Ukraine Invasion Updates, January 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2024

Ukrainian forces struck Russian targets in the vicinity of Belbek airfield in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on January 31. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk amplified geolocated footage on January 31 showing a Ukrainian strike near the Belbek airfield and thanked Ukrainian forces for striking targets in occupied Crimea.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on January 31 shows large smoke plumes rising from the airfield.[2] ISW has yet to observe evidence indicating what Russian targets Ukrainian forces struck at or near the airfield. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 20 Ukrainian missiles, 17 reportedly on the approaches to Sevastopol and three reportedly elsewhere over occupied Crimea.[3] The Russian MoD claimed that missile fragments fell in Lyubimivka (northwest of Sevastopol), and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that missile fragments damaged buildings along Fedorivska Street and the “Ust-Belbek” garden association, both in the vicinity of the Belbek airfield.[4] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the strikes.[5] Ukrainian forces recently repeatedly targeted the Saky airfield (north of Sevastopol) as part of a multi-day strike campaign against Russian targets in occupied Crimea in early January 2024.[6] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a more extensive strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure and Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets in the summer of 2023 that pushed Russian naval assets largely out of the western part of the Black Sea and that aimed to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[7]

Russian President Vladimir Putin doubled down on his maximalist and purposefully vague territorial objectives in Ukraine on January 31. Putin stated during a meeting with his election “proxies” that pushing the current frontline deeper into Ukraine is the most important goal for Russian forces across the theater.[8] Putin emphasized the idea of a “demilitarized” or “sanitary” zone in Ukraine that he claimed would place Russian territory – including occupied Ukraine – out of range of both frontline artillery systems and Western-provided long-range systems. Putin’s stated goal of pushing the front line so that Russia’s claimed and actual territories are outside of Ukrainian firing range is a vague goal that is actually unattainable as long as there is an independent Ukraine with any ability to fight. Putin would likely annex any Ukrainian territories Russia managed to capture in pursuit of this supposed objective (particularly in the four oblasts Russia has already claimed to have annexed but only partially controls), thus bringing the new Russian territories into range of Ukrainian systems in whatever remains of an independent Ukraine. A Russian nationalist milblogger expanded on this dilemma, noting that Russia would also have to capture Mykolaiv and Odesa cities to eliminate the threat of Ukrainian long range strikes against occupied Crimea and that Russian forces would need to capture the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk line in Donetsk Oblast to relieve the current front line.[9] The milblogger notably suggested even further territorial expansion by asking whether Russia wants Slovyansk to ”bear the fate of an eternally frontline city.”[10] Putin’s January 31 statements do not represent significant inflections in Russia’s stated war aims or actual military capabilities but are rather likely intended to capitalize on existing narratives in Western media that could block short and long term Western military assistance to Ukraine and compel the West to negotiate with Russia on Russian terms.

Putin also included Kharkiv City, which he has previously described as “Russian,” in this hypothesized demilitarized zone, likely to capitalize on discussions surrounding the unlikely possibility of a Russian offensive effort along Kharkiv Oblast’s northern border from Belgorod Oblast.[11] Putin may intend to amplify these discussions to divert Ukrainian attention away from the ongoing Russian offensive operation along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast axis, but ISW continues to assess that Russian forces in Belgorod Oblast can conduct only tactical-level actions that would serve as feints to draw and fix Ukrainian forces along the border.[12] Putin is also likely trying to appeal to resurgent calls from Russian ultranationalists to create a ”buffer zone” between Kharkiv and Belgorod oblasts to push Ukrainian MLRS and artillery away from the international border with Belgorod Oblast. Putin previously claimed that he would consider creating such a “buffer zone” during widespread discontent about limited cross border raids by pro-Ukraine forces into Belgorod Oblast in summer 2023, but the Russian military has yet to take any actions that suggest that Putin has seriously considered these calls.[13]

Putin also highlighted the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka likely to portray that effort as successful to domestic Russian audiences and to further justify the Russian war in Ukraine.[14] Putin claimed that the “Veterany” Assault Brigade (Volunteer Assault Corps) fought ahead of regular Russian forces, broke through Ukrainian lines, and captured 19 houses near Avdiivka, which Putin characterized as one of the most important areas of the frontline. Putin stated that the “Veterany” Brigade “fights properly” and should be “educating young people.” Putin also reiterated boilerplate narratives that the Russian war in Ukraine is a struggle for Russian sovereignty that is purging Russian society of those who are against this sovereignty, thus unifying Russian society.[15]

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on January 31, exchanging 195 Russian POWs for 207 Ukrainian POWs.[16] Ukrainian officials reported that this was the 50th POW exchange, presumably since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.[17] Russian and Ukrainian officials stated that the United Arab Emirates helped facilitate the POW exchange.[18] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that the POWs on the preliminary list for the POW exchange planned for January 24 and later canceled due to the Il-76 crash in Belgorod Oblast were not part of the January 31 POW exchange.[19]

The European Union (EU) will reportedly fall short of its promise to provide Ukraine with one million artillery shells by March 1, 2024, as European leaders call on EU member states to intensify deliveries of ammunition to Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 31 that Western diplomats stated that EU partners will only deliver 600,000 artillery shells to Ukraine by the March 1, 2024 deadline.[20] European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 20 that the EU will have the capacity to produce one million shells per year by March or April 2024 and will ensure that it delivers the “majority” of the shells to Ukraine.[21] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Danish Prime Minister Metter Frederiksen, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte acknowledged that the EU fell short of its promise to deliver one million shells to Ukraine by March 2024 in a letter published by the Financial Times on January 31.[22] The letter noted that new orders for artillery ammunition will not reach the battlefield in Ukraine until 2025 and urged the EU to find ways to accelerate the delivery of promised shells to Ukraine, either through provisions of existing stocks or through joint procurement efforts.[23]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian-Chinese relations are at their “best period in their history” in a January 31 call with Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun. Shoigu claimed that Russian-Chinese military cooperation is steadily developing and that the Russian and Chinese militaries regularly conduct operational and combat training exercises.[24] Shoigu claimed that Russian and Chinese defense and security cooperation has helped “reduce the potential for conflict.”[25] Shoigu and Dong emphasized a desire to increase Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation, and Dong reported that China provided unspecified “support” to Russia in the war in Ukraine despite continued US and European pressure.[26] Dong also stated that the US and Europe will not be able to interfere with ”normal Russian-Chinese cooperation.”[27] Dong’s statement is a more overt rhetorical expression of Chinese support for Russia than statements from previous meetings between senior Russian and Chinese officials. Dong’s rhetorical support for Russia is likely primarily posturing against the West. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently made inflammatory comments about Japan likely in an effort to demonstrate Russia’s support of China’s opposition to the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.[28] ISW continues to assess that China is unwilling to establish the no-limits bilateral partnership with Russia that Russia desires.[29]

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continued rhetorical efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and to set information conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova. Moldovan and Ukrainian officials reiterated on January 29 and 30 that Moldova and Ukraine are committed to resolving the Transnistrian conflict through diplomatic means and dialogue with Transnistria.[30] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, who has recently fixated on the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict, continued to claim that Moldova is engaging in military actions that threaten Transnistria, likely as part of efforts to justify future Russian aggression in the area as necessary to protect Transnistria.[31] The milblogger also responded to Ukrainian and Moldovan official statements, claiming that Moldova is only “verbally” interested in diplomatic solutions to the Transnistria conflict and is instead trying to use its economic policies to “blackmail” Transnistria. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on January 31 that Moldova is economically “strangling” regions in Moldova that do not agree with the Moldovan government’s policies – likely referring to both Transnistria and Gagauzia, whose leaders have reportedly complained about Moldovan economic policies recently.[32] Zakharova claimed that the Moldovan government is using increased “Russophobic rhetoric” to divert attention from Moldova’s internal socio-economic and political problems.[33] Another Russian milblogger largely mirrored Zakharova‘s claims, alleging that the Moldovan government is blaming Russia for Moldova’s socio-economic problems.[34] Kremlin narratives about alleged socio-economic issues in Moldova are likely aimed at promoting the idea that Moldova’s moves towards Western integration, particularly with the European Union (EU), are hurting Moldova’s economy and generating discontent among its population.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that it recently conducted a cyberattack on a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) communications server. The GUR reported on January 30 that GUR hackers successfully hacked a Russian MoD server used to exchange information between Russian units. The GUR reported that Russia has installed the software on this server on various other strategic objects including military objects and that the GUR’s cyber operation is ongoing.[35] ISW has recently observed an increase in reported Ukrainian cyberattacks against Russian targets.[36]

Estonian Defense Forces Commander General Martin Herem stated that Russia may be behind recent GPS jamming in the Baltic region.[37] Bloomberg reported on January 31 that Herem stated that Russia may be “learning and testing” its jamming capabilities against the backdrop of the risk of future conflict with NATO. Bloomberg stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously confirmed the presence of Russian electronic warfare (EW) units in Kaliningrad Oblast, and Herem stated that Russia may also jam signals from ships in the Baltic Sea. Swedish Lieutenant Colonel Joakim Paasikivi previously stated that he believes that high GPS interference levels in December 2023 and January 2024 are a result of "Russian influence activities or so-called hybrid warfare."[38]

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved and submitted an updated version of a draft law on mobilization to the Verkhovna Rada on January 30.[39] The Verkhovna Rada withdrew the previous version of the draft law on mobilization for revisions on January 11 after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.[40] The updated version of the draft law has not amended key provisions concerning the lowering of the mobilization age from 27 to 25 years of age, the discharge of servicemen after 36 months of service, and an effort to systematize Ukrainian mobilization infrastructure.[41] Deputy Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Digital Transformation Oleksandr Fedienko stated on January 31 that the Verkhovna Rada will likely consider the updated second draft law no earlier than March 2024.[42]

In accordance with its policy against speculating about future Ukrainian actions, ISW is not covering reported leaks concerning possible changes in the Ukrainian command structure. ISW will continue to report official statements by Ukrainian government officials and organizations as they are made.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian targets in the vicinity of Belbek airfield in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on January 31.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin doubled down on his maximalist and purposefully vague territorial objectives in Ukraine on January 31.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on January 31, exchanging 195 Russian POWs for 207 Ukrainian POWs.
• The European Union (EU) will reportedly fall short of its promise to provide Ukraine with one million artillery shells by March 1, 2024, as European leaders call on EU member states to intensify deliveries of ammunition to Ukraine.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian-Chinese relations are at their “best period in their history” in a January 31 call with Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun.
• Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continued rhetorical efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and to set information conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that it recently conducted a cyberattack on a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) communications server.
• Estonian Defense Forces Commander General Martin Herem stated that Russia may be behind recent GPS jamming in the Baltic region.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City amid positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 31.
• Russian forces reportedly formed a “secret” battalion of penal recruits to conduct offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but are reportedly disbanding the battalion.
• Russian and occupation officials continue efforts to erase Ukrainian cultural and ethnic identity in occupied territories.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2024

The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 30 that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is currently ongoing and that Russian  forces aim to reach the Zherebets River (in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area) and the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[i] Budanov forecasted that Russian forces would fail to achieve these objectives, however, and would likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of the spring.[ii] Budanov’s statements are consistent with ISW’s observation that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations along this axis since the beginning of January 2024.[iii] Russian forces have recently made tactical gains southeast of Kupyansk along the critical P07 Kupyansk-Svatove route near Krokhmalne and appear to be increasing assaults northwest and west of Krokhmalne towards the Oskil River.[iv] Russian forces will likely be able to secure additional tactical-level gains in the Kupyansk area but are unlikely to be able to translate these tactical gains into wider mechanized maneuvers needed for operationally significant advances that could capture more territory in Kharkiv Oblast and push to the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast administrative borders.[v] ISW has observed that elements of the Western Military District’s 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army are active in the Kupyansk area and have been able to pursue infantry-led frontal assaults but have not shown the capacity to conduct large-scale mechanized maneuver since they were deployed to this axis over a year ago. ISW will soon publish a more detailed operational analysis of the situation on this Kharkiv-Luhansk axis.[vi]

Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Ukrainian Presidential Press Secretary Serhii Nykyforov stated on January 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not dismiss Zaluzhnyi.[vii]

Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun reported on January 30 that Russian forces are using chemical weapons against Ukrainian positions in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast).[viii] Shtupun noted that Russian forces conducted at least five strikes using likely K-51 grenades carrying chloropicrin on January 29 alone. Chloropicrin is primarily used as a soil fumigant that can be fatal when inhaled, and it is sometimes classified as a riot control agent (RCA) due to its harmful and irritant effects.[ix] The CWC prohibits the use of RCAs in warfare.[x]

Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).[xi] Dvornikov had been the commander of the Southern Military District and the first overall theater commander in Ukraine from April to May 2022, and Russian President Vladimir Putin had sidelined Dvornikov without officially firing him following Dvornikov‘s failure to capture Donbas by May 2022.[xii] Dvornikov was reportedly serving as an advisor to the Almaz-Antey Aerospace Concern as of October 2023.[xiii] Dvornikov’s newest appointment demonstrates Putin’s preference for rotating his failed generals through positions that are peripheral to combat duty as opposed to outright dismissing them.[xiv] DOSAAF is a Soviet-era youth movement that promotes military skills and has likely supported Russian youth education aimed at Russifying youth in occupied Ukraine.[xv] Russian sources claimed that Dvornikov will need to "resuscitate" the "long-suffering" DOSAAF organization, and Dvornikov’s appointment may indicate increased Kremlin attention to military-patriotic youth education.[xvi]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated on January 30 that Japanese sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine will continue but that Japan is interested in resolving its territorial issues with Russia and signing a peace treaty.[xvii] Japan never signed a formal peace treaty with the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to Kishida’s statement and claimed that the disputed Kuril Islands are Russian and that the “territorial question” between Russia and Japan about the islands is “closed“ according to Russia’s constitution – referring to amendments to Russia’s constitution in 2020 that banned territorial concessions.[xviii] Medvedev claimed that Russia will “actively” develop the Kuril Islands and that their “strategic role” will grow as Russia stations new weapons there.[xix] Russia has been installing military infrastructure on the Kuril Islands since at least 2015.[xx] Medvedev used highly offensive language to imply that Russia would not negotiate with Japan about the islands and to criticize Japan’s relations with the United States.[xxi] Medvedev posted these comments on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account as opposed to his Russian-language Telegram channel, suggesting that his objective was specifically to offend Japan in the English-speaking world and posture aggressively towards the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. The Russian Pacific Fleet also conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the South China Sea on January 29.[xxii] Medvedev’s claims and the Pacific Fleet exercises are likely aimed at demonstrating that Russia is a strong Pacific power that supports China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, as the Kremlin has routinely stressed in the past.[xxiii]

Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the United States with the Nazis. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated at an international ambassadorial roundtable on “solving the situation in Ukraine” on January 30 that “Napoleon, Hitler, and now the US” have found a new way to attack Russia.[xxiv] Lavrov quoted Nazi Reichskommissar (literally “imperial commissar”--the Nazi occupation governor) for Ukraine Erich Koch stating that “Ukraine is for [the Third Reich] only an object of exploitation... and that the population must be used as a second-class people in solving military problems” and claimed that the West today is fighting the war against Russia through Ukraine “with only the goal outlined by Reichskommissar Koch.”[xxv] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently started framing the war as an existential geopolitical conflict against an alleged modern Nazi movement in the West, though Lavrov’s claim that the West is pursuing the same goals and methods as a specified Nazi official is the most explicit framing yet.[xxvi] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin may have decided that the narrative that Russia and other countries are fighting a geopolitical Western “Nazi” force is a more effective immediate narrative than Putin's attempt to appeal to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in territories formerly colonized by the Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) ideology.[xxvii] The Russkiy Mir framework is purposefully based on amorphous ethnic identities that are not universally agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition. Lavrov’s intensification of portrayals of the United States and West as alleged Nazi actors at an international event is also noteworthy and may suggest that the Kremlin views the Nazi narrative as potentially more successful as a posturing tool with international audiences, particularly those that are not aligned with the United States and the West.

Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system. Russian media reported that several major Russian entities experienced outages on January 30, including but not limited to Russian telecommunications giants Yandex, Megafon, MTS, Rostelecom, and Beeline; banks VTB, Sberbank, Alfabank; consumer goods companies Avito, Wildberries, Ozon, and Lamoda; and the social media site VK.[xxviii] The Russian Ministry of Digital Transformation reported that a technical issue with the global Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) caused the outage with .ru domains and that authorities have since restored service to users on Russia’s National Domain Name System.[xxix] Russian anti-censorship organization Net Freedoms Project and other opposition outlets noted that Russia has been trying to establish its “sovereign internet” system and connected the DNSSEC failure with attempts to transfer all Russian internet users to a Russian national domain name system (DNS) server separate from the global internet.[xxx] The Russian “sovereign internet” law, which came into force in November 2019, aims to create an independent Russian internet system protected from external actors and obliges Russian internet service providers to possess the technological means to counter these threats, and the Russian government will likely coopt this technology to increase surveillance and censorship in the Russian information space.[xxxi]

The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system. Russian state newswire TASS reported that social media site Telegram experienced an outage on January 18; telecom operator Beeline experienced an outage on January 19; and YouTube experienced outages in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and Rostov-on-Don on January 23.[xxxii] Russian state censor Roskomnadzor tested blocking all major messaging platforms in the Russian Far East on January 23, and Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that Roskomnadzor blocked internet access in the Republic of Sakha on January 24 to stymie unrest following an ethnically motivated murder.[xxxiii] The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on January 8 that it blocked over 200,000 internet resources for allegedly promoting “fakes” and for “discrediting” the Russian military and that it prepared a bill allowing Roskomnadzor to rapidly block information that fails to comply with Russian censorship laws.[xxxiv] The Kremlin is also replacing blocked sites with its own analogs; Russian Wikipedia replacement “Ruviki” left beta testing as of January 15 and internet giant Yandex took an additional step to separate its Russian entity from its international entity on January 23.[xxxv]

Key Takeaways:

• The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area.
• Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
• Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Russia is signatory.
• Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
• Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the US with the Nazis.
• Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system.
• The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Horlivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 30.
• The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month and is therefore able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations “for the foreseeable future.”
• Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2024

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied rumors about the purported resignation or dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi on January 29.[1] Ukrainian People’s Deputy Oleksii Honcharenko claimed on January 29 that “Zaluzhnyi announced his resignation, but there is no decree yet.”[2] Former Ukrainian People’s Deputy Boryslav Bereza claimed that the Ukrainian Presidential Office “dismissed” Zaluzhnyi.[3] Western media amplified Honcharenko’s and Bereza’s posts, and Russian sources and state media outlets also picked up claims of Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal or resignation.[4] The Ukrainian MoD apparently responded to the rumors by saying “no, this is not true,” but has not yet offered additional information on the situation as of the time of this writing.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm rumors about Zaluzhnyi‘s dismissal or resignation at this time. Russian sources are seizing on rumors of Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal or resignation to further several information operations about domestic Ukrainian affairs they have been conducting for some time.[6] Veteran Russian propagandist and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan emphasized that whether or not reports of Zaluzhnyi’s removal are true, “chaos ... is useful to [Russia].”[7]

Russia may be retooling aspects of its air defense umbrella in deep rear areas amid continued Ukrainian drone strikes within Russia. Russian outlet Kommersant reported on January 29 that the Russian Ministry of Digital Development ordered Russian authorities in Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov oblasts to block 4G LTE internet connection until January 30 so that Russian officials can “fine-tune” anti-drone and air defense systems.[8] Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov oblasts previously announced disruptions to 4G LTE internet services from January 25 to January 30 in connection with technical adjustments to the “radio frequency spectrum.”[9] One of Kommersant’s sources stated that Voronezh Oblast is conducting similar efforts that have been “planned at the federal level” and that many other unspecified Russian federal subjects are pursuing these efforts at different paces.[10]

Kommersant stated that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and mobile internet providers both operate on frequencies permitted by the Russian State Commission on Radio Frequencies (SCRF), and Kommersant’s source stated that indiscriminate EW use can interfere with mobile data.[11] It is unclear what impact internet operations may have on the reorientation of EW systems or the deployment of new capabilities and vice versa. It is equally possible that Russian forces may be testing new EW capabilities and preemptively turned off internet services to avoid sudden disruptions. Russian officials may also be limiting access to the internet to conceal the movement of conventional air defense systems within Russia after Ukrainian drone strikes in Leningrad Oblast on January 18 and January 21 suggested that Russian air defenses in northwestern Russia may be ill-deployed to defend against drones launched from Ukraine.[12] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevraev claimed on January 29 that Russian EW systems downed a Ukrainian drone targeting the Slavneft-Yanos oil refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast.[13] Russian sources amplified images of the downed drown at the refinery and claimed that it did not cause any damage.[14] Kommersant’s source stated that they believe that the timing of the internet disruptions is also associated with security for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing trip to St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast.[15]

Russia appears to be fueling and seizing on neo-imperialist and nationalist sentiments in Europe in order to drive wedges between Ukraine and its western neighbors. Right-wing Hungarian politician and Our Homeland Movement party leader Laszlo Toroczkai stated on January 27 that Hungary should claim Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Oblast in the event of a Ukrainian defeat in the war.[16] Right-wing Romanian politician and Alliance for the Union of Romanians party leader Claudiu Tarziu emphasized on January 29 that Romania needs to “reintegrate” areas of Ukraine neighboring Romania where Romanian populations lived in order to maintain sovereignty.[17] Russian sources amplified Toroczkai’s and Tarziu’s statements and emphasized these ultranationalist Romanian and Hungarian claims to Ukrainian territory.[18] Russia previously proposed the idea of a “partitioned Ukraine” between Russia and the West prior to the full-scale invasion.[19] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials reignited this narrative in December 2023 by claiming that Ukraine has historical “territorial disputes” with Poland, Romania, and Hungary but could maintain its “sovereignty” if the whole country is comprised of the borders of Lviv Oblast.[20] The Russian ultranationalist framework of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) concept appears to have gained traction among nationalist European factions as applied to their own nationalist ideologies, and Russian information space actors likely seek to leverage this ideological bent to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its European neighbors.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a series of economic and technological agreements on January 29 advancing the Kremlin’s efforts to further integrate Belarus into the Union State structure. Putin and Lukashenko approved three agreements on the implementation of the Union State Treaty, joint scientific and technological development, and the coordination of both countries’ foreign policies during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in St. Petersburg.[21] Putin reiterated claims that Russians and Belarusians are “fraternal peoples,” united by a common history and values.[22] Lukashenko highlighted Russian and Belarusian cooperation in Africa, claiming that he coordinated his December 2023 trips to various African countries with Putin, and stated that Russia and Belarus have not yet resolved the issue of creating common markets for gas, oil, and petroleum products under the Union State framework.[23] Lukashenko has previously resisted the Kremlin’s efforts to further integrate Belarus into the Union State, but the fallout of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion, which Lukashenko reportedly played a role in mediating, and the death of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may have hindered Lukashenko’s ability to resist further Union State integration efforts.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied rumors about the purported resignation or dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi on January 29.
• Russia may be retooling aspects of its air defense umbrella in deep rear areas amid continued Ukrainian drone strikes within Russia.
• Russia appears to be fueling and seizing on neo-imperialist and nationalist sentiments in Europe in order to drive wedges between Ukraine and its western neighbors.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a series of economic and technological agreements on January 29 advancing the Kremlin’s efforts to further integrate Belarus into the Union State structure.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russia reportedly deployed more Rosgvardia troops to occupied Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential election.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2024

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to destabilize Moldova, likely as part of efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and the West among other objectives. Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on January 28 that Moldova has begun to “destroy its ties” with CIS member states and the Russia-led CIS organization as a whole and that there are rumors that Moldova plans to leave the CIS by the end of 2024.[i] Polishchuk claimed that this decision would not benefit Moldovan interests or citizens and would be unprofitable for the Moldovan economy. Polishchuk also claimed that the settlement of the Transnistria issue in Moldova is in a “deep crisis” and that Moldova’s economic pressure on Transnistria since the beginning of 2024 has “further delayed” any solution.[ii] Polishchuk claimed that Russia is ready to fix deteriorating relations between Moldova and Transnistria “as a mediator and guarantor” to the settlement.[iii] Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Serebrian stated on January 28 that Moldova would not return to the 5+2 Transnistria negotiating process that included Russia as long as Russian-Ukrainian relations do not improve and Russia’s war in Ukraine continues.[iv]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger, who has recently fixated on the Moldova-Transnistria conflict, continued to highlight alleged discontent in Moldova’s breakaway and autonomous regions. The milblogger claimed that about 50,000 people in Transnistria participated in a rally protesting against Moldovan economic pressure on Transnistria on January 24.[v] The milblogger also stated that Sergei Ibrishim, the Head of the Main Directorate of Agro-Industrial Complex of Gagauzia, sent a request recently to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Russia to send fertilizer to Gagauzia as humanitarian aid.[vi] Ibrishim also reportedly claimed that Gagauzia’s agricultural producers are unable to sell their products to Russia after Moldova’s decision in July 2023 to leave the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and asked Lavrov to abolish excise taxes and customs duties for Russian imports from Gagauzia.[vii] Polishchuk’s and the milblogger’s comments are likely aimed at dissuading Moldova from leaving the CIS and Russia’s wider sphere of influence, setting information conditions to create economic discontent within Moldova, and posturing Russia as an economic and security guarantor in Moldova.

Russia notably accused Ukraine of abandoning and disregarding the Minsk Agreements that had largely frozen the conflict after Russia’s 2014 invasion in the lead up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russia may be setting information conditions to make similar claims against Moldova.[viii] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely setting information conditions to justify future Russian aggression in Moldova under the guise of protecting its “compatriots abroad” and the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) - concepts that are purposely based on vague definitions of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in foreign countries.[ix] Russia may attempt to justify its aggression or destabilization efforts in Moldova by claiming that Transnistrian residents are in danger due Moldova’s alleged abandonment of the Transnistria settlement process. ISW recently observed suggestions that the Kremlin may be turning to rhetorical narratives that appeal to a wider audience beyond the “Russian World.”[x]

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reiterated that the Kremlin is not interested in any settlements short of the complete destruction and eradication of the Ukrainian state, likely in an ongoing effort to justify the long-term and costly Russian war effort to domestic audiences. Naryshkin told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin during a televised “impromptu” interview on January 28 that the Ukrainian state and government have “a very sad fate” and that “Russia will not stop halfway,” presumably in its efforts to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[xi] Naryshkin made a similar statement on January 27 during the opening of a memorial to the Soviet victims of Nazi genocide in Leningrad Oblast, claiming that “Russia will not stop halfway” in its fight with the current followers of Nazi ideology.[xii] The similarity of both statements suggests that Naryshkin may be using pre-approved Kremlin rhetoric to signal to Russian citizens that the Kremlin is not open to negotiating with Ukraine or compromising in any settlement of the war Russia started, despite recent Western reports to the contrary.[xiii] Russian officials have consistently reiterated Russia‘s commitment to its maximalist objectives in Ukraine - which are tantamount to complete Ukrainian and Western capitulation- and statements by Russian officials suggesting that Russia is or has always been interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine are very likely efforts to feign interest to prompt preemptive Western concessions regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.[xiv]  

Naryshkin was notably involved in setting domestic information conditions in the lead-up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including furthering Russian claims that perceived Ukrainian aggression prompted by Ukraine’s Western ‘puppet masters’ forced Russia to invade Ukraine and claims that the Ukrainian government is comparable to Nazi Germany.[xv] Russian President Vladimir Putin ostentatiously humiliated Naryshkin during a televised Russian Security Council meeting on February 22, 2022, demanding that Naryshkin “speak plainly” when Naryshkin declared his support for the independence of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[xvi] Putin likely humiliated Naryshkin in February 2022 due to Naryshkin‘s failure to set the informational conditions to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the Russian domestic and international information spaces that Putin desired. Naryshkin’s return to the Russian information space to further the perception of the Kremlin’s commitment to the war in Ukraine could indicate that Putin has given Naryshkin another chance to prove his ability to set informational conditions, this time setting conditions domestically for a long war effort. If this hypothesis is correct, then Naryshkin will presumably be determined not to disappoint Putin again. Zarubin has also previously been involved in a number of Kremlin informational efforts, including filming and conducting interviews wherein Putin threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance and attempted to portray himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel and an effective Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces.[xvii]

The Kremlin also continues to frame and justify a long-term Russian war effort as part of an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West and Nazism. Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), also stated during his interview with TASS that “the West incited neo-Nazi sentiments in Ukraine” and “made [Ukraine] anti-Russia.”[xviii] Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Naryshkin, and Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin during the 80th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad on January 27 claimed that Russia is fighting “Nazis” in Ukraine and that a number of Western countries have adopted Nazi ideology.[xix] Polishchuk‘s claim that the West incited “neo-Nazi” ideals in Ukraine is likely part of the same coordinated Kremlin informational effort intended to justify geopolitical confrontation with the West and suggests that the Kremlin may increasingly label any perceived adversary and possibly the entire West as “Nazi.”[xx] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may have decided that the simple narrative that Russia and other states are fighting a geopolitical “Nazi” force is a more effective immediate narrative than Putin’s attempt to appeal to Russian citizens and Russian speakers in the territory of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the ideology of the ”Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which is based on purposefully amorphous ethnic identities that are not agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition.[xxi] Polishchuk also reiterated long-standing Russian claims that the West controls Ukraine and that Russia has “always remained” opened to peace negotiations.[xxii]

Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ability to technologically adapt and develop as Russian forces continue to adapt to Ukrainian operations in a January 27 Sky News interview.[xxiii] Neizhpapa’s statement is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are adapting and learning on certain sectors of the front.[xxiv] Neizhpapa also reiterated the Ukrainian assertion that Ukrainian forces should be able to use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets in Russia.[xxv] Neizhpapa stated that the Ukrainian Navy would be “very happy” to accept two UK Type 23 frigates that the UK is considering decommissioning due to a shortage of sailors.[xxvi] The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it would not allow the UK to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits citing Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.” Turkey would likely continue to use the Montreux Convention to prevent the UK from potentially transferring these two frigates through the Turkish Straits to Ukraine.[xxvii] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention to deny access to Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits since February 28, 2022, to Ukraine’s benefit.[xxviii]

The Kremlin will likely use the withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to continue efforts to expand Russian influence in Francophone Africa. The Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien juntas announced their immediate withdrawals from ECOWAS in a joint statement on January 28.[xxix] ECOWAS stated that it had not received “any direct formal notification” from Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger about their intent to withdraw.[xxx] Kremlin newswire TASS cited the frustration of these states with over ECOWAS’ ”Western influence” as a reason for their withdrawal.[xxxi] Russian milbloggers also celebrated the announcement as evidence of rapidly decreasing French influence in the Sahel.[xxxii] The first contingent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps reportedly arrived in Burkina Faso on January 24, and Kremlin officials recently met with Chadian junta officials in Moscow.[xxxiii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is attempting to expand its influence in western and central Africa, particularly focusing on Francophone African countries in the Sahel.[xxxiv]

Unnamed Indian government sources stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia, its largest arms supplier, because the war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions.[xxxv] The unnamed Indian government sources told Reuters in a January 28 article that India will act carefully in order to avoid pushing Russia closer to China.[xxxvi]  Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation’s Russia expert Nandan Unnikrishnan told Reuters that India is unlikely to sign “any major military deal” with Russia because it would cross a red line with the United States.[xxxvii] Indian government-run think tank Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses’ Eurasia expert Svasti Rao stated that the war in Ukraine has caused India to question Russia’s ability to supply India with spare parts.[xxxviii] ISW has routinely observed reports that Russia continues to face challenges repairing aircraft and other equipment and has not been able to produce missiles and artillery ammunition at pre-war levels for its own forces to use, making it highly unlikely that Russia will be able to export military equipment to India or its other customers at pre-war levels any time soon.[xxxix]  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently highlighted Russian-Indian economic and military-technical cooperation in a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar likely in an effort to emphasize positive Russian-Indian relations amid Russian concerns that India is attempting to diversify its defense partners.[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to destabilize Moldova, likely as part of efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and the West among other objectives.
• Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reiterated that the Kremlin is not interested in any settlements short of the complete destruction and eradication of the Ukrainian state, likely in an ongoing effort to justify the long-term and costly Russian war effort to domestic audiences.
• The Kremlin also continues to frame and justify a long-term Russian war effort as part of an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West and Nazism.
• Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ability to technologically adapt and develop as Russian forces continue to adapt to Ukrainian operations in a January 27 Sky News
• The Kremlin will likely use the withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to continue efforts to expand Russian influence in Francophone Africa.
• Unnamed Indian government sources stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia, its largest arms supplier, because the war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting throughout the theater.
• A Russian source claimed that Rosgvardia is forming the 1st Volunteer Corps with remaining Wagner Group personnel and newly recruited volunteers (dobrovoltsy) following the Kremlin adoption of the law allowing Rosgvardia to form its own volunteer formations in December 2023.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 28 that Ukraine and Russia will conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange in the near future.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Kremlin officials claimed that Russia is in an existential geopolitical conflict with an alleged modern Nazi movement that extends beyond Ukraine while marking the 80th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad. Putin attended the opening of a memorial to the Soviet victims of Nazi genocide in Leningrad Oblast on January 27 and focused heavily on long-standing claims that Russia is fighting “Nazis” in Ukraine.[1] Putin also asserted that select countries have adopted Nazi ideology and methods and tied this assertion to a number of European states promoting “Russophobia as a state policy.”[2] Putin declared that Russia will ”do everything to suppress and finally exterminate Nazism” and cast Russia as pursuing the ”aspirations of millions of people...all over the planet for true freedom, justice, peace, and security.”[3] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also attended the ceremony and stated that Belarus and Russia ”are again faced with the question of the right to life of our civilization and the preservation of ancestral...[and] cultural values.”[4] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin stated that Russia will not stop halfway in its fight against current Nazi followers, and Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin explicitly stated that “fascist ideology is becoming the norm...for leaders of NATO states” and specifically accused US President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz of sponsoring genocide in Ukraine.[5] Volodin framed this alleged growing fascist movement as a “dangerous path that could lead to a new world war.”[6]

Nazi Germany besieged Leningrad for over two years during the Second World War, causing the deaths of roughly 1.5 million Soviet citizens. Putin was born in Leningrad in 1952, and his grandfather was seriously wounded while defending the city. Putin likely sought to leverage his known if unstated personal connection with the siege and the emotional appeal of one of the most dramatic moments in the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) to expand his overall ideological framing of the conflict with the West to which he has committed Russia.

