Africa File

Sudanese Armed Forces Retake Central Khartoum in Ongoing Battle for Political Legitimacy

See the PDF executive summary of this development here. 

Key Development

 The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on March 26 fully retook central Khartoum and are clearing the last pockets of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) resistance from the greater Khartoum area, marking a major military and political victory for the SAF.

What's Next

SAF Clearing in Khartoum: The SAF has encircled the remaining RSF elements in southwestern Khartoum, where hundreds of RSF fighters are retreating into White Nile state across the Jebel Awliya Bridge—the RSF’s only exit out the city.

SAF Advances in Omdurman: The SAF has advanced in Omdurman--Khartoum's twin city on the west bank of the Nile River--over the past week, where the RSF has used its positions to shell and conduct drone strikes against the SAF in the greater capital area since the beginning of the civil war.

Implications

More Military Advances: The capture of Khartoum is a military victory that gives the SAF control of the eastern bank of the Nile River, which the SAF can use to prepare for future offensives against the RSF center of gravity in western Sudan.

Political Legitimacy: SAF control over Khartoum bolsters the SAF political claim to be the only legitimate ruler in Sudan. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan said on March 27 that Sudan is preparing for a civilian, technocratic government to take power.

External Involvement: Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt have sent weapons--including drones--that the SAF have been critical in fighting in Khartoum, while the UAE has provided weapons and drone support to the RSF.

Future Outlook

SAF Advances West: The SAF has advanced westward from positions in central Sudan and recaptured several key state capitals from the RSF since November 2024. 

RSF Doubles Down in Darfur: The RSF has intensified its efforts to defeat the SAF in western Sudan to consolidate control over the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition.

Read the full report in the latest Africa File here. 

In this update: Russia Continues Pivot to Libya and Mali; SAF Advances in Khartoum; M23 Marches On Goma; IS Somalia Down but Not Out; AES Joint Force

Key Takeaways:

Russia. Russia has continued to strengthen and expand its military presence in Libya and Mali as it withdraws assets from Syria. The Kremlin’s equipment buildup in Mali is likely unrelated to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and instead part of the Kremlin’s plans to continue to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps. The Kremlin’s decision to send armored vehicles to Mali, particularly T72 tanks, is significant in light of Russia’s significant vehicle losses in Ukraine.

Sudan. The SAF continued to advance in northern Khartoum to relieve besieged SAF troops and dislodge the Rapid Support Forces from the capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) broke the siege on the SAF Headquarters in Khartoum on January 24 for the first time since the war began in April 2023. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports its grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan.

DRC. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels are advancing towards Goma, a provincial capital in eastern DRC, and say that they intend to capture the town, which is a major escalation in the group’s publicly stated aims and would exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC. M23’s advances increase the risk of clashes between M23 and allied Rwandan forces and UN and SADC forces that are supporting the FARDC. Such engagements would increase the diplomatic and military costs for M23 and Rwanda to capture Goma. M23 advances into South Kivu province are also setting conditions to significantly expand the conflict in eastern DRC. M23’s advances will strengthen the group’s control over critical mineral resources and supply lines to Rwanda. The timing of the Rwandan-backed M23 offensive indicates an effort to maximize its position in currently paused negotiations after peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed in December 2024.

Somalia. Somali security forces in Puntland, northern Somalia, have degraded the ISS with a counterinsurgency offensive but have not set conditions to weaken or defeat ISS permanently in the long term. The Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) will be able to reconstitute itself if the Puntland offensive does not significantly degrade the group’s revenue streams and set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones. ISS has sought to defend its support zones and deter security forces from interfering in its support zones without engaging in decisive battles that would draw additional pressure from security forces. These tactics support ISS’s long-term strategic goal of acting as an administrative node for the IS global network.

Sahel. The Alliance of Sahel States created a joint force of 5,000 troops that will deploy in the coming weeks. Increased ground operations will be necessary to degrade the very large and strong insurgent support zones along the borders of the Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Read the full article here

• Niger. JNIM claimed an attack on a border post in northern Niger near the border with Algeria, marking the group’s first attack in far northern Niger. Nigerien Tuareg rebels also gave a competing claim for the attack but failed to provide evidence. The competing claims possibly indicate that the two groups are coordinating their operations, as Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has done with Tuareg rebels in Mali. JNIM and the Nigerien Tuareg rebels have similar short-term economic and military objectives that involve a common enemy in the Alliance of Sahel States that could encourage cooperation to augment their capacity and capabilities in northern Niger. Both groups have mutual ties with the Malian Tuareg rebels and shared ethnic bonds that could facilitate this link.

• DRC. The DRC and Rwanda agreed to move forward in Angolan-mediated peace negotiations, but a lasting agreement remains unlikely in the short term as the parties still disagree on key aspects of the proposed deal. The Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23) rebels also launched a new offensive on the Congolese army (FARDC) and its allied militia groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which risks derailing the Luanda Process by ending a ceasefire that has been in place since August. The M23 rebels likely launched the offensive on October 20 to increase pressure on the DRC and influence the Luanda Process negotiations.

• Djibouti. Djibouti and Egypt signed a contract to construct a solar power plant in Djibouti on October 14, representing growing electricity cooperation between Egypt and Djibouti since 2019. The contract is part of a changing balance in the Ethiopia-Djibouti partnership as both countries seek to reduce their reliance on each other. Egypt has also sought to increase ties with Djibouti over the past several years as part of its efforts to counter and isolate Ethiopia.

• AUSSOM. Somalia and Ethiopia are likely trying to win support for their separate visions on Ethiopia’s involvement in the new AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Somalia plans to exclude Ethiopia from the new mission and replace its contingent with Egyptian troops in retaliation for Ethiopia’s port deal with Somaliland, which Somalia has repeatedly called illegal. Regional and international partners disagree on Somalia’s plan to replace Ethiopia with Egypt as the November 15 deadline to submit the mission plans to the UN Security Council approaches.

• Somalia. The SFG and allied local clan militias have increased operations since October to clear contested areas that serve as a buffer zone and al Shabaab staging ground between key government-held district capitals and al Shabaab’s last remaining stronghold in central Somalia. Somali forces continue to face major political and military challenges to sustaining offensive operations and holding territory.

Read the full article here