Iran Updates

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provide these updates weekly on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

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Iran Update, September 25, 2024

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) leadership is signaling to its forces that it will conduct a major ground operation into Lebanon imminently. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces on September 25 that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon is “prepar[ing] the area for the possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[1] Halevi said that the IDF is preparing in particular for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.” Halevi made these remarks to the IDF 7th Armored Brigade during a training exercise on the Israel-Lebanon border.[2] The 7th Armored Brigade is one of several IDF units that have deployed to the northern border in recent weeks.[3] Major General Ori Gordin—the commander of the IDF Northern Command—similarly remarked that the Israeli forces must be “strongly prepared” for a ground offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while observing the 7th Armored Brigade simulate a ground operation in Lebanon on September 24.[4] Gordin said that the IDF campaign into Lebanon began with degrading Hezbollah rocket capabilities and command-and-control. The IDF has now entered a new phase of this campaign, according to Gordin.[5]  

Halevi and Gordin made these remarks directly to Israeli service members, as the IDF called up reservist units to deploy to the northern border.[6] The IDF announced on September 25 that it activated two reservist brigades—the 6th Infantry Brigade (36th Division) and 228th Infantry Brigade (146th Division)—so that the units would “allow the continuation of the fighting effort” against Hezbollah.[7] These two reservist brigades join several other IDF units, including the 98th Division, that have been called up or deployed from other areas of responsibility to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent days.[8] The commander of the 7th Brigade recently published a letter in which he said his unit is prepared to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[9]

Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance appear to be preparing for an Israeli ground operation into Lebanon. The IDF has observed around 40,000 Iranian-backed Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi militants concentrate around the Syrian border with the Golan Heights, according to Israeli media.[10] It is unclear why and when the Axis of Resistance deployed these militants or whether they were already in the area. It is also unclear whether Hezbollah is able or willing to integrate these foreign fighters into its already well-organized and trained force structure. Syrian opposition media separately reported on September 24 that IRGC officers and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders recently met in Deir ez Zor Province and discussed how to “ease pressure” on Hezbollah.[11] The meeting participants reportedly considered attacking international coalition targets in eastern Syria.[12] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is trying to balance its support for the Axis of Resistance while trying to avoid an all-out war against Israel.[13]

The IDF Air Force continued to strike Hezbollah targets across Lebanon on September 25. The IDF announced that it struck over 280 targets across Lebanon, including rocket launchers and military infrastructure, such as weapons depots.[14] Numerous sites struck by the IDF produced secondary explosions, indicating the presence of explosive munitions.[15] The IDF also stated that it struck 60 targets connected to the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus, including collection sites and headquarters.[16]

Some of the IDF airstrikes targeted weapons depot and other military infrastructure in Nabatieh, which is one of the largest population centers in southern Lebanon.[17] Geolocated footage and local reports indicate that IDF struck targets within relatively densely populated areas near Nabatieh city center.[18] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF airstrikes in the city are ”relatively unusual.”[19]

Iran Update, September 24, 2024

The intensifying operations between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah are part of the broader war that Israel has fought since October 7, 2023.  Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into Israel since the war began in order to compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and thus preserve Hamas.[i] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defined returning northern Israelis to their homes as an additional war aim, adding it to the objectives he set after October 7: returning Israeli hostages and destroying Hamas’ military and governance capabilities in the Gaza Strip.[ii] Nasrallah has similarly directly connected Hezbollah’s war effort to the Gaza Strip in this broader conflict by tying an end to Hezbollah attacks to a ceasefire deal in the Gaza Strip.[iii] Israel’s intensified air campaign in Lebanon is part of a broader Israeli strategy to defeat multiple Iranian-backed military campaigns executed by Iran and its Axis of Resistance as part of the October 7 War.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The intensifying operations between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah are part of the broader war that Israel has fought since October 7, 2023. Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into Israel since the war began in order to compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and thus preserve Hamas. Agreeing to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to stop Hezbollah fire into northern Israel would not satisfy Israel’s war objectives, nor would it discourage similar Hezbollah operations in the future.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign into Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah capabilities on September 23 and 24. The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck around 1,600 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley over the past day.
• Iranian Response to Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Iran declined a request by Lebanese Hezbollah in recent days to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, according to two unspecified Israeli officials and an unspecified Western diplomat speaking to Axios on September 24.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign against Israel by targeting several new Israeli civilian and military sites on September 23 and 24.

Iran Update, September 23, 2024

Israel set new war objectives for Lebanon on September 16. The accomplishment of these objectives would require the IDF to undertake a second major military campaign in Lebanon as part of the October 7 War. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on September 16 that returning Israeli citizens to their homes in northern Israel would be a new Israeli war aim as part of the October 7 War.[1] Netanyahu’s new war aims are a response to the 11-month-long Lebanese Hezbollah military campaign that has sought to accomplish Hezbollah’s own military and political objectives vis-a-vis Israel and in support of Hamas.[2]  

Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon is part of an Israeli effort to prevent Hezbollah from accomplishing its own war aim, which is to enable Hamas’ survival and ability to rebuild itself in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has repeatedly tied an end to rocket fire into northern Israel to an Israeli ceasefire in the Gaza strip on terms dictated by Hamas.[3] Hamas’ proposed ceasefire agreement, however, is tantamount to an Israeli defeat because it would enable Hamas to rebuild over time.[4] Agreeing to Hamas’ terms would also fail to ensure Israeli security over the long term because it would demonstrate to Nasrallah that Israel could be cowed and defeated by relatively inexpensive indirect fire targeting civilians in Israel. This would encourage Nasrallah to undertake similar campaigns again in the future.  

Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[5] Continuing to fire rockets into Israel increases the risk of war, given the stated Israeli aim to return its civilians to their homes in northern Israel. This Israeli aim is not possible unless Hezbollah rocket fire ceases.  Nasrallah is unlikely to abandon his Axis of Resistance partners in the end because to do so would severely diminish Hezbollah’s regional position as a leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah trainers, for example, routinely work with Iranian-backed militias in Syria to sustain ground lines of communication between Iran and Hezbollah. Losing influence with these groups could have detrimental impacts for Hezbollah’s long-term strength in the region and in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah will therefore probably continue its indirect fire into northern Israel despite the ongoing Israeli air campaign. This will increase the risk of a ground campaign, given that the Israeli war aims of returning Israeli residents to northern Israel will require the IDF to physically prevent Hezbollah from firing into Israel. Israel is conducting a major air campaign in Lebanon, primarily targeting rocket launch sites to degrade Hezbollah capabilities and destroy threats to Israel.[6] The IDF reported that it struck approximately 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon the morning of September 23.[7] Targeting the relatively mobile and extremely well-hidden Hezbollah rocket, missile, and drone array is a very difficult undertaking, even for an air force as tactically proficient as the IDF Air Force. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone do not have the ability to stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is very effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[8]

The IDF conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front Ali Karaki in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, according to sources in the IDF.[9] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Karaki became the most senior Hezbollah military commander after the IDF killed Ibrahim Aqil on September 20.[10] Karaki is the Southern Front commander, and controls Hezbollah’s Badr, Nasser, and Aziz Units.[11] Hezbollah rejected reports that Karaki was killed in the Israeli airstrike and claimed that he was moved to a safe location.[12] The IDF has not commented on the airstrike at the time of this writing.

The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck over 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and is preparing to strike targets in the Bekaa Valley.[13] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF was primarily targeting rocket launchers aimed towards Israel to preempt threats.[14] The IDF stated that Hezbollah stores its weapons in populated areas and civilian structures and warned civilians to avoid those areas.[15]

Lebanese Hezbollah expanded the depth of its attack campaign against Israeli civilians by targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.^[16] Hezbollah fired an unspecified number of long-range rockets that struck at least five Israeli settlements in the West Bank.^[17] These settlements are located approximately 100 kilometers south of the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF stated that the rockets fell in open areas.^[18] A Palestinian journalist reported that Hezbollah rockets injured two Palestinians in Deir Istiya, which is about 15km southwest of Nablus and in Salafit Governorate.^[19] Hezbollah may intend for these rocket attacks deep into the West Bank attempting to strain Israeli air defenses by forcing Israeli air defense systems to intercept rockets over the West Bank, where Israel very infrequently intercepts rocket fire. Most of the rocket fire that Israel has historically intercepted close to the West Bank has come from the Gaza Strip to the west, rather than from the north. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks into West Bank demonstrates its capabilities to strike new targets deeper into Israel, and poses an imminent threat to major Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv is also located approximately 100 kilometers south of Israel-Lebanon border. This is the first time that Lebanese Hezbollah has struck targets in the West Bank since launching its indirect fire campaign targeting northern Israel on October 8, 2023.^[20]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on September 23 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration is willing to resume nuclear negotiations.[21] Araghchi made this statement on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City. Araghchi and President Pezeshkian traveled to New York on September 20 and 22, respectively, to attend the UNGA.[22] Araghchi stated that Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations in New York City if “the other parties are ready.”[23] Araghchi added that he will remain in New York longer than Pezeshkian to meet with various unspecified foreign diplomats. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi accompanied Araghchi and Pezeshkian to New York.[24] Ravanchi and Zarif were both part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[25] Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2018 to 2021, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[26]

Araghchi also met with several foreign counterparts in New York on September 22 and 23. Araghchi met with the foreign affairs ministers of Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan.[27] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s support for Lebanese Hezbollah during his meeting with Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bouhabib.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel set new war objectives for Lebanon on September 16. The accomplishment of these objectives would require the IDF to undertake a second major military campaign in Lebanon as part of the October 7 War. Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon is part of an Israeli effort to prevent Hezbollah from accomplishing its own war aim, which is to enable Hamas’ survival and ability to rebuild itself in the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck over 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and is preparing to strike targets in the Bekaa Valley. The IDF conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front Ali Karaki in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, according to sources in the IDF.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah expanded the depth of its attack campaign against Israeli civilians by targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.
• Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on September 23 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration is willing to resume nuclear negotiations.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas has published and attributed several messages to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in recent weeks. Israeli intelligence officials assess that Sinwar did not write the messages himself.
• Iraq: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia member told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on September 23 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ “scope of [Israeli] targets” has expanded due to recent Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.

