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December 16, 2022
Understanding Military Units in Southern Yemen
Yemen’s civil war comprises several overlapping conflicts. International coverage focuses on the conflict between the Saudi-supported Yemeni government (ROYG) and the Iran-backed Houthi movement. Conflict between different anti-Houthi factions within ROYG also influences the war’s trajectory, however. This analysis examines the relationships and allegiances that shape interactions between armed groups in southern Yemen, specifically in Abyan, Aden, Dhaleh, and Lahij governorates. These southern Yemeni armed groups not only fight the Iran-aligned Houthi movement but also support ongoing US-backed counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (IS-Yemen).
Anti-Houthi forces in southern Yemen are part of a formal command structure, but their commanders respond to informal networks defined by personal relationships and political allegiances. Many commanders draw their allegiances from one of two major factions that existed during the 1986 South Yemen civil war and 1994 Yemeni civil war. The secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) is the most influential political organization in Abyan, Aden, Dhaleh, and Lahij. Most STC-backed commanders today were part of the Southern Movement after 1994. Other commanders likely joined the STC to secure a share of funding from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for STC-backed groups after 2015. The UAE began funding armed groups in southern Yemen in 2015 to retake Aden from the Houthis, and it remains heavily involved in southern Yemeni security and political dynamics.[1]
Competition between southern Yemeni factions undermines cooperation within ROYG, imperiling both anti-Houthi and anti-AQAP operations in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition has attempted to formalize command structures to stop this competition in recent years, but animosity between commanders and factions impedes security sector reform. The 2019 Riyadh Agreement forced the STC’s president to subordinate STC-backed armed groups to the ROYG’s Defense and Interior Ministries officially.[2] STC leaders outside of the formal chain of command remain influential within the UAE-backed southern Yemeni military apparatus, however.[3] This dynamic affects the Yemeni Military and Security Committee, a 59-member body that the Saudi-led coalition helped form in 2022. A southern commander and former defense minister leads this committee, which is responsible for security sector reform.[4] Some ROYG factions believe the STC has compromised the committee, and the STC has sought to exploit the committee for political gain.[5]
Click here to download a briefing deck on armed groups in southern Yemen.
Click here to download the full order of battle for military units in southern Yemen.
Analysis
The STC, a UAE-backed political organization seeking southern independence, is the most influential coordinator of armed groups in Abyan, Aden, Dhaleh, and Lahij. The STC is a political organization with control over some military forces in southern Yemen. These STC-backed forces are part of the ROYG, but they often compete with ROYG-backed forces. The STC has secessionist aims but cooperates with other Yemeni factions for the time being, mainly due to Saudi pressure.[6] The formation of the Presidential Leadership Council, which nominally brought together STC President Aydarous al Zubaidi and other leaders across political divides to lead the ROYG in April 2022, has not stopped competition for influence between STC-backed forces and their political competitors. The STC’s primary rival is the Islamist Islah party, which the STC rhetorically equates with al Qaeda and the Islamic State. STC-ROYG competition came to a head in 2019, when the two factions fought each other in Abyan and Aden governorates.[7] Similar flare-ups have occurred since. Most recently, the STC-backed 111th Infantry Brigade attempted to block several ROYG brigades under the Abyan Military Axis—task forces deployed to geographically defined areas—from entering Ahwar district in eastern Abyan governorate in May 2022.[8]
The UAE helped create the armed groups that would become the STC beginning in 2015.[9] The UAE funded southern commanders to retake Aden in 2015 but also ensured that these commanders operated outside of the Yemeni government’s formal chain of command. This autonomy allowed the UAE to maintain its control over the proxies it created at the expense of the broader Saudi-led coalition and ROYG. The UAE continued the practice of dividing the formal chain of command after Zubaidi formed the STC in 2017.[10] STC-backed units do not answer to a coherent chain of command, even within the STC itself, and fissures between various units and commanders create divisions the UAE can use to control STC-backed units.
The UAE seeks to maintain control over the groups it supports in Yemen to pursue its own objectives, which diverge from the Saudi-led coalition’s objectives.[11] The UAE has withdrawn the bulk of its forces from Yemen since 2019, but it supports a large constellation of armed groups.[12] Its objectives include securing international waterways, countering political Islamists (ranging from the violent Salafi-jihadi al Qaeda to the political Islamist party Islah), and countering the Houthis.[13]
Figure 1. Formal Structures vs. Informal Allegiances: The Defense Ministry in Southern Yemen
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate quantity of the unit.
Source: Author’s research.
Figure 2. Formal Structures vs. Informal Allegiances: The Interior Ministry in Southern Yemen
Source: Author’s research.
Southern Yemeni military forces are part of a formal chain of command but often respond to informal structures determined by a commander’s relationships and political allegiance. For example, the Counterterrorism Units fall under the ROYG Interior Ministry and the Southern Resistance Brigades fall under the ROYG Defense Ministry, but both cite former Aden Security Department chief Shalal Shaye’a, who falls outside of this hierarchy, as their overall commander.[14]
This dichotomy between personal relationships and formal command structures affects larger units as well. STC President Zubaidi formally subordinated the Support and Reinforcement Brigades (SRB) to the ROYG Defense Ministry in 2021, placing them under the command of the Yemeni president through the defense minister. Despite being outside the formal chain of command, Zubaidi continued to order the SRB’s troop movements through at least September 2022.[15] Zubaidi remains outside the chain of command, even in his position as deputy on the Presidential Leadership Council, an 8-person council led by Yemen’s president. Zubaidi and other STC officials—including Aden Governor and STC Secretary-General Ahmed Lamlas and Shaye’a—continue to remove and appoint commanders down to at least the brigade echelon.[16]
Southern Yemeni leadership networks often reflect political allegiances dating back to the 1986 and 1994 Yemeni civil wars. One faction of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) from Dhaleh and Lahij fought another faction of the YSP from Abyan and Shabwah in 1986. Many members of the Abyan- and Shabwah-based faction of the YSP, including former President Abdu Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, fled into exile in North Yemen after 1986.[17] Zubaidi’s Lahij-Dhaleh faction won the 1986 war and agreed to unification with North Yemen in 1990. The Saleh regime failed to integrate South Yemen, leading southerners to fight for independence in 1994.[18] Hadi, a part of the ousted Abyan-Shabwah faction from the 1986 war, helped to suppress the 1994 uprising.[19] The national government stripped the Lahij-Dhaleh faction members of their positions, pensions, and salaries and forced many into exile.[20]
The STC is attempting to expand its influence in southeastern Yemen to the detriment of its rivals, leading to increasing competition with the ROYG today.[21] The STC is competing with the ROYG politically and militarily in Abyan, Hadramawt, Mahra, and Shabwah governorates.[22] The STC is co-opting military units in Abyan governorate and maintains close ties with UAE-backed forces in Shabwah governorate.[23] The organization is also using the anti-Houthi fight and Saudi-backed security sector reform to demand the withdrawal of the Islah-backed 1st Military Region from Hadramawt governorate. The STC began signaling in September 2022 that it would militarily “confront terrorism” in Hadramawt and Mahra.
STC-backed and ROYG-backed commanders both cooperate and compete on the ground. The STC moved to co-opt commanders previously close to Hadi after his removal in April 2022.[24] The STC co-opted previously Hadi-backed commanders to facilitate the STC’s military takeover of Abyan governorate in August 2022 without provoking fighting against previously pro-ROYG forces.[25] UAE funding likely enabled the STC to co-opt some previously pro-ROYG units. Some Yemeni government units can draw on other patronage networks. The pro-ROYG Tur al Baha and Abyan axes have fought and been threatened by STC-backed units in 2021 and 2022, demonstrating that the risk for conflict between the STC and government forces remains.[26]
Pro-secession and UAE-backed commanders dominate the STC’s military leadership. Key STC members from the YSP’s Lahij-Dhaleh faction in southern Yemen, including Zubaidi, fought for South Yemen in 1994 before retreating into exile.[27] These former exiles created political parties whose membership now forms the core of the STC’s military and political leadership. Most core STC leaders are likely secessionists. The UAE supported these secessionists in addition to other Salafi and ROYG-linked commanders in 2015 to stop the Houthis’ southward advance and then fight AQAP.[28]
Figure 3. Factions in STC-Aligned Forces
Source: Author’s research.
Most senior STC-backed military commanders are personally close to STC President Zubaidi or worked with secessionist parties supported by Zubaidi. These commanders are officially subordinate to the ROYG Defense or Interior Ministries, but in practice, most commanders answer to Zubaidi.[29] Membership in either the Yafi’ tribe, secessionist Southern 33 Group, or Zubaidi’s personal circle increases a commander’s likelihood of occupying key positions.[30] Zubaidi has also positioned trusted commanders and units to check the influence of units over which he may exert less control.
Zubaidi does not have complete control over all STC-backed units and commanders. Some commanders, including the overall al Hizam Security Forces commander, have fallen out of favor with Zubaidi, but a deputy Zubaidi trusts checks these officers.[31] Lahiji Yafi’ tribesmen occupy key positions in the SRB, but Zubaidi has sought to check their power by appointing commanders from outside Yafi’ territory to other units. Zubaidi appointed commanders from his home governorate, Dhaleh,[32] to the Thunderbolt Brigades. He also placed a military officer loyal to him in command of the force. The Thunderbolt Brigades are likely a counterweight to the Lahiji Yafi’–led SRB.[33]
The STC backs some commanders in southern Yemen who lack personal ties to Zubaidi and may have fought against South Yemen in 1994. Some commanders defected from ROYG for political expediency or UAE financial support. The UAE provides significant funding to forces in southern Yemen, and UAE financial support is more reliable than ROYG salaries.[34] For example, the current ROYG 4th Military Region commander fought alongside secessionist groups as a battalion commander during the fight to recapture Aden from the Houthis in 2015. He also cooperated closely with the UAE. He subsequently refused to fight STC forces on behalf of the ROYG in 2019.[35] This commander retains his ROYG position as 4th Military Region Commander, but the ROYG does not attach some military axes to his command. This decision indicates lower levels of ROYG trust in the regional commander.[36]
Former Yemeni President Hadi likely appointed other commanders to undermine STC power in certain areas. Hadi appointed loyal commanders to the Abyan, Bab al Mandeb, and Tur al Baha axes.[37] These commanders have fought against STC-backed forces directly since 2015 or southern forces in 1994.[38] Hadi’s removal as president in April 2022 may be driving some commanders’ recent shifts toward supporting the STC.[39]
Disunity exists between different political organizations but also within political factions. The STC is not a unitary actor, despite the overlap between interest groups, and friction between different STC-backed commanders exists. Some STC-backed commanders are also not in ideological alignment with the organization’s secessionist aims. The 4th Military Region commander likely fought for the north in 1994 and against the Houthis during the Sa’ada wars, indicating that he was not a member of the Southern Movement and likely supports a united Yemen.[40] Competition over funding has also created friction in STC units. Zubaidi removed the former commander of the SRB, Mohsen al Wali, for his efforts to increase the 3rd SRB Brigade’s independence by creating an oil company with the 3rd SRB Brigade’s commander.[41]
The disunity among southern armed groups weakens the fight against AQAP and the Houthis. The Houthis could take advantage of infighting in the Yemeni government in southern Yemen, as the Houthis have done elsewhere in Yemen. The Houthis took advantage of divisions in the Yemeni government in 2015 to conquer northern Yemen and overthrow Yemen’s internationally recognized government.[42]
Likewise, fighting between the government and the STC causes counterterrorism pressure to decrease. A decrease in counterterrorism pressure allows AQAP to reconstitute its capabilities and embed itself in local communities. Some of the STC’s “counterterrorism” operations prioritize improving the STC’s political position instead of setting conditions for AQAP’s defeat. Local level agreements in southern Yemen are usually personality based and do not solve friction between STC-backed and ROYG-backed forces.[43]
Figure 4. Approximate Locations of Armed Groups in Southern Yemen
Source: Author’s research.
