RSF Counters Recent SAF Gains in Sudan: Africa File, August 20, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured two key footholds in southeastern Sudan, almost certainly launching the operations from Ethiopian territory. The RSF’s push opens two axes of advance toward key agricultural areas and population centers up the Nile River Valley and distracts the SAF from consolidating its recent gains in central Sudan, although several external and internal challenges may limit further RSF advances.
• Nigeria. Suspected Salafi-jihadi militants possibly linked to IS Sahel Province (ISSP) attacked and looted numerous communities throughout northwestern Nigeria. Suspected ISSP-linked Lakurawa fighters have been active in the targeted area and have reportedly increased attacks on civilians in northwestern Nigeria throughout 2026.

Figure 1. Africa File, August 20, 2026

Source: Yale Ford.

Assessments:

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured two key footholds in southeastern Sudan, supporting RSF efforts to threaten the key Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)–controlled Nile River Valley. The RSF captured the district capital Geisan, which is on the Ethiopian border approximately 115 miles southeast of Blue Nile state capital Ad Damazin, on August 11.[1] The RSF and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu militia employed artillery and drones to support their ground operation.[2] The two groups advanced through the center of Geisan before encountering strong resistance at the town’s main SAF base, which they overran after several hours.[3]

The RSF then retook the district capital Kurmuk, which is on the Ethiopian border approximately 95 miles south of Ad Damazin, on August 13.[4] The RSF had initially captured Kurmuk in March 2026, although the SAF regained control of the town in July.[5] The RSF had conducted several days of heavy drone strikes that forced the SAF to withdraw from key defensive positions around Kurmuk before its ground operation, according to SAF sources that the Sudanese news outlet Sudan Tribune cited.[6] SAF units reportedly retreated to Sali, which is approximately 20 miles north of Kurmuk.[7]

Figure 2. Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Advances in Blue Nile State

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr.

The RSF almost certainly launched its operations from Ethiopian territory. The Egyptian investigative outlet MadaMasr reported that the RSF attacked Kurmuk from two axes—from Sudanese territory to the south and western Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region to the east.[8] The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu also attacked Geisan from rear bases in Benishangul-Gumuz, according to MadaMasr—a claim supported by the main RSF-controlled pocket in Blue Nile being approximately 70 miles southwest of Geisan through SAF-controlled territory.[9] The RSF established a training camp near Asosa, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional capital, in late 2025, and SPLM-N al Hilu maintains additional bases in the area.[10] These rear bases will enable the group to transport fighters and matériel between Geisan and Kurmuk via main roads in Benishangul-Gumuz.

RSF control of Geisan and Kurmuk opens two axes of advance toward key agricultural areas and population centers up the Nile River Valley. Both border towns serve as Sudan-based staging hubs that link Emirati-RSF supply lines running through western Ethiopia to the front lines in Blue Nile, which is the agricultural center of Sudan and the location of one of biggest dams in the country.[11] Kurmuk sits on a major north–south highway that links Ad Damazin to the major cities of Sennar, Wad Madani, and Khartoum, the Sudanese capital.[12] The RSF previously seized an SAF base in al Keili—located near the highway approximately 30 miles north of Kurmuk—when it initially captured Kurmuk in March and later attempted to overrun SAF positions in Sali, which is on the highway.[13] Geisan separately connects to the Blue Nile highway from two different secondary roads on the SAF’s eastern flank. The RSF has advanced on one of the secondary roads since taking Geisan, capturing the villages of Agaro and Amora, which are located approximately 20 miles north of Geisan.[14]

The RSF’s advance in Blue Nile distracts the SAF from consolidating its recent gains in central Sudan, where the RSF continues to pressure the SAF’s central Sudan headquarters, el Obeid. The SAF has already reinforced Blue Nile front lines in response to the RSF’s recent advance, although it is unclear where the SAF redeployed these forces from.[15] The SAF redeployed forces from the main front lines in central Sudan to Blue Nile when the RSF previously captured Kurmuk in March.[16]

The RSF recently threatened SAF control of a key Khartoum–el Obeid supply line. The RSF attacked Jabrat al Sheikh, which is approximately 105 miles north of el Obeid, on August 13. The RSF reportedly used a significant force of over 250 combat vehicles in the operation, although the SAF repelled the attack.[17] The SAF took control of the highway where Jabrat al Sheikh is located in late July 2026, establishing the operationally significant supply line.[18] CTP has previously assessed that strengthened supply lines into el Obeid will support SAF efforts to consolidate control of central Sudan and potentially target the RSF’s heartland in western Sudan.[19]

The RSF separately targeted SAF positions around el Obeid. The RSF conducted drone strikes in el Obeid on August 12 as part of a broader operation targeting cities in central and eastern Sudan.[20] The RSF also attacked um Arada and al Ayara, which are approximately 10 miles south and west of el Obeid, respectively.[21] The SAF repelled the attack on al Ayara, but both the RSF and SAF claimed control of um Arada.[22] The two attacks are the RSF’s closest operations to el Obeid since late 2025.

Figure 3. Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Counterattacks Across Sudan

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Angus Muldoon.

Several external and internal challenges may limit further RSF advances on both fronts, however. SAF defensive maneuvers and Sudan’s rainy season may limit further RSF advances in eastern Sudan. The SAF have deployed reinforcements to Bakori, which is located approximately 80 miles southeast of Ad Damazin, and destroyed a bridge connecting Amora to Bakori amid the RSF’s advance.[23] Sudan’s ongoing wet season, which typically lasts through October, also often complicates travel on secondary roads, which are important for further RSF operations north of el Obeid in central Sudan and from Geisan in eastern Sudan.