Putin has long tried to construct an ideology for Russia that he can use to support a geopolitical confrontation with the West reminiscent of the Cold War, and the Kremlin may increasingly use existing rhetoric about fighting Nazism to support this effort. The Kremlin has called for “denazification” in Ukraine as a thinly veiled demand for regime change and has used information operations about Ukrainian “Nazis” to wrap its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in the mythos of the Great Patriotic War.[7] Russian officials have previously applied the label of “Nazism” to Western states and actors outside Ukraine, although Putin’s, Lukashenko’s, Naryshkin’s, and Volodin’s likely coordinated rhetoric on January 27 suggest that the Kremlin may increasingly label any perceived adversary and possibly the entire West as “Nazi.”[8] The Kremlin may have decided that the simple narrative that Russia and other states are fighting a geopolitical Nazi force is a more effective immediate narrative line than Putin’s attempt to appeal to Russian citizens and Russian speakers in the territory of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the ideology of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which is based on purposefully amorphous ethnic identities that are not agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition.[9]

Lukashenko’s participation in this rhetorical posturing suggests that the Kremlin and Lukashenko may believe that this narrative is also easier to coordinate than the Kremlin’s appeals to ethnic Russians and the Russkiy Mir. The Kremlin has increasingly sought to cast Russia as a main actor within the “world majority,” which it has defined as “a civilizational and cultural community that objectively opposes” the West (using the word “objectively” in an echo of the Soviet Union’s Communist ideology).[10] The Kremlin’s overtures to non-Western states have yet to acknowledge that these states have cultural, ideological, and political differences and that many of these states are likely unwilling to involve themselves in Russian appeals to the Russkiy Mir. The Kremlin may hope that “fighting fascism” will be an easier rhetorical line to coordinate with desired partners within this fictitious “world majority.”

Putin specifically accused the Baltic states of adopting “Nazism,” likely as part of continued Kremlin efforts to set information conditions for future Russian aggression against NATO members.[11] Putin alleged that the Baltic states have declared thousands of people living there “subhuman,” are “depriving“ them of their “most basic rights,” and are subjecting them to “persecution.”[12] Although Putin did not specifically claim that the Baltic states are “persecuting” Russians or Russian speakers, Kremlin officials have routinely accused Baltic governments of having “neo-Nazi” policies and of oppressing Russians and Russian speakers.[13] The Kremlin has historically used its concept of “compatriots abroad,” which vaguely includes ethnic Russians and Russian speakers of other ethnicities, to justify Russian aggression in neighboring states.[14] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin officials and mouthpieces may be attempting to set information conditions for possible future Russian aggression in the Baltic states – and other NATO members, such as Finland – under the guise of protecting Russia’s “compatriots abroad.”[15] The Kremlin may also use the pretext of protecting people from alleged “Nazi” policies in the future.

Myanmar banks reportedly connected to the Russian System for the Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) banking system, a Russian analogue for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) banking system. Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated on January 27 that Myanmar banks recently connected to SPFS, which will allow Russian and Myanmar businesses to freely buy and sell products.[16] Russia began developing its SPFS banking system in 2014, following US threats to disconnect Russia from SWIFT in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, and roughly 20 countries have joined SPFS in the past 10 years.[17] The Washington Post reported that internal Russian Security Council documents show that Kremlin officials are working to undermine the dollar’s role as a world reserve currency and hope to work with China to create a new financial system to bypass Western dominance of global financial transactions.[18] Unnamed European security officials told the Washington Post that it is unclear if China has any real interest in this effort.[19]

Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on January 26 and 27. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Myrnohrad and Novohrodivka in Donetsk Oblast and Antonivka, Kherson Oblast with nine S-300 missiles and in Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast with an Iskander-M missile on January 26 and 27.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all four Shahed-136/131 drones that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on January 27.[21] Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated on January 26 that Ukrainian forces are improving and strengthening their ability to counter Russian drone adaptations, including adaptations for Shahed drones.[22]

Russian authorities are likely blocking communications in the Sakha Republic for the fourth consecutive day following January 24 protests in support of a Russian citizen allegedly murdered by a naturalized Russian citizen from Tajikistan. Local Sakha Republic outlets reported on January 27 that disruptions to WhatsApp and Telegram services continue following reported outages on the night of January 24.[23] The local news outlets also noted that Sakha Republic Digital Development Deputy Minister Andrei Suslov stated on January 24 that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor‘s “preventative work” created communication disruptions, but that no officials have since commented on continued disruptions as of January 27.[24] Former Yakutsk Mayor Sardana Avksenteva and Sakha Party of Business Head Vitaly Obedin stated that all internet connection and communication has slowed, creating difficulties for online commerce and digital document organization.[25] Russian authorities are likely attempting to preemptively stifle a potential resurgence in protests and “strengthen public safety and crime prevention measures” in accordance with Sakha Republic Head Aisen Nikolayev’s orders following the protests.[26] Russian sources notably did not report similar widespread communication outages during or following several days of protest in Bashkortostan.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Kremlin officials claimed that Russia is in an existential geopolitical conflict with an alleged modern Nazi movement that extends beyond Ukraine while marking the 80th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad.
• Putin has long tried to construct an ideology for Russia that he can use to support a geopolitical confrontation with the West reminiscent of the Cold War, and the Kremlin may increasingly use existing rhetoric about fighting Nazism to support this effort.
• Putin specifically accused the Baltic states of adopting “Nazism,” likely as part of continued Kremlin efforts to set information conditions for future Russian aggression against NATO members.
• Myanmar banks reportedly connected to the Russian System for the Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) banking system, a Russian analogue for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) banking system.
• Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on January 26 and 27.
• Russian authorities are likely blocking communications in the Sakha Republic for the fourth consecutive day following January 24 protests in support of a Russian citizen allegedly murdered by a naturalized Russian citizen from Tajikistan.
• Russian forces made recent confirmed advances near Kupyansk, Kreminna, and Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 27.
• UK outlet the Telegraph reported on January 26, citing an unnamed Western official, that Russia is spending roughly 40 percent of its GDP on the war in Ukraine, more than Russian national spending on health and education.
• Russian federal subjects continue to establish patronage networks with occupied areas of Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin and US officials rejected rumors about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations amid continued indications from the Kremlin that Russia seeks nothing less than full Ukrainian and Western capitulation.
• Russian demands for Ukrainian “neutrality” and a moratorium on NATO expansion have always been and continue to be one of Putin’s central justifications for his invasion of Ukraine, and any hypothetical concession on these demands would represent a major strategic and rhetorical retreat on Putin’s behalf that Putin is extremely unlikely to be considering at this time.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives that blame Ukraine for the war while also highlighting Russian forces in the Soledar direction.
• The circumstances of the January 24 crash of a Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft in Belgorod Oblast remain unclear.
• The European Union (EU) will provide Ukraine with an additional five billion euros to meet “urgent military needs” in the near future.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence and subsume previous Wagner Group operations in Africa.
• Russia reportedly imported $1.7 billion worth of advanced microchips and semiconductors in 2023, primarily from the West, skirting Western sanctions intended to deprive Russia of such technology.
• Russian forces advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements throughout the theater.
• Elements of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s alleged personal private military company (PMC) may have deployed to Ukraine.
• Russian opposition media reported on January 26 that Viktor Filonov, a Russian soldier in the 234th Airborne Regiment (76th VDV Division) serving in Ukraine, adopted a Ukrainian child from occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2024

Ukrainian and Russian authorities opened criminal investigations into the January 24 Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crash in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) announced on January 25 that it opened an investigation to clarify the circumstances of the crash, and the Russian Investigative Committee stated that it opened a criminal case on charges of “terrorism” in connection with the Il-76 crash after claiming that an initial investigation determined that a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile downed the aircraft.[1] Ukrainian and Western media reported that the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency meeting to discuss the Il-76 crash at Russia’s request on the evening of January 25 after Russian sources claimed that France rejected Russia’s request for the meeting in France’s capacity as rotating UNSC Chair.[2] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets warned that Russia intends to co-opt the Il-76 crash to destabilize Ukraine domestically and reduce Western support Ukraine.[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov noted that Russia has not provided any evidence of Russian claims that Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) were on the aircraft.[4] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that Russian authorities gave Ukraine a 15-minute warning before the Il-76 aircraft entered the area where it was shot down.[5] Ukrainian officials continue to deny that they received a written or verbal Russia request to secure the air space around Belgorod City, however.[6] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger insinuated that Russia should not provide any data from the crash site or evidence of the claimed presence of Ukrainian POWs on the aircraft because the international community has previously dismissed Russian evidence, referring to the international investigation into the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by Russian-backed proxies in occupied Donetsk Oblast[7] Kartapolov stated that Russia will continue POW exchanges because Russia ”cannot abandon [its] guys,” a notable reversal from Karatpolov’s calls for all POW exchanges to pause indefinitely immediately following the[8] ISW continues to offer no assessment of the circumstances of the Il-76 crash at this time and cannot independently verify Russian or Ukrainian statements on the incident.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 24 to 25. Ukrainian military officials reported on January 25 that Russian forces launched 14 Shahed-136/131 drones from Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea, four S-300 missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and another S-300 missile from occupied Donetsk Oblast.[9] Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 11 Shaheds.[10] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses also intercepted a Kh-59 missile over Mykolaiv Oblast.[11] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck an enterprise in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and an industrial facility and residential buildings in Odesa City, and that Russian S-300 missiles struck civilian targets in Rohan, Kharkiv Oblast and Druzhkivka, Donetsk Oblast.[12]

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on a Rosneft oil refinery in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai on the night of January 24 to 25. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on January 25, citing an unspecified source, that the SBU conducted a drone strike on the refinery and that Ukraine will continue to target economically and militarily important objects in Russia.[13] Geolocated footage published on January 24 shows a fire at the Rosneft oil refinery in Tuapse, and additional footage reportedly shows drones operating in the area before and after residents reported explosions at the refinery.[14] Russian sources claimed on January 25 that the refinery had 112 tons of gasoline and 200 tons of fuel oil at the time of the strike.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that the SBU strike shows that Ukrainian forces are not ”suckers” and that rear areas are not ”safe place[s]” in modern war.[16]

Russian forces are reportedly increasing their use of chemical weapons in Ukraine in continued apparent violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is party. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment of the Ukrainian General Staff Captain Andrii Rudyk stated on January 25 that Russian forces began using RG-VO grenades with chloroacetophenone, a type of tear gas used for riot control (also known as a Riot Control Agent [RCA]), in December 2023 and that Ukrainian officials observed 81 instances of Russian forces using the RG-VO grenades in December 2023.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 13 that Russian forces began using a new type of special gas grenade containing CS gas (2-Chlorobenzalmalononitrile – also an RCA) on December 14 and that Russian forces have used chemical weapons at least 51 times in the first two weeks of 2024.[18] The Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade previously acknowledged on December 22 that the brigade deliberately uses chemical weapons by dropping K-51 grenades with CS gas from drones onto Ukrainian positions near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[19] Rudyk stated that the RG-VO grenades can kill personnel in a dugout or an enclosed room within five minutes and that a study found that a recently used Russian RG-VO grenade was manufactured in an unspecified but likely Russian factory in 2023.[20] Rudyk added that Russia may be trying to gauge international reactions to the Russian use of chemical weapons in Ukraine in order to expand the type of weapons Russian forces are using.[21] Russia is party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the use of RCAs as a method of warfare.[22]

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Russia’s war in Ukraine is “directed against the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state.”[23] Scholz stated at a press conference with Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico on January 24 that Russian President Vladimir Putin “can end this war at any time” and warned that “if Ukrainians stop defending themselves, it will be the end of Ukraine.” Scholz warned against accepting the idea that the lack of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine is prolonging the war, noting that there was “no shortage of discussions” in the run-up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Kremlin officials continue to indicate that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s maximalist objectives — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain unchanged.[24]

Russian authorities issued prison sentences in a number of high-profile cases on January 25, including that of imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former officer Igor Girkin. A Moscow court sentenced Girkin to four years in prison on “calls for extremism” charges and banned Girkin from administering websites for three years.[25] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky stated that despite his disagreements with Girkin, he “would prefer to see him free” and noted Girkin’s “significance for events in Donbas.”[26] A volunteer in a Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) brigade similarly claimed that his personal issues with Girkin “in no way undid everything [Girkin] did.”[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that there is something “wrong” with the fact that one of the Russian Spring leaders in Donbas from 2014 is in prison and not fighting on the front.[28]

The Second Western District Military Court in St. Petersburg sentenced Daria Trepova to 27 years in prison on charges of commissioning a terrorist attack, illegally trafficking explosive devices, and forging documents in the case of the assassination of Russian milblogger Maksim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky).[29] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev claimed that this verdict is a “precedent” that will guide future sentences and that will make “many who want to work with [Ukraine]...wonder if it is worth it.”[30] Kremlin newswire TASS stated that the Izmailovsky Court of Moscow sentenced former Penza Oblast Governor Ivan Belozertsev to 12 years in a maximum-security prison colony for taking bribes worth more than 30 million rubles (about $337,000) from former Russian Senator Boris Shpigel.[31] The court also sentenced Shpigel to 11 years.[32]

The Kremlin is reportedly no longer offering pardons to convict recruits and is significantly changing the terms of their service, likely in response to the reduction of the pool of convicts suitable for recruitment into Russian force generation efforts. The BBC reported that Russian officials likely ended recruitment into “Storm-Z” units in August 2023 and began recruiting convicts into “Storm-V” units based on new contract terms in September 2023.[33] Russian officials previously recruited convicts through promises of pardons and six-month contracts, and “Storm-V” units reportedly provide no promise of pardon or even parole and extend convicts’ contracts indefinitely until the end of the war.[34] Russian officials likely extended the contracts on the basis of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization order as the Russian military does for mobilized personnel. The BBC reported that Russian military registration and enlistment offices formally release convict recruits in a procedure that is no longer legally equivalent to “parole/conditional release,” suggesting that convict recruits are legally still considered prisoners.[35] Russia has heavily relied on convict recruits to maintain a level of force generation that is roughly equivalent to Russian losses in Ukraine, and which is likely helping enable Russian forces to conduct regular operational-level rotations.[36] Russian officials reported that as of October 2023 the Russian prison population was 266,000 people — a notable reduction of 54,000 prisoners from January 2023.[37] The loss of convict recruits to attritional assaults in Ukraine and the relatively short terms of their service contracts may have prompted the Kremlin to enact more restrictive terms of service in order to retain more convict recruits at the front in Ukraine. The contract terms for service in new “Storm-V” units are far less attractive and may dampen efforts to recruit convicts, although Russian officials have routinely used coercive measures to force convicts to sign contracts.[38]

Russian officials may have also changed the status of convict recruits in order to relieve force generation burdens on the Russian federal budget. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on January 25 that Storm-Z personnel addressed a letter to Putin asking him to resolve a widespread lack of promised payments, payments for injuries, and documents on the expungement of criminal records for Storm-Z personnel.[39] Vazhnye Istorii reported that a response from a Russian military prosecutor’s office to a Storm-Z fighter stated that Putin’s recent decree promising single payments in cases of injury or death do not apply to Storm-Z fighters.[40]

A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian military command recently replaced the Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) and appointed a new SMD Chief of Staff, although ISW cannot confirm this claim. The Russian insider source, who has previously provided accurate reports regarding several other Russian command changes, claimed on January 25 that the Russian command appointed 8th Combined Arms Army Commander (CAA) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin as SMD Chief of Staff and replaced SMD Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Aleksey Zavizion with Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy.[41] The change in command positions within the SMD is particularly notable given that several formations of the SMD, particularly elements of the 8th CAA, are committed to ongoing localized offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.[42] Changes in command do not necessarily translate to battlefield effects, although such changes may present temporary challenges to Russian command and control (C2). The Russian Command previously dismissed Sychevoy as Western Grouping of Forces Commander in late August 2022, following the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast, and from an unspecified command position in October 2023 and replaced Zavizion as Chief of Staff of the Western Military District (WMD) in late June 2022.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian authorities opened criminal investigations into the January 24 Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crash in Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 24 to 25.
• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on a Rosneft oil refinery in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai on the night of January 24 to 25.
• Russian forces are reportedly increasing their use of chemical weapons in Ukraine in continued apparent violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is party.
• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Russia’s war in Ukraine is “directed against the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state.”
• Russian authorities issued prison sentences in a number of high-profile cases on January 25, including that of imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former officer Igor Girkin.
• The Kremlin is reportedly no longer offering pardons to convict recruits and is significantly changing the terms of their service, likely in response to the reduction of the pool of convicts suitable for recruitment into Russian force generation efforts.
• A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian military command recently replaced the Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) and appointed a new SMD Chief of Staff, although ISW cannot confirm this claim.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 25.
• Bloomberg reported on January 24 that labor shortages in Russia have increased wages in civilian sectors enough to compete with relatively lucrative military salaries, likely making military service even less appealing to Russian citizens.
• Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov signed a decree on January 25 that introduces a “special regime” for entry and exit between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast reportedly in an effort to “localize threats to the security of the population and military and other facilities” in occupied Crimea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 24, 2024

A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crashed in Belgorod Oblast on January 24. Geolocated footage posted by various Russian sources shows the Il-76 crashing in Yablonovo, Belgorod Oblast (about 50km northeast of Belgorod City).[i] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Il-76 was carrying 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and was en route to a pre-arranged POW exchange at the Kolotylivka border-crossing checkpoint between Russian and Ukraine.[ii] The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of hitting the plane with two unspecified missiles, killing the 65 POWs, six Russian crew members, and three Russian military personnel.[iii] Senior Russian propagandist and Editor-in-Chief of state-controlled outlet RT Margarita Simonyan published a list of the names of the Ukrainian POWs supposedly on the flight, but several Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that at least one of the alleged POWs had already been exchanged in a previous POW swap on January 3.[iv] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and the Ukrainian Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, immediately responded to the incident by emphasizing that Ukraine is investigating the crash and urged audiences not to draw premature conclusions about the crash based on unconfirmed reporting.[v] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov confirmed that a POW exchange was scheduled to take place on January 24 but that the exchange was no longer taking place and that GUR is investigating the circumstances of the crash.[vi] GUR later stated that Ukraine “does not have reliable and comprehensive information about who exactly was on board the plane.”[vii] The Ukrainian General Staff did not directly respond to the incident but emphasized that Russia has conducted 19 missile strikes against Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast over the past week and stressed that Ukraine “will continue to take measures to destroy means of delivery” and “control the airspace” in the Kharkiv-Belgorod border area.[viii] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda, citing unspecified sources in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, claimed that the Il-76 was transporting S-300 air-defense missiles, which Russian forces frequently use in strikes against ground targets in Kharkiv Oblast.[ix] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in his nightly address on January 24 that Ukraine is working to establish “all clear facts” and that GUR is looking into “the fate of all prisoners.” ISW offers no assessment of the circumstances of the Il-76 crash at this time and cannot independently verify Russian or Ukrainian statements on the incident.

Russian information space actors are seizing on the Il-76 crash to sow domestic discontent in Ukraine and undermine Western will to continue giving military support to Ukraine. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that Ukraine deliberately shot down the Il-76 knowing that it contained Ukrainian POWs and called for all POW exchanges to pause indefinitely.[x] Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev accused Ukrainian “internal political struggles” of contributing to the crash.[xi] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is currently in New York for UN Security Council (UNSC) meetings, called for an urgent UNSC meeting to address the crash and accused Ukraine of terrorism.[xii] Such Russian accusations are meant in part to sow discontent in Ukraine and galvanize distrust of the Ukrainian government, which is consistent with several other Russian information efforts aimed at weakening Ukraine domestically.[xiii] POW exchanges are a sensitive issue in both Russia and Ukraine, and rhetorical invocations of POWs predictably elicit emotional responses. Russian officials additionally made unsubstantiated claims that Ukraine struck the Il-76 with US- or German-provided missile systems, likely in an attempt to discourage Ukraine’s Western partners from providing Ukraine with critical air defense systems necessary for Ukraine’s continued defense.[xiv]

Russian law enforcement authorities are codifying xenophobic profiling methods suggesting that migrants are predisposed to criminal activity against the backdrop of continued conflicts between Russian citizens and naturalized migrants. Russian outlet RTVI reported on January 24 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) published a “criminogenic index” detailing which countries’ migrants committed the most crimes in Russia in response to a request from Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev to determine if “immigrants from certain countries have criminal characteristics.”[xv] The MVD report found that crimes committed by migrants from “neighboring countries” declined between 2013 and 2019 but have increased since 2019.[xvi] The MVD report also found that citizens of Uzbekistan committed 40 percent of all crimes committed by foreigners from “neighboring countries” between January 2022 and May 2023. Uzbek citizens likely account for the highest percentage of crimes because there are more migrants from Uzbekistan in Russia than migrants from other Central Asian and South Caucasus countries.[xvii] Matveev stated that the MVD’s report excludes migrants with naturalized Russian citizenship, implying that migrants commit more crimes than reflected in the MVD’s official findings.[xviii] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin similarly claimed in September 2023 that the number of serious crimes that foreign citizens committed in Russia increased by 32 percent from 2022 to 2023.[xix] Russian authorities’ deliberate attempts to highlight migrant crimes and portray migrants as a danger to Russian society are likely part of an ongoing effort to appease the pro-war Russian ultranationalist community that also routinely expresses xenophobia toward migrant and diaspora communities and to coerce migrants into Russian military service by limiting work opportunities in Russia.

Sakha Republic Head Aisen Nikolaev and other Russian sources claimed that unspecified foreign actors may have incited protests in Yakutsk, Sakha Republic, after a naturalized citizen from Tajikistan allegedly murdered a Russian citizen.[xx] Nikolaev suggested that foreign agents may have encouraged these protests to incite conflict and divide Russian society.[xxi] Nikolaev instructed Sakha Republic authorities to monitor migrants and investigate the circumstances under which the murder suspect obtained Russian citizenship.[xxii] Nikolaev’s response of both condemning the protests as externally conceived and maintaining a harsh stance against a naturalized Russian citizen likely reflects the wider struggle Russian ultranationalists continue to face in attempting to portray non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities as an internal threat to Russian society while the Kremlin continues to portray Russia as a harmonious multiethnic society.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian hackers recently conducted cyberattacks on Russian intelligence and communications infrastructure. The GUR reported on January 24 that Ukrainian hackers conducted a successful cyberattack against the Russian “Planet” Scientific Research Center of Space Hydrometeorology's Far East branch, specifically targeting the center’s database, servers, and supercomputers.[xxiii] The GUR reported that the attack destroyed a database that received and processed satellite data and contributed to products for over 50 Russian government agencies, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), General Staff, and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The GUR noted that the database contained two petabytes (two million gigabytes) of data potentially worth over $10 million. The GUR reported that the attack also rendered the center’s supercomputers inoperable and unable to be completely restored and brought down the center’s servers and physical infrastructure. The GUR stated that the attack will leave dozens of unspecified strategic defense companies without “critically important information” for a long time. The GUR reported on January 23 that unspecified “cyber volunteers” attacked Russian internet provider Akado-telecom, which services the Russian Presidential Administration, Federal Security Service (FSB), Federal Protective Service, Moscow Oblast governing bodies, Russian state-owned bank Sberbank, and others, causing a large-scale internet failure on January 21 and 22.[xxiv]

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany that recent Russian missile strikes against Ukraine underscore the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses. Stoltenberg noted on January 23 that NATO has already transferred a variety of air defense systems to Ukraine, including Patriots, IRIS-T, and NASAMS, and that NATO is supplying Ukraine with additional demining equipment, winter equipment, and fuel as part of its Comprehensive Assistance Package.[xxv] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Press and Information Department Head Illarion Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian and Western officials discussed increasing the supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine, including adapting Western anti-aircraft missiles to Soviet-era launch platforms and expanding the production and supply of ammunition and artillery systems to Ukraine.[xxvi] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely continue to experiment with new strike packages with different means of penetrating Ukrainian air defenses and to pressure Ukrainian air defense deployments following recent Ukrainian adaptations to prior Russian strike packages.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remain crucial in defending Ukraine‘s growing defense industrial base (DIB) against Russian strikes.[xxviii]

Russian and Chadian officials met in Moscow on January 24, suggesting that Chad may be the Kremlin’s next target among former French colonies on the African continent. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chadian junta leader Mahamat Idriss Deby to discuss counterterrorism efforts in Chad and announced an upcoming agreement expanding Russian–Chadian cooperation.[xxix] Russian Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General Alexander Fomin and Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov also met with Chadian Minister of the Armed Forces, Veterans Affairs, and War Victims Dago Yacouba to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and regional security.[xxx] Fomin and Yevkurov previously met with Nigerien National Defense Minister Major General Saliufou Modi.[xxxi] ISW previously reported that Russia and the Central African Republic (CAR) are in negotiations to construct a Russian military base in CAR.[xxxii] Russia appears to be attempting to expand its involvement with and influence on authoritarian regimes in western and central Africa, particularly focusing on former French colonies in the Sahel such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps published photos on January 24 claiming to show Africa Corps personnel arriving in Burkina Faso.[xxxiii] The Africa Corps claimed that 100 Russian personnel will perform executive protection and conduct counterterrorism operations in Burkina Faso and that another 200 personnel will arrive in the country in the near future.[xxxiv] ISW previously reported that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian MoD and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps and assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.[xxxv] The Kremlin may also eventually set conditions to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Chad, given January 24 Russian–Chadian government meetings.

NATO announced on January 24 that the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises have started and will run until May 31, 2024.[xxxvi] NATO reported that the exercises will occur in the High North, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe.[xxxvii] ISW continues to assess that Russia will attempt to misrepresent these exercises as a threat against Russia despite the exercises’ defensive nature in response to real Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt Russian threats to NATO states.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crashed in Belgorod Oblast on January 24.
• Russian information space actors are seizing on the Il-76 crash to sow domestic discontent in Ukraine and undermine Western will to continue giving military support to Ukraine.
• Russian law enforcement authorities are codifying xenophobic profiling methods suggesting that migrants are predisposed to criminal activity against the backdrop of continued conflicts between Russian citizens and naturalized migrants.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian hackers recently conducted cyberattacks on Russian intelligence and communications infrastructure.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany that recent Russian missile strikes against Ukraine underscore the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses.
• Russian and Chadian officials met in Moscow on January 24, suggesting that Chad may be the Kremlin’s next target among former French colonies on the African continent.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps published photos on January 24 claiming to show Africa Corps personnel arriving in Burkina Faso.
• NATO announced on January 24 that the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises have started and will run until May 31, 2024.
• Positional engagements continued throughout the theater.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to bolster the reputation of Chechen forces.
• Russian occupation authorities are setting conditions to coerce voter turnout in the upcoming March 2024 presidential elections.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2024

Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that Belgium plans to provide Ukraine with 611 million euros (about $663.4 million) worth of military aid in 2024.[1] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated that the US believes that Ukraine is appropriately using military aid and stated that the United States continues to monitor and account for US security assistance delivered to Ukraine. Austin stated explicitly that the US has seen “no credible evidence of the misuse or illicit diversion of American equipment provided to Ukraine.”[2] The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that stated that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner was largely due to DoD limitations but that did not suggest that any of the material air had been misappropriated.[3] Austin reiterated US support for strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).[4] Umerov stated that Ukraine is ready to co-invest in technologies and joint production with interested companies in order to facilitate breakthroughs on the battlefield with ”innovation and significant technological progress.”[5] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Press and Information Department Head Illarion Pavlyuk stated that Ukraine and unspecified officials discussed ways to increase weapons and ammunition production, the creation of an artillery production coalition, and the development of Ukraine’s air force and air defenses.[6]

NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and General Manager of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency Stacy Cummings signed contracts, reportedly with French company Nexter and German company Junghans Defense, on January 23 for the purchase of about 220,000 155mm artillery shells worth $1.2 billion.[7] Stoltenberg stated that the war in Ukraine has become a “battle for ammunition,” so it is important that NATO refill its stocks as the alliance continues to support Ukraine. It is unclear if the contracts are meant to allow NATO to send additional ammunition to Ukraine or to fill NATO’s own ammunition stockpiles. Western security assistance remains vital for Ukraine as any slow reduction or sudden collapse of Western aid will very likely eliminate Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and could lead to the Russian military capturing significantly more territory in Ukraine, bringing Russian forward bases closer to the borders of NATO member states.[8] The replenishment of NATO stockpiles is also an important endeavor, as ISW also continues to assess that NATO rearmament is necessary to deter - and if necessary defeat - any future Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank, given that Kremlin officials have increasingly threatened NATO member states, and Kremlin-affiliated actors appear to be attempting to sow instability and set information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO members and other post-Soviet states.[9]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare. A prominent Russian milblogger stated on January 23 that Russian forces need to figure out how to break out of positional warfare but that Russian forces are unable to concentrate in numbers sufficient to break through Ukrainian lines because Ukrainian forces strike all force concentrations larger than a battalion.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces target Russian force concentrations even in near rear areas. The milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces still target small Russian groups of one-to-two infantry companies and of 10 armored vehicles with drone strikes, preventing Russian forces from even reaching Ukrainian forward defensive lines. The milblogger complained that Russian forces’ only solution thus far has been to attack with 10-20 dismounted infantrymen with armored vehicles supporting at an “extreme” distance behind the infantry. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger responded in agreement with the first milblogger, claiming that Ukrainian technological advancements have made it difficult for Russian forces to concentrate several divisions in a discrete geographic area without Ukrainian forces detecting the force concentration.[11] The milblogger emphasized that Russian forces need to both obtain indirect fire superiority over Ukrainian forces and overhaul Russian command-and-control (C2) to break out of positional warfare. The milblogger stressed that Russian forces on the frontline need to be able to quickly communicate to minimize the time between spotting and striking a target and that this change will only occur with a significant change in C2 processes.