Iran Update, September 22, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a large-scale airstrike campaign across Lebanon on September 21 and 22.[i] The IDF announced on September 21 that it targeted over 400 rocket launchers, thousands of rocket barrels, and other military infrastructure in at least two waves of airstrikes across southern Lebanon.[ii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the strikes targeted short- and medium- range rocket launchers within firing range of Haifa and other northern Israeli towns.[iii] The IDF stated that it was responding to indications that Hezbollah was preparing to launch rockets into northern Israel.[iv] The IDF announced new security protocols for some of the northern communities around the same time in response to the indications of an imminent Hezbollah attack.[v]

The IDF announced on September 22 that it conducted another wave of airstrikes targeting dozens of Hezbollah rocket launchers and military infrastructure across Lebanon.[vi] The IDF framed the most recent wave of strikes as meant to degrade Hezbollah forces rather than to preempt an imminent Hezbollah attack, as was the case for the previous day’s airstrikes.[vii] The framing that the IDF offered for the most recent wave of strikes matches generally how the IDF has discussed most of its airstrikes into Lebanon since October 2023.

This activity marks the third consecutive day of heavy Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon.[viii] This activity also comes immediately after Israel detonated thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios on September 18 and 19, respectively. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that Israel will continue to target Hezbollah with ”blow after blow” until Israel achieves its stated war aim of allowing displaced citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel.[ix]

Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel on September 21 and 22. These attacks are consistent with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declaring recently that the group would continue its cross-border attacks in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[x] Hezbollah launched three barrages of medium-range rockets targeting IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel on September 21.[xi] The airbase is the northernmost one in Israel. Hezbollah stated that the attack was in response to “repeated Israeli attacks” on Lebanon.[xii] The IDF intercepted about 24 rockets.[xiii] This attack may have been the one that the IDF preempted earlier that day.

Hezbollah fired around another 85 short- and medium-range rockets targeting Rafael Advanced Defense Systems near Haifa on September 22.[xiv] The Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli defense company that develops weapons and military technology, including the Iron Dome air defense system, for the IDF.[xv] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted the company’s site in retaliation for Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios.[xvi] Several rockets impacted areas just outside Haifa and injured three people.[xvii]

It is notable that these latest Hezbollah attacks are slightly smaller in scale than previous retaliatory attacks the group has conducted. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24 in retaliation to Israel killing top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr.[xviii]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed five attacks into Israel on September 22. The claims included the following:

• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified location in northern Israel[xix]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Israel[xx]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel[xxi]
• An Arfad drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley[xxii]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley[xxiii]

The IDF intercepted two cruise missiles that were headed toward the southern Golan Heights from Iraq.[xxiv] The IDF intercepted the missiles before they entered Israeli airspace. The IDF also intercepted a drone that was heading toward southern Israel from Iraq.[xxv] The IDF intercepted the drone before it entered Israeli airspace, but air sirens still activated near Eilat. The IDF lastly intercepted a drone that flew over the southern Golan Heights from the east.[xxvi]

The commander of the IDF 7th Armored Brigade, Colonel Elad Zuri, published a letter on September 20 in which he said that the brigade is prepared to be the first unit to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[xxvii] Zuri said that the 7th Brigade is deployed on the northern border and prepared to fight in order to return displaced northern residents to their homes.[xxviii] The IDF separately deployed the 98th Division, including the 35th Paratroopers and 89th Commando brigades, to northern Israel on September 18.[xxix] The 7th Brigade most recently fought in the Gaza Strip on August 30 under the command of the 98th Division.[xxx] It is unclear whether the 7th Brigade deployed north as part of the 98th Division or whether it will be subordinate to the 36th Division in Israel’s Northern Command.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF conducted a large-scale air campaign into Lebanon. This activity marks three consecutive days of heavy Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel, which is consistent with Hezbollah’s stated intent to continue cross-border attacks.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed five attacks into Israel. The IDF intercepted several drones and cruise missiles headed toward Israel from Iraq.

Iran Update, September 21, 2024

Israel has issued new security protocols for some of its northern communities in anticipation of intensifying conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari announced the new measures for residents on September 21 in response to indications that Hezbollah is preparing to launch rocket attacks into Israel.[1] Hagari said that residents should limit gatherings outside to 30 individuals and inside to 300 individuals. Educational and workplace activities should occur near protected areas, such as shelters, according to Hagari. The new measures apply specifically to residents in Galilee and the Jordan Valley. IDF Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar separately reported that the Air Force is maintaining a high level of readiness.[2] Israel has closed its airspace north of Hadera, northern Israel, to civilian flights in order to avoid accidental engagement with Israeli air defenses.[3]