The RSF and its partners are also facing internal challenges that are weakening their capacity and cohesion. The RSF has recently experienced another round of defections, however, following a previous wave in April and May 2026.[24] The RSF parallel government’s governor for central Sudan’s Kordofan region left his post and renounced the RSF in mid-August.[25] A senior RSF field commander and 300 fighters under his command then defected.[26] SPLM-N al Hilu is also dealing with a tribal revolt in South Kordofan state that threatens the its headquarters in Kauda.[27] The Sudan Tribune reported in early August that the RSF has initiated a recruitment campaign among tribes in RSF-controlled western Sudan to address manpower concerns amid defections and battlefield setbacks.[28]

Nigeria

Authors: Liam Karr and Aleksandar Wiebler

Suspected Salafi-jihadi militants possibly linked to IS Sahel Province (ISSP) attacked and looted numerous communities throughout northwestern Nigeria. More than 300 militants riding motorbikes rampaged through settlements in and around the Kebbe local government area on August 14. Militants targeted the town of Kebbe in the morning, reportedly killing four soldiers stationed on the settlement’s outskirts.[29] Fighters spent the day raiding the nearby villages of Umbutu, Maikurfuna, Mwandi, Girkau, Zugu, Sabon Gari, and Kaya, looting shops and rustling cattle.[30] A contingent of militants reportedly killed two civilians in Kaya and occupied the town for around seven hours, looting and holding Friday prayers at the local mosque.[31]

Fighters then attacked Ungushi village, where they opened fire on residents attending evening prayers. Militants remained in the village throughout the night, killing at least 28 civilians in the attack, including the town’s imam.[32] Several sources report that the civilians in Ungushi fought back and killed 13 insurgents.[33]

Figure 4. Suspected ISSP Lakurawa Rampage in Nigeria

Source: Liam Karr; Aleksandar Wiebler and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The proliferation of various armed groups in northwestern Nigeria and the fluid relationships between fighters in the region makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for attacks in the area. Nigerian media has referred to the attackers as “Lakurawa,” a label locals use to refer to any suspected Salafi-jihadi–linked militants from the neighboring Francophone countries.[34] Bandits, which are an array of various criminal gangs that operate across northern Nigeria in a warlord-like system, are also active in this area and have both cooperated and competed with the milieu of Salafi-jihadi–linked fighters.[35]

ISSP-linked Lakurawa fighters have reportedly been active in the targeted area, however. ISSP’s Lakurawa subgroup primarily functions as a key logistic node between ISSP and IS West Africa Province in northeastern Nigeria and had avoided carrying out high-publicity attacks that could draw unwanted counterterrorism pressure.[36] CTP assessed in early 2025 that ISSP’s Lakurawa had operationalized its support zones along the Niger and Nigeria border, however, in response to heightened Nigerien and Nigeria counterinsurgency pressure on the group’s support zones.[37] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded exponentially more suspected ISSP attacks in 2025 on both sides of the border, including a similar rampage across villages in Kebbe LGA in September.[38]

Figure 5. ISSP Lakurawa Increases Attacks on Civilians

Source: Aleksandar Wiebler; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

ISSP’s Lakurawa has reportedly increased attacks on civilians in northwestern Nigeria in 2026 as it seeks resources to sustain its operations and expand its support zones by coercing civilian populations. ACLED has already recorded more ISSP attacks in Nigeria in 2026 than in all of 2025, more than half of which have targeted civilians.[39] Fatalities linked to these attacks on civilians are on pace to nearly double in 2026 compared with 2025.[40] ACLED had not recorded an ISSP-linked attack on civilians in Nigeria that had killed more than 20 people before December 31, 2025, but ACLED recorded four such attacks since, all before August 14.[41] These attacks are often related to cattle rustling, coercive demands imposed on civilians, or retaliatory actions for local cooperation with security forces or other armed groups.[42] ACLED frequently notes that the militants in these engagements are “suspected” ISSP militants and “locally known” as Lakurawa, however, meaning that attribution challenges could be inflating these figures and trends.[43]

The Nigerian army recently announced a new counterinsurgency campaign to target “Lakurawa” fighters. Nigerian forces have further reinforced the area since the August 14 attacks. Nigerian security forces and civilian auxiliaries with air support ambushed a group of militants in the village of Gwali, roughly 25 miles southeast of Kebbe, on August 16. The ambush reportedly killed between 38 and 40 militants.[44] Northwestern Theater (Operation Fansan Yamma) Commander Maj. Gen. Bemgba Koughna separately led 200 Nigerian army reinforcements that arrived at the forward operating base in Kebbe on August 16. Koughna assessed local military capabilities and promised to improve regional operations.[45]

The Nigerian Army’s Joint Task Force Northwest had separately launched Operation Clean Sweep IV on August 13 to limit the infiltration and reinforcement of “Lakurawa” fighters in Nigeria while denying armed groups the ability to exploit border areas as movement corridors.[46] The announcement was accompanied by reports of prior operations, highlighting clearance operations in Katsina state from August 12 and undated airstrikes on militant positions in Zamfara.[47] The military did not clarify whether such maneuvers had targeted ISSP-linked fighters or bandits. Nigerian troops also captured two Nigerien nationals suspected of being Lakurawa bomb makers on August 10, although it is unclear whether the arrest was related to Clean Sweep IV.[48]

Africa File Data Cutoff: August 20, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.