Military Units in Southern Yemen: Aden, Abyan, Dhaleh, and Lahij
This document presents a draft command structure for armed units affiliated with Yemen’s STC and analyzes dynamics among unit commanders based on publicly available sources. This command structure is not exhaustive, and it identifies those units formally subordinated to the Yemeni Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry. The author recognizes several gaps, including additional military axes and smaller formations not present in this document.
Note on methodology and definitions: STC-backed commanders are commanders who cite an STC-aligned figure as their commander, STC media covers extensively but Yemeni government media ignores, have longtime relationships with STC figures, or STC President Zubaidi appointed. ROYG-backed figures are commanders who cite the Yemeni president as their leader, ROYG media covers, express opposition to the STC, or former ROYG President Hadi or current ROYG President Rashad al Alimi appointed.
YEMENI DEFENSE MINISTRY
Defense Minister: Lt. Gen. Mohsen Mohammed al Da’ari (ROYG)
SOUTHERN LAND FORCES COMMAND[44]
Established 2021[45]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ali al Bishi[46]
Staff Officer: Saleh al Sayyed (STC)
1st Southern Land Forces Brigade[47]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ali al Bishi (STC)[48]
2nd Southern Land Forces Brigade—Dhaleh governorate[49]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdulaziz al Hadaf (STC)[50]
3rd Southern Land Forces Brigade—possibly near Yafa, Lahij governorate[51]
Commander: Akram al Hanash (STC)[52]
4th Southern Land Forces Brigade—Abyan governorate[53]
Commander: Ali Nasser al Muaker[54]
This unit is also a component of the Abyan Axis.[55]
SUPPORT AND REINFORCEMENT BRIGADES (UAE-created)[56]
Commander: Saleh al Sayyed (STC)[57]
1st Support and Reinforcement Brigade—Aden city[58]
Commander: Nasr Atef al Yafi (STC)[59]
2nd Support and Reinforcement Brigade—Zinjibar, Abyan governorate[60]
Commander: Mohammed Ali Mahdi[61]
3rd Support and Reinforcement Brigade—Lahij governorate[62]
Commander: Nabil al Mashushi (STC)[63]
4th Support and Reinforcement Brigade—Lahij governorate[64]
Commander: Mohammed Nasser al Shuhati (likely STC)[65]
Previous Commander: Hader al Shuhati (STC);[66] note that a Houthi sniper killed Shuhati on September 6, 2022[67]
5th Support and Reinforcement Brigade—Radfan, Dhaleh governorate[68]
Commander: Mukhtar al Nubi (STC)[69]
7th Support and Reinforcement Brigade (formed by Zubaidi in June 2021)[70]— Habileen, Lahij governorate[71]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan al Bakri (likely STC)[72]
Staff Officer: Col. Amin Nasser Sheikh Alawi al Saqqaf[73]
Operations Officer: Col. Saeed Ali Saleh al Saidi[74]
Facilities Protection Forces—Aden city
Commander: Ahmed bin Afif (has been pro-ROYG but may be shifting to pro-STC)[75]
THUNDERBOLT BRIGADES[76]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ali al Bishi (STC)[77]
1st Thunderbolt Brigade—Dhaleh governorate[78]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Karim al Solani[79]
2nd Thunderbolt Brigade—Hajjar front, Dhaleh governorate[80]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Mohammed Mohsen Mahdi (Abu Bakil)[81]
3rd Thunderbolt Brigade—al Jab front, Dhaleh governorate[82]
Commander: Col. Mohammed Qasim al Zubaidi (STC)[83]
4th Thunderbolt Brigade—Arr camp, Yafa front, Lahij governorate[84]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdul Aziz al Mansoori (STC)[85]
5th Thunderbolt Brigade—Dhaleh governorate[86]
Commander: Col. Yusuf al Hakim (Abu Majid)[87]
6th Thunderbolt Brigade—al Battar front, Dhaleh governorate[88]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Obaid Muthanna Laram[89]
7th Thunderbolt Brigade—al Jab front, Dhaleh governorate[90]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdul Aziz al Hadaf[91]
8th Thunderbolt Brigade—Zinjibar, Abyan governorate[92]
Commander: Col. Ameed Qassem al Marami[93]
9th Thunderbolt Brigade—Tur al Baha, Lahij governorate[94]
Commander: Farouk al Kalouli (STC)[95]
10th Thunderbolt Brigade—Habeel Hanash front, Lahij governorate[96]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Rushdi al Houshabi[97]
11th Thunderbolt Brigade—Abyan governorate[98]
Commander: Akram al Hanashi[99]
12th Thunderbolt Brigade—Abyan governorate[100]
Commander: Col. Abdu Nasser al Azraqi[101]
13th Thunderbolt Brigade—al Rahda, Taiz governorate (on the border of Lahij governorate)[102]
Commander: Ali Saleh al Nubi[103]
14th Thunderbolt Brigade—Abyan governorate[104]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Othman Haidara Moawadeh[105]
15th Thunderbolt Brigade—Abyan governorate[106]
Commander: Col. Nabil al Hanashi[107]
STORM FORCES (UAE-created)[108]
Commander: Awsan al Anshly (STC, likely personally loyal to Zubaidi)[109]
1st Battalion—not specified
2nd Battalion—Coast Guard Camp, Aden city[110]
3rd Battalion—Mount Hadid Camp, Aden city[111]
4th Battalion—Camp 20 in Crater, Aden city[112]
5th Battalion—Alam Point, Aden city[113]
6th Battalion—Midwar Palace, Aden city[114]
4th MILITARY REGION
Commander: Fadl Hassan Mohammed (pro-STC)[115]
111th Infantry Brigade—Ahwar district, Abyan governorate[116]
Commander: Mohammed Ahmed Mulhem al Umaisi (pro-STC)[117]
4th Hazm Brigade—Haifan front, Tur al Baha, Dhaleh governorate[118]
Commander: Wafi al Ghabs al Subayhi (pro-STC)[119]
Bab al Mandeb Axis
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdul Ghani Ali Mohi al Din al Subayhi (ROYG)[120]
3rd Hazm Brigade—Kharaz Camp[121]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Mahmoud Saeed Sael al Subayhi (likely ROYG)[122]
1st Hazm Brigade, also known as the “Zayed Brigade”[123]—Lahij governorate[124]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdul Ghani Ali Mohi al Din al Subayhi (likely ROYG)[125]
Bab al Mandeb Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Majid Omar Seif[126]
Abyan Axis
Commander: Maj. Gen. Abu Bakr Hussein (ROYG)[127]
Staff Officer: Brig. Gen. Louay al Zamki (likely Islah)[128]
103rd Infantry Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdul Qader al Jaari[129]
3rd Presidential Guard Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Louay al Zamki (likely Islah)[130]
89th Infantry Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Mohammed Ali Jabr[131]
115th Infantry Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Saif Ali al Qufaish[132]
Dhaleh Axis
Commander: Maj. Gen. Ali Muqbel Saleh (likely STC)[133]
33rd Armored Brigade:
Commander: Maj. Gen. Ali Muqbel Saleh (likely STC)[134]
30th Armored Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Hadi al Awlaki[135]
83rd Artillery Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Adel Saleh al Shaybah[136]
191st Infantry Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Naji al Khairani[137]
4th Reserve Brigade
Commander: Brig. Gen. Fadl Abd al Rab[138]
Military Police Branch
Commander: Brig. Gen. Fadl al Uqla[139]
State media also reported the al Hizam Security Forces in Dhaleh work alongside the Dhaleh Axis.[140]
Al Anad Axis
Last Known Commander: Maj. Gen. Thabet Jawas (pro-STC)[141]
Staff Officer: Brig. Gen. Najib Saad al Subayhi (likely pro-STC)[142]
131st Infantry Brigade[143]
Last Known Commander: Maj. Gen. Thabet Jawas (pro-STC)[144]
2nd Hazm Brigade[145]—Al Anad Airbase[146]
Commander: Fadl Hassan Mohammed (pro-STC)[147]
Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen. Najib Saad al Subayhi (likely pro-STC)[148]
201st Mechanized Brigade[149]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Fadl Ahmed Tahsha[150]
1st Reserve Brigade[151]
Commander: Abdul Hakim al Shuaibi[152]
Tur al Baha Axis[153]
Commander: Maj. Gen. Abu Bakr al Jaboli (Islah)[154]
Head of Operations: Brig. Gen. Faris al Hafidhi[155]
9th Infantry Brigade[156]
Commander: Col. Munif Abdullah Noman al Atwi[157]
120th Artillery Brigade[158]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Rami al Somati[159]
8th Reserve Brigade[160]
Last Known Commander: Brig. Gen. Yasser al Somali (resigned in March 2021)[161]
4th Mountain Infantry Brigade[162]
Commander: Maj. Gen. Abu Bakr al Jaboli (Islah)[163]
6th Support and Reinforcement Brigade
Commander: Noaman Dukman (Islah)[164]
Unknown Coastal Defense Brigade[165]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Zaki Abdullah Hassan[166]
Yafa Axis
Commander: Abdulaziz al Mansoori (STC)[167]
Staff Officer: Hader al Shuhati[168] (killed in action on September 6, 2022)[169]
4th Thunderbolt Brigade[170]—Arr camp, Yafa front, Lahij governorate[171]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Abdul Aziz al Mansoori (STC)[172]
Also in the Thunderbolt Brigades
4th Support and Reinforcement Brigade[173]—Lahij governorate[174]
Commander: Mohammed Nasser al Shuhati (likely STC)[175]
Prev. Commander: Hader al Shuhati (STC);[176] note that a Houthi sniper killed Shuhati on September 6, 2022[177]
Also in the Support and Reinforcement Brigades
SOUTHERN RESISTANCE BRIGADES
Only the 6th Southern Resistance Brigade is confirmed as part of the 4th Military District,[178] though it is likely that all six are part of the Ministry of Defense’s structure.