An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF exploited an “operational opportunity” in conducting its airstrike that killed 12 Hezbollah Radwan commanders in Beirut on September 20.[4] The correspondent said that the planning and execution of the airstrike occurred within a “few hours.”[5] The IDF received intelligence that the Radwan commanders were gathering in an underground operations center in southern Beirut and quickly developed plans to attack. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi was visiting forces in northern Israel when the IDF received this intelligence and presented the plan to political leaders for approval. This reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that the IDF appears to be exploiting disarray in Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group.[6] Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios disrupted the group’s internal communications and may have prompted the group to begin using less secure methods of communication that Israel could then intercept and exploit.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to threaten intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war. The militias likely seek to deter a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon by threatening to expand the war. These militias could follow through with these threats in the event of intensifying conflict. Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—announced on September 20 that it is prepared to send “hundreds or even thousands” of militants to Lebanon to support Hezbollah against Israel.[7]  Kataib Sarkhat al Quds also threatened to strike the Institute for Biological Research south of Tel Aviv.[8] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and has tried repeatedly to conduct drone and missile attacks into Israel since January 2024.[9]

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi Red Crescent Society sent two plans of aid to Beirut on September 21.[10] The delivery includes medical supplies. The PMF stated that the supplies will be delivered to Lebanese hospitals to treat individuals wounded by Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel has issued new security protocols for some of its northern communities in anticipation of intensifying conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. The new measures are in response to indications that Hezbollah was preparing to launch rockets into areas.
• Lebanon: The IDF reportedly exploited an “operational opportunity” in conducting its airstrike targeting the Hezbollah Radwan commanders in southern Beirut. CTP-ISW has previously observed that Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage on the group.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to threaten to intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war. The militias likely seek to deter a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon but could still follow through on their threats in the event of intensifying conflict.

Iran Update, September 20, 2024

Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut on September 20, killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces unit.[1] The targeted individuals included Ibrahim Aqil, who was the overall Radwan commander. He was also a member of the Hezbollah Jihad Council, which oversees the group’s military operations. That Israel detected and was able to target such a sensitive meeting suggests that Hezbollah is suffering from lapses in operational security—possibly caused by Israel detonating the pagers and personal radios used by Hezbollah members.[2] These detonations compromised Hezbollah’s primary and secondary means of communication. CTP-ISW previously observed that Hezbollah could revert to less secure methods of communication, such as phones and radio relays, in order to rapidly restore communications.[3] Doing so would leave Hezbollah vulnerable, given that Israel could intercept these signals.

Hezbollah remains a capable fighting force that will overcome the disruption to its command-and-control and communications systems. Hezbollah has organized its forces in a conventional military structure that is designed to withstand and resolve these kinds of disruptions. The detonation of pagers and personal radios and the killing of senior Radwan commanders will thus generate only temporary effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness. Hezbollah will recover given sufficient time to do so. Hezbollah also has Iranian-backed allied militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that have not suffered any disruption to their own command-and-control and communications systems.

In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF is now more battle-tested and experienced from its time fighting Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has had time to practice complex maneuver operations against a deeply entrenched enemy force. The IDF 98th Division, for instance, has fought extensively in the Gaza Strip and is now deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border.[4] On the other hand, Hezbollah has a significantly more competent force than it did in 2006.[5] Hezbollah forces are more experienced given their participation in protracted campaigns fighting for Bashar al Assad in Syria. The Axis of Resistance is furthermore positioned to attack Israel from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in a way that they were not in 2006.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. Kataib Hezbollah pledged on September 17 to send fighters and materiel to support Hezbollah against Israel.[6] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—separately announced on September 19 that it will soon launch a “new phase” of operations against Israel.[7] Abu Ala al Walai—the secretary general of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada—lastly sent a message to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 20, in which he suggested that Iranian-backed Iraqi forces could deploy to Lebanon and fight alongside Hezbollah.[8] This public messaging is likely meant to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon, as CTP-ISW previously assessed, but could reflect the militias’ willingness to intervene as well.[9]  The IDF conducted an airstrike south of Damascus on September 20, killing a senior Kataib Hezbollah official, underscoring the military presence that the militia has near the Israel-Syria border.[10]

The United States does not expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months, according to the Wall Street Journal.[11] Anonymous US officials told the outlet that Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands. This behavior has led international negotiators to doubt that Hamas seriously wants a deal. Senior US officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have similarly questioned whether Hamas is sincerely looking to reach a deal.[12] The officials also cited disagreement between Israel and Hamas about hostage-prisoner swaps as an obstacle in negotiations. The officials added that Israel detonating pagers and personal radios owned by Lebanese Hezbollah members has further complicated diplomatic engagement with Hamas. An anonymous Arab official similarly said that there was “no chance” a ceasefire-hostage agreement after the Israel detonated the pagers and personal radios.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon Israel. The IDF conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF unit.
• Lebanon: In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF and Hezbollah have both gained used combat experience since then.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. These militias are active near in Syria near the Israeli border.
• Gaza Strip: The United States does not reportedly expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months. Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands.