The characteristics and problems of positional warfare that Russian milbloggers have identified in recent discussions overlap with many systemic issues in the Russian military that the milbloggers have been complaining about for a long time.[12] Russian milbloggers have complained generally about poor Russian C2 as it pertains to indirect fire, the attrition of Russian forces through unproductive “meat assaults” against Ukrainian positions, poor tactical and operational planning, and the struggle to counter Ukrainian drone operations on the front line and in near rear areas.[13] There are currently no indications that the Russian military command has materially improved on any of these identified issues at the operational level necessary to break through a positional front in one or more areas of the theater. Russian forces have recently proven themselves capable of making marginal tactical advances during intensified offensive efforts even with these systemic issues, however, particularly near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast.[14]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched four S-300/S-400 ground-to-air missiles, 15 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles, eight Kh-22 cruise missiles, 12 Iskander ballistic missiles, and five Kh-59/Kh-31 missiles and that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the Kh-101/555/55 missiles, five Iskander missiles, and two Kh-59 missiles.[15] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy oblasts.[16] This strike package is notably the first time in recent months that a large Russian missile strike series has not included Shahed-136/131 drones, which Russian forces have often used in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.[17] A Russian source posted footage on January 23 purporting to show a Russian missile releasing decoy flares mid-air, and similar footage emerged of a Russian Kh-101 during a Russian strike in late December 2023.[18] This strike package may have utilized decoys in place of Shahed drones in order to experiment with the effectiveness of using such decoys and preserving Shaheds for other purposes. Ukrainian forces appear to have recently adapted to new Russian strike packages, and Russian forces are likely continuing to experiment with new strike packages with different means of penetrating Ukrainian air defenses and force Ukraine to deploy air defense systems to certain locations.[19] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces primarily launched ballistic missiles on January 22-23 and that Ukraine needs additional means to protect against these missiles.[20] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely attempting to acquire more ballistic missiles from abroad, including from Iran and North Korea, because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking Ukrainian targets in some circumstances.[21]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors. Lavrov met with Abdollahian and emphasized strengthening mutually beneficial Russian-Iranian cooperation.[22] Both officials reiterated their support for an “early ceasefire” in Gaza.[23] Lavrov and Abdollahian discussed unspecified agreements that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi made during Raisi’s December 2023 visit to Moscow.[24] Lavrov also reiterated Russian support for an “early end to the bloodshed” and “the resumption of the Middle East settlement process” in a meeting with al Maliki.[25]  

The Kremlin’s domestic policy focus on the “Year of the Family” in 2024 is likely in part meant to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 23 officially defining families with three of more children as “large families” and establishing various social support measures for “large families.”[26] Putin also emphasized that the family is the center of Russian “traditional values,” echoing his previous statements on the importance of Russian families from his annual New Year’s Eve address on December 31, 2023.[27] The Kremlin’s focus on 2024 as the “Year of the Family” is likely meant to provide an ideological underpinning to Russian efforts to increase Russian birthrates and remedy Russian demographic issues. Russia has been reckoning with a demographic crisis since the beginning of the 1990s due to declining birthrates, an aging population, low life expectancy (particularly amongst males of working age), and high emigration levels.[28] Russia’s war in Ukraine has also impacted some aspects of Russian demographics, particularly as men of reproductive and working age are the main Russian demographic fighting in Ukraine. Between 800 to 900 thousand Russians additionally fled the country after the start of the war in February 2022, including up to 700 thousand after Putin’s partial mobilization order in September 2022.[29] A demographic forecast from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) in October 2023 notably forecasted that Russia's population will decrease to 138.77 million people by January 1, 2046 and that the rate of natural population decline will exceed 600,000 people per year between 2024-2032, slowing to 400,000 people per year from 2032-2046.[30] Social support measures for families with three or more children and other pro-natalist policies incentivize Russian women to have more children in order to receive payouts and other benefits from the Russian state, which the Kremlin likely hopes will gradually increase the birth rate in coming generations and slow down the overall pace of Russian population decline.

The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises. The Russian Baltic Fleet’s Press Service reported on January 23 that Russian Bastion coastal missile defense system crews conducted electronic launches of Onyx missiles against mock adversary ships in the Gulf of Finland and also conducted camouflage and anti-sabotage exercises.[31] About 50 Russian military personnel participated in the exercises and used 10 pieces of specialized military equipment.[32] Russian officials often portray NATO exercises as escalatory against Russia despite routinely threatening NATO member states, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the NATO Steadfast Defender exercises “increasingly provocative and aggressive” after NATO announced the exercises in September 2023.[33] Russia’s Baltic Fleet exercises are likely part of Russia’s wider effort to posture against the wider NATO alliance in preparation for potential future conflict with NATO, as ISW has previously assessed.[34]

The Kremlin may intend to use the 2024 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian opposition politician and presidential candidate Boris Nadezhdin, who Russian opposition outlet Verstka and BBC’s Russian Service described as the only Russian presidential candidate who opposes the Russian war in Ukraine, stated to Verstka in an interview published on January 23 that he believes that the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) will have to register him as a candidate due to his broad support among the Russian public.[35] Nadezhdin stated to Verstka that his campaign is collecting signatures in support of his candidacy at a growing rate of 7,000 signatures per day but that he struggles to campaign and collect signatures. Nadezhdin’s campaign announced on January 23 that Nadezhdin collected over 100,000 signatures - the amount the Russian CEC requires to register an independent candidate in the elections - but that these 100,000 signatures are thus far insufficient for the CEC’s requirements.[36] The Russian CEC additionally requires that prospective presidential candidates submit signatures from over half of Russia’s federal subjects (regions) by January 25 and that no more than 2,500 signatures from any one federal subject can count towards the 100,000 total.[37] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported, citing an interlocutor in Nadezhdin’s campaign, that some of the collected signatures are considered “imperfect” or ”defective” and that Nadezhdin wants “perfect” signatures that the Russian CEC cannot contest.[38]

A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin has developed a mechanism to funnel all opposition votes to Nadezhdin, which will account for opposition votes to give voters the semblance of choice while ultimately ensuring the reelection of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[39] The insider source claimed that the Kremlin will pay off Nadezhdin in exchange for funneling opposition votes. Nadezhdin claimed to Verstka that his struggles to campaign, including censorship on Russian state television, show that he is not a “Kremlin puppet” despite his prior affiliations with the current presidential administration.[40] BBC Russian Service noted on January 22 that Nadezhdin’s campaign initially struggled for attention but that he gained prominence in recent days, resulting in an influx in signatures.[41] The Kremlin may decide to allow Nadezhdin to run as an anti-war candidate to use frame Putin’s inevitable resurrection as a positive referendum on the war in Ukraine as the Kremlin seeks to prepare for a long-term war effort.

The Russian legal system is expanding the prosecution of extortion cases to broadly suppress sources of dissent. Russian government-affiliated outlet Lenta posted an investigation on January 23 detailing how Russian courts are increasingly using Article 163 of the Russian Criminal Code—the article defining extortion—to target various media organizations for perceived dissent.[42] Lenta reported that Russian legal experts see the extortion law as a “rubber law,” a deliberately vague law that can have flexible interpretations and that courts can cross-apply to civil cases that they would not typically try under criminal extortion laws.[43] The most severe sentence for extortion can exceed the sentence for murder in some cases.[44] Lenta noted that employees of media and public relations companies and journalists are the most vulnerable to the expanded prosecution of extortion cases and reported that Russian courts initiated 19 extortion cases against journalists and bloggers in 2022-2023 alone.[45] A prominent Russian insider source noted that Russian courts continue to “churn out criminal cases” using a “vicious” interpretation of Russian extortion law.[46] ISW has previously reported on similar Russian legislative manipulations aimed at repressing domestic dissent by introducing a fear of criminal liability to cases that would typically be tried on a civil basis.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23.
• NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors.
• The Kremlin’s domestic policy focus on the “Year of the Family” in 2024 is likely in part meant to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis.
• The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises.
• The Kremlin may intend to use the 2024 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• The Russian legal system is expanding the prosecution of extortion cases to broadly suppress sources of dissent.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 23.
• Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) government chairperson Yevgeny Solntsev announced on January 23 that a branch of the Russian Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol will start instructing its first cadets on September 1, 2024.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely deliberately misrepresenting population statistics in occupied areas to encourage people to relocated to occupied settlements.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2024

Russia continues to weaponize its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to propagate several long-standing Russian information operations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at a UNSC meeting, which Russia convened, on January 22 and blamed the West for the lack of negotiations, claiming that Russia has always been “ready for negotiations.”[1] Lavrov clarified, however, that Russia is only interested in negotiations that result in the removal of the current Ukrainian government from power, confirming that Russia still officially seeks regime change in Ukraine.[2] Lavrov continued to deny Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty, falsely claiming that the Ukrainian people have no interests in the war against Russia and that the West has pushed Ukraine to continue the war.[3] Lavrov advised the West to understand that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ”peace formula” is a “path to nowhere,” claiming that the “sooner [the West] realizes this, the better it will be for both Ukraine and the West.”[4] Lavrov also claimed that “if Ukraine stops fighting, hundreds of thousands” of Ukrainian lives would be saved.[5] Lavrov previously made similar comments, suggesting that the Kremlin believes that Russia will be able to occupy more territory as the war continues and that this course of the war will increasingly weaken Ukraine’s negotiating position.[6]

Lavrov denied Russia’s responsibility for fears that Russia may attack NATO in the future, ignoring the recent Kremlin official statements that have prompted those fears. Lavrov falsely claimed that the West promotes the idea that Russia will attack the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland in the future as a way to “extort money” from Western states for aid to Ukraine.[7] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, have sustained consistent threatening rhetoric directed against NATO member states, and Kremlin-affiliated actors appear to be attempting to sow instability and set information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO members and other post-Soviet states.[8] Lavrov also blamed Ukrainian forces for conducting strikes on Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine, which the Kremlin used to support Russian justifications for its war of conquest in Ukraine.[9] Lavrov recently claimed that Ukrainian forces are using Western-supplied weapons to strike civilian targets, including in alleged strikes against occupied Donetsk City on January 21, for example.[10] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), made similar claims on January 21.[11] The New York Times reported on January 21 that it could not independently confirm the actors behind the strike on Donetsk City, and the press service of the Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces stated on January 21 that forces under the control of the Tavriisk Group of Forces did not conduct the strikes.[12] Lavrov also attempted to downplay the various war crimes and crimes against humanity that Russian occupation forces and occupation administrators are conducting in Ukraine, claiming that Ukrainians and Russians “live in peace and harmony” in occupied Crimea and other Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.[13] Lavrov claimed that “Russians and Ukrainians will live exactly like brothers and good neighbors” after Russia achieves its goals in the war in Ukraine — which ISW continues to assess are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender.[14] ISW has routinely documented how Russian forces and occupation administrations have been engaging in large-scale and deliberate ethnic cleansing campaigns; forcibly and illegally deport Ukrainians, including children, to Russia; and are systematically working to eliminate the Ukrainian language, culture, history, and ethnicity in areas that Russian forces occupy.[15]

ISW previously assessed that Russia aims to reinforce the primacy of the UN and to link as many international efforts to the UN as possible in order to capitalize on Russia’s permanent UNSC seat and veto power.[16] Russia’s request for the January 22 UNSC meeting to discuss arms supplies to Ukraine and Lavrov’s use of this meeting to promote various Kremlin information operations is likely an attempt to legitimize these Kremlin narratives, promote them on a global stage, and convince Ukraine’s international partners to stop sending weapons to Ukraine.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Kyiv on January 22 and announced a new Polish defense package for Ukraine.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Tusk for the new Polish defense package and noted that he and Tusk discussed possibilities for the future production of weapons.[18] Zelensky stated that the package includes a Polish loan for large-scale Ukrainian weapons purchases, but Tusk and Zelensky did not specify additional details about security assistance package provisions or the overall value of the package.[19] Tusk later stated that Poland joined the Group of Seven (G7) declaration of support for Ukraine and noted that Poland will appoint a commissioner to oversee Polish involvement in Ukrainian reconstruction efforts.[20]

Footage purportedly showing an altercation between a Russian soldier and Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” forces in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, reignited criticism of Chechen forces for their lack of contributions to Russian military operations in Ukraine. Footage widely circulated on January 22 purportedly shows Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” Battalion commander Vakha Khambulatov and other “Akhmat-Vostok” Battalion personnel threatening to kill a Russian soldier at a checkpoint in occupied Melitopol after the Russian soldier stated that Khambulatov had invalid identification documents.[21] Russian milbloggers criticized the Chechen personnel for having “too clean uniforms and too clean cars” and complained that these personnel receive the same state salary and social benefits as frontline Russian Airborne (VDV) forces despite contributing less to Russian military operations.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that this is the fifth altercation between Russian and Chechen military personnel in rear areas.[23] Russian sources have previously criticized Chechen forces for conducting performative actions in Belgorod Oblast after all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces raided the area, for posturing themselves as a response force during the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023, and for exaggerating their supposed frontline combat contributions around Bakhmut in July 2023.[24] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov has routinely attempted to curry favor with the Kremlin and promote his domestic power through emphasizing Chechnya’s contributions to the war in Ukraine, and continued criticism against Chechen forces in Ukraine may degrade the influence Kadyrov has gained through this effort.

An investigation by a Russian opposition outlet suggests that Russian elites may have accepted and internalized the domestic consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka, citing unnamed interlocutors amongst Russian elites, reported that Russian elites are increasingly complaining that vacations in Russia and abroad in “friendly countries” are becoming more expensive.[25] Verstka’s interlocutor noted that many Russian elites who work in military and government affairs want a quick end to the war on the condition that Ukraine recognizes Russia’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, and that elites desire Russia to ”finish off” Ukraine so that Russia can go about planning for a new future isolated from Europe. Verstka cited Russian political scientist Ilya Grashchenkov noting that the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential election is not galvanizing Russian political elites as the Presidential Administration had hoped because most Russian elites view the outcome of the elections as pre-determined, and do not anticipate much change to their status as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s re-election. Grashchenkov noted that “new” elites who came into power as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have realized that they will be unable to gain more influence and “old” elites understand they have limited political control. Verstka summarized the sentiments of Russian elites as “apathetic,” which suggests that many Russian elites have internalized and accepted the social ramifications of the war. ISW has previously reported on Russian public opinion polls that similarly show a substantial degree of domestic internalization of the war’s consequences and support for the war.[26]

Russian officials and information space actors are attempting to further rhetorically justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a decree that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22 concerning discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky signed a decree titled “On the Territories of the Russian Federation Historically Inhabited by Ukrainians,” which accurately stated that Russia has systematically oppressed and continues to oppress Ukrainians living in Russia and eroding their national identity, including on lands historically inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians in modern day Russia’s Krasnodar Krai and Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts.[27] The decree instructs the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers to develop an action plan for preserving Ukrainian national identity in Russia, documenting the history of Russia’s oppression of its Ukrainian communities, countering disinformation about the history of Ukrainians in Russia, and disseminating materials about Ukrainian national state formations in different historical periods. Zelensky’s decree does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed.[28]

Russian officials purposefully misrepresented the decree to further justify Russia’s full-scale invasion and made further genocidal appeals to the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and ethnic identity. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoyt called the decree a blatant distortion of history and argued that it shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin was correct to invade Ukraine.[29] Starovoyt’s response suggests that Russian officials and actors may continue to misrepresent the decree as an ex post facto casus belli to falsely assert that Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was defensive in nature. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the decree and reiterated longstanding Kremlin rhetoric that aims to erase Ukrainian ethnic identity by asserting that ethnic Ukrainians are ethnically Russian.[30] Medvedev also stated that “Malorossiya” (Little Russia) is part of Russia — a pseudo-historical Kremlin talking point that Russian officials routinely invoke to deny Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty.[31] The Kremlin has repeatedly used the concept of “compatriots abroad,” which includes ethnic Russian and Russian speakers of other ethnicities, to justify the war in Ukraine and aggression in other neighboring states, and Russian officials and ultranationalists may be primed to view legitimate appeals to protecting compatriots abroad as similar pretexts for aggressive actions.[32]

Russia has historically had a policy to Russify ethnic minorities living within Russian territory, and Zelensky’s decree coincides with wider Russian animus towards non-ethnic Russians within Russia that extends far beyond ethnic Ukrainian communities.[33] The Russian ultranationalist community continues to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russians to express growing hostility towards diaspora communities and non-ethnic Russian minorities within Russia.[34] Russian officials and ultranationalists may attempt to frame states’ legitimate concerns about growing Russian domestic animus towards their diaspora communities and Russia's history of discriminatory policies as anti-Russian and inherently escalatory.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to weaponize its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to propagate several long-standing Russian information operations.
• Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Kyiv on January 22 and announced a new Polish defense package for Ukraine.
• Footage purportedly showing an altercation between a Russian soldier and Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” forces in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, reignited criticism of Chechen forces for their lack of contributions to Russian military operations in Ukraine.
• An investigation by a Russian opposition outlet suggests that Russian elites may have accepted and internalized the domestic consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• Russian officials and information space actors are attempting to further rhetorically justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a decree that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22 concerning discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky’s decree does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances south of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• Kyrgyzstan issued a statement against Russia’s continued practice of targeting naturalized migrants as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian federal subjects continue to establish ties with areas of occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2024

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes. Ukrainian media, citing unnamed sources within Ukrainian special services, reported that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Shcheglovsky Val Plant in Tula City, Tula Oblast and the “Novateka” plant and gas terminal near the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[1] The Shcheglovsky Val Plant reportedly manufactures Pantsir-S and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, and the Ust-Luga complex reportedly processes stable gas condensate into light and heavy naphtha, diesel, kerosene, and naval fuel.[2] Russian sources amplified footage claiming to show explosions in Tula City and Ust-Luga, presumably the results of successful Ukrainian strikes.[3] Geolocated footage published on January 20 shows additional explosions over Smolensk City, indicating possible Ukrainian strikes in the area.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed five drones over Tula, Oryol, and Smolensk oblasts.[5] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18.[6]

A Russian insider source claimed on January 21 that Russian air defense coverage over Leningrad Oblast is poor and indicated that Russian air defenses in Leningrad Oblast are likely not arrayed to defend against strikes from the south.[7] Russian air defense systems in Leningrad Oblast are most likely positioned to defend against strikes from the northwest and west, as Russia has historically arrayed its air defense in the area to defend against hypothetical NATO attacks.[8] The Russian military is currently reforming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) with the expressed intent to prepare for a potential future conventional war against NATO and may be arranging military assets in a way to posture along the border with NATO members.[9] Ukrainian strikes in Leningrad Oblast may prompt Russian forces to reposition short-range air defense systems along expected flight routes of Ukrainian drones to defend potential targets of strategic value. Russian forces using short-range systems such as the Pantsir may not be able to cover all important potential targets in Leningrad Oblast without bringing additional systems into the area, and continued Ukrainian strikes in deep rear areas in Russia may thus increase pressure on Russia’s air defenses overall.

Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece. Members of the Moldovan delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Joint Control Commission (JCC) demanded during a JCC meeting on January 18 that the JCC conduct an investigation into Russian peacekeepers for using small arms, drones, and imitation weapons during an exercise allegedly repelling a sabotage attack on the peacekeepers’ outpost in the Moldovan security zone on December 22, 2023.[10] The Moldovan authorities stated that the Russian peacekeeping forces’ presence and use of these weapons inside the security zone violates JCC protocols and that the Russian peacekeeping forces had not properly disclosed some of these weapons and drones as part of their arsenal. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed in response on January 21 that Moldovan authorities have been increasingly pressuring Russian-backed breakaway republic Transnistria by calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers and through economic pressure.[11] The milblogger claimed that the Moldovan government imposed “double” duties on Transnistrian businesses that amount to roughly $16 million over an unspecified timeframe and that will raise the cost of living in Transnistria. Recent changes to the Moldovan Customs Code require Transnistrian businesses to pay import customs duties to the Moldovan government, whereas previously Transnistrian businesses only paid duties to the Transnistrian government.[12] The milblogger claimed that this pressure supports the “forceful reintegration” of Transnistria into Moldova and that Russia should prepare for further escalation, reminiscent of recent accusations from Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky.[13] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger’s claims and Krasnoselsky’s accusations are likely part of an information operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova, which borders NATO member Romania, and justifying any future Russian escalation in the region.[14]

Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages. The North Korean Foreign Ministry stated on January 20 that Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his willingness to visit North Korea “at an early date” (presumably in 2024) during his recent meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.[15] Putin last visited North Korea in 2000, and his renewed interest in deepening Russian–North Korean relations is likely part of increasing Russian efforts to procure munitions from abroad.[16] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated in a January 21 interview that North Korea provided a “significant amount of artillery ammunition,” which allowed Russia to “breathe a little.”[17] Budanov suggested that Russian forces would likely experience operationally significant artillery ammunition shortages without North Korean–provided ammunition.[18] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023 and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce in total two million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells annually, which resulted in a deficit of 500,000 shells in 2023 and will likely result in a similar deficit in 2024.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes.
• Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece.
• Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages.
• Russian forces advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on January 21 that likely Russian military commanders are mistreating troops at a training ground in Volgograd Oblast.
• Russian federal subjects continue to foster patronage networks in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely claimed that Russia supports the “unconditional equality” and “sovereignty” of all states in a January 20 letter to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, contradicting Russia’s official position on its war in Ukraine and its wider imperial ambitions. Putin claimed that Russia rejects “neocolonialist ambitions, double standards, as well as forceful pressure, dictatorship, and blackmail as a means of achieving foreign policy and foreign economic goals.”[i] Russian officials have routinely denied Ukraine’s sovereignty and refused to treat it as an equal. The Kremlin rejects Ukrainian statehood and nationhood by incorporating Ukraine into the ideological and geographic conception of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir), which includes any Russian speakers and ”carriers of Russian history and culture“ as “compatriots“ and includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation.”[ii] Russia uses the framework of “Russkiy Mir” to justify Russian imperialist expansion and the subjugation of independent, sovereign states and their peoples within a pseudo-cultural and historical context. Russian officials have routinely justified the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by claiming that Russia aims to protect its “compatriots” abroad, again rejecting Ukraine‘s sovereignty.[iii] Russia also continues to trivialize the sovereignty of other post-Soviet countries and has been setting information conditions to escalate tensions in the Baltics and Moldova under the guise of protecting its “compatriots” abroad.[iv] Russia has been in violation of its own commitments to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and “inviolability of borders” and its agreement to center relations with Ukraine on ”non-use of force or threat of force” and “non-interference in internal affairs” undertaken in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum since its initial invasion in 2014.[v] Putin's false claims that Russia respects “equality” and “sovereignty” are likely intended to cater to states that the Kremlin desires to pull into its wider sphere of influence, much as it initially intended to do with Ukraine before the initial 2014 invasion.

Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin threatened Denmark, a founding member of NATO, on January 20 in response to a recent US-Danish agreement allowing US forces access to military bases in Denmark. Barbin claimed during an interview with Russian news outlet RIA Novosti that the December 2023 US-Danish agreement “creates new challenges” for Russia’s security in the Baltic Sea region and stated that Russia will determine the “necessary responses“ to such actions.[vi] The US and Denmark signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on December 21, 2023, allowing the US to permanently station forces and equipment at military bases in Denmark.[vii] Barbin called the agreement a “deliberate course towards further degradation of the military-political situation in the region under the slogans of containing and intimidating Russia.“[viii] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger previously claimed that Finland is becoming a ”second Ukraine” in response to a similar US-Finnish agreement.[ix] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently threatened Finland, and the Kremlin’s threats against a founding member of NATO that shares no borders with Russia is a notable challenge to the wider alliance.[x] Russian threats made towards a founding member of NATO also undermine Russia’s longstanding information operation that its aggressive actions are in response to NATO expansion.[xi]

Russian energy exports to China significantly increased in 2023 amid increasing Russian reliance on oil revenues to manage the fiscal burdens of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS amplified data from the Chinese General Customs Administration on January 20 that shows a 24 percent increase in Russian crude oil exports to China from 2022 to 2023 and a 23 percent increase in Russian exports of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG).[xii] TASS noted that Russia became China’s largest oil supplier in 2023.[xiii] Increased Russian energy exports to Indo-Pacific states, primarily India and China, and widespread Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products allowed Russia to significantly increase oil revenues in 2023.[xiv]

European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 20 that the EU will have the capacity to produce 1.3 to 1.4 million artillery shells by the end of 2024 and will ensure that it delivers the “majority” of the shells to Ukraine.[xv] Breton stated that the EU will be able to produce one million shells per year by March or April 2024 and intends to “significantly” increase its shell production capacity in 2025.[xvi] NATO announced on January 19 that it plans to announce a major unspecified investment in artillery ammunition on January 23.[xvii]

A poll conducted by independent analytical platform VoxUkraine found that 63 percent of Ukrainians who left the country because of Russia’s invasion had returned by July-August 2023.[xviii] The poll also found that 64 percent of respondents who have not yet returned to Ukraine do have plans to return and that 27 percent will return to Ukraine. At the same time, the war continues as long as there are suitable housing and employment opportunities.[xix] As many as 6.2 million Ukrainians are living abroad due to the war, according to various international estimates.[xx]

Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against Ukraine on January 20 amid continued Russian efforts to test and pressure Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched seven Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and three S-300 missiles from occupied Luhansk Oblast.[xxi] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted four of the drones and that the S-300 missiles struck Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[xxii] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that recent Russian strike series have attempted to overload Ukrainian air defenses and that Russian forces continue to launch drones and missiles in ways designed to avoid, penetrate, and degrade limited Ukrainian air defense capabilities.[xxiii] Russian forces will likely continue to adapt missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and place pressure on Ukrainian air defense deployments.[xxiv] Ihnat acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have concentrated a considerable amount of air defense near Kyiv to defend against regular Russian strikes and that it will be difficult for Ukrainian forces to disperse these systems as Russia’s strike campaign continues.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely claimed that Russia supports the “unconditional equality” and “sovereignty” of all states in a January 20 letter to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, contradicting Russia’s official position on its war in Ukraine and its wider imperial ambitions.
• Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin threatened Denmark, a founding member of NATO, on January 20 in response to a recent US-Danish agreement allowing US forces access to military bases in Denmark.
• Russian energy exports to China significantly increased in 2023 amid increasing Russian reliance on oil revenues to manage the fiscal burdens of the war in Ukraine.
• European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 20 that the EU will have the capacity to produce 1.3 to 1.4 million artillery shells by the end of 2024 and will ensure that it delivers the “majority” of the shells to Ukraine.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• A Russian Storm-Z instructor claimed on January 16 that Rosgvardia personnel operating in occupied Ukraine have systematic issues with equipment and weapons storage.
• Occupation authorities continue preparations for the March 2024 Russian presidential election.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2024

Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive "Steadfast Defender 2024" exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative. NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises begin this week and will continue through May 2024.[1] NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Chris Cavoli stated on January 18 that 90,000 personnel from all 31 NATO member states and Sweden will participate in "Steadfast Defender."[2] The exercises will reportedly include over 50 ships; over 80 fighter jets, helicopters, and drones; and at least 1,100 combat vehicles, including 133 tanks and 533 infantry fighting vehicles.[3] Cavoli stated that NATO ”will demonstrate its ability to reinforce the Euro-Atlantic area via trans-Atlantic movement of forces from North America...during a simulated emerging conflict scenario against a near-peer adversary.”[4] Chair of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer stated on January 18 that NATO must prepare for a conflict with Russia as NATO cannot take peace as ”a given” and must ”expect the unexpected.”[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on January 19 that Germany must consider that Putin may try to attack a NATO member in five to eight years, given threats from the Kremlin ”almost every day.”[6]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the initial announcement of the Steadfast Defender exercises in September 2023 and misleadingly claimed that NATO exercises have been increasingly provocative and aggressive in nature.[7] The Russian MFA claimed that NATO is continuing a ”demonstration of force” on Russia’s ”doorstep.” The Russian MFA claimed that Russia had regularly proposed de-escalation initiatives to NATO, called for NATO to abandon its provocative actions, and transferred Russian military exercises to the country’s interior. Russian sources claimed that NATO is using exercises to “wind up“ and incite the Baltic states to prepare for war with Russia and characterized such exercises as a "series of provocations."[8] Yulia Zhdanova, a member of the Russian delegation at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 1066th plenary meeting, similarly claimed on January 17 that NATO exercises on the Russian and Belarusian borders ”provoke a game of nerves” and ”compress the spring of escalation even more.”[9] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger dismissed Pistorius’ comments about a possible future Russian attack on NATO, claiming that European officials regularly make statements about the ”concept of the ’Russian threat’” and that few Germans actually agree with these statements.[10] The milblogger implied that the German government is attempting to artificially create a threat from Russia that doesn’t actually exist by paying experts to ”say the right words.”

The Russian information operation aimed at painting defensive NATO actions in response to real Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank as provocative seeks to deflect from recent aggressive Russian rhetoric and behavior towards NATO. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance.[11] Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.[12] Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated actors have also repeatedly attempted to set information conditions for future aggressive action against NATO member states and their neighbors.[13] Russian electronic warfare (EW) exercises in Kaliningrad may have caused unprecedently high levels of GPS jamming across northern and central Poland and the southern Baltic region on December 25-27, 2023 and January 10 and 16, 2024.[14] ISW continues to assess that Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 not to defend Russia against a nonexistent threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal he still pursues.[15]

Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 19 that US officials are advocating for Ukraine to take a more “conservative” operational approach focused on holding current territory and generating materiel and forces in 2024 for future counteroffensive operations in 2025.[16] One US official reportedly argued that a strategy of “active defense” would allow Ukraine to build out operational requirements and prepare for a counteroffensive in 2025.[17] US military doctrine defines an active defense as the ”employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.”[18] Ukrainian officials have stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active defensive operations in areas where Russian forces are engaged in localized offensive efforts.[19] An active defense throughout the theater, however, would require routine and widespread Ukrainian counterattacks and therefore still demand that Ukrainian forces commit considerable offensive capabilities to the front. FT reported that US officials believe that Ukrainian forces still could opportunistically exploit weak spots in the Russian defense while conducting a theater-wide active defense.[20] Limited opportunistic counterattacks - especially when not resourced adequately- are unlikely to result in gains commensurate with the resources they will inevitably consume, however.

A theater-wide defensive posture would cede the strategic initiative to Russia and permit Russia to launch major attacks at times of its choosing, forcing Ukraine to burn scarce resources it would supposedly be generating during a period of “active defense.” Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zahorodnyuk stated to FT that focusing on defense without any offensive component would be ”a mistake of historic proportions” for Ukraine as it would hand Russian President Vladimir Putin the initiative and allow Putin to double down on ongoing efforts to convince the West and the rest of the world that Ukraine cannot win the war.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov similarly stated that Ukrainian forces need to continue to press Russian forces, particularly through operations that target Russian logistics in occupied Crimea.[22] A Ukrainian ”active defense” into 2025 would cede the theater-wide initiative to Russian forces for at least a year and possibly longer, allowing the Russian command to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs over that period. This extended period of theater initiative would also give the Russian command significant control over determining what resources both Ukrainian and Russian forces must bring to bear. The Russian command would therefore have an ample operational window to conduct a series of campaigns of differing intensities across the theater in Ukraine that could be specifically designed to constrain and degrade critical Ukrainian operational capacities needed for a future counter-offensive.

