Ukraine Invasion Updates July 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2023

The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics. The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on July 29 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Chonhar bridge on the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast. ISW has not observed any Russian milblogger discussion about the Ukrainian strike or Russian milbloggers promoting Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo’s claim that Russian forces intercepted 12 Ukrainian Strom Shadow cruise missiles targeting the bridge. The only other Russian source to comment on the strikes was a local Russian news Telegram channel, which amplified alleged claims from Russian tourists in the area about the bridge being closed to traffic. Russian milbloggers responded to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge on June 22 with widespread outrage and concern, and Russian milbloggers routinely comment on both successful and allegedly unsuccessful Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics. The Chonhar bridge is a notable bottleneck along a critical Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), and it is highly unlikely that Russian milbloggers would voluntarily ignore a successful or unsuccessful Ukrainian strike on the bridge. ISW has previously assessed that select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their coverage of the war in Ukraine in ways more favorable to Kremlin narratives out of fear of Kremlin punishment following the removal of prominent critical voices in the Russian information space, particularly pro-war critic Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. General fear of Kremlin punishment would not likely result in such near-universal lack of coverage of a dramatic event, however, and it is more likely that a specific Kremlin directive not to cover disruptions to critical GLOCs caused this lack of reporting.

Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations. During a press conference at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 29, Putin accused Ukraine of launching a large-scale offensive so that Russia cannot discuss a ceasefire while its troops are defending against Ukrainian attacks. Russian officials have previously weaponized the mention of negotiations in order to accuse Ukraine of being the party unwilling to enter into negotiations discussions, and Putin is likely using discussions of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to undermine reports of Ukrainian battlefield successes and accuse Ukraine of continued lack of interest in a potential negotiations process. Russian forces have been conducting their own attacks in Luhansk and around Donetsk City almost continuously since before the Ukrainian counter-offensive began, moreover, a fact that Putin did not, naturally, mention.  Putin also notably lauded the work of Central Military district Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev for repelling Ukrainian attacks and securing advances, likely in Luhansk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces are achieving small successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (in western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.

Key Takeaways:

• The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremina and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and did not make any confirmed gains in these areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southwest and northwest of Bakhmut and made claimed gains in this direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed marginal advances.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2023

Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around the Kremlin’s narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been. Prominent Russian milbloggers have been increasingly presenting Ukrainian counteroffensive operations inaccurately as a series of failed Ukrainian assaults along the entire line of contact.[i] Russian milbloggers widely amplified footage on July 29 claiming that it showed a single Russian tank defeating an entire Ukrainian company with armored vehicles as if the event had occurred recently, but the footage is actually from June 7 and shows Russian artillery units striking the Ukrainian column.[ii] Russian sources have previously recirculated old footage to support claims that Ukrainian forces are suffering significant armored vehicle losses, and the amplification of the footage on July 29 indicates that Russian sources are deliberately amplifying old footage to support the Kremlin narrative.[iii] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Ukrainian forces lost 39 armored vehicles in a few days of fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast, a notable inflection in his exaggeration of Ukrainian losses during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[iv] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely shifting its policy about the coverage of the war to downplay the possibilities of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.[v] Russian milbloggers continue to report on localized Ukrainian advances and some issues with Russian defensive operations, but the pro-war Russian information space’s wider operational framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive aligns with the likely shift in the Kremlin’s portrayal of the counteroffensive.[vi]

Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin. A Russian insider source claimed on July 28 that sources within the presidential administration stated that the Kremlin recently encouraged Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to reduce their coverage of the war in Ukraine in general and to post more positive content on topics of nationalistic pride.[vii] ISW has not observed Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reducing their coverage of the war, although Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers have begun to argue more emphatically that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a failure.[viii] The arrest of notable critics of the Russian war effort in Ukraine such as Girkin along with ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space may be prompting select milbloggers to align their portrayal of the war with the Kremlin’s more than they have normally done.[ix]

The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort. Segments of the Russian information space do continue to complain about systemic issues within the Russian war effort in Ukraine, and many Russian milbloggers would likely reverse course on their portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the event of significant Ukrainian gains. The milblogger community continues to be highly reactive and motivated by salient topics of outrage, and many milbloggers would likely abandon efforts to align themselves with the Kremlin’s messaging about the war in the event that a controversy about Russian failure prompts renewed intense ire towards the Russian military leadership.[x] A cohesively amplified and unchallenged Kremlin narrative concerning the tactical and operational situation in Ukraine would make accurate coverage of battlefield realities more challenging, particularly in the absence of more detailed reporting from the Ukrainian side.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29. Geolocated footage published on July 28 confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced close to the northwestern outskirts of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[xi] Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced to positions near the northern outskirts of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[xii] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Klishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Andriivka south of Bakhmut.[xiii] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[xiv] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Rivnopil, Staromayorske, and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[xv] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a forest northeast of Robotyne.[xvi] A Russian milblogger stated that Russian defensive fortifications will not matter if Ukrainian forces inflict heavy losses on Russian forces to the point that there are not enough Russian personnel to man the fortifications.[xvii] The milblogger also stated that the depth of Ukrainian advances into Russian defensive lines matters less than the degree to which the balance of forces has shifted to favor Ukraine during the course of the counteroffensive.

Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar bridge between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on the morning of July 29.[xviii] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed Ukrainian forces launched 12 Storm Shadow missiles at the Chonhar rail bridge, but claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted all 12 missiles.[xix] Some social media sources stated that locals reported explosions in the Chonhar area, but there is currently no visual evidence of the strike or claims about the consequences of the strike at the time of this publication.[xx] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that saboteurs set explosives against a Russian ammunition depot in Kozacha Bay near Sevastopol, Crimea on July 28 and that locals reported primary and secondary detonations.[xxi] Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on July 28 that any explosions in the Kozacha Bay area were due to Russian military exercises.[xxii]

Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck a residential building and a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Dnipro City with two Iskander cruise missiles.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around a Kremlin narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been.
• Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin.
• The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29.
• Ukrainian forces likely targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29.
• Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv and advanced along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv but did not make confirmed or claimed advances.
• A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue crypto-mobilization efforts in occupied Ukraine to replenish losses from combat casualties.
• Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rest and rehabilitation programs.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2023

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on July 28. Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces continued advancing south of Bakhmut.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Kurdyumivka and Andriivka.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and some milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces captured Staromayorske on July 27.[3] A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 10-12 kilometers of the main Russian defensive line in the Berdyansk direction.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), Verbove (17km southeast of Orikhiv), and Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky stated that Ukrainian forces can conduct strikes against the full depth of defending Russian forces and that these strikes are killing Russian commanders and degrading Russian command and control.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) refused to go to combat near Staromayorske due to heavy Russian losses and Ukrainian battlefield victories.[7]

Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea likely aims to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports without committing the Black Sea Fleet to the enforcement of a naval blockade. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported on July 28 that Ukrainian officials have intercepted radio transmissions of Russian forces warning civilian ships in the Black Sea against heading to Ukrainian ports.[8] A Russian milblogger amplified an audio recording purportedly of a Russian warship telling a civilian vessel in the Black Sea that Russian forces would consider the vessel involved in the conflict in Ukraine as a military cargo ship if it sailed towards a Ukrainian port.[9] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities announced a nighttime navigation ban for all small vessels near the Kerch Strait due to concerns about Ukrainian naval drones.[10] The Black Sea Fleet conducted exercises on July 27 wherein naval warships launched a missile at a target ship in the Black Sea.[11] The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) recently attempted to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets by claiming that the announcement meant that Russian forces would inspect ships.[12] The Russian MoD itself has not clarified what actions its announcement will allow the Russian military to take and even the Russian MFA’s interpretation would require Russian forces to board and possibly seize foreign civilian vessels. The Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea is likely intentionally ambiguous to generate widespread concern about possible detention by the Russian navy or outright strikes on civilian vessels. The Kremlin likely aims for this posturing to have a chilling effect on maritime activity so that Russian naval assets do not need to enforce an actual blockade of Ukrainian ports. A naval blockade is only mandatory for neutral entities to follow under international law if a belligerent declares the existence of the blockade, and Russia has yet to do so.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to reassure African partner states that Russia will maintain its economic and security commitments during the second day of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg. Putin addressed African heads of state and representatives at the summit’s plenary session on July 28 and highlighted military-technical agreements with 40 African countries and plans to expand Russia’s diplomatic presence in Africa.[14]  Putin stated that Russia aims to help train African partners‘ military and law enforcement personnel and noted that there are many African personnel at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) academy.[15] Putin also claimed that between 2022 and 2023 Russia wrote off $23 billion of debt for African countries.[16] Putin claimed that Russia has sent almost 10 million tons of grain to African countries so far in 2023 and reiterated a pledge to send 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain to six African countries in the next three to four months free of charge.[17] Putin pointedly stated that Russia will always be a responsible international supplier of agricultural products, likely aiming to reassure African partners concerned about food security following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.[18]

African Union Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat stated at the summit that disruptions to energy and grain supplies must end, and both Mahamat and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi explicitly called for the revival of the grain deal.[19] Al-Sissi also promoted a Kremlin talking point that Russia quit the grain deal because the grain corridor was not facilitating grain shipments to the poorest of countries, even though Putin himself cited Russian producers’ losses at depressed grain prices as a primary reason for leaving the deal.[20] African countries are likely appealing to Russia without fully backing its position concerning the grain deal in hopes of retaining Russian economic and security commitments, in line with their likely primary objective to mitigate the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine affecting their economies.[21]

The Kremlin continues to display little interest in an unspecific peace plan focused on eliminating disruptions to international trade proposed by African heads of state. Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Senegalese President Macky Sall, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and Mahamat all appealed to Putin to consider a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.[22] A delegation representing seven African states proposed a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade to Putin on June 17.[23] Putin responded to renewed calls to engage with this peace plan at the summit by stating that Russia is respectfully and carefully considering the proposal.[24] Putin has yet to address the feasibility of the peace plan and instead reiterated boilerplate rhetoric that Ukraine and the West are preventing negotiations from taking place.[25] The Kremlin is likely trying to portray itself as considering the peace plan to promote ongoing Russian information operations that feign interest in a negotiated settlement while aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin is also likely using the proposal to pursue strengthened bilateral and multilateral engagement with African states as part of an overall effort to present itself as a more attractive ally than the collective West.[27] The Kremlin has not demonstrated any intent to engage with any peace process meaningfully.

Russian authorities may be increasingly concerned about how the Russian electorate views the war ahead of regional elections in September 2023 and the Russian presidential election in 2024. A Russian insider source and independent Russian opposition news outlet Verstka both claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) initiative to increase the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30 years old caused a heated discussion among Kremlin officials.[28] The sources claimed that the Russian Security Council urged the Presidential Administration not to support the MoD’s initiative over concern that the initiative would cause public backlash and affect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings.[29] The sources reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu pushed the initiative through and maintained Putin’s support, despite the Security Council’s concerns.[30] Verstka claimed that Putin supported the MoD’s initiative after listening to Shoigu‘s arguments about the shortage of soldiers in Ukraine.[31] Verstka also reported that sources stated that United Russia officials are afraid to use the war in Ukraine in their election campaigns in upcoming regional and local elections because they are concerned about how voters will react to it.[32] Verstka‘s sources claimed that United Russia intends to highlight and appeal to local issues instead of highlighting the war in Ukraine. Verstka claimed that it has reviewed United Russia’s election materials and stated that the war is not a main theme.[33] The concern among elements of the Kremlin and United Russia indicates concern over domestic support for the war and fears that the Kremlin’s perceived electoral legitimacy could weaken in upcoming elections - though to be sure this loss of support primarily presents United Russia with a greater need to falsify election results and the possibility of local losses to other “managed opposition” parties, not a legitimate threat to its dominance of Russian politics.

Politico reported that the first batch of refurbished US Abrams tanks will likely arrive in Ukraine in September. Politico cited six US officials as saying that the US plans to deliver six to eight Abrams (two platoons) to Germany in August for refurbishment before shipping the tanks to Ukraine in September, and that the US will send a total of 31 Abrams (roughly an understrength armored battalion, at most one-third of a full Ukrainian brigade) to Ukraine.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on July 28.
• Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea likely aims to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports without committing the Black Sea Fleet to the enforcement of a naval blockade.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to reassure African partner states that Russia will maintain its economic and security commitments during the second day of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg.
• The Kremlin continues to display little interest in an unspecific peace plan focused on eliminating disruptions to international trade proposed by African heads of state.
• Russian authorities may be increasingly concerned about how the Russian electorate views the war ahead of regional elections in September 2023 and the Russian presidential election in 2024.
• Politico reported that the first batch of refurbished US Abrams tanks will likely arrive in Ukraine in September.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 28 and made advances in certain areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 28 and have reportedly advanced along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.
• The Russian Federation Council approved measures allowing the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to receive heavy military equipment and increasing the upper limit of the conscription age range from 27 years old to 30 years old.
• Russian authorities continue to deport Ukrainian teenagers to Russia under the guise of summer camp programs.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2023

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage on July 27 showing that Ukrainian forces liberated Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in western Donetsk Oblast following heavy fighting in the area.[1] Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces also made marginal advances north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Geolocated footage published on July 26 suggests that Ukrainian forces made additional advances east of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) during offensive operations on July 26.[3] Ukrainian Director of the Department of Application Planning at the Main Command of the National Guard Mykola Urshalovych stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces achieved tactical victories in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults at a lower tempo and with far less manpower near Robotyne on July 27 after Ukrainian forces launched an intense mechanized frontal assault that broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement on July 26.[5] Geolocated footage published on July 27 suggests that Ukrainian forces may be operating in areas well forward of where ISW assesses Ukrainian advances to be as a result of ISW’s intentionally conservative assessments about control of terrain (covered in more detail in Southern Axis text).[6]

The Kremlin and the wider Russian information space are intensifying efforts to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to a reporter on July 27 that in recent days Russian forces destroyed 39 armored vehicles out of 50 that Ukrainian forces committed to intensified assaults in the Zaporizhia direction.[7] Putin claimed that Russian forces also killed 60 percent of the Ukrainian personnel that conducted these assaults as well as 40 percent of Ukrainian combat aviation pilots in the area.[8] Putin has previously claimed that Russian forces have destroyed an implausible amount of Ukrainian equipment during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, although his figures concerning Ukrainian assaults in recent days indicate an inflection in his exaggeration of likely Ukrainian losses.[9] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces destroyed dozens of Ukrainian armored vehicles and celebrated the alleged losses as proof that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is stalling.[10] The Kremlin’s and the Russian information space’s framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably violates a reported Kremlin manual instructing Russian media not to downplay the potential for successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[11] The intensifying portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort suggests that the Kremlin’s policy on the coverage of the war is to bolster efforts to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.

A US official expressed caution about assessing that the July 26 uptick in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast is part of the Ukrainian main effort, tempering July 26 statements to the contrary.[12] The Washington Post cited an unspecified US official as saying that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction may be conducting shaping operations for a later counteroffensive effort, but that US officials do not assess that these operations are part of Ukraine’s main effort.[13] CNN cited two US officials as saying that Ukrainian forces have deployed the “main bulk” of their reserve forces to southern Ukraine to capitalize on recent Ukrainian gains.[14] UK Minister for the State of the Armed Forces James Heappey stated that Ukrainian forces are being “appropriately cautious” and are meeting current expectations.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West. Putin met with several African leaders at the forum, including Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Zimbabwe Emmerson Dambuzo Mnangagwa, President of the Republic of Burundi Evariste Ndayishimiye, President of Mozambique Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and President of Comoros Azali Assoumani.[16] During his speech at the plenary session of the forum, Putin emphasized the importance of expanding Russian–African cooperation and Russia’s investment in the development of African nations, notably accusing Ukraine and the West of interfering with Russia’s supply of grain and fertilizers to the African continent and claiming that Russia will provide between 25 and 50 thousand tons of grain free of charge to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somali, Central African Republic, and Eritrea over the coming months.[17] Putin announced that Russia is helping to develop over 30 energy infrastructure projects in 16 African states and called for an expansion of cultural and social integration between Russia and the African continent, stating that Russia plans to open branches of Russian universities in Africa and increase enrollment of African students in Russian educational institutions.[18]

Beyond the typical diplomatic platitudes and promises of continued cooperation and development, Putin’s rhetoric during the Russia-Africa forum does not represent a major inflection in the Kremlin’s policy toward the African continent. Putin previously signed an article published on July 24 to posture Russia’s commitment to African development and mitigate damage done to Russia’s position in Africa and his personal reputation with African leaders.[19] Putin’s and the Russian government’s reputations likely suffered due to a number of recent factors: Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure (both of which were critical for grain exports to various African countries) and his inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit because of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against him.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa. Russian milbloggers amplified photos of Prigozhin shaking hands with a Central African Republic official and the “director of Afrique media.”[20] A Russian insider source claimed that Prigozhin held private, informal meetings with representatives of an unknown number of African governments in a hotel close to the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum but did not attend the summit itself.[21] Prigozhin's continued efforts to meet with and message to African leaders are likely part of Wagner's efforts to maintain its profitable military and mining contracts in Africa. An unnamed Wagner commander who recently returned from CAR claimed on July 26 that Wagner is working on increasing its operations in Africa to fund its presence in Belarus.[22]

Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger. Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels began circulating an audio recording reportedly of Prigozhin on July 27 wherein Prigozhin praised the Nigerien military’s removal of Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum and lauded it as an act of “gaining independence,” while accusing Western nations of deliberately destabilizing the situation in Africa and supporting terrorist organizations.[23] Prigozhin suggested that a ”thousand fighters” from Wagner would be able to restore order, presumably in post-coup Niger.[24] Several Russian milbloggers responded to Prigozhin’s purported audio recording and suggested that Niger will need ”help” from Wagner similar to what Mali needed following its coup in May 2021.[25] Prigozhin is posturing Wagner as a viable security partner for Niger, which is largely consistent with ISW’s and the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) previous assessment that Wagner is likely to maintain and even expand its presence in the African continent following its July 24 armed rebellion.[26]

The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 27 that it obtained the manual but did not publish the manual itself, which reportedly directs Russian state media to frame the Baptism of Rus as “a key turning point in Russian history” and “the point of formation of statehood.”[27] The manual reportedly emphasized that a “common faith” allowed the “East Slavic tribes” to unify as “one people.”[28] The manual reportedly instructs state media to paint Russian President Vladimir Putin as the one who ”brought the mission of defending the Orthodox faith back to Russia” and reportedly labels the Ukrainian government an ”apostate regime” and a ”satanic regime” that is trying to ”destroy” Orthodoxy in Ukraine and ”the spiritual ties of the fraternal peoples.”[29] These Kremlin-dictated religion-based narratives come as Russia is itself committing systematic religious repressions and persecutions throughout Ukraine, including against Orthodox Christians, in an effort to destroy Ukrainian cultural and national identity.[30] The Kremlin reportedly issued a similar manual to state media in May aimed at controlling the narratives about a potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, and the distribution of these manuals demonstrates the Kremlin’s use of various information operations to spread propaganda messages and discredit Ukraine in the international arena.[31]

Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched two Kalibr cruise missiles that damaged port infrastructure in Odesa City.[32] Ukrainian military sources also reported that Russian forces launched eight Shahed drones and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all eight.[33]

US President Joe Biden has reportedly ordered the US government in recent days to share evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague.[34] This will be the first time the US will share evidence with the ICC as part of a criminal investigation into a country that is not a part of the ICC.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• A US official expressed caution about assessing that the July 26 uptick in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast is part of the Ukrainian main effort, tempering July 26 statements to the contrary.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa.
• Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger.
• The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives.
• Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 27 and did not make any confirmed advances.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and have advanced south of Bakhmut, in the ZaporizhiaDonetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian State Duma approved measures on July 27 aimed at clarifying confusion surrounding the recently updated laws regarding conscripts and reservists.
• Russian authorities are discriminating against Ukrainian refugees in Belgorod Oblast, Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2023

Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and several prominent milbloggers, claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an intense frontal assault towards Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement.[i] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced to within 2.5km directly east of Robotyne during the attack before Russian forces employed standard doctrinal elastic defense tactics and pushed Ukrainian troops back somewhat, although not all the way back to their starting positions.[ii]

Russian sources provided a wide range of diverging claims as to the scale of both the attack and resulting Ukrainian losses, indicating that the actual results and Ukrainian losses remain unclear. The Russian MoD claimed that up to three battalions engaged in a “massive assault” near Orikhiv, but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to suggest that such a large number of personnel (a full brigade) were involved in the attack.[iii] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used over 80 armored vehicles, and other milbloggers more conservatively claimed that the number was closer to between 30 and 40.[iv] Various Russian milbloggers additionally made disparate claims about how many armored vehicles Russian forces destroyed.[v] ISW has also not yet observed a large number of heat anomalies from NASA’s FIRMS / VIIRs sensors in this area of the frontline of the sort that have historically accompanied large, mechanized pushes.[vi] The disagreement amongst several prominent Russian sources, who have generally tended to offer more mutually consistent claims about the size of and losses resulting from previous Ukrainian attacks, indicates that the situation remains less than clear and that Ukrainian forces may have been more successful than assessed by Russian commentators.

The battlefield geometry around Robotyne, as well as the force composition of the Russian elements defending there, offer important color to speculation surrounding the Ukrainian attack and gains. Geolocated footage from July 27 shows two Ukrainian Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and a T-72 tank either disabled or abandoned about 2.5km due east of Robotyne, which is a point that is about 2.5km south of the current frontline.[vii] This geolocated point is beyond the forward-most pre-prepared Russian defensive fortifications in this area, indicating that Ukrainian forces managed to penetrate and drive through tactically challenging defensive positions. This kind of penetration battle will be one of the most difficult things for Ukrainian forces to accomplish in pursuit of deeper penetrations, as ISW has previously assessed. The defensive lines that run further south of Robotyne are likely less well-manned than these forward-most positions, considering that Russian forces have likely had to commit a significant portion of available forces to man the first line of defensive positions that are north and east of Robotyne.

Ukrainians appear to have rotated fresh forces into this area for the operation whereas Russian forces remain pinned to the line apparently without rotation, relief, or significant reinforcement in this sector. Russian milbloggers and unnamed Pentagon officials additionally noted that the Ukrainian units that participated in the July 26 attack are reserves that belong to older and more established Ukrainian brigades.[viii] These reports indicate that Ukraine may now be employing fresh and generally more experienced units in the battle, whereas the same Russian 58th Combined Arms Army elements (particularly the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) have been engaged in defensive operations in this very area continually since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in early June without relief.[ix] The introduction of fresh Ukrainian reserves to the effort, together with the geometry of Russian defensive lines and the likely degraded overall state of Russian forces in this area, may allow Ukraine to begin pursuing more successful advances south of Orikhiv in the coming weeks.

Western and Ukrainian officials suggested that the attacks towards Robotyne mark an inflection in Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort. The New York Times reported on July 27, citing two anonymous Pentagon officials, that the “main thrust” of the Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun in earnest.[x] The Western officials noted that this is an opportune moment for Ukrainian efforts given recent gradual Ukrainian operations to clear Russian defensive positions, Russian command changes following the dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov, and continued Ukrainian artillery strikes against Russian concentration areas in southern Ukraine, which are all elements that are consistent with ISW’s assessment on the state of play in southern Ukraine.[xi] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also cryptically stated in his nightly address on July 27 that Ukrainian forces “had very good results today” and that he will provide more details at a later date.[xii]

Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if the US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust. Even accepting the high estimate of three battalions as the Ukrainian force offered by the Russian MoD, three battalions comprise a single brigade, whereas Ukraine is known still to have in reserve multiple uncommitted brigades readied for the counteroffensive.

Western officials are unhelpfully raising expectations for rapid and dramatic Ukrainian advances that Ukrainian forces are unlikely to be able to meet, as well as offering forecasts of the likely Ukrainian avenues of advance that should probably not have been shared publicly. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces can make significant gains in their counteroffensive operations, but that such gains are likely to occur over a long period of time and interspersed with lulls and periods of slower and more grinding efforts as the Ukrainians come to successive Russian defensive lines and themselves require relief and rotation.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike largely aimed at rear areas in Ukraine on the night of July 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 40 missiles, including three Kalibr cruise missiles and four Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles.[xiii] Ukrainian air defenses shot down at least 36 missiles, including all three Kalibr missiles.[xiv] It is currently unconfirmed if Ukrainian air defenses shot down the four Kinzhals.[xv] The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that missiles were recorded over Kharkiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Lviv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi Oblasts.[xvi] Various Russian sources claimed that the strikes hit the Starokostyantyniv Air Base in Khmelnytski Oblast.[xvii]

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is increasing military posturing in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to forcibly stop and search civilian vessels and exert increased control in the area. The Ukrainian Military Media Center and UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces are preparing vessels on the Black Sea to “enforce a blockade on Ukraine.”[xviii] The Ukrainian Military Media Center reported that the Black Sea Fleet is increasing combat training for its surface forces and naval aviation.[xix] The Black Sea Fleet is unlikely to attempt a full blockade of Ukraine despite increased measures against civilian vessels, however. A full Russian blockade of Ukraine in the Black Sea would mean that Russian forces could fire on all vessels attempting to reach Ukraine. Russia is highly unlikely to attempt to enforce such a complete blockade lest it trigger military conflict with Black Sea littoral countries including NATO members Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey that the Kremlin has hitherto worked hard to avoid. Current Russian posturing in the Black Sea more likely suggests that Russia is setting conditions to search civilian and commercial vessels while posturing for a blockade as a means of gaining additional leverage. The UK MoD reported that the Russian corvette “Sergei Kotov” is patrolling the shipping lane between the Bosphorus Strait and Odesa Oblast and that the “Sergei Kotov” corvette may be part of a task group to intercept commercial vessels that Russian forces assess are headed to Ukraine.[xx] The Russian MoD claimed on July 20 that Russian forces would consider all vessels en route to Ukraine as potential carriers of military cargo.[xxi] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 24 that the Russian State Security Service (FSB) announced that it searched a foreign cargo ship heading from Turkey to Rostov-on-Don and denied its passage through the Kerch Strait.[xxii] The FSB claimed that the ship could be delivering explosives to Ukraine because the ship’s crew included 12 Ukrainian citizens and announced that it would search other vessels crossing Kerch Strait.[xxiii]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 26 that it authorized another presidential drawdown to provide an additional $400 million of security assistance to Ukraine.[xxiv] The DoD stated that the package will include ammunition for HIMARS, munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and other critical military equipment.[xxv]

Angry Patriots Club members may be attempting to align their movement to free former Russian officer and prominent ultranationalist milblogger Igor Girkin with outrage at an anti-war sociologist’s arrest in order to appeal to a broader audience. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 26 that Russian authorities arrested Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (which the Russian Ministry of Justice designated as a foreign agent in 2018) and professor at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences Boris Kagarlitsky on charges of “justifying terrorism” in a post on Telegram about the Ukrainian strike on the Kerch Strait Bridge in October 2022.[xxvi] The Angry Patriots Club published a Telegram post expressing solidarity with Kagarlitsky and claiming that both Girkin’s and Kagarlitsky’s arrests were politically motivated.[xxvii] The Angry Patriots acknowledged that Girkin and Kagarlitsky hold different political views but called for the freedom of political prisoners.[xxviii] Girkin’s supporters may be attempting to frame Girkin’s arrest as a fight against political repression in order to galvanize support for Girkin from beyond the narrow confines created by his ultranationalist ideology and difficult personality. ISW continues to assess that the Angry Patriots Club movement is relatively isolated in the Russian ultranationalist information space, and the Angry Patriots Club may be attempting to make Girkin’s arrest more palatable to a general audience in order to increase support for the movement to free him.[xxix]

Russia continues to find ways to remind Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow’s military and diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus is necessary. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov met in Moscow for bilateral and trilateral negotiations regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on July 25.[xxx] Lavrov walked a careful balance between mediator and participant during the trilateral negotiations, signaling Russia’s support for various Armenian and Azerbaijani positions while continuing to delay any real discussion of a long-term, effective peace agreement. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger highlighted that an assistant was caught on a live microphone, likely intentionally, telling Lavrov not to refer to Nagorno Karabakh as the “former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” because the Azerbaijanis would not appreciate it.[xxxi] The milblogger noted that this was a simple, yet effective manipulation tactic that signaled to Armenia Russia’s desire to please Azerbaijan.[xxxii] Lavrov managed to cater to Armenia as well by stating the importance of “direct dialogue between Stepanakert and Baku” and “guaranteeing the rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh” supporting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s most recent rhetoric about these issues.[xxxiii] It is likely Lavrov also secured Azerbaijan’s approval for the Armenian government to send 400 tons of humanitarian aid to the residents of Nagorno Karabakh through Russian peacekeepers during the July 25 trilateral negotiation.[xxxiv]

The Russian government may have intended for the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral meeting to reduce possible Iranian efforts to supplant Russian influence with Armenia by providing Shahed drones to Yerevan.[xxxv] Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan.[xxxvi] The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project previously assessed that Iran may expand its military support to Armenia in response to Russian “negligence” towards the Caucasus.[xxxvii] The trilateral meeting may have been an attempt to reassert Russia’s influence over Armenia vis-à-vis Iran, influence that has become particularly fragile following Russia‘s redeployment of elements of its “peacekeeping force” from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine in March 2023.[xxxviii]

A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger expressed his incredulity that the US has not provided Ukraine F-16 fighters yet and did not assess Russian deterrence or escalation cycle dynamics to be a factor. The milblogger expressed surprise at the West’s lack of progress in giving Ukraine F-16s, stating it is “not entirely clear why Washington is dragging its feet.”[xxxix] The milblogger laid out at length several hypotheses and potential explanations for the lack of progress in approving the final policy on giving Ukraine F-16s.[xl] The milblogger notably did not include the threat of Russian nuclear escalation or other deterrence factors in his list of hypotheses of why Western policymakers have not yet sent the fighters to Ukraine.[xli] ISW continues to assess that the risk of nuclear escalation remains extremely low.[xlii]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. BBC’s Russian Service reported on July 25 that Putin told Lukashenko at the beginning of their July 23 meeting that Putin was ready to adjust his schedule to prolong Lukashenko’s visit and “discuss important topics in more detail.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reported on July 25 that Putin and Lukashenko intended to “’synchronize watches’ and exchange views” but not sign any agreements during their prolonged meeting.[2] Peskov also reported that Putin and Lukashenko discussed the Wagner Group, the Union State, and external threats on the borders of Russia and Belarus.[3] Putin’s decision to prolong his meeting with Lukashenko likely shows Putin’s continued concerns about Wagner, which it appears that Lukashenko did not allay.

Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin. A Russian insider source claimed that the Wagner Group was the most important topic during the Putin-Lukashenko meeting, and that Lukashenko sought more economic assistance to Belarus through Union State programs.[4] The insider source also claimed that Putin wanted Belarus to be more involved in the war in Ukraine and rejected Lukashenko’s compromise offer to have Belarusian forces conduct a show of force on Belarus’ border with Ukraine.[5]  Lukashenko was likely trying to leverage Putin’s concern over the Wagner Group throughout the entire visit to Russia to gain favorable conditions in Belarusian-Russian relations while deflecting Putin’s demands for closer integration into the Union State and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions). The Russian State Duma adopted the second and third readings of amendments to the federal law regulating the circulation of weapons in constituent entities of the Russian Federation on July 25 that will allow heads of Russian federal subjects to create specialized state unitary enterprises.[6] Russian opposition media noted that certain intricacies in the amendments allow regional heads to create regionally based militarized state enterprises that are analogous to private military companies (PMCs) during a period of mobilization under martial law.[7] The amendments notably require regional and local budgets to finance the special enterprises, which will be equipped with small arms by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and will assist the Russian State Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and other military authorities in ensuring public order and border security.[8] The amendments would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to create the enterprises on a temporary basis and later abolish them, after which these enterprises would have to transfer all small arms and other weapons back to the Russian MoD within a month.[9]

The Kremlin is likely trying to balance two competing security requirements—the need for combat capable formations that can fulfill roles left by the Wagner Group following their armed rebellion and relocation to Belarus and the desire not to recreate the systemic threats to the Russian state that Wagner’s independence posed. The creation of formal militarized state enterprises that will fulfill border security and domestic law enforcement tasks is likely intended in part to remedy the gap left by Wagner. However, the fact that these enterprises are so heavily decentralized and will operate under the auspices of internal security organs on the basis and expense of regional and local governments suggests that the Russian military leadership is very alive to the risk of recreating a powerful Wagner analogue and is therefore trying to limit the scale and power each individual enterprise can obtain. These state enterprises also appear to be a renewed iteration of the failed volunteer battalion model that Russian regions employed throughout the summer of 2022, but these enterprises will operate under formalized and consolidated domestic security organs such as the FSB, likely to mitigate many of the weaknesses in the old volunteer battalion system.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25.[10] Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made tactically significant gains south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) directions.[12] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 750 meters in the direction of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces made marginal advances west of Orikhiv.[13] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are dying at a rate eight times higher than Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area and 5.3 times higher in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations aim to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[15]

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces recorded the launch of about 10 Shahed drones, five of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[16] Ukrainian military sources reported drones over Kyiv City and Cherkasy, Sumy, Poltava, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[17] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that this was the sixth drone strike on the capital city in July alone.[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that the strikes targeted Ukrainian concentration areas, Western-provided military equipment and other military infrastructure, but Ukrainian sources noted that many of the drones struck open fields and empty hangars.[19]

The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest. The Angry Patriots Club, known in the Russian information space for its virulent pro-war, ultranationalist rhetoric and willingness to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Kremlin, and even Putin himself, has unexpectedly postured itself as an organization concerned about the rule of law following Girkin’s arrest.[20] The organization is attempting to cast Girkin as an opposition figure in Russian politics by arguing that his arrest is unlawful and by launching the social media campaign “#FreedomtoStrelkov.”[21] The Angry Patriots Club may be employing rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest as an appeal to Putin, who has historically (and ironically) portrayed himself as a defender of Russian democracy and has seemingly been hesitant to abandon the veil of legitimacy that Russia’s democratic institutions provide his authoritarian and corrupt rule.[22] The Angry Patriots Club may believe that the veneer of legality in Russia is personally important to Putin and that Putin might feel compelled to intervene if he believes Girkin’s arrest and detention is illegal. It is a further irony that Girkin’s statements seem straightforwardly to violate Russia’s repressive laws prohibiting criticism of the war and its leaders.[23] Russian opposition figures Alexei Navalny and Mikhail Khodorkovsky amplified the Angry Patriots Club’s framing of Girkin as a political prisoner and his arrest as illegal, though it is unclear how Navalny and Khodorkovsky intend for their support to affect Girkin’s detention and eventual sentencing.[24]

Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow. The Washington Post reported on July 25 that Ukrainian and European security officials stated that Putin did not issue orders for most of June 24 despite warnings from Russian security services about the likelihood of the rebellion at least two or three days beforehand.[25] Russian security services reportedly increased security at several strategic locations, including the Kremlin, in the days before the rebellion but took no other actions.[26] Regional Russian officials reportedly had to decide how to respond to the rebellion, and regional military and security officials were reportedly the ones that decided not to try to stop Wagner convoys by force.[27] The Kremlin’s and Putin’s alleged lack of response indicates that the Russian security apparatus had likely not prepared for a direct challenge to the Russian military leadership and likely did not have the capacity to quickly bring the rebellion to an end. The Kremlin is likely aware that its paralysis highlighted a degree of regime instability and appears to be consolidating Russia’s internal security apparatus in the Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) to prepare for further internal threats and to signal resolve.[28] Putin’s failure to act quickly also suggests that he is uncertain about his ability to rally the Russian elite around him and may indicate how factional internal Kremlin politics have become. A senior NATO official reportedly stated that unspecified senior Russian political figures in Moscow appeared ready to rally behind Prigozhin in the event that Wagner’s rebellion succeeded.[29] The Kremlin is likely trying to identify Russian elites who may have been prepared to side with Prigozhin and likely views regional officials’ decisions not to stop Wagner's advance as an indicator of disloyalty. Tula Oblast Governor and former head of Russia’s Special Operations Forces Alexei Dyumin has likely drawn further suspicion due to his previous affiliations with Prigozhin and his role in the negotiations that ended the rebellion.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin.
• Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions).
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25.
• Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25.
• The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest.
• Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Svatove, Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area and made claimed advances near Svatove, Kreminna, and Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in the Bakhmut area, in some areas along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and west of Orikhiv.
• US intelligence officials warned on July 25 that Russia’s drone supply will dramatically increase as a result of continued bilateral Russo-Iranian cooperation.
• Russian officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2023

Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) suppressed two Ukrainian UAVs that detonated, damaging two non-residential buildings. One drone detonated on Komsomolsky Prospekt within 500 meters of the MoD building and within 200 meters of a reported secret Russian General Staff Main Directorate (GRU) building. Russian sources reported that the second drone hit a business center on Likhachev Prospekt. CNN reported that an unspecified Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted the attack. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that unspecified UAVs attacked the capital and warned that more UAV attacks against Russia will occur. Russian opposition source The Insider reported that Russian authorities banned Russian television channels from covering the drone strikes, citing sources in Russian state media channels. Russian milbloggers had a muted reaction to these strikes; some criticized the Russian air defenses for allowing the drones to penetrate that far into Moscow, while others argued that the informational victory of such attacks is minimal and short-lived.

Likely Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, temporarily disrupting Russian logistics through Crimea on July 24. The Russian MFA accused Ukrainian forces of attacking occupied Crimea with 17 UAVs, and the MFA claimed that Russian EW suppressed 14 UAVs while air defenses shot down three UAVs. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that one UAV hit an ammunition depot in Dzhankoy Raion. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched three Storm Shadow missiles at an ammunition depot in Vilne (19km southwest of Dzhankoy) and a repair base in Novostepne (immediately south of Dzhankoy). Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andyushchenko reported that strikes injured three Russian personnel at the Vesele military airfield (10km southwest of Dzhankoy) and reported additional explosions near Krasnohvardiiske (20km southwest of Dzhankoy). Aksyonov temporarily suspended road traffic on the Dzhankoy-Simferopol highway as well as rail traffic through Dzhankoy Raion. Aksyonov also announced the evacuation of all civilians within a five-kilometer radius of the strike area in Dzhankoy Raion. Crimean occupation advisor Oleg Kryuchkov stated that occupation authorities will strictly monitor social media posts that could help Ukrainian forces identify targets in Crimea.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an article published on July 24 likely intended to mitigate damage to Russia’s position in Africa and his own reputation resulting from Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia grain deal, Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port facilities, and Putin’s inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued for him. Putin outlined Russia’s goals for establishing partner relationships with Africa and called for the continuation of “traditionally close cooperation on the world stage.” Putin also emphasized Russia’s trade with African economic partners and the importance of “uninterrupted food supply” for the “maintenance of the political stability of African states,” accusing the collective West of exploiting the grain deal for its own benefit at the expense of Russia and countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. Putin’s article follows Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal and attacks that have destroyed tens of thousands of tons of Ukrainian grain and Ukrainian facilities essential to transporting the grain to areas of Africa that rely heavily on Ukrainian grain. Putin is also likely attempting to mitigate the opportunity cost and embarrassment of his inability to personally attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa due to the ICC arrest warrant.

Russia conducted another drone strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight on July 23-24. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched Iranian-made Shahed drones at port infrastructure in Reni, along the Danube River in far western Odesa Oblast, within a few kilometers of the Romanian border. Odesa Oblast Head Oleh Kiper also stated that the drone strikes damaged 25 architectural monuments in Odesa Oblast, including the Transfiguration Orthodox Cathedral in Odesa City. Russian sources claimed that Ukraine used the port infrastructure in Reni for the export of weapons, equipment, and grain.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 24 and have reportedly advanced in certain areas. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that over the past week, Ukrainian forces have advanced gradually on the southern flank of Bakhmut and in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions. Malyar also noted that these counteroffensive actions are taking place against the backdrop of continued Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Avdiivka, and Marinka directions. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast south of Velyka Novosilka and advanced south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff indicated that Ukrainian troops are continuing offensive actions in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions but did not specify locations or outcomes.

The Kremlin continues to codify domestic repression into Russian law, generating minimal opposition from select Russian lawmakers. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed laws on July 24 allowing the Russian Ministry of Justice to conduct unscheduled inspections of those classified as “foreign agents” under new Russian laws and requiring Russian citizens, government officials, and organizations to comply with restrictions on foreign agents. Putin also signed a law that would fine citizens up to 50,000 rubles (about $550), officials up to 100,000 rubles (about $1,100), and organizations up to 300,000 (about $3,300) rubles for violating the law on foreign agents. Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on July 24 that the Russian Federation Council proposed a bill that would allow Russian authorities to deprive natural born Russian citizens of citizenship due to certain “political crimes” and “desertion.” Vashnye Istorii also noted, however, three senators Olga Bas (representing the Luhansk People’s Republic), Ekaterina Altabayeva, and Sergei Kolbin (both representing Sevastopol in occupied Crimea) withdrew their authorship of the bill, potentially due to nuances and intricacies within the ever-expanding new body of Russian law pertaining to citizenship in occupied areas. Federation Council Constitutional Legislation and State Building Committee Head Andrey Klishas criticized the bill and claimed that it would violate the Russian Constitution, likely referencing Article 6 which states that a Russian citizen may not be deprived of their citizenship or of the right to change citizenship status. Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russia has already adopted a law that would allow Russian authorities to revoke Russian citizenship from an individual who did not acquire Russian citizenship by birth for posing what the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) deems a “security threat.” ISW has previously reported on measures taken by Russian authorities to intensify domestic repression and encourage self-censorship through various amendments to and manipulations of domestic law.

Key Takeaways:

• Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24.
• Likely Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, temporarily disrupting Russian logistics through Crimea on July 24.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an article published on July 24 likely intended to mitigate damage to Russia’s position in Africa and his own reputation resulting from Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia grain deal, Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port facilities, and Putin’s inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued for him.
• Russia conducted another drone strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight on July 23-24.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 24 and have reportedly advanced in certain areas.
• The Kremlin continues to codify domestic repression into Russian law, generating minimal opposition from select Russian lawmakers.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and in the Bakhmut area and reportedly advanced in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Orikhiv area.
• Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed successes of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian officials continue to reveal the involvement of Belarusian entities in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia. Putin made several significant symbolic gestures during his July 23 meeting with Lukashenko, suggesting that Putin sought to project power and confidence in his own supremacy over the Prigozhin-aligned St. Petersburg-based faction. Putin took Lukashenko to visit Kronstadt in St. Petersburg – the historically significant island fortress where Russian soldiers and sailors conducted a famous unsuccessful anti-Bolshevik insurrection in early 1921 that the Soviet government ultimately suppressed.[1] Putin and Lukashenko toured Kronstadt with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s younger daughter Ksenia Shoigu.[2] Both Beglov and Shoigu are personal enemies of Prigozhin, and Putin‘s public meeting with Beglov, Shoigu‘s daughter, and Lukashenko on the historic grounds of the failed Kronstadt rebellion was almost certainly intended to signal Putin’s and his loyalist cadre‘s defeat of Prigozhin‘s armed rebellion and Prigozhin’s St. Petersburg-based supporters.[3] Putin also made an unusual effort to take photographs with crowds of local Russian citizens, including children, while at Kronstadt, likely to present himself as a popular and beloved leader among the Russian people.[4] These symbolic gestures indicate that Putin is concerned about his perceived popularity, the security of his regime, and the array of factions competing for power within the high echelons of Russian governance.

Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.[5] Lukashenko’s statements were likely meant to make Putin reflect on the uncomfortable (for Putin) fact that Wagner’s new garrison in Belarus puts its forces half as far from Moscow as Wagner’s previous base in southern Russia. The Wagner Group’s previous base in Krasnodar Krai was about 1,370 km from Moscow, whereas its new base in Belarus is about 720 km along an excellent military highway.

Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West. The leaders amplified their false claims that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has failed.[6] Senior Western and Ukrainian leaders--and ISW--continue to assess that it is too early to evaluate Ukraine’s counteroffensive since Ukraine still has significant uncommitted prepared forces and retains the ability to launch decisive operations at times and places of its choosing.[7] Lukashenko and Putin also reiterated an information operation that the Wagner Group poses a threat to Poland.[8] There is no indication that Wagner fighters in Belarus have the heavy weaponry necessary to mount a serious offensive against Ukraine or Poland without significant rearmament, as it was a condition of the Putin-Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal ending the armed rebellion that Wagner surrender such weapons to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Maxar imagery of the main Wagner base in Tsel, Asipovichy, collected at an oblique angle on July 23 indicates that the vehicles currently parked in and around the vehicle storage area are primarily hundreds of cars, small trucks, and approximately 35 semi-trailers.[9] Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland or Ukraine, for that matter, until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment. They pose no meaningful threat to NATO even then.

Caption: Wagner Group Field camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus. Collected on July 23, 2023.

Credit: Satellite image ©2023 Maxar Technologies.

Caption: Wagner Group Field camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus. Collected on July 23, 2023.

Credit: Satellite image ©2023 Maxar Technologies.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[10] This figure is largely consistent with ISW’s current assessment of control of terrain. Analysts can employ several methods to calculate control of terrain with varying results depending on the cartographical projection used and other factors. An estimate using ISW’s control of terrain data and the Mercator projection indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated about 53 percent of the land that Russian forces captured since February 2022. Estimates made using different data sources, measurement methods, or projections will generate different numbers. Factors, such as higher confidence about unconfirmed Russian claimed territorial gains, can impact such estimations as well. ISW appreciates and closely studies government officials’ statements about control of terrain geometry to cross-reference, confirm, and where necessary correct assessments.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23. Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Ukrainian forces made some advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[11] Geolocated footage published on July 22 also shows that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Kamianske, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted additional ground attacks south of Orikhiv near Robotyne (12km south).[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in both areas of the front.[13] Some Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks and reportedly made advances near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[14]

Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 19 missiles, including five Onyx, five Iskander-K, four Kalibr, two Kh-22, and two Iskander-M missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down four Kalibr and five Iskander-K missiles.[15] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian strikes hit the Odesa Transfiguration Cathedral, and Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the city center strikes injured 19 civilians.[16] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Russian strikes against Odesa City and Oblast intend to disrupt Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and intimidate international partners working to restore the Black Sea Grain Initiative deal.[17] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi warned that Russian forces are also evaluating Ukrainian energy infrastructure to identify critical infrastructure objects, presumably to target in future strikes.[18]

Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin. Angry Patriots Club member and leader of the “Civil Solidarity” movement Georgy Fedorov claimed on July 22 that the Club developed a strategy and specific action plan for a campaign to defend Girkin and will be reaching out to grassroots supporters for help.[19] Fedorov also announced that the Angry Patriots Club will release a political statement sometime next week.[20]   A Russian insider source claimed that Girkin planned to start formal legal procedures to create a political party in the spring of 2024.[21] The insider source claimed that Girkin had discussed with Angry Patriots members the possibility of holding a founding party congress in fall 2023 and plans to form regional branches for the Angry Patriots Club.[22] The Angry Patriots Club has opened a St Petersburg regional chapter and published a 17-point political resolution on June 26 that signaled its interest in participating in Russian politics.[23] The Angry Patriots Club’s political resolution explicitly states that it will use legal means to compel Russian leadership to ”end the policy of appeasement and behind-the-scenes agreement with the West” and declares its ”intention to claim political power.”[24] The Angry Patriots Club’s resolution indicates that this section of the pro-war community may have attempted to set conditions for future political actions opposing figures in the Kremlin whom the Angry Patriots Club believes seek to end the war. Girkin previously claimed that there is a faction within the Kremlin arguing in favor of freezing the front line in Ukraine and negotiating with the West, and the Angry Patriots appeared to be preparing to explicitly challenge this faction through a political project.[25] Factions within the Kremlin are likely aiming to maneuver for more influence against the backdrop of Russia’s 2024 presidential elections, and Girkin’s alleged plans to explicitly cast himself and his affiliates as political actors ahead of the elections likely threatened some of these factions.

Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure. Angry Patriots Club member Yevgeny Mikhailov continued to criticize the Kremlin, calling Girkin’s arrest a ”gross mistake” and highlighting the double standards that Russian authorities use for prominent Russian officials who have criticized Russian forces’ conduct in the war in Ukraine.[26] Mikhailov noted the hypocrisy of arresting a ”Russian patriot” who he claimed ”led the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics to victory in 2014” while allowing Russian State Duma Deputy Sergei Morozov to go unpunished for saying that officers who sent mobilized personnel into combat without preparation “should be shot themselves.”[27] Another Angry Patriots member, Vladimir Grubnik, expressed his loyalty to Girkin claiming that he joined at Girkin’s invitation and would leave the organization if Girkin chose to leave.[28] Grubnik claimed that 95 percent of the people joined the Angry Patriots Club because of Girkin’s personality and reputation.[29] The continued support for Girkin despite his arrest suggests that Girkin established a strong personal loyalty among his affiliates reminiscent of other ultranationalist figures, particularly Prigozhin’s support among Wagner personnel and affiliated milbloggers.[30]

The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on July 21 that Russian law enforcement is investigating Angry Patriots Club Chair Pavel Gubarev for extremism because of his Telegram posts.[31] Milbloggers outside of Girkin’s relatively isolated Angry Patriots Club have notably not commented on Girkin’s arrest, suggesting a fragmentation in the Russian ultranationalist community along factional affiliations and ideological differences on Russia’s approach to the war in Ukraine. Continued Russian law enforcement censorship of Angry Patriots members likely indicates that the Kremlin does not intend to censor the wider ultranationalist community at this time and is likely isolating this round of censorship primarily to the Angry Patriots movement and their affiliates.

The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22. Russian law enforcement found “IKS Holding” Head Anton Cherepennikov dead in his office on July 22 and later claimed that Cherepennikov suffocated during a xenon gas therapy session.[32] IKS Holding owns the developer of the YADRO data storage system, which Russian authorities reportedly use in efforts to monitor Russian internet users, and the Citadel Group, which produces operational-search measures that Russian special services use to listen to phone calls and monitor internet activities.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia.
• Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.
• Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas.
• Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin.
• Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure.
• The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
• The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly made tactically significant gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area, and reportedly made gains near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas but did not advance.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities are bringing foreign citizens to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter demographics.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2023

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area) and Melitopol directions (western Zaporizhia Oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled 14 Ukrainian attacks south of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, and in the Bakhmut area. The Ukrainian General Staff did not publish a situation report about its counteroffensive operations on July 22.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel. Zelensky stated at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that Ukrainian forces had plans to launch counteroffensive operations in the spring but that a lack of munitions and military equipment, such as mine-clearing equipment, and continued Ukrainian training abroad necessitated a delay. Zelensky noted that the delay in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations allowed Russian forces to establish minefields and multiple defensive lines. ISW assessed in January 2023 that the provision of Western weapons and materiel to Ukraine has been essential to Ukraine’s previous ability to conduct successful counteroffensive operations and that delays between Western pledges to send higher-end Western systems to Ukraine and the arrival of those systems likely hinder Ukraine’s ability to initiate and sustain large-scale counteroffensive operations. Zelensky stated that counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo due to ongoing mine-clearing operations. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on July 21 at the Aspen Security Forum that it is too early to draw conclusions about Ukrainian counteroffensive operations and that Ukraine will likely “make a profound difference” on the battlefield as Kyiv commits all of the forces that Ukraine prepared for the counteroffensive.

Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor. Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems of the General Staff Colonel Serhiy Baranov stated on July 22 that Ukrainian missile and artillery units are responsible for approximately 90 percent of Russian losses. Baranov stated that Ukrainian missile and artillery units have created a long-range “fire fist” thanks to Western high-precision missiles and artillery systems and that Ukrainian strikes are so powerful and accurate that Russian forces can no longer conduct effective counterbattery fire. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on July 22 that Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition concentrations in deep rear areas are causing logistical issues for the Russian military. Humenyuk noted that this trend is reflected in decreased Russian shelling in Kherson Oblast, which indicates that Russian forces are experiencing “shell hunger” in the area. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi compared Ukraine’s counteroffensive to boxing on July 13 and stated that Ukraine intends to “hold the opponent at arm’s length” in order to avoid close combat because Ukraine can effectively defeat Russian forces from a long distance, likely referencing Ukraine’s continued interdiction campaign in eastern and southern Ukraine. Baranov’s, Humenyuk’s, and Tarnavskyi’s statements suggest that the Ukrainian military is successfully carrying out this interdiction campaign. This campaign is a central aspect of Ukraine’s plan to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported on July 22 that Ukrainian forces destroyed an oil depot and ammunition depot near Oktyabrske, Krasnohvardiiske Raion, Crimea. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck an airfield near Oktyabrske where Russian forces have reportedly been stockpiling equipment for a month. Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot, causing it to explode and prompting occupation officials to evacuate residents within a five-kilometer radius of the depot. Aksyonov also stated that Russian authorities suspended rail traffic on the Kerch Strait bridge to minimize risk. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two Storm Shadow cruise missiles, while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used an unspecified number of drones for the strike. ISW cannot confirm what kind of weapons Ukrainian forces used in this strike. A prominent Russian milblogger tied today’s strike to Ukraine’s previous strikes on Russian military warehouses in Crimea and the Chonhar and Kerch Strait bridges. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian strikes are aimed at disrupting Russian logistics and creating “shell hunger” in Russia’s forces fighting in southern Ukraine.

Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull. The intensity of Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine has steadily decreased since July 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched only five Shahed drones from the southeast direction – all of which Ukrainian air defense reportedly intercepted – on July 22. In comparison, Russian forces launched 19 Shahed drones, four Iskander missiles, and three Kalibr missiles against Ukraine on July 21. Russian forces launched seven Onyx cruise missiles, four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, three Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and 19 Iranian-made Shahed drones on July 20. Russian forces fired even more ordnance at Ukraine on July 18 and 19, respectively.

Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely had the backing of an unknown silovik, possibly within the FSB since Girkin was a former FSB officer and consistently used passports under fictitious names that he received from the FSB. Russian sources, including the Angry Patriots Club, amplified a document from Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, on July 22 purporting to show that FSB investigators initiated the criminal case against Girkin on July 18 and that the Moscow Department of the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and Combating Terrorism (SZKSBT) provided the materials for the case. Girkin previously suggested that the head of the SZKSBT’s Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS), Lieutenant General Aleksey Zhalo, censored Girkin’s July 9 speaking engagement at a bookstore in St. Petersburg. Zhalo and Girkin have had a longstanding feud after Girkin publicly criticized Zhalo for the arrest of ultranationalist figures in 2018 and for failing to combat the Ukrainian Azov Regiment’s recruitment measures.

The involvement of the SZKSBT in Girkin’s case may be indicative of this personal struggle, although it may also suggest a degree of factionalism within the FSB itself. The alleged document also states that the FSB’s Center for Criminalistics (TsST) formally assessed on July 17 that Girkin’s May 25, 2022 Telegram posts, likely referencing comments he made criticizing a lack of payments to Russian personnel, constituted a crime. The TsST and SZKSBT may have approved the initiation of Girkin’s criminal case because FSB leadership decided to stop protecting Girkin as he increasingly became more adversarial towards the Kremlin. It is also possible that the two FSB entities acted on longstanding desires to arrest Girkin after a potential shift in the balance of power in the Kremlin to the FSB’s detriment. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov reportedly secured security guarantees for Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in negotiations to end Wagner’s June 24 rebellion and may have lost what appeared to be the Kremlin’s increasing backing for the FSB. Girkin himself recently claimed that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin to favor factions hostile to the FSB and other Russian security organs. Russian authorities’ recent initiation of criminal cases against other prominent Telegram administrators and ultranationalist figures with connections to the FSB and Russian security services suggests that select Russian officials may be trying to undermine the reputation of these security structures in the wake of a potential shift in the influence of Kremlin factions.

Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to the Russian leadership. Angry Patriots Club members gathered at the Moscow Meshansky Court on July 21 and denounced the court’s charges against Girkin and its decision to remand Girkin at an unspecified pre-trial detention center until September 18. Angry Patriots Club Chairman Pavel Gubarev stated in front of the court that the group would fight for Girkin’s release by any legal means and accused Russian leadership of using all of its resources to knock Girkin out of his “public work.” Angry Patriots member and the coordinator for the Other Russia Party, Eduard Limonov, announced in front of the court that the Angry Patriots Club will launch a public campaign defending Girkin as a “political prisoner.” Russian authorities detained Gubarev, Limonov, and Angry Patriots member Yan Sidorov for their demonstrations in front of the court, but later released them. Girkin’s Telegram channel posted on July 22 a screed against Russian authorities for punishing Girkin, a “patriot... who gave his whole life to the service of the motherland,” while allowing those that took part in Wagner’s rebellion to escape punishment. Girkin’s Telegram signed the post as “the Russian Movement in Support of Igor Strelkov” indicating that Girkin’s affiliates intend to galvanize widespread public support for Girkin. It is unclear if Girkin’s affiliates, specifically those in the Angry Patriots Club, will succeed in this effort given that they represent a small, insular group within the wider Russian ultranationalist community.

Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space. Russian milbloggers notably did not express anger at Girkin’s arrest as they have in previous instances when Russian authorities have attempted to censor ultranationalist figures. Russian milbloggers recently decried Russian authorities charging pro-war Russian military doctor Yuri Yevich with discrediting the Russian military for offering a negative assessment of the state of Russian combat medicine. The milbloggers defended Yevich and criticized Russian authorities for targeting someone they deemed to be a Russian patriot. Outrage at Girkin’s arrest and the subsequent defense of his patriotism was limited to members and supporters of the relatively isolated and small Angry Patriots Club, which Girkin launched in April, by contrast. Girkin’s critics in the Russian ultranationalist information space notably did not celebrate his arrest, however. The lack of widespread outrage among milbloggers suggests that Girkin’s arrest is unlikely to deeply agitate the majority of the Russian ultranationalist community and Russian military personnel, contrary to some Western reporting. The tepid response from Russian milbloggers concerning Girkin’s arrest and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers’ continued support for Prigozhin after the Wagner rebellion likely indicates an increasing fragmentation within the Russian ultranationalist community along factional affiliations and significant ideological differences about Russia’s approach to the war in Ukraine.

Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian insider sources claimed on July 22 that Russian Duma Deputy Oleg Matveychev recently submitted a report to the Russian Presidential Administration proposing to recognize Girkin as a foreign agent in support of an overall effort to encourage self-censorship among jingoistic patriots that criticize the Russian leadership. ISW cannot verify these claims, although they suggest that the Kremlin may have been in active discussions about how it could silence the section of the ultranationalist community that Girkin represents. Putin has routinely sought to maintain relationships with select milbloggers in a bid to leverage their connections to the wider Russian ultranationalist community, and Girkin’s arrest does not likely portend a Kremlin effort to reverse course on courting the increasingly prominent ultranationalist milblogger community. Girkin’s arrest does suggest that the Kremlin views those whose criticism passes certain not entirely clear boundaries as a threat, particularly following the Wagner Group rebellion that aimed to replace Russia’s military leadership.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel.
• Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign.
• Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull.
• Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continues to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to Russian leadership.
• Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space.
• Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area but did not make gains.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Bakhmut areas and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances in the Kupyansk area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make advances.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances.
• Prominent Russian Federation Council members opposed a bill aimed at increasing the upper age limit for the conscription age while maintaining the lower limit of 18.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023

The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. The Russian Investigative Committee arrested Girkin on July 21, and Girkin will be held until September 18 on extremism changes.[1] Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, reported that representatives from the Russian Investigative Committee detained Girkin at his home in Moscow, and noted later that the Moscow’s Meshansky Court arrested Girkin and that he will be held until September 18 on extremism charges.[2] Girkin unsuccessfully attempted to argue in the court that he is not a high flight risk due to his sentence at the Hague Tribunal, but the court cited Girkin’s notoriety and “connections in law enforcement” as the reasons for his immediate incarceration.[3] Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, argued that Russian law enforcement is prosecuting Girkin for his May 25, 2023 Telegram posts, which reportedly discussed the lack of payments to servicemen of the 105th and 107th airborne (VDV) regiments.[4] Court documents, however, indicate that Russian authorities opened a case against Girkin on July 18 - the day on which Girkin published several harsh critiques of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[5] Girkin had been consistently criticizing Putin prior to July 18, however, but his past criticisms had not triggered an arrest.[6] Members of the Girkin-led “Angry Patriots Club” gathered for a small protest outside of the court demanding Girkin’s release.[7] Some sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest followed his conflict with a fellow Angry Patriots Club member about the Wagner Group.[8] Other sources speculated that Wagner complaints about Girkin may have triggered his arrest.[9] One source claimed that the arrest is related to Russian authorities targeting Russian “patriots” deemed disloyal to Putin.[10]

Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24. A Russian source affiliated with the Russian security services leaked a document – approved after the Wagner rebellion – in which the Russian Presidential Administration purportedly ordered the Russian authorities to “take repressive measures against those who are insane, including Strelkov-Girkin.”[11] The document additionally targeted several high-profile propagandists including Margarita Simonyan, prominent milbloggers, Russian State Duma deputies with extensive online presence, and Prigozhin. Russian insider sources have previously claimed that Kremlin factions have begun a struggle for control over the Russian information space and that First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko has been attempting to undermine Simonyan.[12] The Russian Investigative Committee – the government organization that reportedly arrested Girkin – is a structure subordinated to Putin. ISW previously reported that Kiriyenko has been notably expanding his control over Russian social media outlets and increasing his reach in the Russian federal government since Prigozhin’s rebellion.[13]

Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely has the backing of an unknown silovik – possibly within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) – who promoted their interests by using Girkin as a conduit to reveal select information to Russia’s online ultranationalist community.[14] Russian authorities arrested on July 14 former FSB officer Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly ran several popular insider Telegram channels that speculated on internal Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) dynamics between different factions.[15] Russian authorities also initiated a criminal case against Girkin’s affiliate, former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, on charges of discrediting the Russian Armed Forces on July 18 – the same day on which Girkin’s criminal charge was opened.[16] Girkin himself was an FSB officer and had been consistently using passports under fictitious names that he received from the FSB.[17] Girkin recently accused the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) of deliberately censoring him by interfering with his presentations at a St. Petersburg bookstore on July 9.[18] The court publicized Girkin’s court proceedings, and the Russian media had been consistently televising Polyakov’s arrest and raids of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s property – and it is possible that select Russian officials are trying to undermine the reputation of a security structure or of an affiliated silovik who protected Girkin.[19] One milblogger observed that the media attention around Polyakov’s arrest suggests that some unnamed figure is attempting to ruin the FSB’s reputation.[20]

Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power. Girkin claimed on July 12 that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin in favor of the group that reportedly includes Kiriyenko.[21] Girkin claimed that members of the “Ozero Cooperative” – an association unifying the dachas of Putin and several members of his inner circle in Leningrad Oblast – want to oust Putin in favor of one of its own members, such as Prigozhin or Kiriyenko. Girkin warned that the “Ozero Cooperative” members will target the Ministry of Defense, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, the FSB, and other structures outside the control of the presidential administration. While Girkin’s specific affiliations remain unknown, the recent crackdowns on ultranationalist figures in connection with the Russian security services are likely a public manifestation of a significant change within the Kremlin’s power politics.

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of three Kaliber missiles, three of four Iskander missiles, and 13 of 19 Shahed UAVs launched at areas in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces also launched one Kh-22, one S-300 surface-to-air, and six Onyx missiles.[22] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that seven of the missiles damaged an unspecified infrastructure facility in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion just southwest of Odesa City.[23] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces began targeting agricultural infrastructure including destroying 100 tons of peas and 20 tons of barely in strikes on a granary after three consecutive nights of targeting port infrastructure.[24] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk and Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are targeting Ukraine with specific missiles and tactics to complicate Ukraine’s ability to detect and intercept the missiles.[25]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets. Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry Sergei Vershinin stated on July 21 that the Russian MoD’s July 19 announcement that the Russian military will consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo vessels meant that Russian forces will inspect the ships.[26] The Russian MoD’s announcement, however, still indicates that Russian forces intend to treat civilian ships as legitimate military targets, and even Vershinin’s interpretation of the announcement states that Russian forces will board and possibly seize foreign civilian vessels.

Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West. Vershinin also argued that the July 22, 2022 memorandum underpinning the Black Sea Grain Initiative remains valid because neither Russia nor the United Nations (UN) gave notification about the termination of the memorandum that the UN, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine signed.[27] Vershinin justified Russia’s exit from the grain deal by accusing Ukrainian forces of using grain corridors to conduct “terrorist attacks” against Russia, which is consistent with prior Russian official and milblogger narratives to justify Russia’s exit from the deal during periods of its renewal.[28]

The Russian MFA is likely trying to assert that Russia is still a de jure participant in the agreement despite its exit from the grain deal in an effort to leave open a channel for Russia to renegotiate the grain deal on conditions more favorable to Russia rather than negotiating an entirely new one. Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bondar reported on July 21 that the Joint Coordination Center in Istanbul, which monitors the grain corridors in the Black Sea, has stopped operating and that all Russian personnel at the center have left.[29] The Joint Coordination Center’s halted operations indicate that Russia is engaging in efforts to further remove itself from the grain deal, although in ways that it could easily reverse.

Putin delivered an array of demands for Russia’s return to the agreement on July 19, notably including the lifting of sanctions on Russian grain and fertilizer deliveries and the reconnection of Russian banks servicing food supplies to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) banking system.[30] The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation in the Black Sea likely aim to pressure the West to acquiesce to these demands among other things.[31] The Kremlin routinely engages in escalatory rhetoric aimed at prompting Western concessions and often will have some officials promote that rhetoric while having other officials feign willingness to engage in negotiations.[32]

Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.[33] Putin’s rhetoric heavily drew upon historical parallels meant to evoke fear and distrust between European countries and the United States as well as between Ukraine and Poland. Putin’s rhetoric is consistent with prior rhetoric from Russian senior officials meant to sow distrust between Ukraine and its allies, undermine ongoing Western security assistance to Ukraine, and encourage Western states to push Ukraine prematurely into negotiations with Russia.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and closer to Pryyutne (12km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, where heavy fighting continues in the Orikhovo-Vasylivka-Paraskoviivka (up to 8km north of Bakhmut) and the Klischiivka-Andriivka (7km to 10km southwest of Bakhmut) directions.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved success in the Novodarivka-Pryyutne (13km to 16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) direction in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area as well as the Novodanylivka-Verbove (up to 16km southeast of Orikhiv) and Novodanylvika-Robotyne (up to 12km south of Orikhiv) directions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[36] US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on July 20 that Ukrainian forces have started to use US-provided cluster munitions and are using them effectively against Russian defensive formations.[37] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns stated on July 21 during a speech at the Aspen Institute that Russian defenses in Ukraine have a number of structural flaws, including low morale and disorder among Russia’s political and military leadership.[38]

Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger released an interview with an alleged unnamed Wagner platoon commander on July 21. The platoon commander claimed that none of the Wagner personnel he knows signed contracts with the Russian MoD except for fighters whom Wagner fired for drunkenness and looting and a Wagner commander with the surname Troshev (callsign “Seda”).[39] Putin notably claimed that he offered Wagner fighters the option to serve under a Wagner commander with the callsign “Seda” at the June 29 meeting with Prigozhin and Wagner commanders.[40] The platoon commander claimed that the goal of the Wagner armed rebellion on July 24 was to protest the “lawlessness” of the Russian military command who attempted to disband Wagner by forcing all volunteers to sign MoD contracts by July 1. The platoon commander expressed his dedication to Wagner by stating that he would not care if the MoD killed him, but he would not “disgrace [his] name or the name of Wagner PMC.”[41] He also claimed that Wagner would not have existed without Prigozhin, that all Wagner fighters took an oath to Prigozhin and to an unnamed Wagner commander (likely Wagner Group co-founder and commander Dmitry Utkin), and therefore, that they would remain with them.[42] ISW has consistently observed Wagner-affiliated sources voicing their support for Prigozhin despite Kremlin efforts to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation.[43] ISW has notably not observed Wagner-affiliated sources refusing to support Prigozhin or attempting to separate Wagner from Prigozhin.

French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21. Bonn told a CNN journalist at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that China is supplying “massively [sic] military capabilities to Russia.”[44] CNN later quoted unspecified French officials as clarifying Bonne’s intent to speak of non-lethal aid, however.[45]

A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.[46] The milblogger amplified footage of alleged personnel of the 7th VDV division denying Kornev’s dismissal as well as speculations that Russian authorities may intend to arrest VDV commander Mikhail Teplinsky.[47] ISW cannot confirm Kornev’s dismissal.

Key Takeaways:

• The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
• Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
• Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
• The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
• Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
• Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
• French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
• A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
• Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2023

Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched seven Onyx cruise missiles, four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, three Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and 19 Iranian-made Shahed drones.[i] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 18 targets, including two Kalibrs, three Iskanders, and 13 Shaheds.[ii] Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces targeted port infrastructure in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and noted that the strikes mainly affected warehouses and logistics facilities.[iii] Humenyuk noted that Russian “blackmail and sabotage” of Ukrainian ports started shortly after Russian began its rhetoric about its conditions for the expansion of the grain deal.[iv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian manufacturing and storage facilities in Odesa City and Chornomorske in Odesa Oblast, and fuel infrastructure facilities and ammo depots in Mykolaiv City.[v] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces destroyed the Odesa Seaport Administration building in the center of Odesa City and noted that residential buildings were damaged by the blast wave.[vi] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian missile strikes also damaged a Chinese consulate building in Odesa City.[vii]

Ukrainian military officials outlined the challenge of defending against Onyx missiles and Russia’s shortage of Kh-22 missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Onyx missiles fly at a speed of more than 3,000 kilometers per hour at a high altitude and then quickly change altitude to 10–15 meters above the surface when striking a target, making it difficult to detect and destroy.[viii] Ihnat noted on July 19 that Russian forces are using Onyx cruise missiles that are designed to destroy targets located directly on the coastline along the sea.[ix] Ihnat also stated on July 20 that Russia does not have the same ability to manufacture Kh-22 missiles that it does to produce other types of high-precision long-range missiles.[x] Ihnat noted that Russia had approximately 250 Kh-22 missiles at the beginning of the war in February of 2022 and has already used approximately 150 missiles against Ukraine.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17.
• The Russian military announced that it may consider civilian ships in the Black Sea en route to Ukrainian ports legitimate military targets.
• The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation are likely a part of a Kremlin effort to leverage Russia’s exit from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and exact extensive concessions from the West.
• The Kremlin likely views the Black Sea Grain Initiative as one of its few remaining avenues of leverage against the West and has withdrawn from the deal to secure these concessions.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced on July 20.
• The United States and European Union (EU) reiterated their long-term security commitments to Ukraine via security assistance packages and proposals on July 19 and 20.
• Wagner Group personnel are training Belarusian special forces on modern tactics at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus.
• The Wagner Group may open another base in Belarus in Gomel Oblast near Belarus’ international border with Ukraine.
• The Wagner Group reportedly suffered an 80 percent casualty rate and a 28 percent killed-in-action rate in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and advanced on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line as of July 20.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kupyansk, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and made gains near Bakhmut on July 20.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar, on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and south of Orikhiv and made limited territorial gains in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 20.
• Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully counterattack Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on July 20.
• The Russian State Duma approved amendments increasing penalties for draft dodging and for officials and legal entities that fail to assist Russian force generation efforts on July 20.
• Russian authorities continue persecution of non-Russian Orthodox churches in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 19, 2023

Russian forces launched an extensive missile and drone attack against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 19 likely to further emphasize Russia’s objections to the renewal of the Black Sea grain deal and hinder Ukraine’s ability to export grain. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted strikes using 16 Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, eight Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, six Onyx cruise missiles, one Kh-59 guided air missile, and 32 Iranian-made Shahed drones. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces predominantly targeted civilian and military infrastructure in Odesa Oblast with Kh-22 and Onyx missiles and that Ukrainian forces shot down 37 air targets including 13 Kalibrs, one Kh-59 missile, and 23 Shaheds. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces deliberately targeted the infrastructure necessary for executing the Black Sea grain deal in Odesa, Zhytomyr, and other oblasts. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck grain and oil terminals and damaged tanks and loading equipment.  Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Mykola Solskyi reported that Russian strikes destroyed 60,000 tons of grain in the Chornomorsk port in Odesa Oblast on the night of July 19. The Southern Operational Command added that Russian strikes also targeted coastal areas in Mykolaiv Oblast and some infrastructure in Kherson City. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Captain of the First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the Russian July 19 strikes “happened virtually simultaneously,” and that Russian forces likely attempted to overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense systems. Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that this attack was the most intense missile and drone attack on Odesa Oblast since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Russian sources, apart from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian strikes on south Ukraine aimed to dismantle the port infrastructure necessary for the Black Sea grain deal. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian military infrastructure and ammunition depots in Odesa Oblast and the Kanatove Air Base in Kirovohrad Oblast. Kremlin-affiliated mibloggers and former proxy officials claimed that Russian strikes damaged port infrastructure, grain storage, and industrial facilities in Odesa Oblast. Some Russian ultranationalists called on the Russian MoD to authorize additional strikes to destroy Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure to ensure that no grain deals can ever be renewed. One milblogger who has been routinely skeptical of the Kremlin’s war effort claimed that the Russian strike campaign is more “retaliatory” than “operationally sound” and blamed the Russian General Staff for wasting Russian efforts (and likely the dwindling stock of Russian precision weapons) on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure rather than military infrastructure.

The South African Presidential Office announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the BRICS summit in-person in Johannesburg in August 2023. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will represent Russia at the summit, and President Putin will participate by video call.

An explosion at a Russian training ground in occupied Kirovskyi Raion (Islam Terek Raion), southeastern Crimea, disrupted the Russian use of the Tavrida highway that connects eastern Crimea to Sevastopol on July 19. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian ammunition depots detonated following an explosion at the Starokrymskyi Training Ground in Kirovskyi Raion. Geolocated footage showed explosions at the reported Russian ammunition depot south of Aivazovske (25km northwest of Feodosia). Crimean Occupation Head Sergei Aksyonov stated that the explosions caused a landfill to catch on fire and announced that the Russian occupation officials will block movement on the Tavrida highway until the consequences of the fire are managed. Aksyonov also announced the evacuation of 2,000 residents. Aksyonov stated that the cause of the explosion is unknown as of the time of this publication, and Russian occupation officials notably did not accuse Ukrainian forces of striking Russian military infrastructure. A Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Yusov denied claims that GUR Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed Ukraine’s involvement in the explosion. Russian milbloggers, however, accused Ukrainian forces of striking a Russian ammunition depot but did not provide a consistent suggestion of the means Ukraine might have used to conduct this strike. Some ultranationalist milbloggers claimed that the explosion sparked criticism of Russian military officials within the Kremlin as these officials continued to lie about the situation in Crimea.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 19 and made gains in these areas. Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut City and forced Russian forces to retreat from positions northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut). The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced more than a kilometer in an unspecified area of the Melitopol direction. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces lack rotations and reinforcements on the Zaporizhia front and south of Bakhmut, which is preventing Russian forces from recapturing lost positions. The milblogger forecasted that continued delays in resolving these rotation and reinforcement issues south of Bakhmut threaten serious consequences for the Russian grouping in the area.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin and reportedly Wagner Commander Dmitry Utkin greeted Wagner fighters at the new Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18. Footage posted on July 19 and likely captured on July 18 shows Prigozhin addressing Wagner fighters at the field camp near Asipovichy, Belarus. Prigozhin welcomed the fighters to Belarus in a ceremony whose symbolism demonstrates that Prigozhin still controls the Wagner Group. Prigozhin handed the Wagner flag that had previously flown at the Wagner Group’s main military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to the local Wagner commander – a man with a first name of Sergey and callsign “Pioneer” – who will command Wagner forces in Belarus. “Pioneer” has reportedly been awarded five Orders of Courage and participated in combat in Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, and other countries. Prigozhin stated that unspecified current events in Ukraine are a “shame in which [Wagner] does not need to participate” but acknowledged that Wagner may return to Ukraine when Wagner can be sure that Wagner fighters will not be forced to “shame” themselves. Prigozhin also ceremonially presented ribbons of Russian and Belarusian flags so that “no one will think that [Wagner] fights without a flag and without a Motherland as some have said.” Prigozhin stated that Wagner personnel will remain in Belarus “for some time” and that they will make “make the Belarusian army the second army in the world” - an insult directed against the Russian Ministry of Defense. Prigozhin also stated that Wagner will embark on a new journey in Africa after regrouping in Belarus. An unidentified man – reportedly Dmitry Utkin (callsign “Wagner”) – also thanked the Wagner fighters for their work and for making Wagner a world-famous name. Utkin said that “this is only the beginning of the biggest job that will be carried out soon.” ISW is unable to confirm the identity of the man who was presented as Utkin. If the man is indeed Utkin, this ceremony would mark Utkin’s first public appearance since 2016. Russian milbloggers reported that several thousand Wagner fighters attended this ceremony, though ISW cannot verify attendance numbers at this time.

Russian sources claimed that Wagner will continue to operate abroad in African countries, although Prigozhin’s involvement in these activities remains unclear. A Russian source published on July 19 an apparent audio clip from Prigozhin, in which Prigozhin stated that he has sold part of Wagner’s “African assets” to an unspecified buyer to pay off existing liabilities – but that this will not curtail any Wagner programs in African countries. Wagner-affiliated milbloggers amplified statements from Wagner Commander Alexander Ivanov on July 19, in which Ivanov claimed that Wagner is continuing to rotate Wagner instructors in the Central African Republic (CAR). Ivanov reportedly stated that Wagner’s employees in CAR are not military personnel and did not sign military contracts with the Russian MoD. Ivanov stated that Prigozhin intends to expand Wagner‘s presence in Africa despite unspecified change in the structure of Wagner’s business in the region and quoted Prigozhin as saying that ”concrete negotiations” are occurring on the matter.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to display his knowledge of Russian history at odd moments, this time appearing to warn against the possibility of revolution in Russia. Putin stated on July 19 that Russia already exceeded its “limit on revolutions in the last century” in response to the mention of the Mayevka tourism event that took place in May. Mayevka was an illegal meeting of revolutionary-minded workers held outside of Moscow during the Tsarist period, but the word can also be associated with the arrival of spring. Putin additionally stated that he hoped that the tourism Mayevka event would not “lead to a revolution.” Putin had previously made a seemingly unrelated and unprompted allusion to Russian history at a public engagement in October 2022 when he spoke about the causes of the 18th Century Pugachev Rebellion, observing that it began because the center appeared weak and because someone decided that he was tsar – an observation that has since appeared to have been apropos.

Russian authorities opened a case against an affiliate of the ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club for discrediting Russian forces, prompting the Angry Patriots Club to make explicit demands of Russian officials. Russian media reported on July 18 that Russian authorities initiated a criminal case against former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov under the article for discrediting the Russian Armed Forces. Angry Patriots Club member Viktor Alksnis claimed on July 18 that he talked with Kvachkov and confirmed the initiation of the case. The Angry Patriots Club formally denounced the criminal case and demanded that Russian authorities end their “persecution” of Kvachkov. Kvachkov recently spoke at the Angry Patriots Club’s June 25 event in Moscow aimed at espousing longstanding criticisms against Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military leadership. Kvachkov may have drawn the attention of Russian authorities at the event, although it is likely that authorities were aware of his activities given that Kvachkov recently left prison in 2019 after serving a six-year sentence for creating a terrorist group and plotting to overthrow the government. Kvachkov called for violence “against representatives of state power” in a video message in 2017 and admitted to promoting anti-government propaganda among the military. The Federal Security Service (FSB) previously reportedly attempted to censor notable Angry Patriots Club member Igor Girkin.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched an extensive missile and drone attack against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 19 likely to further emphasize Russia’s objections to the renewal of the Black Sea grain deal and hinder Ukraine’s ability to export grain.
• The South African Presidential Office announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the BRICS summit in-person in Johannesburg in August 2023.
• An explosion at a Russian training ground in occupied Kirovskyi Raion (Islam Terek Raion), southeastern Crimea, disrupted the Russian use of the Tavrida highway that connects eastern Crimea to Sevastopol on July 19.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 19 and made gains in these areas.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin and reportedly Wagner Commander Dmitry Utkin greeted Wagner fighters at the new Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18.
• Russian sources claimed that Wagner will continue to operate abroad in African countries, although Prigozhin’s involvement in these activities remains unclear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to display his knowledge of Russian history at odd moments, this time appearing to warn against the possibility of revolution in Russia.
• Russian authorities opened a case against an affiliate of the ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club for discrediting Russian forces, prompting the Angry Patriots Club to make explicit demands of Russian officials.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk area, near Kreminna, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and made gains near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area. They made marginal gains along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and reportedly made limited advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made reportedly made gains in both sectors of the front.
• The Russian State Duma adopted on July 19 a law on the first reading and “in general” that allows the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to have heavy military equipment.
• The Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group conducted another successful attack on a Russian military convoy in occupied Kherson Oblast on July 14.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2023

The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. Footage and imagery published on July 17 and 18 show extensive traffic jams and accidents reportedly on the E58 Mariupol-Melitopol-Kherson City highway – Russia’s current main logistics line connecting Russia to southern Ukraine – at various points between Mariupol and Berdyansk, and in Kherson Oblast.[1] Russian occupation authorities claimed to have reduced traffic at Crimea-Kherson Oblast checkpoints near Chonhar and Armiansk following significant traffic jams in the morning.[2] Russian occupation authorities also advertised alternate routes and rest stops along them for tourists to drive from occupied Crimea through occupied Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts – rear areas in a war zone – to return to Russia.[3] Russian authorities also announced additional measures to mitigate resulting traffic jams and logistics issues, including a temporary road bridge next to the Kerch Strait Bridge, the reconstruction of a 60-kilometer stretch of road between Crimea and Kherson Oblast through Armiansk, and lowering security measures at the Kerch Strait Bridge checkpoints.[4] Russian authorities reopened one span of the Kerch Strait Bridge to one-way road traffic towards Russia on July 18, and plan to reopen the same span to two-lane traffic on September 15 and the whole bridge to road traffic in November.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 18 that the Russian government is still developing measures to increase the security of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the claimed Russian security failure to adequately protect the bridge.[6]

Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian retaliatory strikes hit port infrastructure in Odesa City and to have destroyed Ukrainian fuel storage facilities holding a combined 70 thousand tons of fuel near Odesa and Mykolaiv cities.[7] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all six Russian Kaliber missiles and 31 of 36 Shahed 131/136 drones targeting these areas, but that falling missile fragments damaged port infrastructure and a residential area in Odesa.[8] Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian MoD for only targeting Ukrainian military assets in retaliation for Ukrainian military ”provocations” rather than targeting these assets as part of the war effort.[9] These complaints are consistent with prior milblogger criticisms to the same effect following other major military events, including the October 2022 Kerch Strait Bridge attack.[10] The Russian MoD also accused Ukrainian forces of targeting occupied Crimea with 28 drones overnight on July 17 to 18 and claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems downed all 28 drones.[11]

The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to exhaust Russian forces defending in southern Ukraine and noted that the Russian military command has not solved the force rotation issues Popov outlined before his dismissal.[12] Another prominent milblogger supported Popov, noting that the issues Popov outlined seem more important issues for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to address than transferring Popov to Syria or other information mitigation measures.[13] Some Russian milbloggers amplified reports of several Russian assault groups with forces of up to a platoon simultaneously surrendering to Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[14] Persistent issues with Russian logistics and operations in southern Ukraine may have contributed to these forces’ inability or unwillingness to fight and reported resulting surrender.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18. Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that Russian forces have recently increased offensive operations in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast).[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km along the front and up to 1.5km in depth in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[16] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar and Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces continue to transfer reinforcements to the Bakhmut direction and are concentrating their main forces in the Kupyansk direction due to Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut area, supporting ISW‘s assessment that Russian forces aim to draw Ukrainian reserves to the Kupyansk area and away from critical areas of the theater where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will not likely make tactically significant advances or an operationally significant breakthrough between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and Luhansk Oblast in part due to the poor quality of Russian forces deployed in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) and convict-formed “Storm-Z” units are operating in the Kupyansk area.[18] ISW has previously assessed that the elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army are heavily degraded and that “Storm-Z” units suffer from poor morale and discipline.[19]

Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability. Russian State Duma Deputy Vasily Piskarev stated on July 18 that he and several other deputies submitted a bill for consideration to the Duma on “liability for propaganda and justification of the ideology of extremism” that will introduce a 300 thousand ruble (roughly $3,297) fine and up to five years in prison for violation of the amendment.[20] ISW has previously reported on similar laws and amendments that are meant to set high penalties and criminal liability for anything that Russian authorities assert is “extremist” or “terroristic” behavior in order to encourage self-censorship and facilitate crackdowns against any dissenting parties.[21] Some facets of the Russian information space expressed concern that Russian authorities could use the law to crack down against any expressed viewpoints that contradict those of the Russian state, including support for Russian opposition parties or figures.[22]  