Iran Update, September 19, 2024

Israeli sources reported on September 19 that Israeli officials are deciding whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will conduct an offensive into Lebanon.[1] Hezbollah will almost certainly not cease rocket fire into northern Israel, which will necessitate an Israeli operation if Israel hopes to achieve its stated objectives in northern Israel. The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war objective on September 16.[2] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 12 that a political settlement alone will not return displaced citizens to northern Israel and that Israel is "preparing for a broad campaign” to accomplish Israeli objectives.[3]Netanyahu chaired a security meeting with military and political leaders at the HaKirya in Tel Aviv on September 19 to discuss the IDF’s possible courses of action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Israeli Army Radio.[4] The meeting follows Israel's multi-stage attack that detonated explosives in Hezbollah communications devices that killed 32 Hezbollah fighters and injured over 3,000 on September 17 and 18.[5] Israel also conducted pre-emptive strikes targeting over 150 Hezbollah rocket launchers ready to fire at Israel on September 19.[6] Israel has deployed additional IDF units to the northern sector since September 18.[7] Israeli media reported that the IDF does not have “imminent” plans to undertake a new major operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however, and that the Israeli security cabinet instructed the IDF to wait to see Hezbollah’s chosen course of action.[8]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declared in a September 19 speech that Hezbollah would continue to conduct attacks targeting Israel. Nasrallah said that Hezbollah would not stop its cross-border attacks in support of Gaza and that Israel would face a “severe reckoning” in response to the explosive device attacks.[9] Nasrallah did not specify when Hezbollah would conduct this retaliatory attack, however. Nasrallah has frequently delivered direct threats against Israel but seldom follows through upon these threats. There have been a few occasions on which Hezbollah has carried out Nasrallah’s threats by conducting attacks that Nasrallah deemed to be appropriate, however.[10] Nasrallah did retaliate as promised after Israel killed top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, for example. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24, a month after Israel killed Shukr.[11] Nasrallah is currently facing competing priorities that highlight Hezbollah’s constraints and impact his decision-making as he calculates Hezbollah’s response to Israel’s actions.

Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance. Continuing to fire rockets into Israel increases the risk of war, given the stated Israeli aim to return its civilians to their homes in northern Israel. This aim is not possible unless Hezbollah rocket fire ceases. This objective is in tension with other Hezbollah priorities, which include avoiding a major war with Israel to prevent jeopardizing Hezbollah’s preeminent political position in Lebanon. Nasrallah ex post facto recognized that his decision initiating the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War by kidnapping three Israeli soldiers was a strategic mistake, likely due in part to the negative impact the war had on Hezbollah’s political position in Lebanon.[12] Nasrallah is unlikely to abandon his Axis of Resistance partners in the end, however, because to do so would severely diminish Hezbollah’s regional position as a leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah trainers, for example, routinely work with Iranian-backed militias in Syria to sustain ground lines of communication between Iran and Hezbollah. Losing influence with these groups could have detrimental impacts for Hezbollah’s long-term strength in the region and in Lebanon. It could also undermine Hezbollah's unity, as Nasrallah's relative caution is likely not reflective of the attitudes of all Hezbollah rank-and-file. Hezbollah’s rank-and-file is presumably more in favor of continuing operations against Israel, given the recent Israeli communications attacks and ongoing Israeli airstrikes targeting mid-level Hezbollah commanders.

Iranian officials stated that there will be a response to the Israeli operation that detonated pagers belonging to Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon on September 17. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami vowed a “crushing response” from the Axis of Resistance in a message to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 19.[13] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated his condemnation for the attack in Lebanon and stated on X (Twitter) that “God...takes revenge and [Israel] will definitely be punished justly” on September 19.[14] Salami separately visited Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani, who had been injured in the attack, after Amani had been transferred to a hospital in Tehran on September 19.[15] The Iranian Ambassador to the UN Saeed Iravani said in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres on September 18 that Iran will follow up the attack and Iran has the right to respond to Israel’s attack in Lebanon.[16]

Unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials. The Israeli Shin Bet assessed that the plot was likely part of an effort to retaliate against Israel for the operation that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. It is not clear which specific Iranian officials had knowledge of or approved this plan. It is also unclear whether multiple government agencies were aware of the plan. The Shin Bet and Israel Police announced that Iran allegedly recruited an Israeli civilian in a failed plot to assassinate a senior Israeli political or defense official including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[17] The Shin Bet assessed that Iranian officials viewed the assassination plans as "revenge” for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[18] The Israeli civilian traveled to Iran and Turkey several times and met with an Iranian businessman there who presented himself as a member of the Iranian intelligence apparatus.[19] The Israeli civilian met with the ”businessman” and his associates abroad on numerous occasions beginning in April 2024.[20] The fact that Iran cultivated this asset in April 2024 suggests that Iranian intelligence did not initially recruit this asset for an assassination operation directly related to the Haniyeh killing, given that Israel killed Haniyeh in July 2024.  The Shin Bet did not provide indications as to whether the Israeli civilian made significant progress in carrying out any these assassination plots.[21] Israel Police arrested the civilian in August 2024.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli sources reported on September 19 that Israeli officials are deciding whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will conduct an offensive into Lebanon. Hezbollah will almost certainly not cease rocket fire into northern Israel, which will necessitate an Israeli operation if Israel hopes to achieve its stated objectives in northern Israel. Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance.
• Iran and Israel: Unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials. The Israeli Shin Bet assessed that the plot was likely part of an effort to retaliate against Israel for the operation that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Senior Hamas official Hossam Badran said on September 19 that the group is not optimistic that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Cairo will produce a ceasefire agreement.
• Iraq: An Iraqi politician said that the IRGC Quds Force Commander met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad and ordered the militias to “calm the political and military situation in Iraq” due to current regional developments, which is consistent with prior CTP-ISW assessments.