1st Southern Resistance Brigade—Radfan, Dhaleh governorate[179]
Commander: Col. Basil Saif Sakara[180]
2nd Southern Resistance Brigade—Maris Front, Dhaleh governorate[181]
Commander: Mohammed Ali Mohsen[182]
3rd Southern Resistance Brigade—Jir Sabira, Dhaleh governorate[183]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Zakaria Omar Qahtan Qaboos[184]
4th Southern Resistance Brigade—Dhaleh governorate[185]
Commander: Awsan al Shaeri[186]
5th Southern Resistance Brigade—Dhaleh governorate[187]
Commander: Mahmoud al Batool[188]
6th Southern Resistance Brigade—Dhaleh governorate[189]
Last Known Commander: Mohammed al Shobaji[190]
YEMENI INTERIOR MINISTRY
Minister of Interior: Ibrahim Haidan
AL HIZAM SECURITY FORCES (UAE-created)[191]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Mohsen al Wali (STC)[192]
Deputy Commander: Brig. Gen. Jalal al Rubaie (STC)[193]
Al Hizam Security Forces in Abyan
Commander: Abdullatif al Sayyed[194]
Rapid Intervention Forces in Abyan
Commander: Abdullatif al Sayyed[195]
Al Hizam Security Forces in Dhaleh
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ahmed Qaid al Qubba (ROYG)[196]
Deputy Commander: Walid al Dame’[197]
Rapid Intervention Forces in Dhaleh
Commander: Moadh Ali Saleh al Ma’ada[198]
Al Hizam Security Forces in Lahij
Commander: Hussein al Saidi (STC)[199]
Rapid Intervention Forces in Lahij
Last Known Commander: Ahmed al Lahiji[200]
Al Hizam Security Forces in Aden
Commander: Brig. Gen. Jalal al Rubaie (STC)[201]
Rapid Intervention Forces in Aden
Commander: Capt. Qaid al Hattas[202]
Aden Ring Belt (This unit may not be part of the Yemeni Interior Ministry)
Commander: Col. Naji al Yahri (STC)[203]
ADEN SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Commander: Maj. Gen. Muthar al Shouaibi (UAE-based General People’s Congress faction)[204]
Emergency Forces
Commander: Brig. Gen. Mohammed al Khaili[205]
Counterterrorism Unit
Commander: Brig. Gen. Yusran al Maqtari[206]
The Aden Security Department also has an additional six battalions numbering 5,000–6,000 personnel. Most personnel are from Dhaleh.[207] It is unclear if other governorate security departments also have additional battalions, but they likely have some forces in addition to Emergency Forces and Counterterrorism Units.
ABYAN SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ali Nasser Bouzid Baazab (pro-ROYG, Southern National Coalition)[208]
Emergency Forces
Commander: Ali Awad al Mahawari
Counterterrorism Unit
Commander: Col. Abdul Rahman Nasser Abdullah al Shenini (likely pro-STC)[209]
DHALEH SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Commander: Brig. Gen. Ahmed Qaed al Qubba (ROYG)[210]
Emergency Forces
Commander: Moadh Ali Saleh al Ma’ada[211]
Counterterrorism Unit
Last Known Commander: Col. Mohammed al Shobaji (STC)[212]
LAHIJ SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Commander: Saleh al Sayyed (STC)
Emergency Forces
Commander: Unknown
Counterterrorism Unit
Commander: Unknown
ADDITIONAL COMMANDS
CTP cannot verify if these commands fall under an ROYG ministry. They may be independent, but it is possible they also fall under the Defense or Interior Ministries.
1st MOUNTAIN INFANTRY BRIGADE
Commander: Aydarus al Zubaidi[213]
AMAJID BRIGADE—either Lawdar district, Abyan governorate, or Mudiyah, Abyan governorate[214]
Commander: Brig. Gen. Salih Salim al Sharji (from Abyan)[215]
Spokesperson: Fahd al Barsha[216]
This unit is likely not a part of an official ROYG ministry as of 2020. The unit numbers about 5,000–6,000 personnel, and Saudi Arabia funds the brigade.[217]
The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute sometimes cites sources from foreign domains. All such links are identified with additional parentheses inserted into the URL for the reader’s awareness.
[1] Michael Knights and Alex Almeida, “The Saudi-UAE War Effort in Yemen (Part 1): Operation Golden Arrow in Aden,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 10, 2015, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saudi-uae-war-effort-yemen-part-1-operation-golden-arrow-aden.
[2] UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” January 26, 2022, 84, https://undocs.org/en/S/2022/50.
[3] Aden al Khabar, “Commander ‘Mohammed Ali al Houshbi’ congratulates Brig. Gen. Hussein al Saidi on his appointment as the leader of the al Hizam sector in Lahij governorate,” Facebook, August 15, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/adenkbr/posts/pfbid02yqofAZ4K4pic49Bp2t8vsSiQrQ8y99ctyoHH7Hy5GoYbwdpc7chMvWR8n79E9fKPl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVOJMM8XhyOpIrZ3hLefu1MG3sp60ZC9nFLYS-6fiNrMHdLgRLE56MdPrq0AvqIa5PkSETr5PwfjTTliZTm6O3-UDx9R57YaJy9yNar3Dar_zBg2YQCTQSrKFevHIM-MITMuN8HG1GDsx9OKWEpnEJw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; Department of Moral Guidance for the Security Belt Forces in the Abyan Delta, “The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Counter Terrorism Units issues a decision to appoint a commander for the Counter Terrorism Unit in Abyan Governorate,” Facebook, June 25, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02GoHcM8yyJTPFL4h8XD6Km9RTmaYg627bm4ZbRR3mSCMvx5wnNqMMcb54tBg24Vhl&id=240921553455856&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZWYY_ErHiojrNUjgusvutkk3E3YankY-GeysMdLsoR7eUx1F6gNiFt0OVHrZn-NUAumBhtPvY4-9YWrSavcZ0YsVSWblq3W_uWIFo6PpLsQRa9n-SSmIw3PxIYnd9ZvyjW7Kq5Dfd4iQDcjixPeXMbTmEjpcHAXmy2nwTSBra-MY0ba0GkV-T-Lpx_Bfh-GTa4&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; and UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” 81.
[4] Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “Headed by ‘Haitham Qassem Taher’ and 59 Members.. The Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Approves the Formation of the Security and Military Committee,” May 30, 2022, *https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/232431.
[5] Al Khabar al Yemeni, “An Emirati Committee Arrives in Taiz to Restructure the Islah Factions,” October 10, 2022, *https://alkhabaralyemeni.net/2022/10/10/190989/; and al Mashhad al Yemeni, “The Armed Forces and Security Restructuring Committee Acquiesces to the “Transitional” and the Latter Threatens the Forces of the First Region to Expel Them by Force,” August 13, 2022, *https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/237261.
[6] Patrick Wintour, “Crisis in Yemen as Aden Separatists Declare Self-Rule,” Guardian, April 27, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/26/crisis-in-yemen-as-aden-separatists-declare-self-government.
[7] James Barnett, “Yemen’s Anti–al Houthi Coalition is Collapsing, and America’s Gulf Partners Are Partially to Blame,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, August 13, 2019, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/yemens-anti-al-houthi-coalition-is-collapsing-and-americas-gulf-partners-are-partially-to-blame; and Al-Monitor, “South Yemen in Tumult as Yemen Government, Separatists Face Off in Abyan,” May 15, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/05/yemen-south-saudi-government-uae-separatists-coronavirus.html.
[8] SMA News, “The Military Command of the Southern Resistance in Ahwar Refuses to Keep the al Zamki Militia in the District,” May 19, 2022, *https://smanews.org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a/281748.
[9] International Crisis Group, “Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council: A Delicate Balancing Act,” March 30, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-southern-transitional-council-delicate-balancing-act.
[10] International Crisis Group, “Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council.”
[11] Andreas Krieg, “The UAE’s Tactical Withdrawal from a Strategic Engagement in Yemen,” Responsible Statecraft, March 6, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/03/06/the-uaes-tactical-withdrawal-from-a-strategic-engagement-in-yemen; and Middle East Eye, “UAE’s Support for Separatists Stokes Resentment Against Saudi Arabia,” September 19, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uaes-support-stc-stokes-resentment-against-saudi-arabia.
[12] This includes the Giants Brigades, Hadramawt Elite Forces, Shabwani Elite Forces, and Tariq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces, in addition to the forces backed by the Southern Transitional Council.
[13] Andreas Krieg, “The UAE’s ‘Dogs of War’: Boosting a Small State’s Regional Power Projection,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 33, no. 1–2 (2022): 152–72, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1951432; and Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah, Evolving UAE Military and Foreign Security Cooperation: Path Toward Military Professionalism, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, January 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/DaltonShah_UAEMilitary.pdf.
[14] Elite Hadramawt News Network, “Commander of the Fifth Resistance Brigade: Aden deserves development, and will stand with Governor Lamlas, and we are on the lookout for those who harbor evil intentions,” Facebook, October 10, 2020, https://m.facebook.com/NokhbaHadramout/posts/pfbid0q9hBuy26fGDAq4oj46YoErpbeXnFSRtDpKKUZP8nyxdChq8Lcm6sC9nZsW5C69X3l?_rdr; UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” 65; and Department of Moral Guidance for the Security Belt Forces in the Abyan Delta, “The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Counter Terrorism Units issues a decision to appoint a commander for the Counter Terrorism Unit in Abyan Governorate.”
[15] UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” 84; and Dera al Ganoob, “The Tasks of Security Barriers Continue to Be Handed Over to the Security Belt Forces in the Capital, Aden,” March 29, 2022, *https://deraalganoob.com/archives/5239.
[16] Department of Moral Guidance for the Security Belt Forces in the Abyan Delta, “The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Counter Terrorism Units issues a decision to appoint a commander for the Counter Terrorism Unit in Abyan Governorate”; Aden al Khabar, “Commander ‘Mohammed Ali al Houshbi’ congratulates Brig. Gen. Hussein al Saidi on his appointment as the leader of the al Hizam sector in Lahij governorate,” Facebook, August 15, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/adenkbr/posts/pfbid02yqofAZ4K4pic49Bp2t8vsSiQrQ8y99ctyoHH7Hy5GoYbwdpc7chMvWR8n79E9fKPl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVOJMM8XhyOpIrZ3hLefu1MG3sp60ZC9nFLYS-6fiNrMHdLgRLE56MdPrq0AvqIa5PkSETr5PwfjTTliZTm6O3-UDx9R57YaJy9yNar3Dar_zBg2YQCTQSrKFevHIM-MITMuN8HG1GDsx9OKWEpnEJw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; and Al Ayyam, “Security Decisions Against the Background of the Battles of Workers Island,” March 14, 2022, *https://www.alayyam.info/news/8XT6VQX9-2M609C-CB65.
[17] Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: The Road to War (London: Verso, 2019), 113.
[18] John Kifner, “Massacre with Tea: Southern Yemen at War,” New York Times, February 9, 1986, https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/09/world/massacre-with-tea-southern-yemen-at-war.html; and Ahmed Nagi, “The Barriers to Southern Yemeni Political Aspirations Are Mainly in the South,” Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, March 7, 2022, https://carnegie-mec.org/2022/03/07/barriers-to-southern-yemeni-political-aspirations-are-mainly-in-south-pub-86579.
[19] Nagi, “The Barriers to Southern Yemeni Political Aspirations Are Mainly in the South”; and Lackner, Yemen in Crisis.
[20] Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, 174.
[21] Brian Carter and Liam Karr, “Gulf of Aden Security Review—August 26, 2022,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, August 26, 2022, https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/gulf-of-aden-security-review/gulf-of-aden-security-review-august-26-2022; and Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “UAE- and STC-Affiliated Forces Win the Second Battle for Shabwa,” August 2022, https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18643.
[22] Brian Carter and Liam Karr, “Gulf of Aden Security Review—August 26, 2022”; SMA News, “It Praises the Popular Movements in Wadi Hadramawt.. The Presidency Condemns the Campaign of Repression and Terrorization of the Brotherhood Militia Against the Demonstrators in Seiyun,” February 14, 2022, *https://smanews.org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a/271749.
[23] Aden Ghad, “Urgent: Abu Mishaal al Kazmi Takes Over the Security Administration in Abyan,” August 27, 2022, *https://adengad.net/posts/634448.
