Understanding Syria's Emerging Insurgency

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. This interactive map now includes our layer showing pro-regime insurgent presence.

The new Syrian interim government faces a nascent insurgency across the country. The most organized insurgents are Alawites in the coastal areas. These Alawites are likely supported by Hezbollah smuggling networks, given these networks’ overlapping activities around the Lebanon-Syria border.[i] A combination of sectarian fears and a desire to restore Alawite-led, Assad-era political and economic power structures motivates the Alawite insurgency.[ii] Other insurgent cells exist throughout the country as well and may strengthen in the coming months, particularly in the Euphrates River Valley in eastern Syria.[iii] Former Assad regime militiamen in Sunni Arab areas along the Euphrates River likely seek to restore Assad-era smuggling networks that they controlled in the area. The interim government has disrupted this smuggling activity, depriving those Sunni Arab militiamen of a critical revenue stream.[iv] Though the insurgency in the Alawite-majority coast and the nascent insurgent cells in the Sunni-majority Euphrates region are currently distinct and motivated differently, they could coalesce into a broader coalition in time, which would seriously threaten the Syrian interim government.

Assad loyalists (Assadists) are well-positioned to lead a broader insurgency across Syria. Assadists are currently the best-organized and most experienced Syrian fighters owing to their combat experience and regime connections throughout the country. They could use these pre-existing networks to co-opt newer organizations and suppress rivals. Not every Assadist will seek to restore Assad, however, and many could have different political objectives.

Alawite insurgent leaders designed the March 5-7 offensive in the coastal region to trigger sectarian violence against Alawites, which could in turn buoy support for the insurgency.  Local reports indicate that Alawite insurgents first entered mixed Alawite-Sunni neighborhoods in Jableh with the support of local Alawites.[v] The insurgents killed Sunnis in these neighborhoods and prevented local security forces and civilians from entering hospitals throughout Jableh.[vi] The decision to immediately enter mixed neighborhoods and kill Sunnis suggests that the insurgents sought to trigger violent government reprisals.  The insurgents did not intend to overthrow the government or seize territory in this particular offensive, as indicated by their tactics. An insurgent force that sought to seize terrain or overthrow the government would have prioritized seizing key government infrastructure and defending the approaches to the city over sectarian blood-letting.

Damascus likely faces a long, taxing counterinsurgency campaign that will constrain its bandwidth at a critical time. Alawite insurgents have significant local support—including within major cities in Latakia and Tartous provinces—and the government’s response has likely increased that support further.[vii] Alawite mountain villages are very likely insurgent control zones, which would require a long, well-executed counterinsurgency campaign to disrupt.[viii] Such a campaign would need to protect Alawite and Sunni civilians equally. The insurgents have gone back into hiding but have repeatedly attacked government forces since March 7, highlighting their enduring presence.[ix] The sectarian killing that occurred between March 5 and 7 will inflame the fighting and make it harder to defeat this insurgency. 

The map below shows CTP-ISW’s assessment of the pro-Assad insurgent presence in Syria as of March 8, 2025. CTP-ISW defines “presence” as any area where an insurgent force has attack or support zones. An attack zone is any area where an insurgent force can conduct offensive operations. A support zone is any area where an insurgent force can receive logistical and administrative support from the population. Insurgent presence in an area does not imply that the insurgents “control” that area or that insurgents maintain a persistent presence there. CTP-ISW has not marked areas as “presence” without evidence of insurgent activity, meaning that the insurgent presence is likely more widespread than this map shows.