Iran Update, September 17, 2024

Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers used by Lebanese Hezbollah members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17.[1] Lebanese officials reported that around 2,800 individuals were injured, though some reports suggest that the number is closer to 4,000, most of whom are Hezbollah members.[2] The attack also injured the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani.[3] Hezbollah mourned the death of 12 fighters after the attack but did not explicitly acknowledge how they died.[4] Israel reportedly executed the attack by planting one-to-two ounces of explosive material and remote triggers inside a batch of Taiwanese-made pagers en route to Lebanon.[5] Hezbollah had ordered the pagers to communicate across its ranks, as Hezbollah Secretary General ordered group members to limit cellphone usage in order to avoid Israeli detection.[6] Hezbollah responded to the attack by blaming Israel and vowing to retaliate.[7] 

The attack has likely had several negative effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness at least temporarily. The attack likely disrupted some internal communications across Hezbollah, especially given the extent to which Hezbollah has been relying on pagers in recent months. The nature and scale of the attack also likely stoked confusion and shock among some Hezbollah members. These effects could drive general paranoia within Hezbollah as well, given that Israel has demonstrated repeatedly in recent months how deeply it has infiltrated Iranian and Iranian-backed networks.

Israel announced on September 16 that it thwarted a Lebanese Hezbollah attempt to assassinate a former senior Israeli security official.[8] The Shin Bet located at an unspecified location an anti-personnel mine that a Hezbollah cell was planning to use for the assassination in the ”coming days.”[9] The mine was connected to a camera and a remote-controlled detonator. The Shin Bet reported that the mine was “nearly identical” to ones previously used by Hezbollah.[10]

The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war objective on September 16.[11] The Israeli security cabinet’s approving this addition marks the first time that northern Israel is officially included in Israel’s stated war objectives.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 12 that a political settlement alone will not return displaced citizens to northern Israel and that Israel is "preparing for a broad campaign” to this end.[13]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is in the process of defeating Hamas militarily in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has very likely degraded severely the two Hamas brigades in the southern Gaza Strip.[14] Hamas attacks decreased dramatically since August 2024, reflecting this degradation.[15] Israeli operations have destroyed the bulk of Hamas’ rocket supply as well, leading to a significant decline in Hamas rocket attacks.[16] Hamas is likely no longer operating as an effective and well-organized fighting force. Hamas is instead fighting in a disorganized manner through small, de-centralized cells of fighters across the Gaza Strip.[17]

Israel is meanwhile continuing to pursue its stated war aim of destroying Hamas as a military force and governing authority in the Gaza Strip.[18] Destroying Hamas militarily is a greater undertaking than defeating it and requires Israel—per US military doctrine—to physically render Hamas forces combat ineffective unless reconstituted.[19] Destroying Hamas as a governing authority requires Israel to replace Hamas with a new entity or force that can provide the civil services and security that the Hamas government has provided to Gazans.

Hamas is projecting public confidence that it will survive in the Gaza Strip as part of an information operation to erode Israeli will to sustain the war. Hamas cannot defeat Israel militarily in this war and is instead trying to compel Israel to accept defeat. Senior Hamas official Khaled Mashal said in an interview that Hamas will play a “dominant role” in the post-war Gaza Strip.[20] Hamas has also exploited Israeli hostages to increase Israeli domestic pressure on the government to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would allow Hamas to survive. Hamas has, for example, published propaganda videos of hostages to reinforce the perception that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[21] Mashal admitted in his interview that Hamas is in no rush to conclude ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel and will remain committed to its maximalist demands, which include a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[22]

Hamas has articulated its own post-war vision for the Gaza Strip to further cement its enduring influence there. Hamas has repeatedly advocated for a Palestinian unity government to take control of the strip after the war and even signed an agreement with Fatah in July 2024 to that end.[23] CTP-ISW previously argued that Hamas could use its functioning military and internal security wings to coerce technocratic government employees at every level, thus providing Hamas with significant influence over the Gazan government even if Hamas officials were not officially controlling it.[24] Remnants of Hamas’ military and internal security organizations could still coerce government officials in any future Gazan Authority, though those efforts may initially lack overarching guidance from higher echelons of command.[25] A lack of central control of such efforts would initially impede Hamas’ efforts to exert influence over a future Gazan governing authority, but Hamas would almost certainly rebuild the control necessary to overcome this deficiency. Israeli efforts that focus on disrupting remaining elements of Hamas’ civil rule, such as its role in the distribution of humanitarian aid, would make it more even more difficult for Hamas to do so.[26]

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17 following recent visits to Syria and North Korea and amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military support from allies. Shoigu met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[27] The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Ahmadian and Shoigu discussed upcoming bilateral agreements.[28] Pezeshkian told Shoigu that Iran will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions.[29] Shoigu previously met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria, on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional and international security issues.[30] Shoigu also recently visited Pyongyang on September 13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[31] Shoigu's international visits are coming over the backdrop of the recent Iranian delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[32] Russia’s deepening engagement with China, Iran, and North Korea is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states that could bolster Russia's defense industrial base and secure economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[33]