[24] Brian Carter and Liam Karr, “Gulf of Aden Security Review—August 26, 2022”; and Al Masdar Online, “Narrowing the Circle in Aden and Abyan.. What Are the Motives of the Recent Moves of the Southern Transitional Council,” January 31, 2021, *https://almasdaronline.com/articles/214667; and Aden Ghad, “Urgent.”
[25] Sana’a Center, “UAE- and STC-Affiliated Forces Win the Second Battle for Shabwa.”
[26] Aden Time, “Video—He Accused the Transitional Council.. Governor of Abyan: I Will Hand Over the Governorate With My Eyes and Head,” March 15, 2021, *https://www.aden-tm.net/news/166982; Nuom News, “Documents.. The Secrets of the al Baha Axis,” February 17, 2021, *https://nuomnews.com/news-193274004; Al Ameen Press, “The Brotherhood Appoints a Leader for the ‘Tur al Baha-Lahij’ Axis,” 2020, *https://www.alameenpress.info/news/25232; and SMA News, “The Military Command of the Southern Resistance in Ahwar Refuses to Keep the al Zamki Militia in the District,” May 19, 2022, *https://smanews.org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a/281748.
[27] Al Jazeera, “Who Is Aydarus al Zubaidi?,” May 14, 2017, *https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/icons/2017/5/14/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A.
[28] A non-exhaustive list of these commanders includes Fadl Hassan al Omari, Saleh al Sayyid, Shalal Shaye’a, Nasr Atef al Yafi, Jalal Nasser al Rubaie al Yafi, Mohsen al Wali al Yafi, and Abu Yamamah. All remain alive except for Abu Yamamah (who died in 2019) and control key military forces in southern Yemen. See Maggie Michael, “Yemen Detainees Free Days After AP Report on UAE-Run Prisons,” Seattle Times, June 26, 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/apxyemen-detainees-free-days-after-ap-report-on-uae-run-prisons; Al Omana, “Maj. Gen. Fadl Hassan al Omari Tells Al Omana the Details of the War and the Battle to Liberate the Capital, Aden, and Puts His Testimony to History (2-2),” March 13, 2022, *https://al-omana.net/news171511.html; Aden Time, “Who Is Saleh al Sayyid, the New Director of Lahij Security?,” November 20, 2016, *https://www.aden-tm.net/news/17541; Tahdeeth, “Conducting the Process of Receiving and Handing Over to the Security Belt Command, a Young Sector Between the Predecessor Commander and the Successor Commander,” July 19, 2017, *https://www.tahdeeth.net/news/9040; Al Wattan, “The Coalition Assigns Jalal al Rubaie as Commander of the Security Belt in the Lahij and Yafa Sectors,” November 22, 2017, *https://www.alwattan.net/news/550; Aden Time, “Who Is the New Commander of the Martyr Brigade, ‘Abu al Yamamah?’ CV,” April 4, 2020, *https://www.aden-tm.net/news/122779; and Al Mawqea Post, “Who Is the Leader in the Security Belt, Abu al Yamamah al Yafei? (Profile),” July 17, 2018, *https://almawqeapost.net/news/32349.
[29] This list of units omits the Giants Brigades, a military force backed by the United Arab Emirates and led by Presidential Leadership Council Deputy Abu Zara’a al Muharrami.
[30] Nagi, “The Barriers to Southern Yemeni Political Aspirations Are Mainly in the South.” Commanders personally close to Aydarous al Zubaidi and the Movement for the Right of Self-Determination (Hatam) include Awsan Anshly, Ali al Bishi (Abu Taher), Saleh Sayyid, Shalal Shaye’a, Jalal Nasser al Rubaie al Yafi, and Abu Yamamah. See Hassan al Bishi, “The army of its leaders, like the heroic fighter Brig. Gen. Ali Ahmed al Bishi (Abu Taher), will definitely be victorious,” Facebook, July 22, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02P8ERxqifnVLiqSPofUrpjBteYAWBFvBzDijWzSDuodvL7doJkQbRBd9hvSsEkrxFl&id=100014052102726&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVmly2LmV-5cAlwuHY7eEkvFBzrC8TaBJMQN36Vq4OzUAhEI_ngfbUNF6FqD4H0-n8F5icQiQN-2lIssYaR0O8sMGkRQ5ggnobbbr5GM09Viw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; Al Ayyam Newspaper, “Abu al Yamamah al Yafei.. There are many questions about this name and this leader? What is his struggle role? And how proven is it on the battlefield?,” Facebook, July 14, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/alaeyam/photos/a.359113447508445/1090757544344028/?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZXOpSdWWCTJhymDZzy33F1iRzvry7OctPI906FYzazZ4oW5X8AQGiV-fbcsf9s-4n_FItzRk-eI2sJZMwvT9f-F5M5pLkiPW7kEqwUUpzUEsZ-ZMsqnL0BG-Cw6cXLB7shw-zOwxEIB49jwCPgq4UNwN-n4BM0nMrKfB4uqafANgA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; Al Omana, “The Southern 33 Group Distributes a Food Basket to the Families of the Martyrs of the Salman Battalion in Aden,” June 29, 2016, *https://www.al-omana.net/news34749.html; Aden Time, “Who Is Saleh al Sayyid, the New Director of Lahij Security?”; Tahdeeth, “Conducting the Process of Receiving and Handing Over to the Security Belt Command, a Young Sector Between the Predecessor Commander and the Successor Commander”; Al Ghad al Janubi, “Who Is the Commander Shalal Ali Shayea Hadi,” December 23, 2018, *https://www.gdjnooby.com/2018/12/shalal-ali-shaiaa.html.
[31] UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” 81; Al Masdar Online, “Agency: Changes in the Leadership of the Security Belt Forces in Aden After Disagreements.. al Yafei and al Rubaie Instead of al Wali and al Mashushi,” April 24, 2021, *https://almasdaronline.com/articles/222594; and Al Masdar Online, “The Overthrow of al Wali and al Mashushi from the Leadership of the ‘Support and Reinforcement’ forces . . . Why Now?,” April 25, 2021, *https://almasdaronline.com/articles/222725.
[32] Al Jazeera, “Who is Aydarus al Zubaidi?” May 14, 2017, *https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/icons/2017/5/14/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A.
[33] Al Araby al Jadeed, “South Yemen: Secession Eats Its Children,” July 4, 2021, *https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%A3%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1%D9%87.
[34] Nadwa al-Dawsari, “Fantasies of State Power Cannot Solve Yemen’s War,” Century Foundation, July 13, 2021, https://tcf.org/content/report/fantasies-state-power-cannot-solve-yemens-war/?agreed=1.
[35] Shukri Hussein, “The Yemeni Defense Stopped Dealing with the Commander of the Fourth Military Region,” Anadolu Agency, September 20, 2019, *https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9/1589377.
[36] Al Quds al Araby, “Did the Yemeni Defense Ministry Stop Dealing with the Commander of the Fourth Military Region Because He Refused to Fight the UAE-Backed ‘Transitional’ Forces?,” September 20, 2019, *https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84.
[37] Morning Scene, “Who is Brig. Gen. Abdul Ghani al Subayhi, commander of the Zayed al Solban Brigade?” Facebook, September 1, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02icZEZDaxa4sCroqHnM6o7UxDoQsTBZpGzEgqqTuVxDm8MG2iivXdnBm2o3J46WLkl&id=1058207330940246&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZXkEMlqJnBpXHCQj4g7Uar9j0aaUJ8yw1vuNwBsMe1crQlut_RDK88I4EKiWRr8o4qQidI86ci4uxUuHNCfuMqPUM1dxZOlYJHSZ0Mylqcxo0Kw61n299bPpuSMKj0YG5atQZZ98zIVuN04GUc3bVx4&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; Al Mawqea Post, “Who Is Maj. Gen. Abu Bakr Salem, the New Governor of Abyan?” March 12, 2017, *https://almawqeapost.net/news/17543; Mandeb Press, “Hadi Issues a Decree Appointing a New Commander for the 3rd Brigade, Presidential Protection.. Who is He?,” March 30, 2019, *https://mandabpress.com/news55247.html; 26 September News, “Lahij.. The Leadership of the Tur al Baha Axis Discusses a Plan to Complete the Liberation of the Fronts Adjacent to the District,” February 11, 2021, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2021/02/11/%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AC-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3; Al Ameen Press, “The Brotherhood Appoints a Leader for the ‘Tur al Baha-Lahij’ Axis,” 2020, *https://www.alameenpress.info/news/25232; Nuom News, “Documents.. The Secrets of the al Baha Axis,” February 17, 2021, *https://nuomnews.com/news-193274004; and Al Wattan, “Al Hattas Announces His Rebellion Against the Interior Minister’s Decision to Dismiss Him and Appoint al Qubba as His Replacement,” March 25, 2021, *https://www.alwattan.net/news/153995.
[38] These officers include Abyan Governor and Axis Commander Abu Bakr Hussein and Abyan Axis staff officer and 3rd Presidential Protection Brigade Commander Louay al Zamki. See Aden Time, “Video—He Accused the Transitional Council.. Governor of Abyan: I Will Hand Over the Governorate With My Eyes and Head”; and Mandeb Press, “Hadi Issues a Decree Appointing a New Commander for the 3rd Brigade, Presidential Protection.. Who Is He?”
[39] Aden Ghad, “Urgent: Abu Mishaal al Kazmi Takes Over the Security Administration in Abyan,” August 27, 2022, *https://adengad.net/posts/634448; Aden Time, “Appointing Abu Mishaal Al-Kazmi as Director of Abyan Security and Promoting Him to the Rank of Brigadier General,” June 20, 2019, *https://aden-tm.net/news/89293; and Al Masdar Online, Al Masdar Online, “Elected a 23-Presidency Board Members… Southern National Coalition to Hold First Conference in Aden,” April 27, 2019, *https://almasdaronline.com/articles/167045.
[40] Ababiil, “Who Is the New Commander of the Fourth Military Region Appointed by Hadi to Succeed al Yafei?,” November 22, 2016, *https://ababiil.net/yemen-news/111752.html.
[41] Al Masdar Online, “The Overthrow of al Wali and al Mashushi from the Leadership of the ‘Support and Reinforcement’ forces . . . Why Now?”
[42] Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, “The Houthis: From the Sa’ada Wars to the Saudi-led Intervention,” Sana’a Center, June 16, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/10205.
[43] Al Jazeera, “After Shabwah.. How Did the Transitional Council Forces Take Control of New Areas in Southern Yemen,” August 27, 2022, *https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2022/8/27/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A.
[44] Saddam al Lahiji, “Disclosure of a Document for Appointments in the Command of the Southern Land Infantry Brigades,” Aden Time, October 5, 2021, *https://www.aden-tm.net/news/186329; and Said Nader, “The Transitional Council Integrates Its Forces Within the Ministries of Interior and Defense,” Al Mushahid, June 25, 2021, *https://almushahid.net/81334.
[45] Saddam al Lahiji, “Disclosure of a Document for Appointments in the Command of the Southern Land Infantry Brigades.”
[46] Dera al Ganoob, “The Commander of the Southern Land Infantry Brigades Offers Condolences to Major General Askar on the Death of His Nephew,” June 7, 2022, *https://deraalganoob.com/archives/7981.
[47] The Southern Land Forces Brigades may also each fall within a military axis. This document does not fully expand on each military axis and its subordinate units.
