September 22 to 23.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted seven airstrikes with KAB glide bombs at Zaporizhzhia City overnight, damaging 13 residential buildings and two educational facilities, and injuring at least 21 civilians.[8] Zaporizhzhia  Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces conducted another strike against a critical infrastructure facility in Zaporizhzhia City on September 23 but did not specify whether Russian forces used glide bombs or another weapon.[9] Some Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that Russian forces did not use KAB glide bombs, which are largely guided but rather used FAB-250 bombs equipped with unified planning and correction modules (UMPCs).[10] Soviet-era FAB bomb variants are largely unguided, and other iterations of Russian FABs with UMPCs have been unguided, though it is unclear whether the glide bombs that struck Zaporizhzhia City had guidance systems.[11] Russian glide bombs have a glide range of 40-60 kilometers, and Zaporizhzhia City is roughly 25-35 kilometers from the current frontline in western Zaporizhzhia  Oblast.[12] Russian milbloggers celebrated the strike as an inflection in Russian strike capabilities and called on Russian forces to target logistics assets near the city, including bridges across the Dnipro River.[13] Ukrainian forces are only able to counter the threat of Russian glide bombs by shooting down the aircraft that launch them, further demonstrating Ukraine's need for increased air defense capabilities on the frontline and in near rear areas.[14]

A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership. A Russian insider source claimed on September 23 that Yuri Annekov, head of the 678th Communications Center of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), committed suicide at the end of last week in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast.[15] The insider source claimed that Annekov had recently complained about insufficient rest and the command's "inadequate" behavior. The insider source claimed that Annekov had served in the VKS for roughly 20 years and had tried to resist the "chaos and disorder" within the VKS that began after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ISW cannot verify the insider source's claims.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance.
• The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state.
• Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time overnight on September 22 to 23.
• A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Hlyboke, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian government informally supported a bill on September 23 that would allow Russian authorities to fine individuals who promote “child-free propaganda,” likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to address Russia’s demographic problem.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2024

Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.[1] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on September 20 that the strike caused 30,000 tons of munitions to explode, noting that the size of the explosion equates to 750,000 artillery shells and that Russian forces on average fire 10,000 shells per week. His calculations suggest the Ukrainian strike destroyed two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on September 18 that a source within Ukrainian special services stated that the Toropets facility stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition.[2] It is unclear if Kiviselg's statement about 30,000 tons of explosives includes both missiles and artillery ammunition, but the strike destroyed significant Russian materiel stockpiles in any case. ISW continues to assess that continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military, including by forcing the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes.[3]

The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia. The Washington Post, citing officials close to senior Russian diplomats, stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be realizing that Russian nuclear threats are starting to lose their power over Western officials and that Putin may be developing an unspecified more nuanced and limited informational response to future Western approval of long-range strikes into Russia.[4] An unnamed Russian official claimed that Russian officials have realized that nuclear threats "don't frighten anyone," and a Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats claimed that Russia's partners in the "Global South" are dissatisfied with Russia's nuclear threats. ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the Washington Post's sources, but these reports are consistent with ISW's various assessments about how the Kremlin uses nuclear saber-rattling to promote Western self-deterrence and that such statements are not an indication of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons.[5] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation are aimed at disrupting and delaying key decision points in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[7]

Satellite imagery of damage at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test.[8] The imagery shows a large crater at the Yubileynaya launch silo, where Russian forces have previously conducted test launches of the Sarmat missile, and four fire trucks responding to active small fires near the destroyed silo.[9] Open-source intelligence analysts reported that imagery indicates that an unsuccessful Sarmat test caused the damage but offered differing analyses about whether an explosion occurred close to or at launch or before launch during fueling.[10] The silo at the Yubileynaya site was reportedly converted especially to conduct Sarmat launches.[11] Russia intends for the Sarmat ICBM to replace the Soviet-era Voevoda ICBM and accelerated the development of the Sarmat after an agreement to source components parts for Voevoda from Ukraine collapsed following the start of Russia's war against Ukraine in 2014.[12] Sarmat's development has faced repeated delays, however, and this recent apparent failed test would be the fourth reported failed test of the Sarmat to date.[13] Russia has only successfully tested the Sarmat once, in April 2022, and the Russian military reportedly put the missile on combat duty in September 2023.[14] The latest apparent failed Saramat test does not necessarily indicate that Russia's existing nuclear triad is any less effective than it has been but does suggest that Russia continues to struggle with developing new missile capabilities under the pressures of international sanctions and the demands on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) amid the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative superiority over Russian drone production.[15] Umerov stated that Ukraine can produce "several million" drones and that the Ukrainian state budget and funding from Ukraine's partners finance this production.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently discussed ongoing efforts to increase Russian drone production and claimed that Russian companies delivered roughly 140,000 drones to Russian forces in 2023 and that Russia plans to increase its drone production by tenfold (to 1.4 million drones) in 2024.[16] The Russian military, however, continues to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of its technical specialists. Russian authorities recently reportedly arrested an assault detachment commander who developed a counter-drone system to train Russian counter-drone specialists that was against the staff's protocol.[17] Russian field commanders, particularly those amongst units of the 51st Combined Arms Army, are also reportedly often sending drone operators to conduct frontal assaults as punishment for dissent.[18]

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."[19] Zakharova reiterated boilerplate Russian information operations aimed at discrediting Ukraine and the Ukrainian Peace Formula – which is based on the principles of international law – as an unfair "ultimatum."[20] Zakharova claimed that Russia is ready to discuss "serious" peace proposals that account for Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 14 "proposal." Putin outlined uncompromising demands on June 14 for Ukrainian capitulation as prerequisites for any "peace" negotiations, including Ukraine's recognition of Russian control over the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – including the areas of these oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy.[21] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin will only invoke the concept of “peace plans” and “negotiations” to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[22]

Russia is reportedly expanding intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine. NBC News, citing unspecified US officials and former intelligence officers, reported on September 21 that Russian intelligence services have been increasing their presence in Mexico for the past few years in order to spy on the United States and to enhance propaganda meant to undermine the United States and Ukraine.[23] US officials reportedly expressed concern over Russia's addition of dozens of employees to its embassy staff in Mexico City, despite notably lacking strong trade relations with Mexico, and interpreted this growth as a return to Cold War-style tactics to enhance intelligence operations in Mexico. CIA Director Willian Burns recently noted that this increase is a result of the expulsion of Russian spies from Europe.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.
• The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia.
• Satellite imagery of damage at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative superiority over Russian drone production.
• Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."
• Russia is reportedly expanding intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Svatove.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• A Ukrainian officer in a drone crew stated on September 22 that the Russian military command is forcing soldiers to dig trenches at Russian positions in unspecified areas of Ukraine without weapons and sometimes without armor, helmets, or military uniforms.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing a source “briefed” on an exchange between Putin and Russian MoD officials several months prior to the presidential inauguration in May 2024, reported that Putin dismissed the Russian MoD’s calls for another mobilization wave.[1] The source claimed that Putin instead stated his intent to only recruit people who were voluntarily signing military service contracts but that more Russian officials are convinced that mobilization is inevitable. The source added that the Russian military's current manpower is insufficient to achieve Russia's long-term goal of occupying all of Ukraine, degrading overall Ukrainian combat capability, and protecting the Russian state border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to rapidly recruit contract servicemen (kontraktniki) and volunteers and that these forces are sufficient for Russia's aggression against Ukraine in response to a request from WSJ. Putin has avoided declaring another partial mobilization call-up of reservists since his decision to mobilize 300,000 troops in late September 2022 in response to successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and Russia appears to lack the necessary manpower resources to simultaneously sustain the scale and tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and defensive efforts in Russian border regions.[2] A mobilized Russian servicemember and milblogger claimed in late August 2024 that the Russian government continues to rely on the remnants of regular military forces, mobilized personnel, and deceived short-term volunteers to continue Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, even though these elements are ill-prepared and have been suffering significant losses since October 2023.[3]

Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability. ISW observed reports speculating about the possibility of Russia declaring another mobilization wave prior to Putin’s inauguration and following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, but Putin has not yet authorized such mobilization.[4] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Kremlin entertained the idea of mobilization immediately after Ukraine's incursion, but that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and Kremlin-affiliated businessmen opposed these considerations.[5] Putin has also been consistently signaling throughout the incursion his commitment to recruiting volunteers by boasting about the number of volunteers interested in fighting in Ukraine and meeting with Russian volunteers in response to the incursion.[6] Putin notably did not seize on the incursion as an opportunity to condition Russian society for mobilization in the immediate to medium term, instead choosing to form new irregular formations and expand Russian volunteer recruitment efforts.[7] The Kremlin and the Russian MoD notably shocked Russian society with the declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022, and Putin likely seeks to avoid societal backlash in response to a new mobilization wave at this time.[8]

Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time. Ukrainian newswire RBC-Ukraine reported on September 19 that unspecified sources stated that Russian forces have concentrated 37,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and that Russian authorities have instructed these forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October.[9] RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that the Kremlin wanted to concentrate a grouping of forces in Kursk Oblast that had a five-to-one manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces before launching a counteroffensive operation but did not establish such a grouping before launching a "counteroffensive" on September 10.[10] Russian forces have begun counterattacks within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast but have not yet started large-scale combat operations that would indicate a concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[11] Sustained Russian counteroffensive operations within Kursk Oblast will require Russian forces to redeploy additional elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and/or commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[12] Ukrainian forces have not established control of all areas throughout the entire salient in Kursk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces most certainly have prepared positions within some areas of the salient that will pose challenges to any concerted Russian counteroffensive effort.[13]

RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that Russian authorities have also tasked Russian forces with creating a "buffer zone" on the territory of "border oblasts bordering Russia" by October 30 — presumably an order to advance into Ukrainian territory along the international border to push Ukrainian fire elements further back from Russian territory.[14] Russian forces aimed to create a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast when they launched their offensive operation in the area on May 10, but have since only advanced roughly 10 kilometers in depth at most in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[15] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations outside of northern Kharkiv Oblast in the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine and further fix and stretch Ukrainian forces along a longer front.[16] A Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast followed immediately by a subsequent incursion into Ukrainian border oblasts reminiscent of Russia's offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast would be a massive operational effort that would require a substantial allocation of manpower and materiel. The Russian military command has demonstrated a desire to shield the priority Russian offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, but a Russian counteroffensive followed immediately by an offensive operation along the international border would most certainly generate operational requirements that would impact Russia's already degraded capability to funnel more manpower and materiel into the drive on Pokrovsk.[17]

The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russia's Military-Industrial Commission on September 19 and discussed ongoing efforts to increase Russian drone production.[18] Putin acknowledged that drones are an integral part of modern warfare and that Russia’s war in Ukraine has further confirmed this assessment. Putin claimed that Russian companies delivered roughly 140,000 drones to Russian forces in 2023 and claimed that Russia plans to increase its drone production by ten-fold (to 1.4 million drones) in 2024. Putin emphasized that Russia must "consistently" increase its drone production capabilities and improve the effectiveness of Russian-produced drones in order to meet the needs of the Russian military. Putin praised Russia's private drone production initiatives or "people's defense industry" and noted that these private initiatives have joined forces with state defense enterprises to increase Russia's national drone production capabilities. Putin noted that privately produced drones are not "inferior" to drones produced by state defense companies and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) extensively tests all drone models before transferring the drones to frontline Russian forces. A DW investigation, however, observed evidence that suggests that some Russian irregular forces may be testing newly-developed drones in strikes on Ukrainian civilians, possibly to speed up the testing periods.[19] Putin thanked Russian volunteer organizations for providing drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems to frontline Russian units. Putin also visited Russia's Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg, which specializes in drone, EW system, and communication systems production and inspected new drone types at the facility.[20] Russian milbloggers also reported that Putin met with and inspected drones from private drone production initiatives and praised the drone producers for their work.[21] Russian milbloggers have consistently complained about the poor quality of state-produced drones and often praise private drone production initiatives for producing more effective drones.[22]

Putin’s claims that Russian plans to increase the drone-production to 1.4 million drones in 2024 is slightly lower than planned Ukrainian drone production rates in 2024. Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Strategic Industrial Hanna Hvozdyar noted in March 2024 that Ukraine intends to produce two million drones in 2024, and Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine is prioritizing modernizing and constantly developing new drones to meet the needs of Ukrainian servicemembers.[23]

Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.[24] Putin claimed during a meeting with recently elected heads of Russian federal subjects (regions) and occupied Crimea on September 19 that Kaliningrad Oblast is Russia's "western outpost" and that Russia must strive to ensure that Kaliningrad Oblast is not only an "outpost" or a "fortress" on Russia's western borders but is also well integrated into Russian society and the Russian economy. Putin stated that Russia will never "forget" about Kaliningrad Oblast and that Kaliningrad Oblast must continue to develop in accordance with Russia's social and cultural values. Kaliningrad Oblast is a Russian federal subject situated between Lithuania and Poland on the coast of the Baltic Sea, and some Russians travel between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad by train or car via Belarus and NATO member states Latvia and Lithuania.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed in May 2024 that the Russian government should reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea, including around Kaliningrad Oblast, so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation,” and Russian authorities repeatedly threatened NATO member states, including Finland and the Baltic States, in late 2023 and early 2024. [26] Putin's comments about maintaining Kaliningrad's cultural and social ties to Russia are likely aimed at his domestic audience, although Putin may be setting conditions for future Russian aggression against the Baltic States under the guise of defending Kaliningrad Oblast.

The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian–Indian relationship. Reuters, citing 11 Indian and European government officials and unspecified defense industry sources, reported on September 19 that Ukraine has acquired Indian artillery shells procured through European intermediaries for over a year despite Russian objections.[27] Reuters noted that European countries, including Italy and Czechia, have purchased empty artillery shells from India, filled them with explosives, and shipped them to Ukraine. Reuters stated that customs records reveal that shipments to Ukraine included 155mm, 120mm, and 125mm ammunition shells. Reuters stated that the Kremlin has addressed the supply issue with Indian officials on multiple occasions including during a July 2024 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, but that New Delhi has reportedly not intervened to halt the trade. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs dismissed the Reuters report as “speculative and misleading" on September 19.[28] The Reuters report comes amid complications in Russian–Indian bilateral relations and following Modi’s August 23 visit to Ukraine during which Modi highlighted principles of international law, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, in discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[29] Modi's comments with Zelensky contrast with his July 9 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin during which Modi made rather vague statements of peace.[30]

The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on September 19 encouraging its members to allow Ukraine to use western-provided weapons to strike “legitimate military targets” in Russia.[31] The European Parliament called on all European Union (EU) and NATO members to commit to providing annual military support to Ukraine at a minimum of 0.25 percent of the member's GDP. The statement comes against the backdrop of ongoing Western hesitation to lift restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential.
• Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability.
• Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time.
• The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort.
• Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.
• The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian-Indian relationship.
• The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Svatove, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated during a meeting on the development of the Russian Armed Forces on September 18 that the Kremlin aims to improve Russia's federal level training system.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2024

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with von der Leyen in Kyiv and stated afterward that Ukraine will use part of the 35 billion euro European loan to purchase domestically produced long-range missiles and drones, address Ukraine's energy needs, and construct bomb shelters to defend Ukrainian schools against Russian strikes.[2] The European Commission will distribute the 35 billion euro loan to Ukraine in one installment before December 31, 2024, and Ukraine can further disburse the money in one or more tranches before December 31, 2025.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners.[4] Umerov noted that Ukraine's defense industrial production capabilities significantly exceed the amount of investment that Ukraine can provide alone.

Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat. The Guardian, citing Russian government and military documents that Ukrainian forces seized in Kursk Oblast, reported on September 20 that Russian forces stationed in Kursk Oblast repeatedly warned the Russian military command about the possibility of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast beginning in late 2023.[5] The documents, which The Guardian reviewed but could not independently verify, show that local military commanders repeatedly ordered additional training exercises for Russian military personnel serving in Kursk Oblast, the construction of additional fortifications, and the preparation of decoy trenches and military equipment in preparation for a future Ukrainian incursion. One of the documents noted that Russian military units stationed along the international border were only staffed at between 60 and 70 percent of their intended end strength on average and were primarily staffed by poorly trained reservists as of June 2024. Russian authorities do not appear to have made any substantive efforts to improve the preparedness of the Russian military units serving in border areas of Kursk Oblast or construct additional fortifications along the international border prior to the incursion, and Russian authorities may have decided to ignore these requests due to a miscalculation of Ukraine's ability to advance deep into Kursk Oblast.

These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.[6] The American doctrinal definition of surprise is to "attack the enemy in a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared."[7] Although Russian forces were likely aware of various points along the international border at which Ukraine could conduct an incursion, Ukrainian forces were able to leverage ambiguity around their operational intent and capabilities to maintain operational surprise. Ukrainian forces also reportedly experimented with innovative techniques integrating ground activity and unmanned systems that ISW will not cover in-depth to maintain Ukrainian operational security. ISW has previously noted that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise over the past year and a half due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine.[8] Ukraine's campaign in Kursk Oblast demonstrates that surprise is still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield where an adversary can observe force concentrations but not reliably discern an enemy's operational intent and capabilities.

Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human rights abuses. ICRC President Mirjana Spoljaric met with Russian officials, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova, and President of the Russian Red Cross (RRC) Pavel Savchuk, in Moscow on September 17.[9] Spoljaric reiterated that states must follow international humanitarian law, including by granting the ICRC access to prisoners of war (POWs), and emphasized the need to protect humanitarian workers following the recent deaths of three ICRC employees due to frontline shelling in Donetsk Oblast.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), however, claimed that the meeting focused on humanitarian issues in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Europe, and Asia as well as the ICRC's activities in Russia.[11] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian delegation at the meeting spoke about alleged Ukrainian human rights violations, including those concerning the treatment of POWs and civilians. ISW has observed widespread reports of Russian forces abusing and executing Ukrainian POWs and has reported at length on Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine, including the illegal deportation of Ukrainian civilians and children to Russia.[12] Russia has reportedly not fully opened its POW facilities to ICRC inspectors, whereas Ukraine has regularly opened its main POW camp to the ICRC.[13] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated in July 2024 that a majority of the Ukrainian POWs who have returned home to Ukraine report that they did not see or communicate with ICRC representatives while in captivity.[14] The RRC is reportedly functioning as a Kremlin propaganda tool in occupied Ukraine.[15] The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent suspended the Belarusian Red Cross due to its involvement in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus.[16] The Kremlin is likely attempting to use the participation of the RCC president in the September 17 meeting to legitimize the RCC and its illegal activities in occupied Ukraine. Russian officials have similarly used meetings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhzhia Oblast and promote false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the ZNPP and Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP).[17]

Key Takeaways:

• European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.
• Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat.
• These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.
• Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human rights abuses.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk and Siversk.
• Russian state media is increasingly emphasizing the participation of foreign nationals in the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely to reassure domestic audiences that Russia continues to recruit sufficient manpower and will not need to declare another mobilization wave.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing a source “briefed” on an exchange between Putin and Russian MoD officials several months prior to the presidential inauguration in May 2024, reported that Putin dismissed the Russian MoD’s calls for another mobilization wave.[1] The source claimed that Putin instead stated his intent to only recruit people who were voluntarily signing military service contracts but that more Russian officials are convinced that mobilization is inevitable. The source added that the Russian military's current manpower is insufficient to achieve Russia's long-term goal of occupying all of Ukraine, degrading overall Ukrainian combat capability, and protecting the Russian state border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to rapidly recruit contract servicemen (kontraktniki) and volunteers and that these forces are sufficient for Russia's aggression against Ukraine in response to a request from WSJ. Putin has avoided declaring another partial mobilization call-up of reservists since his decision to mobilize 300,000 troops in late September 2022 in response to successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and Russia appears to lack the necessary manpower resources to simultaneously sustain the scale and tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and defensive efforts in Russian border regions.[2] A mobilized Russian servicemember and milblogger claimed in late August 2024 that the Russian government continues to rely on the remnants of regular military forces, mobilized personnel, and deceived short-term volunteers to continue Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, even though these elements are ill-prepared and have been suffering significant losses since October 2023.[3]

Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability. ISW observed reports speculating about the possibility of Russia declaring another mobilization wave prior to Putin’s inauguration and following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, but Putin has not yet authorized such mobilization.[4] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Kremlin entertained the idea of mobilization immediately after Ukraine's incursion, but that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and Kremlin-affiliated businessmen opposed these considerations.[5] Putin has also been consistently signaling throughout the incursion his commitment to recruiting volunteers by boasting about the number of volunteers interested in fighting in Ukraine and meeting with Russian volunteers in response to the incursion.[6] Putin notably did not seize on the incursion as an opportunity to condition Russian society for mobilization in the immediate to medium term, instead choosing to form new irregular formations and expand Russian volunteer recruitment efforts.[7] The Kremlin and the Russian MoD notably shocked Russian society with the declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022, and Putin likely seeks to avoid societal backlash in response to a new mobilization wave at this time.[8]

Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time. Ukrainian newswire RBC-Ukraine reported on September 19 that unspecified sources stated that Russian forces have concentrated 37,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and that Russian authorities have instructed these forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October.[9] RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that the Kremlin wanted to concentrate a grouping of forces in Kursk Oblast that had a five-to-one manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces before launching a counteroffensive operation but did not establish such a grouping before launching a "counteroffensive" on September 10.[10] Russian forces have begun counterattacks within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast but have not yet started large-scale combat operations that would indicate a concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[11] Sustained Russian counteroffensive operations within Kursk Oblast will require Russian forces to redeploy additional elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and/or commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[12] Ukrainian forces have not established control of all areas throughout the entire salient in Kursk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces most certainly have prepared positions within some areas of the salient that will pose challenges to any concerted Russian counteroffensive effort.[13]

RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that Russian authorities have also tasked Russian forces with creating a "buffer zone" on the territory of "border oblasts bordering Russia" by October 30 — presumably an order to advance into Ukrainian territory along the international border to push Ukrainian fire elements further back from Russian territory.[14] Russian forces aimed to create a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast when they launched their offensive operation in the area on May 10, but have since only advanced roughly 10 kilometers in depth at most in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[15] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations outside of northern Kharkiv Oblast in the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine and further fix and stretch Ukrainian forces along a longer front.[16] A Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast followed immediately by a subsequent incursion into Ukrainian border oblasts reminiscent of Russia's offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast would be a massive operational effort that would require a substantial allocation of manpower and materiel. The Russian military command has demonstrated a desire to shield the priority Russian offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, but a Russian counteroffensive followed immediately by an offensive operation along the international border would most certainly generate operational requirements that would impact Russia's already degraded capability to funnel more manpower and materiel into the drive on Pokrovsk.[17]

The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russia's Military-Industrial Commission on September 19 and discussed ongoing efforts to increase Russian drone production.[18] Putin acknowledged that drones are an integral part of modern warfare and that Russia’s war in Ukraine has further confirmed this assessment. Putin claimed that Russian companies delivered roughly 140,000 drones to Russian forces in 2023 and claimed that Russia plans to increase its drone production by ten-fold (to 1.4 million drones) in 2024. Putin emphasized that Russia must "consistently" increase its drone production capabilities and improve the effectiveness of Russian-produced drones in order to meet the needs of the Russian military. Putin praised Russia's private drone production initiatives or "people's defense industry" and noted that these private initiatives have joined forces with state defense enterprises to increase Russia's national drone production capabilities. Putin noted that privately produced drones are not "inferior" to drones produced by state defense companies and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) extensively tests all drone models before transferring the drones to frontline Russian forces. A DW investigation, however, observed evidence that suggests that some Russian irregular forces may be testing newly-developed drones in strikes on Ukrainian civilians, possibly to speed up the testing periods.[19] Putin thanked Russian volunteer organizations for providing drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems to frontline Russian units. Putin also visited Russia's Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg, which specializes in drone, EW system, and communication systems production and inspected new drone types at the facility.[20] Russian milbloggers also reported that Putin met with and inspected drones from private drone production initiatives and praised the drone producers for their work.[21] Russian milbloggers have consistently complained about the poor quality of state-produced drones and often praise private drone production initiatives for producing more effective drones.[22]

Putin’s claims that Russian plans to increase the drone-production to 1.4 million drones in 2024 is slightly lower than planned Ukrainian drone production rates in 2024. Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Strategic Industrial Hanna Hvozdyar noted in March 2024 that Ukraine intends to produce two million drones in 2024, and Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine is prioritizing modernizing and constantly developing new drones to meet the needs of Ukrainian servicemembers.[23]

Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.[24] Putin claimed during a meeting with recently elected heads of Russian federal subjects (regions) and occupied Crimea on September 19 that Kaliningrad Oblast is Russia's "western outpost" and that Russia must strive to ensure that Kaliningrad Oblast is not only an "outpost" or a "fortress" on Russia's western borders but is also well integrated into Russian society and the Russian economy. Putin stated that Russia will never "forget" about Kaliningrad Oblast and that Kaliningrad Oblast must continue to develop in accordance with Russia's social and cultural values. Kaliningrad Oblast is a Russian federal subject situated between Lithuania and Poland on the coast of the Baltic Sea, and some Russians travel between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad by train or car via Belarus and NATO member states Latvia and Lithuania.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed in May 2024 that the Russian government should reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea, including around Kaliningrad Oblast, so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation,” and Russian authorities repeatedly threatened NATO member states, including Finland and the Baltic States, in late 2023 and early 2024. [26] Putin's comments about maintaining Kaliningrad's cultural and social ties to Russia are likely aimed at his domestic audience, although Putin may be setting conditions for future Russian aggression against the Baltic States under the guise of defending Kaliningrad Oblast.

The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian–Indian relationship. Reuters, citing 11 Indian and European government officials and unspecified defense industry sources, reported on September 19 that Ukraine has acquired Indian artillery shells procured through European intermediaries for over a year despite Russian objections.[27] Reuters noted that European countries, including Italy and Czechia, have purchased empty artillery shells from India, filled them with explosives, and shipped them to Ukraine. Reuters stated that customs records reveal that shipments to Ukraine included 155mm, 120mm, and 125mm ammunition shells. Reuters stated that the Kremlin has addressed the supply issue with Indian officials on multiple occasions including during a July 2024 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, but that New Delhi has reportedly not intervened to halt the trade. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs dismissed the Reuters report as “speculative and misleading" on September 19.[28] The Reuters report comes amid complications in Russian–Indian bilateral relations and following Modi’s August 23 visit to Ukraine during which Modi highlighted principles of international law, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, in discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[29] Modi's comments with Zelensky contrast with his July 9 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin during which Modi made rather vague statements of peace.[30]

The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on September 19 encouraging its members to allow Ukraine to use western-provided weapons to strike “legitimate military targets” in Russia.[31] The European Parliament called on all European Union (EU) and NATO members to commit to providing annual military support to Ukraine at a minimum of 0.25 percent of the member's GDP. The statement comes against the backdrop of ongoing Western hesitation to lift restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential.
• Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability.
• Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time.
• The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort.
• Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.
• The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian-Indian relationship.
• The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Svatove, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated during a meeting on the development of the Russian Armed Forces on September 18 that the Kremlin aims to improve Russia's federal level training system.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2024

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW). Graphic social media images circulated on September 16 shows the body of a Ukrainian servicemember whom Russian forces evidently executed with a sword bearing the inscription "for Kursk."[1] X (formerly Twitter) users geolocated the images to Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov recently confirmed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) and 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment) seized Novohrodivka in early September — potentially implicating members and command of these two formations with the execution.[3] The footage shows the Ukrainian servicemember clearly disarmed, wearing no protective equipment, and with remnants of duct tape around his wrists, suggesting that Russian forces captured, disarmed, and forcibly detained the servicemember.[4] The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the "mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" of POWs, as well as the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly hors de combat.[5] The apparent circumstances of this particular execution, particularly the use of a sword with an inscription that implies that Russian forces executed the POW in some sort of retaliation for Ukraine's Kursk operation, likely fall firmly into the category of mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture of an unarmed POW. This most recent report of Russia's abuse of Ukrainian POWs is consistent with the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)'s March 2024 report, which documented and verified widespread abuse and executions of Ukrainian POWs at the hands of Russian forces.[6] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office announced that it started an investigation into violation of the laws and customs of war and intentional murder in regard to the apparent execution of the servicemember.[7] Ukrainian law enforcement is also currently investigating 84 cases of potential Russian execution of Ukrainian POWs.[8] ISW has reported on apparent Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024, July 2024, June 2024, May 2024, and several different incidents in February 2024 alone and has routinely assessed that Russian commanders are either complacent or enabling their subordinates to engage in such atrocities in clear violation of international law.[9]

Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media. Meta, which owns Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, banned Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) and "other related entities" on September 17 for "foreign interference activity."[10] The US State Department announced sanctions on September 13 against entities and individuals connected with RT, which the State Department accused of engaging in information operations, covert influence, and military procurement efforts for the Kremlin by targeting states in Europe, Africa, and North and South America.[11] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) "Schemes" investigative project analyzed thousands of leaked documents that German and Estonian outlets previously received that outline the work of the Russian "Social Design Agency" (SDA) company, which the US Department of Justice (DoJ) recently announced as part of the Kremlin's "Doppelganger" complex malign influence operations.[12] The "Schemes" project reported that the SDA has distributed fake official documents, including fabricated orders from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, as part of its self-described efforts to "discredit the military-political leadership of Ukraine and demoralize the [Ukrainian] Armed Forces." The SDA reportedly created fake documents allegedly from European government entities, fake news stories allegedly from European outlets, and anti-Ukrainian memes that spread widely on social media. ISW continues to assess that Russia is continuing its efforts to develop capabilities to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.[13]

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17 following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies. Shoigu met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akhbar Ahmadian and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during a previously unannounced visit to Tehran on September 17 and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[14] The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Shoigu and Ahmadian discussed upcoming bilateral agreements and emphasized that Iran continues to support Iran's official policy regarding corridors and communication routes with Azerbaijan.[15] Pezeshkian told Shoigu that the Iranian government will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions.[16] Shoigu also met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional and international security issues.[17] Shoigu previously recently visited Pyongyang, North Korea on September 13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[18] Shoigu's international visits are coming against the backdrop of Iran's recent delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[19] Russia’s deepening engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states which can bolster Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and secure strategic economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[20]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow on September 17.[21] Lavrov and Choe discussed further developing Russian-North Korean bilateral relations in unspecified manners, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that Choe will attend the BRICS Women's Forum on the sidelines of the Eurasian Women's Forum in St. Petersburg on September 18-20.[22] Lavrov has recently fostered increased dialogue and cooperation with Russia's non-Western partners through various meetings on the ministerial level, including with Saudi Minister of Hajj and Umrah Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabieh on September 11, a BRICS foreign ministers meeting on September 12, and a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty on September 16.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW).
• Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 17 that Russia continues to recruit citizens from Syria to fight in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2024

Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with CNN on September 13 that Ukraine "needs 14 brigades to be ready" for an unspecified requirement and that Ukraine has not been able to equip "even four" of these brigades with slowly arriving Western aid.[i] Zelensky noted that Ukraine has been increasing its domestic production of drones and transferring equipment from warehouses or reserve brigades to attempt to offset insufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that these insufficient provisions, particularly of armored vehicles and artillery ammunition, have led to Ukrainian personnel losses. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee Chairperson Oleksandr Zavitnevych told the Financial Times on September 16 that Ukrainian mobilization is "on track" and that newly trained forces could "impact" the battlefield likely in three months.[ii] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May 2024 that Ukraine was working to stand up 10 new Ukrainian brigades but that equipment, not manpower, was the main bottleneck in Ukraine's defensive operations.[iii] ISW has long assessed that Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the Western provision of miliary aid and Ukraine's efforts to reconstitute existing units and create new ones — the latter of which Ukraine has taken significant steps to resolve.[iv] Ukrainian forces have partially mitigated the artillery ammunition shortages that resulted from delays in Western aid provisions by using first-person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults, but current FPV drones are unable to offset the tactical requirements of traditional field artillery.[v] Ukraine has taken steps to boost its domestic production of 155mm artillery ammunition, but Ukraine has had to build these industries largely from scratch during wartime.[vi] Ukraine has also been working to increase its production of armored vehicles, including armored personnel carriers (APCs), since 2022, but Ukraine cannot manufacture complete tanks.[vii] The US and other foreign allies likely can greatly increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian force-generation and force-reconstitution efforts by providing Ukrainian forces with more mechanized equipment, such as M113 armored personnel carriers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and main battle tanks. Ukraine’s 155th Infantry Brigade was recently upgraded to a mechanized infantry brigade after the brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks, for example.[viii] The generation of more Ukrainian infantry without a commensurate increase in mechanized equipment will not substantially increase Ukraine’s combat power or increase Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative.
• Russia continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces.
• Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient.
• Ukrainian forces regained territory near Kharkiv City and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• Russia reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2024

Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years.[1] Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside increasing difficulties with military recruitment.[2] Budanov stated that the Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts.[3] Recent significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36 Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in 2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more, are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue recruiting personnel.[4] Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility.[5] Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine.[6] Putin maintains the option to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do so, of course. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative

Russia will likely face growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel needs. The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine.[8] The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry and invest in capacity building if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough to sustain the high level of equipment losses that Russian forces suffer in Ukraine even with further economic mobilization.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s efforts to expand its DIB is unlikely to be sustainable in the medium- to long-term due to anticipated labor shortages and impacts of Western sanctions.[10] Putin acknowledged on April 4 that Russia will experience a high demand for human capital and face labor shortages in the coming years.[11] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya reported on December 24, 2023, that Russia’s labor shortages, partly driven by the war in Ukraine, reached 4.8 million people in 2023 and would likely worsen and impair Russia's ability to enhance domestic defense industrial initiatives.[12]

Budanov drew attention to North Korea’s role as Russia’s most impactful military ally. Budanov noted that North Korean artillery ammunition deliveries to Russia have a direct and rapid effect on the war's dynamics, with Ukrainian forces experiencing increased Russian operational tempo just days after North Korean-provided artillery ammunition arrive.[13] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in January 2024 that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce enough artillery ammunition to sustain Russia’s rate of fire and that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia between September and November 2023, offsetting some of Russia's crucial shortages.[14] North Korea had reportedly delivered 4.8 million artillery shells to Russia as of June 2024.[15] North Korean support has previously enabled Russia to maintain significant artillery advantages over Ukraine, and Russia has used these advantages to support consistent offensive operations designed to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to contest the initiative.[16] ISW has noted that Russian authorities have recently intensified military cooperation with North Korea, as evidenced by Russian Security Council head Sergei Shoigu’s September 13 visit to Pyongyang and Putin’s visit in June 2024, when Putin signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with North Korean President Kim Jong Un.[17] Russia's deepening military partnership with North Korea is emblematic of the relationship that Russia aims to create with Iran, the PRC, and other desired partners. Russia will likely face dwindling weapons and equipment stockpiles and struggle to offset these shortages unless it can circumvent Western sanctions at scale and significantly expand its engagements with foreign partners to obtain sufficient military materiel, component parts, and dual-use items. ISW will soon launch an initiative to study Russia’s growing partnerships with other hostile state actors.

Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on September 15 that Ukraine has started domestic serial production of 155mm artillery shells. Kamyshin stated that Ukrainian production of defense products doubled while he oversaw the Ministry of Strategic Industries (March 2023 to September 2024) and will triple by the end of 2024. Ukraine began domestically producing NATO-standard 155mm shells in small volumes no later than September 2023 after having never produced these shells before.[19]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to backlash from the ultranationalist community. The Russian MoD stated on September 14 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov personally ordered Head of the MoD's Main Military-Political Directorate and Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Viktor Goremykin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, alongside the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Military Counterintelligence Department, to "sort out information" related to the death of the two drone operators within th of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]).[20] Various Russian milbloggers reported on September 13 that two drone operators from the 87th Rifle Regiment died in combat near Pokrovsk after their field commander forced them into an assault detachment as punishment for criticizing their command.[21] The death of the drone operators generated pronounced outrage among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about poor command discipline, and the Russian MoD appears to be trying to promptly address this outrage by issuing a statement on the matter within 24 hours.[22]

The MoD's response is the latest in a series of incidents in which ultranationalist outcries have influenced Russian officials' decision-making. The Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels following backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community on September 5.[23] Russian ultranationalist outcries about controversies tied to migrants have also previously prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open criminal investigations.[24] Russian officials' attentiveness to the Russian ultranationalist community underscores the importance the Kremlin has placed on leveraging the community's favor to support its war effort in Ukraine and the Kremlin's concerns about the consequences of pronounced ultranationalist discontent.[25]

Russian milbloggers praised the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths. The Russian milbloggers broadly expressed concern about various systemic issues within the 51st CAA and the Russian military more widely, including a culture of lying to senior military commanders to falsely portray the military situation as positive; the practice of sending soldiers with specializations to conduct attritional, infantry-led "meat" assaults, command and control (C2) issues, and commanders' abuses of power.[26] A milblogger claimed that the Russian military command only ordered the assault that led to the drone operators' deaths because of false reports that Russian forces had seized a settlement near Pokrovsk.[27] Another milblogger noted that the Russian MoD only responded to the drone operators' deaths because of the significant outcry online and claimed that Russian authorities have previously investigated the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade for sending engineers to conduct infantry assaults.[28] Some milbloggers described the persistent issues within the Russian military as "Augean Stables," comparing the work necessary to eliminate the issues to the mythological Herculean task.[29] One milblogger pointed to another unresolved problem with Russian commanders sending wounded soldiers back to the frontline without treatment - an issue about which milbloggers have widely complained recently, prompting the Russian MoD to posture itself as making an effort to focus on soldiers' medical care.[30] Another milblogger provided insight into the struggles involved in the formalization and force structure of irregular Russian forces, claiming that regiments of the 51st CAA and 3rd Luhansk People's Repulic (LNR) Army Corps are severely understrength as the regiments have reduced tables of organization and equipment (TO/E) that do not include organic artillery; drone; air defense; or radiation, chemical, and biological defense elements that Russian regulations require of all Russian regiment The milblogger stated that regiments of the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA are inadequately provisioned, drastically reducing the units' combat capabilities. The Kremlin's efforts are unlikely to be sufficient to solve the broader issues that pervade the 51st CAA and other Russian regular and irregular formations in the near or medium term, especially as the Russian military is in the process of formalizing irregular formations into the regular Russian forces.

Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended against the Ukrainians incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society. Alaudinov responded on September 15 to requests for help from the relatives of Chechen servicemembers whom Ukrainian forces have captured in Kursk Oblast, claiming that "Chechens have always considered surrender to be the greatest disgrace."[32] Alaudinov claimed that Chechen prisoners of war (POWs) "didn’t deserve to live" and that Chechen soldiers should have attacked the Ukrainian personnel who were guarding them in order to provoke Ukrainian forces to kill them. Alaudinov claimed that he is prepared to help secure the release other Russian prisoners of war (POWs), however. Alaudinov has been posturing himself as the spokesperson for the Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian incursion, and Russian state media has widely amplified his statements September 15 statement denouncing Chechen soldiers who choose surrender over death is likely an attempt to rebalance his posturing to facets of Chechen society that hold similar beliefs and to portray Chechen forces as elite and making extreme sacrifices in the war. Ukraine and Russia conducted two POW exchanges on September 13 and 14, and Russia reportedly returned individuals whom Ukrainian forces captured in the Kursk direction, including many conscripts.[34] Russia has increasingly conducted POW exchanges with Ukraine since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast following months of reportedly rebuffing Ukrainian overtures for POW exchanges - demonstrating the importance the Kremlin is placing on the return of Russian POWs captured in Kursk Oblast, particularly conscripts.[35] Alaudinov similarly recently berated the relatives of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast for their complaints about their relatives' participation in combat operations, which likely exacerbated Kremlin efforts to respond to this socially and politically sensitive issue.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
• Russia will likely face growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel needs.
• Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on September 15 that Ukraine has started domestic serial production of 155mm artillery shells.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to backlash from the ultranationalist community.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers praised the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths.
• Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended against the Ukrainians incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces reportedly recently recaptured territory in the area as of September 15. Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the salient.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
• Russian authorities continue to strengthen coercive mechanisms to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts in order to avoid conducting a wider mobilization.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14, 2024

Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three. Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on September 14 that Russian forces had 11,000 personnel deployed in Kursk Oblast at the start of Ukraine's incursion in early August 2024.[i] Mysnyk stated that there are various estimates that place the current size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast between 30,000 and 45,000 personnel.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and aim to concentrate a total of 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in the area.[iii] The individual number breakdown for each of the Russian services (Rosgvardia, border guards, regular units, irregular units, and conscript forces) contributing to these figures remains unclear. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 14 that there are roughly 61 various Russian units of various sizes comprised of roughly 35,500 Russian personnel within the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' Kursk Group (which has responsibility for Glushkovsky, Korenevsky, Sudzhansky, Rylsky, Lgovsky, Kurchatovsky, and Kursky raions).[iv] The reported growth in the size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast is reflective of how operational pressures caused by the incursion have forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[v] A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area and therefore additional Russian redeployments from Ukraine.[vi]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges. Ukrainian officials reported that Russia returned 103 prisoners to Ukraine including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol in early 2022, servicemembers of the Ukrainian National Police and State Border Service, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Transport Special Service, and other Ukrainian military personnel.[vii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Ukraine returned 103 individuals to Russia whom Ukrainian forces captured in Kursk Oblast.[viii] Russian sources suggested that the returned Russian prisoners were conscripts.[ix] The POW swap directly follows a similar exchange that Russia and Ukraine conducted on September 13, during which they returned 49 prisoners each.[x] Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized that the Kursk incursion has enhanced Ukraine’s negotiating power in POW exchanges with Russia, following the Kremlin's consistent rejection of Ukraine's attempt to negotiate exchanges.[xi] The frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and Russia has significantly increased since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs each in three separate exchanges.[xii] Russia and Ukraine only conducted three other POW exchanges, encompassing roughly 405 Ukrainian POWs and 423 Russian POWs, between January 1 and August 6, 2024.[xiii]

Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and innovations in combat operations. Various Russian milbloggers reported on September 13 that two drone operators from the 87th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) died in combat near Pokrovsk after their field commander forced them into an assault detachment as punishment for criticizing their command.[xiv] The two drone operators posted footage explaining the situation and their forced reassignment to assault tasks before their deaths, which milbloggers widely amplified.[xv] Several milbloggers claimed to have heard numerous similar stories and claimed that the practice of sending specialists, such as electronic warfare (EW) specialists, snipers, machine gunners, and drone operators, to conduct frontal assaults as punishment for dissent is commonplace, particularly amongst units of the 51st CAA.[xvi] DNR First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov claimed that the commander of the "Komendant" naval Spetsnaz group, which was operating in Kherson Oblast, similarly divided his subordinates into assault groups based on personal vendettas and that a commander operating in Donetsk Oblast sent a talented cyberhacker to an assault unit for disagreeing with the command, after which the hacker died in combat.[xvii]

Milbloggers argued that this practice is indicative of poor command discipline and is degrading the quality of Russian forces.[xviii] ISW has previously noted that the Russian military command's reliance on infantry-led frontal assault tactics has flattened the distinctions between formerly elite (such as Airborne and Naval Infantry forces) and ordinary Russian combat services and degraded Russian combat capability throughout the frontline.[xix] Reports of Russian commanders forcing personnel with more technical specialties to conduct such frontal assaults are consistent with this wider observed pattern. Machine gunners and snipers are not necessarily specialists in a technical sense, but they possess unique skills that accomplish different effects than foot-mobile infantry conducting a frontal assault against a tactical objective. By using specialists of any variety as additional bodies for frontal assaults, the Russian command is forgoing the opportunity to properly leverage whatever specialties they could integrate into their respective units, further illustrating that most Russian frontline troops have been reduced to understrength and low-quality motorized rifle units.[xx] The use of specialists who are familiar with more advanced battlefield technologies, such as drones and EW systems, is likely compounding these effects. While Ukrainian forces have consistently displayed high degrees of tactical and technical innovation, the Russian military appears to be willfully undermining its own ability to integrate innovations into combat operations.[xxi]

The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes. The US State Department announced new sanctions on September 13 against entities and individuals connected to Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT), which the State Department noted is engaging in information operations, covert influence, and military procurement efforts for the Kremlin by targeting states in Europe, Africa, and North and South America.[xxii] The State Department reported that the Kremlin created a cyber operations entity within RT in Spring 2023 that provided information to Russian intelligence, media, and mercenary groups. RT is reportedly also crowdfunding money to purchase equipment for the Russian military in small orders, including from the People's Republic of China (PRC), "to avoid unwanted scrutiny." The State Department noted that RT is coordinating with the Kremlin to influence the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and to foment violent protests in Moldova. The State Department stated that the Kremlin is using Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank's (PSB) recent pension funding agreement with Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia to buy votes in support of pro-Kremlin presidential candidates, as ISW similarly assessed in April 2024.[xxiii] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on September 14 that RT is "functioning like a de facto arm of Russia's intelligence apparatus."[xxiv] The US Department of Justice (DOJ) reported on September 4 that the Kremlin is conducting complex malign influence operations called "Doppelganger" to reduce Western support for Ukraine and influence US and foreign elections.[xxv] ISW assessed at that time that Russia was continuing its efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity.[xxvi]

Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories. Georgian Dream party’s founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili attributed the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and subsequent Russian occupation of Georgian territories to unspecified "external actors" and the former pro-Western Georgian United National Movement (UNM) ruling party during an election rally in Gori, a city bordering Russian-occupied South Ossetia.[xxvii] Ivanishvili notably omitted any mention of Russia and Russian aggression against Georgia. Ivanishvili claimed that Georgian Dream would hold UNM, particularly former pro-Western Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, accountable should Georgia Dream obtain a constitutional majority in the upcoming October 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections. Ivanishvili also stated that the Georgian government, under the Georgian Deam party, would seek reconciliation with South Ossetia and work towards forgiveness for the alleged violence that UNM caused. Ivanishvili’s rhetoric closely echoes the larger Georgian Dream election campaign that seeks to present itself as the party of peace while framing opposition parties, such as UNM, as parties supporting instability and war.[xxviii] ISW previously assessed that Georgian Dream has used narratives that closely mirror Kremlin information operations aimed at justifying Russian aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states that the Russian Empire and Soviet Union formerly colonized by blaming domestic, pro-Western parties who allegedly cooperate with unspecified “external actors” to instigate violence.[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges.
• Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and innovations in combat operations.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.
• Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• Russian forces are reportedly repairing captured Soviet-era Ukrainian equipment to replenish Russian vehicle stocks.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 13, 2024

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stopped Russian plans to create several buffer zones along the Ukrainian border "from the east to the north," including in Sumy Oblast.[1] Zelensky stated that Russian forces wanted to launch major offensives to seize regional centers, likely referring to the regional capitals of Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Sumy and Kharkiv cities are roughly 25 and 30 kilometers from the international border, respectively – significantly further than the approximately six to 10 kilometers that Russian forces currently occupy near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).