A Washington-based think tank reported that Iran has in recent months increased its operation at two nuclear sites that were previously used for high explosive testing.[34] The report noted that this increased activity—paired with the growing Iranian stockpile of highly enriched uranium—could shorten the Iranian breakout timeline for producing a nuclear weapon to about one week.[35] The Institute for Science and International Security, citing unspecified Western intelligence sources, reported specifically that Iran has ”reactivated and accelerated” activities at the Sanjarian and Golab Dareh nuclear sites in Tehran Province in recent months.[36] The institute also observed through satellite imagery an increase in human traffic, landscaping, and physical security at the Sanjarian site.[37] The Sanjarian and Golab Dareh sites were both involved in Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, according to documents retrieved by Israel in a clandestine operation in Iran in 2018.[38]

This report comes as Iran has taken several other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has increased its stockpile of weapons-grade uranium, installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges, and conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[39] Russia has separately begun giving Iran unspecified nuclear assistance in exchange for Iran sending ballistic missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel-Hezbollah conflict: Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers used by Lebanese Hezbollah across Lebanon and Syria. The attack has likely had several negative effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness at least temporarily.
• Israel-Hezbollah conflict: The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war aim. Israeli leaders seek to push Hezbollah away from the Israel-Lebanon border to allow displaced citizens to return to northern Israel.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF is in the process of defeating Hamas militarily in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is projecting confidence outwardly that it will survive in the Gaza Strip as part of an information operation to erode Israeli will to sustain the war.
• Iran-Russia cooperation: Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran on an unannounced visit following recent visits to North Korea and Syria and amid ongoing Kremlin efforts to secure military support from allies.
• Iranian nuclear program: A Washington-based think tank reported that Iran has in recent months increased its operations at two nuclear sites that were previously used for high explosive testing. This activity could shorten the Iranian nuclear breakout timeline to a week.

Iran Update, September 16, 2024

Israel is refocusing its operations in the Gaza Strip to prioritize “destroying the pillars of Hamas’ civil rule. . . especially the distribution of humanitarian aid,” according to an anonymous Israeli official.[i] The official told Israeli media that controlling aid distribution enables Hamas to project the image that it still controls the Gazan population.[ii] Hamas inserts itself into the aid distribution process by forcing humanitarian organizations to coordinate with Hamas affiliates and seizing aid shipments as they enter the strip.[iii] Hamas has also aggressively opposed other Gazan factions from adopting a role in aid distribution given that it would jeopardize Hamas’ near monopoly of aid.[iv]

Israeli officials have recently considered alternative methods to distribute aid without Hamas, especially as the IDF faces less resistance from Hamas’ military across the Gaza Strip.[v] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 2 that Israel needs to find an alternative distribution mechanism in order to deprive Hamas of its ability to rule.[vi] Netanyahu has reportedly ordered the IDF to examine the administrative and logistics requirements involved in the IDF assuming responsibility for aid distribution from international organizations.[vii] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi has reportedly opposed the IDF assuming such responsibility due to the risk it would pose to Israeli service members and because international organizations are already prepared to do so.[viii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel is refocusing its operations in the Gaza Strip to prioritize “destroying the pillars of Hamas’ civil rule. . . especially the distribution of humanitarian aid.” An Israeli official said that controlling aid distribution allows Hamas to project the image that it still controls the Gazan population.
• Iranian nuclear program: Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Russia has increased nuclear cooperation with Iran in line with Iranian “ambitions to obtain atomic weapons,” according to Western media.
• Iranian economy: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed parts of his agenda to strengthen Iran’s economic relationships abroad during his first press conference. Pezeshkian advocated for Iran complying with international money laundering and financial transparency standards, which Iranian hardliners have historically opposed.

Iran Update, September 15, 2024

Israeli air defenses “partially intercepted” a Houthi ballistic missile that entered Israeli airspace on September 14.i This is the third time that a Houthi missile or drone has entered Israeli airspace from Yemen since October 7.ii The Houthis claimed that the attack targeted an unspecified military target in the Tel Aviv area with a “new hypersonic missile” on September 14.iii The IDF denied that the Houthis used a hypersonic missile.iv The IDF launched several interceptors at the missile but only partially struck it, causing the missile to disintegrate over central Israel.v The missile and interceptor fragments damaged and set fire to several areas but did not strike populated or military targets.vi The Houthis said the missile flew for 11 minutes and 30 seconds over 2,040 kilometers.vii  The Houthis did not say that the strike was in response to a specific event, but the attack coincided with the Prophet Mohammad's birthday.viii Hezbollah similarly chose a religious occasion—Arbaeen—to conduct its August 25 rocket and drone attack on northern and central Israel.ix The Houthi Defense Minister and Chief of Staff foreshadowed the attack on September 14, declaring to Israel that ”the coming days will bring you surprises that you will not expect” that would be ”more severe and harsher than what you have witnessed in the past.”xThe Houthis said in their attack claim that they would continue to target Israel as the anniversary of Hamas’ October 7 attack draws closer.xi 

Palestinian and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias praised the Houthi missile attack targeting Israel.xii Hamas claimed that the attack was a “natural response” to Israeli “aggression” against Palestinians, Arabs, and the Yemeni people.xiii Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai claimed that the attack “surprised” Israeli air defenses and is part of the “new phase of operations” against Israel.xiv Walai recently announced on September 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would soon begin their fourth phase of operations against Israel.xv Walai claimed that this phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and other Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. 