Offensive and defensive operations place similar requirements and constraints on Ukrainian materiel and personnel, and Ukrainian defensive operations do not necessarily present Ukraine with more opportunities to husband materiel and expand reserves for future counteroffensive operations. Russian and Ukrainian forces rely on the same weapons and equipment to conduct both defensive and offensive operations. Equipment such as armored vehicles, artillery, and drones are just as critical for defending positions as they are for capturing positions. Defensive operations do not eliminate manpower requirements or losses, moreover, as holding positions and counterattacking can produce significant force requirements and losses, particularly when the aggressor can set the terms of battle each time. The stability of a defensive line relies in part on the ability of defending forces to conduct sufficient rotations, rapidly reinforce weakened sectors of the frontline, establish physical fortifications, and when necessary, conduct orderly withdrawals from threatened positions, all of which require significant resources and a significant amount of committed and immediately available manpower. Offensive operations have required more materiel and manpower than defensive operations in Ukraine as in most wars, but both Russian and Ukrainian forces have regularly suffered significant losses on the defensive as well.[23]

Just as defensive operations do not guarantee that Ukraine will be able to amass resources for future counteroffensives, offensive operations do not necessarily preclude Russia from continuing efforts to build out stockpiles of equipment and establish operational reserves. ISW currently assesses that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign is enabling Russian forces to conduct regular operational-level rotations but that Russian forces are unlikely to be able to rapidly establish operational reserves.[24] Russian forces have recently expended considerable amounts of equipment on failed offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine and are currently consuming artillery ammunition far faster than Russia’s gradually mobilized defense industrial base (DIB) can produce.[25] Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are funneling newly produced weapons and ammunition to the frontline for immediate use and not for expanding stockpiles for future operations.[26] These constraints on Russian materiel and manpower are not inevitable characteristics of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, however. Russian forces could ease these constraints while still conducting offensive operations if the Russian command changed the intensity or tactics of these operations, intensified force generation efforts, or significantly expanded efforts to mobilize Russia’s DIB. Granting Russia a year or more of holding the theater-wide initiative would allow the Russian command to choose freely between prioritizing its own offensive efforts and operational requirements, amassing its own resources for future use, and forcing Ukraine to expend the resources Kyiv would be seeking to amass for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Russian forces will likely choose to conduct localized offensive operations as well as larger offensive efforts throughout the theater in order to force Ukraine to commit scarce materiel and manpower to defensive efforts. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on January 19 that the entire eastern front from Kupyansk to Bakhmut is active and reported intensified Russian assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman and Bakhmut directions.[27] Fityo warned that while Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian tanks and armored vehicles, Russian forces have “a large reserve of resources.“[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have recently ”switched to the offensive” in certain areas of the Lyman direction, particularly west of Svatove and west and southwest of Kreminna.[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are likely preparing for larger-scale actions in the Lyman direction in the near future.[30] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces have begun a ”massive offensive” in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[31] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in the coming weeks.[32] Russian sources have repeatedly acknowledged Russia’s intent to continue active operations throughout Ukraine intended to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[33]

FT also reported, citing unspecified Ukrainian officials, that Russian forces are planning to conduct a large-scale offensive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024 and will attempt to capture the rest of the four illegally annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts).[34] FT’s unspecified Ukrainian sources did not rule out the possibility of Russian forces attempting to recapture Kharkiv of Kyiv cities.[35] German outlet BILD reported similar Russian plans on December 14, 2023, and ISW noted at the time that Russia’s reported plans for the war are generally consistent with ongoing localized offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[36] Russian offensive operations in Ukraine will likely not have to achieve significant territorial advances to force Ukraine to expend valuable and limited resources on defensive efforts. Ukrainian forces will likely be unable to husband materiel and personnel while defending against Russian offensive operations, localized or large-scale, that are meant to prevent them from doing so. Ukraine would risk consuming resources it hoped to conserve for its own counteroffensive operations in efforts to stop continuing Russian attacks, likely while losing ground, if it went over to the strategic defensive as some US officials are apparently recommending. The side in war that holds the initiative generally has the advantage, and it is unwise to suggest that Ukraine should cede that advantage to Russia for longer than is absolutely necessary.

US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026. CNN reported on January 19 that US President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines met with US lawmakers on January 17 to urge lawmakers to support additional security assistance to Ukraine.[37] Biden Administration officials highlighted air defense systems and artillery ammunition as key Ukrainian capabilities that could be depleted without additional US aid, ending Ukraine‘s ability to conduct long-range strikes against occupied Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.[38] An unspecified US official told CNN that getting as much aid to Ukraine approved as possible before 2025 is “on the minds of a lot of folks.“[39] CNN reported that unspecified US intelligence officials assess that the war will last at least two more years, with some assessing there may be up to five years of fighting. CNN reported that unspecified US officials do not believe that a short-term ”drop-off” in US assistance to Ukraine will have a major battlefield impact, but that a long-term lack of US assistance could allow Russia to regain momentum by stockpiling weapons produced domestically and by Iran and North Korea, however.[40] ISW continues to assess that the positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate and could be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West and Russia and that the collapse of Western aid to Ukraine would likely lead to the eventual collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military and significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.[41]

Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev stated on January 18 that Russia would "welcome" South Korea into the circle of Russia’s “friendly countries” and suggested that South Korean businesses should invest in the restoration of occupied Donbas.[42] Zinoviev claimed that South Korea does not want to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and warned South Korea against supplying military aid to Ukraine. Zinoviev also falsely claimed that Russian-North Korean cooperation is not violating any international sanctions. Recent direct signaling from South Korean officials suggests that South Korea is increasingly at odds with the Kremlin, particularly due to growing Russian cooperation with Pyongyang. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol stated on September 17, 2023 that Seoul believes that Russian and North Korean military-technical agreements may violate UN Security Council sanctions, and South Korean officials have recently warned that North Korea is increasing weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia.[43] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight published a report on January 19 mapping the logistics routes along which North Korea is transferring ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine, highlighting the dramatic impact of North Korean ammunition deliveries on the Russian war effort.[44] Continued Russian cooperation with North Korea is likely further driving South Korea away from Russia, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of these shifting dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale. Russian opposition sources reported that anywhere from “hundreds” to 1,500 supporters of imprisoned Bashkort activist Fail Alysnov protested in Bashkhortostan’s capital Ufa on January 19 and that Russian Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) detained at least 10 demonstrators.[45] Russian authorities sentenced Alysnov to four years imprisonment on January 11 for "inciting hatred" and publicized the ruling on January 17, prompting mass protests outside the courthouse in Baymak, Bashkortostan.[46] Footage published on January 19 shows dozens to hundreds of Alysnov’s supporters demonstrating in the center of Ufa, and footage published later in the day suggests that the protests concluded for the day.[47] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 19 that there were no mass riots in Bashkortostan and that local law enforcement is handling ”individual” local demonstrations.[48] A Russian political blogger, who reported on the initial protests and denounced Alysnov as a ”separatist” with ”neo-fascist” values, claimed that no more than 50 people protested in Ufa and that half had dispersed by midday – a claim inconsistent with footage of the actual protests.[49]

The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved an action plan for the State Concept of Migration Policy, which the Russian government will implement throughout 2024-2025.[50] The action plan includes six sections that address the entry of foreign citizens to Russian territory; the assimilation of foreigners into Russian society; the free movement of students, scientific personnel, and teaching staff between Russia and other countries; and the prevention of violations to Russian migration laws.[51] The action plan also requires the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) to submit proposals by March 20, 2024 to the Cabinet of Ministers on how to strengthen punishments for foreigners who violate Russian laws.[52] The plan also includes several provisions to facilitate the integration of migrants into Russia's domestic sphere including Russian language proficiency assessments and assimilation courses to help foreigners internalize Russian "traditional spiritual and moral values."[53] Migrants will also have to create a "digital profile" by the end of 2024, which will allow the Russian government to track arrivals of those coming from countries that have a visa-free entry regime with Russia, as well as to expand the collection of biometric data of foreigners who arrive at Moscow airports.[54] ISW previously assessed that Russia was using similar digital surveillance technologies to expand its societal control toolkit during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it appears that the Kremlin is applying such surveillance and control measures to monitor the activities of foreigners in Russia.[55] The Kremlin likely seeks to quickly enact this action plan in order to gain more oversight over foreigners and manage growing tensions with some migrant communities within Russia.[56]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[57] The decree directs the Russian Presidential Administration’s Foreign Property Management Enterprise and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with power and funds to search for, register, and legally protect “property,” though the exact parameters of what constitutes current or historical Russian property are unclear. The Kremlin may use the “protection” of its claimed property in countries outside of its internationally recognized borders to forward soft power mechanisms in post-Soviet and neighboring states ultimately aimed at internal destabilization.[58] A prominent milblogger responded to the decree by implausibly calling for Russia to start enacting the law in "Alaska" and throughout a significant portion of eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.[59]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative.
• Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do.
• US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026.
• Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea.
• Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale.
• The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions southeast of Kupyansk amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 19 that it will resume fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine when the period of positional fighting ends and will “continue to serve” after the war, presumably subordinated to Rosgvardia.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to leverage the provision of social benefits and healthcare to augment passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2024

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine or the West. Lavrov stated at a press conference on January 18 that Russia “will achieve the goals of its ‘special military operation’ consistently and persistently.”[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) readout of this speech included a link to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 24, 2022 speech in which Putin outlined Russia’s goals of “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” Ukraine and his demand that NATO commit not to admit new members – goals which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender.[2] Lavrov reiterated that these goals are unchanged, claiming that “serious” talks about the “realistic” conditions for ending the war “presuppose [Ukraine’s] renunciation of Nazi ideology, Nazi rhetoric, racism towards everything Russian, and entry into NATO.”[3] Lavrov attempted to justify these conditions as necessary for preserving the Ukrainian people’s independence and identity, despite the fact that ISW has routinely documented how Russian forces and occupation officials have been engaging in large-scale and deliberate ethnic cleansing campaigns and efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian language, culture, history, and ethnicity in areas that Russian forces occupy.[4] Lavrov also denied Ukraine’s agency as a sovereign state, claiming that “it is not Ukraine that will decide when to stop and start talking [with Russia] seriously” about the end of the conflict, but that it is the West that will make this decision. Lavrov dismissed a question about recent media publications about the possibility of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, stating that “rumors are just that - rumors.” Lavrov claimed that the West – not Russia – is to blame for the absence of negotiations and threateningly stated that “those [in the West] who refuse [to negotiate] must understand that the longer they wait, the harder it will be to negotiate” and that “there is no hope that Russia will be ’defeated.’” Lavrov made similar statements on December 15, 2023, suggesting that the Kremlin believes that the longer the war continues, the more territory Russia will be able to occupy, and that the course of the war will increasingly weaken Ukraine’s negotiating position.[5]

Lavrov also claimed that support of the war has unified the Russian people and strengthened Russian identity. Lavrov claimed that the war contributed to the “cleansing of people who do not feel involved in” ethnic Russian history and culture and the history and culture of the Russian state.[6] Lavrov claimed that some of these people left Russia at the beginning of the war, but that an “overwhelming part of [Russian] society came together in an unprecedented way.” Lavrov's statements are meant to frame Russian society as unified around the war, despite heavy Kremlin efforts to crack down on any dissent and disproportionately amplify factions who support the war. Lavrov’s statements also indicate that the Kremlin continues to lack a unified position about the return to Russia of those citizens who previously left, as some Kremlin officials, including Putin, have celebrated the trend of Russians returning from abroad, whereas others have publicly threatened them.[7]

The battlespace in Ukraine continues to be the center of the technological offense-defense race between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 18 that Russian forces "learn quickly enough" and have completely adapted the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile compared to the model that Russia used in 2022.[8] Skibitsky stated that new Kh-101s are equipped with an active electronic warfare (EW) system and "thermal traps" to prevent the missiles from emitting trackable heat signatures.[9] Skibitsky noted that Ukrainian forces need to innovate and adapt in response to Russian adaptations to "prevent the loss of territories."[10] The GUR assessment of Russian technological innovation in the air domain is consistent with ISW's previous observations that Russian forces are adapting their methods and means for conducting strikes on Ukraine, and that Ukraine in turn must adapt and innovate with Western support to respond to such strikes.[11] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev identified similar adaptation-response dynamics in a January 18 post where he discussed the use of drones by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.[12] Medvedev stated that Russia has opted for the mass production of drones, leading to the production of large numbers of drones that lack the technological adaptations needed to compete with Ukrainian drones based on battlefield experience. Medvedev noted that Ukrainian forces are constantly improving their drones and warned that constant Ukrainian innovation may eventually make Russian mass-produced drones ineffective. Medvedev's discussion of the importance of constant technological adaptation and innovation on the battlefield emphasizes ISW's assessment that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological and tactical offense-defense race.[13]

Recent widespread GPS disruptions across Poland and the Baltic region are prompting speculation about the potential operation of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems in the region. Polish outlet Radio Zet cited data from the GPSJAM GPS interference tracking site on January 16 that showed unprecedentedly high levels of GPS jamming across northern and eastern Poland, including across Warsaw and as far south as Łódź.[14] GPSJAM data also shows similarly high levels of GPS jamming across the southern Baltic Sea and northwestern and central Poland between December 25-27, 2023, and on January 10, 2024.[15] Polish media outlets suggested that the December 2023 outages may have been caused either by unspecified NATO military exercises in the Baltic region or could be linked to recent Russian EW tests in the Kaliningrad region.[16] Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) opened a case into the disturbances on January 12 in light of Russian Baltic Fleet EW exercises.[17] Swedish Lieutenant Colonel Joakim Paasikivi stated on January 6 that he believes that recent GPS interference levels are a result of "Russian influence activities or so-called hybrid warfare," and noted that Russia has previously interfered with GPS signals in northern Europe to protect Russian activities in Murmansk Oblast or disrupt NATO exercises.[18] Russian media reported that elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet have been training with the Borisoglebsk-2 EW system in Kaliningrad Oblast since mid-December 2023, which some sources linked to the disturbances.[19] ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the GPS jamming levels at this time, but the suggestion that Russian EW capabilities in Kaliningrad Oblast could so significantly impact Poland and the Baltic region is notable.

The French Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 18 that it launched an “artillery coalition” to strengthen support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian statements that Russian forces in Ukraine have superior artillery capabilities.[20] The French MoD stated that it launched the “Artillery for Ukraine” coalition – one of five "capability" coalitions within the Contact Group for the Defense of Ukraine, which also include coalitions that aim to help support Ukraine with air defense, armored vehicles, air force capabilities, and maritime security.[21] The French MoD stated the “artillery coalition,” which France will co-chair with the US, will provide Ukrainian forces with artillery capabilities in the short term and aims to build out Ukrainian artillery capabilities in the long term through industrial partnerships.[22] French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu also announced that France will deliver six Caesar artillery systems to Ukraine in the coming weeks and supply 50 AASM Hammer glide bombs to Ukraine per month starting in January 2024.[23] Lecornu stated that France can produce 72 Caesar artillery systems for Ukraine in 2024 and will spend 50 million euros ($54.3 million) to finance the production of 12 of the Caesar systems, but that France will need partner support to finance the 60 other systems.[24]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that ammunition shortages are an urgent problem for Ukrainian forces and that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have enabled Russian forces to launch tens of thousands of artillery projectiles at Ukrainian positions every day.[25] Umerov stated that Russian artillery fire exceeds Ukrainian artillery fire at ratios between five-to-one and ten-to-one depending on the sector of the front and combat intensity.[26] Ukrainian officials have previously indicated that a combination of artillery ammunition shortages and delays in the provision of Western security assistance is likely causing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.[27] Umerov stated that improved artillery capabilities are a key necessity for winning the war and that Ukraine is pursuing efforts to expand shell production.[28] Ukraine is also currently expanding its production of first-person view (FPV) drones to offset the impacts of artillery ammunition shortages with the goal of producing one million FPV drones in 2024.[29]

Ukrainian partisans and satellite imagery confirmed that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea in late December 2023 sank a Russian Tarantul-class corvette near Sevastopol. The Crimean-based “Atesh” Ukrainian partisan group reported on January 18 that it discovered a sunken Tarantul-class corvette in Hrafska Bay, Sevastopol, and satellite imagery of the Atesh-provided coordinates confirms that the corvette sank between December 28 and 31, 2023.[30] Russian and Crimean occupation officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian air and naval drone strikes against Sevastopol on December 28 and 30, 2023.[31] This confirmation of a previously unaccounted-for successful Ukrainian strike indicates that Ukraine‘s recent strike campaign against occupied Crimea may have been more successful than has been confirmed thus far by open sources.[32] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a successful strike campaign against Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets in summer 2023 that forced Russian forces to move ships away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[33]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18. A source within the GUR told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on January 18 that there were confirmed strikes against unspecified targets in Leningrad Oblast and noted that Russian military facilities in St. Petersburg are “within reach” of Ukrainian forces.[34] Russian media stated that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems suppressed two Ukrainian drones over the Gulf of Finland and that Russian forces shot down a third Ukrainian drone near the St. Petersburg oil terminal.[35] A Russian source claimed that this is the first attempted Ukrainian strike on Leningrad Oblast in the course of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that it intercepted one drone over Leningrad Oblast in the early morning hours of January 18.[37]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 33 Shahed-136/131 drones at unspecified targets throughout Ukraine and two S-300 ground-to-air missiles in the direction of Kharkiv Oblast.[38] Ukrainian air defenses downed 22 Shaheds and an unspecified number of Shaheds did not strike their intended targets.[39] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian S-300 missiles struck Chuhuiv in Kharkiv Oblast.[40]

The European Union (EU) Parliament voted to endorse another step in a rule of law procedure that could eventually suspend Hungary’s voting rights after Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vetoed an EU vote for further military assistance to Ukraine. The EU Parliament endorsed both a condemnation of Orban’s recent veto of assistance to Ukraine and a nonbinding resolution that calls on EU member states to “take action and to determine whether Hungary has committed serious and persistent breaches of EU values” in accordance with the EU’s rule of law framework.[41] The EU rule of law framework establishes a three-step process, including an assessment, recommendation, and follow-up monitoring, to determine and prevent any threats to the rule of law in the EU.[42] The EU notably declared in 2022 that it can no longer consider Hungary a ”full democracy” but rather a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy,” as Hungary’s ”respect for democratic norms and standards is absent.”[43] Reuters noted that a possible deprivation of Hungary‘s EU voting rights through this procedure in accordance with EU Treaty Article 7 is unlikely to occur quickly and that the EU vote aims to pressure Orban ahead of the EU leaders’ summit on February 1, which will include discussions for further assistance to Ukraine.[44]

Russia and the Central African Republic (CAR) are in negotiations regarding Russian military basing in CAR. Russian Ambassador to CAR Alexander Bikantov stated that Russia’s and CAR’s defense ministries are discussing the creation of a Russian military base in CAR and are currently selecting the base’s location.[45] Russian outlet RBK reported that the Russian Embassy in CAR stated that Russian and Central African officials have not yet finalized the size of the potential Russian contingent in CAR or the date of its arrival.[46] Kremlin-backed outlet Africa Initiative reported on January 16 that CAR Presidential Advisor Fidel Ngouandika stated that CAR wants Russia to build a military base in the country and that CAR’s government has “already provided a site in Beringo, 80km from Bangui, where there is an international airport.”[47] The site in Beringo reportedly can accommodate up to 10,000 personnel.[48] The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia‘s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps and is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and CAR.[49] The Russian military’s apparent ability to negotiate deploying expeditionary forces to the CAR indicates that Russia has offset some of the acute manpower shortages that the Russian military experienced in 2022 and 2023. The Russian military hastily redeployed forces from Russia’s (small) foreign bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Armenia, and Syria, to Russia in 2022, likely in response to acute personnel shortages from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[50]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine or the West.
• The battlespace in Ukraine continues to be the center of the technological offense-defense race between Russian and Ukrainian forces.
• Recent widespread GPS disruptions across Poland and the Baltic region are prompting speculation about the potential operation of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems in the region.
• The French Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 18 that it launched an “artillery coalition” to strengthen support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian statements that Russian forces in Ukraine have superior artillery capabilities.
• Ukrainian partisans and satellite imagery confirmed that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea in late December 2023 sank a Russian Tarantul-class corvette near Sevastopol.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18.
• The European Union (EU) Parliament voted to endorse another step in a rule of law procedure that could eventually suspend Hungary’s voting rights after Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vetoed an EU vote for further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russia and the Central African Republic (CAR) are in negotiations regarding Russian military basing in CAR.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• Russian officials continue to target naturalized migrants as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to restore logistics infrastructure in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2024

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 17 that Russia does not have enough reserves to conduct large-scale offensive operations in several directions at the same time.[1] Skibitskyi stated that it is impossible for Russian forces to conduct strategically or operationally significant offensive operations without “powerful” reserves and implied that Russia does not have such reserves.[2] Skibitskyi noted that mobilization measures are ongoing in Russia, likely referring to the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign that relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants.[3] It is unclear if Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign has provided or would be able to provide the increased number of personnel that an intensified Russian offensive effort would require. Skibitskyi reported on January 15 that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month, which the Russian military uses to replenish losses and form reserve regiments, and that Russia would need to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to another “partial mobilization” like Russia conducted in September 2022 or a large-scale general mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[4] Skibitskyi’s statements suggest that although the Russian military is able to generate enough manpower to conduct routine operational-level rotations in Ukraine, Russian forces may not necessarily be able to generate manpower at a rate that would allow Russian forces to quickly re-establish the operational reserves necessary for simultaneous offensive efforts in several directions.[5]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims. Medvedev claimed that “the presence of an independent state on historical Russian territories” is a “constant reason for the resumption of hostilities” and that Ukraine’s very existence as an independent state is therefore “mortally dangerous” for Ukrainians.[6] Medvedev claimed that an independent Ukraine will never be a legitimate state regardless of who leads the government and that a future conflict for Ukrainian territory is inevitable whether or not it is a new conflict or the continuation of the current Russian war in Ukraine.[7] Medvedev’s January 17 statement is one of many recent signals from senior Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, that Putin and the Kremlin have no interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and that Putin’s maximalist war aims in Ukraine remain unchanged.[8] Medvedev attempted to portray Russia’s commitment to these maximalist objectives as unwavering by claiming that Ukrainian accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO will not prevent future conflict.[9] Medvedev notably did not define what he considers to be historical Russian territories, but Putin has defined historical Russian lands as the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[10] Medvedev’s opacity may be intentional, as the Kremlin’s loosely defined concept of “historical Russian territories” allows the Kremlin to pursue expansionist objectives wherever and whenever it so determines in a broad area including Central Asia, the Caucuses and parts of Eastern Europe.[11] Medvedev’s emphasis on the destruction of any Ukrainian state on these “historical Russian territories” could indicate that some actors in the Kremlin prioritize expansionist objectives over the identified objective of regime change under calls for the “de-nazification” of Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Odesa and Kharkiv cities on the night of January 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv City and 20 Shahed-136/-131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 19 of the drones over Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[12] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian drones largely targeted Odesa City.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings in Odesa and Kharkiv cities.[14]

Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on January 17 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Shahed drone with a hybrid air defense system — referring to the so-called FrankenSAM systems that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers — for the first time.[15] Kamyshin noted that the full development of Ukraine’s own air defenses will take years, so Ukraine is creating home-made air defense systems using Soviet components and Western missiles. ISW continues to assess that Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remain crucial as Ukraine develops its defense industrial base (DIB).[16] Kamyshin also stated that Ukraine has doubled its ammunition production for NATO-caliber artillery systems.[17] Ukraine began domestically producing 155mm shells, which are a NATO-standard used by Western-supplied guns that Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) had never produced before, no later than September 2023.[18]

Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on January 16 that Germany will provide Ukraine with military goods worth more than seven billion euros (roughly $7.62 billion) in 2024.[19] The German government announced that the aid package includes ammunition for Leopard tanks, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance drones, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles.[20] Germany provided 5.4 billion euros ($5.89 billion) worth of military assistance to Ukraine in 2023.[21] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on January 16 that he would finalize a bilateral security agreement with Kyiv during a visit to Ukraine in February 2024.[22] Macron also stated that France will send 40 SCALP long-range missiles and “several hundred” unspecified bombs to Ukraine in the coming weeks.

Western officials highlighted Ukraine’s battlefield successes at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16 and 17. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that Ukraine has opened a corridor to export grain in the Black Sea, weakened the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and liberated more than half of its territory that Russian forces captured since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[23] Sullivan also highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to develop its own defense industrial base (DIB).[24] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely in the near future — in line with ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia is not interested in engaging in meaningful, good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Ghanan President Nana Akufo-Addo and called on them to support Ukraine’s peace formula.[26] Zelensky also met with Polish President Andrzej Duda and discussed bilateral relations, the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU).[27]

The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia. Russian information space actors within the ultranationalist milblogger community have increasingly fixated on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in 2023 and have weaponized this rhetoric to call on Russian officials to more widely mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine, curtail migrants’ access to social and economic opportunities, and substantively change Russia’s existing migration policies.[28] Russian ultranationalists have also increasingly advocated for ethnic Russians to receive more domestic power in Russia and continue to promote hyper-nationalist ideologies that are generating domestic tensions between ethnic minority communities and ethnic Russians.[29] s may malign the nominal rights to autonomy that many non-ethnic Russian communities have through their respective federal Russian republics and are likely to react harshly to discussions centering on the political, economic, and social concerns of non-ethnic Russians.[30]

The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists. Russian officials appear to have tolerated or even endorsed ultranationalists’ increasing anti-migration rhetoric since it likely generated social pressures that have augmented Russian efforts to coerce migrants into military service in Ukraine.[31] The Kremlin now appears to be struggling to reconcile efforts to increase Russian industrial capacity while also coercing migrants into military service and disincentivizing them from working in Russia.[32] Any efforts to appease Russian ultranationalists will likely only exacerbate inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies concerning migrants. Hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia directly contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effort to promote the concept of a wider and ethnically inclusive “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) that encompasses non-ethnic Russians in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.[33] The Kremlin continues to rely on the ultranationalist community in its effort to solidify pro-war sentiments, hyper-nationalism, Russian orthodoxy, and “traditional” social values as core tenets of the Russian state.[34] The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance these parallel efforts as Russian ultranationalists display increasing animus to non-ethnic Russians in Russia and in neighboring countries.

Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community. Bashkortostan’s Baymaksky Court found prominent Bashkort activist Fail Alsynov guilty on January 11 of inciting ethnic hatred and sentenced him to four years in prison, which the court announced publicly on January 17 following a closed-door trial.[35] Alsynov allegedly gave a speech on April 28, 2023, that insulted ethnic groups from the Caucasus.[36] Hundreds of Alsynov’s supporters had gathered at the courthouse ahead of his January 17 verdict announcement, and protests involving hundreds to thousands of supporters lasted for hours following the verdict. Some Russian opposition sources reported that 2,000-5,000 people protested in support of Alsynov and that responding Russian authorities detained anywhere from five to several dozen protestors.[37] The reported scale of the Baymak protest appears comparable to if not larger than that of the antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[38] Footage shows Russian riot police using tear gas and stun grenades to dispel the protestors, two of whom Russian police beat with batons and 20-40 of whom sought medical attention following the protests.[39] Russian law enforcement reportedly detained around 20-40 protestors, and Alsynov’s supporters negotiated with Russian law enforcement to cease protests for the day in exchange for the release of the detained protestors.[40] The protests have dispersed as of this publication, though it is unclear whether activists are planning for further protests on subsequent days. Hundreds to thousands of activists gathered outside the Baymaksky Court in the days leading up to the public announcement of Alsynov’s sentence, suggesting that the size of the protests on January 17 was not necessarily spontaneous.[41]

Russian authorities appear to be better equipped to handle the Bashkortostan protests than the October 2023 Dagestan protests. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it is opening a criminal investigation into the protest for the organization of and participation in “mass riots” and for the use of violence against authorities.[42] Multiple Telegram channels that the Bashkort activists reportedly used to coordinate and spread news of the protest became temporarily unavailable on January 17, a possible Russian government censorship attempt to limit the protest from growing or spreading.[43] The Russian ultranationalist community latched onto the Bashkortostan protest in anger despite the swift government response. Some criticized Alsynov’s supporters as “extremists” and “wolves in sheep’s clothing” who only aim to separate Bashkortostan from Russia.[44] Others amplified footage of military personnel in Bashkortostan’s “Minigali Shaimuratov” Battalion disavowing the protesters and Alsynov as “traitors,” “extremists,” and “separatists.”[45] The Russian government and Bashkort military personnel’s swift response suggest that the Russian government may intensify efforts to ensure that non-ethnic Russian communities support the war in Ukraine. Russian sources’ characterization of the protesters as “separatists” organized by outside forces suggests that Russian ultranationalists will continue to label any notable unrest from non-ethnic Russians as a hybrid warfare attack against Russia.[46]

Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it opened a criminal investigation into Interregional Uzbek Community "Vatandosh" President Usman Baratov for a social media post allegedly “insulting the participants of the special military operation” after unspecified Russian military correspondents appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin.[47] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers widely criticized Baratov’s social media posts and called for Baratov to leave Russia.[48] The Investigative Committee’s swift response to milbloggers’ requests may prompt them to make future demands of the Russian government. The Investigative Committee’s prompt announcement also suggests that the Russian government is monitoring and potentially responding to demands of the Russian ultranationalist community — a subsection of the Russian information space that it routinely attempts to cultivate and co-opt to advance government narratives. Russian milbloggers also widely criticized an allegedly naturalized Russian citizen of Azeri ethnicity against whom the Investigative Committee opened a case for “attempted murder and incitement of hatred based on ethnicity” on January 17.[49] Russian milbloggers increasingly fixate on crimes that non-ethnic Russians reportedly commit, and some milbloggers have claimed that unspecified non-ethnic Russian diasporas control entire sectors of the Russian economy.[50] The Russian ultranationalist community’s framing of non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities as an internal threat to Russian security and economic interests are irreconcilable with the Kremlin’s portrayal of Russia as a harmonious multiethnic society. The Russian ultranationalist community may increasingly pressure the Russian government to take actions against migrant and non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities, which may exacerbate the fracture between the ultranationalist community and the government.

The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military. Moscow’s Second Western District Military Court sentenced the former head of Rosgvardia’s maritime department, Colonel Sergei Volkov, to six years in prison on January 16 for allegedly supplying low-quality radar systems to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and a gas pipeline from Krasnodar Krai to occupied Crimea from Ukrainian drone strikes.[51] The court found Volkov guilty of “abuse of office with grave consequences” for his participation in a 400 million ruble ($4.5 million) corruption scheme involving the acquisition of two radar systems that Volkov reportedly knew could not properly defend against Ukrainian drones.[52] The Second Western District Military Court convicted two Russian air defense officers on December 6, 2023, for negligence in failing to prevent a Ukrainian strike on Russian territory.[53] Russian authorities also previously detained the commander of the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army on corruption and bribery charges, likely for failing to prevent drone strikes against Moscow City in July and August 2023.[54] The Russian military command likely intends to set a precedent across the Russian military concerning possible punishment for failures to defend against Ukrainian strikes — particularly strikes against high-value targets — regardless of whether the cases explicitly allege that these officers violated Russian rules of combat duty or tangentially associate the officers’ dereliction of duties with corruption schemes.[55] The Russian command likely hopes that these precedents will improve discipline writ large among Russian forces in Ukraine, although ISW has not observed such an effect.