Zelensky's statement suggests that Russian forces planned to start new offensive operations aimed at penetrating at least 25 kilometers deep into Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and activating along a much wider front between at least Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi similarly stated on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and "reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into northern Ukraine.[2] ISW previously assessed that the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed to fix Ukrainian manpower and materiel along the northern border, granting Russian forces opportunities to re-intensify offensive operations in other higher-priority areas of the theater.[3] Ukrainian forces have largely stabilized the frontline in the Kharkiv direction since Summer 2024 and continue to contest the tactical initiative through counterattacks that have regained limited positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[4] The Russian military command may have intended for additional offensive operations along a wider and more continuous front in northeastern Ukraine to significantly stretch Ukrainian forces along the international border following the Ukrainian stabilization of the frontline north and northeast of Kharkiv City.

Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has also impacted Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian incursion "slowed" Russian advances throughout Donetsk Oblast and reduced the advantage in artillery ammunition that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction had over Ukrainian forces from 12-to-1 to 2.5-to-1.[5] ISW is unable to verify Zelensky’s statement, though the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk area has notably slowed since the start of September 2024. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated during an interview published on September 7 that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated Russia's plans for offensive operations, including in Russia's "main direction" (likely referring to the Pokrovsk direction), in August 2024 and later this fall.[6] ISW has recently observed indications that Russian authorities have transferred limited elements of likely Russian reserve units from Donetsk Oblast, including from the Pokrovsk direction, to Kursk Oblast to counter the Ukrainian incursion.[7] Such limited redeployments are unlikely to have an immediate impact on the tempo of Russian offensive operations, although Russian forces may struggle to maintain their current offensive tempo into the future if Russian authorities conduct additional redeployments from reserve forces in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian forces continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on September 13 that Russian forces have begun counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast, and Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder stated on September 12 that the US has observed Russian units beginning to try to conduct "some type of counteroffensive" operation that Ryder described as "marginal."[8] ISW continues to track observable Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast but has not yet observed large-scale combat operations indicating that Russian forces have started a large-scale concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.

Zelensky stated that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast but did not specify the composition of the Russian grouping, and it remains unclear whether Zelensky’s count is representative exclusively of combat-effective Russian soldiers or a joint force that includes contract soldiers, plus less effective conscripts, irregular forces, border guards, Rosgvardia elements, and Russian Interior Ministry forces.[9] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 13 that there are roughly 33,000 to 35,000 Russian personnel in Kursk Oblast.[10] Zelensky stated that the Russian military command intends to concentrate 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, a number notably higher than the 50,000 personnel that US officials reportedly assessed that Russia would need to push Ukrainians out of Kursk Oblast.[11] Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly-trained and equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far, and it is unlikely that most of the current Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is comprised of combat experienced units.[12]

A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area — especially if most of the already committed units lack combat experience. Russian Airborne (VDV) forces that recently redeployed to Kursk Oblast from the frontline in Ukraine currently appear to be heavily responsible for counterattacks in Kursk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command may intend to field units perceived to be more "elite" or combat effective to regain territory.[13] The Russian military will most certainly have to redeploy units already committed to ongoing offensive operations or operational reserves from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast in order to field the combat-effective units needed for a large counteroffensive operation and then subsequently guard the international border against future Ukrainian incursion.

Russian forces appear to be testing more effective mechanized assault tactics west of Donetsk City, although Russian armored vehicles remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strike and drone capabilities. Geolocated footage published on September 12 shows Russian forces conducting a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault and advancing across the fields southwest of Krasnohorivka and into eastern Hostre (west of Donetsk City).[14] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced during the mechanized assault and one Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control one-third of Hostre.[15] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the attack reported that Russian forces launched four waves of assaults over six hours on the morning of September 12 and that Russian forces used 46 pieces of mechanized equipment, including armored vehicles, tanks, and motorcycles during the assaults.[16] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 15 armored vehicles, tanks, and motorcycles and damaged 11 additional armored vehicles while repelling the assault. Although Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed over half of the armored vehicles that Russian forces used during the mechanized assault near Hostre, Russian forces managed to advance between six and eight kilometers southwest of Krasnohorivka during the battle. Russian forces have historically struggled with rapid mechanized maneuver through open fields due to a lack of cover and concealment from Ukrainian drones and fires, but Russian forces may have assessed that the recent intensification of Russian offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City had sufficiently strained Ukraine's defensive capabilities in this area to enable Russian forces to make tactically significant advances.[17]

The commander of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Donetsk direction reported on September 13 that Russian forces are using a new tactic during mechanized assaults in this direction.[18] The commander reported that Russian forces are using a task-organized, small mechanized unit that features a heavily armored "turtle" tank (a tank with extra armored platting) equipped with mine-clearing equipment as the lead vehicle followed by several armored personnel carriers. The armored personnel carriers then carry Russian infantry close to Ukrainian positions before the infantry dismount to begin the assault and the personnel carriers presumably return to the point of departure. The commander reported that Russian forces are still suffering significant armored vehicle losses and estimated that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction. Russian forces conducted a series of costly mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast in late July 2024 but made very marginal territorial advances in exchange for their comparative heavy armored vehicle losses.[19] Russian forces most recently conducted a tactically significant mechanized assault up to the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar in April 2024, and Russian forces may attempt to model future mechanized assaults after these more tactically successful outcomes.[20]

Ukraine and Russia conducted their second prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on September 13. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine and Russia each returned 49 prisoners and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the swap.[21] Zelensky stated that Ukraine returned servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, servicemembers of the Ukrainian National Police and State Border Service, and civilians. Russian officials have not yet confirmed the details of their returned prisoners, but Russian sources claimed that Russia returned individuals whom Ukrainian forces captured in the Kursk direction, including conscripts.[22] Ukrainian officials have previously suggested that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to more readily consider POW exchanges.[23] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian citizens wrote a record number of 1,927 requests to Russian President Vladimir Putin to search for Russian servicemembers missing or captured in August 2024 following the beginning of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[24]

Russia continues efforts to strengthen strategic military ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin traveled to Beijing on September 13 to partake in the Xiangshan Forum where he highlighted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the PRC.[25] Fomin emphasized Russian-PRC plans for over 100 joint military cooperation events in 2024, blamed NATO and the US for intensifying the war in Ukraine, and criticized the US for pursuing an alleged dual containment policy of Russia and the PRC.[26]

Reuters, citing two undisclosed European intelligence sources and obtained documents, reported on September 13 that Russia has been producing the long-range “Garpiya-A1” attack drone using Chinese engines and other dual-use parts since 2023 and that Russian forces have used the drone to strike military and civilian targets in Ukraine.[27] The Garpiya-A1 drone has a range of 1,500 kilometers, similar to the Iranian Shahed-136 drones. Reuters reported that Russian weapons manufacturer IEMZ Kupol reportedly produced over 2,500 Garpiya-A1 drones between July 2023 to July 2024.

TASS also reported on September 13 that Russian Security Council head Sergei Shoigu traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea and met North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[28] This follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024, where he signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with Kim and continued shipments of North Korean artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia.[29] Shoigu’s visit also follows Iran’s recent delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia and Putin's meeting with Iranian Secretary of the National Security Council, Ali Akbar Ahmadian on September 12.[30]

Russia’s deepening engagement with the PRC, North Korea, and Iran is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states aimed directly at enhancing the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and securing strategic economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation.
• Russian forces appear to be testing more effective mechanized assault tactics west of Donetsk City, although Russian armored vehicles remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strike and drone capabilities.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted their second prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on September 13.
• Russia continues efforts to strengthen strategic military ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian and Ukrainian assaults in the area on September 13.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• Russian authorities continue attempts to coerce minorities and Ukrainian youth living in occupied Ukraine to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to avoid conducting a wider mobilization.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2024

• Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area.
• Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control.
• A Ukrainian HIMARS strike reportedly damaged a temporary pontoon bridge across the Seym River and wounded a group of nearby Russian troops on September 12.
• Russian authorities have reportedly deployed additional elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast and may begin redeploying more combat experienced forces to support ongoing Russian counterattacks and future counteroffensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia.
• The United Kingdom (UK) will reportedly allow Ukraine to use UK-provided long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike military objects in Russia in the coming days.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues rhetorical efforts aimed at influencing the ongoing Western policy debate about granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia, although Russia has not previously escalated militarily against perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines."
• Russian forces struck a civilian cargo ship transiting through the Ukrainian grain corridor in the western Black Sea on September 11, likely as part of a renewed Russian effort to undermine international confidence in the safety of the corridor.
• Russia continued its efforts to enhance relations with non-Western countries at the meeting of BRICS high-ranking security officials and advisors in St. Petersburg.
• Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project in the Caucasus.
• Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states.
• Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published an investigation on September 12 into the Kremlin's efforts to consolidate its influence over the Russian information space via Telegram ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently north of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and west of Donetsk City.
• Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed on September 12 that the first group of the newly-formed "BARS-Sarmat" volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD and are training for deployment to the frontline in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2024

Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11. The size, scale, and potential prospects of the September 11 Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast are unclear and the situation remains fluid as of this report. It is premature to draw conclusions about Russia’s new counterattacks and ISW will continue following the situation. Geolocated footage published on September 11 indicates that Russian forces retook positions east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo).[1] Additional geolocated footage published on September 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced north and northeast of Snagost (south of Korenevo) during a company-sized mechanized assault.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched the mechanized counterattack from the north near Korenevo and that Russian forces quickly advanced into Snagost.[3] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces fully seized Snagost, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[4] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced northwest of Snagost and seized Krasnooktyabrskoye; advanced west of Snagost and seized Komarovka and Vishnevka; advanced southwest of Snagost and seized Apanasovka and 10-y Oktyabr; advanced southeast of Snagost and seized Obukhovka; and advanced south of Snagost and seized Byakhovo, Vnezapnoye, and Gordeevka.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Olgovka (just east of Korenevo).[6]

Ukrainian forces reportedly began new attacks against the Russian counterattack west of Snagost and throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast reported on September 11 that Ukrainian forces began attacking Russian forces' flank west of Snagost after the initial Russian counterattack into Snagost.[7] An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Kulbaki (southwest of Snagost and roughly five kilometers from the international border), suggesting that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near the settlement, reportedly after crossing the international border.[8] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting small mechanized cross-border assaults into Glushkovo Raion near Medvezhye (southwest of Snagost and along the international border) and in another unspecified area along the international border.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks south of Snagost near Apanasovka; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Borki.[10] It remains unclear how much force Ukraine has committed to the reported Ukrainian counterattack.

Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on September 10 shows elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) conducting a company-seized mechanized assault north of Snagost.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian naval infantry and airborne "battalion tactical groups" (BTGs) are conducting offensive operations in Kursk Oblast, although ISW has only observed geolocated footage of a company-sized mechanized assault.[12] The milblogger could be referring to a BTG-sized force (roughly a unit with the strength of a reinforced battalion but not necessarily operating in the structure of a traditional BTG), and Russian forces could theoretically deploy a detached company from a BTG. Russian forces notably have not utilized BTGs at scale on the battlefield since mid-2022, following the widespread failure of BTGs to accomplish Russian offensive objectives in the early stages of the war, as well as damage accrued to BTGs during costly Russian offensive operations on Kyiv, Severodonetsk, Mariupol, and Lysychansk.[13] The Russian military has transitioned away from using BTGs in the past two years as a task-organized unit and their re-emergence in Kursk Oblast, if confirmed, would be a noteworthy inflection.[14] ISW has not observed any confirmation that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast are operating BTG as of this publication. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in Kursk Oblast and involved in the counterattacks.[15] The Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade most notably participated in the failed Russian push for Vuhledar in late 2022 to early 2023, then fought southwest of Donetsk City near Marinka, and deployed to participate in the Russian offensive north of Kharkiv City in May 2024 — largely without significant rest, and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade has been degraded to the point of being reconstituted several times.[16] Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment participated in repelling Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Verbove in Summer 2023 and were reportedly still operating in the area as of July 2024.[17] The Russian military may be relying on relatively combat-experienced units to conduct assault operations in Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear how effective these operations will be since these units, especially units which have been heavily degraded and reconstituted many times, like the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. It is also unclear if Russian forces have enough forces necessary to fully repel Ukrainian forces — or defend against reported Ukrainian counterattacks — from Kursk Oblast since the Russian military command likely deployed elements of these units, instead of the entire formations, to Kursk Oblast, making it premature to assess the longer-term strategic-level effects of the Ukrainian incursion.

Russian forces may intend to temporarily bisect the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast before beginning a more organized and well-equipped effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory. Russian forces are currently conducting counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, in an area that is largely comprised of fields and small settlements. Russian forces may be working to establish more tactically favorable positions during these initial counterattacks before beginning a wider counteroffensive operation against Ukrainian forces operating northeast of Korenevo and near Sudzha. Russian forces may intend to cut the Ukrainian salient and advance to the international border southeast of Snagost to complicate existing Ukrainian logistics routes and fire support positions closer to the international border before beginning a larger-scale counteroffensive operation. The Russian military command appears to be relying on elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 56th and 51st VDV regiments for these initial counterattacks but will likely introduce other elements of the Russian force grouping in this area in future counterattacks. It remains unclear if the Russian authorities responding to the Kursk incursion assess that the current Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast — largely comprised of conscripts, irregular Russian forces, and smaller elements of regular and more elite Russian units — can successfully push Ukrainian forces from the area. Russian authorities may also plan to transfer additional, more combat-capable Russian units from Ukraine to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear when Russian authorities may conduct such redeployments. It would be premature to assess the impact of two days of Russian counterattacks on the month-long Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, particularly amid ongoing Ukrainian cross-border assaults, and ISW will continue to evaluate the impact of the Russian counterattacks in the coming days.  