[48] Dera al Ganoob, “The Commander of the Southern Land Infantry Brigades Offers Condolences to Major General Askar on the Death of His Nephew.”
[49] Mustafa Illa Yazid “The Commander of the Southern Land Infantry Brigades Offers Condolences to Major General Askar on the Death of His Nephew,” Sout al Mukwama, May 7, 2022, *https://soutalmukawama.com/news/68116.
[50] Mustafa Illa Yazid “The Commander of the Southern Land Infantry Brigades Offers Condolences to Major General Askar on the Death of His Nephew.”
[51] Southern Land Forces/Third Infantry Brigade, “The brigade members of the brigade are from the pillars and officers, describing officers and individuals,” Facebook, October 29, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/ADENBWABAWORLD/posts/pfbid0zkK5QR2CEF7uJyCZs9djcD99tBZ5tVhmgVQLfSKk7z8KxQPfd9Y7eBcoPb2R8Kpbl?__cft__[0]=AZX476p_4SVi_yuXznuObCM7sp9yMWcJfW5ZD5pB0pdg4tgLQPoZHHHPtgUS_uieQ9zTii6Pp4yumpXXjmzjeE_RTl0rWFHxRp4IP8BxAgUBbBsRxg9WL5GjNoXdJ0sErTtn8iX_77QSMqZoNwFdlXzwUU7DKJgUfq7IPankEjNaf2gRV6n4SaYj3gaSE9CEiGY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[52] Southern Land Forces/Third Infantry Brigade, “In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. And do not consider those who were killed in the way of Allah dead, but alive in the sight of their,” Facebook, March 23, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/ADENBWABAWORLD/posts/pfbid07Z8dWMtcNMkUNupEssnXnWxKP7wtvCxBPTpwB8S1K3KepAFA4ayfmAXcyAoEKpD8l?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZWNLjwLOPAC_FTPF2AZPoAE6aXNGDrHemkLzfE-itHDUElu5Hg8HMWdh-gXiNDMlZPvbUnStf2ADGGd9FEs7jJtJsnW4jXcForz3NDPDmJ1XL0SbzRqL7xeO_DXhEmW9tiT8E68wfORoJC9N7cseWe1QvneCXyvQfV8jR6CLP3Kq0aHXTRtWlMIf8Ct8Ze_1OI&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[53] Dera al Ganoob, “The Fourth Infantry Brigade Inaugurates the Training and Operational Year 2022 AD,” January 2, 2022, *https://deraalganoob.com/archives/930.
[54] Dera al Ganoob, “The Fourth Infantry Brigade Inaugurates the Training and Operational Year 2022 AD.”
[55] Dera al Ganoob, “The Fourth Infantry Brigade Inaugurates the Training and Operational Year 2022 AD.”
[56] UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” 84; and Nader, “The Transitional Council Integrates Its Forces Within the Ministries of Interior and Defense.”
[57] Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “The Graveyard of Hubris—Yemen Annual Review 2021," March 3, 2022, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/16768#military_developments.
[58] Official Website of the First Brigade, Support and Attribution, “The First Brigade Support and Support issues an important explanatory statement. The brigade's command issued its first support and support, this morning,” Facebook, July 23, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/allwaaalawaldaamwasnad/posts/pfbid0XgnUdTExRMTKTZ6nFZv9LvEuKJrMQE9sV93n2drsARCeC3gv3rUcLDyFiMA4ezLMl.
[59] Official Website for the First Support and Reinforcement Brigade, “The 1st Brigade, Support and Reinforcement, inaugurates the second training semester 2022 with a solemn military parade,” Facebook, June 12, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/allwaaalawaldaamwasnad/posts/pfbid02cNb4wrTD5XBBmk3g7aPi6KqtVgvzxs2FBLmvxnKtCY3z7HwXhAPwU4H23FHfG1PMl.
[60] Al Masdar Online, “Abyan.. Two Members of the 2nd Brigade Were Killed by Masked Gunmen in the Center of Zinjibar,” September 21, 2021, *https://almasdaronline.com/articles/235647.
[61] Second Brigade Support and Attribution, “Brigadier/Muhammad Ali Mahdi—Commander of the Second Support and Reinforcement Brigade the deepest condolences and condolences to the family of Dukhana,” Facebook, May 21, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0JBwv79Wu5zKpmcRfMp6QR9SfELJuRJNwSRoegViKMAT2F7p7x81Bks7LTyGZ1QDZl&id=532082213825718&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZWo_OAU8KSorH6yN2B5W3PvReofNsypkSE-i7t392e0mN09mCpbTn6PHRRXq865O2ohTxo2P8IICKxyPbNAUSX3YdPMpZjaWL5kILhurCfYYmrUL3tTFXOTd4RK3GjFlTSk7KPtoAkX_N1pX7FhIs-ETDDudBVjKKaJkLV1OgyXtQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; Brigadier General/Muhammad Ali Mahdi—Commander of the Second Brigade, Support and Reinforcement, “Brigadier General/Muhammad Ali Mahdi offers condolences to the Kurda family on the death of the father, Qasim Kurda,” Facebook, November 7, 2022, https://m.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=507242998112890&id=100064815813923&set=a.475547707949086&eav=AfZPZWeqhZZvm4WRDaLqkRfiuQH-p5U1YN31cUKAgxKQZR1DXaArgle5E3SdrUYCVQk&paipv=0&source=48; and Masa Press, “A Southern Military Leader Survived an Assassination Attempt in Ma’rib,” January 5, 2022, *https://masa-press.net/2022/01/05/%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A3.
[62] 4May, “The Command of the 3rd Brigade, Support and Reinforcement Issues a Statement About the Kidnapping of the Brigade’s War Staff,” July 21, 2022, *https://www.4may.net/news/78198.
[63] Al Ayyam, “Commander Nabil al Mashushi Was Injured in Clashes in al Durayhimi,” October 13, 2018, *https://www.alayyam.info/news/7K9WVDQ8-UQTEKF.
[64] Aden al Hadath, “The Command of the 3rd Brigade, Support and Reinforcement Issues a Statement About the Kidnapping of the Brigade’s War Staff,” May 31, 2021, *https://www.aden-alhadath.info/news/91776.
[65] Al Hizam Media, “The Brigadier General Congratulates al Shuhati on His Assignment as Commander of the 4th Brigade, Support and Reinforcement,” September 22, 2022, *https://alhezam-media.com/site/2022/09/22/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d9%87%d9%86%d8%a6-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d9%88%d8%ad%d8%b7%d9%8a-%d8%a8%d8%aa%d9%83%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%81%d9%87-%d9%82%d8%a7.
[66] Abdullah Khalidi (@abdullahHShm), “Commander of the Fourth Brigade, Hadar al Shuhati, Support and Reinforcement. Some time ago, he razed the soldiers of the brigade affiliated with Lahj and Aden,” Twitter, May 26, 2022, 2:24 a.m., https://twitter.com/abdullahHShm/status/1529710049106530306?s=20&t=Y9QCtU15QB_H0ElD-bgptg.
[67] Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “The Houthi Militia Denies Responsibility for the Killing of ‘al Shuhati’ and Refuses to Employ the Transitional Council for the Incident Politically and Lists the Name of the Real Killer!,” September 7, 2022, *https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/239073.
[68] Haid Shamsan, “Fifth Brigade Support and Reinforcement forces arrest of the assassin of commander Rashdi Al-Tayar in Radfan. Forces of the Fifth Brigade Support and…,” Facebook, June 17, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/groups/570349656926481/posts/1032150874079688/?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVcP-KSZWpiaEd3K0VJu3jcQC68bdQra8ffW7yIcEeehRs8sgTjZj0nydvlauU1gNHAS5asie1xeCQZuP4SdpFVYodv5NS4MAcGSZRBHIIwIRfLnLo6DRj83sCV80XU-1E&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[69] Media Center of the Support Forces—Radfan, “Brigadier General Mokhtar al Nubi, the commander of the Abyan Axis, the commander of Fifth Brigade Support and Reinforcement, an important security meeting this,” Facebook, June 18, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/aaaesasdsssz/posts/pfbid0vcwkcN8PBLYReYBUoVb8YEUDd49o5ieXAqspbpZCg4g2Hg2mVvVYxdzCvjfri3Pjl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZXUSowLGlHtU-6f49kyWTGrswctgoK42NGPWboKh6NqAVrX9CdS4RU38RIvFXTRQ2KH1MtWR6erFLKPRtvphUM9-TwIgsKJ5Gf4xK_w6rHqL4vHMLoxZKGIP01F48nHLWI&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; and Al Hezam Media, “The Leaders of the Southern Forces receive the Giants Forces Coming from Shabwah,” Shabwa,” *https://alhezam-media.com/site/2022/01/29/%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A.
[70] Alameen Press, “The Support and Reinforcement Command Issues a Decision to Form the Seventh Brigade and Appoint al Bakri as the Brigade Commander,” 2021, *https://www.alameenpress.info/news/29041.
[71] Cater Sky, “The Commander of the Seventh Support and Reinforcement Brigade Announces His Support for the Radfan March, Which Will Take Place Tomorrow, Tuesday,” November 31, 2022, *https://cratersky.net/posts/92765.
[72] Crater Sky, “The Support and Support Command in Aden Appoints a Commander for the Seventh Brigade, Support and Reinforcement,” June 3, 2021, *https://www.cratar.net/archives/145865.
[73] Crater Sky, “The Support and Support Command in Aden Appoints a Commander for the Seventh Brigade, Support and Reinforcement.”
[74] Crater Sky, “The Support and Support Command in Aden Appoints a Commander for the Seventh Brigade, Support and Reinforcement.”
[75] Raed Khelifi and Matthias Sulz, “The Facilities Protection Force,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, November 30, 2020, https://acleddata.com/2020/11/30/the-facilities-protection-force; and Aden Ghad, “Brigadier General Ahmed bin Afif Sponsors the First Collective Marriage of 13 Grooms from the Facilities Protection Brigade,” December 15, 2020, *https://adengad.net/posts/511974.
[76] Al Masdar Online, “Zubaidi Reportedly Appoints the Brigade Commanders Within the Thunderbolts Brigades, Indicating They Are Likely Almost Entirely Loyal to the Southern Transitional Council,” *https://al-masdaronline.net/national/915; and Al Araby al Jadeed, “South Yemen: Secession Eats Its Children.”
[77] Shabwa News, “After the directives of Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, the commander of the Thunderbolt Brigades, Abu Taher Al-Bishi, asks Samid Sanah to surrender unless he will be raided,” Facebook, February 6, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/1ShabwaNews/videos/425691222639241/?__tn__=%2CO.
[78]SMA News, “The 1st Brigade, Thunderbolt, Celebrates Eid on the Beat of Victories from the Barricades and the Trenches,” July 9, 2022, *https://smanews.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/287993.
[79] SMA News, “Commander of the 1st Brigade Condemns Terrorist Operation That Targeted Salam al Soqatri,” October 10, 2021, *https://smanews.org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a/254607.
[80] Shabwah Press, “The Second Thunderbolt Brigade Repels a Houthi Attack in the Hajjar Front, North of al Dhaleh,” July 17, 2022, *https://shabwaah-press.info/news/80625.