The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Russian military is forming squads of “military instructors” to deploy to African countries, likely referring to the Africa Corps, and that Russia is recruiting these squads in Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly in Crimea.[56] ISW previously reported that the Africa Corps aims to subsume the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa after the Russian MoD failed to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.[57] Russian officials have routinely referred to Wagner personnel operating in Africa as “military instructors” and “advisors” since 2018 despite Wagner’s combat roles in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.[58] The GUR reported that Russia is particularly focused on recruiting Russian reservists who specialized in maintaining air defense systems, former sailors, and other specialists and that Russian reservists are attracted to this opportunity due to high salaries and the hope of avoiding fighting in Ukraine.[59] ISW has previously observed the Africa Corps advertising “high salaries” beginning at 110,000 rubles ($1,240) but stipulating that interested applicants who are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine cannot transfer to serve in the Africa Corps.[60] The Russian MoD announced on January 17 that Russian Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General Alexander Fomin and Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Nigerien National Defense Minister Major General Salifou Modi to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation.[61] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.[62]

The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish–Russian financial ties. Russian outlet Kommersant stated on January 17 that Turkish banks have “universally” begun to refuse to work with Russian banks.[63] Kommersant reported that sources indicated that Turkish banks’ fear of secondary sanctions sharply increased after the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions on December 22, 2023, that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that at least two state-owned Chinese banks ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities tied to the Russian defense industry following the US’ December 2022 secondary sanctions authorization.[64]

The Russian government likely continues efforts to gain access to data on Russian citizens. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on January 17 that a Moscow court fined Amazon Cloud Services more than 200 million rubles (about $2,256,400) for not having a representative office in Russia.[65] Russian law stipulates that Russian authorities can fine entities that operate in Russia without opening a branch or representative office in Russia a penalty amounting to one-fifteenth to one-tenth of their total revenue for the year. Russia previously fined Google for a similar law that requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021.[66] Russia also previously fined Yandex for failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding the disclosure of users’ personal data to the Russian government.[67]

Key Takeaways:

• A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims.
• Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time.
• Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16.
• The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.
• The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists.
• Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community.
• Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals.
• The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps.
• The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish-Russian financial ties.
• Positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact on January 17.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to demonstrate that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine – which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender – remain unchanged. Putin claimed on January 16 during a meeting with Russian municipal heads that “Ukrainian statehood may suffer an irreparable, very serious blow” if the current battlefield situation continues.[1] Putin also reiterated Kremlin allegations of the prevalence of Nazism in Ukraine and claimed that ”such people...cannot win.”[2] Russia’s continued calls for Ukraine’s “denazification” are thinly veiled demands for the removal of the elected Ukrainian government and its replacement with a government acceptable to the Kremlin.[3] Putin reiterated the Kremlin narrative that Ukraine – not Russia – is to blame for the absence of negotiations, claiming that Ukraine’s “peace formula” is actually a continuation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ban on negotiating with Russia and amounts to “prohibitive demands” on the negotiation process.[4] Putin claimed that any negotiation process is an “attempt to encourage [Russia] to abandon gains [it] has made in the past year and a half” and that this is “impossible.”[5]

The Kremlin appears to lack a consistent framing for current Russian offensive operations to present to the Russian public, despite the fact that Putin appears to be – at times – using his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian military as part of his election campaign.[6] Putin declared that Russian forces “completely” have the initiative in Ukraine following a failed Ukrainian counteroffensive.[7] This is a notable departure from Putin‘s claim on December 14, 2023, that almost all Russian forces are in “the active stage of action” and from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s previous characterization of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine as an “active defense.”[8] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have regained the initiative throughout most of the Ukrainian theater but have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson Oblast.[9]

Russian President Vladimir Putin notably amplified a longstanding Kremlin effort to set information conditions for future escalations against the Baltic countries, likely as part of his wider effort to weaken NATO. Putin claimed on January 16 that Latvia and other Baltic states are “throwing [ethnic] Russian people” out of their countries and that this situation “directly affects [Russia’s] security.”[10] Previous changes to Latvia’s immigration law stipulated that Russian citizens’ permanent residence permits would become invalid in September 2023 and that Russian citizens would need to follow the general procedure for obtaining EU permanent residence status in Latvia, including passing a Latvian language exam, by November 30, 2023.[11] The Latvian Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs stated in December 2023 that Latvia would deport about 1,200 Russian citizens who failed to apply for a new residence permit by the deadline.[12] Putin has long employed an expansive definition of Russia’s sovereignty and trivialized the sovereignty of former Soviet republics, and Russia has long claimed that it has the right to protect its “compatriots abroad,” including ethnic Russians and Russian speakers beyond Russia’s borders.[13] ISW has not observed any indication that a Russian attack against the Baltics is imminent or likely, but Putin may be setting information conditions for future aggressive Russian actions abroad under the pretext of protecting its “compatriots.” Putin recently threatened Finland in mid-December 2023 and reiterated a world view illustrating that he continues to pursue demanded changes to the NATO alliance that would amount to dismantling it.[14]

Putin subsequently tied alleged security threats to Russia in Eastern Europe to NATO’s “Open Door Policy,” a core principle of the alliance enshrined in its charter that allows it the discretion to admit new members. Putin claimed that NATO “open[ed] the doors to Ukraine and Georgia” in 2008 – referring to the Bucharest Declaration in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no concrete steps towards opening such paths – and claimed that this declaration went against Ukraine’s 1991 Declaration of Independence that stated that Ukraine is a neutral state.[15] Putin did not mention that the Russian Federation committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” which included Crimea and occupied Donbas, in 1994 in exchange for Ukraine’s return of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia.[16] Sovereignty includes the right of self-determination. Putin claimed that NATO’s 2008 declaration “completely changed the situation in Eastern Europe” and affected Russia’s security. ISW previously assessed that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 to defend Russia against a threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal he still pursues.[17] The Kremlin and Kremlin-affiliated actors have recently promoted information operations and conducted hybrid warfare tactics aimed at destabilizing NATO and may now be setting information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO countries and their neighbors.[18]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated the importance of defeating Russia in Ukraine at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16. Zelensky emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not change – referring to Putin’s maximalist war aims – and noted that all attempts to restore peace have failed two years after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and 10 years since the illegal annexation of Crimea.[19] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian military is holding Putin back and that it is better to defeat Russia on the battlefield now than later. Zelensky’s statements are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Kremlin is very unlikely to engage in good faith, meaningful peace negotiations.[20] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Ukraine needs steady funding and supplies of weapons through 2024 and beyond in order to defend and reclaim its territory, indicating that Europe will continue to play an increasingly active role in supporting Ukraine.[21] Von der Leyen stated that Ukraine can win the war but that the West needs to expand Ukraine’s capabilities.[22] Von der Leyen emphasized Ukraine’s successes throughout the war thus far: “Russia has lost roughly half of its military capabilities,” and Ukraine has recaptured half of the territory that Russian forces captured after the full-scale invasion, pushed back the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and opened a grain corridor in the Black Sea.

Zelensky continued bilateral meetings with world leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16. Zelensky discussed US-Ukraine defense cooperation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Russian strikes and NATO summit preparations with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the battlefield situation and Ukraine’s defense needs with Luxembourg Prime Minister Luc Frieden, and Ukrainian operations in and corridors through the Black Sea with business representatives.[23] Zelensky also met with Singaporean President Tharman Shanmugaratnam and invited Shanmugaratnam to join the Ukrainian peace formula and global peace summit.[24]

Russian tactical aviation operations are reportedly decreasing near the Sea of Azov, and Russian aviation capabilities may be degraded after Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and caused severe damage to a Russian Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14. Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on January 16 that Russian tactical aviation presence over the Sea of Azov is currently at a lower level “than ever before.”[25] Ihnat stated that the A-50 and Il-20 aircraft helped Russian forces detect air targets at a range of up to 600 kilometers and transmitted information to Russian control points in Ukraine in real time.[26] Ihnat stated that this monitoring allowed Russian tactical aviation to see Ukrainian aircraft from afar and increased the effectiveness of tactical aviation operations.[27] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces only had three A-50 and six modernized A-50U aircraft in service before January 14, 2024, and Ihnat stated that the destruction of one of these few aircraft would reduce Russian operational capabilities to some extent.[28] Ihnat stated that severe damage to the Il-22 aircraft rendered the aircraft inoperable but that Russian forces would likely replace both the destroyed A-50 and damaged Il-22 aircraft.[29] Ihnat clarified that the destruction of these aircraft will not impact the intensity of Russian missile and drone strikes since Russian forces program these missiles and drones with specified routes and targets from ground positions.[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 16 that Ukraine must gain air superiority just as it gained superiority in the Black Sea following strikes on Russian naval assets in occupied Crimea.[31]

At least two state-owned Chinese banks reportedly ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities with ties to the Russian defense industry. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that people familiar with the matter stated that at least two People’s Republic of China (PRC)-owned banks ordered reviews of international transactions with Russian clients after the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and support the Russian war effort in Ukraine on December 22, 2023.[32] Bloomberg’s sources stated that these Chinese banks are auditing clients’ business registrations, authorized beneficiaries, and ultimate controllers to determine whether the clients are Russian, conduct business in Russia, or transfer critical items to Russia through a third country.[33] Bloomberg’s sources stated that these banks will sever ties with these clients, regardless of the currency or location of the transactions.[34] Bloomberg reported that the PRC’s four largest state-owned banks have a history of complying with previous US sanctions against Iran and North Korea.[35] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov refused to comment on Bloomberg’s reporting on January 16.[36] Russia has relied on Chinese entities for dual-use goods for use in Ukraine and for component parts in Russian military equipment.[37] ISW previously assessed that China has likely been heavily involved in various Russian sanctions evasion schemes, but it appears that US secondary sanctions may be threatening enough to force China to abandon many of these schemes.[38] The reported Chinese reaction to the US secondary sanctions further indicates that China has reservations concerning the Kremlin’s desired “no limits partnership” between the two states.[39]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov thanked North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui for North Korea’s support for Russia in the war during Choe’s official state visit to Moscow on January 16.[40] Lavrov highlighted his visit to Pyongyang in October 2023 and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in Russia in September 2023 as “only the beginning” to comprehensively developing relations between Russia and North Korea.[41] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Lavrov and Choe met with Putin to discuss new unspecified Russian-North Korean agreements.[42] Russia is likely advancing efforts to procure ammunition and ballistic missiles from abroad amid reported Russian ammunition shortages and missile production constraints. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023, and Western and Ukrainian officials have stated that Russian forces have launched at least one North Korean ballistic missile against Ukraine.[43]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on its second reading to digitalize Ukrainian military records on January 16.[44] The law will improve the register for mobilized personnel, conscripts, and reservists and introduce the possibility of creating a digital military accounting document.[45] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the draft law will also create an electronic services portal for military personnel and conscripts.[46] The Ukrainian MoD also stated that the draft law will allow Ukraine to strengthen its cyber defense, expand its access to unspecified allies' intelligence, develop and deploy new combat systems, and place its IT systems for military cloud storage in NATO member states, thereby allowing Ukrainian air defense systems currently protecting national data centers to cover military and civilian infrastructure.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to demonstrate that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine – which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender – remain unchanged.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin notably amplified a longstanding Kremlin effort to set information conditions for future escalations against Baltic countries, likely as part of his wider effort to weaken NATO.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated the importance of defeating Russia in Ukraine at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16.
• Russian tactical aviation operations are reportedly decreasing near the Sea of Azov, and Russian aviation capabilities may be degraded after Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and caused severe damage to a Russian Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14.
• At least two state-owned Chinese banks reportedly ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities with ties to the Russian defense industry.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov thanked North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui for North Korea’s support for Russia in the war during Choe’s official state visit to Moscow on January 16.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on its second reading to digitalize Ukrainian military records on January 16.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Bakhmut as positional engagements continued along the entire frontline.
• Russian State Duma deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) proposed a bill on January 16 that would create a legal status for volunteers of the Russian war in Ukraine that would grant them compensation in case of injury or death.
• Russian occupation officials from occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Donetsk oblasts attended a meeting of Russian municipal representatives in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 16.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2024

Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and severely damaged an Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi posted flight tracking footage indicating that Ukrainian forces struck the A-50 and Il-22 over the Sea of Azov.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces were able to hit two targets while initially targeting the A-50.[3] Ihnat stated that the Ukrainian strike forced the Il-22 to land in Anapa, that the Il-22 is likely irreparable, and that there were wounded and dead among its crew. Ukrainian and Russian sources posted a photo of the damaged Il-22 at the airfield in Russia.[4] Ukrainian military officials, including Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk, stated that the A-50 directed Russian strikes against Ukrainian targets, such as air defense systems and aviation.[5] Humenyuk stated that the destruction of the A-50 will at least postpone future Russian missile strikes on Ukraine.[6] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 3 that Russia began constant sorties of A-50 aircraft due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure in Crimea, including Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets.[7] Valery Romanenko, a leading researcher at the Ukrainian State Aviation Museum of the National Aviation University, stated that the loss of the A-50 and members of its crew is “very painful” for Russia since a large part of the A-50's crew is highly specialized and must undergo several years of training.[8] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russia had only three A-50s in service out of a total of six prior to this strike.[9]

The Russian information space largely denied that Ukrainian forces struck the A-50 aircraft and instead strangely claimed that the aircraft was destroyed by friendly fire from Russian air defenses.[10] The A-50 is used to coordinate Russian air and possibly air defense activity, and the claim that Russian air defenses shot down the A-50 would amount to a calamitous failure on the part of Russian forces, if true. A Russian source that focuses on Russian aviation blamed Russian commanders who lack the proper background required for their positions.[11] The current commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Colonel General Viktor Afzalov, has an extensive background in Russian air defense operations.[12] Whether his lack of experience as a pilot poses any problems for Russian air operations, which is questionable, his experience as an air defender should have been appropriate to ensure that Russian forces do not shoot down their own airborne control aircraft. A Russian insider source claiming to be an employee of an unspecified Russian security structure claimed that unspecified Russian actors created a “duck” (a Russian term for a false claim) about how Russian forces shot down the A-50 to reassure Russian pilots that missions over the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are still safe and that human error was the cause of the incident.[13] It is unclear why Russian pilots should be more comfortable with the idea that their ground-based air defenders are so incompetent. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that he did not have any information about the downed aircraft and recommended that journalists clarify information about this with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] The Russian MoD has not made an official statement about the incidents as of this publication.

A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Russian forces can generate forces at a rate equal to Russian monthly personnel losses, which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are able to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month, which the Russian military uses to replenish losses and form reserve regiments.[15] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk similarly assessed that Russia is able to replace about 25,000 to 27,000 personnel per month and has a small ready professional reserve of mechanized, naval infantry, and airborne (VDV) assault units staffed at 10 to 15 percent of its total capacity.[16] Skibitskyi and Chernyk’s figures are consistent with the ISW’s assessment that Russian forces can conduct operational level rotations in most sectors of the frontline.[17] Chernyk stated that Russia has between 1.5 million and seven million people in its general mobilizable reserve (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) composed of men that could be mobilized regardless of prior military experience, as distinct from the far smaller ready and professional reserve (“personnel mobilization reserve“) that should, in theory, be more militarily proficient on mobilization.[18] Skibitskyi stated Russia is highly unlikely to conduct any form of official mobilization prior to the March 2024 Russian presidential election.[19] Skibitskyi reported that Russia would need to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to large-scale mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[20] Skibitskyi stated that it is too early to comment on whether Russia intends to conduct “mobilization” after the March 2024 Russian presidential election, however.[21]

Skibitskyi indicated that international sanctions are constraining Russian missile and drone production as Russian forces likely continue to adapt their missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Skibitskyi stated that recent Russian strikes have targeted Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, military headquarters, and military control systems and units on the frontline, consistent with ISW’s observations.[22] Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces have recently started launching Shahed drones against frontline areas, whereas Russian forces previously used Shahed drones to target rear DIB enterprises.[23] ISW observed Russian forces using Shahed drones to target frontline areas starting in late December 2023, and Ukrainian forces intercepted a lower number of drones likely due to lower levels of Ukrainian air defense coverage or air defense coverage not optimized for intercepting drones near the frontline.[24] Skibitskyi noted that Russia can produce about 330 to 350 Shahed drones per month but that these numbers largely depend on Russia’s ability to acquire electronic components such as microchips and circuits abroad.[25] Skibitskyi reported that Russia is using Chinese-made engines in Shahed drones.[26] Skibitskyi also stated that Russian forces had not included Kh-101 or Kalibr cruise missiles in strike series since mid-September 2023 likely as part of efforts to build  up a missile reserve.[27] Skibitskyi reported that the Russian DIB may be able to produce 115 to 130 missiles suitable for strategic strikes against Ukraine per month but that the actual monthly production output varies because Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles and Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles require many foreign components blocked under international sanctions.[28] Skibitskyi stated that Russia is unable to produce analogues of these foreign components domestically. ISW has assessed that Russia is likely attempting to acquire more ballistic missiles from abroad because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking Ukrainian targets in some circumstances.[29] Russia may also be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad due to increased difficulties in the Russian domestic production of Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles. Skibitskyi reported that Russia can produce Kh-31, Kh-34, Kh-29, and Kh-59 air-to-air missiles using mainly domestic components and that Russian forces use Kh-31 and Kh-59 missiles to target Ukrainian air defense systems and radar stations during large strike series.[30]

German outlet BILD reported on classified German documents describing a hypothetical scenario to prepare for a possible future conflict between NATO and Russia. Developing such scenarios, which are usually classified, is a normal task for professional military staff. BILD reported on January 14 that it obtained classified documents from the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) that outline “Alliance Defense 2025,” a scenario of a possible “path to conflict” between Russia and NATO that begins in February 2024.[31] BILD stated that the hypothetical scenario includes Russia’s movement of troops and equipment to Kaliningrad Oblast amid claims of an impending NATO attack and artificial Russian-created “border conflicts” and “riots” in states near the Suwalki Gap. A German MoD spokesperson accurately told BILD that “considering different scenarios, even if they are extremely unlikely, is part of everyday military business, especially training.”

Germany’s reported consideration of paths to a possible future conflict with Russia is not unwarranted given recent Russian threats towards NATO and the possibility of faltering Western aid to Ukraine. Russian officials and milbloggers largely dismissed the BILD report as rumors.[32] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, have recently and consistently threatened NATO, and Kremlin-affiliated actors appear to be attempting to sow instability and set information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO member states and their neighbors, although not on anything like the timeline suggested by the scenario BILD described.[33] ISW continues to assess that Western aid to Ukraine remains crucial as Ukraine’s inability to hold off the Russian military could allow Russian forces to push all the way to western Ukraine along the border with NATO states, which would very likely present NATO with challenging and expensive new defense requirements.[34]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Switzerland on January 15 to discuss aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan and support for Ukraine with global leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum from January 15 to 19. The World Economic Forum opened in Davos, Switzerland, on January 15, and Zelensky stated that he will hold bilateral meetings with representatives of NATO and European Union (EU) countries.[35] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Switzerland have begun preparations for the Global Peace Summit that could be held in Switzerland and that he wants China to be part of these discussions.[36] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak stated that the Ukrainian delegation to Davos met regarding five aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan: the withdrawal of Russian forces to Ukraine, Russian accountability for its violations of international law, environmental security, prevention of escalation and recurrence of war, and confirmation of the end of the war.[37] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov proposed on January 14 to create an international working group of defense ministers and national security advisors about a Russian military withdrawal from Ukraine.[38] The Ukrainian Ministry of Justice announced that Ukraine and Switzerland signed a joint communique on January 15 agreeing that Ukrainian security is an inseparable part of regional and global security and that the international community’s goal is to end the war and overcome the crises that the war caused.[39]

Ukrainian and Swiss officials also discussed reconstruction and repatriation efforts. Zelensky met with Swiss President Viola Amherd and various factional representatives of the Swiss Federal Assembly on January 15 about Swiss support for Ukraine, reconstruction efforts, and the Ukrainian peace plan.[40] Amherd announced that Switzerland will provide 1.5 billion francs ($1.75 billion) for Ukrainian reconstruction efforts in 2025-2028.[41] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets stated in Davos on January 14 that 517 Ukrainian children and 2,828 adults, including 150 civilians, have returned to Ukraine from Russia and called on the international community to help return all Ukrainians to Ukraine.[42]

A North Korean delegation including North Korean Foreign Minister Choi Song Hui arrived in Moscow on January 14 for an official state visit to Russia on January 15 to 17.[43] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Choi will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on January 16.[44] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia intends to develop a partnership with North Korea in “all areas” and that the Kremlin expects Lavrov’s and Choi’s negotiations to be fruitful.[45] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce enough artillery ammunition to sustain Russia’s pace of fire and that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia in September-November 2023.[46]

Russia and Iran are preparing to sign a Grand Interstate Treaty to further develop Russian-Iranian military-technological cooperation.[47] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Defense and Iranian Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani reportedly discussed bilateral military and military-technical cooperation during a phone call on January 15, and both sides are reportedly preparing to sign the Grand Interstate Treaty within an unspecified timeframe.[48] Both sides emphasized their commitment to the fundamental principles of Russian-Iranian relations – including unconditional respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – which will be confirmed in the upcoming Grand Interstate Treaty. Shoigu noted that Moscow and Tehran are consistently increasing their cooperation in the interest of building a “truly equal multipolar world.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian about the progress of the new interstate agreement and a number of bilateral cooperation topics involving trade, economy, transport, and logistics during a phone call on January 15.[49] Lavrov and Abdollahian reiterated that Russia and Iran are preparing to codify different fundamental principles of Russian-Iranian relations in the new Grand Interstate Treaty.[50] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview published on January 15 that Iran wants to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia and hopes to acquire Su-34 fighter aircraft, training aircraft, and radar stations.[51]

The Kremlin is intensifying censorship measures to limit criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 presidential election. Russian State Duma deputies from the ruling United Russia party proposed a draft bill that would allow the Russian government to confiscate property from individuals convicted of spreading “fake” information about the Russian military.[52] Russian opposition media sources reported on Russian investigations and arrests for allegedly spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, including specific cases targeting an opposition journalist and the wife of a mobilized individual.[53] The relatives of Russian mobilized personnel have increasingly complained about the Russian military’s treatment of mobilized personnel, and the Kremlin likely wants to silence concerned relatives to maintain good appearances ahead of the presidential election, as ISW has previously assessed.[54]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and severely damaged an Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14.
• A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Russian forces can generate forces at a rate equal to Russian monthly personnel losses, which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are able to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
• Skibitskyi indicated that international sanctions are constraining Russian missile and drone production as Russian forces likely continue to adapt their missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• German outlet BILD reported on classified German documents describing a hypothetical scenario to prepare for a possible future conflict between NATO and Russia. Developing such scenarios, which are usually classified, is a normal task for professional military staffs.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Switzerland on January 15 to discuss aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan and support for Ukraine with global leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum from January 15 to 19.
• A North Korean delegation including North Korean Foreign Minister Choi Song Hui arrived in Moscow on January 14 for an official state visit to Russia on January 15 to 17.
• Russia and Iran are preparing to sign a Grand Interstate Treaty to further develop Russian-Iranian military-technological cooperation.
• The Kremlin is intensifying censorship measures to limit criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances west of Donetsk City and near Krynky amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is reportedly forming a women’s drone operating detachment.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian resistance forces detonated a Russian military UAZ Patriot vehicle in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, injuring four Russian personnel and killing an unspecified number of personnel.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2024

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian literary critic and alternative historian Sergey Pereslegin claimed on January 12 that Russian forces will launch a large-scale offensive effort in Ukraine sometime between January 12 and February 2 after the ground freezes and likely after Ukrainian forces grow “exhausted” of defending their positions in Avdiivka and east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[1] Pereslegin claimed that Russians should be more concerned about Russia launching its offensive at the wrong time or making the same “mistakes” that Ukraine made during its 2023 counteroffensive than of a renewed Ukrainian offensive effort in 2024.[2] Pereslegin also expressed concern that Russia does not have enough manpower to conduct the large-scale offensive effort he is anticipating.[3] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on January 14 that the number of Russian military personnel on the frontline allows Russian forces to conduct localized tactical maneuvers but is unlikely to support operationally significant ”breakthroughs.”[4] The milblogger claimed that freezing weather is impacting Russian and Ukrainian ground activity and artillery and drone systems throughout the front, particularly in the Kherson direction.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that freezing weather conditions are preventing Russian forces from conducting ground operations and advancing north of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian aviation is unable to operate in southern Ukraine due to freezing weather conditions.[7] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin claimed on January 14 that the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast is “buzzing like a bee hive” due to the large number of Ukrainian drones operating, however.[8] Rogozin claimed that Ukrainian forces devote half a dozen drones to striking each valuable target in western Zaporizhia Oblast and that intense Ukrainian drone use is complicating Russian personnel rotations.[9] ISW previously assessed that freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely currently constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely try to sustain or intensify localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative regardless of winter weather and terrain conditions.[11] ISW also assesses, however, that Russian forces will be unable to make operationally significant breakthroughs.

Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have recently been launching strikes against Ukraine using a variety of missile types, including hypersonic Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles.[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched unspecified air decoys and Shahed drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems so that Russian forces could conduct successful missile strikes.[13] ISW has observed Russian forces experimenting with various combinations of drone and missile strikes in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems as Ukrainian forces have adapted to Russian strike patterns.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on January 14 that sanctions are likely reducing the quality of Russian missiles.[16] The reported decrease in quality of Russian missiles may further hinder Russia’s ability to conduct successful strike series against Ukraine.

Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak also met with Romanian State Secretary Julian Fota to discuss bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, making Romania the 9th country to begin bilateral security negotiations with Ukraine.[18] Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis and Yermak noted the importance of involving China in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[19] Cassis argued that the West “must find a way to include Russia” in the peace process and stated that “there will be no peace if Russia does not have its say.”[20] It is unclear what Cassis meant by the call for Russia to “have its say.” ISW has long assessed that Putin does not intend to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s goals in Ukraine — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain unchanged.[21]

The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian Tatar activist and political scientist Ruslan Aisin reported that Russian officials cut funding for the state program for preservation, study, and development of Tatarstan’s state languages by 12.5 percent in 2023.[22] Aisin stated that officials originally planned to spend 126.8 million rubles (around $1.4 million) on the program but cut the funding by 15.8 million rubles (about $180,000). Aisin argued that these cuts are likely related to the Kremlin’s efforts to finance the war effort in Ukraine and undermine Tatarstan’s identity. Aisin observed that Tatarstan backed away from its state policy on strengthening its identity alongside the country-wide Russian identity in the fall of 2023 and argued that the Kremlin likely had seen an opportunity to save money on Tatarstan’s efforts to preserve its culture, language, and identity. Aisin also implied that the Kremlin is favoring an all-Russian identity. The Kremlin directed Tatarstan officials in January 2023 to abolish the title of the republic’s president and refer to Tatarstan’s leader as “glava” (regional head).[23] Tatarstan has been supporting the Russian war effort by forming and financing the recruitment of regional volunteer battalions, some of which suffered tremendous losses on the battlefield in 2022 and 2023.[24] BBC’s Russian Service and independent Russian outlet Mediazona also confirmed that at least 922 servicemen from Tatarstan died in Ukraine — a number that is likely significantly higher — as of January 11.[25]

The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin ordered the Investigative Committee to look into the fire and investigate Wildberries managers for abuse of power and violations of fire safety compliance rules.[26] St. Petersburg–based outlet Fontanka reported that Wildberries has been unable to establish contact with at least 66 employees who were at the warehouse during the fire.[27] Russian authorities have otherwise not offered additional information about the circumstances of the fire, which some Russian sources suggested may have broken out the day after a fight between migrant workers and a subsequent mobilization raid on the warehouse.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.
• The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg.
• Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Moscow-based international exhibition-forum “Russia” opened the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) “Army of Children” exhibit on January 14 to educate children about the military and careers in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Swedish Defense Materiel Administration announced on January 14 that it had signed an agreement with Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to increase the production and deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to support Ukraine’s needs.
• The Kremlin is funding select non-profit organizations operating in occupied areas that propagate Kremlin social narratives.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2024

A recent video appeal by a Serbian mercenary addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed discussions about an ongoing “clan war” within the Kremlin and the Russian information space against the backdrop of the Russian presidential campaign. Serbian sniper Dejan Beric (also known as “Deka”)  – who has reportedly fought with Russian forces in Ukraine since Russia’s initial invasion in 2014, conducts Russian mercenary recruitment in Serbia, and became a member Putin’s election team – published a video appeal on January 8 wherein he accused military commanders of the Russian 119th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) of mistreating Serbian mercenaries in the “Wolves” (Volki) detachment.[1] Elements of the 119th Guards VDV Regiment are currently operating on Bakhmut’s southern flank near Klishchiivka.[2] Beric claimed that commanders of the 119th VDV Regiment forced Serbian mercenaries to conduct an assault without sufficient weapons, which prompted the entire detachment to refuse to continue attacks and demand a transfer to the nearby Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units.[3] Beric stated that Russian military officials and police declared that the Serbian mercenaries were deserters and war criminals, disarmed them, pushed them out of their trenches, and forced them to admit that they were spies.

A Russian political insider source – who routinely discusses specific details of Russian political and military command changes – claimed that Beric’s appeal is a direct indication that a “clan war” has broken out among some Russian strongmen (siloviki) within Putin’s inner circles.[4] The source claimed that Beric’s appeal is likely a part of widely discussed informational attacks against a group of Russian milbloggers who are independent and openly critical of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and that these informational attacks are part of an organized campaign against VDV commanders and their patrons. The source claimed that Beric’s appeal was part of a retaliatory attack executed on behalf of Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev’s and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s respective factions within the Kremlin against the faction of Igor Sechin – Putin’s “de facto deputy” and CEO of Russian state oil company Rosneft. The source specified that Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin is an active member of Sechin’s faction and the patron of the 106th VDV Division and assessed that the Beric’s public attack against 119th VDV Regiment’s command was likely an attempt to undermine Dyumin, 106th VDV Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, and Russian VDV and “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky. Dyumin, Teplinsky, and Seliverstov have previously been involved in feuds with the Russian MoD and affiliated themselves with the Wagner Group and opposition to Shoigu.[5] The source implied that Sechin’s faction launched public attacks on Patrushev’s faction by amplifying problems with Russian egg supplies, which had been inadequately handled by Russian Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev – who is also Patrushev’s son.[6] Shoigu’s faction had also faced similar public attacks on its inability to deal with the collapse of the communal infrastructure in Moscow Oblast and problems with the Defenders of Fatherland Foundation. Putin notably recently obliquely criticized Dmitry Patrushev and Shoigu for their respective failures.[7] The source implied that factions are attempting to discredit each other in Putin’s eyes to ensure that they can secure new positions within the Kremlin following the presidential election. Another insider source claimed that First Deputy of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev approved Beric’s appeal to bring Putin’s attention to the lack of supplies within the military amidst rumors about Alekseyev’s dismissal.[8]

In-fighting and factional dynamics within the Kremlin are not new phenomena and do not indicate the imminent collapse of Putin’s regime, particularly because power verticals are the foundation of Putin's regime. ISW has routinely assessed that Putin deliberately creates an environment in which officials within his inner circle must compete for his favor, largely to ensure that his lieutenants remain loyal to him and his regime.[9] ISW also observed that Putin has an affinity for rotating officials and military commanders instead of outright dismissing them to prevent any single individual from amassing too much political influence and to maintain support among competing factions.[10] Putin is unlikely to change this system and eliminate these power verticals as they serve as a foundation of his rule. ISW has also observed numerous instances of Russian officials and commanders using the Russian information space to attract Putin’s attention, discredit an opposing faction, and influence changes within Putin’s inner circle.[11] Such factional feuds have notable but not dispositive battlefield effects. They can damage cohesion between Russian forces and demoralize Russian personnel but are unlikely to lead to mass conflict within the Russian ranks or wider society. A Russian “Storm-Z” assault unit instructor observed in response to Beric’s appeal that numerous Russian detachments and units are facing problems similar to those experienced by the Serbian mercenaries and implied that the Russian military has systematic issues that are prevalent outside of factional dynamics.[12] Permanent friction among the different factions that play roles in Putin’s war in Ukraine can impede Russia’s decision-making, however, and limit the Kremlin’s ability to bring coherence and efficiency to the Russian military.