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Davit Lammy arrived in Kyiv on September 11 and reiterated support for Ukraine but did not clarify current Western policy on Ukraine’s ability to strike military objects in Russia with Western-provided weapons.[18] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Lammy on September 11 and emphasized that Ukraine is still waiting for permission from the UK to use UK-provided long-range weapons to strike military objects in Russia. Two unspecified US officials told CNN on September 11 that the Biden administration has not changed its policy of prohibiting Ukrainian forces from using US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia despite discussing the issue regularly. One unnamed senior administration official said that there is "no openness" to lifting these restrictions.[19] US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that his administration was “working that out,” when asked about potential plans to lift US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons in Russia.[20]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in St. Petersburg on September 11 and reiterated that the PRC will continue to promote its own vision to end Russia's war in Ukraine and will aim to convince other countries to support the PRC's peace plan.[21] Shoigu reiterated Russia's support for the joint PRC-Brazilian peace plan during the meeting.[22] PRC officials have routinely promoted the PRC-Brazilian peace plan and allowed Russian officials to posture themselves as willing to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith despite consistent Kremlin statements outright rejecting negotiations or otherwise indicating that Russia will only negotiate on terms that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation.[23]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for Ukraine on September 11. Erdogan gave a virtual speech to the Fourth Summit of the International Crimea Platform on September 11 in which he reiterated support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty, independence, and autonomy and asserted that Crimea "must be returned" to Ukraine under international law.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11.
• Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks.
• Russian forces may intend to temporarily bisect the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast before beginning a more organized and well-equipped effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Davit Lammy arrived in Kyiv on September 11 and reiterated support for Ukraine but did not clarify current Western policy on Ukraine’s ability to strike military objects in Russia with Western-provided weapons
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine.
• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for Ukraine on September 11.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Toretsk, and near Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported on September 11 that Russian forces are replenishing their tactical, operational, and strategic reserves.
• Russian occupation authorities illegally held regional elections in occupied Crimea on September 6 to 8 and likely fabricated increased voter turnout numbers to claim that residents broadly support Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2024

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[i] Blinken confirmed that Russia has received an unspecified number of SRBM shipments from Iran and warned that Russian forces will likely use them on the battlefield "within weeks." Iranian officials continue to deny that Tehran has sent weapons to Moscow, however.[ii] Blinken and United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Secretary David Lammy affirmed on September 10 that the US and UK are "completely aligned" on the need to tackle Iranian influence both in Ukraine and the Middle East.[iii] France, Germany, and the UK jointly condemned Iran's SRBM deliveries and emphasized that they are taking steps to cancel bilateral air services with Iran (including by sanctioning Iranian national airline Iran Air), designate individuals and organizations involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and in the transfer of SRBMs to Russia, and sanction Russian cargo ships.[iv] UK outlet The Times, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported that Iran had delivered over 200 Fateh-360 SRBMs to Russia via a Caspian Sea port on September 4, and ISW continues to assess that Russia will use Iranian-supplied SRBMs to target Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the coming months, thus alleviating the strain on Russia's domestic missile production capacity.[v]

Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told POLITICO on September 10 that the PRC is giving Russia's defense industry "very substantial" support in exchange for secretive Russian military technologies.[vi] Campbell emphasized that the PRC is not just supplying dual-use products to Russia but is instead engaged in a "substantial effort....to help sustain, build, and diversify elements of the Russian war machine." Campbell warned that Russia is sending the PRC safeguarded submarine, aeronautical design, and missile technologies in return, which Russia has previously been reluctant to share with Beijing. PRC officials continue to deny their support for the Russian war effort and claim that the PRC remains "impartial" when it comes to Russia's war in Ukraine, despite frequent Western reporting of the PRC's material support for Russian defense industrial output and geospatial intelligence capabilities.[vii] Reports of more direct PRC support to Russia come against the backdrop of the Russia-led "Okean-2024" international naval exercises, which are currently taking place in the Pacific and Arctic oceans and Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic seas with the involvement of three ships, one vessel, and 15 aircraft of the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA).[viii] Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of Okean-2024 on September 10 and accused the US of placing pressure on Russia and the PRC, necessitating the conduct of joint naval exercises.[ix] PLA and Russian forces are also currently conducting the "Northern/Interaction-2024" joint "strategic collaboration" exercise, comprised of air force and naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, and a joint maritime patrol in the Pacific.[x]

Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 144 Ukrainian drones in total, including 72 drones over Bryansk Oblast, 20 drones over Moscow Oblast, 14 drones over Kursk Oblast, 13 drones over Tula Oblast, eight drones over Belgorod Oblast, seven drones over Kaluga Oblast, five drones over Voronezh Oblast, four drones over Lipetsk Oblast, and one drone over Oryol Oblast.[xi] Footage published on September 10 reportedly shows the aftermath of a drone strike in Ramenskoye, Moscow Oblast, and Ramenskoye Urban Raion Acting Head Eduard Malyshev claimed that Ukrainian drones damaged two buildings in the raion.[xii] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov claimed that Russian forces shot down 14 drones near Podolsk, Ramenskoye, Lyubertsy, Domodedovo, and Kolomna.[xiii] Domodedovo Urban Raion Head Yevgenia Krustaleva claimed that falling drone debris blocked a section of the Kashirskoye Highway from Domodedovo to Moscow City.[xiv] Russian Federal Aviation Agency Rosaviatsiya stated that it introduced temporary restrictions at the Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports near Moscow City and limited airport operations in Kazan, Tatarstan Republic in response to the drone strikes.[xv] Tula Oblast authorities stated that drone debris fell on an unspecified fuel and energy facility in an unspecified location in Tula Oblast but did not damage the facility.[xvi] Russian milbloggers criticized Russian regional authorities for claiming that falling "debris" caused damage to infrastructure during the strikes and reiterated calls for Russian authorities to allow the Russian military, Rosgvardia, border guards, and private security companies to create mobile fire groups to repel drone strikes.[xvii]

US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.[xviii] Biden stated that his administration is "working that out now," in response to a question about whether the United States would lift restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided long-range weapons to strike within Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated earlier on September 10 during a press conference with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer will likely discuss lifting these restrictions during a meeting on September 13.[xix] House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul stated on September 10 that he believes that Blinken will use the visit to Kyiv to inform Ukrainian officials that the United States will allow Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia.[xx]

The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet. Forbes' Russia service reported on September 9 that it obtained documents on Russia's federal "Cybersecurity Infrastructure" project detailing how Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor will spend 59 billion rubles between 2025 to 2030 to update its "technical means of countering threats" (TSPU) system, which the Kremlin uses to block certain websites.[xxi] The 59-billion-ruble budget is roughly 86 percent of the 68 billion rubles (about $747 million) that the Kremlin is dedicating to the broader federal "Cybersecurity Infrastructure" project. This TSPU update will reportedly include the modernization of existing TSPU systems and installation of new TSPU systems to account for an increase in user traffic. Forbes noted that modernizing and increasing TSPU systems will increase Roskomnadzor's ability to block virtual private networks (VPNs), which Russians can use to bypass Roskomnadzor's restrictions on which websites they can view while in Russia. Roskomnadzor Head Andrei Lipov previously stated that Roskomnadzor finished equipping all communications nodes with TSPU as of September 2023, and Roskomnadzor's Main Radio Frequency Center's Center for Special Projects Head Sergei Temny stated in June 2024 that Roskomnadzor no longer purchases foreign equipment for TSPU and is working to replace existing foreign TSPU equipment with domestically produced alternatives.[xxii] Roskomnadzor has previously used TSPU to slow down access to X (formerly Twitter) and likely recently did the same for YouTube.[xxiii] The Kremlin has recently intensified efforts to compel Russians to abandon Western social media sites in favor of Kremlin-approved alternatives, and strengthening TSPU supports technical aspects of this effort.[xxiv] The Kremlin is likely trying to balance encouraging self-censorship as a self-deterrent among Russian ultranationalists and other critics of Russian authorities with imposing actual technical restrictions on the types of information and internet services that Russians can access.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10.
• US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.
• The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 10.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
• The German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy published a report on September 9 warning that Russia has significantly increased its defense industrial base (DIB) capabilities since 2022 and that depleting weapons and equipment stockpiles may not significantly impact future Russian DIB production.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 9, 2024

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”[1] Lavrov held talks with GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on the sidelines of the Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue and emphasized Russia’s interest in enhancing cooperation with Gulf states.[2] Lavrov and Saudi officials discussed strengthening trade, cultural relations, and bilateral investments, and Lavrov invited bin Salman to the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in October 2024.[3] Lavrov claimed in July 2024 that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are advocating within the GCC for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture, and Lavrov likely used his meetings with Gulf state leaders to promote this agenda.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russia's proposal of a Eurasian security architecture is consistent with Russia's long-term strategic goal of disbanding Western unity, disbanding NATO from within, and destroying the current world order.[5]

Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the sidelines of the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting in Saudi Arabia on September 9.[6] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Lavrov discussed the war in Ukraine with Vieira and Jaishankar but did not offer details.[7] Brazil and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have promoted their "Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" six-point peace plan — whose key principles favor Russia — since May 2024.[8] Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi notably recently reaffirmed India's support for peace in Ukraine based on principles of international law such as respect for territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states.[9] Lavrov, however, reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives on September 9 demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine, claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's Peace Formula — which is indeed based on principles of international law — is an "ultimatum" and that Russia has never seriously considered the plan.[10] Ukrainian officials have openly invited a Russian representative to attend Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024.[11]

The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials. Acting Secretary of Russia's ruling United Russia political party Vladimir Yakushev stated on September 9 that 308 of the total 380 Russian veterans (or 81 percent) who ran for various positions in regional Russian elections won.[12] United Russia announced in July 2024 that it would nominate over 300 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine, some of whom were participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program to run in the elections, and Yakushev stated in August 2024 that United Russia's main priority was to support veteran candidates during the September 2024 election cycle.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the Time of Heroes program in February 2024 to prepare Russian veterans to serve in the Russian government, and ISW assessed that the program may also aim to incentive Russians to fight in Ukraine by portraying Russian military service as a pathway to a government career.[14]

The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on September 9 that former United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak won the regional election in Altai Republic and officially became the head of the Altai Republic for the next five years.[15] The Kremlin reportedly originally tasked Turchak with expanding the Time of Heroes program before the Russian presidential election in March 2024.[16] Putin later demoted Turchak to acting head of Altai Republic — one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin — possibly due to Putin's perception of Turchak's disloyalty in 2023 due to his prior affiliation with the Wagner Group and Turchak's failure to integrate veterans into the government.[17] Several Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers publicly celebrated Turchak’s electoral victory and highlighted his efforts to support the war.[18] Turchak’s electoral victory and the surrounding media campaign celebrating his accomplishments during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may be part of the Kremlin’s effort to advance the Time of Heroes program. The Kremlin may be attempting to rebrand United Russia as a leading party in veteran affairs to prepare Russian society for a long-term war effort by preempting the rise of alternative political parties or movements that could court Russian veterans. The Time of Heroes program also indicates that the Kremlin is increasingly militarizing its society and government, which may have long-term implications on Russian domestic and foreign policy.

The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on September 9 that Smirnov won the Kursk Oblast gubernatorial election with over 65 percent of the vote.[19] Sources close to the Kremlin told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Kremlin did not consider canceling the Kursk Oblast gubernatorial and local elections because such an approach would create panic in the region and undermine the Kremlin’s efforts to condition Russians to accept the incursion as a ”new normal.”[20] CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova also claimed on September 7 that Kursk Oblast had one of the highest turnouts in the gubernatorial elections, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to convince Russians that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast has not impacted Russian society.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly claimed on September 5 that Ukraine intended for the incursion to divide Russian society but that the incursion instead further unified Russia — likely to undersell the implications of the incursion on Russia’s territorial integrity and society.[22]

Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine. Ukraine's Support Forces Command reported on September 9 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with dangerous chemicals and chemical agents 447 times in August 2024 and 4,035 times between February 15, 2023 and August 24, 2024.[23] The Ukrainian Support Forces Command stated that Russian forces are using K-51 and RG-VO gas grenades to deliver munitions containing banned chemical agents and are also using unidentified chemical compounds. Ukrainian officials, and a Russian military unit, have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical agents in combat that are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”
• Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials.
• The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Siversk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin expanded Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s powers on September 9 by allowing him to grant eligible parties within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) access to Russian state secrets (classified information).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2024

Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine. Burns stated during a panel with United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Chief Richard Moore on September 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to issue periodic threats of direct confrontation against the West but that these threats should not intimidate the West.[i] Burns stated that the CIA had assessed that Russian forces may have considered using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 and that he was in contact with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin on the matter.[ii] The CIA's assessment of possible Russian readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 corresponded with intensified Russian rhetoric about nuclear confrontation amid the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts.[iii] This rhetoric was likely more a part of a routine information operation designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine than an indicator of Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons, however.[iv] The Kremlin has repeatedly invoked thinly veiled threats of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine, such as in the fall of 2022, to induce fear among decision makers.[v] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[vi]

Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia. Prominent Russian milblogger Alexander Sladkov claimed on September 7 that former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and his team in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) punished milbloggers, including Sladkov, for being "too frank and harsh" about Russian military failures and disasters.[vii] Sladkov claimed that the Russian Main Military Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal case against him for discrediting the Russian military at an unspecified time, presumably several months ago during Shoigu's tenure in the Russian MoD. Sladkov implied, however, that the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, for which Sladkov works as a war correspondent, and the Russian Presidential Administration stopped the case and "protected" him. Sladkov claimed that Russian MoD officials under Shoigu, many of whom Russian authorities have arrested for bribery and fraud in recent months, were hypocritically trying to teach milbloggers how to "act morally" and "state-like." Sladkov complained that Russian MoD officials were trying to punish milbloggers despite the fact that select milbloggers had personally met with Russian President Vladimir Putin four times to inform Putin about issues on the frontline and within the Russian MoD. Sladkov claimed that milbloggers "breathed a sigh of relief" with the appointment of current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, whom Sladkov praised for "seriously increasing" the Russian military's capabilities. Sladkov’s anecdote and mention of the Russian Presidential Administration imply that the Kremlin intervened and spared Sladkov (and other Russian milbloggers) from criminal prosecution, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to co-opt pliable milbloggers who tended to be critical of the Russian state’s conduct of the war in Ukraine, to ensure that they do not pose a liability to the Kremlin in the future.[viii] The Kremlin began an effort to co-opt pliable Russian milbloggers in late 2022 and continues to use awards to co-opt Russian milbloggers and buy their loyalty.[ix] The Russian state-funded Union of Journalists awarded Russian milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny with the Solidarity Prize on September 8 for "demonstrating courage" while exposed to danger during professional duties and for "demonstrating a civic position in defending the freedom of speech."[x] ISW assessed in 2022 and 2023 that the Kremlin was trying to co-opt Sladkov and Poddubny, both of whom previously had been more critical of the Russian military's failures in Ukraine before being co-opted.[xi]

The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however. Another Russian milblogger, who is often openly critical of the Kremlin and Russian MoD, posted three since-deleted videos on September 8 in which he claimed that "traitors are sitting in the Kremlin" and that Russian authorities have "removed" and imprisoned "inconvenient people," such as imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin.[xii] The administration that runs the milblogger's channel later posted an audio recording on September 8, claiming that the milblogger was emotional due to his strong nationalism.[xiii] The administration claimed that most Russians in private have said something to "discredit" others, likely in an attempt to prevent Russian authorities from charging the milblogger with discrediting the Russian military.