The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. The Telegraph quoted the head of the Belarusian opposition group National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka, who alleged that Lukashenko is personally responsible for the forced displacement of Ukrainian children to Belarus and that he gave direct instructions on how to carry out and finance the displacement.[23] The Telegraph found that Belarusian authorities actively worked with Russian authorities to transport some Ukrainian children to Belarus and others to far eastern regions of Russia. The Telegraph reported that Belarusian and Russian authorities collaborated to forcibly transport at least 2,150 Ukrainian children to Belarus since September 2022 and that the number of Ukrainian children in Belarus will likely reach 3,000 by fall of 2023.[24] The European Parliament Foreign Affairs Council had previously called for an arrest warrant against Lukashenko in early June for actions relating to Ukrainian children and for facilitating other crimes committed in Ukraine.[25] ISW has long assessed that Belarus is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and the Russian Federation.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack.
• The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18.
• Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability.
• The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, southwest of Kreminna, and in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas and made limited territorial gains in all sectors.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut and advanced north of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area and recently made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Some Russian sources suggested that recent measures supporting the development of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) allow it to posture as an alternative Russian military formation.
• Russia continues to formalize methods of social programming targeted at youth in occupied areas of Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2023

The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have continuing ramifications on Russian logistics in southern Ukraine. Russian authorities accused Ukrainian special services of conducting an unmanned surface vehicle strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea on the morning of July 17.[i] Footage of the aftermath shows that one Kerch Strait Bridge road span had collapsed and another span suffered damage but remains intact.[ii] The Russian Ministry of Transport claimed that the strikes did not damage the rail bridge or supports of the road bridge, and rail traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge resumed several hours after the strike.[iii] Russian occupation authorities rerouted heavy civilian traffic from occupied Crimea to Russia through occupied southern Ukraine, and Russian sources reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoy Raion and occupied Kherson Oblast towards Melitopol.[iv] Russian tourists fleeing occupied Crimea likely exacerbated traffic and likely impeded Russian logistics from Crimea to rear areas in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes to mitigate the immediate traffic issues.[v] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andrii Yusov declined to comment on Ukrainian involvement in the incident.[vi] The Kerch Strait Bridge and military areas in occupied Crimea are legitimate military targets for Ukrainian forces in their defense against the full-scale Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine, as ISW and Ukrainian officials have previously reported.[vii]

The Russian government’s continued failure to put Russian society on a war-time footing will have significant impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from Russian tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south. The Kerch Strait Bridge is along one of two ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting Russia’s southern force grouping, with the other route passing through occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts. This sole remaining logistics route is now a single point of failure for the supply of the large numbers of mechanized Russian forces in southern Ukraine needed to resist Ukrainian counteroffensives. Russian and occupation officials have nevertheless continued to promote occupied Crimea as a tourist destination, however, urging Russian civilians to drive through and to a warzone rather than advising them to avoid it as a responsible government would.[viii] Russian occupation authorities recently struggled to mitigate traffic issues just from increased Russian tourism across the Kerch Strait Bridge, as ISW has previously reported.[ix] Russian President Vladimir Putin even ordered the use of Russian military assets to ferry tourists across the Kerch Strait.[x] Some Russian milbloggers also suggested that the attack against the Kerch Strait Bridge should not reduce continued tourist flows.[xi]

Russian logistics to southern Ukraine will likely suffer in the short and medium-term, likely exacerbating recent and significant complaints about inadequate Russian supplies in southern Ukraine. Former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s recent complaints about the Russian military command’s mistreatment of Russian forces defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine sparked great ire in the Russian information space.[xii] Many of Popov’s complaints indicated that the 58th Combined Arms Army, and likely other Russian formations deployed in Zaporizhia Oblast, suffer from supply shortages that will further worsen if tourist and other civilian traffic slow down logistics routes supporting Russian forces in southern Ukraine.[xiii] Further issues with support for this grouping, and further resulting complaints that emerge in the Russian information space, are likely to draw further outrage from the Russian ultranationalist community and undermine confidence in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[xiv]

Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting instructing Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to lead a headquarters and develop solutions to mitigate traffic issues across the bridge.[xv] Khusnullin and other occupation authorities decided to lift curfews and passport checks along major highways to Russia in occupied territories, which are under Russian martial law, in order to mitigate some of these traffic issues.[xvi] Putin’s and other senior Russian officials’ statements were largely straightforward; the officials accused Ukraine of conducting a “terrorist attack” and promised retaliation, which is consistent with prior official reactions to claimed Ukrainian provocations.[xvii] The Russian Foreign Ministry accused Ukraine of conducting the strike in conjunction with American and British intelligence, forwarding a consistent Russian narrative aimed at falsely portraying Russia as at war with the West rather than Ukraine.[xviii] Some Russian officials connected the Kerch Strait Bridge attack to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which expired today.[xix] Senior Russian officials, including Putin, had signaled before the bridge was attacked that Russia was unwilling to renew the grain deal without significant additional concessions, however.[xx] Russia was very unlikely to have engaged in negotiations around the continuation of the grain deal or any other negotiations with Ukraine in good faith, as ISW has previously assessed.[xxi]

The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge. Some milbloggers, including former Russian officer and critical pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, offered the critique that Russian authorities have focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security, thereby allowing the most recent attack on the bridge to occur.[xxii] Girkin complained that the Russian border officials have devoted too much time to checking civilian cars entering the bridge and not enough time investing in infrastructure that could protect against attacks launched by sea.[xxiii] Another prominent milblogger and Kremlin-appointed member of the Russian Human Rights Council blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on security on the land bridge and neglecting to take into account any maritime threats.[xxiv] One milblogger emphasized that the strike was caused by poor internal Russian decision making and posed a threat to the stability of Russian domestic peace.[xxv] Many Russian sources erroneously claimed that the strike will not impact Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine and called the attack a “terrorist act” to minimize the fact that the Kerch Strait Bridge is a legitimate military target in the rear of an active war zone.[xxvi] Some Russian sources additionally advocated for retributive and retaliatory actions against Ukraine in the wake of the attack, but this brand of milblogger response closely resembles outcry following previous such events.

The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus. Independent Belarusian monitoring group “The Hajun Project” reported on July 17 that another Wagner vehicle convoy traveled towards the Tsel village tent camp near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast, Belarus, and that two other Wagner columns had traveled along this same route between July 11 and July 17.[xxvii] Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels relatedly posted footage on July 17 of a Wagner column moving between Voronezh and Oryel oblasts before arriving at the training ground near Asipovichy.[xxviii] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that over 700 Wagner fighters have recently settled in the Tsel-Asipovichy area and that Belarusian authorities have formed three Belarusian special-purpose units to train under Wagner leadership in these training areas.[xxix] Several Wagner-affiliated milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner’s training ground in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, will cease operations by July 30 and that Wagner will deploy elsewhere and they posted footage of Wagner fighters ceremoniously lowering Russian and Wagner flags at Molkino.[xxx] Wagner fighters will likely continue to redeploy to Belarus from training areas in Molkino and staging grounds elsewhere in Russia over the coming month.

Russia continues efforts to reorganize its domestic security apparatus in the wake of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexander Khinshtein stated on July 17 that the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) were officially transferred to the control of the Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[xxxi] Khinshtein emphasized that the decision was made to capitalize on Rosgvadia’s key role in protecting Russia’s internal security.[xxxii] ISW previously reported on July 4 that the decision to transfer “Grom” to Rosgvardia emphasizes the Kremlin’s desire to consolidate an effective anti-rebellion force under Rosgvardia command.[xxxiii] The Russian Duma additionally announced on July 17 that it is considering a bill to allow Rosgvardia to field heavy weapons by amending the federal law “On the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation,” which will allow the Rosgvardia to be armed with transport aircraft, combat, transport, and multi-purpose helicopters, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, communications complexes, boats, engineering equipment, and other military and paramilitary kit.[xxxiv] The transfer of “Grom” units to Rosgvardia, as well as the decision to provide Rosgvardia with heavy combat equipment, supports ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin is continuing efforts to consolidate its internal security apparatus around Rosgvardia’s structures. However, several actors within the Russian internal security sphere have voiced their concern and dissatisfaction over the “Grom” transfer, and the reorganization of domestic security organs may cause more tension within Russia.[xxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have launched active offensive operations and advanced in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast) in the past several days.[xxxvi] Russian forces likely are engaging in offensive operations in this area of the front in an effort to exploit Ukrainian operational focus on other sectors of the front and draw Ukrainian reserves away from critical areas of the theater, namely the Bakhmut and western Donetsk, and western Zaporizhia Oblast areas, where Ukrainian forces are pursuing counteroffensive operations. The poor quality and composition of Russian troops currently deployed on this line, however, will likely hinder Russia’s ability to achieve more than tactically significant gains or make an operationally significant breakthrough. Ukrainian and Russian sources have both reported the deployment of convict-formed “Storm-Z” assault units to the Kupyansk direction, and ISW has previously assessed that “Storm-Z” units have low operational effectiveness due to poor morale and discipline.[xxxvii] Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut, south of Velyka Novosilka, and near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast throughout July 17.[xxxviii]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2023

The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort. The recent dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander (CAA) Colonel General Ivan Popov and the reported dismissal of 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov prompted further discussions of other alleged recent dismissals and arrests.[i] Russian sources amplified an alleged audio message from personnel of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division on July 15 in which the personnel claimed that the Russian military command dismissed 7th VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev in early July.[ii] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities arrested 90th Tank Division (Eastern Military District) Commander Major General Ramil Ibatullin as well as two unspecified deputies on an unspecified date.[iii] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger suggested that the Russian military command is also planning to dismiss the 31st VDV Brigade Commander, who is reportedly Colonel Sergei Karasev.[iv]  Russian sources speculated that the Russian MoD may be preparing to arrest VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[v] ISW has not observed confirmation of Seliverstov’s and Kornev’s dismissals nor of Ibatullin’s arrest, although these claims follow a pattern similar to that of previous claims of command changes that have proven true.[vi]

These formations and units are conducting defensive and offensive operations in key sectors of the front in Ukraine. The 58th CAA has conducted a relatively successful defense against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the 106th Division is committed to defending against Ukrainian assaults on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.[vii] ISW has observed elements of the 7th VDV Division deployed to east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as well as to unspecified areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast.[viii] Russian milbloggers have claimed that the 31st VDV Brigade is also defending in the Bakhmut direction and that elements of the 90th Tank Division are involved in ongoing limited assaults west of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast.[ix]

The reported dismissal and arrest of commanders leading combat effective units and formations appears to be associated with cases of insubordination. Popov flagrantly attempted to bypass Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and directly bring his complaints about the frontline in western Zaporizhia to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[x] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Seliverstov’s dismissal was a result of similar insubordination, and Russian sources claimed that Seliverstov had a reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.[xi] Kornev may have voiced criticism of a host of potential issues on behalf of the 7th VDV Division, including the likely failure to be notified beforehand about the Russian destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station (KHPP) on June 6, reported attritional fighting that failed to eliminate a Ukrainian presence near the Antonivsky Bridge, or conditions in western Zaporizhia Oblast similar to those that Popov complained about.[xii] Ibatullin’s arrest may be associated with the 90th Tank Division’s resumption of assaults in Luhansk Oblast, where it conducted widespread offensive operations that failed to achieve territorial gains during the Russian 2023 winter offensive campaign.[xiii] It is unclear why Ibatullin would have been arrested, if, indeed, he was, when the other commanders were reportedly simply removed from their commands.

Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers. Russian milbloggers shared an audio excerpt on July 16 in which the alleged elements of the 7th VDV Division threatened that they would withdraw from their positions in occupied Kherson Oblast if the Russian MoD arrests Teplinsky or threatens his life.[xiv] The elements of the 7th VDV Division also claimed that they would defend Teplinsky against the Russian MoD and asserted that the high command is targeting Russia’s most combat effective commanders. This audio appeal, if legitimate, is a threat of mass desertion in the face of the enemy on behalf of Teplinsky. Desertion in the face of the enemy is a capital offense in many militaries. The VDV servicemen are blackmailing the Russian MoD to ensure that Teplinsky continues to command troops in Ukraine, despite Teplinsky’s previous affiliation with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin who had led an armed rebellion on June 24 to overthrow Shoigu and Gerasimov.[xv]

Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD. The Russian MoD had previously attempted to launch wide-scale personnel changes within the Russian Armed Forces in January-February 2023 to replace some commanders who had been insubordinate to Shoigu and Gerasimov throughout the invasion. The Russian MoD announced on January 11 that Gerasimov assumed the position of overall theater commander in Ukraine, which upset a group of commanders and Russian irregular formations such as Wagner that supported Gerasimov’s predecessor, Army General Sergei Surovikin.[xvi] Teplinsky was one of these commanders, and he reportedly resigned on January 12 following an altercation with Gerasimov over Gerasimov’s use of elite VDV forces in human wave attacks.[xvii] Teplinsky later recorded a video on February 23 in which he confirmed his resignation and implied that Russian commanders in charge of the Russian winter offensive paid for captured villages with soldiers’ lives.[xviii] Teplinsky’s resignation was not in itself insubordinate--resigning is one of the legal actions an officer can take when he decides that he cannot in good conscience execute a lawful order. Releasing a video criticizing the theater commander, however, was insubordinate and would likely be viewed as conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, which is a violation of military law in many militaries. Teplinsky’s video likely publicly blamed Gerasimov for Russian casualties during the winter offensive in an effort to undermine his command and set informational conditions to signal the need for Gerasimov’s replacement to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[xix] Teplinsky later mobilized support within the VDV veteran community and directly appealed to Putin on March 15 regarding the Russian MoD’s poor treatment of Wagner forces and poor conduct of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[xx] Putin rewarded Teplinsky’s insubordination by reappointing him as the VDV commander on April 1 instead of punishing him for his public actions undermining the theater commander.

Popov’s leaked audio recording demonstrated a striking resemblance to Teplinsky’s appeals as it portrayed Popov’s insubordination as an attempt to improve conditions for 58th CAA’s servicemen. Popov did not claim responsibility for leaking the audio recording, however, he likely intended to evoke similar support for himself as the voice of opposition to the Russian MoD among servicemen and veterans of the 58th CAA. Both Teplinsky and Popov demanded radical changes in the Russian conduct of the war – that, however necessary they might be, are impossible for Gerasimov or Shoigu to execute given Putin’s unrealistic demands for the war effort, constraints on Russian mobilization, and the Russian MoD’s persistent incompetence. Putin reportedly signed a decree deploying Popov to Syria on July 14 on Gerasimov’s recommendation.[xxi] ISW assessed on April 30 that the Kremlin demoted several commanders by transferring their responsibilities from combat in Ukraine to Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh and that these apparent demotions leave open the possibility that these commanders could return to Putin’s favor.[xxii]

The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine. Putin consistently bypassed or ignored the established chain of command in hopes of securing rapid successes on the battlefield throughout the war, degrading Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s authority – especially when military failures on the frontlines also eroded their reputations. Putin had cultivated an environment in which military personnel, officials, and even Russian war correspondents bypassed Shoigu and Gerasimov to present Putin their understandings of the current state of the war and recommendations for what to do.[xxiii] It is unusual but not unique for a commander in chief to solicit views on the war from outside experts. It is more problematic, although still not unique, for a commander in chief to solicit the views of subordinates opposed to senior leadership directly. But allowing a quasi-military commander such as Prigozhin to conduct his own campaign parallel but not subordinate to the one being executed by the formal chain of command is extraordinarily unusual and badly corrosive of the authority of the formal military leadership.

Putin also established the Russian MoD as the scapegoat for all Russian military failures, which saddled Shoigu and Gerasimov with a reputation for incompetence and failure that they are unlikely to repair.[xxiv] ISW previously assessed that Putin regularly grants and withdraws his support for different commanders in hopes generating rapid improvements in Russia’s military fortunes but without always doing so formally.[xxv] Shoigu and Gerasimov likely expected that Putin would restore their full authority over the Russian military’s decision-making processes given their loyalty to him after Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24. Putin, however, has clearly not done so.  He has instead followed his normal pattern of seeking to divert backlash away from himself and rotating commanders instead of outright dismissing them.[xxvi] Intensifying insubordination and widespread outrage in response to the ongoing officer purge may force the Kremlin to reconsider its partial backing for Shoigu and Gerasimov in the wake of Wagner’s rebellion. 

The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly. ISW has previously assessed that Teplinsky and Popov have established precedents for Russian military officers to challenge the authority of senior commanders and for to use their responsibility for key sectors of the front to cajole the Kremlin into supporting them.[xxvii] Insubordinate commanders appear to be more actively emulating this approach to achieving their desired aims and are likely aware of the constraints the MoD faces in punishing them. These commanders present themselves as defenders of their soldiers, tapping into longstanding grievances about the war effort that the Kremlin routinely attempts to avoid exacerbating but has been unable or unwilling to address.[xxviii] The Kremlin’s relatively soft reaction to insubordination likely incentivizes strong-willed commanders to engage in these patterns of insubordination, knowing that they offer substantial rewards with relatively low risks. These commanders appear to be deftly drawing a line between themselves and Prigozhin by centering their soldiers in their complaints and avoiding the appearance of promoting their personal ambitions, which had made Prigozhin appear a threat to the Kremlin (they are also, obviously, avoiding leading armed forces in a march on Moscow).[xxix] As the Kremlin fails to adequately punish commanders who challenge Gerasimov’s and Shoigu’s authority it becomes more logical for commanders who wish to protect their soldiers (or to appear to be doing so) to engage in this kind of behavior. Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s attempts to remove and punish these commanders will likely cause some commanders to intensify their insubordination and draw public attention to their conflicts with the senior Russian military leadership in hopes of making the Kremlin more hesitant about supporting Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s efforts. It may cause the fainter of heart to become more pliable yes-men and, thus, likely less effective on the battlefield.

Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization. Teplinsky and Popov may have leveraged Russian military and ultranationalist communities to bring awareness to the Russian MoD’s intentions to dismiss military commanders and thus spark backlash within these communities.[xxx] This effort has the potential to drive the Kremlin to undo or halt the Russian MoD’s command changes.[xxxi] Teplinsky’s earlier involvement of veteran communities allowed him to reestablish control of the VDV and occupied southern Ukraine, and it is likely that these commanders are aware of their ability to garner support on Russian social media platforms under the guise of attempting to save their troops from the Russian MoD.[xxxii] ISW assesses that some of these commanders, like many Russian officials, likely have personal connections to Russian Telegram channels and social media networks that they use to spread their desired narratives and objectives.[xxxiii] Russian servicemembers routinely engage with milblogger content to follow the war in Ukraine, and insubordinate commanders likely rely on servicemembers consuming this content to garner support for their opposition to the Russian senior military leadership.

The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale. The 7th VDV Division’s threat to withdraw in response to the latest speculations about dismissals and arrests of commanders suggests that Russian servicemembers are actively engaging with this content.[xxxiv] Russian milbloggers also often amplify videos and letters from servicemen further confirming the interactions between milbloggers and the Russian forces on the frontlines.[xxxv] ”Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky (who is currently fighting in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) argued that Russia will lose the war in Ukraine if Russian authorities arrest Teplinsky.[xxxvi] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger rhetorically asked who would lead Russian forces to victory if there are only commanders who do not stand up for their soldiers and fear upsetting the General Staff with their ”panicked” reports about the situation on the frontlines.[xxxvii] Another Russian source, that promotes narratives sympathetic to the insubordinate commanders, claimed that the situation is reminiscent of the demoralization of the Soviet military at the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.[xxxviii] One milblogger noted that the degree of speculation and claims about the dismissals and arrests is indicative of widespread concern among the Russian military about this issue.[xxxix] These narratives threaten to cause a widespread loss of confidence in the Russian command and an overall sense of defeatism if Gerasimov and Shoigu continue to remove and/or punish the commanders whom many view as ”heroes born of the Special Military Operation.”[xl]

The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine. Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine follow a pattern in which one echelon of Russian forces slows and degrades attacking Ukrainian forces until a second echelon counterattacks from prepared defensive positions to roll back the Ukrainian advances.[xli] Tactical counterattacks from prepared (and therefore likely relatively safe and defensible) positions require a degree of motivation and morale that the chain of command crisis may undermine to the point of failure. Elements of the 58th CAA and the 7th VDV Division are engaged in the defense of areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast and are likely already experiencing pronounced morale issues in the wake of the controversies surrounding their dismissed commanders. Ukrainian assaults also appear to be occurring along seams of the Russian defense between different formations and units in some areas, and insubordination and command and control issues may lead to a lack of cohesion between these defending units.[xlii] ISW has not observed direct indicators of these developments at this time.

The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine. It is unlikely that the Kremlin will allow the conflict between these commanders and the Russian senior military command to escalate to a point where personnel follow through on threats like the one the 7th VDV division made, although the continued hollowing out of support for the Russian military leadership among field commanders will produce morale issues throughout the theater. Further controversies about insubordination and command changes will likely increasingly reach a wider domestic audience as the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community continues to closely follow and amplify these developments. The Kremlin’s failure to appeal to these commanders and their personnel while also failing to fully back Shoigu and Gerasimov may increasingly undermine the Kremlin’s desired goal to be viewed as an effective manager of the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains northwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.[xliii] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1km in an unspecified area in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area).[xliv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast area).[xlv] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Bakhmut area and are defending new positions on the flanks of Bakhmut against Russian ground attacks.[xlvi] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut), parts of heights near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and a fortified area west of Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut).[xlvii] Russian President Vladimir Putin denied Ukrainian successes in the counteroffensive and claimed that Ukrainian forces have not been able to break through Russian defenses on July 16.[xlviii] Putin notably told a journalist that he would answer a question about further goals of the war if the journalist turned off the camera.[xlix] Ukrainian forces have, however, advanced in southern Ukraine where Russian forces have prepared the most extensive fortifications. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4 to July 9, ISW calculated based on its own control of terrain data that Ukrainian forces liberated approximately 253 square kilometers of territory.[l] (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.)[li]

Ukrainian officials indicated that extensive Russian minefields and shortages of Western mine clearing equipment have slowed the pace of Ukrainian advances in the counteroffensive. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi acknowledged in an interview with CNN published on July 14 that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected citing “complex and dense minefields” in areas through which Ukrainian forces intend to move.[lii] The Washington Post reported on July 15 that Russian forces heavily mined areas between five and 16 kilometers behind the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, which has slowed Ukrainian advances and forced Ukrainian forces to conduct ground attacks with infantry rather than Western kit.[liii] An unnamed Ukrainian officer told the Washington Post that Russian forces have prioritized destroying more advanced mine-clearing systems over Leopard tanks.[liv] An unnamed senior Ukrainian official told the Washington Post that Ukraine received less than 15 percent of the quantity of mine clearing and engineering material it requested ahead of the counteroffensive with some equipment arriving only last week.[lv]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to increase its control over Russian social media outlets to set conditions for the 2024 Russian presidential elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko is brokering a deal to purchase the Russian division of media giant Yandex on behalf of investors heavily affiliated with billionaire Yuri Kovalchuk, a close Kiriyenko ally and reported personal banker to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[lvi] Meduza reported that these investors will likely transfer their shares of Yandex to another entity, such as Kovalchuk or one of his holdings, after a period of time. Meduza noted that Yandex corporate advisor Alexey Kudrin and Putin personally approved an earlier deal to sell Yandex to investors with less direct connections to the federal government, but the deal fell through after an investor withdrew under fear of Western sanctions should he proceed with the purchase.[lvii] Meduza reported that Kudrin hoped that the new Yandex buyers would have less explicit federal government ties, but that Kiriyenko’s influence likely swayed Putin to this new deal.[lviii] A Russian insider source claimed that Telegram channels affiliated with Kiriyenko accused RT editor in chief and Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan of spreading fake information to try to take control over Telegram.[lix] The source also claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) recent detention of the Russian Deputy Minister of Digital Development Maxim Parshin and of Russian insider sources is part of a broader Russian federal effort to take more direct control over Russian social media.[lx]

Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. ISW reported recently on claims from former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin accusing Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk of directly acting as Prigozhin’s patrons.[lxi] The degree of Kiriyenko’s and Kovalchuk’s support for Prigozhin in recent months, and especially following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion, is currently unclear, however. Some Russian sources continue to postulate that Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk are firm Prigozhin supporters.[lxii] Other sources have claimed that Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk have distanced themselves from Prigozhin in recent months due to Prigozhin’s escalation of his conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov prior to the rebellion.[lxiii] Kovalchuk, Kiriyenko, and Prigozhin all reportedly contributed to the effort to elect Beglov to his office in 2019, but the Prigozhin-Beglov relationship deteriorated.[lxiv] Some sources assert that Kovalchuk – and likely Kiriyenko as a result – firmly backed Beglov in his feud with Prigozhin.[lxv] Kiriyenko has consistently postured himself as a firm Putin loyalist, and his increasing role in the Russian information space reflects both Putin’s trust in him as a result of his labors thus far and Kiriyenko’s desire to further advance his influence with Putin.[lxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make confirmed advances.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kreminna and made tactical advances.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that some Chechen forces have deployed to the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area and made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances in the area.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area.
• Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on July 15 to 16.
• Russian “Lancet” drone (loitering munition) producer Zalo Aero Group announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems and the intention to expand production abroad.
• A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity.
• Wagner Group forces will reportedly integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2023

Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.[i] Russian sources stated that the reason for Seliverstov’s dismissal is currently unknown but speculated that it could be associated with Seliverstov’s reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.[ii] Russian sources claimed that the 106th VDV Division has been operating in the Bakhmut area since January, and ISW has recently observed the 106th VDV Division’s 137th Guards VDV Regiment defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s northern flank.[iii] A Russian milblogger has claimed that elements of the 106th VDV Division are also supporting Russian defensive operations south of Bakhmut.[iv] Relatives of mobilized personnel serving in the 137th VDV Regiment notably appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in April about poor conditions and lack of supplies in the unit.[v] Vocal discontent about conditions in areas where Russian forces are defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have prompted Seliverstov to appeal to the Russian military command, which may have contributed to his dismissal. ISW has not observed confirmation of Seliverstov’s dismissal, but Russian reporting about the dismissal follows a pattern similar to that of previous claims of command changes that have proven true.[vi]

Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating. The Russian military command recently dismissed 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov after he reportedly attempted to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast directly to Putin.[vii] Popov’s complaints reportedly centered on a lack of rotations for his troops, and in a leaked audio message Popov also complained about heavy losses and a lack of effective counterbattery capabilities.[viii] These issues are likely impacting Russian forces throughout the theater in Ukraine, and reports of Seliverstov’s dismissal only four days after reports of Popov’s dismissal suggest that the Russian command may have fired Seliverstov for similar reasons.[ix] ISW assessed that Popov’s insubordination is indicative of a pattern of behavior that has developed within the Russian command in Ukraine, in which commanders have challenged the authority of senior commanders and sought to use their responsibility for key sectors of the front to cajole the Kremlin to support them.[x]

Endemic problems within the Russian war effort in Ukraine, exacerbated by poor decisions made by senior political and military leaders, are likely prompting strong-willed commanders to challenge their senior commanders in efforts to preserve their forces and lead combat effective units.[xi] The 58th Combined Arms Army‘s (CAA) and the 106th VDV Division’s relatively effective defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in their respective areas of the front thus far suggests that they are some of the most combat effective formations committed to the frontline, and Popov and Seliverstov likely contributed to their relative effectiveness by being willing to challenge superiors and the system. Popov’s reported actions clearly crossed the line to insubordination.  Seliverstov may have followed Popov’s example or the Russian military leadership may have dismissed Seliverstov out of the fear that he would do so.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.
• Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating.
• The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
• Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
• Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space.
• Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.
• The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.
• The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus.
• Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin further indicated he intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up but seeks to separate Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces. Putin confirmed to Russian news outlet Kommersant in an interview published on July 13 that he met with Prigozhin and 35 Wagner commanders on June 29. Putin claimed that he offered Wagner fighters the option to serve under a Wagner commander (callsign “Seda”) who has commanded Wagner forces for the last 16 months, further confirming ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin seeks to retain Wagner as a cohesive fighting force while separating it from Prigozhin. Putin claimed that “many [Wagner commanders] nodded” in response to his offer, but that Prigozhin, “who was sitting in front of his personnel and did not see them nodding,” said that the Wagner commanders did not agree with the decision. Putin likely emphasized Prigozhin’s differing response to frame Prigozhin as a problem in contrast to loyal Wagner commanders. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin noted that Putin’s retelling of the July 29 meeting portrays Putin as succumbing to Prigozhin’s demands, but the final outcome of the July 29 meeting is unclear. When asked directly by Kommersant about Wagner’s future as a combat unit, Putin continued to maintain the absurd notion that private military companies (PMCs) do not exist in Russia. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder stated on July 14 that Wagner forces are not participating in military operations in Ukraine in any significant support or combat roles. ISW has previously observed Russian sources reporting that Wagner forces are not involved in combat operations in Ukraine.