Russian forces launched a medium-sized drone, missile, and air attack against Ukraine on the night of January 12-13 using a strike package similar to the recent Russian strike packages. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 40 long-range munitions at Ukraine from various directions—seven S-300/S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Belgorod Oblast; three Shahed-131/131 drones from Kursk Oblast; six Kh-47 “Kinzhal” aero-ballistic (ostensibly hypersonic) missiles from six MiG-31K aircraft over Tambov Oblast; up to 12 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles from 11 Tu-95MS strategic bombers over the Caspian Sea; six Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 bombers over Bryansk Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from two Su-35 bombers over occupied Kherson Oblast; and four Kh-59 cruise missiles from two Su-34 bombers over Bryansk Oblast.[13] Ukraine’s Air Force Command reported that Ukrainian air defense destroyed seven Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles and one Kh-59 cruise missile.[14] Ukrainian military officials notably stated that Ukrainian forces also disabled over 20 of the missiles using “active countermeasures by means of electronic warfare,” which may be an inflection in Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities that are normally credited with disabling Russian drones but not missile systems.[15] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine, and Ukrainian adaptations to counter new Russian strike packages, is part of a wider tactical and technological offense-defense race between long-range strike and air defense capabilities.[16] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that the Russian strike package used on January 13 was similar to the strike package that Russian forces used on January 8 and in previous recent strikes—suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be able to discern patterns in recurring Russian strike packages and innovate and adapt accordingly.[17]

Russian forces are reportedly increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine in continued apparent violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have used chemical weapons 626 times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and have used them at least 51 times so far in 2024.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces currently launch chemical weapons at Ukrainian positions up to 10 times a day and that Russian forces typically use drones to drop K-51 grenades filled with irritant CS gas (2-Chlorobenzalmalononitrile), a type of tear gas used for riot control (also known as a Riot Control Agent [RCA]), onto Ukrainian positions.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces used a new type of special gas grenade containing CS gas against Ukrainian positions on December 14, 2023.[20] The Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade previously acknowledged on December 22 that the brigade deliberately uses chemical weapons by dropping K-51 grenades from drones onto Ukrainian positions near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[21] Russia is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the use of RCAs as a method of warfare.[22]

A fire destroyed a large warehouse in St. Petersburg belonging to Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries on January 12.[23] Russian sources claimed that on the night of January 10 to 11 a mass fight broke out between migrant workers at the facility and that this prompted Russian authorities to conduct a raid on the warehouse, during which several migrants received military summonses.[24] Russian law enforcement recently detained 700 migrants at a Wildberries warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses in November 2023.[25] Russian authorities have consistently conducted raids on migrant communities to issue military summonses to naturalized migrants and coerce other migrants into military service.[26] Wildberries appears to be a notable target for these mobilization raids, and the company has previously admitted that such raids have interrupted their operations.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• A recent video appeal by a Serbian mercenary addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed discussions about an ongoing “clan war” within the Kremlin and the Russian information space against the backdrop of the Russian presidential campaign.
• In-fighting and factional dynamics within the Kremlin are not new phenomena and do not indicate the imminent collapse of Putin’s regime, particularly because power verticals are the foundation of Putin's regime.
• Russian forces launched a medium-sized drone, missile, and air attack against Ukraine on the night of January 12-13 using a strike package similar to recent Russian strike packages.
• Russian forces are reportedly increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine in continued apparent violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.
• A fire destroyed a large warehouse in St. Petersburg belonging to Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries on January 12.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire front line.
• Russian forces may be forming air assault brigades within combined arms ground formations as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.
• Russian officials continue to fund social projects in occupied Ukraine in an effort to integrate these territories further into Russia and create the veneer of an active civil society in occupied areas.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2024

Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 12 and signed the UK-Ukraine Agreement on Security Cooperation.[1] The agreement covers joint efforts supporting Ukraine’s future accession to NATO, including comprehensive assistance to Ukraine to protect and restore its territorial integrity, preventing new Russian aggression against Ukraine, and supporting Ukraine’s integration into certain Western institutions.[2] The agreement also states that the UK government will work with its domestic defense industrial base (DIB) to help develop Ukraine’s own DIB. The UK is the first country to sign a final agreement with Ukraine on the basis of the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, and at least 24 non-G7 countries have joined the declaration.[3]

Sunak also announced a military assistance package valued at 2.5 billion GBP (roughly $3.19 billion), which includes long-range missiles, air defense components, artillery ammunition, and maritime security provisions, and at least 200 million GBP of this package is specifically allocated to producing and procuring drones, most of which the UK expects to produce.[4] Sunak also announced an additional 18 million GBP to support frontline humanitarian efforts and fortify Ukraine’s energy infrastructure against Russian strikes. Sunak reiterated the UK’s commitment to long-term support for Ukraine and stated that the new UK-Ukraine security pact will last ”100 years or more.”[5]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 11 that the US has suspended security assistance to Ukraine and will not resume sending aid to Ukraine until the US Congress approves funding.[6] Kirby stated that the US provided the last package of aid to Ukraine that the US had enough funding for, which was a $250 million security assistance package announced on December 27, 2023.[7]

Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to produce one million first-person viewer (FPV) drones in 2024.[8] Fedorov stated on January 12 that the number of Ukrainian enterprises producing drones increased to from seven to 200 between 2022 and the end of 2023.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 19, 2023, that Ukraine plans to produce one million drones and expand artillery production in 2024.[10] Production of a million drones per year requires a monthly average production of more than 83,000 FPV drones per month, and Ukraine already produced 50,000 FPV drones per month as of December 2023.[11]

Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated on January 11 that there is no credible evidence of the illegal diversion of US-provided advanced conventional weapons to Ukraine.[12] Ryder stated that the US has given Ukraine unprecedented access to information regarding US-provided equipment and that Ukraine fully understands and supports the US need to report on defense articles that are accountable to Department of Defense (DoD) standards.[13] The US DoD Office of the Inspector General published a report earlier on January 11 that stated that DoD limitations were largely responsible for a failure to properly document certain US-provided military assistance to Ukraine.[14] The DoD Office of the Inspector General report stated that it was not responsible for determining whether US defense articles allocated to Ukraine have been misappropriated and did not attempt to do so.[15]

The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced on January 11 sanctions against several Russian entities reportedly involved in the transfer of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia.[16] OFAC announced sanctions against one (1) employee of the Russian state-owned cargo transport service 224th Flight Unit State Airlines, a weapons testing facility called Ashuluk Firing Range in Astrakhan Oblast, and Russian defense manufacturer Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons and Research Complex in Astrakhan Oblast.[17] Western and Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian forces have launched at least one ballistic missile acquired from North Korea at Ukraine.[18]

Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova. The Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB) issued a press release on January 12 claiming that Moldovan special forces are training “special combat groups” of more than 60 people to destroy critical facilities, sabotage military installations, and capture or destroy senior Transnistrian officials and law enforcement officers.[19] ISW previously reported that the MGB is a Russian-dominated organization that is commonly understood to be a ”department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)” that likely takes orders directly from Moscow.[20] The MGB and Transnistrian officials have previously made similar, less escalatory claims likely also as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to set informational conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future Russian campaigns in the region by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova.[21]

Russian occupation officials appear to be deliberately censoring information about Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have illegally removed to occupied Crimea. A Reuters special report published on January 11 details how Russian occupation officials and Russian authorities facilitate the removal and deportation of Ukrainian children from orphanages and children's homes under the direct guidance of Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova.[22] Reuters found that Lvova-Belova personally visited a children's home in occupied Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, in early 2023 and encouraged Ukrainian children, many of whom were separated from their parents due to the war or other circumstances but are not officially orphans, to obtain Russian passports so that Russian families can adopt the children.[23] Reuters also identified Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov as directly involved in removing Ukrainian children from Kherson Oblast to children's homes in Crimea, consistent with ISW's assessment about the involvement of Russian occupation authorities in the removal and deportation process.[24] According to Reuters, an unspecified Crimean occupation official stated that all information about Ukrainian orphans in Crimea is "strictly confidential" on Aksyonov’s direct order and that all requests about children are immediately reported to the occupation administration. The suggestion that Russian occupation authorities are deliberately trying to hide information about Ukrainian children from the public is notable—it indicates that Russian authorities are uninterested in repatriating these children, which undermines the Russian information operations that the removal and deportation of children is a temporary humanitarian endeavor and that Russia's ultimate interest is in returning these children to their homes and families.[25

Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin accused the Kremlin of hesitating to conduct operationally significant offensive operations in Ukraine or a new wave of mobilization in Russia as Ukraine “build[s] up [its] strength” for a future counteroffensive effort. Russian milblogger and serviceman Mikhail Polynkov published a letter reportedly written by Girkin on December 8, 2023 to his Telegram channel on January 11 wherein Girkin claimed that Russia currently has “no plans” for a broad offensive in Ukraine and that Russia’s war in Ukraine is developing according to a “very bad” scenario.[26] Girkin writes that the Kremlin’s unwillingness to conduct a new wave of mobilization in Russia is prompting the Russian military to fill “holes” in its units with convicts and contract servicemen (kontraktniki). Girkin claimed that most of the reported 452,000 servicemen who enrolled in the Russian military in 2023 are already serving in Ukraine or “will not get there at all,” meaning that without a new wave of mobilization in spring 2024, Russia will not have the manpower required to conduct operationally significant offensive operations later this year. Girkin claimed that the Russian military and the Kremlin are choosing to “wait” until Ukraine ”falls apart” or agrees to peace negotiations, while the Ukrainian military is receiving foreign aid and building up strength for future counteroffensive efforts. Girkin warned that Ukraine’s ability to learn lessons on the battlefield may make its next counteroffensive operation more successful while the Russian military is still led by “the same morons” who insist on conducting costly frontal infantry assaults to capture settlements.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 11 that the US has suspended security assistance to Ukraine and will not resume sending aid to Ukraine until the US Congress approves funding.
• Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to produce one million first-person viewer (FPV) drones in 2024.
• Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated on January 11 that there is no credible evidence of the illegal diversion of US-provided advanced conventional weapons to Ukraine.
• The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced on January 11 sanctions against several Russian entities reportedly involved in the transfer of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia.
• Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian occupation officials appear to be deliberately censoring information about Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have illegally removed to occupied Crimea.
• Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin accused the Kremlin of hesitating to conduct operationally significant offensive operations in Ukraine or a new wave of mobilization in Russia as Ukraine “build[s] up [its] strength” for a future counteroffensive effort.
• Russian forces made confirmed marginal advances northeast of Bakhmut, northwest of Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, west of Verbove, and in (east) left bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional fighting along the entire front.
• The Russian State Duma will consider a draft law allowing foreigners with a criminal record to serve in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko confirmed that Russian authorities have deported over 2,100 Ukrainians, including 500 children, to Russia for medical reasons in 2023.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2024

The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 11 that Russian forces have 462,000 personnel in Ukraine and that this represents the entire land component of the Russian military.[i] Skibitskyi stated that most Russian units in Ukraine are manned at between 92 and 95 percent of their intended end strength and that the size of the Russian grouping in Ukraine allows Russian forces to conduct rotations throughout the theater.[ii] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces withdraw units that are at 50 percent or less of their intended end strength to rear areas and return them to the front following recovery and replenishment.[iii] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on January 11 that the Russian military has successfully replenished Russian forces in Ukraine through an ongoing crypto-mobilization effort that generated over 500,000 new personnel in 2023.[iv]

ISW previously observed routine Russian struggles to conduct operational level rotations from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 through Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive.[v] The apparent Russian ability to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses likely provides Russian forces the ability to replenish units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the line due to degradation and later return these replenished units to the front.[vi] Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations.[vii] Russian forces have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson Oblast, however, and appear to be degrading units and formations operating near the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River without making apparent efforts to conduct operational level rotations (although they do appear to conduct tactical-level rotations).[viii] Russian forces have conducted several regroupings during localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman, and Kupyansk directions since early October 2023, which likely provided Russian forces time to conduct the rotations Skibitskyi described.[ix] ISW has not observed widespread Russian complaints about a lack of rotations throughout the theater since summer 2023, and the overall tempo of Russian operations is consistent with Skibitskyi’s reporting.[x]

Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation. Russian operational rotations in principle mitigate the degradation of attacking Russian forces that over time could cause Russian offensive efforts to culminate. Several other operational factors have previously contributed to the culmination of Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine, but constraints on available manpower and combat effective formations have often been a primary factor.[xi]   Russian forces are largely conducting infantry-heavy assaults in Ukraine with assault groups that do not necessarily require large amounts of equipment or high levels of training.[xii] The Russian force generation apparatus appears to be replenishing losses in Ukraine with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel whom the Russian command has deemed to be sufficient for routine attritional frontal assaults.[xiii] These assaults have yet to result in more than marginal Russian gains in Ukraine since early October 2023, and it is unlikely that Russian forces can continue them indefinitely in a way that will allow the Russians to convert tactical successes into operationally significant results. Successful Russian operational-level offensives in Ukraine will require the Russian command to commit relatively combat effective and well-equipped units and formations to offensive operations at scale, and it is unclear if replenishment through these Russian operational rotations will suffice to maintain these units’ combat capabilities. Overall Russian combat capabilities in Ukraine may still degrade over time, therefore, despite the rotations, hindering the Russian military’s ability to sustain several significant offensive operations at once.

The Russian military may also incur losses greater than Russia’s ability to generate new forces if the Russian command decides to intensify offensive efforts in Ukraine, thereby limiting the manpower available to replenish degraded units and formations. The intensification of Russian offensive efforts would commit more elements to the frontline and place pressure on the number of available forces that could assume control over a degraded unit’s area of responsibility while that unit underwent rest and restoration. It is unclear if the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign, which relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants, would be able to provide the increased number of personnel required to conduct rotations during an intensified Russian offensive effort.[xiv]

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce two million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells annually, which resulted in a deficit of 500,000 shells in 2023 and will likely result in a similar deficit in 2024.[xv] Skibitskyi stated that Russia plans to increase its ammunition production in 2024 but lacks the necessary components, qualified personnel, and production capabilities.[xvi] Skibitskyi noted that Russia has previously purchased shells from Belarus, Iran, and North Korea and assessed that Russia will likely seek to procure additional shells from abroad in 2024 and beyond.[xvii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on January 11 that Russia will use any "pause” or temporary ceasefire agreement to stockpile drones, artillery, and missiles and address its large materiel shortages ahead of future aggression against Ukraine.[xviii] Zelensky added that Russia is currently negotiating the acquisition of additional missiles and ammunition from other countries and noted that Russia has already received more than one million shells from North Korea.[xix] Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin also confirmed recent Western reports that Russian forces have already launched at least one North Korean missile against Ukraine.[xx]

Politico, citing a report by the Kyiv School of Economics and Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, reported on January 11 that despite Western sanctions, Russia imported $8.77 billion worth of goods and components necessary to produce missiles, drones, armored vehicles, and other military equipment between January and October 2023.[xxi] The report states that Russia’s capacity to manufacture missiles and drones appears to have increased in 2023 despite Western sanctions, and Politico stated that Russia increased its production of missiles to 115 per month by the end of 2023.[xxii]  The report noted that sanctions have strained Russia’s supply chains and have caused “unparalleled losses” in Russia’s overall production of military aviation and equipment, however.[xxiii]

Ukrainian and Western sources have previously reported on Russia‘s sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components and noted that Russia’s reliance on foreign components has constrained Russia’s domestic production of aircraft, missiles, and drones.[xxiv] An unnamed Russian drone manufacturer also drew Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attention to the fact that a “large percentage” of electronics, particularly drones, produced in Russia require foreign components during a campaign event in Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District on January 11, prompting Putin to acknowledge the importance of this issue and the need to address Russia’s reliance on foreign components.[xxv] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s current missile and drone reserves and production rates likely do not allow Russian forces to conduct regular large-scale missile strikes, but likely do allow for more consistent drone strikes due to Russia’s ability to produce drones at a much higher rate (roughly 1,400 Shahed-136/131 drones between February and October 2023).[xxvi] The Russian government is likely attempting to develop domestic substitutions for foreign components to sustain and even increase its domestic drone and missile production despite Western sanctions.

Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using fewer loitering munitions in the Kupyansk direction due to cold weather.[xxvii] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on January 11 that Russian forces did not launch as many drones against Ukraine in the past two nights because ice can freeze drones.[xxviii] A Ukrainian officer in a brigade operating near Bakhmut stated on January 10 that the temperature drops to –18 Celsius (about –1 Fahrenheit) at night, making it “impossible” for personnel to stay at observation posts for more than a few hours.[xxix] The officer reported that the intensity of Russian infantry assaults decreased in the Bakhmut direction likely due to the freezing temperatures.[xxx] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the freezing temperatures coupled with the potential for deep snow may limit maneuverability but that the frozen ground will improve “cross-country movement” throughout January and into February.[xxxi] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely try to sustain or intensify localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative regardless of winter weather and terrain conditions.

Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11. Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics stated that Latvia will provide a new aid package to Ukraine, which includes howitzers, 155mm ammunition, anti-tank weapons, rockets, grenades, all-terrain vehicles, helicopters, drones, and other equipment.[xxxii] Estonian President Alar Karis stated that Estonia will provide a military aid package worth 1.2 billion euros (about $1.32 billion) in 2024 to 2027, amounting to 0.25 percent of Estonia’s annual GDP.[xxxiii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Estonian Defense and Aerospace Industry Association signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at supporting the development and production of drones and electronic warfare systems.[xxxiv]

Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia. The Latvian parliament adopted a bill on January 11 to transfer the “Moscow House” business and cultural center in Riga, owned by the Russian government, to Latvian state ownership in order to “guarantee Latvia’s security.”[xxxv] The Latvian parliament reported that the Russian government has been using the “Moscow House” to support Russian influence operations in Latvia.[xxxvi] The Russian Embassy in Latvia responded to the transfer by claiming that this “hostility” will result in ”serious consequences.”[xxxvii] The Russian Embassy in Latvia also accused the Latvian government of systematically oppressing “Russian speakers“ in Latvia due to a recent Latvian law requiring Russian citizens with Latvian residence permits to pass a Latvian language exam.[xxxviii] The Russian accusation likely deliberately equates all Russian speakers in Latvia with Russian citizens residing in Latvia in an attempt to exacerbate tensions between local Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and Latvian speakers. Russian officials have been increasingly asserting Russia’s right to protect “compatriots abroad,” intentionally loosely defined as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and not limited to Russian citizens. Russia may be setting conditions aimed at destabilizing Latvia by exacerbating linguistic tensions and framing itself as a protector of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.

European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.[xxxix] Bernsel stated that there are no updates on whether EU member states will deliver the promised one million artillery shells to Ukraine by spring 2024. EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 10 that the EU will be able to supply Ukraine with the one million artillery shells by spring 2024.[xl]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.[xli] The report stated that the DoD’s Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine (ODC-Ukraine) failed to adequately inventory defense articles within the 90 days required by law due to manpower shortages, the absence of protocols for maintaining a monitoring database in a hostile environment until December 2022, and a lack of internal controls for validating data in the database. DoD Inspector General Robert Storch noted that this report does not mean that these inventories are “not there” or “not being used,“ and the report noted that Ukrainian forces do provide “raw” numbers to the ODC-Ukraine and that Ukraine is working to implement a system better utilizing the serial numbers.[xlii] The report also stated that Ukraine has conducted inventories that have not been uploaded to the designated database.[xliii] The report noted that while the DoD’s delinquency rate – the rate of US-provided defense articles for Ukraine not properly documented within 90 days of arrival – is still not in compliance with federal regulations, revised protocols for both the DoD and Ukrainian personnel contributed to an improved delinquency rate from February 10, 2023 to June 2, 2023. The report noted that the “diversion” of US military assistance from the Ukrainian military is outside the scope of its report, and that the report offers no evidence that any of the US defense articles allocated to Ukraine have been misused.

The DoD Office of the Inspector General’s report places the onus for ensuring compliance with the DoD’s reporting standards on the ODC-Ukraine, and Ukraine’s struggle to implement these standards appears to be related to manpower and logistics issues rather than malign intent.[xliv] The Office of the Inspector General’s report noted that Ukrainian personnel only have 10 barcode scanners to record serial numbers - none of which are on the front line - and that Ukrainian personnel sometimes struggle to report losses within the required 90 days due to the serial numbers becoming lost or unreadable from use and battle damage. The report also stated that Ukraine occasionally did not provide written reports of losses in a timely manner due to a difference between Ukraine’s and the DoD’s loss classification standards. The report noted that ODC-Ukraine lacks enough personnel at logistics hubs to ensure compliance with DoD reporting standards due to significant personnel limitations.

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.[xlv] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is prepared to introduce a new version of the draft law that accounts for various unspecified proposals and emphasized the importance of rotations and leave for Ukrainian servicemen.[xlvi] ISW previously reported on several provisions made in the now returned draft law, and it is currently unclear what provisions will be made in the new version.[xlvii]

A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.[xlviii] Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa stated to Ukrainska Pravda in an interview published on January 11 that the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, is a poorer base than Sevastopol due to its vulnerability to poor weather conditions and a lack of nearby airfields, large repair facilities, or weapons storage facilities. Neizhpapa noted that Ukrainian strikes have forced Russian forces to reduce their use of Sevastopol as a main naval base, as ISW has recently observed.[xlix] Neizhpapa stated that Ukrainian strikes are compelling Russian forces to disperse their naval assets to ports in Novorossisyk and in Russian-backed separatist Abkhazia and that Russian forces are also reducing their use of the port of Feodosia, Crimea.[l]

Key Takeaways:

• The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
• Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
• Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad.
• Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.
• Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11.
• Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia.
• European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.
• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.
• A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements along the entire front.
• Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 10 that Russian forces will deploy additional aircraft and vessels and increase the production of hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in 2024.
• The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated on January 10 that it sponsored a trip for 35 Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Mogilev for the New Year holiday during which soldiers taught children “the basics of life safety” and how to behave in “extreme situations.”

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2024

• The Kremlin’s effort to use the mythos of the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) to prepare the Russian public for a long war in Ukraine is at odds with Russia’s current level of mobilization and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetorical attempts to reassure Russians that the war will not have lasting domestic impacts.
• The Kremlin may be instructing actors in the Russian-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria to set information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• The Kremlin may also be reviving its efforts to leverage Transnistria to create instability in Moldova in order to undermine Ukrainian grain exports along the western coast of the Black Sea.
• Iran has reportedly developed a new Shahed drone for Russian forces to use against Ukraine and is “close” to providing Russia with surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and systems.
• European Union (EU) Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated that the EU will be able to supply Ukraine with one million shells by spring 2024.
• Lithuania announced a new long-term military aid package to Ukraine worth 200 million euros (about $220 million) on January 10.
• The very characteristics that make the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community popular – its perceived independence from and willingness to criticize the Russian government – likely continue to complicate the Kremlin’s efforts to co-opt the community as Kremlin mouthpieces.
• Russian insider sources continue to discuss the reported removal of First Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU), Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, who was reportedly in charge of the Russian “Volunteer Corps” that was intended to replace the Wagner Group in Ukraine.
• Russian forces advanced southwest of Bakhmut and Donetsk City and in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire front.
• Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov stated on January 10 that the Russian military plans to reorganize the five existing naval infantry brigades of Russia’s fleets into naval infantry divisions and the Caspian Flotilla’s naval infantry regiment into a naval infantry brigade in the medium-term.
• Russian authorities continue to deport prisoners from prisons in occupied Ukraine to Russia and are likely using penal colonies as part of widespread efforts to collect data on Ukrainian citizens.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2024

A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) published a survey on December 18, 2023, that it conducted between November 29 and December 9, 2023, that shows that 96 percent of respondents support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 88 percent trust Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and 66 percent trust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[1] 84 percent of respondents in a previous KMIS poll conducted in December 2022 expressed trust in Zelensky, and trust in many Ukrainian institutions experienced a similar decline between December 2022 and 2023 – an unsurprising development given the protracted war.[2] The Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the Ukrainian National Police, and Ukrainian volunteers did not see similar decreases in polled public trust during this time.[3]

Ukrainian sentiments in December 2022 were likely more optimistic than in November and December 2023 because Ukrainian forces had recently liberated large portions of occupied territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts during successful counteroffensive operations in the fall of 2022. Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive operations in 2022 liberated the strategic regional capital city of Kherson, pushed the frontline away from several major Ukrainian population centers and turned these cities into near rear and rear areas, which may have allowed more Ukrainians to focus on domestic issues of local governance throughout 2023 instead of the imminent existential threat of Russian military activity and occupation they faced in 2022.

The KMIS poll also shows that the majority of respondents support both Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi and that only 15 percent held polarized opinions supporting one and not the other.[4] Russian sources have widely promoted Kremlin information operations alleging a serious rift between Ukrainian military and civilian leadership and have routinely attempted to portray domestic issues in Ukraine as significantly undermining the Ukrainian will to fight.[5] These Russian information operations aim to break Ukrainians‘ trust in their leadership and weaken Ukrainian morale while also decreasing Western support for Ukraine by falsely portraying Ukrainian society as demoralized and divided. The KMIS poll suggests that these Russian information operations are far from reality and that the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine remains highly unlikely to break Ukrainian support for Ukraine‘s military and civilian leadership and the Ukrainian will to fight.

A new independent poll from the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains strong domestic support for his regime and his war in Ukraine, despite relatively poor economic conditions and living standards in Russia.[6] The NORC poll surveyed 1,046 Russian adults living in the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied Crimea using data from Russian mobile service providers.[7] The poll found that 67 percent of participants approve of how Putin has conducted foreign policy and 58 percent approve of his domestic policy, but that 66 percent plan to vote for Putin in the upcoming March 2024 Presidential Election.[8] Putin's relatively high ratings appear to persevere even though the NORC poll found that Russians are unhappy with rising prices causing a general decline in living conditions.[9] The NORC poll also noted that 63 percent of participants support the war in Ukraine and that 64 percent of respondents see the war as a "civilizational struggle between Russia and the West."[10]  This result contrasts with other recent independent Russian polling that showed decreased support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[11]

Russian ultranationalist vitriolic responses to gender integration in the Ukrainian military highlight Russia's ongoing shift towards a cultural-ideological worldview that seeks to restore rigid and traditional gender roles and exposes gaps between Russia and Ukraine's respective abilities to mobilize their societies. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January 8 that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) purchased 50,000 sets of uniforms specifically for female servicemembers for the first time.[12] Several ultranationalist Russian milbloggers inaccurately took Umerov's statement to mean that Ukraine would be conscripting women, with one saying that the purchase of uniforms for women means "the time has come for everyone to think," and another milblogger claiming that Ukraine is now preparing to "exterminate" 50,000 Ukrainian women.[13] Ukraine has not been conscripting women, and neither current law nor proposed bills provide for conscripting Ukrainian women.[14] Women have been volunteering to serve in the Ukrainian military, and Umerov's statement instead reflects recent Ukrainian efforts to further increase gender integration in the Ukrainian Armed Forces by developing uniforms and body armor suited to the unique needs of female servicemembers.[15]

The negative Russian responses illuminate not only the ongoing Russian information operation designed to undermine Ukrainians’ will to fight, but also the archaic and misogynistic views shaping the worldviews of Russia’s leadership and the ultranationalist community.  They also reflect the Russians’ ongoing failure to understand exactly how broadly and deeply Ukrainian society has mobilized to defend against the Russian invasion. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported in October 2023 that nearly 43,000 female servicemembers are serving in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a 21 percent increase in female servicemembers from 2021.[16] The Ukrainian Military Media Center and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Nataliia Kalmykova stated that over 5,000 female servicemembers were actively serving in frontline combat zones as of November 2023.[17]

By contrast, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in March 2023 that 1,100 Russian women were serving in frontline combat positions of the 39,000 Russian women serving in the Russian Armed Forces, mostly in non-combat roles such as combat medics and cooks.[18]  Russian opposition media began reporting in 2023 that Russian authorities were increasingly relying on mass forced recruitment of women from penal colonies to fill force generation requirements, suggesting that recruitment of women in Russia takes place on a much more coercive basis than the voluntarism of Ukraine’s female servicemembers.[19] Kremlin officials and Kremlin mouthpieces have recently emphasized the importance of instilling and concretizing traditional gender roles and family values as a fundamental part of Russian domestic policy, with Russian officials calling for the institution of large families with a working father and a stay-at-home mother.[20] Russian President Vladimir Putin defined 2024 as the "Year of the Family" during his New Year's Eve address and has recently placed great weight on the role of Russian women as performing their expected role of "motherhood."[21] The increasing Russian social reliance on traditional gender roles, as defined and encouraged by the state, is likely heavily impacting Russian social expectations for women to fight in the military, thereby impacting Russia's ability to mobilize a significant portion of society, whereas Ukrainian society continues to be galvanized by a popular desire to defend Ukraine strong enough to bring so many Ukrainian women near and onto the battlefield of their own accord.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukraine has a shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles after several recent large Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.[22] Ihnat stated that Ukraine has rationed air defense equipment and ammunition and has used a considerable amount of Ukraine’s existing air defense missile stockpile in defending against the past three large series of Russian strikes.[23] US Administration officials reported on January 8 that they met with leaders from venture capital firms and technology and defense industries to discuss providing Ukraine with US systems and equipment.[24] The meetings reportedly focused on providing Ukraine with drones, demining equipment, and means to counter Russian drones.[25]  

Russian sources continue to complain about persistent command and communication problems that degrade Russian combat capability in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian commanders have less frequently ordered units to conduct attritional assaults in the past two months since Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Colonel General Oleg Makarevich as the commander of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces.[26] The milblogger claimed that many problems have persisted and worsened in this area, however. Russian forces operating near Krynky are reportedly unable to target Ukrainian aircraft and helicopters because the Russian command does not give them timely permission to shoot targets down.[27] Russian commanders also reportedly take several hours to approve artillery strikes and require units to send target coordinates and video or photo confirmation of targets before approving strikes.[28] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces do not have enough electronic warfare (EW) systems to combat the number of Ukrainian drones operating in the area.[29] Another milblogger called on Russian forces to stop moving equipment to Krynky and nearby areas because Ukrainian forces destroy up to 90 percent of Russian equipment there.[30] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), reportedly deployed southeast of Krynky, are literally “burning with desire“ to conduct heavily attritional attacks, suggesting that the command of this regiment is still relying on attritional frontal assaults as a favored attack tactic.[31] Russian forces, especially elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division, have reportedly suffered significant losses in operations near Krynky.[32] ISW has consistently observed Russian complaints of inadequate command, inter- and intra-unit coordination, air defense, fire support, and EW since November 2023 but continues to assess that these reported tactical problems do not always translate into significant operational effects.[33]

Russian sources are reviving longstanding calls for a large-scale Russian offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to create a “buffer zone” with Belgorod Oblast despite the Russian military’s likely inability to conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on January 9 that Russian forces will do everything to prevent Ukrainian indirect fire in Belgorod Oblast.[34] Russian sources seized on Peskov’s comments to call on Russian forces to create a “buffer zone” up to 15 kilometers in depth in Kharkiv Oblast to push Ukrainian MLRS and artillery away from the international border with Belgorod Oblast.[35] Russian ultranationalists routinely called for a similar operation in summer 2023 amid widespread discontent about limited cross-border raids by pro-Ukrainian forces into Belgorod Oblast.[36] A Russian incursion 15 kilometers in depth and several hundred kilometers in width would be a massive operational undertaking that would require a grouping of forces far larger and significantly better resourced than what Russian forces currently have concentrated along the entire international border with Ukraine, least of all in Belgorod Oblast.[37] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, in the coming weeks and that the Russian grouping in the Kupyansk direction appears more well-suited to conduct an intensified offensive effort than elsewhere in Ukraine or along the international border.[38] The Russian military is likely currently able to conduct only tactical-level actions into Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast, which at most would serve as feints to draw and fix Ukrainian forces away from a possible Russian operational effort in the Kupyansk direction.