The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship. The initial publication of the milblogger's critical videos demonstrates how the Kremlin has not been successful at co-opting or silencing the entire Russian information space, but the channel's later retraction of the videos suggests that the Kremlin has been successful at coercing milbloggers (and their administrative teams) to self-censor out of fear of punishment. Sladkov's claims about the Russian Presidential Administration's intervention into his case and Putin's attention to milblogger complaints further suggest that Putin did not support the Russian MoD's previous attempts to directly censor milbloggers, preferring a policy aimed at co-opting prominent milbloggers, likely in order to maintain a veneer of freedom of speech in Russia and prevent an inadvertent viral spread of explicitly censored dissident material. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin will likely continue its efforts to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future but is still sensitive to the sentiments of the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community.[xiv]

The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a "mass brawl" between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia. The Investigative Committee stated on September 8 that its Krasnodar Krai office is investigating a mass brawl in Afipsky between local residents and "people of non-Slavic appearance."[xv] Footage published on September 8 purportedly from the incident in Afipsky shows a large crowd of people and limited fighting.[xvi] The regional Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported that law enforcement detained 43 people at the scene of the fight.[xvii] Russian opposition outlet SOTA noted that the Russian ultranationalist online community "Russian Sword," which espouses xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia, promoted the incident and likely influenced more ultranationalists to join the crowd. SOTA also reported that a subscriber to the Russian Sword online community claimed that Russian authorities conducted a raid against migrant communities after the brawl.[xviii] SOTA noted that members of another Russian far-right ultranationalist online community, the "Russian Community," have previously organized demonstrations against migrants.[xix] BBC Russian Service reported in June 2024 that affiliates of Russian Tsargrad outlet founder and Russian Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev founded the "Russian Community" project in late 2020.[xx]

Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed presidential decrees on September 8 appointing Iryna Vereshchuk and Viktor Mykyta to the positions of Deputy Heads of the Presidential Office and appointing Oleksandr Kamyshin and Dmytro Lytvyn as his advisors.[xxi] Kamyshin will advise Zelensky on strategic issues, and Lytvyn will advise him on communications. Zelensky reassigned Mykyta from his previous position as the Head of the Zakarpattia Oblast Military Administration on September 8 and Vereshchuk resigned from her previous post as Ukrainian Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT) on September 3.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine.
• Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia.
• The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however.
• The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship.
• The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a "mass brawl" between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia.
• Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8.
• Russian forces conducted counterattacks in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 8.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and marginally advanced near Chasiv Yar.
• A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor claimed on September 8 that the Russian military needs to improve the training of drone unit commanders.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov noted that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having theater-wide impacts on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and addressed the prospects for continued Russian offensive operations in Winter 2024–2025.
• Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.
• Ukraine continues to successfully adapt and develop its anti-drone capabilities, allowing Ukrainian forces to leverage lower-end systems to offset Russian pressures on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella.
• Russian forces recently regained territory and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 7.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City and in the Dnipro River Delta.
• Russian officers continue to mistreat and abuse their subordinates likely due to poor command training and discipline.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2024

US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.[1] An anonymous US official confirmed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that Iran delivered the missiles to Russia and a senior European official stated that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected.[2] Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[3] It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Reuters reported on July 7 that Iran expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran since August and October 2023 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia.[4] Russia recently intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles.[5] Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy. military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and disrupt Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).

The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Moscow and Tehran have expanded their economic, media, military, and political cooperation since Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[6] Iran seeks to benefit economically and militarily from its expanding partnership with Russia. Iran has sought cash for its ailing economy in return for selling weapons to the Kremlin, as CTP-ISW reported in September 2023.[7] Iran has also sought to procure Russian Su-35 fighter jets and Iranian officials “pressed” Russia for the delivery of Su-35s during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Tehran in August 2024.[8] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power, given that the current Iranian air fleet is outdated and poorly maintained.[9] Iranian leaders have separately sought Russian support in upgrading their cyber capabilities and missile and space programs as part of the expanding military collaboration.[10] The United States and unspecified European countries have reportedly prepared a sanctions package against Iran for this contingency.[11]

US Defense Secretary Llyod Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.[12] Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas. Austin reiterated a Biden Administration talking point that since Russia has moved aircraft conducting glide bomb strikes out of range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, it somehow renders Ukraine’s request to use ATACMS in Russian territory against hundreds of known stationary military objects moot.[13] ISW has previously noted there are at least 209 of 245 (over 85 percent) known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS that are not air bases and not within range of US-provided HIMARS that the US does allow Ukraine to use in Russia under limited circumstances.[14] Austin also argued that Ukraine has its own domestically produced capabilities that can attack Russian targets well beyond the range of Western-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles.[15] Most of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities come from domestically produced long-range drones, which Ukraine cannot use to cause the same level of damage as long-range missiles due to drone payload limitations. Russian forces can also more easily harden facilities against Ukrainian drones than Western-provided missiles. Ukraine has begun to produce and successfully field long-range precision weapons with payloads more comparable to Western-provided long-range missiles but currently lacks the quantity of these domestically produced systems to significantly threaten Russian military targets within Russia at scale.[16]

Ukraine therefore can only use a limited number of domestically produced long-range strike systems and Western-provided HIMARS to significantly threaten a limited number of Russian military objects within Russia. This scarcity is not reflective of all the long-range strike capabilities that Ukraine possesses, and Western decision-making continues to artificially suppress Ukraine's overall long-range strike capability. ISW has assessed at length that long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would degrade Russia's ability to leverage sanctuary space in Russia for offensive operations in Ukraine and place significant operational pressures on the deployment of Russian air defense, electronic warfare (EW), logistics, command and control (C2), and military support assets.[17] Russia, on the contrary, continues to actively expand its ability to maintain deep precision strikes against Ukraine by increasingly procuring ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea, and continuing to expand its missile production.[18]

Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on September 6, a significant portion of which will reportedly not be delivered in the immediate future. The US Department of Defense (DOD) announced that it will provide an aid package for Ukraine worth $250 million from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which includes missiles for RIM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems; Stinger missiles, HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery shells; Tube-Launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Bradley infantry fighting vehicles; and M113 armored personnel carriers.[19] United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) worth £162 million (about $212 million) in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense capabilities.[20] Healey stated that the UK expects to deliver the LLMs by the end of 2024. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 150 million euros (about $166 million), including 12 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers – six of which Germany will deliver in 2024 and six of which will arrive in 2025.[21] Pistorius also stated that Germany will deliver 77 Leopard 1A5 tanks "as quickly as possible." Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair announced that Canada will send 80,840 CRV-7 rocket motors, 1,300 unspecified warheads, 970 C6 machine guns, and 10,500 9mm pistols to Ukraine and that the rocket motors will arrive in the coming months.[22] Blair also stated that Canada will provide decommissioned chassis from 29 M113 and 64 Coyote LAV armored personnel carriers that Ukraine can use for spare parts. Blair stated that 10 of the 50 armored combat support vehicles (ACSVs) that Canada donated to Ukraine in June 2024 will arrive in Ukraine in September 2024 and that the remaining 40 will begin arriving in Spring 2025. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands will provide Ukraine with 80 million euros (about $88 million) worth of maintenance equipment, spare parts, and air-to-air missiles for Ukraine's F-16 aircraft but did not specify a timeline for delivery.[23] Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles announced the immediate dispatch of a complete HAWK air defense system battery, including six missile launchers that Spain donated to Ukraine and that are already in Poland.[24]

Russian forces are increasingly executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers throughout the frontline likely in part because Russian commanders appear to be endorsing the proliferation of such war crimes. CNN reported on September 6 that it obtained footage showing Russian forces executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers near Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast in late August 2024 and Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024.[25] Ukrainian defense intelligence reportedly gave CNN transcripts of audio intercepts from the May 2024 execution that showed that a Russian commander gave his subordinates the order to kill the surrendering Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian defense intelligence sources also reportedly gave CNN a list of 15 cases of Russian forces executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline since November 2023 - most of which included supporting drone footage or audio intercepts, and an anonymous Ukrainian official told CNN that the "pattern" of such executions has increased in 2024. Ukraine's Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin told CNN that the Prosecutor General's office has investigated at least 28 such executions since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Kostin stated that different Russian units operating in different sectors of the front have committed these crimes leading Ukraine to assert that this Russian policy could amount to crimes against humanity. A United Nations (UN) investigative source told CNN that the "pattern" of these Russian executions "suggests complacency, if not orders to give no quarter" and that together they could amount to crimes against humanity. Attacking soldiers who are hors de combat, specifically those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender, is a violation of Article 41 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Arms Conflict.[26] ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and observed a wider trend of prolific Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and upheld by Russian field commanders.[27]

Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to pursue longstanding efforts to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhia Oblast, while also promoting false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to weaken Western support for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Grossi met with Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev; Russian Chief of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection (CBRN) Forces Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov; and representatives from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Russian Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor) in Kaliningrad Oblast on September 6.[28] Likhachkev repeatedly accused Ukrainian forces of threatening the safety of the ZNPP and KNPP and claimed that Ukrainian forces are targeting ZNPP employees and occupation officials operating near the ZNPP.[29] The Kremlin routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the Russian-occupied ZNPP and extended this information operation to the KNPP shortly after Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[30] The Kremlin aims to convince the IAEA and the West that Ukrainian forces pose a threat and could cause a radiological incident at the KNPP in order to encourage Western fears about continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast and weaken Western support for the incursion.[31] The Kremlin has long sought to use Russia's physical control over the ZNPP to force the IAEA to meet with Russian officials to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP, and by extension, Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory.[32]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels, possibly after receiving backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community. The published draft document appeared on the Russian federal portal of legal acts on September 5, before promptly disappearing from the website overnight on September 6.[33] The deleted draft stated that Russian social media bloggers and Telegram channels with over 10,000 followers would be required to provide their personal information, such as their names, phone numbers, email, and IP addresses, to Roskomnadzor in accordance with the new federal law that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into effect on August 9.[34] The deleted draft stated that these procedures would come into force in November 2024. Roskomnadzor later told Russian state outlet RBK that it deleted the draft after it was "prematurely” published due to a technical error.[35] Russian milbloggers immediately criticized the draft on September 5 and 6, stating that these procedures would threaten milbloggers’ safety due to potential data leaks and observed that the law had already ”scared” many independent bloggers away – leaving behind only well-funded and foreign Telegram channels.[36] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian officials may have rushed the draft to meet a certain deadline and speculated that Roskomnadzor deleted the draft following a backlash online to further revise it for a later publication.[37] One milblogger forecasted that the Kremlin will directly mandate authorization and deanonymization of all Internet users in Russia by the end of the 2020s.[38] The sudden deletion of the draft suggests that the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community still has some influence over the Kremlin’s decisions and that the Kremlin continues to fear backlash from this community.

The Kremlin signaled its commitment to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future and will likely reattempt to deanonymize Russian social media and Telegram channels even though Roskomnadzor withdrew its recently proposed regulations for now. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 5 that censorship is justified during periods of war and implied that freedom of information would return in peacetime.[39] Peskov also added that Russian media outlets often compete with international media for Russian domestic audiences and argued that Russian content and technological means should not lag in such a “tough” information environment. The Kremlin passed a law in 2014 that tasked Roskomnadzor with creating a registry of all social media users with an audience of over 3,000 people, but Roskomnadzor stopped updating this registry by 2017 and instead created a list of ”information dissemination organizers.”[40] These ”information dissemination organizers” include social media platforms and websites that were visited by more than 500,000 Russian users per day such as Yandex, VK, HeadHunter, and Qiwi. Roskomnadzor’s recent reversal is not indicative of a permanent policy shift, as the Kremlin has passed laws and regulations that Russian milbloggers have vocally opposed before. The Kremlin recently passed laws that Russian milbloggers avidly scrutinized in the past, such as banning the use of personal cell phone devices on the frontlines in Ukraine, for example.[41]

The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology. Russian President Vladimir Putin created the "Rossiya" National Center in Moscow on July 1 to preserve the "Rossiya" (“Russia”) Exhibition and Forum that ran from November 2023 to July 2024.[42] Putin signed a decree on September 6 creating an organizing committee for the "Rossiya" National Center, which will "demonstrate [Russia's] achievements, strengthen national identity,...create a sense of pride for the country, [and] develop the professional skills of children and youth."[43] Putin appointed Kiriyenko as the chairperson of the center's organizing committee, which will plan the center's activities, propose events that include representatives of foreign governments, and assist Russian media with their coverage of the center's events. Kiriyenko has a prominent role overseeing multiple Kremlin information operations targeting Russian, Ukrainian, and Western information spaces, and his appointment to supervise the development of the center suggests that the center will play a role in shaping domestic and foreign perceptions of Russia.[44] The "Rossiya" National Center will likely continue these informational efforts to legitimize Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories and to promote Russia's justification of its war against Ukraine. The eight-month-long "Rossiya" exhibition forum featured exhibits claiming that Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts are part of Russia.[45] The Kremlin has recently appeared to be taking steps to codify a Russian state ideology while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which forbids Russia from establishing a state ideology, by vaguely defining Russia's "traditional values," and the "Rossiya" National Center's emphasis on Russia's "national identity" will likely further these Kremlin ideological efforts.[46]

Russia continues efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and has been using the Ukrainian information space for several years to hone this capability.[47] The US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on September 4 the ongoing seizure of 32 internet domains that the Russian government used in foreign malign influence campaigns called "Doppelganger."[48] Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko directed the campaigns, which promoted Russian propaganda in order to reduce Western support for Ukraine and influence US and foreign elections. The US DOJ stated that the Doppelganger campaigns registered domain names that imitated Western media websites in order to publish Russian narratives falsely presented as content from legitimate news outlets. The Doppelganger campaigns also used "sleeper" channels on social media claiming to be Ukrainian news outlets that would start to disseminate Russian-friendly information after spending at least four months developing trust among their Ukrainian audiences. The US DOJ noted that the Kremlin developed the tactic of using "sleeper" channels after many Ukrainians started rejecting messages that favored Russia during the war. The US DOJ reported that the "Morning Dagestan" Telegram channel, which the DOJ labeled as "anti-Russian," is the most "famous recent" example of such a "sleeper" channel. The "Morning Dagestan" channel notably promoted rumors that sparked antisemitic riots at the Makhachkala airport in the Republic of Dagestan in October 2023.[49] The description of the Doppelganger campaigns' tactics, particularly the use of "sleeper" channels to provoke riots, indicates that the Kremlin is developing ways to trigger kinetic activity via information operations promoted on social media platforms, and the current Ukrainian information space offers the West the best opportunity to study this latent, growing Russian threat.

Key Takeaways:

• US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
• The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia.
• US Defense Secretary Llyod Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.
• Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas.
• Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on September 6, a significant portion of which will reportedly not be delivered in the immediate future.
• Russian forces are increasingly executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers throughout the frontline likely in part because Russian commanders appear to be endorsing the proliferation of such war crimes.
• Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to pursue longstanding efforts to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhia Oblast, while also promoting false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to weaken Western support for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels, possibly after receiving backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community.
• The Kremlin signaled its commitment to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future and will likely reattempt to deanonymize Russian social media and Telegram channels even though Roskomnadzor withdrew its recently proposed regulations for now.
• The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology.
• Russia continues efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and has been using the Ukrainian information space for several years to hone this capability.
• Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 6.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
• Open-source tracking of confirmed Russian military deaths in Ukraine suggests that more Russian volunteers have died in Ukraine than Russian convict recruits and mobilized personnel.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2024

Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area.[1] Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar) during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault.[2] Additional geolocated footage published on September 5 shows reported elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a Russian flag in northwestern Prechystivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Zolota Nyva (immediately west of Prechystivka) and that Russian forces are continuing to advance in the area.[4] Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced immediately east of Vuhledar near the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1.[5] A Ukrainian open-source account published additional footage showing Russian forces conducting several platoon-sized mechanized assaults near Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar) and Prechystivka in recent days.[6] The Ukrainian account stated that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), and 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) attacked near Makarivka and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) are attacking near Prechystivka.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the intensified Russian offensive operations in the area during a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai on September 5, claiming that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (responsible for the front roughly from Vuhledar to Hulyaipole) seized "a triangle" of territory five to seven kilometers deep on September 3.[8]

Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term. A Ukrainian airborne brigade operating southwest of Donetsk City published footage on September 4 of Ukrainian forces repelling a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of four tanks and 17 armored combat vehicles near Kostyantynivka.[9] Russian forces intensified both the regularity and size of mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024 and have since routinely conducted relatively large mechanized assaults in the area — although these assaults have only resulted in marginal tactical gains.[10] Russian forces appeared to initially intensify offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City in late July in order to achieve their longstanding tactical objective of cutting the 0-0532 (Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway, but have since continued large mechanized assaults in the area after achieving this objective.[11] Intensified Russian efforts to exploit gains in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian redeployments in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast have yet to disrupt the Russian offensive tempo west and southwest of Donetsk City, however. Continued large and costly Russian mechanized assaults suggest that the Russian military command has tasked elements of both the Eastern and Southern Grouping of Forces in the area with a wider operational objective.

Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar. Russian forces began an immediate tactical effort in late August 2024 along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating the salient's vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks.[12] Russian forces have already succeeded in partially widening the southern section of the Pokrovsk salient and are continuing efforts to tactically envelop limited Ukrainian positions in rural areas east of Hirnyk and north of Krasnohorivka. Russian forces have reportedly advanced to the outskirts of Ukrainsk and are approaching the outskirts of Hirnyk, and the seizure of these towns would allow Russian forces to assault Kurakhove — a significant Ukrainian defensive node for the front west and southwest of Donetsk City — from the north as well as from the east from Krasnohorivka and Maksymilyanivka. Russia's intensification near Vuhledar likely aims to pressure the western flank of the Ukrainian defense in the area west and southwest of Donetsk as Russian forces approach Kurakhove on the eastern flank. Russian offensive operations along the O-0532 highway between Kostyantynivka and Vuhledar offer Russian forces avenues for advance that would support both an effort to seize Kurkahove to the north and Russian efforts to envelop and seize Vuhledar to the west. Russian forces conducted a failed offensive effort in western Donetsk Oblast in Winter 2022–2023 characterized by mass frontal mechanized assaults against Vuhledar itself, but Russian forces now appear to be pursuing gradual advances along multiple mutually supporting lines of advance — a Russian campaign design that has become more common as the Russian military has abandoned attempts at operationally significant break throughs through mechanized maneuver.[13]

The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. The envisioned Russian seizure of Vuhledar would remove a Ukrainian strongpoint that Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged to prevent Russian efforts to advance to the H-15 highway from the south, although seizing Vuhledar will not be the decisive factor for whether Russian forces can reach the highway. Vuhledar is 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway, and the area between Vuhledar and the highway is mainly comprised of open fields that would require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults to make more rapid tactical gains. Intensified Russian mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City since late July have so far facilitated only a couple of kilometers of advance, and Russian forces have historically proven inept at conducting effective operational-level mechanized maneuver.[14] The intended Russian seizure of Kurakhove would take another significant defensive point away from Ukrainian forces, but the settlements west of Kurakhove along the H-15 highway also provide opportunities for defense and there is no reason to assess that Russian forces would be able to advance more rapidly west of Kurakhove if Ukrainian forces decide to defend in these settlements. The Russian Eastern and Southern groupings of forces have generally proven ineffective at conducting successful offensive operations, and more combat effective elements of the Central Grouping of Forces that are driving on Kurakhove's northern flank may improve Russian prospects for seizing Kurakhove.[15] It is unlikely that the Russian military command will commit Central Grouping of Forces elements to a prolonged effort to advance further along the H-15 highway and away from the Central Grouping of Force's priority effort to seize Pokrovsk, however.[16]

The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command has shown a pronounced desire to insulate its offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast and is likely holding back its remaining operational reserves for the effort to seize the city of Pokrovsk itself.[17] This level of prioritization will likely remain regardless of the success of the intensified Russian offensive effort in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces began efforts to widen the Pokrovsk salient along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line as a preparatory step for the upcoming attempt to seize Pokrovsk itself, and any participation by elements of the Central Grouping of Forces in the offensive effort in western Donetsk Oblast will likely be further conditions-setting for the Pokrovsk effort.[18] The Russian military command has pursued a theater wide campaign design aimed at stretching Ukrainian forces through consistent offensive pressure and appears to be replicating this theater-wide effort in a more intensified way along the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[19] Russian forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine indefinitely, and multiple intensified offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast, in addition to the persisting operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, will likely cause Russian offensive operations to culminate sooner than the Russian military command intends.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. Putin claimed during his speech at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has failed to force Russia to redeploy forces from frontline areas in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast or stop Russia's offensive operations in "key directions" of eastern Ukraine.[20] Putin claimed that the incursion has not impacted Russia's "primary goal" of seizing the remainder of Donbas. Putin claimed that Ukraine also intended for the incursion to divide Russian society, but that instead the incursion has further unified Russia and there has been a sharp increase in the number of people interested in signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Putin claimed that Russian forces have "stabilized" the situation in Kursk Oblast and are beginning to push Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. Putin claimed that Russian forces are making significant territorial advances in Ukraine and have accelerated their offensive operations. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces are suffering "heavy" manpower and equipment losses, but did not provide specific numbers for these losses. Putin's claims about the Kursk incursion having no operational impacts are demonstrably false, however, as ISW has reported.[21]

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during an interview with CNN published on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and "reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into northern Ukraine.[22] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine's key objectives for the incursion were to stop Russian forces from using Kursk Oblast as a sanctuary to prepare offensive operations into Ukraine, divert Russian forces from other unspecified areas in Ukraine, create a "security zone," take Russian prisoners of war (POWs), and boost Ukrainian morale. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces have moved "tens of thousands" of troops previously intended to reinforce Russian offensive operations in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, including small elements of several elite Russian Airborne (VDV) units. Russian forces have reportedly redeployed elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the 11th and 83rd VDV brigades to Kursk Oblast.[23] The Russian military command has largely relied on conscripts and regular and irregular forces redeployed from lower priority sectors of Ukraine, such as northern Kharkiv Oblast, to conduct defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.[24] These forces are extremely unlikely to be sufficient to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk if the Ukrainians choose to defend. The Russian military command may have also redeployed at least a company of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) from the Pokrovsk direction in mid-August 2024.[25] The redeployment of elements of the CMD — which is reportedly tasked with completing the seizure of Pokrovsk — suggests that the Russian military command has not be able to fully insulate its priority offensive operations from the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion, despite Putin's claims.

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has also allowed Ukraine to challenge Russia's control of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine. Russia has possessed the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine since at least November 2023, which has allowed the Russian military command to determine the location, time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine at will and has forced Ukraine to expend manpower and materiel in reactive defensive operations.[26] Syrskyi recently stated that Russia has redeployed roughly 30,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast to respond to the Ukrainian incursion.[27] A significant additional redeployment of Russian troops from the frontline in Ukraine would very likely be necessary to let Russia regain control of its territory in Kursk, as US intelligence officials have reportedly assessed, and would significantly impact Russia's offensive operations and Russia's ability to prepare for future operations.[28]

Putin's informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk. The Kremlin is reportedly trying to condition Russian society to accept that the limited Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is a "new normal," possibly in order to afford itself time and space to respond to the incursion after seizing Pokrovsk.[29] Putin delayed declaring a "counterterrorism operation" for several days following the incursion and has largely avoided redeploying the large numbers of experienced and combat effective forces that Russia will likely need to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[30] ISW continues to assess that Putin is likely prioritizing Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Putin's rhetorical efforts further support this assessment.[31] Putin also attempted to marginally rehabilitate the Russian MoD's public image during his speech by claiming that the MoD is "objective" and by presenting battlefield reports from the MoD as accurate.[32] Putin may also intend to influence select Western audiences with his comments about the Ukrainian incursion. Putin may assess that he can encourage Western decision-makers to pressure Ukraine into withdrawing its forces from Kursk Oblast, which would allow Putin to continue his offensive operations in Ukraine without having to redeploy additional forces to Kursk Oblast. Putin's ostensible comfort with allowing Ukrainian forces to hold Russian territory for a protracted time is a stunning reversal of longstanding Russian rhetoric and doctrine about the inviolability of Russia's borders and calls into question the significance of Russia's supposed "red lines."[33]

Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic. Russian forces have advanced at most roughly 40 kilometers from the 2022 frontline in Pokrovsk Raion since the beginning of the Russian offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and appear to have suffered significant manpower and armored vehicle losses in exchange for these territorial gains.[34] A Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would almost certainly complicate Ukrainian logistics, and further Russian advances west and southwest of Donetsk City will challenge Ukraine's defensive positions in the area to be sure. The loss of Pokrovsk, and the loss and occupation of any Ukrainian territory and people, would be a significant blow to Ukrainian morale. The Russian seizure of Pokrovsk is by no means inevitable, however. Russian forces have failed to seize Chasiv Yar and threaten Ukraine's fortress belt from Slovyansk to Kostyantynivka after months of assaults, and Ukrainian forces have proven their ability to limit Russian advances elsewhere in the theater, particularly when well-staffed and equipped. It remains too soon to forecast the outcome of the current Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast, and far too soon to assess the effects of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk that were intended to go far beyond affecting the immediate situation around Pokrovsk.

The US, Ukraine's other supporters, and Ukraine itself maintain the ability to make decisions that can impact the battlefield situation — including by addressing Ukraine's manpower and training restraints and adequately arming and equipping Ukraine so that the Ukrainian military command can properly prepare for future defensive and counteroffensive operations.

Russia continued its efforts to bolster economic relations with non-Western countries on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai. Russian President Vladimir Putin shared the stage during his speech with officials from Malaysia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on September 5 to discuss bilateral cooperation and multilateral projects.[35] Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim told Putin during a plenary session that Malaysia is interested in joining BRICS and claimed that Russian-Malaysian collaboration on what Ibrahim called “Islamic finance” would help Russia attract more investment from majority Muslim countries.[36] Indian Ambassador to Russia Vinay Kumar stated that India expects to increase imports of Russian oil until 2030 and that India and Russia are developing a new interbank exchange system.[37] Kumar also expressed hope that Russia will increase its exports of fertilizer to India. Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev highlighted Rosatom’s ongoing work with India and Vietnam to develop the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic, a shipping route between western Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.[38] Putin also discussed joint PRC-Russian efforts to address and mitigate external challenges to bilateral cooperation between the two countries with PRC Vice President Han Zheng.[39] This conversation occurred against the backdrop of a statement by the CEO of Russian metals and renewables company En+, Vladimir Kolmogorov, at the EEF, who claimed that a large joint Russia-PRC coal project in Siberia is facing financial difficulties due to concern among PRC companies about Western secondary sanctions.[40] ISW previously noted that Russian efforts at the EEF are largely centered around diplomatic efforts with non-Western countries to evade Western sanctions.[41]

Ukrainian officials announced a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 5. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Yaroslav Zheleznyak reported on September 5 that that the Verkhovna Rada voted to appoint First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha as Foreign Minister; Head of Ukraine's state-owned defense enterprise Ukroboronprom, Herman Smetanin, as Strategic Industries Minister; former Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha Stefanishyna as Justice Minister; Presidential Office Deputy Head Oleksiy Kuleba as Development of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Minister; and Deputy Defense Minister Nataliya Kalmykova as Veterans Affairs Minister.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway.
• Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term.
• Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.
• The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.
• The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
• The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive.
• Putin's informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.
• Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces continue to forcibly redeploy mobilized Russian military personnel from occupied Ukraine to frontline positions to bolster Russia's crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2024

Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 4, citing leaks from Russian state correspondence, that Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry devised a plan to spend nearly $1 billion on securing critical electronic components in October 2022, which reportedly included the possibility of building facilities in India to gain access to such components.[1] FT reported that the leaked documents reveal that Russia has been covertly acquiring sensitive dual-use electronics from India with “significant reserves” of Indian rupees amassed by Russian banks from increasing oil sales to India. The extent to which Russia has implemented this plan remains unclear, although ISW assesses Russia is engaged in a wider effort to evade Western sanctions and procure sanctioned electronic components and machinery necessary for Russia's defense industry production via foreign actors.[2]

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin on September 4 on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai.[3] Putin and Vulin discussed the removal of bilateral trade barriers to reverse declining trade levels, and Vulin stated that Serbia will not impose sanctions on Russia and will not allow its territory to be used for “anti-Russian” actions. Vulin’s comment may have been intended in part to avert some of Putin’s annoyance following Serbia’s recent purchase of 12 Rafale jets from France in a likely effort to diversify the country’s arms suppliers away from Russia.[4] Putin stated that he hopes to see Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic at the upcoming October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan.[5] Putin also met PRC Vice President Han Zheng on September 4 and emphasized that the EEF serves as a valuable platform for enhancing mutual understanding and fostering Russia–PRC economic cooperation.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 3 that Putin briefed PRC officials about the outcomes of his recent trip to Mongolia, during which Putin emphasized growing regional trade and cooperation with the PRC and Mongolia.[7] ISW has previously observed indications that foreign companies and banks, including in the PRC, have been increasingly reluctant to conduct transactions with Russian actors due to fears of Western secondary sanctions, which could be affecting Russia's sanctions evasion efforts.[8]

Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Lviv City, Lviv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during another mid-sized combined drone and missile strike on the night of September 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from MiG-31K aircraft over Tula Oblast; two Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 strategic bombers over the Black Sea; six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Tu-95 strategic bombers from Volgograd Oblast airspace; three Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; and 29 Shahed-136/131 drones from launch areas in Kursk Oblast.[9] Ukrainian forces shot down four Kh-101 missiles, three Iskander-K missiles, and 22 Shahed drones; six other Shaheds did not reach their targets likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) suppression, and one Shahed flew into Belarusian airspace. Russian missiles struck civilian objects in both Kryvyi Rih and Lviv City, wounding and killing civilians. Kryvyi Rih City Head Oleksandr Vilkul stated that the Russian strike on Kryvyi Rih damaged a hotel in the city center, apartment buildings, four educational institutions, and other civilian facilities and wounded up to six people.[10] Russian missiles also struck Lviv City and killed seven civilians, including two children, and damaged up to 188 residential and historical heritage buildings and schools.[11] International humanitarian law forbids strikes on civilian objects (defined as any object that does not have an explicit military purpose or objective), and furthermore prohibits strikes that indiscriminately target both military and civilian objects.[12] Russian sources attempted to justify the strikes as targeting military objects, but under international law even strikes on military objects do not justify indiscriminate collateral harm to civilians or civilian objects.[13]

Ukrainian authorities are investigating another report of apparent Russian war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on September 3 that the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office launched a pre-trial investigation into footage published on a Telegram channel purportedly showing Russian forces executing three Ukrainian servicemen point-blank near Toretsk after they had clearly surrendered and been disarmed.[14] ISW cannot independently verify the footage. Attacking soldiers who are hors de combat, specifically those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender, is a violation of Article 41 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict.[15]

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on September 4 that Germany will provide 17 additional IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026.[16] Scholz stated that Germany has already delivered seven IRIS-T systems previously pledged to Ukraine and that Germany will send four of the 17 additional systems by the end of 2024. A German government official told Bloomberg on September 4 that Ukraine will receive 12 medium-range and 12 shorter-range IRIS-T systems from Germany by 2026.[17] Other European countries also continue to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Simon Harris signed a ten-year bilateral agreement on support and co-operation on September 4 during Harris' visit to Kyiv.[18] The agreement stipulates that Ireland will continue diplomatic efforts promoting Ukraine's peace formula, security support, and the provision of non-lethal military aid to Ukraine.[19]

Ukrainian officials announced a series of resignations and appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 3 and 4. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on September 3 and 4 that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territory Iryna Vereshchuk, State Property Fund Head Vitaliy Koval, Justice Minister Denys Maliuska, and Ecology Minister Ruslan Strilets submitted their resignation letters.[20] Vereshchuk and Kamyshin will both reportedly transition to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's office, and the Verkhovna Rada is still considering several of the resignations.[21] Zelensky responded to the reshuffling on September 3 and stated that he intends to "weight" areas of Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy differently in the future.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions.
• Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Lviv City, Lviv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during another mid-sized combined drone and missile strike on the night of September 3 to 4.
• Ukrainian authorities are investigating another report of apparent Russian war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers.
• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on September 4 that Germany will provide 17 additional IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026.
• Ukrainian officials announced a series of resignations and appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 3 and 4.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly made marginal advances in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 4.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions west of Donetsk City.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to portray itself as suitably addressing its obligations towards Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2024

Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, a Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast, and 35 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 27 Shahed drones over Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, that six Shaheds did not strike their target, and that two Shahed drones flew toward Belgorod Oblast and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that two Iskander missiles struck a military educational institution and a nearby hospital in Poltava City, partially destroying a building at the Poltava Military Communications Institute.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated the strike killed at least 51 and injured at least 271.[4] Zelensky highlighted Ukraine's need for more air defense systems and interceptors and called on Western countries to lift restrictions on Ukrainian forces conducting long-range strikes against military targets within Russia as such restrictions inhibit Ukraine from defending against long-range Russian strikes.[5] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only Patriot and SAMP/T air defense systems are capable of intercepting Russia's ballistic missiles.[6] Russian milbloggers celebrated the strike and amplified footage of the strike and its aftermath.[7]

The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with NBC on September 3 that Ukrainian forces are "conceptually" planning to hold territory in Kursk Oblast for an unspecified period of time, but did not offer further details about Ukraine's objectives for the incursion due to concerns about operational security.[8] Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's "victory plan" to end the war on just terms and bring Russia to the negotiating table.[9] Zelensky noted that Ukraine intends to exchange Russian prisoners of war (POWs) captured in Kursk Oblast for Ukrainian POWs currently in Russian captivity and reiterated that one of the goals of the incursion was to force Russia to redeploy troops from the frontline throughout Ukraine, particularly eastern Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Russia has diverted roughly 60,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on August 27 that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast.[10] ISW has observed indications for several weeks that the Russian military command was redeploying forces from northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast and recently observed indications that the Russian military command is redeploying forces likely intended for future higher priority offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin has thus far avoided redeploying the type of combat effective and experienced frontline units that will likely be necessary to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Zelensky's statement suggests that Ukrainian forces will likely maintain positions in the over 1,100 square kilometers of territory where Ukrainian forces are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast until Putin choses to commit such forces. ISW assesses that Putin is attempting to preserve the Russian drive on Pokrovsk at the expense of delaying the clearing of Kursk but that the incursion is likely to have a variety of other important impacts on Russian military operations over various time periods regardless of its impact on the current Pokrovsk operation.[12]

While the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to be having operational-level impacts on the Russian military, the incursion has likely not yet shifted Putin's strategic-level thinking. ISW assesses that Putin maintains that Russia can slowly and indefinitely subsume Ukraine through grinding advances and that Russia can achieve its goals through a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces and by outlasting Western support for Ukraine — assessments that make Putin averse to peace negotiations on terms other than Ukrainian and Western capitulation to his demands.[13]

Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms. Ukrainian counteroffensives in Fall 2022 both successfully pushed the frontline back from Kharkiv City – Ukraine's second largest city – and liberated Kherson City and established a defensible frontline along the Dnipro River.[14] Ukraine demonstrated its ability to conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations and liberate large swaths of territory when properly aided and equipped by the West in Fall 2022, and the assumption that Ukraine is permanently unable to conduct future counteroffensive operations that result in operationally significant gains with timely and reliable deliveries of Western aid is premature. Delays in the provision of Western aid, among other factors, hindered the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive and generated a military crisis in Ukraine in 2024 from which Ukraine is still attempting to recover.[15] Russian forces were able to make tactically significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2024 in large part because of the shortages of artillery and air defense munitions caused by the suspension of US military assistance.[16] ISW continues to assess that prompt and reliable Western security assistance will be critical to Ukraine's ability to conduct future counteroffensive operations, and that the US and wider Western alliance can make decisions to redress Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.[17]

Russia will very likely resolve to continue its genocidal war against Ukraine unless faced with significant battlefield setbacks and strong Western support for Ukraine, and it is highly unlikely that any foreseeable Russian leader after Putin will be more amenable to peace negotiations and a just resolution to the war. The Kremlin has spent years denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation and delegitimizing Ukrainian sovereignty, and this effort has had widespread and likely long-term impacts on Russian society and elite opinion.[18] Russian officials in both Putin's inner circle and the wider Russian government have publicly stated their aversion to peace negotiations with Ukraine on terms other than capitulation, and Putin's successor is far more likely to hold such views than to reject them in the absence of significant Russian setbacks.[19] A negotiated ceasefire on current lines and under current circumstances will only benefit Russia and will afford the Kremlin time to further radicalize and militarize Russian society against Ukraine and the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine.[20] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has highlighted that the war in Ukraine is not indefinitely stalemated, however, and shown that Ukraine, Russia, and the West maintain the ability to make decisions that significantly impact current battlefield realities and the future end state of the war.

Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months. Reuters reported, citing three sources including US officials, that the US is close to an agreement to provide JASSMs to Ukraine and that the missiles would be announced in a military assistance package in Fall 2024 but that the US has not yet finalized the deal.[21] Reuters noted that the JASSM has only been integrated into US-designed aircraft, and one US official told Reuters that "there were efforts" to integrate the JASSM with other fighter jets in Ukraine's air fleet. The standard JASSM has a range of roughly 370 kilometers, and the extended-range JASSM (JASSM-ER) has a range of about 1,000 kilometers.[22] Reuters reported that it is unclear which variant the US would send to Ukraine under this deal, although both variants have ranges longer than the maximum range of ATACMS missiles that the US has already provided to Ukraine.[23] ISW has previously assessed that there are at least 245 Russian military objects — at least 85 percent of which are not airfields — within range of ATACMS, and even just the standard JASSM launched from over Ukrainian airspace would likely further expand the set of military objects within Russia that would be in range of Ukrainian missiles.[24] It is unclear whether Ukraine would be able to take advantage of the JASSM's extended range given that current US policy restricts Ukraine from using the US-provided long-range precision weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[25] ISW continues to assess that current US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia and the slow provision of small numbers of such weapons are actively hindering Ukraine's ability to conduct offensive operations and substantially disrupt Russian operations.[26]

Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[27] Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh emphasized increasing projects under the Mongolia-Russia-China Economic Corridor program, which supports the Russian “Greater Eurasian partnership” economic initiative, China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and Mongolia’s “Steppe Road” development plan.[28] Putin emphasized that the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline connecting Russia, Mongolia, and the PRC is fully constructed and awaits state examination.[29] Putin invited Kurelsukh to the BRICS forum in Fall 2024 and suggested that Mongolia join the BRICS Plus/Outreach format.[30] Mongolia is also reportedly close to completing a temporary trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[31] Russia and Mongolia also signed bilateral agreements to increase oil and petroleum product exports from Russia to Mongolia, and Putin announced that Russian energy company Inter RAO will assist in restoring Ulaanbaatar Thermal Power Plant No. 3 (TPP-3).[32]

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war in Ukraine. The two presidents released a joint statement on September 2 expressing support for the joint PRC–Brazilian proposal on the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” and the African Union’s efforts to solve the war in Ukraine.[33] The two leaders affirmed that inclusive dialogue and peaceful negotiations are essential for a lasting solution to the war and called on Russia and Ukraine to adhere to three key principles that favor Russia: avoiding battlefield expansion, preventing escalation of fighting, and refraining from provocations. ISW continues to assess that the PRC's peace plan is favorable to Russia and that several African states seek to balance Ukraine and Russia to maintain longstanding bilateral relationships with Russia without officially voicing support for Russia.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3.
• The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature.
• Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms.
• Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2024

Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[i] NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 2 ISW-CTP Iran Update. An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia "within a matter of days.”[ii] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia.[iii] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently in Iran training to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while preserving Russia's stockpiles of domestically-produced missiles, such as Iskanders, for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[iv]

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Mongolian outlet Unuudur ahead of his visit to Mongolia on September 2-3, emphasizing historical and modern Russian-Mongolian relations and current trilateral economic and energy initiatives with Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Putin emphasized Soviet-Mongolian relations and the 2019 Russian-Mongolian comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the interview published on September 2.[v] Putin also highlighted economic and energy cooperation initiatives to deepen relations between Russia, Mongolia, and the PRC and expressed confidence in developing the Russia-Mongolia-China Economic Corridor and the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which will run from Russia through Mongolia to the PRC upon its completion. Putin also asserted that the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Mongolia have made significant progress in drafting a temporary free trade agreement. Putin notably published articles in North Korean and Vietnamese state newspapers before his visits to the countries in June 2024 and is likely attempting to pursue stronger relations with countries that historically had friendly ties to the Soviet Union to form a coalition to act as an alternative to the West.[vi]

Russian and Mongolian officials indicated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Putin's arrest will not impact Putin's ongoing visit to Mongolia, despite Mongolia's legal obligation to enforce this warrant. Putin arrived in Ulaanbaatar on September 2, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh invited Putin and that Putin will discuss bilateral relations and sign bilateral agreements during the visit.[vii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 30 that the Kremlin is not worried about Mongolia's obligation to arrest Putin as Russia and Mongolia maintain an "excellent dialogue," and Peskov reiterated similar sentiments on September 2.[viii] Russian state media claimed that Mongolian Presidential Spokesperson Ulziibayar Zolbayar reportedly rejected reports that the ICC appealed to Mongolia to enforce the arrest warrant for Putin.[ix] Russian authorities have previously stated that Russia does not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction, but Mongolia has been party to the Rome Statute (which gives the ICC its power) since 2002.[x]

Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Russian Investigative Committee suspects that Mumindzhanov accepted bribes worth over 20 million rubles (about $222,000) while he was the Resource Provision Head within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and oversaw contracts for the supply of Russian military uniforms.[xi] A Russian insider source, who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD, claimed that Mumindzhanov was a direct subordinate of former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitry Bulgakov, whom Russian authorities arrested on corruption charges on July 26.[xii] The insider source also claimed that Mumindzhanov had ties to current Russian Security Council Secretary and former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[xiii] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mumindzhanov's arrest indicates that the Kremlin does not intend to curtail current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's efforts to "cleanse" the Russian MoD and that arrests are not limited to several high-profile MoD officials but have been ongoing for five months.[xiv] The milblogger also claimed that continued investigations into high-ranking Russian MoD officials will satisfy the public's demand for justice and the fight against corruption.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Mongolian outlet Unuudur ahead of his visit to Mongolia on September 2-3, emphasizing historical and modern Russian-Mongolian relations and current trilateral economic and energy initiatives with Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Russian and Mongolian officials indicated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Putin's arrest will not impact Putin's ongoing visit to Mongolia, despite Mongolia's legal obligation to enforce this warrant.
• Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2.
• Russian forces recently regained lost positions east of Korenevo amid continued Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 2.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials are highlighting Russian military training capabilities, likely in an attempt to promote military recruitment and as part of long-term efforts to rebuild the Russian officer corps.
• Russian occupation officials announced the start of the school year in occupied Ukraine, highlighting Russia's various efforts to coopt the educational system and forcibly Russify and militarize Ukrainian children and youth.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2024

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest series of drone strikes against targets within Russia on the night of August 31 to September 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed 158 Ukrainian drones over 16 oblasts: 46 drones over Kursk Oblast, 34 over Bryansk Oblast, 28 over Voronezh Oblast, 14 over Belgorod Oblast, nine over Moscow City and Oblast, eight over Ryazan Oblast, five over Kaluga Oblast, four over Lipetsk Oblast, three over Tula Oblast, two over Tambov and Smolensk oblasts each, and a drone each over Oryol, Tver, and Ivanovo oblasts.[1] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces shot down two Ukrainian drones near the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya and that drone debris damaged a technical room at the facility and caused a fire.[2] Russian sources posted footage of the Ukrainian drone striking the Moscow Oil Refinery and a small fire in the area, although some characterized the fire as a normal gas flare at the facility.[3] Kashira Raion Head Mikhail Shuvalov stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Kashira State District Power Plant in Kashira Raion, Moscow Oblast with three drones, and Russian sources amplified footage of Russian air defense activating and explosions near the plant.[4] The Tver Oblast press service stated that a Ukrainian drone caused a fire in Konakovo Raion, and Russian sources amplified footage of the drone striking the Konakovo State District Power Plant, a subsequent large fire at the plant, and damage within the plant.[5] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that there was also a fire at the Konakovo gas distribution network along the "KGMO-Konakovo" main gas pipeline following Ukrainian drone strikes in Tver Oblast.[6] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed that a Ukrainian drone damaged a cell tower in Tarusa Raion, Kaluga Oblast.[7] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies at the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) in Lipetsk Oblast, a military facility for a unit of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division in Tula Oblast, two cement plants in Voskresensk and Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, and the Ferzikovo cement plant in Kaluga Oblast on the night of August 31 to September 1.[8] Only the FIRMS data from the site in Tula Oblast appears to be anomalous, as the other facilities routinely give off heat signatures due to normal industrial activities.

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 1, but there were no confirmed Ukrainian advances. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Korenevo; east of Korenevo near Matveyevka; northeast of Korenevo near Aleksandrovka; northwest of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and Pogrebki; north of Sudzha near Kamyshevka; and northeast of Sudzha near Nizhnyaya Parovaya, Bakhtinka, and Nechayev.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Pogrebki, and geolocated footage published on September 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating within Pogrebki.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to establish a foothold in Borki (southeast of Sudzha) and continue to attack Ukrainian positions within the settlement.[11] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from Korenevo, cleared Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo), and counterattacked near Kauchuk (northeast of Korenevo).[12] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Varvar" detachment are reportedly operating near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[13] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]), the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Aida" group are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has not yet degraded Russian domestic support of the war in Ukraine in the short-term following the Kursk incursion and that Russian support for the war has remained high since 2022. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published the results of a monthly poll on August 30 and found that about 78 percent of respondents support Russian military operations in Ukraine — an increase from 75 percent in July 2024 and 77 percent in June 2024.[15] The Levada Center's polling indicates that the lowest Russian support for the war in Ukraine was in February 2022 with 68 percent of respondents supporting the war and that war support among poll respondents has not fallen below 70 percent since March 2022. The Levada Center also asked respondents in August 2024 about the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and found that 91 percent of respondents are concerned about Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory. The Levada Center also reported that 57 percent of respondents do not expect a second wave of mobilization and 60 percent do not see a need for a second wave of mobilization in the coming months — both decreasing from 65 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Levada Center's polling data indicates that the Kremlin's refusal to fully transition Russian society at large to a wartime footing and the Kremlin’s ongoing domestic information operations aimed at normalizing the war to Russian society have mitigated against domestic war weariness thus far and that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has not changed this mindset. The fact that Russian society in general appears to not be experiencing war fatigue likely grants the Kremlin flexibility in how it strategizes to wage a protracted war of attrition against Ukraine.[16]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at an August 31 press conference that "Armenia has frozen its participation in the [Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization] CSTO at all levels," after Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO for nearly a year.[17] Pashinyan also acknowledged that other government officials and the public may have differing views on Armenia's decision to freeze its participation in the CSTO but noted that the Armenian government does not currently see the need to reconsider the decision. Pashinyan stated that Armenia may "see the need to make another decision" in the future, however.[18] Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO since Pashinyan and Armenian representatives failed to attend several consecutive CSTO events — both political meetings and military exercises — starting in mid-to-late 2023.[19] Pashinyan acknowledged in February 2024 that Armenia had "essentially" frozen its participation in the CSTO because the CSTO "failed to fulfill its obligations in the field of security" to Armenia, particularly in 2021 and 2022.[20] Armenia has also appeared to be reducing its bilateral security relations with Russia, and Russian border guards left the Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan — where Russian border guards had been serving previously since 1992 — on July 31, 2024.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest series of drone strikes against targets within Russia on the night of August 31 to September 1.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 1, but there were no confirmed Ukrainian advances.
• Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has not yet degraded Russian domestic support of the war in Ukraine in the short-term following the Kursk incursion and that Russian support for the war has remained high since 2022.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at an August 31 press conference that "Armenia has frozen its participation in the [Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization] CSTO at all levels," after Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO for nearly a year.
• Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.