Belarusian government and independent sources confirmed on July 14 that Wagner Group instructors previously deployed in Africa previously arrived at training grounds in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on July 14 showing Wagner instructors training Belarusian territorial troops near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast. A Belarusian insider source claimed that the Wagner instructors from Wagner‘s African contingent (which the source described as the “Wagner Africa Corps,“ though it is unknown if that is a formal designation) arrived in Belarus on July 11 via a convoy from occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Belarusian insider source suggested that Wagner seeks to rotate troops of their African contingent and that the arrival of some instructors to Belarus is part of a wider troop rotation effort. A Russian milblogger claimed that only a part of Wagner’s Africa contingent has left Africa and that sufficient troops remain in African host nations to perform assigned tasks. Wagner’s internationally deployed commanders are likely arriving in Belarus to prepare training infrastructure and set conditions for the arrival of regular Wagner forces, who are reportedly slated to deploy to Belarus in early August after taking leave and undergoing reorganization following Wagner‘s June 24 armed rebellion. Russian milbloggers additionally amplified an image on July 14 reportedly showing Prigozhin himself either in Belarus or en route to Belarus from occupied Luhansk Oblast, but one milblogger noted that Prigozhin’s current role in Wagner remains unclear.

Former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s dismissal continues to generate pronounced ire against the Russian military command and the Russian civilian leadership. Russian milbloggers argued that Popov’s dismissal shows that the Russian military command is detrimentally suppressing the opinions of commanders about the situation at the front and that Russian command has forgotten that their main priority is preserving their personnel. A Russian military correspondent argued that Popov’s dismissal illustrates a dire issue with both the Russian military leadership as well as Russia’s civilian leadership. The military correspondent accused the civilian leadership of routinely suppressing and ignoring reports from the frontline and of failing to properly mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) for the war effort. The military correspondent claimed that Russian elites and businessmen have agreements with the Russian military command constraining Russian military action on the ground to avoid damaging economic interests - providing the hypothetical example of Russian forces being denied permission to attack a town to preserve an industrial plant owned by a Russian businessman. Prigozhin previously accused Russia’s oligarchs of deceiving Putin and the Russian public to launch the invasion of Ukraine in order to divide the assets of occupied Ukrainian territories between themselves. The military correspondent also warned that the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is further degrading and that the situation is “beginning to boil.” Popov’s dismissal has exposed a new level of concern about factional dynamics and degraded command structures in the Russian military following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion, and will likely serve as a point of neuralgia in the Russian information space for the foreseeable future.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 14 and reportedly made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) directions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success in the Bila Hora-Andriivka direction (9-15km southwest of Bakhmut). Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated that Ukrainian forces have advanced over 1,700 meters in unspecified places in the Melitopol direction. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces achieved a localized breakthrough of Russian defensive lines north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 17 Shahed-131/136 drones from Krasnodar Krai and an S-300 missile at targets in Ukraine and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 16 of the launched drones. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces targeted Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Russian sources claimed that an unspecified number of Russian Shahed-131/136 drones struck Ukrainian military infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian authorities detained former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly is the administrator of several popular telegram channels covering internal Kremlin politics. Moscow City police detained Polyakov on accusations that he extorted unspecified Russian politicians and businessmen. Russian sources claimed that Polyakov runs the “Kremlin Laundress” channel and is either affiliated with or an administrator of the telegram channels “Brief” and “Siloviki.” “Brief” and “Siloviki” denied that Polyakov is affiliated with their channels, however. These three telegram channels routinely speculate on internal Kremlin politics and dynamics between Russian political factions and have promoted notable rumors within the Russian information space. Channels that speculate about internal Kremlin politics represent a specific niche of the Russian information space, and Polyakov’s detention suggests that the Kremlin may intend to suppress speculations about internal politics following Wagner’s rebellion.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are waging an interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in Russia. The Washington Post quoted Zaluzhnyi as saying that Ukraine uses domestically produced weapons to strike Russian military targets in Russia due to Western concerns about Ukrainian forces using Western-provided weapons against Russian territory. Zaluzhnyi also stressed the importance of Ukrainian strikes across the theater in Ukraine. The Washington Post reported that Zaluzhnyi also stated that increased Ukrainian indirect fire can pin down Russian forces and minimize Ukrainian casualties, but that Ukraine is currently dependent on munitions from other countries for this aim. Zaluzhnyi also reiterated Ukraine’s intent to liberate Crimea.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin further indicated he intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up but seeks to separate Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces.
• Belarusian government and independent sources confirmed on July 14 that Wagner Group instructors previously deployed in Africa previously arrived at training grounds in Belarus.
• Former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s dismissal continues to generate pronounced ire against the Russian military command and the Russian civilian leadership.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 14 and reportedly made gains in some areas.
• Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 14.
• Russian authorities detained former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly is the administrator of several popular telegram channels covering internal Kremlin politics.
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are waging an interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in Russia.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizha Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in this direction.
• Russia continues efforts likely aimed at keeping high ranking officers in their positions without needing special exemptions to retirement age limits.
• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories by manipulating residence requirements and forcibly passportizing occupied populations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2023

Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov claimed in leaked audio that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed him for expressing persistent grievances about problems on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline to senior commanders. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev leaked Popov’s audio message on July 12 in which Popov stated that Russian command fired him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces and replaced him with Lieutenant General Denis Lyamin.[1] Popov claimed that he expressed concerns to the “highest level” of Russian command over the lack of Russian counter-battery warfare capabilities, the absence of artillery reconnaissance stations, significant Russian casualties from Ukrainian artillery fire, and other issues.[2] Popov claimed that Shoigu fired him because his honesty in voicing various problems in the Russian military threatened the Russian command. Popov claimed that he chose to “call a spade a spade” in the name of his dead comrades instead of “remaining in silent cowardice.”[3] Russian sources previously claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov dismissed Popov for expressing concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[4]

Popov was very likely aware that a recipient of his message in the veteran community of the 58th CAA would leak the audio recording. Popov reportedly distributed the recording to various actors including commanders, personnel, and veterans of the 58th CAA.[5] Gurulev, a former Chief of Staff of the 58th CAA, posted the recording on his Telegram channel on July 12, after which some prominent voices of the Russian ultranationalist community criticized Gurulev for breaking the sanctity of a private chat.[6] The voices accused Gurulev of leaking the audio in order to politicize the situation and bolster his own public appeal. Popov’s choice to distribute the audio to voices within the Russian veteran community suggests that he likely used unofficial or non-secure channels to distribute this message and that he was likely aware of the risk of using such channels for a supposedly limited audience. Popov may have intended for some recipients to leak the audio. Gurulev is a prominent voice in the Russian veteran community who has previously criticized the Russian MoD’s conduct of the war, so was likely to distribute such a recording from an insecure channel.[7]  One milblogger claimed that Popov purposefully released the audio to demonstrate that Popov does not fear the wrath of the Russian military command.[8] A Russian source leaked Popov’s grievances and reports of his dismissal on July 11 prior to the leak of the recording, which may suggest that Popov may have coordinated the timing of the July 12 leak.[9]

Popov equated himself with a rebellion leader less than a month after the Wagner Group rebellion, regardless of whether he intended for the recording to leak. Popov referred to himself as "Spartak” - his longtime callsign - and his subordinates as “gladiators,” likely deliberately invoking the memory of Roman slave rebellion leader Spartacus.[10] Popov may have used this comparison to underscore his self-portrayal as separate from the inept and actively harmful Russian military command. Popov claimed that Russia’s “most senior [military] commander” (likely referring to Gerasimov) is attacking Russian forces from the rear as they defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive on the frontline and painted himself as morally obligated to raise his concerns with the Russian military command. Popov’s portrayal of himself as a rebellion leader with grievances against the MoD - whether intentionally or otherwise - is notably reminiscent of the self-portrayal and rhetoric of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin leading up to and during his June 24 armed rebellion.[11] Popov notably has no known affiliations with Wagner or Prigozhin, however.

Popov likely attempted to appeal to the Kremlin to partially or fully strip Gerasimov of command over operations in Ukraine. Popov’s indications that senior Russian command was responsible for the operational decisions he opposed and the absence of Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev in the controversy may suggest that Gerasimov is playing a more active role in overseeing operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian sources have speculated that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) commander and rumored deputy theater commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky recently assumed Gerasimov‘s responsibilities for operations in Ukraine, although ISW has not observed confirmation that such a transfer of responsibilities has occurred.[12] Even if Gerasimov is not directly in charge of the Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine, Popov’s complaints against the Russian military command suggest that Gerasimov still has significant command over operational decision-making in Ukraine. Popov therefore likely aimed to bypass Gerasimov’s responsibilities as overall theater commander by directly asking Putin to overrule Gerasimov, although it is unclear to what extent Popov aimed to depose Gerasimov of his authority.

Popov likely modeled his attempt to secure Putin’s favor for his desired goals off of Teplinsky’s successful appeal to Putin in March.[13] Teplinsky temporarily resigned in January over a conflict with Gerasimov about the use of VDV forces in human wave attacks around Soledar and reportedly used connections in veteran communities to directly appeal to Putin on March 15 to rally support for the anti-Gerasimov group within the MoD.[14] Popov’s message to current and former SMD personnel likely sought to recreate the effect of Teplinsky’s outreach after Popov failed to initially bring his complaints directly to Putin. Popov may have more ambitiously sought to seize on possible Kremlin concerns about the widespread disdain for Gerasimov in order to elevate his own standing in a way reminiscent of Teplinsky’s alleged rise to deputy theater commander.

Gerasimov may have tried to shield Putin from unwanted criticism to uphold Putin’s ignorance by firing Popov before he could appeal directly to the Kremlin. A source reportedly affiliated with the Russian security services claimed that Popov announced that he would appeal to Putin before Gerasimov dismissed him from his position, which may indicate that Gerasimov directly responded to Popov’s threat.[15] ISW had previously observed that Putin has ignored complaints from Russian officials who spoke on behalf of Russian servicemen – likely to distance himself from Russian military failures. For example, the Secretary of the United Russia Party‘s General Council Andrey Turchak delivered a blunt briefing directly to Putin in February 2023 regarding the dire state of the Russian winter-spring offensive but was unsuccessful in triggering a command change.[16] ISW assessed that Teplinsky’s appeal to Russian veteran communities, however, forced Putin to respond to the complaints about the need for preparations for Ukrainian counteroffensives as of March.[17] The anecdote showcases that Putin preferred to remain ignorant until he faced potential backlash from military officials and Russian veterans. Putin may have instructed Gerasimov to prevent and resolve similar compromising situations before these incidents reached the Kremlin.

Popov’s attempt to directly appeal to Putin for support and his insubordination of Gerasimov’s command is indicative of a pattern of corrosive behavior that has developed within the Russian command and the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Popov’s and Teplinsky’s attempts to prompt Putin to act against Gerasimov are reminiscent of Prigozhin ’s June 24 rebellion, during which Wagner forces attempted to force Putin to remove Gerasimov and Shoigu.[18] Three prominent figures within the Russian war effort in Ukraine (Teplinsky, Prigozhin, and Popov) have now attempted to weaken Gerasimov and Shoigu’s authority due to a deep concern about the attrition of their forces and have attempted to use their responsibility over key sectors of the front to go outside of the chain of command to compel the Kremlin to act in their favor. ISW has previously assessed that public disagreements between Russian forces in Ukraine over supplies and combat tasks and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders on these issues suggest that there are severe chain of command problems.[19]

The growing precedent of commanders subordinate to Gerasimov conducting outright insubordination to achieve desired goals may be the result of an incentive for commanders to violate the chain of command. Russian commanders may be increasingly taking the wellbeing of their forces into their own hands in the face of the Russian MoD’s continued failures to address endemic issues with the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The increasingly fragile Russian chain of command may prompt a critical command and control crisis in the future, in which field commanders’ support for the Russian military command could become increasingly hollow.

Russian milbloggers expressed varied reactions to Popov’s dismissal, though none disagreed with Popov’s complaints about problems Russian forces experience on the front. Many Russian sources characterized Popov as “intelligent,” “competent,” and “authoritative” and claimed that he was a good commander who had wide support of his troops.[20]  Popov is a respected commander who has followed a promising promotion path similar to that of generals who have gone on to command military districts, and ISW does not have any reason to doubt milblogger characterizations of Popov as an effective and respected commander. Some Russian sources used Popov’s firing to express longstanding disdain for the Russian military command and Gerasimov, claiming that the Russian military command never listens to their complaints.[21] Wagner-affiliated sources attempted to co-opt Popov’s grievances by likening Popov to Prigozhin and describing their situations as beloved and respected commanders who faced punishment for voicing genuine concerns.[22] Other milbloggers noted that Popov and Prigozhin held many similar unresolved complaints that eventually led to Wagner’s armed rebellion, regardless of Prigozhin’s personal ambitions.[23] Milbloggers also expressed concerns that continued outspoken dissatisfaction from senior Russian commanders following the Wagner armed rebellion could set a precedent for Russian forces conducting armed protests.[24] Prominent Russian milblogger and former Russian officer Igor Girkin cynically claimed that Russian forces are only one major military defeat away from conventional Russian forces conducting their own march on Moscow.[25] Russian milbloggers notably did not disagree with Popov’s list of problems on the frontline, with one milblogger explicitly asserting that ineffective Russian counter-battery fire and artillery reconnaissance result in Russian casualties that diminish Russian forces’ long-term ability to hold defensive positions.

Disruptions to the Russian command overseeing Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine will likely have some immediate but marginal impacts on Russian forces. ISW has observed that the 58th CAA’s 19th and 42nd Motorized Rifle Divisions are heavily committed to defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[26] Popov’s sudden firing may temporarily disrupt Russian command and control in these areas and degrade Russian morale given the widespread support Popov had among Russian servicemembers of the 58th CAA. These impacts will likely be marginal and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces in the area are conducting a sound doctrinal defense.[27]

Popov’s dismissal over the issue of Russian casualties and reported complaints about lack of force rotations further supports ISW’s assessment that Russian defenses in Ukraine are likely brittle. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces lack the reserves to rotate frontline units and that without operational reserves Russian forces would have to fall back to prepared defensive positions without significant support in the case of a Ukrainian breakthrough.[28] Popov’s complaint about Russian casualties from artillery fire likely indicates that Russian forces need rotations and reinforcements to sustain their defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russia’s lack of reserves likely made it impossible for Gerasimov to seriously consider Popov’s appeal, and Popov’s dismissal has further illustrated that Russian forces are unable to conduct force rotations. The apparent theater-wide lack of force rotations suggests that Russian forces would have to rely on existing and already degraded forces in the event of any Ukrainian breakthrough. Popov’s complaints about Russian forces’ poor counterbattery capabilities and significant Russian casualties from Ukrainian artillery fire are likely a result of what ISW assesses to be a Ukrainian effort to attrit Russian forces defending in southern Ukraine.[29]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 13 and made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) directions.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success in the Novodanylivka-Shyroka Balka (roughly 3km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka-Novopokrovka (6-13km southeast of Orikhiv) directions.[31] Ukrainian officials also reported that Ukrainian forces advanced on Bakhmut‘s southern flank.[32] Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances north of Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka).[33]

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 20 Shahed-131/136 drones from Kursk Oblast and the Sea of Azov, two Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea, and one Iskander-M missile from occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea.[34] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces targeted Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, and Kyiv oblasts.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all 20 Shahed drones and both Kalibr missiles.[36] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces constantly use combined missile and drone strikes and seek opportunities to bypass Ukrainian air defenses to inflict maximum damage.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that they conducted a successful group strike with sea-based long-range high-precision weapons and destroyed Ukrainian ammunition storage facilities.[38]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated boilerplate Russian rhetoric to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine following the NATO summit. Lavrov claimed that Russia would recognize the appearance of F-16s in Ukraine as a nuclear threat because F-16s are technically capable of carrying nuclear warheads.[39] The US and other NATO states are extremely unlikely to provide F-16s to Ukraine with the specific modifications necessary to carry nuclear weapons, and the notion of Ukraine acquiring nuclear weapons is preposterous. Many airframes and other common weapons systems are capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons if the weapons or warheads have the correct modifications.[40] Lavrov also claimed that Ukraine rejected multilateral negotiations frameworks from China, Brazil, and African states.[41] ISW has consistently assessed that Russia is currently highly unlikely to meaningfully engage in any negotiations framework despite efforts to signal falsely otherwise.[42]  ISW has assessed that the Kremlin routinely amplifies information operations about nuclear escalation with the West over the war in Ukraine or Russia’s willingness to negotiate in an effort to weaken Western support for Ukraine.[43]

The Kremlin continues to navigate the aftermath of Wagner’s armed rebellion, as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin continues to be unclear. Geolocated footage published on July 13 purportedly shows Wagner forces driving along the M4 highway in Voronezh Oblast redeploying from field camps likely in the rear of Russian occupied Ukraine.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that the footage showed Russian police escorting the convoy and buses with Belarusian license plates, possibly indicating the convoy’s destination.[45] The Russian military continues to express concerns over the security of the SMD headquarters in Rostov-on-Don after Wagner forces surrounded the building during the armed rebellion. Images published on July 13 show that Russian forces placed gabions filled with sand around the headquarters, and milbloggers claimed that unspecified Spetsnaz personnel and an armored car equipped with a machine gun are stationed outside the building.[46]

Russian outlet RTVI reported on July 12 that companies associated with Prigozhin have received nine contracts with Russian businesses amounting to 1.064 billion rubles (about $11.8 million) since Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.[47] The largest contract is reportedly between the company Prodfutservis and the Ministry of Education of Mytishchi in Moscow Oblast for over 705 million rubles (about $7.8 million) to supply meals to public schools from 2023 to 2025.[48] Other customers include Russian government linked entities such as the hospitals subordinate to the Moscow Department of Health and the Medical and Health Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which claimed that it had not received complaints over catering services and therefore had no grounds to terminate the contract. It is unclear if Prigozhin is still linked to these companies, however.

The Kremlin reportedly ordered the detention and suspension of several senior military officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24, supporting ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin likely intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.[49] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on July 13 that Russian authorities detained at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired around 15 senior officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24.[50] Russian authorities reportedly detained Wagner-affiliated Deputy Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin, former Russian Deputy Defense Ministry for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, and other unnamed senior officers. Russian authorities also reportedly detained and later released Surovikin’s deputy Colonel General Andrey Yudin and deputy head of Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alexeyev. The WSJ reported that one source claimed that the detentions are intended to ”clean ranks” of those Russian President Vladimir Putin no longer sees as trustworthy.[51]

Russian authorities arrested the Russian Deputy Minister for Digital Development Maxim Parshin for allegedly accepting bribes. The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest on July 13, and Russian State Duma Deputy Alexander Khinshtein claimed that Russian law enforcement witnessed Parshin accept a bribe of 3.5 million rubles ($33,350), after which law enforcement detained him.[52] Russian authorities also arrested the Director of the Budget and Financial Technologies LLC, Alexander Monosov, for attempting to bribe Parshin.[53]

The Russian Ministry of Digital Development and the Union of Journalists expressed support for measures that would grant Russian military correspondents some type of veteran status. Russian Union of Journalists Head and state propagandist Vladimir Solovyev announced that the Union of Journalists and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development mutually support an effort to officially designate Russian military correspondents as “veterans of military journalism.”[54] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky stated on July 5 that the LDPR aims to pass legislation that will grant military correspondents the status of combat veterans, which would afford these milbloggers state guarantees and payments in cases of injury or death in Ukraine.[55] ISW assessed that Russian ultranationalist figures are likely supporting these measures to court the Russian milblogger community as a key constituency.[56] The Kremlin could use such measures to exert more control over milbloggers and determine who qualifies as a recognized milblogger, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov claimed in leaked audio that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed him for expressing persistent grievances about problems on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline to senior commanders.
• Popov likely attempted to appeal to the Kremlin to partially or fully strip Gerasimov of command over operations in Ukraine.
• Gerasimov may have tried to shield Putin from unwanted criticism to uphold Putin’s ignorance by firing Popov before he could appeal directly to the Kremlin.
• Popov’s attempt to directly appeal to Putin for support and his insubordination of Gerasimov’s command is indicative of a pattern of corrosive behavior that has developed within the Russian command and the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
• Russian milbloggers expressed varied reactions to Popov’s dismissal, though none disagreed with Popov’s complaints about problems Russian forces experience on the front.
• Disruptions to the Russian command overseeing Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine will likely have some immediate but marginal impacts on Russian forces.
• Popov’s dismissal over the issue of Russian casualties and reported complaints about lack of force rotations further supports ISW’s assessment that Russian defenses in Ukraine are likely brittle
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 13 and made gains in some areas.
• The Kremlin reportedly ordered the detention and suspension of several senior military officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24, supporting ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin likely intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.
• Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 13.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources engaged in positional battles near Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces reported conducting limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and made some gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of July 13.
• Russia may not be fulfilling some of its commitments to Iran in their bilateral security partnership, even as the Russian military continues to rely heavily on Iranian-made drones in Ukraine.
• The Associated Press (AP) reported on July 13 that Russian forces and occupation administrations are conducting a wide scale campaign to detain and abuse civilians and are planning to build additional internment infrastructure in the occupied territories.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 12, 2023

The Group of Seven (G7) Coalition and NATO signed agreements to offer Ukraine long-term security commitments during the NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 12. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that NATO has agreed on a three-part package that will give Ukraine a multi-year program of practical assistance, create a NATO-Ukrainian coordination council, and commits NATO to allow Ukraine to join the alliance without going through a Membership Action Plan (MAP).[i] G7 members Germany, Japan, France, Canada, Italy, Britain, and the United States signed a general framework document called the “Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine” aimed at offering the Ukraine military, financial, and intelligence support and stated that each member of the G7 will enter into bilateral security negotiations with Ukraine regarding the document.[ii] Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated that other countries would have the opportunity to join the declaration at a later stage.[iii] The general framework document also reportedly promises immediate steps to swiftly provide Ukraine with all necessary support in the event of a new attack but did not specify what that support would look like.[iv] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the agreements reached at the NATO summit mean that Ukraine would receive formal security guarantees, although neither the NATO nor the G7 agreements currently provide such guarantees.[v] Ukraine did secure notable agreements that will strengthen long-term Western support for Ukraine at the NATO summit, and these agreements will likely serve as the framework for potential increases in Western security assistance to Ukraine.

Ukraine secured additional bilateral security and defense agreements during the second day of the NATO summit on July 12. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov signed agreements with Swedish Defense Minister Paul Jonsson on cooperation in the field of defense procurement and with the French Defense Ministry on increasing French military assistance to Ukraine by 170 million euros.[vi] The Ukrainian Presidential Office announced that Australia will send an additional 30 Bushmaster armored vehicles to Ukraine.[vii] The UK government stated that the UK will provide Ukraine with an additional 50 million pounds in security assistance, including additional ammunition for Challenger tanks.[viii] Norwegian Defense Minister Bjorn Arild Gram stated that Norway will provide an additional NASAM (Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) support package, including two additional fire control centers, two launch units, and spare parts.[ix] Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted that Japan will provide Ukraine with $30 million in non-lethal equipment including drone detection systems.[x]

The Russian information space continues to exhibit a generally muted response to the NATO summit. Many Russian sources claimed that they have long had access to planning documents for the summit and that none of the resulting agreements come as a surprise, and many milbloggers claimed that the summit has been a “failure” for Ukraine because Ukraine did not secure immediate NATO membership.[xi] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev emphasized that participants of the summit are acting in “predictable ways” and that the West will continue to provide Ukraine with military aid, and Russia will therefore continue to pursue the same goals in Ukraine.[xii] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov delivered boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric by stating that the G7’s provision of “security guarantees” to Ukraine is “potentially very dangerous” and an encroachment on Russian security interests.[xiii]

The muted Russian response belies the reality that the summit demonstrated the degree to which the 2022 Russian invasion has set back the goals for which the Kremlin claims it launched the war. The aim of preventing NATO expansion and, indeed, rolling back earlier rounds of NATO expansion and pushing NATO back from Russia’s borders was one of the Kremlin’s stated demands before the invasion.[xiv] The Kremlin has repeated this aim continually throughout the war. The lack of general outcry within the Russian information space regarding developments at the NATO summit, as well as Finland’s NATO accession and Turkey’s agreement to forward Sweden’s accession protocol, likely indicates that the Kremlin has internalized these defeats and desires to avoid dwelling on them. Many Russian sources are reporting on the NATO summit in a dispassionate and muted manner that is not commensurate with the wider defeat that the summit actually represents for Russia’s pre-war aims.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 12 and reportedly made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) directions.[xv] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success along the Bila Hora-Andriivka and Bila Hora--Kurdyumivka lines (up to 13km southwest of Bakhmut).[xvi] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success and advanced along the frontline in the Berdyansk direction.[xvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) southwest of Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast, and south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[xviii]

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 12. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russia launched 15 Shahed drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian air defense forces shot down 11 of the launched drones.[xix] Russian forces have notably not conducted missile strikes aimed at Ukrainian infrastructure over the past few days as the NATO summit is ongoing in Vilnius, behavior that diverges somewhat from previous Russian patterns of conducting missile strikes to correspond with major international political events that are relevant to the war in Ukraine.[xx]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Wagner Group has almost completely handed weapons and military equipment over to the MoD. Russian MoD spokesperson Igor Konashenkov announced on July 12 that the Wagner Group transferred more than 2,000 pieces of equipment and weapons to the Russian MoD.[xxi] Konashenkov stated that the transferred weapons include T-90, T-80, and T-72 tanks, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), anti-aircraft missile systems, howitzers, anti-tank guns, mortar systems, armored tractors, armored personnel carriers, vehicles, and small arms.[xxii] Konashenkov stated that the Russian MoD transferred all the equipment and armaments to rear areas where Russian repair and recovery units will maintain and prepare the equipment for use.[xxiii] Konashenkov also claimed that dozens of units of the transferred equipment had never been used in combat conditions.[xxiv] A Russian milblogger challenged Konashenkov’s claims about the equipment and claimed that a RU MoD employee stated that while Wagner’s equipment was in good condition, it had clearly seen combat and that there was no unused equipment.[xxv] The Russian MoD announcement, following the Kremlin‘s acknowledgment of Putin’s June 29 meeting with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is likely part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control and the Wagner rebellion as a settled affair.[xxvi]

Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that certain members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle may push Putin to end the war in order to depose him. Girkin claimed that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion succeeded, resulting in a power redistribution according to the plans of Prigozhin’s patrons, whom Girkin suggested include Presidential Administration First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko, billionaire and Putin’s reported personal banker Yuri Kovalchuk, and energy executives Arkady and Boris Rotenberg.[xxvii] Girkin claimed that the power structure including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobev, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has been weakened following the rebellion. Girkin claimed that members of the “Ozero Cooperative” – an association unifying the dachas of Putin and several members of his inner circle in Leningrad Oblast – want to oust Putin in favor of one of its own members, such as Prigozhin or Kiriyenko. Girkin claimed that the “Ozero Cooperative” first aims to sabotage Russian military operations, the defense industrial base (DIB), and control of rear areas to make Putin realize he must accept defeat in the war. Girkin warned that the “Ozero Cooperative” members will target the Ministry of Defense, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and other structures outside the control of the presidential administration.