Recent Kremlin and Russian media rhetoric aimed at threatening Moldova likely continues to embolden pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moldova to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova. Vadim Krasnoselsky, the president of the Russian-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria, claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on January 9 that Moldova’s increased military budget, joint exercises with NATO, and military subsidies and supplies from European states are evidence of Moldova’s “militarization,” which threatens Transnistria.[39] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistria does not threaten Moldova and dismissed the idea that Moldova’s force generation efforts stem from a desire to defend itself, despite the fact that Russian troops have occupied Transnistria since 1992 after the Russian Federation intervened on behalf of separatist Transnistria on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations.[40] Krasnoselsky also affirmed in 2018 his commitment to ensuring that Transnistria eventually becomes part of Russia.[41] Krasnoselsky claimed that Moldova “treacherously attacked [Transnistria’s] peaceful cities in the past” and has committed ”massive” human rights violations. Krasnoselsky blamed Moldova for stopping dialogue with Transnistria and abandoning previously reached agreements. Krasnoselsky claimed that Moldova is “consistently following the path of escalation” and threateningly stated that Moldova “bears the responsibility for further inevitable consequences.” ISW previously assessed that Russia is setting information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future campaigns by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova--an approach that closely parallels debunked Russian narratives used to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[42]

Krasnoselsky's anger with a recent change to the Moldovan Customs Code likely motivated him to further the Kremlin’s efforts to set such information conditions and sow instability in Moldova. CTP has previously assessed that Krasnoselsky is closely related to Moldovan-Russian businessman Viktor Gushan, who effectively controls Transnistria’s government and a large part of its economy.[43] The Kremlin likely conducted a false flag operation in April 2022 intended to draw Transnistria into its invasion of Ukraine, but ultimately failed to win Gushan‘s support as Gushan‘s businesses benefited from ties to the West and Ukraine.[44]  Moldova passed a new Customs Code in March 2023 that went into effect on January 1, 2024, and requires companies in Transnistria to pay import customs duties to Moldova.[45] Krasnoselsky claimed on January 5 that the change came as a “surprise” to Transnistria.[46] Moldovan investigative journalists reported in 2020 that two Transnistrian companies tied to Gushan’s Sheriff Enterprises imported cigarettes worth about $22 million to Transnistria without paying taxes.[47] Krasnoselsky claimed on January 9 to TASS that Moldova’s introduction of duties starting January 1, 2024, is an “unreasonable” policy that violates the trade agreement between Transnistria and the EU and that Moldova is pushing Moldovan-Transnistrian relations towards “greater confrontation.”[48] Krasnoselsky highlighted that Transnistria is striving to build direct communication with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and emphasized Transnistria’s “extensive” bilateral cooperation frameworks with Russia as means to ”help avoid risks provoked by” Moldova’s policy.[49]

Bloomberg reported that officials from Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified countries held a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 16 to build a support for Ukrainian conditions to negotiate with Russia.[50] Unspecified individuals familiar with the meeting told Bloomberg in an article published on January 9 that officials from China, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not attend the meeting, although Brazil submitted a written statement.

Key Takeaways:

• A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war.
• A new independent poll from the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains strong domestic support for his regime and his war in Ukraine, despite relatively poor economic conditions and living standards in Russia.
• Russian ultranationalist vitriolic responses to gender integration in the Ukrainian military highlight Russia's ongoing shift towards a cultural-ideological worldview that seeks to restore rigid and traditional gender roles and exposes gaps between Russia and Ukraine's respective abilities to mobilize their own societies.
• Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukraine has a shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles after several recent large Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.
• Russian sources continue to complain about persistent command and communication problems that degrade Russian combat capability in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian sources are reviving longstanding calls for a large-scale Russian offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to create a “buffer zone” with Belgorod Oblast despite the Russian military’s likely inability to conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term.
• Recent Kremlin and Russian media rhetoric aimed at threatening Moldova likely continues to embolden pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moldova to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.
• Bloomberg reported that officials from Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified countries held a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 16 to build a support for Ukrainian conditions to negotiate with Russia.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances southwest of Donetsk City, and positional engagements continued along the entire frontline.
• The Russian military is reportedly abusing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue the systematic oppression of residents of occupied Crimea using law enforcement and administrative means.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2024

Ukrainian officials highlighted the need for more air defense systems after another large series of Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 7 to 8. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched a total of 59 missiles and drones against Ukraine including: eight Shahed-136/-131 drones; seven S-300/400 missiles; four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles; 24 Kh-101/555/55 and eight Kh-22 cruise missiles; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles; and two Kh-31P air guided missiles.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted critical and civilian infrastructure, and military facilities in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that Ukrainian forces downed all eight Shaheds and 18 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that the percentage of Russian air targets that Ukrainian forces shot down on the night of January 7 to 8 did not change in comparison to previous, more intense Russian strikes, but that Ukraine needs to intercept more Russian missiles and drones given the large number of such systems that Russia regularly launches.[3] Ihnat stated that only “specific means,” such as Patriot air defense systems, can down ballistic missiles and that Ukrainian forces have yet to down a Kh-22 cruise missile.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in a virtual address to Sweden’s annual national Society and Defense Conference on January 8 that Ukraine needs to strengthen its air defense capabilities at the front to better protect Ukrainian positions against Russian strikes and in the rear to protect civilians.[5] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have intercepted over 70 percent of the over 500 Russian missiles and drones launched over the past “several days” thanks to air defenses systems from Western partners but that this current interception rate is insufficient.[6] Zelensky stated that Russian forces will lose their power on the battlefield if Russian forces lose air superiority.[7]

Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces attempt to adapt to current Ukrainian air defense capabilities and as Ukraine develops its defense industrial base (DIB). ISW assessed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are currently engaged in a tactical and technological offensive-defense race wherein both sides are constantly experimenting and adapting their long-range strikes and air defenses.[8] The continued and increased Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine is crucial as Russian forces continue to experiment with new ways to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. The inclusion of Western-provided air defense systems into Ukraine’s air defense umbrella has been essential to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian missiles, particularly ballistic missiles.[9] Western air defense systems and air defense missile provisions to Ukraine in the near- and medium-term are also essential to protecting Ukraine’s growing DIB as Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian industrial facilities.[10] US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller called the provision of US aid to Ukraine “critical” on January 4 because Ukraine is not yet able to defend itself but noted that US aid will not need to continue at previous levels because Ukraine is working to expand its DIB to “stand on its own feet.”[11]

Ukrainian forces are adapting to battlefield difficulties from equipment shortages but are struggling to completely compensate for artillery ammunition shortages and insufficient electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces are struggling with artillery ammunition shortages on the frontline but that Ukrainian forces are using first person view (FPV) drones to compensate for these shortages until Ukraine receives more ammunition.[12] Ukrainian soldiers near Robotyne, western Zaporizhia Oblast told the WSJ that they are able to strike small Russian vehicles and soldiers transporting supplies with FPV drones and hinder Russian logistics, but that the FPV drones carry smaller payloads so that Ukrainian forces cannot use them to strike Russian field fortifications as they can with artillery. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces, particularly in western Zaporizhia Oblast, are struggling to overcome difficulties due to Russian ground attacks, FPV drone strikes, and EW capabilities.[13] A Ukrainian deputy battalion commander told NYT that Ukrainian morale is “all right” but that the soldiers are “physically exhausted.” The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 7 that Russian forces have an advantage in EW and are prioritizing the production of strike drones and reiterated the importance of bolstering Ukraine’s EW capabilities to counter Russian drones and missiles.[14] FT noted that Ukraine has heavily invested in its EW capabilities since the start of the full-scale invasion but that Russian forces retain the upper hand due to Russia’s pre-war EW capabilities.

Russian authorities are reportedly illegally deporting Ukrainian civilians to Russia and holding them in penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers without charges, investigations, trials, access to lawyers, or designated release dates. The BBC’s Russian Service reported on January 8 that Russian authorities have detained thousands of Ukrainian civilians in penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers in Russia and occupied Ukraine for “opposing the ‘special military operation.’”[15] BBC’s Russian Service reported that Russian authorities are holding the Ukrainian civilians without formal records of their detention, without initiating criminal or administrative cases, and without ongoing investigations, so the detainees do not “formally” exist in the Russian penitentiary system and have no access to lawyers. The BBC’s Russian Service reported that some former Ukrainian civilian detainees stated that Russian authorities treated them “like subhumans” and tortured them. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly responded to a request about one of the detained civilians, stating that Russian authorities are holding the detainee in accordance with “the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” The BBC noted that the Geneva Convention prohibits the taking of civilian hostages who are non-combatants.[16] The BBC reported that there is currently no mechanism in international law for the release of civilians from captivity, and the Geneva Convention only allows for POWs to be exchanged for other POWs.[17] The BBC’s Russian Service stated that the work of third parties, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), that recently helped mediate a prisoner exchange that included the return of Ukrainian civilians, have proven vital for the return of the civilian detainees. The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories stated that there were 4,337 Ukrainians in Russian captivity as of November 2023, including 763 civilians, but the BBC noted that these numbers rely on data from the Red Cross, which does not always have access to places where Russian authorities hold Ukrainian civilians, including detention centers and penal colonies in occupied territories.[18] Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights Dmitry Lubinets stated that about 25,000 Ukrainian civilians are missing and that Russian forces may have kidnapped a significant number of the missing individuals.[19] The BBC quoted the Ukrainian “Find Ours” project as estimating that there may be about 7,500 Ukrainian civilians unlawfully detained in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[20] The BBC’s Russian Service stated that Russian and Ukrainian human rights activists have identified more than 30 penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers in which Ukrainian civilians have been reportedly detained.[21]

A Russian insider source claimed that Russian officials dismissed First Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU), Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, who was reportedly in charge of the Russian “Volunteer Corps” that was intended to replace the Wagner Group. A Russian insider source, which has previously provided accurate information about Russian command changes, claimed in response to a source reportedly affiliated with Russian authorities (siloviki), that Russian officials forced Alekseyev to resign in fall 2023.[22] The siloviki-affiliated source originally claimed that Alekseyev’s irregular armed formation, the “Volunteer Corps,” was facing similar equipment and shell shortages that Wagner experienced in early 2023.[23] The siloviki-affiliated source claimed that almost all units of the “Volunteer Corps” have been experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and lubricants for the past two months, especially on the Bakhmut and Avdiivka frontlines. The siloviki-affiliated source added that the “Volunteer Corps” is struggling with these shortages even though it was integrated into the GRU organizational structure under the 462nd Special Purpose Training Center. The siloviki-affiliated source claimed that Alekseyev is assuring his subordinates that such shortages are temporary and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is delaying weapon and supply provisions to the “Volunteer Corps” - in a similar fashion to his prior efforts to calm now-deceased Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in the spring of 2023. A Russian political blogger (who has an audience of 150,000 followers) argued that the Russian MoD likely is not intentionally failing to provide military equipment and supplies to the Russian “Volunteer Corps” since that irregular formation cannot pose the same political threat to the Kremlin as Wagner and Prigozhin’s mutiny did in June 2023.[24] The blogger argued that the reported shell shortages indicate potential systematic supply shortages across all Russian forces or more likely suggest that the Russian MoD is withholding ammunition from certain units whose functions it deems to be “less relevant.” The blogger observed that elements of the Russian “Volunteer Corps” are primarily engaged in infantry assaults and that Russia is conserving means, such as the use of aircraft, in certain directions.

ISW cannot confirm either Alekseyev’s dismissal in fall 2023 or the reports of shell shortages disproportionately affecting the Russian “Volunteer Corps.” ISW last observed reports of Alekseyev awarding servicemen of the Russian “Hispaniola” Soccer Fan Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade on November 30, 2023.[25] BBC’s Russian Service reported that Alekseyev was present during the negotiations with Prigozhin after his mutiny, and Radio Liberty reported that Wagner channels referred to Alekseyev as “one of the founders” of Wagner.[26] Alekseyev also accompanied Prigozhin around the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don during the mutiny and later recorded a video of himself asking Prigozhin to stop the mutiny.[27] BBC’s Russian Service reported that Alekseyev was one of the main managers of all “volunteer” irregular formations – including the Redut private military company (PMC).

Russian authorities continue efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March presidential elections. Kremlin newswire ТASS stated on January 8 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministry of Digital Development, and Russian federal information monitoring service Roskomnadzor prepared a bill on the rapid blocking of illegal content on the internet using a specialized information system.[28] The Prosecutor General’s Office stated that it sent 555 demands to Roskomnadzor to block “fakes” that “discredit” the Russian Armed Forces and Russian authorities in 2023 and that Russian authorities deleted or blocked over 69,000 internet resources.[29] The Prosecutor General’s Office stated that the topics of these “fakes” included the war in Ukraine, decisions made by government authorities, and violations of the electoral process during the September 2023 elections.

Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on January 8 that recent polling shows decreased domestic support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections. Verstka, citing polling data from independent Russian opposition polling organizations Chronicles and the Public Sociology Laboratory and unspecified Kremlin sources, reported that the percentage of Russians who support Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine “without achieving the [war] goals” exceeded the percentage of Russians who support continuing the war for the first time at the end of 2023.[30] An unnamed source with reported connections to the Russian Presidential Administration told Verstka that fewer than 50 percent of respondents in a recent Kremlin-sponsored poll supported the continuation of Russia‘s war in Ukraine while more than 30 percent are in favor of peace negotiations.[31] Verstka stated that decreased support for the war has not yet led to a vocal anti-war political movement due to continued domestic political support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, however.[32] Chronicles stated on November 30, 2023, that data from its October 17–22, 2023 telephone survey indicates that respondents who are “consistent” supporters of the war – those who expressed support for the war, do not support the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine unless Russia achieves its war aims, and think that Russia should prioritize military spending – decreased from 22 percent to 12 percent between February 2023 and October 2023.[33] Chronicles stated that 40 percent of respondents supported a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims and that this number has remained consistent at about 39 to 40 percent throughout 2023.[34] Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center reported on October 31, 2023, that 55 percent of respondents believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations while 38 percent favor continuing to conduct the war, noting that these numbers have largely remained consistent since July 2023.[35] The Levada Center released a poll on December 5, 2023, that showed that the Russian public continues to have questions about the end and outcome of the war as well as mobilization and prospects for peace consistent with increased domestic support for a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and peace negotiations.[36]

Russian government and media officials recently have died, possibly under mysterious circumstances. Russian authorities found the editor-in-chief of the online editorial office of the Kuban branch of the Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), Zoya Konovalova, and her husband dead in Krasnodar Krai on January 6, and the cause of death is reportedly poisoning.[37] Many Russian milbloggers and war correspondents are associated with VGTRK.[38] Vladimir Egorov, the deputy chairman of the Tobolsk City Duma and member of the United Russia party, died on December 27, 2023, after falling from a third-story window in his home.[39] A Russian source claimed that the most likely cause of death was a heart problem.[40] Russian news outlet RBK stated that Egorov was sentenced to correctional labor in 2016 for not collecting rent from businessmen after leasing municipal land, but the charges were dropped due to the statute of limitations.[41]

A Russian state media outlet confirmed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained three officers of its Directorate “M” in connection with a high-profile bribery scheme. Kremlin newswire TASS cited Russian law enforcement agencies on January 8 as reporting the detention of FSB officer Alexander Ushakov and house arrests of officers Alexei Tsaryev and Sergei Manyshkin for accepting bribes totaling over five billion rubles ($55.6 million) and other unspecified crimes.[42] TASS’s report confirms part of a claim from a Russian insider source on November 28, 2023, that the FSB detained an ”Ushakov,” two unspecified Directorate “M” officers, and two unspecified Directorate “T” officers in connection with a five-billion ruble bribery case.[43] TASS reported that the FSB’s Directorate “M” is responsible for counterintelligence and combating corruption in various Russian government and law enforcement agencies, including the Russian Supreme Court, Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Ministry of Justice, and Investigative Committee.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials highlighted the need for more air defense systems after another large series of Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 7 to 8.
• Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces attempt to adapt to current Ukrainian air defense capabilities and as Ukraine develops its defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces are adapting to battlefield difficulties from equipment shortages but are struggling to completely compensate for artillery ammunition shortages and insufficient electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
• Russian authorities are reportedly illegally deporting Ukrainian civilians to Russia and holding them in penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers without charges, investigations, trials, access to lawyers, or designated release dates.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Russian officials dismissed First Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU), Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, who was reportedly in charge of the Russian “Volunteer Corps” that was intended to replace the Wagner Group.
• ISW cannot confirm either Alekseyev’s dismissal in fall 2023 or the reports of shell shortages disproportionately affecting the Russian “Volunteer Corps.”
• Russian authorities continue efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March presidential elections.
• Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on January 8 that recent polling shows decreased domestic support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections.
• Russian government and media officials recently have died, possibly under mysterious circumstances.
• A Russian state media outlet confirmed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained three officers of its Directorate “M” in connection with a high-profile bribery scheme.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City and Verbove, and positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 8 that there are more than 450,000 Russian military personnel in Ukraine as of December 2023.
• Russia continues to forcibly deport children from occupied Ukraine under the guise of vacations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to court Russian servicemen and their families ahead of the March 2024 presidential election during a meeting with family members of deceased Russian servicemen on January 6.
• Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia cannot reject Russian citizens who “understand they made a mistake” by fleeing Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and now want to return home.
• Two Russian government officials defended migrants’ continued presence in Russia amid ongoing migrant crackdowns, generating heavy milblogger criticism and indicating that the Russian government likely still lacks a unified policy toward migrants in Russia.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drones strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 6 to 7.
• Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat refuted media reports that the Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) is delaying its first delivery of six F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine for up to six months.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 7 that Russia has pushed back the deadline for the establishment of the new Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts (MMD and LMD) for at least the second time due to weapons and personnel shortages and bureaucratic issues.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 4 that will allow Russia to forcibly grant citizenship to deported Ukrainian children.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2024

Ukrainian forces are conducting a multi-day strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and have successfully struck several targets throughout the peninsula. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an administrative building at the Russian airfield in occupied Saky, Crimea with up to four Storm Shadow cruise missiles on the night of January 5 to 6.[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed five Ukrainian drones and four missiles over the Black Sea and Crimea on the night of January 5 to 6 and six Ukrainian Neptune missiles over the northwestern Black Sea on January 6.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk thanked Ukrainian pilots for successfully striking targets at the Saky airfield but did not specify if he was referring to Ukrainian strikes on January 4, 5, or 6.[3] Oleshchuk posted satellite imagery showing the target of the reported successful Ukrainian strike at the Saky airfield, although ISW is currently unable to identify what the target was.[4] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on January 6 that the GUR, Ukrainian Air Force, and Ukrainian forces conducted a complex special operation that struck Russian radar positions at the Saky airfield and an equipment depot near Hryshyne (60km northeast of Yevpatoria) on January 4.[5] GUR posted satellite imagery showing damage to the Russian ammunition depot near Hryshyne.[6] Ukrainian officials and sources have reported that Ukrainian forces have also struck an air defense radar system and a communications center in Yevpatoria responsible for coordinating Russian air defense operations in occupied Crimea, ammunition warehouses near Pervomaiske (82km north of Simferopol), and a Russian command post near Sevastopol in strikes since January 4.[7] Ukrainian and Russian reporting indicates that Ukrainian missiles and drones are penetrating Russian air defenses in occupied Crimea and have successfully struck some intended targets.

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting strikes aimed at degrading the Russian air defense umbrella over occupied Crimea.[8] ISW will not assess the intent of the current Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian rear areas in occupied Crimea at this time. Ukrainian forces conducted a strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure, headquarters, logistics routes, and Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets in summer 2023 that pushed Russian naval operations out of the western part of the Black Sea and that aimed to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[9]

A Russian milblogger argued that Russian forces need to improve planning and coordination at the tactical and operational levels so that Russian offensive operations can break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger stated that Russian forces should not concentrate the attacking formations – especially mechanized units – in the intended directions of attack due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes against large force accumulations. The milblogger stated that Russian forces must precede any breakthrough with preparatory artillery fire against both the objective that Russian forces are attacking and Ukrainian artillery firing positions in a wider area within range of the objective. The milblogger emphasized the importance of coordinating the actions of various units, including allocating individual artillery units to cover certain sectors of the front and allocating some ammunition for preparing the battlefield while reserving ammunition for after the assault has begun. The milblogger noted that the attacking Russian units need to maintain uninterrupted communications and be able quickly to exchange intelligence data – coordination that the Russian military units on multiple fronts have struggled with in recent months, as ISW has frequently reported.[11] The milblogger observed that the Russian military command must understand and incorporate the battlefield geography and the array of Ukrainian forces and defenses in the area into battle plans.[12] ISW has not observed any indication that Russian forces have improved their ability to plan and coordinate offensive operations given the ongoing costly and disorderly Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka. Russian forces in Ukraine have proven capable of successfully adapting limited aspects of their operations or defensive efforts in certain sectors of the front, however.[13]  It is unclear if the Russian command will be able to improve tactical and operational coordination across larger sectors of the front as the milblogger called for.

Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine in the near- and medium-term remain crucial for Ukraine’s development of a defense industrial base (DIB) that can sustain Ukraine’s war effort against Russia in the long term. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on January 6 that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) completed the approvals process for about 15 new types of weapons and military equipment, including robotic systems, drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, engineering equipment, a modernized armored fighting vehicle, and anti-tank guided missiles systems and ammunition, to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the first week of 2024.[14] This approvals process allows the Ukrainian MoD to make agreements with defense manufacturers and to issue the weapons to the Ukrainian military. Havrylyuk stated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces completed the approvals process for more than 200 types of domestically produced weapons and military equipment in 2023.

US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller stated on January 4 that the provision of US aid remains “critical” because Ukraine is not yet able to defend itself but will not need to continue at current levels because Ukraine is working to expand its defense industry to be able to “stand on its own feet.”[15] ISW previously assessed that recent large-scale Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian industrial facilities in an effort to degrade Ukraine’s ability to develop its DIB and sustain its war effort against Russia.[16] The configuration of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella, including Western-provided air defense systems, in targeted areas have proven vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian missiles, particularly ballistic missiles.[17] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on January 2 that Patriot systems enabled Ukrainian forces to down a record number of 10 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles during Russian strikes on January 1-2.[18] The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 6 that White House and Pentagon officials warned that the US will soon be unable to supply Ukraine with Patriot air defense missiles, however.[19]

The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 6 that it is delaying its first delivery of six F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine for up to six months.[20] Danish officials previously stated that Denmark would deliver F-16s to Ukraine around the start of 2024, and a recent Estonian MoD strategy document identified Denmark as committed to delivering F-16s to Ukraine before the end of 2023.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are conducting a multi-day strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and have successfully struck several targets throughout the peninsula.
• A Russian milblogger argued that Russian forces need to improve planning and coordination at the tactical and operational levels so that Russian offensive operations can break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.
• Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine in the near- and medium-term remain crucial for Ukraine’s development of a defense industrial base (DIB) that can sustain Ukraine’s war effort against Russia in the long-term.
• The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 6 that it is delaying its first delivery of six F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine for up to six months.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 6.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to incentivize service with the Russian military by advertising support for housing.
• Russian occupation authorities are struggling to provide basic services to residents of occupied areas of Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2024

Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, in the coming weeks and have a grouping of forces in the area that appears to be less degraded than Russian groupings responsible for offensive efforts elsewhere in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces appear to have conditions conducive to intensifying operations in the Kupyansk direction (Kharkiv-Luhansk oblast area) with the intent of making territorial gains in areas that are more operationally significant than other areas that Russian forces are currently attempting to seize. Ukrainian officials have stated that Russian forces aim to capture Kupyansk and Borova (35km west of Svatove) during winter 2024.[1] Russian seizure of those towns would likely force Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and set conditions for future Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. The tempo of Russian operations in the Kupyansk direction and the apparent configuration of Russian forces in occupied Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts overall does not indicate an impending Russian offensive effort along the entire Kupyansk-Lyman line (Kharkiv-Luhansk-northeastern Donetsk oblast area), similar to the failed Russian offensive effort in northeastern Ukraine in winter-spring 2023. Russian forces likely have not accumulated enough forces in Belgorod Oblast to support launching large-scale offensive operations elsewhere in northern or northeastern Kharkiv Oblast as of this writing.[2]

Ukrainian officials have not publicly reported any sudden buildup of Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction indicating that a large-scale offensive to advance to the Oskil River is imminent. Russian forces appear to have gradually reconstituted units badly degraded during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in September 2022 and Russia’s failed winter-spring 2023 offensive, and the Russian command likely intends these relatively well-rested and reconstituted units to intensify localized offensive operations that Russian forces started in the area in October 2023.[3] Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction appear not yet to have committed a substantial force to current offensive operations in the area and thus have been able to sustain localized ground attacks without suffering losses similar to those that Russian forces have suffered in operations around Avdiivka and in southern Ukraine.[4] Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction, comprised largely of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) and 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (both of the Western Military District [WMD]), have not heavily participated in large offensive operations since the culmination of the Russian winter-spring 2023 offensive in April 2023.[5] 1st GTA and 6th CAA elements have likely reconstituted to a considerable degree through the incorporation of manpower generated by Russia’s September 2022 partial mobilization and continued crypto-mobilization efforts.[6] Russian forces may be deploying new forces to the Kupyansk direction at a rate roughly equal to Russian losses in the area as they have done throughout Ukraine, although these elements are likely poorly trained Storm-Z and Storm-V assault detachments and not more combat-effective regular elements of the 6th CAA and 1st GTA.[7] These elements likely do not need to reconstitute their kit to full doctrinal end strength to support new offensive operations because current Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction rely heavily on dismounted infantry assaults and only sporadically use small mechanized assaults.[8] Russian regular forces in the Kupyansk direction are drawn primarily from the Western Military District and thus benefit from a degree of organizational coherence unlike Russian forces in other parts of Ukraine, which are often thrown together from various military districts and airborne (VDV) units.[9] The relative coherence of the WMD force grouping in the Kupyansk direction likely generates relatively more effective command and control (C2) among these forces, although it remains unclear if these WMD elements are able to conduct large-scale assaults that would be significantly more effective than the disorganized and costly Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka.

UK outlet the Telegraph reported on January 4 that an unspecified source ”close“ to the Ukrainian military stated that Russian forces may conduct a ”ground offensive” as early as January 15.[10] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo responded to the Telegraph article on January 5 and stated that the Ukrainian military has not observed a change in the composition of Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast or in Russia bordering Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian forces continue offensive operations near Synkivka with the aim of capturing Kupyansk.[11] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov also responded to the Telegraph noting that Russian forces are not concentrating in Kharkiv Oblast in preparation for a large-scale offensive and that the intensity of Russian attacks in the Kupyansk direction has decreased in the past three days due to bad weather conditions.[12] Synehubov noted that Russian forces are using the slower tempo of operations caused by poor weather conditions to deploy reinforcements to the frontline and to train and coordinate units.[13] Fityo and Synehubov’s comments are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces may intensify offensive operations, though not launch a full-scale offensive operation, with the existing grouping of forces in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces may have conducted a gradual buildup of forces since Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian military concentrated over 100,000 personnel in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions as of October 2023.[14]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Russian targets in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai on the night of January 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated on January 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehouses near Pervomaiske (82km north of Simferopol) in occupied Crimea.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 36 Ukrainian drones over Crimea, a drone in Krasnodar Krai, and a Ukrainian Neptune missile in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.[16] Saky occupation head Aleksandr Ovdyenko claimed that Russian forces successfully repelled a large Ukrainian drone attack along the Saky-Yevpatoria coast on the evening of January 4.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian drones and missiles targeted Yevpatoria, the Russian airfield in Saky, the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai.[18] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Ukrainian strikes hitting Russian targets on the night of January 4 to 5. These Ukrainian strikes follow Ukrainian strikes near Uyutne (west of Yevpatoria) and Yevpatoria on January 4, which reportedly struck at least one Russian command post.[19] The Ukrainian Crimean-based ”Atesh” partisan group claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense radar system and a communications center in Yevpatoria responsible for coordinating Russian air defense operations in occupied Crimea on January 4.[20]

Russian forces conducted Shahed 131/136 drone strikes and missile strikes against frontline areas in Ukraine overnight on January 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two waves of Shahed drones at frontline areas in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts and that Ukrainian forces shot down 21 of the 29 drones.[21] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces targeted frontline areas of southern Ukraine, particularly Kherson Oblast, where it is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept the drones.[22] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces launched 10 S-300 missiles at Liptsi, Kharkiv Oblast on the night of January 4 to 5.[23]

Germany announced a new military assistance package to Ukraine on January 4.[24] The package includes 10 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, two demining tanks, 30 drone detection systems, 155mm artillery ammunition, missiles for Patriot and IRIS-T air defense systems, and a Skynex air defense system.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will convene on January 10 and discuss Russia’s reported use of North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine, a likely violation of UNSC resolutions. US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated on January 4 that US officials will raise the issue of the reported ballistic missile use at a January 10 UNSC briefing on Ukraine.[25] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russian forces launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and January 2, 2024.[26] Ukrainian officials stated on January 5 that Russian forces have used foreign-made ballistic missiles in strikes against Ukraine but that Ukrainian officials have yet to identify the country of origin.[27] North Korea has reportedly begun transferring an unspecified number of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in recent weeks.[28]

UNSC resolutions on North Korea specifically call for North Korea to suspend all ballistic missile activities and prohibits member states from exporting and importing weapons to and from North Korea.[29] The UNSC resolutions also prohibit any trade with North Korea that can contribute to nuclear, ballistic missile, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related activities.[30] Russian Ambassador at Large Oleg Burmistrov stated on October 15, 2023, that Russia ”strictly adheres to its international obligations towards [North Korea] through the UNSC.”[31] Russia’s increasing procurement of ammunition and weapons systems from North Korea materially violates the UNSC resolutions on North Korea, however. UNSC resolutions do not commit member states to enforce any secondary sanctions against third parties trading with North Korea, but the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has wide sanctions enforcement powers to sanction any entity trading goods or services with North Korea and any foreign financial institution knowingly facilitating transactions with North Korea.[32]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov strangely offered to exchange 20 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) for lifting sanctions against his family members. Kadyrov’s oddly public offer to negotiate with the Ukrainian government for personal gain follows indicators that the Kremlin may be engaging in POW negotiations to offset reports of Russian abuses of Ukrainian POWs and posture Russia as interested in operating within the bounds of international law and norms.[33] Kadyrov’s proposal undermines this larger Kremlin posturing. Russian milblogger and Kremlin Human Rights Council member Alexander “Sasha” Kots criticized Kadyrov for “dispos[ing] of prisoners [of war] as goods for personal purposes.”[34] Kadyrov likely negotiated with the Ukrainian government independently from the Kremlin for personal gain when he claimed to have paid Ukrainian special services for the return of his racehorse, Zazu, in May 2023.[35]

The Moscow Arbitration Court ordered Google to unblock four YouTube channels belonging to Russian state-affiliated channel 5TV on January 5, likely as part of an ongoing effort to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March presidential elections. Mocow’s Arbitration Court upheld a previous ruling that Google must unblock 5TV’s YouTube channels or pay a 100,000 ruble (roughly $1,094) fine for each day Google refuses to reinstate the channels.[36] YouTube blocked access to channels associated with Russian state-funded media in February and March 2022 to enforce a policy that ”prohibit[s] content denying, minimizing, or trivializing well-documented violent events” including the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[37] The Kremlin has likely been attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia by imposing increasing fines for failing to comply with Russian censorship and data privacy laws.[38] A Moscow court fined Google 4.6 billion rubles (roughly $50.3 billion) on December 20, 2023, for refusing to comply with Russian censorship laws and remove ”fake” information about the Russian war in Ukraine.[39] Reuters reported on January 3 that Russian fines against Google, YouTube, Meta, TikTok, and Telegram ”appear to have been settled” as they no longer appear as debtors on the Russian Federal Bailiff Service‘s database, but the reason for this omission is unclear.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, in the coming weeks and have a grouping of forces in the area that appears to be less degraded than Russian groupings responsible for offensive efforts elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Russian targets in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai on the night of January 4 to 5.
• Russian forces conducted Shahed 131/136 drone strikes and missile strikes against frontline areas in Ukraine overnight on January 5.
• Germany announced a new military assistance package to Ukraine on January 4.
• The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will convene on January 10 and discuss Russia’s reported use of North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine, a likely violation of UNSC resolutions.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov strangely offered to exchange 20 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) for lifting sanctions against his family members.
• The Moscow Arbitration Court ordered Google to unblock four YouTube channels belonging to Russian state-affiliated channel 5TV on January 5, likely as part of an ongoing effort to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March presidential elections.
• Russian forces made a confirmed advance near Avdiivka as positional engagements continued along the entire frontline.
• International sanctions are reportedly impeding Russia’s Su-34 aircraft production.
• The Kremlin continues to solidify federal administrative oversight of local and regional occupation administrations in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2024

Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian military target in occupied Crimea, while Russian officials and milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian strike was unsuccessful. Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated on January 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near Sevastopol in the afternoon.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk implied that Ukrainian strikes against Sevastopol and Yevpatoria may have targeted the locations of Russian military leaders.[2] Oleshchuk also amplified footage of a smoke plume geolocated to the eastern outskirts of Uyutne and a report by a Crimean source, which stated that a projectile reportedly struck a Russian air defense unit near Uyutne (just west of Yevpatoria).[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 10 Ukrainian missiles over Crimea.[4] Russian sources, including the MoD and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev, claimed that Russian air defenses repelled the Ukrainian strike.[5]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran. Kirby stated that North Korea provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and that Russian forces launched at least one of the North Korean missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023.[6] Kirby also stated that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported earlier on January 4 that unspecified US officials stated that Russia could receive Iranian short-range ballistic missiles as early as spring 2024 but that the officials do not believe that Russia and Iran have yet completed a deal.[7]

Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances. Russian forces routinely use short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian cities closer to the frontline, and these missiles appear to be more effective at penetrating or avoiding Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted 149 of a reported 166 Russian cruise missiles in intensified attacks since December 29, 2023, but have only intercepted a handful of the ballistic missiles that Russia has launched at Ukraine in the same period, for example.[8] Russian forces have repurposed S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles for conducting strikes against surface targets in Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to intercept these unorthodox missile attacks using their own S-300 and S-400 systems.[9] Ukrainian forces have also appeared to be less successful in intercepting Iskander ballistic missiles during recent strikes, although Ukrainian forces did intercept an Iskander-M missile during a less intense series of Russian missile and drone strikes on December 30.[10] Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted all Iskander-M or S-300/S-400 missiles that Russian forces launched at Kyiv on December 12.[11] Ukrainian forces reportedly also intercepted all 10 Kinzhal missiles that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on January 2 with Western-provided Patriot systems.[12] The effectiveness of Russian ballistic missiles thus appears to depend in part on the configuration of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella in the target area and the strike package of which the missiles are part.