[81] Flags of the Second Brigade Thunderbolt, “Commander of the Second Brigade, Saeqa Abu Bakil Al-Halimi: Our forces formed an impregnable barrier at the northern gate of the south, and our next kiss.,” Facebook, September 26, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid034mVs9VodqgzNqskuGcv3FYjYN26PLDw2SmJbi8JPbt37ERJFdYpugw6uQY1QRmvAl&id=108916667598952&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZXHe1STlhTB4c7Ma-EeTTxQB5iAGS02LVaeG9eHryX270Mskdimt-LNxOE1C3Ibsr4PFNaU4hDKQZiaLbymMHdI4iT43pgO604Nvwn1PA-9Cj77leDXmli-TddzQqXgIQsZoqhdIdftZl-2D0KDVXH43QC5G_6O_L9XZ5JBT1VWsQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[82] Sout al Mukawama, “Command of the 3rd Brigade Thunderbolt Visits the al Jub Front, North of al Dhaleh,” July 2, 2020, *https://www.soutalmukawama.com/news/38494.
[83] Media Center Third Brigade Thunderbolt, “The commander of the 3rd Brigade, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Qassem al Zubaidi, during his meeting with the officers of the brigade,” Facebook, June 8, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0pcEhKFFztv3mH56u8YmsiAgMBiRWJYYWhF2BUoMfifenwsfkCPSaziMXGsSSLTbwl&id=100975124842360&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZWRcSnrhbG1lfIkBmXCtOjKxIeYTwe0LwTi98EMCKh88U66i0G2bkgJKSXA0VRbjtPQj3qpsnFHTUHz2jmiCe8Y0ryW7bvA713Wf93pfxHxGn-PFnYp3gHZ0W__tqQRVNGkm69LGGXopPOA32NU1sq9oKo4M8DTCqNDYayIlAJngaU2r-f6GgGQqn2A5fBQsZk&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[84] Saad al Hakika, “The Head of Operations of the Transitional Council Reviews the Readiness of the 4th Thunderbolt Brigade in the Yafa Axis,” October 21, 2021, *https://sadaalhakika.com/news/25663.
[85] 4May, “The Chief of Operations of the Southern Forces Reviews the Readiness of the 4th Thunderbolt Brigade (Yafa Axis),” October 4, 2021, *https://www.4may.net/Mnews/67191.
[86] Al Omana, “Al Tuhamy Visits the Command of the Fifth Thunderbolt Brigade,” February 9, 2022, *https://al-omana.net/m/details.php?id=169072.
[87] Al Jadeed Press, “Al Dhaleh: Civil and Military Leaders Visit the Village of Arar in al Shuaib District to Inaugurate the Second Phase of the Road Paving Project,“ November 9, 2021, *https://pressn.net/article/12359354?news=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%8A%D9%86; and Al Omana, “Al Tuhamy Visits the Command of the Fifth Thunderbolt Brigade,” February 9, 2022, *https://al-omana.net/m/details.php?id=169072.
[88] Al Ayyam, “Commander of the 6th Thunderbolt Brigade: The Blood of the Martyrs Will Not Be in Vain,” March 2, 2020, *https://www.alayyam.info/news/84CWEQOP-YJ3A7K-A821.
[89] Media Office: Sixth Brigade Thunderbolt, “The Commander of the Six Thunderbolt Brigade condolences on the departure of Major General Qassem Yahya Qassem, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the ,” Facebook, April 6, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0ysE1jwVLtLA3yyQzRS4WtLuQMpQURr9bHdPRjwURPFVTnSd5FSmRHUZYi3MvbCQkl&id=104140467616991&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZUqFzLMTUBFH2aO0Q4so7NKcI7NY8JW7uf6KrDK17q7Dol6xKTO54Kpg0wzyQybKthTpoW7k1kRwR2zwPyjYqKyqPtO32KYynqH2w20D8i-Qbfov0EtzXnRjKkr1_Pe_N6CFRa_-Npl7Gyd4PEU2jW0M5-E0C6iGeF-z9F-wW07Lw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[90] Nawras Mahmoud Mohamed (@NOOARS8), “#Al-Dhalea Southern forces: the ‘martyrdom’ of the chief of operations of the Seventh Brigade, Brigadier General Pilot Al-Jahfi, in the Al-Jub front, northwest,” Twitter, March 10, 2022, 4:57 a.m., https://twitter.com/NOOARS8/status/1501859672495636486?s=20&t=c_7xPEUoJ9MeNE8l3IWLqQ.
[91] The Seventh Brigade Thunderbolt, “Commander of the Seventh Saaqa, represented by the General/Aziz Al-Hadaf, Commander of the Seven Saaqa Brigade. And all the members of the seventh brigade,” Facebook, February 24, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0219bcsC6xwrRqyuscQ6V9KidQkw4sXjsZFAwMVaR5eErySoEQ9pjTA9TuF9ag2hCvl&id=101609834585039&__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVi2tiUaABUpLgXYIY4CDOGoieZ96Kz-b2niXnz4bTW2Ue12SpJNIm91AlAHjSv694R48pswL90_KRbYffoZTSEDp5V4pYF3-6dMDx_gkatxQ6ee66muXRvqf1inB2Fn-jd_PHuyqG2or6IY8yrhbE45lz4spDG3DZdn-eKzmpZBQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; and Salem Bin Hizam (@sa711____, “In al Dhaleh, the 7th Brigade, the Southern Thunderbolt, led by Brigadier General al Hadaf, and the al Dhaleh Belt with all its formations, led by al Qubbah,” Twitter, January 22, 2022, 12:11 p.m., https://twitter.com/sa711___/status/1484936770118733827?s=20&t=S00HWh5ORUYC817VQMkBIQ.
[92] Aden Time, “Carrying Out a Process of Receiving and Handing Over to the Command of the Eighth Thunderbolt Brigade in the Abyan Axis,” July 7, 2021, *https://www.aden-tm.net/news/177163.
[93] Abu Malak Al-Harbi, “Infographic report: Who is the commander of the new 8th Brigade, Colonel/Amin Qassem #Southern_Armed_Forces,” Youtube, May 10, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5UPKt0eFV4.
[94] Baraa Shiban (@BShtwtr), “A serious and scary development. The 9th Strike Force Brigade—a UAE backed force—abducted AbdulMalik Al-Sanbani from a checkpoint South of Lahij,” Twitter, September 9, 2021, 5:59 p.m., https://twitter.com/BShtwtr/status/1436086936519823364?s=20&t=wP4ZJl1XlIh5s8KN34lZoA; Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “Southerners Protest Economic Collapse as the Houthis Advance—the Yemen Review, September 2021,” October 13, 2021, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218; and Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “The Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs Comments on the Killing of the Young Man ‘al Sanabani’ at the Hands of the Transitional Elements,” September 10, 2021, *https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/214477.
[95] Baraa Shiban (@BShtwtr), “A serious and scary development. The 9th Strike Force Brigade—a UAE backed force—abducted AbdulMalik Al Sanbani from a checkpoint South of Lahj”; Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “Southerners Protest Economic Collapse as the Houthis Advance—the Yemen Review, September 2021”; Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “The Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs Comments on the Killing of the Young Man ‘al Sanabani’ at the Hands of the Transitional Elements.”
[96] Aden al Ghad Newspaper, “Brigadier General Rushdi al Houshabi and Colonel Waddah Abu Ali inspect the heroes of the 10th Thunderbolt Brigade stationed at the Habeel Hanash front,” Facebook, July 20, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/ADENALGHAD.NET/photos/a.468793163163535/4496941627015315/?__tn__=%2CO*F; and Sada al Hakika, “Commander of the 10th Thunderbolt Brigade, Brigadier General Rushdi al Houshabi, Sends a Telegram of Condolence and Sympathy for the Passing of the Deceased Ahmed Ali al Quraidi,” May 6, 2022, *http://www.sadaalhakika.com/news/28576.
[97] Aden al Ghad Newspaper, “Brigadier General Rushdi al Houshabi and Colonel Waddah Abu Ali inspect the heroes of the 10th Thunderbolt Brigade stationed at the Habeel Hanash front”; and Aden Hura, “Brigadier General Rushdi al Houshabi Offers Condolences on the Death of the Staff of the Fifth Brigade, Support and Reinforcement,” February 17, 2022, *https://www.aden-hura.com/news/6274.
[98] Ahmed Salih al Omari, “Commander of the 11th Thunderbolt Brigade Announces Combat Readiness and Defense of the Land of the South,” February 17, 2021, *https://www.soutalmukawama.com/news/50017.
[99] Aden Lang, “Akram al Hanashi, Commander of the 11th Thunderbolt Brigade, Is a Model of a Successful Commander,” June 10, 2022, *https://adengad.net/public/index.php/articles/559390.
[100] Aden al Hadath, “The Twelfth Brigade Thunderbolt—Den of the Lions,” August 22, 2021, *https://aden-alhadath.info/news/94196.
[101] Molham Faisal Ghaleb Saleh Al-Hawij, “Individuals and officers of the 12th Brigade, Saeqa, are calling on the higher command to lift the arrest of the commander, Abdo Nasser Al-Azraqi,” Twitter, October 1, 2021, 3:51 p.m., https://twitter.com/molhamalhawag/status/1444027164156960780?s=20&t=numDO6C6KLsLjqCMlPdogQ.
[102] Aden 24, “Brigadier General Mukhtar al Nubi and the Commander of the 13th Thunderbolt Brigade Inspect the Fighters in the Karsh Front Hamalah,” *https://aden24.net/news/122838.
[103] Aden 24, “Brigadier General Mukhtar al Nubi and the Commander of the 13th Thunderbolt Brigade Inspect the Fighters in the Karsh Front Hamalah”; Hayrout, “Urgent: The First Picture of the al Nubi Brother Who was Killed During the Battles, and This Is the Fate of Their Third Brother,” October 2, 2021, *https://hayrout.com/84799.
[104] Southern Thunderbolt Brigades, 14th Thunderbolt Brigade, “The Moral Guidance Division of the General Command of the Land Infantry Brigades carries out an orientation and educational field visit to the 14th Thunderbolt,” Facebook, June 15, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/alwiatalsaaeiqat/posts/pfbid033ZbqYNwGeNg8Hof9v9NppxmKsrgcGyHg1BAib9L2oYWb6DC9yi65aDLSuNebTbGUl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVZKkWUrvVzBf2d-Yq57ycCIqlN2C8_EqBWz0S8ICvjjwDG0bTVTQssZdvZ9d0-DvaRm4Xvppn7NZPFoCFkyjDkcTKtj5h-otnPDdqoJvOsWlci8dixSvQlUa-wQAqA9T0mEktXpPmuMa03Ay3WYHzDsNVeF5ylQ-GfEHwnkK225w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R\.
[105] Southern Thunderbolt Brigades, 14th Thunderbolt Brigade, “Commander of the 14th Thunderbolt Brigade offers condolences on the death of the fighter Colonel Saif Muqbel Abd al Qawi al Ashafi, who passed away due to an…,” Facebook, May 4, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/alwiatalsaaeiqat/posts/pfbid022QzTtyKd3fu3Qx3PHMQB6FU3Y5murfPwwb8m1eXXnmv1q4t9ZLw8GjsDvzorphZEl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZWSwdYwsGWwDW_lmM-L0cRcH-DCwtm1HvrXDIDmkxQFu2GupwynbnRZMkLofg__rxwJYVhzCa3urFkxPL5alwubtPgsf0RY5ehgqe4T9o03ZIzZHmbov0FkaMPH0GXOQdR1QqAXgT7G7ersTCiad5EPldZVN67pLTv5zywjrGvK6Q&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[106] Al Ghad al Mashreq Channel, “Abyan Witnesses the Holding of a Graduation Ceremony for a New Batch of the 15th Thunderbolt Brigade,” YouTube, July 19, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZD9voNSNmVc.