Girkin’s claims are likely part of his ongoing effort to diminish Russian political and domestic support for a potential ceasefire in the war in Ukraine, but his targeting of specific members of Putin’s inner circle is notable. Girkin has repeatedly accused Prigozhin of being part of the faction arguing in favor of freezing the lines in Ukraine while Girkin has argued in favor of a grinding, protracted war effort, as ISW has previously reported.[xxviii] Kiriyenko in particular is a prominent Kremlin mouthpiece for domestic policy and occupation matters. Kiriyenko has reportedly positioned himself to expand his political reach in recent years, including into education development, oversight of regional elections, development of the Russian internet and information bloc, and political nongovernmental organizations.[xxix] Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing sources within the presidential administration, previously reported that Kiriyenko is attempting to position himself as a possible successor to Putin.[xxx] Meduza’s sources saw Kiriyenko’s lack of connection to regional governments or businesses as undermining his prospects but noted that Kiriyenko is likely able to overcome these issues. Girkin is most likely attempting to portray Prigozhin as a direct threat to Putin’s regime in order to encourage harsher Kremlin action against Prigozhin and discourage any efforts to freeze the front in Ukraine. Girkin may be trying to discredit Kiriyenko and other claimed Prigozhin patrons to undermine any support that Prigozhin may have among any possible remaining prominent patrons.[xxxi]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2023

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26 of the 28 Russian Shahed 131 and 136 drones launched from the Primorsk-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar Krai) direction.[1] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces tried to strike the grain terminal in Odesa Oblast, and that two drones struck an administrative building at a port facility.[2] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces targeted port infrastructure to disrupt the Black Sea Grain deal.[3] Russia’s drone strikes on port infrastructure also coincide with the first day of the NATO summit in Vilnius and are likely intended to discourage NATO members from providing more military aid to Ukraine. Russia may be threatening the Black Sea grain deal to message the deal's original broker, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that his recent statement of support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and the return of the five Ukrainian Azovstal commanders on July 7 has not gone unnoticed and is not appreciated by the Kremlin.[4]  

Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that Germany will provide Ukraine with two Patriot air defense launchers, 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 25 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks, and five Bergepanzer 2 armored recovery vehicles over an unspecified time period.[5] France will reportedly send Ukraine Storm Shadow missiles. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he decided to send Ukraine weapons to allow Ukrainian forces to conduct deep strikes.[6] Reuters reported that a French diplomatic source said that France will provide Ukraine about 50 SCALP missiles (the French name for Storm Shadow missiles) with a range of 250km.[7]

A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov announced on July 11 that 11 partner states signed a memorandum on the terms for the coalition to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16.[8] Reznikov noted that the training program may include other fighter aircraft types and expressed his thanks to Denmark and the Netherlands for their ”outstanding leadership” in the process.[9]

The Kremlin’s and Russian milbloggers’ reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov took a predictably dim view of the NATO Summit’s first day, complaining that the summit has a ”pronounced, concentrated anti-Russian character.”[10] Peskov reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about how the West’s continued security assistance to Ukraine and Ukraine’s promised future membership in NATO would result in grave consequences.[11] Russian milbloggers expressed general discontent about new weapons deliveries to Ukraine but have not voiced any major reactions at the time of this publication.[12] The milbloggers are likely waiting to react to the main events that will occur on the summit’s second day when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Joe Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on July 12.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit. Shoigu implausibly claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces have lost 26,000 servicemembers and 1,244 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles since starting counteroffensive operations on June 4.[13] Shoigu also tried to present possible Ukrainian interdiction efforts in southern Ukraine as similarly ineffective by claiming that Russian air defenses have intercepted 176 HIMARS rockets and 27 Storm Shadow cruise missiles since the start of the counteroffensive.[14] ISW assesses that Russian MoD reporting on Ukrainian losses is likely highly inflated, and even Russian milbloggers have recently accused the MoD of counting strikes on already damaged and destroyed vehicles as new Ukrainian equipment losses.[15] Shoigu’s rhetoric about the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably contradicts the Kremlin’s reported media guidance instructing Russian state media not to downplay the counteroffensive or overstate Russian successes.[16] Shoigu may be increasingly ignoring established Kremlin guidance on covering the counteroffensive in a renewed effort to portray the MoD as an effective manager of the war in Ukraine following the Wagner Group’s rebellion.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk directions (Zaporizhia Oblast-Donetsk Oblast border area), and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut.[17] Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[18] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and advanced up to 1.5km near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut).[19]

A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58^th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian sources reported Tsokov’s death on July 11, and social media users reported that Tsokov died in a strike on a local hotel according to preliminary information.[21] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov published footage purportedly showing smoke plumes resulting from Ukrainian missile strikes on Berdyansk but did not offer any information regarding Tsokov’s death.[22] Tsokov was previously wounded during a Ukrainian strike on Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, in late September 2022 when he commanded the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District (WMD).[23] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that locals knew about Tsokov’s arrival and noted that Ukrainian forces have been systematically targeting Russian-occupied infrastructure in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblast – specifically recreation centers that Russian forces use as headquarters and command posts.[24] Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly signaled that Ukrainian forces are conducting an interdiction campaign as part of their counteroffensives to disrupt Russian logistics and command.[25] ISW has observed the 58th CAA‘s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division operating south of Orikhiv and the 58th CAA‘s 19th Motorized Rifle Division operating southwest of Orikhiv.[26] Tsokov’s presence at the reported command post of the 58th CAA suggests that he was personally overseeing the army responsible for repelling Ukrainian counteroffensives in key sectors of western Zaporizhia Oblast stretching from near Polohy (90km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) to the Kakhovka Reservoir.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters. One milblogger claimed that Russia lacks professional military analysts who would improve the Russian military command’s decision-making processes and adequately analyze information to develop risk assessments.[27] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to underestimate Ukrainian intelligence capabilities that set conditions for the strike.[28] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that Russian officers have poor operational security procedures despite knowing about the dangers of operations in occupied southern Ukraine.[29]

Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58^th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.[30] A source reportedly affiliated with the Russian security services claimed that Popov notified Gerasimov that elements of the 58^th CAA – which are attempting to prevent Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast – are in need of rotation after fighting in combat for a long time and suffering significant casualties.[31] Gerasimov reportedly accused Popov of alarmism and blackmailing the Russian military command. The source added that Gerasimov dismissed Popov and sent him to forward positions after Popov threatened to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin with his complaint. Another Russian source who appears to be in contact with Russian forces in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast stated that his sources confirmed Popov’s dismissal after he raised a ”real” question about the lack of rotations in Polohy Raion on the Orikhiv frontline.[32] These reports, if true, may support ISW’s previous assessments that Russian forces lack operational reserves that would allow them to carry out rotations of personnel defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives and that Russian defensive lines may be brittle.[33]

An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.[34] Russian media reported that an unknown person shot Rzhitsky several times in Krasnodar and then fled the scene.[35] The Investigative Committee of Russia posted footage of Russian authorities detaining a man in Kurban, Krasnodar Krai on July 11 on suspicion of murdering Rzhitsky.[36] A Russian citizen previously attempted to kill a Russian officer at a recruitment office in Irkutsk shortly following the start of partial mobilization in Russia in late September 2022.[37] Rzkitsky’s killing could be associated with continued discontent with mobilization, but ISW cannot definitively identify the motivation behind his killing at this time. Russian milbloggers claimed without offering evidence that Ukrainian operatives conducted the killing and compared it to previous high-profile killings of Russian ultranationalist figures in Russia.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal.
• Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
• A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
• The Kremlin’s and Russian milbloggers’ reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas
• A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters.
• Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.
• Russian forces are conducting offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and made territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s northern and southern outskirts.
• Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues measures to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to meet Russian military demands in Ukraine without conducting a wider economic mobilization.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 11 that the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) is struggling to establish regional branches in occupied territories in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2023

Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have taken control of unspecified heights around Bakhmut, allowing Ukrainian forces to establish fire control over Bakhmut itself.[2] Ukrainian officials have recently signaled that Ukraine seeks to trap Russian forces within the city, and it appears that Ukrainian operations in the Bakhmut area in recent days have been intended to slowly envelop Russian troops in Bakhmut and on its flanks.[3] ISW was previously conservative when assessing claims of Russian fire control and general interdiction of Ukrainian lines of communication in and around Bakhmut as Russian forces gradually took control of the settlement, but Ukrainian claims of establishing fire control may be more credible. [4] Both Ukrainian and Russian sources have indicated in recent days that Ukraine is gaining ground in the Bakhmut area and on its southwestern flanks including specific terrain features that can give Ukrainian forces fire advantage. The fear of Ukrainian fire control and imminent threats to Bakhmut is also permeating the Russian information space, and Russian milbloggers have repeatedly expressed fear over Ukrainian forces encircling Russian forces in Bakhmut.[5] Russian sources claimed at least since February that Russian forces maintained fire control over critical Ukrainian GLOCs around Bakhmut, while Ukrainian officials and sources did not express concern over these Russian claims, in contrast, and withdrew their forces in good order in the face of the Wagner Group‘s expensive frontal assaults.[6] The persistent signaling of Ukrainian officials about Ukrainian operational intent in Bakhmut, alongside the clear concern of milbloggers over exactly what this intent may be, suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in this direction may be credibly threatening the Russian hold on Bakhmut, although it is far too early to forecast the liberation of the city.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10. Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian troops continued offensive actions in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated four square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction over the past week, and a total of 24 square kilometers since starting counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut direction (likely around early June).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops advanced up to one kilometer in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions, and a total of 8.6 kilometers since Ukrainian troops initiated counteroffensive operations in these directions.[9] Since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4, ISW has calculated based on its own control of terrain data that Ukrainian forces recaptured approximately 253 square kilometers of territory. (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.) Russian forces have captured a total of 282 square kilometers in the entire theater since January 1. In five weeks, Ukrainian forces have liberated nearly the same amount of territory that Russian forces captured in over six months.

Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov’s first public appearance since Wagner’s rebellion supports ISW’s previous assessment that he will likely retain his official position within the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on July 10 showing Gerasimov receiving reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and Rostov and Kaluga oblasts.[10] ISW previously assessed that Gerasimov’s past long periods of public absence have not been indicators of his official position within the Russian military leadership and that Putin will likely not remove Gerasimov as the overall theater commander or Chief of the General Staff, as doing so would be too damaging to the Kremlin’s and the MoD’s reputation.[11] The Kremlin has previously responded to speculations about Gerasimov’s public absences by affirming his role as Chief of the General Staff and appears to be currently publicizing Gerasimov’s presence at the meeting to respond to a new bout of rumors about his absence following Wagner’s rebellion on June 24.[12] ISW has previously observed Russian speculations that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has recently assumed Gerasimov’s responsibilities for Russian operations in Ukraine, although there continues to be no confirmation of these speculations.[13] Gerasimov’s first public appearance since the rebellion was notably focused on alleged Russian internal security issues and not necessarily on Russian operations in Ukraine that the overall theater commander oversees.

The Kremlin and Western intelligence officials reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 29 (and/or July 1) following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Putin met with Prigozhin and all of the Wagner commanders (35 people in total) in a three-hour meeting in the Kremlin. Peskov claimed that Putin gave an assessment of Wagner’s actions during the “special military operation,” gave his assessment of the armed rebellion, and listened to commanders’ explanations.[15] Putin also reportedly offered Wagner commanders “further employment options,” while the Wagner commanders assured Putin that they are loyal supporters and soldiers of the state and Putin. Peskov refused to answer a question about whether Russian MoD officials were present at the meeting. French outlet Liberation previously reported on July 7, citing Western intelligence officials that Prigozhin and Wagner’s top commanders met with Putin, Head of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) Viktor Zolotov, and Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin on July 1.[16] It is unclear if Liberation is referring to the claimed June 29 meeting or an additional meeting in the Kremlin.

Putin’s decision to meet with Prigozhin is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s prior rhetoric about Prigozhin and his role within the Wagner private military company (PMC). Peskov stated on June 29 that he did not have information about Prigozhin’s whereabouts.[17] Putin had also claimed in his speech on June 27 that “the owner of Concord company” (the Concord company is the parent company of Prigozhin’s catering company) provided catering services for the Russian army, while the Russian state fully funded and supplied Wagner forces.[18] Putin was clearly referring to Prigozhin in this statement given that Prigozhin is the owner of the Concord company and previously served as Putin’s caterer in an effort to deliberately deprive Prigozhin of the title of Wagner financier and undermine his role in the Wagner PMC. Putin’s meeting with Prigozhin and the later acknowledgment erodes these efforts and contradicts Putin’s condemnation of the rebellion’s organizers.[19] The Kremlin may have sought to publicize the meeting to address the number of questions arising regarding Prigozhin’s ability to freely move around Russia without facing legal action.

A Kremlin-affiliated war correspondent characterized the Putin-Prigozhin meeting as the Kremlin’s attempt to “gently” replace Prigozhin and restructure Wagner.[20] The milblogger claimed that the Kremlin is very dependent on Prigozhin’s structures within Wagner and that their destruction would seriously damage the Wagner PMC, confirming ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin is gradually attempting to separate the Wagner PMC from Prigozhin.[21] ISW also previously assessed that the Kremlin relied on irregular armed formations and their patrons to outsource reservist recruitment and crowdfunding efforts, which may be one of many forms of the Kremlin’s structural dependencies on Prigozhin-lead Wagner PMC.[22] The milblogger noted that the meeting aimed to close out any issues that were not discussed during the negotiations between Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov that ensured security guarantees for Prigozhin. The milblogger noted that some of these issues included the fate of Wagner PMC as well as Prigozhin’s businesses and personal affairs. The milblogger added that Prigozhin is still allowed to operate his businesses and not face charges in Russia but had lost access to his media companies and faces a smear campaign in the state media, as ISW has also assessed.[23]

Gerasimov’s public reemergence and the acknowledgment of the Putin-Prigozhin meeting is likely a part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control following Wagner’s rebellion while also reaching out to those who lean toward loyalty toward Wagner and especially Prigozhin himself. The MoD published the footage of Gerasimov on the same day that the Kremlin acknowledged Putin’s June 29 meeting with Prigozhin, likely signaling a rejection, at least officially, of the rebellion’s call to replace senior Russian military leadership. A notable Russian milblogger argued that Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s media appearances show that there will be no command reshuffles and observed that Putin never fires people under external pressure.[24] Acquiescence to Prigozhin’s demands to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov would have likely damaged Putin’s regime security by creating a precedent that resistance and outright rebellion are legitimate means to achieve desired goals. The public backing of Shoigu and Gerasimov and the acknowledgment of Putin’s meeting with Prigozhin indicates that the Kremlin likely aims to portray the rebellion, its potential fallout, and the calls to replace disdained MoD establishment figures as a settled affair. The Kremlin may have chosen to portray itself as solving this issue now because of Lukashenko’s apparent attempt on July 6 to distance himself from the deal he mediated between the Kremlin and Prigozhin.[25] The meeting and the publicized support for Shoigu and Gerasimov are in line with what ISW continues to assess to be the Kremlin’s attempt to balance a desire to mitigate the widespread disdain for MoD establishment figures that fueled Wagner’s rebellion while also trying to disempower those who sympathized or supported the rebellion.[26]

It is unclear whether any agreements between the Kremlin and Prigozhin will prompt significant numbers of Wagner personnel to agree to sign contracts with the MoD. A Russian milblogger interviewed a Wagner assault group commander on July 10 and claimed that the commander stated that no personnel in his unit have signed the contract with the MoD.[27] The Wagner commander reportedly stated that Wagner is united around Prigozhin and a common ideology of fighting for the motherland instead of a military contract.[28] The commander reportedly stated that he will either continue serving with Wagner or demobilize.[29] It is unclear what proportion of Wagner fighters has this deep ideological loyalty to Prigozhin and Wagner as an independent organization, although such an ideological commitment will likely prove a significant obstacle for MoD efforts to subordinate Wagner. Prigozhin ramped up efforts to disseminate Wagner’s militarism and ideology throughout Russia in March, and Prigozhin may have similarly intensified internal ideological messaging within Wagner itself at the time.[30]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces have deployed to the Bakhmut direction, but a local Ukrainian commander denied having encountered Chechen forces, suggesting that these Chechen elements are not making significant frontline contributions to Russian operations in Ukraine. Kadyrov claimed on July 9 that Akhmat Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Commander Apty Alaudinov recently visited Akhmat Spetsnaz near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces recently decided to transfer Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Bakhmut direction, allegedly reflective of the Russian General Staff’s trust in Akhmat’s combat capabilities.[31] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated on July 10 that Ukrainian personnel have yet to encounter any Akhmat units near Bakhmut, however.[32] A Russian source claimed on July 6 that “bearded mountain men” were taking pictures at the Bakhmut Raion welcome sign, likely hinting that Chechen forces were coming to the Bakhmut area for propaganda purposes.[33]

Kadyrov recently claimed on May 31 that Akhmat Spetsnaz assumed responsibility for the Russian offensive to capture Marinka southwest of Donetsk City.[34] Kadyrov also reportedly deployed Akhmat Spetsnaz to border areas in Belgorod Oblast to defend against limited all Russian pro-Ukrainian cross-border raids.[35] ISW has observed Akhmat Spetsnaz elements fighting near Bilohorivka south of Kreminna and operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[36] Kadyrov has previously claimed that 7,000 Chechen servicemen are operating in Ukraine but that there are 70,000 active Chechen personnel in the entire Russian military.[37] If Akhmat forces are deployed across five different sectors of the front, it is likely that each grouping lacks significant manpower and provides limited combat capabilities to ongoing Russian operations in each sector. Akhmat forces have allegedly been fighting in Marinka for over a month and have yet to produce the significant breakthroughs that they promised. Akhmat forces have been engaged in Russian offensives south of Kreminna since at least February 2023 with a similar lack of Russian advances in the area.[38] Akhmat Spetsnaz thus appears unlikely to make even a tactically significant impact in their alleged deployment to the Bakhmut area. Kadyrov is likely promoting Akhmat as a heavily involved force in Ukraine in order to curry favor with the MoD and with Putin. It is unclear how involved Akhmat forces are in Russian operations in each sector that they are reportedly deployed to, and Kadyrov may be intentionally shielding these forces from combat and degradation in a bid to retain the influence these paramilitary structures provide.

Former Russian officer and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin claimed on July 10 that he managed to deliver a speech in St. Petersburg despite efforts by law enforcement to censor him and prevent the speech from happening. Girkin previously accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of fabricating a bomb threat at the Listva bookstore in St. Petersburg to prevent him from speaking about the Wagner Group rebellion.[39] On July 10, Girkin posted an update claiming that he still delivered the lecture in St. Petersburg, and the Listva bookstore reported that Girkin spoke in a pre-prepared spare room while the law enforcement raid was ongoing.[40] Girkin stated that the only thing that law enforcement accomplished during the raid was making a stronger point against itself and its resort to censorship than even he could.[41] Girkin went on to complain that he is preparing to leave St. Petersburg for Moscow as it is clear he is no longer welcome in the city.[42] ISW previously assessed that the FSB-fabricated bomb threat at Girkin’s event is likely part of a long-standing feud between the FSB and Girkin and the larger ultranationalist community, and the fact that Girkin supposedly went ahead with his speech despite the censorship attempts is likely to exacerbate the feud.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10.
• Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov’s first public appearance since Wagner’s rebellion supports ISW’s previous assessment that he will likely retain his official position within the Russian military.
• The Kremlin and Western intelligence officials reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 29 (and/or July 1) following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.
• Putin’s decision to meet with Prigozhin is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s prior rhetoric about Prigozhin and his role within the Wagner private military company (PMC).
• A Kremlin-affiliated war correspondent characterized the Putin-Prigozhin meeting as the Kremlin’s attempt to “gently” replace Prigozhin and restructure Wagner.
• Gerasimov’s public reemergence and the acknowledgment of the Putin-Prigozhin meeting is likely a part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control following Wagner’s rebellion while also reaching out to those who lean toward loyalty toward Wagner and especially Prigozhin himself.
• It is unclear whether any agreements between the Kremlin and Prigozhin will prompt significant numbers of Wagner personnel to agree to sign contracts with the MoD.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces have deployed to the Bakhmut direction, but a local Ukrainian commander denied having encountered Chechen forces, suggesting that these Chechen elements are not making significant frontline contributions to Russian operations in Ukraine.
• Former Russian officer and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin claimed on July 10 that he managed to deliver a speech in St. Petersburg despite efforts by law enforcement to censor him and prevent the speech from happening
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut direction.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10.
• Russian forces are continuing to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield.
• Russian occupation officials acknowledged widespread utility service disruptions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2023

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces successfully continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Russian positions in small groups and are targeting Russian rear positions, warehouses, and infrastructure. Ukrainian military officials also reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing their interdiction campaigns in southern and eastern Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukrainian forces are attempting to soften Russian defenses before liberating territory, accepting a slower pace of advance. The WSJ also reported that Ukrainian forces are focusing on dislodging Russian forces from fortifications and minefields, which are over 24km deep in some areas of Russian occupied territory. Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Telehin of Ukraine’s 108th Territorial Defense Brigade told the WSJ that Russian forces are continually able to bring in replacements even if Ukrainian forces destroy entire units. ISW has assessed that Russian forces lack operational reserves. Telehin’s statement likely refers to locally available tactical reserves. Another unit commander in the 108th Territorial Defense Brigade stated that the shortage of armored vehicles makes it difficult for Ukrainian forces to advance on well-prepared positions. WSJ sources also cited the lack of Ukrainian air superiority as one of the factors slowing down Ukrainian counteroffensives. ISW continues to assess that the current pace of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is reflective of a deliberate effort to conserve Ukrainian combat power and attrit Russian manpower and equipment at the cost of slower territorial advances.

US President Joe Biden stated that Ukraine cannot join NATO until Russia’s war in Ukraine is over. Biden told CNN on July 9 that it is premature to vote on Ukraine’s NATO membership and that the alliance should “lay out a rational path for Ukraine to be able to qualify to be able to get into NATO.” Biden’s statement follows Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s July 7 statement that Ukraine “deserves NATO membership” and precedes the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11 and July 12.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed Turkey’s decision to allow the release of five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan on July 9. Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey previously agreed in September 2022 that Azovstal commanders would remain in Turkey for the duration of the war after Russia freed some Azovstal defenders in an Ankara-brokered prisoner exchange. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky brought five Azovstal commanders home to Ukraine on July 8. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced that Lavrov and Fidan discussed the situation regarding the release of Azovstal defenders in a phone call initiated by the Turkish side but did not provide additional details regarding the discussion. Lavrov reportedly emphasized to Fidan that further deliveries of military aid to Ukraine are “destructive” and “can lead to negative consequences,” likely in an effort to discourage further military support for Ukraine. The Turkish MFA also noted that Fidan and Lavrov discussed the United Nations-brokered grain export deal, while the Russian MFA predictably blamed the West for its “inability to take necessary steps” to implement the agreement. The grain deal expires on July 17, and it is likely that the Kremlin will threaten to not extend the deal to advance its objectives.

The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey. Russian ultranationalists have been consistently criticizing the Kremlin’s decisions to free Azovstal defenders in other prisoner exchanges because the Kremlin had portrayed these Ukrainian fighters as “Nazis” during the Battle of Mariupol. One Russian milblogger observed that the release of Azovstal defenders undermines Russia’s aim to ”denazify” Ukraine, while another milblogger implied that Russia should not have trusted Turkey to uphold the deal given that Turkey is Russia’s ”historical enemy.” A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russia could have avoided this release by not organizing the initial prisoner of war (POW) exchange in 2022, and another Russian milblogger stated that Russia was once again misled because Russian officials irresponsibly prioritized the release of Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk - who is a godfather to one of Putin’s children - from Ukrainian captivity. Another milblogger stated that the news of the Azovstal commanders’ release had upset Russian military personnel on the frontlines and urged people to reevaluate the reasons for Wagner Group’s armed rebellion – implying that the rebellion’s goals of changes within the Russian military command and information space are still needed in Russia. The milblogger added that this incident is one of many incidents since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that are dividing Russian society.

Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) is deliberately censoring him. Girkin reported that his talk about the Wagner Group armed rebellion was canceled at the Listva bookstore in St. Petersburg on July 9 after St. Petersburg law enforcement responded to a claimed bomb threat at the bookstore. Girkin and Listva complained on July 8 that St. Petersburg police warned Listva not to host the event, but Listva claimed it would host the event despite the warning. Russian police routinely cancel events under the premise of bomb threats to censor public figures. Girkin claimed that someone attempted to censor his event and discussed three potential culprits. Girkin sarcastically hypothesized that the government perceives him as a greater threat than Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and 15,000 Wagner military personnel. Girkin also noted that Prigozhin may own and fully control the Listva bookstore. Listva has notably promoted Girkin and hosted many prior events with him, and it is unclear why a Prigozhin-owned bookstore would first try to host such an event and then cancel it. Girkin also suggested that UZKS Head Lieutenant General Aleksey Zhalo may have censored his event, either because he had gone crazy or because he is under Prigozhin’s influence. Girkin’s mention of Zhalo stands out as the only serious theory Girkin offered.

The FSB’s possible soft censorship of Girkin may be part of a longstanding feud between Girkin and Zhalo. Zhalo previously orchestrated FSB crackdowns on Russian ultranationalist groups and charged their leaders with terrorism and fraud. Girkin, who led an ultranationalist movement, publicly criticized Zhalo and the FSB in 2018 for further arrests of individuals in the ultranationalist pro-separatist movement and for failing to combat the Ukrainian Azov Regiment’s recruitment measures. Girkin claimed in 2018 that he personally knew Zhalo, criticized Zhalo as a ”thief” and a ”hypocrite,” and claimed that Zhalo is one of multiple Russian officials who stand against him.

Central African Republic (CAR) Presidential Spokesperson Albert Yaloke Mokpem stated on July 8 that Wagner Group personnel leaving CAR are conducting rotations and are not withdrawing. Reuters reported that a CAR military source claimed that several hundred Wagner forces recently left CAR, and ISW observed footage published on July 6 purportedly showing 600 Wagner personnel departing from an airport in Bangui, CAR. ISW previously assessed that some Wagner personnel in CAR may be leaving after refusing to sign contracts with the Russian MoD given similar reports of Wagner personnel departing Syria. Wagner personnel may be attempting to remain in CAR to maintain control over Wagner-owned natural resource extraction operations in CAR.

Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization. The document, dated May 1, 2014, commits Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner Group commander Dmitry Utkin to follow a set of rules for their new private military company’s participation for combat in eastern Ukraine. Prigozhin’s duties as “director” include the responsibility to provide weapons and funding; provide guarantees for the killed and wounded; provide permanent work; protect personnel against criminal charges for mercenaryism (article 359 of Russia’s Criminal Code); resolve all issues “collegially”; participate in person; and not go against the Russian nation. Utkin’s responsibilities as “commander” were to select and train personnel; get rid of deserters; prohibit alcohol and drugs; resolve issues “collegially”; implement lessons learned and complete tasks to the end; not go against “VVP” (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin); and not lie or deceive and always tell the truth as it is. It is unclear who leaked this document or why. Russian law enforcement, which raided Prigozhin’s home, and pro-Prigozhin actors likely had access to the document. The leak may be part of an effort to rehabilitate Wagner’s image following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion. The document reiterates that Wagner’s founding principles are to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine in loyal service to Russian President Vladimir Putin and “the Russian nation.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position. It remains unclear who benefits from the leak of Wagner’s alleged founding document as the document makes the Wagner Group look professional and appealing in comparison with the regular Russian military. Wagner is still reportedly recruiting within Russia while the Russian MoD is reportedly conducting a competing effort to recruit Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the MoD. Putin’s decision to not dispose of the Wagner Group – previously Russia's most combat capable force – is making it difficult for Putin and other Russian power players to know how to interact with the Wagner Group and its leaders and fighters.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9.
• The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukrainian forces are attempting to soften Russian defenses before liberating territory, accepting a slower pace of advance.
• US President Joe Biden stated that Ukraine cannot join NATO until Russia’s war in Ukraine is over.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed Turkey’s decision to allow the release of five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan on July 9.
• The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey.
• Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) is deliberately censoring him.
• Central African Republic (CAR) Presidental Spokesperson Albert Yaloke Mokpem stated on July 8 that Wagner Group personnel leaving CAR are conducting rotations and are not withdrawing.
• Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Russian forces advanced as of July 9.
• Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area, and continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces reportedly continued to reestablish previously flooded positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly accepting Wagner Group mercenaries for contract service with the Russian MoD in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2023

Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine. The Russian military intended to take Kyiv within three days but failed to accomplish any of its intended objectives in Ukraine. Determined and skillful Ukrainian resistance has forced the culmination of multiple Russian offensives including the one aimed at Kyiv and has liberated Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as the parts of Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces had temporarily seized. Ukrainian forces have secured and retained the initiative and are conducting counteroffensive operations along most of the frontline with Russian forces focused almost entirely on trying to hold on to the Ukrainian lands they still occupy. With Western assistance, Ukraine has ensured its independence but faces the critical task of liberating the strategically vital territory still under Russian control.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 8. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced more than 1km on the southern flank of Bakhmut, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked Russian positions southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.[i] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.[ii] Ukrainian military sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and are having partial success in unspecified areas of these directions.[iii]

US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl noted on July 7 that current Ukrainian operations across the front are the “beginning of the middle” of the wider counteroffensive and that it is therefore “too early to judge” how the counteroffensive is going.[iv] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhaylo Podolyak also emphasized on July 8 that Ukrainian forces are focusing on the destruction of Russian manpower as part of the first phase of counteroffensive operations and noted that the initial phase of the counteroffensive is focused on shaping the battlefield.[v] ISW continues to assess that the current pace of Ukrainian counteroffensives is reflective of the deliberate and strategic effort to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient to conserve Ukrainian combat power and attrit Russian manpower and equipment at the cost of slower territorial advances.[vi]

Key Takeaways:

• Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 8. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl noted on July 7 that current Ukrainian operations across the front are the ”beginning of the middle” of the wider counteroffensive and that it is therefore ”too early to judge” how the counteroffensive is going.
• The United States announced a new military aid package for Ukraine that includes cluster munitions on July 7.
• Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed 131/136 drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's industrial and infrastructure facilities overnight from July 7 to 8.
• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Ukraine “deserves NATO membership” ahead of the July 11 to 12 NATO summit in a press conference on July 7 in Istanbul with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky returned to Ukraine from Turkey with five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast whom Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey had previously agreed would remain in Turkey until the end of the war.
• Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Russian authorities are capitalizing on the fear of a provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to drive out Ukrainian personnel and increase the Russian presence at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit.
• A Wagner commander stated that the Wagner Group will go to Belarus after completing rest and recuperation through August 2023. The status of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prigozhin is unclear, and the deal may be in flux.
• The Kremlin may be attempting to ensure that it has control over Wagner leadership and personnel in Africa and the Middle East.
• A prominent Russian milblogger speculated that the Russian military leadership may be in the process of making the decision to replace Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, suggesting that the implications of the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion may still be having ramifications on the highest echelons of military command.
• Russian authorities reportedly prevented former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin from holding a talk about the Wagner Group rebellion.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and south of Kreminna, and Ukraine likely continues to conduct strikes on Russian concentration areas deep within the rear of occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 8.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly observed combat training of Russian contract servicemen at the Southern Military District (SMD) training grounds on July 8, likely in an attempt to favorably portray Russian formalization efforts and incentivize personnel recruitment.
• The Ukrainian government has indicated that Russian occupation authorities struggle to compensate staff in critical industries, resulting in staffing shortages that could hinder the Russian war effort.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7, 2023

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant gains in the Bakhmut area and continued counteroffensive operations in at least three other sectors of the front on July 7. Geolocated footage published on July 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces have made tactically significant gains near Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut).[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsykyi reported that Ukrainian forces established control over unspecified previously lost positions in the Bakhmut area.[2] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev reported that Ukrainian forces also achieved partial success near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kreminna direction along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[5]

Russian forces have reportedly committed almost the entirety of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces to southern Ukraine. Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets stated on July 5 that the Eastern Grouping of Forces is comprised of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA), the 35th CAA, the 36th CAA, and the 29th CAA (all of the Eastern Military District).[6] ISW cannot confirm the exact composition of the Eastern Grouping of Forces, although it continues to appear that this operational direction command structure is largely coextensive with the Eastern Military District (EMD). Mashovets claimed that the 5th CAA’s 127th Motorized Rifle Division and 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts and that the CAA’s other main unit, the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade, is operating south of Bakhmut. ISW has observed the 5th CAA‘s 127th Division and 60th Brigade in the Zaporizhia Oblast-Donetsk Oblast border area along with previous Russian claims that the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been operating on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[7] Mashovets stated that the 35th CAA’s 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 69th Separate Cover Brigade are deployed to western Zaporizhia Oblast and that the 36th CAA’s 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Separate Tank Brigade are deployed to areas south of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[8] ISW previously assessed that the 35th CAA’s Chief of Staff’s alleged death from a Ukrainian missile strike on June 13 in Zaporizhia Oblast suggested that significant elements of the 35th CAA are likely operating along the Zaporizhia front.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported on March 19 that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade would deploy to western Donetsk Oblast.[10] Mashovets also stated that the 29th CAA, the smallest combined arms army in the EMD, is the only formation of the Eastern Grouping of Forces in reserve.[11] Mashovets added that the 58th and 49th CAAs and 22nd Army Corps of the Southern Military District (SMD) are committed to operations in Southern Ukraine.[12] Mashovets stated that elements of the 68th Army Corps (EMD) are also deployed to southern Ukraine, but suggested that the 68th Army Corps is not a part of the Eastern Grouping of Forces, making it the only higher-level EMD formation separate from the Eastern Grouping of Forces.[13] ISW has also observed elements of the EMD Pacific Fleet’s naval infantry brigades (40th and 155th) continuing to serve in western Donetsk Oblast after suffering heavy losses during the Russian winter spring 2023 offensive.[14] Mashovets‘ reporting and ISW’s current observation of the Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in southern Ukraine indicates that almost the entirety of the EMD’s combat power is committed to defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives, primarily in southern Ukraine.

The deployment of almost the entirety of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces and extensive SMD elements to the frontline in southern Ukraine suggests that Russian defenses in southern Ukraine may be brittle. Mashovets’ report suggests that the only reserve that the Russian military maintains in southern Ukraine consists of elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army – the Eastern Military District’s smallest combined arms army that has only one maneuver brigade: the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade. Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022 and fought near Vuhledar in early 2023 and are thus likely degraded.[15]

Russian defenses in southern Ukraine, while formidable, are not insurmountable. Russian forces in southern Ukraine would likely have to fall back on prepared defensive positions without significant support from operational reserves if Ukrainian forces achieved an operational breakthrough. Withdrawal in contact is an exceedingly difficult military task, and it is unclear that Russian forces in contact would be able to successfully withdraw from their first lines to other prepared lines in good order, especially if those forces - and the forces behind them in echelon - are worn-down and unsupported. ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a gradual effort to systematically degrade Russian combat power in southern Ukraine over time, increasing the brittleness of the Russian defenses.[16]

Russia temporarily disconnected at least partially from the global internet during a test of its “sovereign internet” system overnight on July 4-5. Russian state affiliated media outlet RBK cited telecommunications sources that claimed that Russia successfully conducted a test of the Sovereign Internet system overnight.[17] The test reportedly prevented Russians from accessing common Western services including Google and Wikipedia while retaining access to Russian-hosted web services.[18] The test likely disconnected some Russian government services, however, including Russian Railways and the Russian federal veterinary and agricultural oversight body Rosselkhoznadzor.[19] Russian telecommunications operators Megafon and Beeline also reported outages during the test.[20] Continued tests and development of the ”sovereign internet” indicate that the Kremlin continues long term efforts to be able to isolate Russia from Western influence and the global sphere, and this effort will likely have ramifications that spread beyond the information space.[21] Russia’s economy would likely significantly from protracted internet isolation, for example, because so much international commerce relies on the global internet.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against rear areas in Ukraine on June 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 12 of 18 Shahed-131/136 drones and seven of 11 Kalibr cruise missiles.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched the drones from areas near Primorsk-Akhtarsk in Krasnodar Krai and that Russian missiles struck Lviv City, an infrastructure facility in Zaporizhzhia City, and a residential building in Cherkasy Oblast.[23] Ukrainian Permanent Representative to the UN Serhiy Kyslytsya stated that Russian forces have launched over 1,000 Iranian Shahed-131/136 and Mohajer-6 drones against Ukraine since September 2022.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces made tactically significant gains in the Bakhmut area and continued counteroffensive operations in at least three other sectors of the front on July 7.
• Russian forces have reportedly committed almost the entirety of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces to southern Ukraine.
• The deployment of almost the entirety of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces and extensive SMD elements to the frontline in southern Ukraine suggests that Russian defenses in southern Ukraine may be brittle.
• Russia temporarily disconnected at least partially from the global internet during a test of its “sovereign internet” system overnight on July 4-5.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against rear areas in Ukraine on June 6 to 7.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border. Ukrainian forces made tactically significant gains in the Bakhmut area between July 6-7.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a renewed wave of counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 7.
• The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) continues to restrict international monitors’ access to the facility.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly drafted a law that would expand the list of gross disciplinary offenses within the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian authorities continue to portray themselves as responsible custodians of Ukrainian children in an effort to discredit Ukraine while continuing to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.
• A Belarusian military official stated that Wagner Group forces have not yet decided to deploy to Belarus while giving a press tour of the speculated Wagner Group base in Asipovichy on July 7.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2023

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner forces are not in Belarus as of July 6, indicating that Prigozhin may be failing to uphold the deal Lukashenko mediated between Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24. Lukashenko and the Kremlin previously announced that Prigozhin, Putin, and Lukashenko reached an agreement that offered Prigozhin and the Wagner forces that participated in the rebellion unspecified security guarantees in Belarus. The full contents of this agreement have not been revealed, but it appears that Wagner is not fulfilling its end of the deal. Lukashenko stated on July 6 that Wagner forces are currently at their permanent camps (either in Russia or in Ukraine) to which they withdrew following the Battle for Bakhmut. Lukashenko added that Prigozhin is in St. Petersburg or may have even flown to Moscow on the morning of July 6. Lukashenko denied the reports that Belarus is constructing new training camps for Wagner forces and noted that Belarus offered Wagner several former Soviet military camps including some near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast. Lukashenko implied that Wagner had not yet agreed to deploy to these bases and that Wagner “has a different vision for [their] deployment,” the details of which Lukashenko refused to share. Lukashenko, however, denied that the deal has been terminated and noted that the question of Wagner forces’ transfer and setup “has not been decided” at the moment.

Russian sources also indicated that Prigozhin is in Russia, although ISW cannot confirm Prigozhin’s whereabouts at this time. A Russian opposition outlet reported that Prigozhin’s plane landed in Rostov Oblast after flying from Moscow Oblast on the morning of July 6. A St. Petersburg outlet reported on July 5 that Prigozhin personally picked up several small arms seized by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) from the FSB building in St. Petersburg on July 4. The outlet also reported that Prigozhin was in Moscow over the weekend on July 1 and July 2. ISW had not observed any visual confirmations in the open source that Wagner personnel deployed to Belarus at this time. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also claimed that the Kremlin does not follow Prigozhin’s movements, noting that the Kremlin cannot and does not want to follow Prigozhin. Peskov’s statement is absurd given that the Kremlin and Russian security forces have the ability to detain Prigozhin or restrict his movements in Russia. It is particularly absurd if Prigozhin was actually able to collect his weapons from an FSB facility.

Lukashenko appears to be distancing himself from the deal he reportedly mediated while continuing to tout his ability to mediate between Putin and a formerly loyal lieutenant in the first place, thus still highlighting Putin’s weakness. Lukashenko demonstratively stated that Wagner and Prigozhin are Russian, and the questions about their whereabouts should not be directed to him. Lukashenko appears to be distancing himself from Wagner, and his rhetoric may suggest that he is pinning the responsibility on the Kremlin to enforce the deal. Lukashenko also continued to boast about his skillful negotiations with Prigozhin after stating that Putin’s authority was not weakened during the armed rebellion in response to a journalist’s question.

Prigozhin’s ability to freely operate in Russia suggests that Prigozhin is still protected by some security guarantees and/or that the Kremlin continues to prioritize undermining his reputation in Russia over targeting Prigozhin physically or legally. Lukashenko noted that neither he nor Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to assassinate Prigozhin, and dismissed suggestions that Putin might attempt to kill Prigozhin in the future. ISW assessed on June 27 that Putin has likely decided that he cannot directly eliminate Prigozhin without making him a martyr for causes concerning the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) mishandling of the invasion. ISW also observed on June 27 that the Kremlin launched an information operation aimed at presenting Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar, and Russian state outlets have maintained this narrative since. Russian propaganda networks are extensively covering FSB’s raids of Prigozhin’s mansion and his wealth, and one journalist sarcastically called Prigozhin’s house a “palace belonging to the fighter against corruption” on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1.

Select Russian ultranationalists criticized Russian state propaganda for attempting to villainize Prigozhin, however, suggesting that the Kremlin’s attempt to alienate the ultranationalist community from Prigozhin is not succeeding. A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel accused the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs of deliberately leaking footage of the FSB raids to the media in order to portray Prigozhin as a traitor who is only interested in a lavish lifestyle. Another Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel attempted to disprove Rossiya 1’s suggestion that the FSB may have found narcotics at Prigozhin’s mansion. It is not necessarily surprising that Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are attacking Kremlin efforts to blackguard Prigozhi, but a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also condemned the Russian media’s efforts to portray Prigozhin as a corrupt individual, noting that Prigozhin’s home is consistent with that of a wealthy individual and that Prigozhin appears to showcase his military awards throughout his mansion. Another milblogger noted that Prigozhin’s house did not appear that lavish when compared to other Russian billionaires.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 6 and are continuing efforts to gradually degrade Russian manpower and logistics assets. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive activities in the Bakhmut, western Donetsk, and western Zaporizhia directions. Geolocated footage posted on July 6 shows that Ukrainian troops have advanced towards the western outskirts of Klishchiivka, about 5km southwest of Bakhmut. Russian and Ukrainian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast south of Velyka Novosilka and in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged the generally slower pace of Ukrainian counteroffensive gains in an interview with CNN on July 5 and stated that Ukrainian operations have “slowed down” against entrenched Russian defensive positions, remarking that he believes Ukraine still needs certain Western weapons systems before launching new attacks along the front. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar emphasized that the Ukrainian efforts to strike Russian concentration areas are imperative for the wider counteroffensive and contribute to the slower rate of ground attacks across the theater. Malyar noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed six Russian ammunition depots in the Tavriisk (Zaporizhia) direction alone in the past day and confirmed that the July 4 strike on Makiivka was an effective example of the destruction of Russian artillery and equipment assets.

Ukrainian and Russian officials largely de-escalated their rhetoric regarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 6. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on July 6 that the danger of a man-made disaster at the ZNPP is “gradually decreasing,” following warnings by various Ukrainian officials on July 4 that Russian forces may have placed objects resembling explosive devices on the roofs of two of the ZNPP’s reactor buildings. First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky also notably visited the ZNPP on July 6 and posted images reportedly near the plant’s dry nuclear waste storage facility. Kiriyenko and Balitsky noted that the plant continues to “operate normally” under Russian control, thus downplaying previous Russian claims that Ukrainian actions were imminently threatening the safety of the ZNPP. Kiriyenko and Balitsky may have visited the plant to portray Russia as a capable custodian of the ZNPP, and their rhetorical posturing during the visit suggests that Russian officials may be stepping back from harsh warnings of imminent disaster at the plant. ISW continues to assess that Russian rhetoric surrounding the ZNPP is meant to discourage Western support for Ukraine by accusing Ukraine of nuclear irresponsibility, as well as to dissuade Ukrainian forces from conducting counteroffensive operations into occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian political actors continue attempts to court or control Russian milbloggers, indicating that many view the milblogger community as a critical constituency. Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) head Leonid Slutsky met with select milbloggers on July 5 to discuss a series of proposals to grant benefits and protections to military correspondents and bloggers covering the war in Ukraine. Slutsky stated that the LDPR will aim to pass legislation that will grant military correspondents the status of combat veterans and provide state guarantees and payments in cases of injury or death. Slutsky claimed that the LDPR sent relevant proposals about Russian military correspondents and bloggers to the Russian MoD and the Ministry of Digital Development. Slutsky added the LDPR and select milbloggers will launch an educational program to teach youth about the “informational realities” of the war in Ukraine. Russian pundits on the Kremlin-affiliated show Solovyov Live recently discussed milbloggers’ potential violation of operational security in Ukraine and urged them to engage in some degree of self-censorship. The Kremlin has routinely sought to appeal to select Russian milbloggers in a bid to win the favor of the community and leverage their connections to the wider Russian ultranationalist community, although the Russian MoD has recently indicated that it once again seeks to curb select milblogger activity. It is unclear what backing the LDPR proposals have from the Kremlin, although the Kremlin could use such measures to exert control over milbloggers and determine who qualifies as a recognized milblogger.

The growing prominence of the milblogger community within the Russian information space and in certain accepted Russian civil society movements is likely creating a competition amongst various political actors vying for control over what is viewed as a critical constituency, either through winning their favor or by establishing authority over their activities. These political actors, both those firmly within the Kremlin’s orbit and those further outside of it, likely believe that it has yet to be decided who will control the political influence of this constituency. Milbloggers, with their own diverging interests and allegiances, have yet to indicate how the overall community will respond to this growing competition for their influence.

Russian opposition media outlet Vertska reported that Russian forces and occupation authorities are conducting a campaign of systematic religious persecution in occupied Ukraine. Verstka found that Russian forces and occupation authorities have committed at least 109 acts of religious persecution and destroyed nearly 600 places of worship in Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Verstka uncovered the stories of people whom Russian forces and occupation authorities kidnapped, arrested, captured, tortured, and killed over their faith. The investigation found that Orthodox and Protestant Christians are the most repressed group in the occupied territories, but that Catholics, Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses have also been persecuted. Verstka cited at least 43 cases in which clergymen were targeted for their faith, including eight who were kidnapped and five who were killed. Verstka reported that at least 66 places of worship have been confiscated or destroyed by Russian forces and turned into warehouses, police departments, National Guard offices, or ‘United Russia’ offices. Verstka noted that the primary purposes of religious oppression in the occupied territories are to suppress the Ukrainian language, which services are commonly conducted, to discourage or punish congregants who refuse to support occupation authorities, and to pressure congregations and priests into supporting the Russian Orthodox Church. ISW previously reported that Russian occupation authorities were likely conducting a campaign of religious persecution in occupied Ukraine to systematically eradicate “undesirable” religious organizations and promote the Moscow Patriarchate. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely intensify their campaign and that Russian authorities are conducting religious persecution in a way that is entirely at odds with efforts to frame Russian President Vladimir Putin as the true protector of the Christian faith.

Russian milbloggers claimed that aspects of Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine have severe limitations and may not be as effective as Russian sources have previously portrayed them. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian mobilized service members operating in Zaporizhia Oblast have been on the frontlines since October 2022 without any rotations. The milblogger stated that Russian forces have not been able to rotate these mobilized personnel out of these positions because there are no available personnel to replace them with. The milblogger’s description of acute rotation issues supports ISW’s previous assessment that Russian forces likely lack combat-ready reserves. The failure to conduct any rotations will likely result in a quicker rate of degradation for Russian formations defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in southern Ukraine. Other Russian milbloggers accused Russian attack helicopters of striking already destroyed Ukrainian military equipment and suggested that the Russian MoD may be using these repeated hits to report inflated Ukrainian losses. The Kremlin has previously used reports of wildly inflated Ukrainian armored vehicle losses to portray Russian defensive operations as extremely effective.

Key Takeaways:

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner forces are not in Belarus as of July 6, indicating that Prigozhin may be failing to uphold the deal Lukashenko mediated between Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.
• Russian sources also indicated that Prigozhin is in Russia, although ISW cannot confirm Prigozhin’s whereabouts at this time.
• Lukashenko appears to be distancing himself from the deal he reportedly mediated while continuing to tout his ability to mediate between Putin and a formerly loyal lieutenant in the first place, thus still highlighting Putin’s weakness.
• Prigozhin’s ability to freely operate in Russia suggests that Prigozhin is still protected by some security guarantees and/or that the Kremlin continues to prioritize undermining his reputation in Russia over targeting Prigozhin physically or legally.
• Select Russian ultranationalists criticized Russian state propaganda for attempting to villainize Prigozhin, however, suggesting that the Kremlin’s attempt to alienate the ultranationalist community from Prigozhin is not succeeding.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 6 and are continuing efforts to gradually degrade Russian manpower and logistics assets.
• Ukrainian and Russian officials largely de-escalated their rhetoric regarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 6.
• Russian political actors continue attempts to court or control Russian milbloggers, indicating that many view the milblogger community as a critical constituency.
• Russian opposition media outlet Vertska reported that Russian forces and occupation authorities are conducting a campaign of systematic religious persecution in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that aspects of Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine have severe limitations and may not be as effective as Russian sources have previously portrayed them.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Visual evidence confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Bakhmut as of July 6.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials continue efforts to create territorial defense units in Russian border oblasts.
• Occupation officials continue efforts to forcibly assimilate Ukrainian legal and cultural traditions into the Russian system in occupied territories.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed on July 6 that Russia will transfer all planned tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus by the end of 2023, if not earlier.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2023

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southwest of Bakhmut.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in an unspecified area on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[2] Ukrainian MP Yuriy Mysyagin stated that Ukrainian forces established a new position north of Opytne (6km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk City) along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults in the Lyman direction, the Bakhmut direction, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, on the border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff General Oleksii Hromov reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces have advanced 7.5km into Russian-controlled territory in western Zaporizhia Oblast and along the administrative border between the Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[5] Hromov stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated nine settlements and 160 square kilometers of territory since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4.[6]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Russian rear positions along the entire front overnight and during the day on July 5. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast (6km northeast of Donetsk City).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot in Makiivka and that Ukrainian forces are regularly launching missile strikes against rear Russian targets in Ukraine.[8] Geolocated images published on July 5 also show apparent Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions near Debaltseve (52km northeast of Donetsk City).[9] Geolocated footage published on July 5 also shows the aftermath of an alleged Ukrainian strike on a railway station in Yasynuvata (6km northeast of Donetsk City).[10] Geolocated images published on July 5 shows the aftermath of an alleged HIMARS rocket strike on a Russian occupation administration building in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Yakymivka (16km southwest of Melitopol) and attempted to strike Berdyansk in Zaporizhia Oblast with Storm Shadow Cruise missiles.[12] Russian sources claimed that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian missile in the vicinity of Berdyansk.[13] A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel also claimed that Russian air defenses were activated near Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast (60km southeast of Kherson City).[14]

The footage and claims of these Ukrainian strikes suggest that Ukrainian forces launched a coordinated series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian logistics and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) throughout the theater. United Kingdom Chief of the Defense Staff Admiral Sir Antony David Radakin stated on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are conducting an operation to “starve, stretch, and strike” Russian forces to break down Russian defensive lines.[15] A widespread strike series targeting Russian GLOCs and logistics would be an appropriate element of such a strategy and is partially reminiscent of the interdiction campaign that Ukrainian forces conducted as a part of the Kherson counteroffensive.[16] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[17] A possible Ukrainian interdiction campaign supporting this effort would have cumulative effects, and its results would not be immediately evident.

Ukrainian and Russian officials maintained their heightened rhetoric regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5 following significant claims of a possible attack against the plant overnight on July 4-5.[18] Russia likely continues setting informational conditions for a possible false flag attack against the ZNPP but remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at this time. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russia may attack the ZNPP to either accomplish its military goals in the area — presumably deterring any possible Ukrainian counteroffensive near the Kakhovka Reservoir — or to intimidate and blame Ukrainian forces for any attacks against the ZNPP.[19] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operational Department, Oleksii Hromov stated that the situation at the ZNPP is not new and that Ukrainian forces have the necessary equipment to handle radiological incidents.[20] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that there is a “great threat” that Ukraine may sabotage the ZNPP with “catastrophic consequences.”[21] ISW continues to assess that Russian statements accusing Ukraine of imminent sabotage against the ZNPP are likely part of a broader information operation aimed at undermining support for Ukraine ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuading Ukrainian forces from counteroffensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[22]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on July 5 that IAEA experts at the ZNPP have requested access to nuclear reactors no. 3 and 4 and other areas at the ZNPP following Ukrainian statements that Russian forces placed explosives on the reactors’ outer roofs.[23] Grossi’s statement on the importance of accessing certain areas of the ZNPP — along with consistent prior statements to the same effect — indicates that Russian authorities are denying the IAEA contingent access to various critical areas at the ZNPP and are unlikely to allow access in the future.[24] Russian authorities may refuse access to reactors no 3. and 4 to prevent the IAEA from investigating the Ukrainian reports on these reactors. Satellite imagery published on July 5 shows unknown objects on the roofs of one of the ZNPP reactor containment units, reportedly reactor no. 4, placed there after July 3.[25] Though the exact nature of these objects is unknown, their presence on the reactor containment unit roof, recent Ukrainian reports, and significant alarm over the ZNPP underscore the importance of Russia’s refusal to give the IAEA access to critical ZNPP areas to investigate possible threats to the plant.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to procure Iranian-made Shahed drones and is setting conditions to manufacture these drones in Russia with Iran’s assistance. Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff General Oleksii Hromov stated that Russia received up to 1,800 drones from Iran - of which 1,600 are of the Shahed-type and 200 of unspecified types.[26] Hromov added that Iran consistently replenishes Russian stocks of Iranian drones, and that Russia reached an agreement with Iran to produce drones in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian and Iranian officials are planning to set up the production of Iranian Shahed drones on the territory of Yelabuga in the Republic of Tatarstan given that this settlement is the provisional headquarters of the Yelabuga Free Economic Zone.[27] Russia previously used Yelabuga Free Economic Zone exclusively for civilian industrial and economic projects before turning the project into a key focus of Russia’s military industry. The Resistance Center reported that Iran will provide Russia with necessary components that will then be assembled in Russia. The Resistance Center, citing open-source intelligence, reported that Russian leadership intends to train Yelabuga specialists in Iran to assemble Shaheds and transfer the production of some Shahed components to the territory of the Yelabuga Free Economic Zone. The Resistance Center added that Russia wants to establish an automated production line.

The Kremlin continues to show concern over the risk of a potential armed rebellion in Russia after Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24. A pro-Kremlin online outlet reported that the Moscow Oblast police will train in urban combat tactics, light machine gun shooting, grenade throwing, and tactical medicine to improve skills in the aftermath of Wagner’s armed rebellion.[28] Such training indicates that the Kremlin is attempting to improve the ability of security forces in Moscow to defend the regime against potential future threats. Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs is unlikely to adequately prepare the Moscow Oblast police for urban combat given that some police elements are already expressing disinterest with the new training plans among many other problems with this plan. The outlet stated that Moscow Oblast’s female police officers are also trying to avoid the training.

The Financial Times (FT) reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in late March.[29] FT reported, citing unnamed former Chinese government officials, that Xi told Putin not to use nuclear weapons and noted that China’s stance against the use of nuclear weapons was included in its position paper on peace in Ukraine. FT reported that Xi’s warning to Putin was likely part of China’s efforts to bolster its relationships with the European Union. Western security officials also noted that Putin was disappointed after Xi’s visit to Moscow did not secure any important gains for Russia such as the approval of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline. ISW previously assessed that Xi may have played a role in pressuring the Kremlin to reduce its nuclear threats in November 2022 and that Putin was unable to secure the desired no-limits bilateral partnership with China during Xi’s visit to Moscow.[30]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin dismissed Sergei Mikhailov from his position as General Director of TASS state newswire and replaced him with Andrey Kondrashov.[31] Mikhailov took over TASS in 2012 and rebranded the news agency into the modern publication it is today.[32] Kondrashov has previously made documentaries about the annexation of Crimea and Putin’s life and was the press secretary for Putin’s campaign headquarters in 2018.[33] Ukrainian sources suggested that Kondrashov’s appointment might indicate that the Kremlin is unhappy with the media coverage of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion and highlights the continued importance of loyalty to Putin over professional achievement.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Russian rear positions along the entire front overnight and during the day on July 5.
• Ukrainian and Russian officials maintained their heightened rhetoric regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5 following significant claims of a possible attack against the plant overnight on July 4-5.[35] Russia likely continues setting informational conditions for a possible false flag attack against the ZNPP, but remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at this time.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to procure Iranian-made Shahed drones and is setting conditions to manufacture these drones in Russia with Iran’s assistance.
• The Kremlin continues to show concern over the risk of a potential armed rebellion in Russia after Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
• The Financial Times (FT) reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in late March.
• Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin dismissed Sergei Mikhailov from his position as General Director of TASS state newswire and replaced him with Andrey Kondrashov.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Russian and Ukrainian forces continued skirmishing around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces liberated an important height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk Oblast-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• A Ukrainian official confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s hybrid cryptomobilization and contract service recruitment campaigns have failed to produce large numbers of recruits, contrary to Russian claims.
• Russian officials are setting information conditions to postpone regional elections in occupied Ukraine likely out of concerns for successful Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2023

Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are performing their main task of destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses and that a “war of destruction is equal to a war of kilometers.”[i] Danilov’s assessment underlines the prioritization of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign to attrit Russian manpower and assets over attempting to conduct massive sweeping mechanized maneuvers to regain large swaths of territory rapidly. NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Bob Bauer reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are correct to proceed cautiously and avoid high casualties in the counteroffensive and acknowledged that the counteroffensive is difficult due to landmines and other obstacles up to 30km deep into Russian-occupied territory.[ii] Bauer stated that Ukrainian forces should not face criticism or pressure for moving slowly.

