Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, November 29, 2023: Potential ISSP-JNIM Truce Boosts Salafi-Jihadi Insurgency in the Sahel

Data Cutoff: November 29, 2023, at 10 a.m.

CTP has temporarily paused the Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and Pakistan sections of the Salafi-Jihadi Weekly Update to support the production of CTP’s Iran Update, which is covering the Israel-Hamas war. This update will continue to cover the Salafi-jihadi movement in sub-Saharan Africa on a weekly basis in the interim.

Contributor: Charlie Towle

Key Takeaway: A potential localized truce between Islamic State and al Qaeda–linked militants near the Malian-Nigerien border is likely aiding both groups’ efforts to strengthen their support zones in the Sahel and increasing their transnational threat risk. The Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP) has spread its governance efforts in northeastern Mali and expanded governance and military activity closer to the Nigerien capital since the July 2023 coup. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has increased its military activity in northern Mali to exploit opportunities created by the end of the UN mission in Mali and renewed fighting between the Malian army and Tuareg rebels since July.

A potential truce between Islamic State and al Qaeda–linked militants near the Malian-Nigerien border is likely aiding ISSP efforts to expand military and governance activity toward the Nigerien capital. ISSP and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), fought several battles across northeastern Mali between August 2022 and April 2023.[1] The fighting escalated as ISSP strengthened due to France’s withdrawal from Mali and began to encroach on JNIM’s area of influence in the first half of 2022.[2] Both groups lost hundreds of fighters in the clashes and used sophisticated systems such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and in-battle drone reconnaissance.[3] The high casualties and advanced tactics suggest that both groups viewed each other as high priority threats. JNIM eventually abandoned the last major settlement it controlled in Mali’s Menaka region in early April.[4]

The two groups have notably not fought each other in the Menaka region since April.[5] The conflict rate in the neighboring Gao region has also decreased over the same period.[6] However, regular clashes have continued elsewhere in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[7] This decrease in fighting along the Malian-Nigerien border compared to the rest of the tri-border area likely indicates a localized détente. A faction claiming to be an al Qaeda–linked splinter group circulated calls for unity between ISSP and JNIM in August, and numerous local and open-source news aggregators have speculated about the existence of a truce between the two groups.[8] Any potential truce would be a formalization of the de facto de-escalation between the two groups in northeastern Mali that began in April.

• CTP has observed an average of nearly eight clashes between ISSP and JNIM per quarter since mid-2022.[9] ISSP has not clashed with JNIM in the Menaka region since it seized the final JNIM-controlled district capital in early April, however.[10]

Figure 1. ISSP and JNIM Contest the Tri-Border Region

Source: Liam Karr.

ISSP has increased the rate and severity of its attacks across the border in Niger and expanded governance activity closer to the Nigerien capital since the July 2023 Nigerien coup.[11] The new junta has been preoccupied with protecting itself from a potential regional intervention to restore the Nigerien president and assumed significant risk along the Malian border to concentrate its forces around the capital.[12] The withdrawal of French support and halting of US military cooperation after the July 2023 coup has made Nigerien forces even more vulnerable.[13]

ISSP has nearly tripled its monthly rate of attacks and carried out several large-scale ambushes that killed hundreds of Nigerien troops.[14] Some Nigerien soldiers stationed near the Malian border halted patrols after the October ambush.[15] Security forces confined to their bases are unable to secure local populations from ISSP militants, conduct patrols, or gather the local intelligence necessary to disrupt impending attacks. Local reports on X (Twitter) claim that ISSP has begun collecting zakat—an obligatory religious tax in Islamic law that Salafi-jihadi groups use to mask forcible extortion—in localities closer to the Nigerien capital since the July coup.[16]

• Niger’s armed forces overthrew the country’s democratically elected president on July 26.[17] ISSP has nearly tripled its monthly rate of attacks since the coup.[18] The group has averaged over seven attacks per month since August after attacking about 19 times in the first seven months of 2023.[19] ISSP also carried out two ambushes involving VBIEDs and hundreds of militants in October and November that killed dozens of Nigerien troops.[20] Multiple open-source X (Twitter) accounts alleged that JNIM militants participated in these attacks.[21]
• France announced it would withdraw its 1,400 troops from Niger by the end of the year on September 24 and began withdrawing troops in early October.[22] The US has not removed its 1,100 soldiers stationed in northern Niger, but it officially ceased military cooperation and aid to Nigerien forces on October 10 after designating the July takeover as a coup.[23]
• Former regional allies in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) political bloc threatened to invade Niger to reinstate the democratically elected president on July 30 and mobilized a standby force on August 10.[24] Strong public and internal military dissent led Côte d’Ivoire to demobilize its soldiers who would have participated in the intervention force by early November, and the ECOWAS commissioner for political affairs said on November 30 that the bloc had temporarily “suspended” any military intervention.[25]