[107] Yafa News, “The Command of the 15th Thunderbolt Brigade Mourns the Death of Colonel Madian Harmel,” October 16, 2021, *https://www.yafa-news.net/archives/526641.
[108] Naif al Qodasi and Adnan al Gabarni, “Parallel Militaries: Anatomy of the Armed Forces Fighting Yemen’s War,” January 3, 2021, *https://al-masdaronline.net/national/915.
[109] Emile Roy, “The Asifa Brigades,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, August 2, 2021, https://acleddata.com/2020/08/13/the-asifah-brigade/; Doha Institute, “Fighting of the Southern Transitional Council forces in Aden: towards more internal fragmentation,” October 11, 2021, https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Infighting-between-the-Transitional-Council-Forces-in-Aden-Exacerbating-Fragmentation.aspx; and Al Hezam Media, “Doctors ‘al Aqel’ and ‘Nader’ Give an Educational Lecture to Members of the Storm Brigades in Aden,” February 2, 2019, *https://alhezam-media.com/site/2019/02/02/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%83%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%82%d9%84-%d9%88-%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%b6%d8%b1.
[110] Dera al Ganoob, “Storm Forces ... a Pioneering Southern Security Experience,” December 19, 2021, *https://deraalganoob.com/archives/380.
[111] Dera al Ganoob, “Storm Forces ... a Pioneering Southern Security Experience.”
[112] Dera al Ganoob, “Storm Forces ... a Pioneering Southern Security Experience.”
[113] Dera al Ganoob, “Storm Forces ... a Pioneering Southern Security Experience.”
[114] Dera al Ganoob, “Storm Forces ... a Pioneering Southern Security Experience.”
[115] Al Omana, “Maj. Gen. Fadl Hassan al Omari Tells al Omana the Details of the War and the Battle to Liberate the Capital, Aden, and Puts His Testimony to History (2-2)”; and Aden Time, “Who Is Saleh al Sayyed, the New Director of Lahij Security?”
[116] SMA News, “The Military Command of the Southern Resistance in Ahwar Refuses to Keep the al Zamki Militia in the District.”
[117] Yemen News, “The Defection of a Military Brigade from Hadi Forces in Abyan,” May 19, 2021, *https://yemnews.net/index.php/news/2020-05-21-10-08-01.
[118] Raed Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, August 2, 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/08/02/the-hazm-brigades.
[119] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades.”
[120] Abdul Sami Al-Aghbari, “The Return of the Commander of the Bab al Mandab Axis and the First Brigade, Hazm Abdul Ghani al Subayhi, to the Homeland,” July 7, 2020, *https://www.marsad.news/news/1092866.
[121] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades.”
[122] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades”; and 26 September News, “The Defense Minister Inspects the Military Units in the Bab al Mandeb Axis,” July 22, 2022, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2022/07/22/732-3.
[123] Nuom News, “A Meeting That Brings Together the Commander of the Bab al Mandab Axis, the Commander of the 1st Brigade, Hazm, and the Leadership of the Subayha Belt,” November 9, 2020, *https://nuomnews.com/n-744177.
[124] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades.”
[125] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades”; and 26 September News, “The Defense Minister Inspects the Military Units in the Bab al Mandeb Axis.”
[126] 26 September News, “The Ministry of Defense Committee Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units of the Bab al Mandeb Axis,” March 18, 2022, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2022/03/18/453-5.
[127] 26 September News, “The Minister of Defense Inspects the Readiness the Military and Security Units of Abyan Governorate,” July 13, 2022, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2022/07/13/453-11.
[128] 26 September News, “Joint Security Force from the Abyan Axis Implements a Field Descent to Ahwar with the Aim of Securing the Directorate and the International Line,” May 18, 2022, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2022/05/18/1-9121.
[129] 26 September News, “Joint Security Force from the Abyan Axis Implements a Field Descent to Ahwar with the Aim of Securing the Directorate and the International Line.”
[130] 26 September News, “Joint Security Force from the Abyan Axis Implements a Field Descent to Ahwar with the Aim of Securing the Directorate and the International Line.”
[131] 26 September News, “Joint Security Force from the Abyan Axis Implements a Field Descent to Ahwar with the Aim of Securing the Directorate and the International Line.”
[132] Aden al Ghad, “The Commander of the 115th Infantry Brigade Offers Condolences to the Commander of the 103rd Infantry Brigade on the Death of His Mother,” February 4, 2022, *https://adengad.net/posts/596325.
[133] 26 September News, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis,” March 13, 2022, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2022/03/13/12-33.
[134] 26 September News, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis.”
[135] SABA New, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis,” March 13, 2022, *http://sabanew.net/story/ar/84661.
[136] SABA New, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis.”.
[137] SABA New, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis.”
[138]SABA New, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis.”
[139] SABA New, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis.”
[140] SABA New, “The Committee of the Ministry of Defense Reviewed the Level of Technical and Logistical Readiness of the Units in the al Dhaleh Axis.”
[141] Yemen Future, “Commander of al Anad Axis, Commander of Brigade 131 Marshah, Major General Sabat Jawas announces his endorsement of the Southern Transitional Council,” Facebook, April 26, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/YemenFutur.net/posts/pfbid0VKYS8JrGWKKvCKVEqjiy9msUKaxucpNp7ksgagu5oCmcBRxD9qHPFAtTeMHk1W2Xl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZXDGL-q3Iy7Co6Epez2STfhtoS__KaqqRYY1QomnNj9C_7B68UY-Tcfc7wRMNGVrxlXopFfYu6UI1mf_9vPuqQcL8SOe4nvF-KytWtD6xJqj2X7iglqBVsJsnvMPYXNnQdvVTvM7BykMZCLgGGqpdac&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[142] Aseel Muhammad, “The Commander of the Fourth Military Region Visits al Anad Axis and a Number of Security Sectors Surrounding It,” Marsad, May 19, 2021, *https://www.marsad.news/news/133274.
[143] Al Marsad News, “Urgent: Commander of the al Anad Axis, Brigadier General Thabet Jawas: We Are Ready to Defend the Homeland,” December 18, 2019, *https://www.marsad.news/news/90636.
[144] Sky News Arabia, “The Leader of the ‘al Anad’ Axis Was Killed in a Car Explosion in Aden,” March 23, 2022, *https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1509916-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86.
[145] Al Yemeni al Ethadi, “The Commander of the Fourth Region Inspects the Readiness of the 2nd Brigade, Hazm, in the al Anad Axis,” November 17, 2017, *https://alyemenalethadi.com/12525.
[146] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades.”
[147] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades.”
[148] Khelifi, “The Hazm Brigades.”
[149] Aden al Ghad, “The Leadership and Members of the 201st Mika Brigade, Led by Brigadier General Tahasha, Mourn the Departure of the Commander of the 1st Battalion, Colonel Ahmed Askar,” April 26, 2022, *https://adengad.net/posts/612722.
[150] Aden al Ghad, “The Leadership and Members of the 201st Mika Brigade, Led By Brigadier General Tahasha, Mourn the Departure of the Commander of the 1st Battalion, Colonel Ahmed Askar.”
[151] Muhammand, “The Commander of the Fourth Military Region Visits al Anad Axis and a Number of Security Sectors Surrounding It.”
[152] Muhammand, “The Commander of the Fourth Military Region Visits al Anad Axis and a Number of Security Sectors Surrounding It.”
[153] This force is fully Islah. The Republic of Yemen government may have dismantled some of the axis in 2021, redeploying some elements from the Tur al Baha Axis to Ma’rib and al Jawf in 2021. Local media reported that President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi redeployed one battalion from the 9th Infantry, at least two battalions from the 6th Support and Reinforcement Brigade, one battalion from the 8th Reserve, an unspecified military police force, and the 120th Artillery Brigade from Tur al Baha to Ma’rib and al Jawf in 2021. See Lahij Press, “The 9th Infantry Brigade in Tur al Baha Pushes a New Combat Force to the Ma’rib and al Jawf Fronts,” 2020, *https://lahjpress.com/news/19324; and Al Janoob al Youm, “The Struggle for Influence Between the Transitional Government and the Islah Party is Moving to the Stage of al Baha, and Mutual Preparations for a Decisive Battle,” October 20, 2020, *http://www.aljanoobalyoum.net/37257.
[154] Tur al Baha-Lahj Axis, “The leadership of the Tur al Baha axis condolences on the martyrdom of Major General Thabet Jawas The leadership of the Tur Al-Baha axis sent a telegram,” Facebook, March 25, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/mihwar.twralbaht.lahj/posts/pfbid0gKm3iAvgJdkwkUEnk4hKzEE6g3NaLnYNHbGKorWdp6Jy6MhMNnASeV8emcT6UgCsl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZWS0N9HpqzCoUFIzhOyExmawCsUCYuCQjtCueHcvTHTjKexIInejPTTD1uCaE2TGZWLGwM6HKTpwSxYlo414XSdf0VzOjXgMxNrN4IYc1TBOtQjfmmNaY_NQ3cQHq4hnJ3L6IcOh4ds9vuvsQf1Ks47sQdIyU2v8dWDKDwJDHi5EA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; 26 September News, “Lahij.. The Leadership of the Tur al Baha Axis Discusses a Plan to Complete the Liberation of the Fronts Adjacent to the District,” February 11, 2021, *https://www.26sepnews.net/2021/02/11/%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AC-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3/; and Alameen Press, “The Brotherhood Appoints a Leader for the ‘Tur al Baha' Lahij Axis,” 2020, *https://www.alameenpress.info/news/25232.
[155] Mihwar Tur al Baha-Lahij, “The Tur Al-Baha axis confirms the continuation of the military operation and the continuation of the efforts of the Welfare and Works Divisions,” Facebook, May 31, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/mihwar.twralbaht.lahj/posts/pfbid037d77bzeQSgfR6pv5Z5a7bPAu2oDeLGa9rJuDhCFdSS6cu8Ey8rpsqTgUNLDt4jvel.
[156] Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “Revealing the Last Moments of the Martyrdom of ‘Amin al Waeli’, Commander of the Sixth Military Region,” March 27, 2021, *https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/print~198927.
[157] Lahij Press, “The 9th Infantry Brigade in Tur al Baha Pushes a New Combat Force to the Ma’rib and al Jawf Fronts.”
[158] Lahij Press, “Al Sabiha Bids Farewell to the Martyr of Duty, ‘Hassan al Marq,’” 2021, *https://lahjpress.com/news/19639.
[159] Lahij Press, “Al Sabiha Bids Farewell to the Martyr of Duty, ‘Hassan al Marq.’”
[160] This unit may be a ghost brigade. The commander resigned because he had no troops. See Lahij Press, “Al Sabiha Bids Farewell to the Martyr of Duty, ‘Hassan al Marq’”; and Hayrout, “Al Somali Sells the General and Submits his Resignation, ‘Exclusive’ Details,” March 18, 2021, *https://hayrout.com/47385/.
[161] Lahij Press, “Al Sabiha Bids Farewell to the Martyr of Duty, ‘Hassan al Marq.’”; and Hayrout, “Al Somali Sells the General and Submits His Resignation, ‘Exclusive’ Details,” March 18, 2021, *https://hayrout.com/47385.