The relative success that Russian forces have had in striking targets in Ukraine with ballistic missiles in combination with cruise missiles and drones may be prompting an intensification of Russian efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad. Russia can reportedly produce roughly 42 Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles per month, although it is unclear how many S-300/S-400 missiles Russia can produce.[13] Russia‘s defense industrial base (DIB) likely cannot produce ballistic missiles at the scale required for a persistent strike campaign in Ukraine that relies on regularly expending a large volume of ballistic missiles, and Russia likely has to source ballistic missiles from abroad if it wishes to maintain large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby dismissed recent Western reporting of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to engage in peace negotiations with Ukraine as “ballyhoo” during a press conference on January 3.[14] Kirby stated that Putin “sure doesn’t act like a guy who’s willing to negotiate,” referring to Russia’s recent large-scale strikes against Ukraine from December 29, 2023, to January 2.[15] Kirby added that Putin is doing everything possible to put Ukraine in a disadvantageous position and reiterated the importance of continued Western support for Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated during an interview with CNN on January 3 that Ukraine is confident that Western aid to Ukraine will continue and that Ukraine does not have a “plan B.”[17] Kuleba noted that a theoretical Russian victory in Ukraine would embolden other world leaders with predatory expansionist objectives and cited recent Russia’s missile strikes against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities as a clear indication of Putin’s unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine.[18] ISW has long assessed that Putin does not intend to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s goals in Ukraine — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain the same.[19]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree strengthening procedures for granting foreign citizens Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military. The January 4 decree grants Russian citizenship to foreign citizens who have signed at least a year-long contract with the Russian military or “military formations,” likely referencing volunteer formations and private military companies (PMCs), during periods of “special military operations.”[20] The decree also grants Russian citizenship to the spouses, children, and parents of the foreigners serving with the Russian military.[21] The decree reduces the time it takes for these foreigners to receive and be considered for Russian citizenship from three months to one month.[22] Putin previously signed a decree in September 2022 simplifying the process of obtaining Russian citizenship and dropping some prerequisites for foreigners who signed contracts with the Russian military.[23] The January 4 decree likely aims to further streamline and simplify the citizenship application process while formalizing migrant recruitment efforts following increased raids on migrant communities since summer 2023 in which Russian officials have issued military summonses to migrants with Russian citizenship.[24]

Russian State Duma’s Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein noted that the January 4 decree would “solve the problem” of foreign countries’ extradition requests for their citizens who fought in Ukraine.[25] Khinshtein prevented the deportation of an Uzbek citizen who allegedly fought in the Wagner Group and successfully requested that Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) grant the Uzbek citizen asylum in Russia in December 2023.[26] Russian authorities have routinely offered Russian citizenship to migrants in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine and have threatened to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized migrants if they refuse to serve in the Russian military.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin does not have a clearly defined policy regarding migrants as Russian authorities continue to pursue incoherent and competing efforts to restrict them working in Russia, coerce them into the Russian military, and leverage them to offset Russian labor shortages caused by the war. Putin’s January 4 decree suggests that the Kremlin may be prioritizing coercing migrants into the military over relying on migrants to offset domestic labor shortages.

Kyrgyzstan sentenced a Kyrgyz citizen to five years in prison for participating in the war in Ukraine as a member of the Wagner Group. A court in Kyrgyzstan announced on January 4 that it sentenced Beknazar Borugul uulu, a Kyrgyz citizen, to five years in prison on December 7, 2023, under the article for participation “in armed conflicts or military operations on the territory of a foreign state or undergoing training to commit a terrorist act.”[28] Wagner reportedly recruited Borugul uulu while he was in a Russian prison. Kyrgyzstan previously sentenced another Kyrgyz citizen who joined a Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) military unit to 10 years in prison on charges of mercenarism in May 2023, and the case was sent to a retrial in August 2023 after an appeal to replace the mercenarism charge with charges of participating in a military conflict in a foreign country.[29] Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also recently sentenced some of their citizens on mercenarism charges after those citizens fought with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Wagner forces in Ukraine.[30] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s continued use of Central Asian populations in Central Asia and Russia for force-generation purposes will likely create friction between Russia and its Central Asian neighbors.[31] Central Asian countries are charging and detaining their citizens for fighting in Ukraine upon their return to Central Asia, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree granting foreigners expedited Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service may be aimed at combatting this issue.

Russia has begun negotiations with Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia to open Russian cultural centers (Russkii dom) abroad, likely aimed at increasing Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) Deputy Head Pavel Shevtsov told Kremlin newswire Tass on January 4 that Russia has begun similar negotiations with other unnamed countries and noted that he is confident that the agreements will be completed “quickly enough” due to mutual interest between parties.[32] Russian media previously reported that Russia is also in negotiations to open additional Russkii dom centers in Brazil, South Africa, Angola, and Mali by 2025.[33] Russia currently has over 80 Russkii dom centers concentrated in Europe, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[34] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use Russkii dom centers to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian military target in occupied Crimea, while Russian officials and milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian strike was unsuccessful.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran.
• Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby dismissed recent Western reporting of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to engage in peace negotiations with Ukraine as “ballyhoo” during a press conference on January 3.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree strengthening procedures for granting foreign citizens Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military.
• Kyrgyzstan sentenced a Kyrgyz citizen to five years in prison for participating in the war in Ukraine as a member of the Wagner Group.
• Russia has begun negotiations with Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia to open Russian cultural centers (Russkii dom) abroad, likely aimed at increasing Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka as positional engagement continued along the entire frontline.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities are planning to mobilize Ukrainian teenagers living in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 4 streamlining the process for certain Ukrainians to receive Russian citizenship.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2024

Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 3 in what was the largest POW exchange of the war to date and the first official POW exchange since August 2023. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that over 200 Ukrainian soldiers and civilians returned to Ukraine from Russian captivity, including personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, National Guard, Navy, and State Border Guard Service.i Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets later clarified that 230 Ukrainian personnel returned to Ukraine in the 49th POW exchange since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.ii Lubinets and Zelensky noted that many of the Ukrainian POWs fought and were captured on Snake Island and in Mariupol, suggesting that these soldiers had been in Russian captivity for nearly two years.iii The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), in turn, stated that 248 Russian military personnel returned to Russia as part of the exchange, and notably thanked the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for its role in mediating the exchange.iv Russian sources disagreed on the exact number of Ukrainians returned in the exchange, with some claiming that it was 173 and others claiming that it was "up to 230."v Russian milbloggers generally praised the Russian MoD for securing the return of a greater ratio of Russian POWs to Ukrainian POWs, which Russian sources claimed was long overdue following a deeply unpopular POW exchange in September 2022 that swapped 215 Ukrainian POWs, including captured leaders of the Azov Regiment whom Russia had initially pledged to imprison at least until the end of the war, for 55 Russian POWs and political prisoners including Putin’s personal friend, pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvechuk.vi  

The timing of Russia's apparent willingness to participate in the largest POW exchange since the beginning of the war, and the first exchange in nearly five months, is noteworthy. Representative of the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War Petro Yatsenko stated on November 17, 2023, that Russia implemented a freeze on POW exchanges over summer 2023 for an unspecified reason.vii As ISW has recently reported, there have been several incidents over the past few weeks of Russian forces using Ukrainian POWs in apparent violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs, including using a battalion of former Ukrainian POWs in active combat, using Ukrainian POWs as human shields, and summarily executing surrendered Ukrainian POWs who were clearly hors de combat.viii The Russian leadership may have chosen to engage in such a large POW exchange at this time to undermine reports of Russian abuses of Ukrainian POWs and posture Russia as interested in operating within the bounds of international law and norms. ISW has frequently assessed that senior Russian officials are often very invested in portraying Russia as adhering to humanitarian and other legal guidelines, and the timing of this POW exchange may be part of this wider informational effort.ix 

Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to increase its defense industrial base (DIB) output six-fold in 2024.x Shmyhal reiterated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s December 27 statement that Ukraine’s DIB production capacity tripled in 2023 compared to 2022 and highlighted the importance of additional drones, shells, ammunition, and armored vehicles for Ukrainian forces.xi Shmyhal stated that the Ukrainian government has allocated more than 760 billion hryvnia (roughly $20 billion) for payments to military personnel and more than 265 billion hryvnia (roughly $7 billion) for the purchase, production, and repair of weapons in 2024.xii Shmyhal also advocated for the reported Western plan to use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s future reconstruction.xiii Shmyhal’s comments come after several days of large-scale Russian strikes that reportedly primarily targeted Ukrainian DIB facilities and military infrastructure.xiv ISW previously assessed that reported Russian strikes against Ukrainian industrial facilities likely aim to prevent Ukraine from developing key capacities to sustain operations for a longer war effort.xv  

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba announced on January 3 that the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) will hold an emergency meeting in response to Russia’s recent mass air strikes against Ukraine.xvi Kuleba called the upcoming meeting a “sign of Euro-Atlantic unity in the face of Russian terror” and noted that strengthening Ukraine’s air defense will be one of the meeting’s key topics.xvii The NUC met for the first time on November 29, 2023, to discuss the roadmap to full Ukrainian interoperability with NATO and steps to increase weapons and ammunition production.xviii 

NATO member states continue initiatives to support Ukrainian operations in the air domain. Norwegian Defense Minister Bjørn Arild Gram announced on January 3 that Norway is providing two F-16 fighter jets and 10 instructors to train Ukrainian military personnel in Denmark.xix Gram stated that Ukraine’s partners will work “day and night” to establish a lasting and modern Ukrainian air force.xx NATO also announced in a statement on January 3 that NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency will support a coalition of member states, including Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain to purchase up to 1,000 Patriot missiles to strengthen the member states’ air defenses, additionally noting that NATO partners have previously supplied Ukraine with Patriot systems.xxi It is unclear if Ukraine will receive any of the 1,000 Patriot missiles, or on what timeline. The $5.5 billion contract will support the establishment of a Patriot missile production facility in Germany, increasing the available supply of Patriot missiles and replenishing member states’ stockpiles.xxii Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on January 2 that Western-provided Patriot systems enabled Ukrainian forces to down a record number of 10 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles during Russian strikes overnight on January 1-2 and during the day on January 2.xxiii 

Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces may be setting information conditions to blame the West for a potential future conflict in the Arctic. A prominent Russian milblogger, whom the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have recently rewarded for service to the Russian Armed Forces and whose channel has recently fixated on the Arctic region, amplified a post wherein another milblogger responded to comments from the Danish Foreign Ministry about how Denmark’s chairmanship of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) will focus on Arctic security after reports from the Danish Defense Intelligence Service and NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept listed Russian activity in the region as a possible cause of future regional instability.xxiv The milblogger claimed that despite Danish statements about Denmark’s hopes to keep the Arctic a region of low tension, Denmark views Russia as the main threat in the Arctic, suggesting that the milblogger views Denmark’s response to Russian actions in the Arctic as unnecessary and inconsistent with other Danish signaling. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 21, 2023, that Russia deployed forces to the Arctic not as a demonstration of military force but to ensure Russian economic development in the region, whereas Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have increasingly blamed Western countries for preparing Arctic countries for a confrontation against Russia and claimed that Russia has been forced into responding by reforming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in Russian's northwest to counter supposed threats from Finland and other NATO states.xxv Recent Kremlin and MoD statements and the Russian MoD-affiliated milblogger’s post may be part of Kremlin efforts to set information conditions for Russia to blame Denmark and other Western Arctic countries for any future conflicts with Russia in the Arctic. These narratives are in line with Putin’s declaration on January 2 that the West is Russia‘s “enemy” and his further implication that the war in Ukraine is an existential war for Russia against the West.xxvi  

Efforts driven by Kremlin mouthpieces to set such information conditions may be permeating the larger Russian information space. Another prominent Russian milblogger, who has previously amplified Kremlin narratives about Russia's maximalist goals of imperial reconquest in Ukraine, amplified a post claiming that the next regional “flare up” will be the Baltics and Nordic countries.xxvii The post vaguely claimed that an unspecified actor, possibly the West, is preparing the Baltic and Nordic peoples for a confrontation with Russia and that the Baltic and Nordic countries have lacked sovereignty for a long time - echoing Kremlin narratives about how states that are not great powers - like Ukraine - do not have full sovereignty.xxviii These informational lines are disturbingly similar to the justifications the Kremlin used to invade Ukraine in 2022 and to continue the invasion. There are no indications that Russia will seek conflict with NATO in the very near future, but Moscow began running similar information operations in Ukraine many years before Russian invasions in 2014 and 2022. 

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev characterized Russia as Kazakhstan’s “main partner and ally” in an interview published on January 3 despite recent efforts to distance Kazakhstan from Russia. Tokayev emphasized the strength of current Russian-Kazakh relations and Russia’s position on the world stage, claiming that “no problem in the world can be solved” without Russia’s participation.xxix Tokayev’s statement comes after Kazakhstan took over chairmanship of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on January 1.xxx Tokayev has recently sought to balance maintaining friendly relations with Russia against allowing Kazakhstan to fall too far under Russian influence, likely reflecting an increase in tension that Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused. Russia previously deployed airborne (VDV) elements to Kazakhstan as CSTO peacekeeping forces to help quell domestic anti-government protests in January 2022, but Tokayev reportedly refused to help Putin quell the Wagner PMC’s June 2023 rebellion.xxxi Tokayev also refused to recognize Russia's claimed independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s republics (DNR and LNR) following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and subsequently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of the DNR, LNR, and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in September 2022.xxxii  Russian society has also recently intensified violence towards, and disenfranchisement of, Central Asia migrant communities living in Russia, including Kazakh migrants. This has likely become a growing point of neuralgia in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors, especially as Russia has massively mobilized Central Asian migrants to fight in Ukraine. A Kazakh court recently sentenced a Kazakh citizen for mercenarism for fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, suggesting that Kazakh authorities feel discomfort around the idea of their citizens affiliating with Russia militarily.xxxiii Despite these evident frictions, Tokayev recently emphasized the extent of friendly Russian-Kazakh relations at the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara, Turkey on November 9, 2023, also likely to maintain strong ties with Russia while remaining relatively independent.xxxiv  

Key Takeaways: 

• Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 3 in what was the largest POW exchange of the war to date and the first official POW exchange since August 2023. 
• Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to increase its defense industrial base (DIB) output six-fold in 2024. 
• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba announced on January 3 that the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) will hold an emergency meeting in response to Russia’s recent mass air strikes against Ukraine. 
• NATO member states continue initiatives to support Ukrainian operations in the air domain. 
• Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces may be setting information conditions to blame the West for a potential future conflict in the Arctic. 
• Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev characterized Russia as Kazakhstan’s “main partner and ally” in an interview published on January 3 despite recent efforts to distance Kazakhstan from Russia. 
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact. 
• The Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 3 that the unit will continue to operate subordinated to Rosgvardia and will not be impacted by the Russian military’s reported dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the DNR’s Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD). 
• Russian authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia using infrastructure projects and social outreach programs. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West. Putin responded to a Russian serviceman’s question about Western aid to Ukraine during a meeting at a military hospital in Moscow Oblast on January 1, stating that Russia’s issue is not necessarily that the West is aiding Ukraine, but rather that the West is Russia's "enemy."[i] Putin added that “Ukraine by itself is not an enemy for [Russia],” but that Western-based actors “who want to destroy Russian statehood” and achieve the “strategic defeat of Russia on the battlefield” are Russia’s enemies. Putin claimed that Western elites are trying to break Russia into five parts and are trying to do so using Ukraine, but that the situation on the frontlines is changing and that Russia will “deal with the [West] faster” than the West can deal with Russia on the battlefields in Ukraine. Putin added that the problem is not in Western aid deliveries to Ukraine and noted that Ukraine has already been “completely destroyed,” that there is “nothing left” of the country, and that it “exists only on handouts.”

Putin implied that Russia is fighting an existential war against the West in Ukraine and noted that Western rhetoric has recently refocused on how to “quickly end the conflict.” This phrasing implies that Putin sees a conflict and potential negotiations between Russia and the West – not a conflict and potential negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Putin added that Russia also wants to end the Russia-West conflict but only on the Kremlin’s terms and emphasized that Russia will not give up its positions. Putin does not view Ukraine as an independent actor and is thus portraying his full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a confrontation between Russian and West – deliberately misrepresenting the reality that Russia invaded Ukraine to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin’s emphasis on changing narratives in the West may indicate that he will perceive and/or frame any wavering in Western support for Ukraine and any Ukrainian defeats on the battlefield as a Russian victory in this supposed Russian-Western confrontation.

Putin’s framing of his war in Ukraine as a Russian struggle against the West – and not Ukraine – indicates that he does not intend to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine and is setting information conditions aimed at convincing the West to betray Ukraine through negotiations. Putin is likely deliberately and falsely framing Ukraine as pawn without agency in the Russia-West conflict to mask his expansionist and maximalist goals of establishing full effective Russian control of Ukraine. Putin’s January 1 discussion of negotiations refers to his intent to negotiate solely with the West about Ukraine’s future within the Russian sphere of influence and only about Western abandonment of Ukraine. It does not signal that Putin is interested in negotiating with Ukraine as an autonomous actor. Putin previously adopted a similar line when issuing two ultimatums to the United States and NATO in December 2021, which were intended to force the West to recognize Russia’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe by surrendering essential elements of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the name of de-escalating the conflict between the West and Russia that Putin was inflaming.[ii] Any Western commitment to negotiations about Ukraine's future that bypass Ukraine will signal to Russia that it can impose its will upon countries that it deems to be in its sphere of influence – even countries beyond Ukraine, and potentially including Finland and Moldova, about which various Russian actors have begun setting informational conditions for future campaigns.[iii]

Putin may be expanding his war aims in Ukraine to include confrontation with the West in an effort to set conditions for permanent Russian military buildup and to justify high battlefield sacrifices. Russia gained almost no meaningful ground in 2023 at a high manpower cost, despite Putin’s January 1 absurd claims that he only orders Russian servicemen to launch offensives that will not generate significant casualties.[iv] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD), however, stated on December 30 that “the average daily number of Russian casualties in Ukraine has risen by almost 300 during the course of 2023” and that Russian casualties could rise to over half a million by the end of 2024.[v] A declassified US intelligence assessment shared with Congress on December 12 stated that Russian forces have lost 315,000 personnel since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[vi] Such high casualties for small territorial gains are likely prompting Putin to present a strong and ideological justification to continue the prolonged war of choice on which he has launched Russia. Ukraine needs no such contorted justifications for the high losses and suffering that Putin’s invasion is inflicting on its people, even when Ukraine’s military operations do not produce the desired results. The war really is existential for Ukraine as it is not for Russia.

Putin notably concluded his observations about the Russian-West conflict by telling one wounded serviceman in the hospital that the serviceman did not get wounded for Russia to give up everything and surrender. Putin also addressed several domestic concerns about the lack of housing and compensations to servicemen who have received injuries on the battlefield, thereby attempting to posture himself as an empathetic and involved wartime leader even while seemingly raising the stakes to support his demands for increasing sacrifices by his people. Putin’s statements likely suggest that he is preparing a long-term justification to keep forces mobilized and engaged in combat for the perpetual defense of Russia’s sovereignty against the West.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed Ukraine’s need for urgent Western support to protect both Ukraine and the rest of Europe in an interview with the Economist published on January 1.[vii] Zelensky warned that the West has lost its sense of urgency and that some Ukrainians have lost a sense of the existential threat that Russia poses to Ukraine. Zelensky emphasized that Europe needs to support Ukraine not solely to protect Ukraine but also to protect Europe, as Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue fighting further west if Ukraine loses. Zelensky added that the speed of Ukrainian military success depends on Western military assistance. Zelensky noted that the idea that Putin is "winning" the war is false and that there are no indications that Russia is willing to engage in meaningful peace negotiations, citing recent massive Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure as evidence of Putin's continued pursuit of his maximalist objectives. Zelensky assessed that Crimea and the Black Sea will be the center of gravity for military operations in 2024 and noted that a successful Ukrainian operation in Crimea, particularly an operation that would isolate Crimea and degrade Russian military operations there, would have a significant effect on Russia.

Russian forces conducted another massive series of drone and missile strikes against deep rear areas in Ukraine between December 31 and January 2, one of which used a strike package similar to that used on December 29, and to which Ukrainian forces appear to be adapting. Ukrainian military officials stated that overnight on December 31 to January 1 Russian forces launched 90 Shahed-136/131 drones from Cape Chauda and Balaklava (occupied Crimea); Kursk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 87 of the drones.[viii] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces also launched four S-300 missiles, three Kh-31P missiles, and one Kh-59 missile from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on January 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that later in the afternoon on January 1, Russian forces later launched an additional 10 Shahed drones and one Kh-59 missile, and that Ukrainian forces shot down nine of the drones and the missile.[ix] Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes damaged a museum and part of the Lviv National Agrarian University in Lviv City and residential buildings in Odesa City and Esma, Sumy Oblast.[x] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Russian strikes on December 31 targeted unspecified Ukrainian airfields, although ISW has not yet been able to confirm strikes against Ukrainian airfield infrastructure.[xi] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on January 1 that Russian strikes on January 2 would target military infrastructure in Ukraine like the strikes on January 1.[xii]

Russian forces then conducted another massive series of missile and drone strikes overnight on January 1-2 and during the day on January 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed drones; 10 Kh-47 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles; 70 Kh-101/555/55 missiles; 12 Iskander-M, S-300, and S-400 ballistic missiles; four Kh-31P anti-radar missiles; and three Kalibr missiles at Ukraine on the night of January 1-2 and the morning of January 2 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 59 of the Kh-101/555/55 missiles and all of the drones, Kinzhal missiles, and Kalibr missiles.[xiii] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down a record number of 10 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Western-provided Patriot systems.[xiv] Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes caused damage in Kyiv and Kharkiv cities.[xv] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian weapons storage sites and defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, including those that produce missiles and drones and repair military equipment in Kyiv City and its suburbs, and Zaluzhnyi confirmed that there were hits to civilian, critical, and military infrastructure.[xvi]

Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces will likely attempt to adapt to Ukrainian air defense capabilities. Ukrainian military officials largely characterized the weapons composition of munitions used and the number of Russian strikes on January 1-2 as comparable to those on December 29, 2023.[xvii] Ukrainian forces notably shot down more Shahed drones and Kinzhal missiles on January 1-2 than on December 29, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have adapted to the type of strike package Russian forces employed on December 29, likely after months of experimentation and testing Ukrainian air defenses using various weapons systems, strike routes, and air defense mitigation tactics.[xviii] Russian strikes on Ukraine are part of an ongoing tactical and technological offense-defense race wherein both sides are constantly experimenting and adapting to the other, particularly in the realm of long-range strikes and air defense. Western aid to Ukraine remains crucial as Russian forces will likely continue to experiment and innovate new ways to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. ISW continues to assess that the end of Western aid to Ukraine would likely set conditions for an expanded Russian air campaign in Ukraine and eventually result in significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.[xix] UK outlet the Telegraph cited analysts on January 1 who stated that Ukraine may have to ration its air defense missiles in the face of decreasing Western aid in order to protect targets it deems to be the most important, which would likely expose critical frontline areas if Ukraine is forced to withdraw air defense systems to cover critical population centers.[xx] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called on Western countries to expedite deliveries of air defense systems and ammunition to Ukraine and provide Ukraine with combat drones and long-range missiles.[xxi] Several Western officials condemned the Russian strikes on January 2 and noted Ukraine’s need for air defenses.[xxii]

Russian officials publicly defined the goals for Russia’s 2024 chairmanship of both BRICS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), articulating how the Kremlin may intend to use these organizations to fulfill its foreign policy objectives this year. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a speech on January 1 that Russia will promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation during its BRICS chairmanship and prioritize “strengthening multilateralism for equitable global development and security."[xxiii] Putin stated that the accession of Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia to BRICS demonstrates the organization’s “growing authority” in the world and that BRICS is attracting ”like-minded” countries that respect sovereign equality and desire a multipolar world order.[xxiv]

The Russian government also published a list of priorities for its CIS chairmanship on January 1, which includes increased military cooperation, sanctions evasion, and joint “military-patriotic education and the popularization of common spiritual and moral values.”[xxv] The CIS’ rotating chairmanship is something of a formality due to Russia's outsized influence on the CIS generally.[xxvi] Russia’s emphasis on unspecified “common spiritual and moral values” in the CIS follows Putin’s emphasis in his annual New Year’s address on December 31, 2023, on ideological concepts such as Russian “multinationalism” and family values that fit into his wider ideology of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir).[xxvii] ISW previously assessed that Putin is trying to re-establish the conception of the Russian World as the backbone of Russian domestic and foreign policy and is working to create an international order, through organizations such as BRICS and CIS, that will readily accept Russian principles, including the Kremlin’s claimed right to own Ukraine.[xxviii]

The Norwegian government announced on January 1 that it is permitting Norwegian defense companies to sell weapons and defense-related products directly to the Ukrainian government. The new policy, which went into effect on January 1, allows Norwegian defense industrial base (DIB) companies to apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for export licenses to sell these products to Ukraine, and the Norwegian MFA will consider each application on a case-by-case basis.[xxix] Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide reiterated the need for ongoing support to Ukraine to defend against Russia’s war of aggression.[xxx]

The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it will not allow the United Kingdom (UK) to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits “as long as the war continues.”[xxxi] Turkey cited Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.”[xxxii] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention to deny access to Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits since February 28, 2022.[xxxiii] UK Defense Minister Grant Shapps announced on December 11 that the UK transferred two Sandown-class minehunter vessels to Ukraine as part of a plan that predated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[xxxiv]

Russian society continues to reckon with the impacts of increasing anti-migrant sentiment amid Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts to systematically disenfranchise migrant communities within Russia. Several Russian milbloggers and sources amplified footage posted on January 1 that shows a small group of apparently intoxicated adolescents, reportedly the children of Central Asian migrants, cursing at and later fighting with demobilized Russian veterans of the "special military operation" in Chelyabinsk.[xxxv] The Russian Investigative Committee later detained three suspects—two 18-year-olds and a 17-year-old—and referred to them as "foreign citizens."[xxxvi] Russian milbloggers seized on the incident and called for harsh and dehumanizing punishment for the adolescents while fixating on their Central Asian ethnicities and whether they and their parents are Russian citizens.[xxxvii] Russian outlet Fontanka additionally reported on January 1 that law enforcement in central St. Petersburg detained nearly 3,000 migrants during document checks on New Year's Eve, 600 of whom were reportedly residing in Russia in some violation of migration law and 100 of whom now face deportation.[xxxviii] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta claimed that up to 1,500 of the detainees have already been coerced to sign contracts with the Russian MoD, which is consistent with a general increase in mobilization raids against migrant communities in Russia, as ISW has previously reported.[xxxix] Russian information space actors, particularly the ultranationalist milblogger community, tend to fixate on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in order to weaponize xenophobic and anti-migrant rhetoric, often to suggest that migrant communities should face wider rates of mobilization and fight in Ukraine.[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.
• Putin’s framing of his war in Ukraine as a Russian struggle against the West – and not Ukraine – indicates that he does not intend to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine and is setting information conditions aimed at convincing the West to betray Ukraine through negotiations.
• Putin may be expanding his war aims in Ukraine to include confrontation with the West in an effort to set conditions for permanent Russian military buildup and to justify high battlefield sacrifices.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed Ukraine’s need for urgent Western support to protect both Ukraine and the rest of Europe in an interview with the Economist published on January 1.
• Russian forces conducted another massive series of drone and missile strikes against deep rear areas in Ukraine between December 31 and January 2, one of which used a strike package similar to that used on December 29, and to which Ukrainian forces appear to be adapting.
• Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces will likely attempt to adapt to Ukrainian air defense capabilities.
• Russian officials publicly defined the goals for Russia’s 2024 chairmanship of both BRICS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), articulating how the Kremlin may intend to use these organizations to fulfill its foreign policy objectives this year.
• The Norwegian government announced on January 1 that it is permitting Norwegian defense companies to sell weapons and defense-related products directly to the Ukrainian government.
• The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it will not allow the United Kingdom (UK) to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits “as long as the war continues.”
• Russian society continues to reckon with the impacts of increasing anti-migrant sentiment amid Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts to systematically disenfranchise migrant communities within Russia.
• Russian forces made marginal confirmed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line, northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• The Russian military command may be seeking avenues to re-pardon recidivists who previously fought in the war in Ukraine in an apparent effort to maintain Russia's ability to leverage convict recruits as a manpower resource.
• Russian occupation authorities are restricting and likely monitoring internet communications ahead of the March 2024 presidential elections.