ISSP is also likely taking advantage of reduced pressure from JNIM to strengthen its governance efforts in northeastern Mali. ISSP was predominantly focused on military efforts against JNIM and ethnic groups that had historically supported French and JNIM forces against ISSP before the détente in April 2023.[26] The group massacred hundreds of civilians in retaliatory killings against suspected French and JNIM collaborators.[27] ISSP has since shifted its focus to political efforts and has significantly increased governance control around northeastern Mali by implementing various economic, health, infrastructure, judicial, and security initiatives.[28] The group repatriated locals who had fled from several villages now under its control and rebuilt damaged houses and water towers.[29] It also began regulating water tower usage, reopening weekly markets, financing health services, and providing security patrols around towns and for traders traveling to nearby markets.[30] ISSP has carried out shari’a punishments at least five times in the Gao and Menaka regions since June 2023.[31]

Figure 2. ISSP Governance Activities in the Tri-Border Region

Source: Liam Karr.

ISSP’s accelerated territorial growth is creating a leadership, logistics, and recruitment hub for IS in West Africa that could generate a transnational attack threat. The UN Security Council reported in July that ISSP is using its growing support zones to strengthen its lines of communication with the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin for logistical and recruitment purposes.[32] ISWAP hosts the regional IS office, which distributes guidance and resources to the group’s affiliates.[33] Both of these affiliates have shown the capability and intent to threaten US personnel in the region.[34] An IS hub in West Africa will also attract foreign fighters that would increase both the group’s strength and the risk of transnational attack plots. The UN Security Council reported in July that IS recruiters and facilitators in the Sahel established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel and organized an attack cell operating out of Morocco and Spain.[35]

• ISWAP was behind a credible security threat to the US embassy in Nigeria in October 2022 and attempted to assassinate the Nigerian president in December 2023.[36] ISSP killed four US soldiers in an ambush in 2017.[37]
• IS propaganda has increasingly highlighted its provinces in West Africa since 2022 and encouraged foreign fighters to travel to the area. An IS media campaign in June 2022 included videos of militants from the Middle East encouraging the African affiliates and an edition of the group’s weekly newsletter that focused on its West African affiliates, and it called for migration to Africa.[38] The IS newsletter also spotlighted ISSP more recently in its August 24, 2023, edition.[39]

The potential truce has also likely aided JNIM’s efforts to exploit opportunities created by the end of the UN mission in Mali and renewed fighting between the Malian army and Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. JNIM has increased the rate and severity of its attacks in northern Mali since the nearly 13,000 UN soldiers began departing in late June to complete a full withdrawal by the end of 2023.[40] This escalation in activity suggests that the group has not exhausted its resources in northern Mali and is instead giving priority to attacking Malian forces instead of ISSP. The UN withdrawal also contributed to renewed fighting between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels for control of formerly UN-secured towns since August 2023.[41] CTP has previously assessed that JNIM and the rebels are taking advantage of—if not explicitly coordinating—each other’s activity to amplify their impact based on JNIM and rebel attacks in close geographical proximity and timing.[42] The groups have separately claimed to overrun at least eight bases in northern Mali since the beginning of September.[43]

• JNIM has more than quadrupled its monthly rate of attacks in northern Mali since the beginning of July.[44] The group has averaged nearly nine attacks per month after only averaging two in the first half of 2023.[45] The group has used suicide VBIEDs against Malian forces in the area at least three times since the beginning of September. The group used VBIEDs in northern Mali in battles against ISSP in early 2023 but had not used them against security forces in the area since November 2018.[46]
• JNIM and Tuareg rebels have attacked the same locations within 24 hours two separate times since the beginning of October. Rebels claimed to shoot down two Malian planes near Tarkint in the Gao region on October 3.[47] JNIM claimed an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against Malian and Wagner forces in the same area on the same day.[48] JNIM also claimed an IED attack on a Malian-Wagner convoy along the RN18 road in the Gao region on October 4, and the rebels said they repelled an attack by a Malian-Wagner convoy along the same stretch of road on October 5.[49] JNIM claimed another IED attack against UN forces withdrawing from Aguelhok in the Kidal region on October 23, the same day that rebel forces captured the newly vacated UN base in the town.[50] The lack of JNIM IED attacks against rebels further indicates that the rebels have advanced knowledge of where IEDs are or that JNIM militants are intentionally not detonating them against rebels.
• JNIM and the Tuareg rebels have a shared goal of removing Malian forces from northern Mali, a history of working together, and extensive human network connections stretching from the leadership to the fighters. The JNIM emir and other al Qaeda–linked militants now in JNIM initially fought alongside the rebel groups during the 2012 Tuareg rebellion.[51] The al Qaeda–linked faction sidelined the rebels in 2013 and expanded into central Mali.[52] The jihadist takeover prompted the French-led intervention in 2013, which pushed back the insurgents and helped split non-jihadist rebels from the al Qaeda–linked militants.[53] Connections between the two sides remain intact, however. The groups have cease-fire agreements in their shared support areas and membership overlap, and they have operationally coordinated against ISSP since 2021.[54] The factions’ leaders also have relationships dating back to at least the 1990s.[55]