[162] Sahifa Newspaper, “Commander of the Tur al Baha axis: We will not return to our homes without victory or martyrdom. The commander of the Tur al Baha military axis, the commander,” Facebook, March 27, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/sahafnews/posts/pfbid02HQEzwS7pLJfnu7BheK2gfbqbMWDL4vSQtTgbNJf7hhpdzue2rhgzdfPWH4PMsqbYl?__tn__=%2CO*F.
[163] Sahifa Newspaper, “Commander of the Tur al Baha axis: We will not return to our homes without victory or martyrdom. The commander of the Tur al Baha military axis, the commander”; and Nuom News, “Documents.. The Secrets of the al Baha Axis.”
[164] Al Janoob al Youm, “The Struggle for Influence Between the Transitional Government and the Islah Party Is Moving to the Stage of al Baha, and Mutual Preparations For a Decisive Battle,” October 20, 2020, *http://www.aljanoobalyoum.net/37257.
[165] This unit is not numbered in media reports. See Socotra Post, “The Coastal Defense Brigade Inaugurates the Training Year (2020 AD).. Brigadier General Zaki Hassan, We Are at Your Disposal to Perform the National Tasks Assigned to Us,” January 15, 2022, *https://socotrapost.com/localnews/1811.
[166] Socotra Post, “The Coastal Defense Brigade Inaugurates the Training Year (2020 AD).. Brigadier General Zaki Hassan, We Are at your Disposal to Perform the National Tasks Assigned to Us,” January 15, 2022, *https://socotrapost.com/localnews/1811.
[167] South Arabian News Aden, “The commander of the Yafea axis, the commander of the 4th Thunderbolt Brigade, Brigadier General Abdulaziz al Mansouri, confirms the readiness of the Yafaa axis,” Facebook, March 16, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2961119190616372&id=1168400226554953&paipv=0&eav=AfaJnu3tBjkC1Evryg1S-4jrpZ5BtbfE82NS-RdWfqbY11R8rYcENoIAl-WsBfWl9OQ&_rdr; and Southern Transitional Council, “The Transitional President of Lahij Inspects the Southern Forces in the al Hidd Yafaa Front and Attends a Tribal Reconciliation in Marfad,” March 1, 2022, *https://stcaden.com/news/11342.
[168] Dera al Ganoob, “The Staff of the Southern Land Forces and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior Inspects the Fronts of Yafaa Axis,” July 16, 2022, *https://deraalganoob.com/archives/10205; and Southern Transitional Council, “The Transitional President of Lahij Inspects the Southern Forces in the al Hidd Yafaa Front and Attends a Tribal Reconciliation in Marfad.”
[169] Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “The Houthi Militia Denies Responsibility for the Killing of ‘al Shuhati’ and Refuses to Employ the Transitional Council for the Incident Politically and Lists the Name of the Real Killer!”
[170] South Arabian News Aden, “The commander of the Yafa axis, the commander of the 4th Thunderbolt Brigade, Brigadier General Abdulaziz al Mansouri, confirms the readiness of the Yafa axis,” Facebook, March 16, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2961119190616372&id=1168400226554953&paipv=0&eav=AfaJnu3tBjkC1Evryg1S-4jrpZ5BtbfE82NS-RdWfqbY11R8rYcENoIAl-WsBfWl9OQ&_rdr; and Aden Time, “The Yafa Axis Inaugurates the 2020 Training Year with a Military Parade in Jabal al Ar,” December 26, 2019, *https://www.aden-tm.net/news/108883.
[171] Saad al Hakika, “The Head of Operations of the Transitional Council Reviews the Readiness of the 4th Thunderbolt Brigade in the Yafa Axis,” October 21, 2021, *https://sadaalhakika.com/news/25663.
[172] 4May, “The Chief of Operations of the Southern Forces Reviews the Readiness of the 4th Thunderbolt Brigade (Yafa Axis),” October 4, 2021, *https://www.4may.net/Mnews/67191.
[173] Southern Transitional Council, “The Transitional President of Lahij Inspects the Southern Forces in the al Hidd Yafaa Front and Attends a Tribal Reconciliation in Marfad.”
[174] Aden al Hadath, “The Commander of the Fourth Brigade, Support and Attribution, Explains the Truth About the Attempt on his Life,” May 31, 2021, *https://www.aden-alhadath.info/news/91776.
[175] Al Hizam Media, “The Brigadier General Congratulates al Shuhati on His Assignment as Commander of the 4th Brigade, Support and Reinforcement.”
[176] Abdullah Khalidi (@abdullahHShm), “Commander of the Fourth Brigade, Hadar Al-Shuhati, Support and Attribution Some time ago, he razed the soldiers of the brigade affiliated with Lahj and Aden.”
[177] Al Mashhad al Yemeni, “The Houthi Militia Denies Responsibility for the Killing of ‘al Shuhati’ and Refuses to Employ the Transitional Council for the Incident Politically and Lists the Name of the Real Killer!”
[178] Nabd, “The Commander of the 4th Military Region and the Leaders of the al Dhalea Axis Offer Condolonces to the Al-Shoubaji Family on the Martyrdom of Commander Muhammad al Shoubaji,” May 9, 2022, *https://nabd.com/s/103949366-733073/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A2%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%8A.
[179] Al Janoob al Youm, “The Commander of the First Brigade, Southern Resistance, Was Injured in Clashes Between the Southern Factions,” March 17, 2022, *http://www.aljanoobalyoum.net/54862.
[180] Al Janoob al Youm, “The Commander of the First Brigade, Southern Resistance, Was Injured in Clashes Between the Southern Factions.”
[181] Khlaasa, “The Second Brigade Is a Resistance That Raises the State of Alert and Readiness and Thwarts Houthi Infiltration Operations,” March 23, 2020, *https://www.khlaasa.net/485627.html.
[182] Nakhbat Hadramout, “The Leaders of the Southern Resistance Brigades Mourn the Leader Muhammad al Shobaji,” May 7, 2022, *https://www.nhadramout.com/07/05/2022/149756/.html.
[183] Al Ameen Press, “The Leadership of the 3rd Brigade Is a Resistance Inspecting the Front Lines of the Fighting Fronts, North of Al-Dhalea,” 2021, *https://www.alameenpress.info/news/29863.
[184] The 3rd Resistance Brigade—al Dhaleh, “Commander of the 3rd Brigade, Southern Resistance, Brigadier General Zakariya Qaboos, mourns the death of Colonel Muhammad al Shobaji, Commander of the 6th,” Facebook, May 6, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/3T.B.R.AD/posts/pfbid0EtPyanU7HGXLBQQNo7mxExuuXfDfNLXSgahAXfog8C5JPD7tGYujfpfV67ZXaDoBl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZW6jqF8n137yQTTxjkjTbwUTGW6YUXNq4Mq-Dza-KlkPFvGRzSmnVnwc4Z-eJW-CxkllzrjGqDO6spw3F26YJI-16zYIq8QurW6DU3cBWeAcJqf1iS1kyDIpcMvpdtHsgxrPj6ajZkaph0pZlNFGqZyNVHI2XPVQK-wZt-XHGb6UmyTKepco2--YlUQMRTBi34&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[185] Southern Resistance Brigades, “The funeral of the martyr of al Dhaleh Front, Lieutenant Abdel Razek Sweileh, to his hometown of al Habileen. Al Dhaleh. This afternoon, the body of the martyr,” Facebook, July 12, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/Mokawma2019/posts/pfbid0k7gPeny4ucymFfa2siAWvAPYdxTSCNuhQFb1n7vimFoRzTsMu1MWmVURjYJoVC1yl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVL7f1nKeFezpMBKlNLM750d0yexSMySof2jiNJmBoIdUJc0S8qwqwxeH4ah9OlMX9K3vY3W9_u6yygk8GzlvBnTiAjFEli7-phNQT2i0IwPuudPORBzMVt1nSpbN45FSm4kQgoNb6oFqfhPE59BzDxqe03bf8Gp9A5P7lQE_PBMA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[186] The Fourth Brigade Resistance—al Dhaleh, “Commander Awsan al Shaeri, Commander of the Fourth Brigade, mourns the martyrdom of Commander Jawas. The Almighty said: Think not of those who have been killed,” Facebook, March 24, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/Fourth.Brigade.resistance.aldhala/posts/pfbid028rhsorYh3mFJZ4jVn2ePbWQitj6GMxNmoPwB1ko2eZk3BiCGNsjLfmNAzEG2WtLQl?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVefXG17vl6FPWf05MN1kDqTlENHaDjBmYfrtfCT4PabLmlWI_sUqJQ2mGYxapghZqS0mUY2rFRjO_nMQSf0niwtIQ2_MR-890R8V-0883dsbZ9SgQj0Q09cRAtybci1-nIaCHRx0nZ3eoZHnmjcI6VC4PUajKtfVETAjbzTi-JFA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[187] Elite Hadramout News Network, “Commander of the Fifth Brigade Resistance: Aden deserves development, and we will stand with Governor Lamlas, and we are on the lookout for those who harbor,” Facebook, October 10, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/NokhbaHadramout/posts/pfbid0q9hBuy26fGDAq4oj46YoErpbeXnFSRtDpKKUZP8nyxdChq8Lcm6sC9nZsW5C69X3l?__cft__%5b0%5d=AZVrg08Lp2OPnsuNXCKyaofOcQoUdn2XasUilDV5U2fsO_upMW6JDe6mw34roLViro944jxm2NN0MvLlrpRdE4U5DJD-t57-txTlN3YajUGK83TTMxMvJ1zGcloI6FDZo2Uvv08yCfAOhCCrCkItbg-1&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.
[188] Huna Aden, “A Prominent Leader in the Security Belt in al Dhaleh Survived an Assassination Attempt.. Details,” June 21, 2022, *https://hunaaden.com/news72079.html.
[189] Al Omana, ”Commander of the 2nd Brigade Thunderbolt Brigadier General Muhammad Mushin (Abu Bakil) al Halimi Offers his Condolences on the Martyrdom of the Two Commanders, al Shobaji and al Dami,” May 9, 2022, *https://al-omana.net/m/news175793.html.
[190] Tahdeeth, “Brigadier General Muhammad al Shobaji Offers Condolences on the Death of the Commander of the 12th Brigade, Brigadier General Abu Ali Ammar al Dhaleh,” April 1, 2022, *https://www.tahdeeth.net/news/206015.
[191] Nader, “The Transitional Council Integrates Its Forces Within the Ministries of Interior and Defense.”
[192] Aden Time, ”Brigadier General al Wali Responds to Accusations Against the al Hizam Commander in al Dhaleh,” May 27, 2022, *https://www.aden-tm.net/mobdet.aspx?contid=208419.
[193] UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Committee Resolution 2140 (2014),” 81.
[194] Al-Dawsari, “Fantasies of State Power Cannot Solve Yemen’s War.”
[195] Aden Today,” A Leader Was Killed in the Abyan Belt.. Details,” January 2, 2022, *https://www.adentodey.net/archives/21834.
[196] Aden Time, “Brigadier General al Wali Responds to Accusations Against the al Hizam Commander in al Dhaleh”; and Al Wattan, “Al Hattas Announces His Rebellion Against the Interior Minister’s Decision to Dismiss Him and Appoint al Qubba as His Replacement.”
[197] Aden Time, “Brigadier General al Wali Responds to Accusations Against the al Hizam commander in al Dhaleh.”
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