Ukrainian forces have liberated territory in multiple areas of the front since the start of the counteroffensive in early June. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces have liberated a total of 37.4 square kilometers in eastern and southern Ukraine in the past week.[iii] Ukrainian forces are continuing to make steady, gradual advances.

The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas. Ukrainian forces conducted slow and gradual interdiction campaigns against Russian concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and limited ground attacks on the west (right) bank between August and November of 2022, before finally forcing the Russian withdrawal from the right bank in mid-November.[iv] The situation in southern Ukraine is different, of course, because there is no natural bottleneck of the sort created by Russian reliance on the two bridges over the Dnipro. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson nevertheless alternated phases of relatively rapid advance with long periods of preparation, combat focused on attritting Russian forces, and limited gains that ultimately made Russian positions on the west bank of the river untenable.  By contrast, the Russian winter-spring offensive culminated in just over one month without making significant gains along the Luhansk-Kharkiv Oblast border.[v]  The current Ukrainian counter-offensive is less dramatic and rapid than the one that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast, more successful than the failed Russian winter offensive, and generally most like the slower but ultimately successful Kherson counteroffensive in its pace and initial progress.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in the Lyman direction.[vi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[vii] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces have made some unspecified advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, and a prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Bakhmut.[viii] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached Pryyutne, 15 kilometers southwest of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[ix] Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces made additional advances south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[x]

Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 4, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack. Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Ukrainian officials have begun preparations for a potential Russian provocation at the ZNPP “in the near future” and warned that Russian forces placed objects “resembling explosive devices” on the outer roofs of the ZNPP’s third and fourth reactors in order to blame damage to these areas on Ukrainian shelling.[xi] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this statement in his nightly address on July 4, and other Ukrainian military sources warned of possible Russian provocations at the plant.[xii] As ISW has previously reported, it is unlikely that limited Russian sabotage at the ZNPP that Russian could hope to blame on Ukraine would be able to generate a massive radiological incident, as the ZNPP’s reactors were constructed to withstand considerable damage.[xiii] Ukrainian military sources reiterated this assessment and noted that even if the purported explosive devices detonate, the damage would not harm the reactor but would rather create the false impression that Ukrainian forces had shelled the reactors.[xiv] Advisor to the head of Russian nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom, Renat Karchaa, also claimed on July 4 that Ukraine is planning to strike the ZNPP overnight on July 4-5.[xv] ISW has previously assessed that such provocative Russian statements, and even the possibility of a tangible provocation at the plant, are likely part of a Russian wider information operation meant to accuse Ukraine of irresponsibility at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuade Ukrainian forces from conducting counteroffensive operations against occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[xvi]

The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on July 3, citing internal law enforcement sources, that Russian law enforcement authorities are considering reassigning the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[xvii] Vedomosti noted that this reported change follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with heads of various Russian law enforcement agencies on June 26 in the wake of the Wagner armed rebellion.[xviii] Several Russian sources spoke out against the reported transfer of ”Grom” to Rosgvardia, citing overall poorer equipment, training, and leadership quality.[xix] Vedomosti claimed that Alexander Khinstein, former advisor to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov, warned that the assignment of ”Grom” units to Rosgvardia would be a ”dangerous experiment.”[xx] The alleged restructuring of Russia’s internal security forces suggests that the Kremlin is working to build an effective anti-rebellion force following Wagner’s armed rebellion. The fact that these purported changes are happening following the rebellion indicates that the Kremlin was correctly dissatisfied with the performance of security forces, which failed to stop or even contest Wagner’s march on Moscow, and suggests that the Kremlin has not ruled out the risk of future such rebellions.

Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko. The Rostov-on-Don administration claimed that the total damages from Prigozhin’s rebellion amounted to 92.5 million rubles (roughly $1 million), and that the administration will not recover damages from Prigozhin or the Wagner Group.[xxi] St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka claimed, citing internal sources, that Russian authorities returned over 10 billion rubles (roughly $111 million) in cash, five gold bars, and hundreds of thousands of US dollars in cash to Prigozhin on July 2 that authorities had seized from Prigozhin-affiliated facilities in St. Petersburg on June 24.[xxii] Fontanka claimed that authorities only reversed their decision to hold onto Prigozhin‘s liquid assets on July 2 but did not specify a reason for the reversal. The legal basis that Russian authorities would have had for seizing Prigozhin’s assets remains unclear in any case, as Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Prigozhin for the rebellion.[xxiii] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that part of Prigozhin’s liquid assets were supposed to be compensation to the families of Russian pilots whom Wagner forces killed during the rebellion, but it is now uncertain whether Wagner will make those payments.[xxiv] The milblogger assessed that Wagner will likely use at least part of the returned assets to support transferring Wagner Group personnel to Belarus.

The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on July 4 that unspecified, masked actors in Grozny, Chechnya intercepted a car containing one of its journalists, Yelena Milashina, severely assaulted Milashina, destroyed her equipment and documents, and warned Milashina against writing “anything.”[xxv] Milashina traveled to Chechnya in order to cover the trial of Zarema Musayeva, the mother of an exiled Chechen opposition activist, and the attackers also assaulted Musayeva’s lawyer, Alexander Nemov, who was in the car with Milashina. Chechen courts sentenced Musayeva to five and a half years in prison on July 5 for alleged fraud and attacking Chechen authorities, but some Russian opposition voices claimed that Chechen authorities prosecuted Musayeva due to her son‘s activism.[xxvi] Prominent Russian ultranationalist voices seized on Milashina’s attack despite its lack of relevance to the war in Ukraine likely out of concern for broader press censorship.[xxvii] The voices condemned attacks against journalists – including Milashina – as unacceptable even though they disagree with Milashina.[xxviii] The Russian Union of Journalists and the Russian Human Rights Council both issued statements of condemnation and opened investigations into the attack.[xxix]

Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however. Kadyrov’s response was a brief acknowledgment that the relevant Chechen authorities are investigating the ”incident” - a response inconsistent in tone and content with Kadyrov’s usual flamboyant, long-winded messaging.[xxx] Kadyrov previously condemned Milashina as a ”terrorist” and demanded her detention, which is largely consistent with his overall effort to retain his authoritarian rule in Chechnya.[xxxi] If Kadyrov supports the investigation into Milashina’s attack, he risks undermining his domestic regime and crackdowns against Chechen opposition voices. But if Kadyrov refuses to support the investigation, then he risks undermining his standing within an information space that is hypersensitive to the prospect of increased censorship. Kadyrov already struggles to balance these dual aims in his force arrayment in Ukraine; Kadyrov portrays Akhmat forces as capable fighters against Ukraine but has simultaneously largely avoided committing them intensive and attritional combat, and some Russian milbloggers have complained that Chechen forces are distracted posing online while other Russian forces actually fight.[xxxii]  Chechen forces notably failed to engage Prigozhin’s rebels despite ostentatiously mobilizing and moving ostensibly to fight them, although Putin might have directed Kadyrov to avoid combat with Wagner forces.[xxxiii]

Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO. Russian news outlet Izvestia reported that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources claimed that the existing 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet will be reformed into the new combined arms army with motorized rifle brigades, divisions, and regiments subordinate to it.[xxxiv] Izvestia suggested that the 14th Army Corps‘ 200th and 80th Brigades will be reorganized into a division under the new combined arms army.[xxxv] Russian army corps before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine existed only within fleets and largely performed the same functions as combined arms armies. The reported decision to form a new combined arms army is thus likely posturing ahead of the NATO summit on July 11-12 intended to show Russia’s military response to the accession of Finland and possibly Sweden to the alliance. The promotion of the 14th Army Corps to a combined arms army level will not by itself increase Russian combat capacity, and it is unclear where the Russian military leadership could find the personnel and equipment that would be needed for the new organization to generate a material difference.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down and electronic warfare suppressed five of five Ukrainian drones.[xxxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed two drones near Valuevo, electronic warfare suppressed one in the Odinstovo Raion, one drone fell near Krivosheino, and one flew toward a military unit in Kubinka - likely the Russian airbase there.[xxxvii] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have intended to strike Vnukovo Airport, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin announced that Russian authorities temporarily redirected some flights from Vnukovo Airport in response to the drones.[xxxviii] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have conducted the drone attack in retaliation for an alleged Russian strike on a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Sumy Oblast.[xxxix]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2023

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front and made marginal advances on July 3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted counteroffensive operations in the Lyman direction.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations the Bakhmut area, the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[2] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces recaptured nine square kilometers of territory in eastern Ukraine, and geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Bakhmut.[3] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces also recaptured 28.4 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in the past week for a total of 158.4 square kilometers in southern Ukraine during an unspecified time period.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited gains south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5]

Russian milbloggers have seized on recent Ukrainian activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to call for an increased presence of small river vessels and equipment in the Dnipro River to prevent further Ukrainian advances. Russian milbloggers appealed on July 2 to the heads of the Dagestan and Tatarstan republics, Astrakhan Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, and Primorsky Krai to send boats confiscated from poachers to the Kherson Oblast frontline, specifying that 10 regiments and brigades of the Southern Military District’s “Dnepr” (the Russian word for Dnipro) Grouping of Forces sorely need the vessels.[6] ISW previously reported on July 2 that milbloggers are accusing the Russian MoD of failing to provide Russian forces on the east bank with requisite boats and other equipment, and it appears that milbloggers outsourced their requests for additional logistical support to Russian regional heads.[7] Dagestan Republic Head Sergey Melikov responded to the milblogger appeal on July 3 and ordered Dagestan to solve the issue of transferring confiscated poaching boats to Russian forces.[8] One Russian milblogger called for the resurrection of the “Dnepr” flotilla,” a special miliary river unit that was active in the 1735-1739 and 1787-1792 Russo-Turkish wars, the Russian Civil War, and World War II.[9] The milblogger claimed that a resurrected “Dnepr” flotilla could significantly ameliorate the position of Russian troops in the Kherson direction and that this grouping could be reinforced with simple, civilian-use boats.[10] Several other milbloggers, including former Russian officer Igor Girkin, claimed that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast need small boats and equipment in order to keep Ukrainian troops as far back from the Dnipro delta as possible.[11] The overall anxious milblogger response to recent Ukrainian activity across the Dnipro River suggests that many Russian milbloggers fear Ukraine’s ability to cross the river and believe that the current command of the “Dnepr” grouping has not sufficiently prepared its troops for that potentiality.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev published an essay that reamplified inflammatory Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine and the West, likely to undermine support for Ukraine at the upcoming NATO summit.[12] Medvedev’s July 3 essay paints his usual alarmist rhetoric in new colors; he again portrayed the war in Ukraine as part of a broader existential conflict against the West, restated many of Putin’s extreme pre-war demands that transcended Ukraine, and implied that Russia is prepared to engage in this broader conflict for “decades” if these demands are not met.[13] Medvedev claimed that “armageddon” is “probable” if the West does not agree to negotiate a new world order with Russia, absurdly claiming that the nuclear “taboo” is broken (presumably by the US use of atomic weapons in 1945--it is otherwise entirely unclear to what he might be referring) to falsely imply that nuclear war is a certainty.[14] Medvedev attempted to portray Russia as connected to partners outside of the West despite Western sanctions, and that states not aligned with the West actively stand against it. Medvedev’s essay is consistent with his and other senior Kremlin officials’ prior attempts to scare Western states, organizations, and media prior to significant international discussions about military, political, and economic support for Ukraine and its effort to liberate Russian-held territories.[15] Medvedev’s essay is a restatement of existing Russian narratives and does not represent a true inflection in Russian political, military, or nuclear rhetoric.[16]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about the current state of the war in Ukraine and the Wagner Group rebellion on July 3.[17] Shoigu notably did not directly name the Wagner Group or its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin while discussing the “provocation,” opting instead to denounce the rebellion and credit the loyalty of the Russian military as the reason for the rebellion’s failure. Shoigu also claimed that Ukrainian forces have lost 2,500 pieces of military equipment since June 4, likely intending to undermine Western support for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu’s speech did not present any new rhetorical arguments and is likely continued projection of claimed internal stability following the rebellion and portraying the Russian military as capable of defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Russian forces continued drone and missile strikes against rear areas in Ukraine overnight and during the day on July 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 17 Shahed drones at unspecified areas of Ukraine overnight on July 2-3, and Ukrainian forces shot down 13 of the drones.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in its evening situational report that Russian forces targeted civilian infrastructure with three S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and 20 Shahed drones in Sumy, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia Oblast during the day on July 3, and Ukrainian forces shot down 16 of the UAVs.[19] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported that Shahed drones struck a residential building in Sumy City, killing two and injuring 19 civilians.[20]

The Kremlin continues to use tools of digital authoritarian to surveil Russia’s domestic population and aim to expand domestic production of surveillance technology. The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 3 that the Kremlin has given Russian law enforcement, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), more tools to monitor the location of phones, break into personal accounts, and track activity in encrypted applications such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Signal.[21] According to Russian internal records that NYT reportedly obtained, the Russian government reportedly aims to expand its surveillance technology tools by supporting the transition of Russian technology firms into producing advanced tools for Russian intelligence services. Russian technology firms may be experiencing a shortage of skilled employees given the number of skilled workers that left Russia after the start of the war in February 2022.[22] ISW has previously reported on the Kremlin’s use of automated technology to censor the Russian information space and trading of surveillance tools in exchange for weapons to use in Ukraine.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front and made marginal advances on July 3.
• Russian milbloggers have seized on recent Ukrainian activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to call for an increased presence of small river vessels and equipment in the Dnipro River to prevent further Ukrainian advances.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev published an essay that reamplified inflammatory Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine and the West, likely to undermine support for Ukraine at the upcoming NATO summit
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about the current state of the war in Ukraine and the Wagner Group rebellion on July 3.
• Russian forces continued drone and missile strikes against rear areas in Ukraine overnight and during the day on July 3.
• The Kremlin continues to use tools of digital authoritarian to surveil Russia’s domestic population and aim to expand domestic production of surveillance technology.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued limited attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Official Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces repel all Ukrainian assaults on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge.
• The Wagner Group is reportedly suspending regional recruitment on a temporary basis.
• Russian officials continue efforts to portray Russia as a safe custodian of Ukrainian children while inadvertently confirming that Russia is facilitating mass deportations of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2023

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in six sectors of the front on July 2 and made gains in some of these areas. The Russian Ministry of Defense and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in western Donetsk Oblast, on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces are continuing to make unspecified advances on the flanks around Bakhmut.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made unspecified gains southwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[3] Geolocated footage published on July 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Volodymyrivka (12km southeast of Vuhledar) in western Donetsk Oblast.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Russian trench positions near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and that there is ongoing close combat in these trenches.[6] Some Russian sources continue to describe these Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as smaller tactical operations than earlier Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[7]

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine and Kyiv on July 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 11 missiles and eight Shahed drones at Ukraine, including three Kalibr missiles at Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted all three Kalibr cruise missiles and eight Shahed drones.[9] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all Russian Shahed drones targeting Kyiv, and Ukraine‘s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two drones over Mykolaiv Oblast.[10]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to consolidate control over the Russian information space by undermining select Russian milbloggers who did not repeat the MoD’s desired framing regarding the claimed defeat of a Ukrainian presence on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1. The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 and July 2 that Russian forces successfully repelled Ukrainian landings near the Antonivsky Bridge and disproportionally celebrated defeating a small Ukrainian landing on the eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[11] Some Russian milbloggers, however, contrary to the MoD‘s reports noted that fighting is still ongoing and that Ukrainian forces maintained some positions near Antonivsky Bridge as of July 2.[12] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified a post on July 1 from an unspecified Telegram channel, which criticized several prominent Kremlin and Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels for contradicting the Russian MoD’s official narrative.[13] The post accused select milbloggers of spreading false information about the situation around the Antonivsky Bridge and  other Russian MoD claims - ultimately accusing these channels of assisting Ukrainian “psychological operations.”[14] Russian milbloggers who contradicted the MoD’s report responded in turn by accusing the Russian General Staff of launching an attack on the Russian milblogger community.[15] These defiant milbloggers claimed that the Russian General Staff and the MoD previously attempted to open a criminal case against milbloggers in 2022 and claimed that milbloggers’ accurate coverage of frontline realities greatly undermines defense officials’ efforts to exaggerate Russia’s successes.[16] Some of these defiant milbloggers directly interact with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and it is likely that the Russian MoD seeks to censor some Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers out of a concern that these ultranationalists may expose Russian military failures to Putin during their monthly ”special military operations” milblogger working groups within the Kremlin.[17]

The Russian MoD’s conflict with the milblogger community over a trivial combat operation may indicate that the Russian military command does not think it has any other successes to report to Putin amidst the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive. One milblogger noted that Russian defense officials worry that milbloggers’ coverage of the war endangers their official positions and implied that the Russian MoD may be attempting to recover from the Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.[18] ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD may have exaggerated its victory in east Kherson Oblast to repair the reputation of the Russian ”Dnepr” Group of Forces and the Southern Military District (SMD), whose headquarters in Rostov-on-Don the Wagner Group surrounded a week before.[19] The Russian MoD has consistently exaggerated Ukrainian losses since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and may not be confident that such tired narratives are sufficiently offsetting the lack of any Russian progress on the battlefield as Ukrainian forces continue to make limited but steady advances in eastern and southern Ukraine.

The Russian MoD’s attempt to overstate a potential tactical Russian victory near the Antonivsky Bridge and its efforts to restrict opposing information has backfired. Russian milbloggers began to blame Russia’s military command for failing to provide Russian servicemen in east bank Kherson Oblast with boats and other supplies and generally accused the Russian MoD of lying about the situation on the frontlines for its own self-interested reasons.[20] One milblogger observed that the Russian MoD failed to provide Russian forces with more boats despite the fact that an acute and persistent Russian lack of patrol boats for littoral security has been widely known since at least April 2023, while another milblogger claimed that Russia should authorize the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to create a parallel control system over the Russian MoD to resolve bureaucratic problems.[21] The Russian pro-war community thus continues to criticize the Russian MoD even after Wagner’s failed rebellion and even as Prigozhin losses his platform in Russia.

Putin continues to face the choice of either siding with the Russian MoD to defend its weakened reputation or maintaining his support among pro-war ultranationalist milbloggers and their patronage networks. The Russian MoD had launched similar organized attacks against hostile milbloggers in July and October 2022 that did not result in milbloggers’ arrests or punishments for their criticism of the Russian military command.[22] ISW assessed that Putin was not interested in restricting the milblogger community as he valued its support for the invasion of Ukraine and instead increasingly co-opted select milbloggers by bringing them into the pro-Kremlin fold - likely in part to check the Russian MoD.[23] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin had extensively used Russian milbloggers to promote his efforts to replace Russian MoD leadership with Wagner-affiliated officials prior to his rebellion, and Putin now faces the choice of censoring or appeasing Russian milbloggers in the aftermath of the rebellion.[24] Putin will need to restrict Russian milbloggers from criticizing the Russian MoD if he seeks to reestablish and reinforce the MoD’s credibility, but the MoD’s failures, struggles, and apparent pervasive dishonesty may make that task infeasible. Putin may thus instead decide to continue appeasing the milblogger community and scapegoating the Russian MoD for military failures in Ukraine, a far easier undertaking. That course of action could let Putin retain support for the war among the Russian ultranationalist camp at the expense of the Russian MoD. But that course of action also carries risk for Putin: the continued erosion of the MoD’s credibility could enable other ambitious Russian figures to promote their interests at its expense, as Prigozhin tried to do.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in six sectors of the front on July 2 and made gains in some of these areas.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine and Kyiv on July 2.
• The Russian MoD’s conflict with the milblogger community over a trivial combat operation may indicate that the Russian military command does not think it has any other successes to report to Putin amidst the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• The Russian MoD’s attempt to overstate a potential tactical Russian victory near the Antonivsky Bridge and its efforts to restrict opposing information has backfired.
• Putin continues to face the choice of either siding with the Russian MoD to defend its weakened reputation or maintaining his support among pro-war ultranationalist milbloggers and their patronage networks.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and have advanced as of July 2.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as of July 2.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian officials plan to create regional centers for the development of drones in Nizhny Novgorod as well as in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukrainian and Belarusian sources reported that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and other Belarusian officials and citizens are actively involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Belarus.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2023

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the frontline on July 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the Bakhmut area and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains near Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut) and unspecified gains near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut). Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts and made gains southwest of Velyka Novosilka. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast, with one milblogger claiming that Ukrainian forces made gains up 1.5km deep and 6km wide in the direction of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv). Other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are still at least 1.5km north of Robotyne as of July 1, consistent with ISW’s current assessment of the control of terrain in the area.

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley acknowledged that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations will take longer than some Western observers had expected. Milley stated that Ukrainian forces are deliberately working through difficult minefields and advancing from 500m to 2,000m a day. Milley reiterated that he expects Ukrainian counteroffensive operations to last up to 10 weeks and urged people to realize that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be a long and likely costly operation. Russian sources are increasingly claiming that Ukrainian forces are currently conducting assaults in southern Ukraine with smaller infantry groups and fewer armored vehicles than during earlier counteroffensive operations. Russian sources also claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in southern Ukraine in even smaller groups, some of them allegedly with seven to nine personnel. These claims about Ukrainian operations suggest that Ukrainian forces are not currently attempting the kind of large-scale operations that would result in rapid territorial advances. Ukrainian officials have routinely indicated that Ukrainian forces have yet to commit a substantial portion of their forces to counteroffensive operations and have yet to launch the main phase of the counteroffensive.

Russian officials and sources celebrated claims that Russian forces defeated small-scale Ukrainian landings in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1 as if they had won a major victory. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that servicemen of the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces cleared areas near the Antonivsky Bridge on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River after special forces elements conducted a surprise landing on Ukrainian forces’ rear positions overnight. Saldo claimed that elements of a “Storm” detachment, the 61st  Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet), the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet), the 127th Reserve Brigade (likely a new reserve unit), and the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the operation that decisively repelled Ukrainian forces from their position near Antonivsky Bridge. Saldo also claimed that Ukrainian forces no longer have any “bridgeheads” on the eastern bank, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces were able to advance to the dacha areas near the Antonivsky Bridge after launching an Iskander ballistic missile at the bridge on June 30. A Crimean-based Russian blogger also claimed that elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division using T-72 tanks also participated in an attack against Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces eliminated a Ukrainian sabotage group that attempted to land on the island north of Oleshky (9km southeast of Kherson City) - likely referring to the Antonivsky Bridge area. The Russian MoD also demonstratively awarded servicemen of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) - a unit within the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces - for destroying Ukrainian military equipment in Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD also published an interview with the commander of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade who claimed that Russian forces fully restored their positions along the coast of the Dnipro River and along the islands and repelled all Ukrainian attempts to cross the river. Russian sources notably did not provide any evidence that Russian forces regained control over coastal areas and many Russian sources reported that clearing operations near the dacha areas adjacent to the Antonivsky Bridge are still ongoing as of July 1.

The exaggerated Russian praise for defeating a small Ukrainian landing suggests either that the Russian military command sincerely fears a Ukrainian attack on east bank Kherson Oblast or that it is desperate for an informational victory following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion or both. Russian sources previously claimed that a grouping of around 70 Ukrainian servicemen held positions near the Antonivsky Bridge and that the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces’ military command had been consistently ordering Russian forces to eliminate the Ukrainian “bridgehead” despite significant personnel and equipment losses. The Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces is reportedly headquartered in Rostov-on-Don likely within the SMD headquarters.Wagner forces notably surrounded the SMD headquarters during the armed rebellion on June 24, and the Russian MoD is likely trying to recover the headquarters' reputation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also expressed concern that Ukrainian forces will continue to conduct small unit sorties across the Dnipro River and will launch a large-scale attack to reach Oleshky to break through to southwestern Kherson Oblast. ISW makes no effort to forecast Ukrainian operations, but the milblogger’s statements suggest that the Russian military command may be increasingly concerned over a potential Ukrainian landing on east bank Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces are likely responding to Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut by pulling forces from elsewhere in Ukraine. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 1 that Russian forces recently transferred an unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment from the Lyman direction (the area west of Kreminna) to the Bakhmut direction. Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment (106th Airborne Division) operating south of Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut). A Russian milblogger also claimed that elements of the 98th VDV Division are now operating in the Bakhmut direction. ISW has previously observed elements of the 237th Air Assault Regiment (76th VDV Division) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th VDV Division) operating in the Lyman direction, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of elements of either formation near Bakhmut recently. Cherevaty reported that Russian forces replaced the VDV regiment in the Lyman direction with unspecified territorial defense forces, indicating that Russian forces may be redeploying more elite units to the Bakhmut area and replacing the elite units with inferior formations. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar previously stated that Russian forces transferred some of their most-combat capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions in the week following the start of Ukrainian counteroffensives on June 4. Cherevaty stated that Bakhmut continues to offer Russian forces more propaganda value than military benefits and suggested that Russian forces may be concentrating elite forces in the Bakhmut area to preserve the perceived informational victory resulting from the capture of Bakhmut on May 21.  If Russian reinforcements already sent to Bakhmut are insufficient to hold Russian gains in the area the Russian command may face difficult choices about whether to risk creating serious vulnerabilities in Kherson or Luhansk oblasts or to begin drawing forces away from southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russians might initiate an intentional radioactive leak at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a potential Russian strategy to freeze the war. Zelensky stated in an interview with Spanish news outlet El Mundo published on June 30 that Russian forces may attempt to remotely detonate the ZNPP if Ukrainian authorities are able to pass control of the ZNPP to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Zelensky stated that Russian forces may cause a radiological incident to halt maneuver warfare and buy more time for Russia to recruit more personnel and produce more military equipment.  Zelensky also reported that about 5,000 Russian forces remain at the ZNPP with military equipment. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at the ZNPP since Russia would not be able to control the impacts of the incident, which would degrade Russia’s ability to operate and govern in occupied southern Ukraine.  Russian forces could conduct various possible man-made radiological incidents at varying levels of severity; however, ISW continues to assess that the consequences of a Russian radiological incident would outweigh any benefit for Russian forces at this time. Russia is likely continuing to use the threat of a radiological incident to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensive actions and degrade Western military assistance support for Ukraine.

Russian propagandists are likely conducting an information campaign to destroy the Wagner Group’s reputation as a uniquely effective fighting force in support of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to dismantle the Wagner Group and integrate former Wagner fighters into MoD structures. Russian state TV channel Rossiya-1 aired a segment on June 30 trivializing the Wagner Group’s effectiveness in Ukraine, calling into question the “constructed myth about the Wagner Group’s [high level of] effectiveness.” The segment implied that there is a popular misconception in Russia that Wagner forces are extraordinarily effective and argued that regular Russian forces are more effective than the Wagner private military company (PMC). Rossiya-1 argued that regular Russian forces captured a geographically larger and more important city of Mariupol (in 71 days) much faster than Wagner Group forces were able to capture Bakhmut (in 224 days). Many Russian milbloggers – including Wagner-linked milbloggers – decried the report as a shameless rewriting of history and part of a “vile agenda” designed to “consign [Wagner PMC] feats to oblivion.” The Kremlin media apparatus is likely targeting Russian public perception of the Wagner PMC to decrease the group’s popularity as the MoD may seek to effectively disband the Wagner Group in Ukraine and reorganize its elements within the Russian MoD. This segment is likely a supporting effort within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assessed campaign to destroy Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s personal reputation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the frontline on July 1.
• US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley acknowledged that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations will take longer than some Western observers had expected.
• Russian officials and sources celebrated claims that Russian forces defeated small-scale Ukrainian landings in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1 as if they had won a major victory.
• The exaggerated Russian praise for defeating a small Ukrainian landing suggests either that the Russian military command sincerely fears a Ukrainian attack on east bank Kherson Oblast or that it is desperate for an informational victory following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion or both.
• Russian forces are likely responding to Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut by pulling forces from elsewhere in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russians might initiate an intentional radioactive leak at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a potential Russian strategy to freeze the war.
• Russian propagandists are likely conducting an information campaign to destroy the Wagner Group’s reputation as a uniquely effective fighting force in support of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to dismantle the Wagner Group and integrate former Wagner fighters into MoD structures.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks in and transfer airborne (VDV) elements to the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continued to counterattack recently-liberated Ukrainian positions on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian security procedures on the Kerch Strait bridge are likely slowing down Russian logistics from Russia to occupied Crimea.
• Iran may be sending materiel and personnel to Russia to help construct a factory in the Republic of Tatarstan that will reportedly make Iranian combat drones.
• Ukrainian and Western sources continue to report on the abductions of Ukrainian children and adults in the occupied territories.