JNIM will pose a greater transnational threat risk as its support zones in northern Mali strengthen and face less pressure from ISSP and security forces. The Malian government failed to contain the previous jihadist-rebel insurgency in 2012 and does not have the capacity to defeat a new one given the expanded threat the Salafi-jihadi insurgency now poses in central and southern Mali compared to 2012.[56] These fighters still aspire to build external attack capabilities targeting the West and have carried out regional terror attacks, despite giving priority to their locally focused insurgency in recent years.[57] JNIM’s growing support zones in northern Mali will give it access to the space, resources, and recruitment pools needed to stage regional and international terror attacks. Some JNIM leaders have threatened to attack Europe and the US, which creates a transnational attack risk even if most group leadership does not give priority to rebuilding external attack capabilities.[58]

Any truce between ISSP and JNIM is likely localized and temporary. ISSP and JNIM have continued fighting in other contested areas of the tri-border region despite the détente in northeastern Mali. IS-affiliated media highlighted at least one clash between the two groups near the Malian border in northern Burkina Faso that occurred in late October.[59] The JNIM militants in Burkina Faso are from different JNIM subgroups and predominantly belong to a different ethnic group from the subgroup in northern Mali.[60] The subgroup in northern Mali has also historically had a closer human network and operational connections with the IS-linked militants.[61] Previous instances of ISSP and JNIM cooperation with the northern Mali subgroup have also been limited to mutually beneficial cease-fires and occasional operational cooperation and never escalated to a merger.[62]

• JNIM’s northern Mali subgroup Ansar al Din has historically had closer human network and operational connections with IS-linked militants in the Sahel than other JNIM subgroups. Ansar al Din historically coordinated with and provided fighters for the splinter group that eventually became ISSP.[63] Nearly all UN-verified intermediaries between the two groups in the 2010s operated in Ansar al Din’s area of influence, highlighting the long-standing human network ties between the two groups.[64] Ansar al Din also continued to allow IS-linked militants to operate unimpeded in its area of operations after the fighters pledged to IS in 2015, and it allowed them to have a continued presence in their areas of operational overlap several months after the IS-linked militants began fighting with other JNIM subgroups in 2019.[65] Ansaroul Islam and Macina Liberation Front are the two JNIM-linked subgroups active in Burkina Faso, and both draw heavily from the Fulani population, while Ansar al Din is predominantly Tuareg.[66]
• Pressure from IS leadership has previously instigated inter-jihadi fighting and is still a driver of conflict. IS media and high-ranking leadership have historically espoused a more hostile stance against JNIM, increasing tensions between JNIM and ISSP.[67] IS media’s continued promotion of ISSP and JNIM clashes in October 2023 indicates that this view has not changed and that the wider group and leadership do not support a truce, which will put pressure on localized agreements.[68]

The Sahelian juntas have increased the rate and sophistication of cross-border operations against Salafi-jihadi groups along shared border areas since establishing an alliance in September 2023, but they lack the capacity to significantly degrade Salafi-jihadi militants’ attack capabilities. Security forces have carried out at least seven operations on neighboring territory since September, compared to just two in the rest of 2023.[69] At least two of the seven operations involved combined forces from two countries, which had not happened since 2022.[70] Increased counterinsurgency pressure, especially from drone strikes, will make it more dangerous for militants to gather and stage large-scale attacks. Recent ISSP and JNIM attacks indicate that the amplified pressure has failed to degrade the groups’ capability to organize such attacks, however. ISSP conducted two large ambushes in Niger in October and November, and hundreds of JNIM militants temporarily overran a provincial capital near the Burkinabe-Malian border on November 26.[71] The security forces lack the capacity to effectively clear insurgent havens from geographically peripheral areas on their own sides of the border, which minimizes the impact of cross-border cooperation.[72]

• The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas signed a mutual defense pact on September 16 called the Alliance of Sahel States.[73] The pact agrees to provide individual and collective assistance in case of rebellion or external aggression, which was a direct response to the potential ECOWAS intervention in Niger.[74] Burkina Faso and Mali repeatedly warned that any military intervention in Niger would mean war against all three countries, and leaders from both juntas also facilitated security-related conversations between Nigerien and Russian officials.[75]

Figure 3. Alliance of Sahel States Cross-Border Counterterrorism Operations

Source: Liam Karr.