Iran, the Houthis, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance could learn lessons from the Houthi attack in order to increase the effectiveness of future attacks on Israel. The Houthi attack was likely in part a reconnaissance-in-force operation. The US Army defines reconnaissance-in-force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”xvi The Houthis could use their attack on Israel to better understand the capabilities and disposition of Israeli air defenses. Iran could similarly study the failure of Israeli air defense to intercept the missile prior to it entering Israeli airspace to better understand how to penetrate Israeli defenses in the future. 

Key Takeaways:  

• Yemen: Israeli air defenses “partially intercepted” a Houthi ballistic missile that entered Israeli airspace on September 14. Iran, the Houthis, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance could learn lessons from the Houthi attack in order to increase the effectiveness of future attacks on Israel. 

• Gaza Strip: Hamas conducted a relatively simple but multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Rafah City on September 15. Even severely weakened military organizations like Hamas’ Rafah Brigade can continue to conduct simple opportunistic attacks targeting Israeli forces. This attack, while somewhat tactically notable in that the Palestinian fighters conducted the attack in two deliberate stages, does not indicate that the Rafah Brigade is operating at a high level of combat effectiveness given that it appears to have been executed by one cell using one type of direct fire weapon system. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces thwarted an infiltration attempt by a group of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel on September 14. 

• Lebanon: An IDF brigade commander in northern Israel independently issued evacuation orders for areas of southern Lebanon without coordinating with Israeli political leadership or higher IDF headquarters on September 15.  

• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified target in Haifa, Israel, on September 15. 

Iran Update, September 14, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division killed over 100 Hamas fighters and located Hamas infrastructure in Tel al Sultan over the past week.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 13.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 15 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 13.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi drones and one Houthi “support vehicle” in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on September 13.

Iran Update, September 13, 2024

The US Embassy in Baghdad assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted the attack a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[i] CTP-ISW also assessed on September 11 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the September 10 attack. The US Embassy in Baghdad said on September 11 that an attack targeted the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound, a US diplomatic facility.[ii] An unspecified military official told AFP on September 11 that militants fired two Katyusha-type rockets in the attack. One rocket struck the wall of an Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service building and the other rocked landed inside an international coalition base, presumably a reference to the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound.[iii] CTP–ISW previously noted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants seem to have conducted the attack against the wishes of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iv] The US Embassy called on the Iraqi government to protect US and coalition personnel and facilities.[v] The US government has often emphasized to the Iraqi government, especially Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani, the importance of ensuring the safety of US forces following Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria.[vi]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sent a letter to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah vowing to continue Hamas’ fight against Israel, according to Hezbollah-affiliated media.[vii] Sinwar reportedly wrote the letter at an unspecified date after former Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh’s death on July 31.[viii] Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported that Sinwar wrote that Hamas will “remain steadfast” until Israel is defeated and an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital is established.[ix] Sinwar also thanked Nasrallah for Iranian-backed groups' efforts to support Hamas since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[x] Hezbollah began its cross-border attacks in northern Israel in October 2023 in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah also harbors Hamas elements in Lebanon and permits them to conduct attacks into Israel.[xi] The al Qassem Brigades recently an attack targeting an IDF site in northern Israel with rockets fired from Lebanon, for example.[xii]

The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—claimed on September 11 that its fighters continue to engage Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip.[xiii] Hamas has not claimed many individual attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, however. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on September 9 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip, suggesting that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military.[xiv] 

The IDF said on September 13 that it discovered a small tunnel during a multi-day operation in Tulkarm.[xv] The IDF said that the tunnel was near a hospital in the Tulkarm refugee camp.[xvi] The IDF added that the tunnel had only one entrance, which could indicate the tunnel was still under construction, according to an Israeli journalist.[xvii] Multiple entrances and exits to a tunnel network improve its resilience. Israeli media reported in March 2024 that the IDF has established a team to locate tunnels in the West Bank.[xviii] The IDF reportedly established the unit after residents near Tulkarm heard digging noises near their homes. An unspecified security official said that the unit is aware that “terrorist organizations [in the West Bank] are trying to mimic some of the combat methods in Gaza” and that these organizations use underground facilities for weapons storage. The IDF previously discovered one tunnel dozens of meters long in Jenin refugee camp in July 2023.

The Pentagon announced on September 12 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and is en route to the Indo-Pacific area of command.[xix] The USS Roosevelt arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility on July 12 to deter or defend against an Iranian retaliatory strike targeting Israel.[xx] The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group will remain in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian concluded his official three-day trip to Iraq on September 13.[xxi] Pezeshkian met with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders in Sulaymania, Iraqi Kurdistan, on September 12.[xxii]  Pezeshkian emphasized Iraqi Kurdistan’s importance to Iran during the meeting. Pezeshkian said that he hoped to increase economic relations between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. PUK President Bafel Talabani stated that Iraqi Kurdistan will ”fully and accurately implement what is mentioned in the security agreement.” This is likely in reference to the March 2023 security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran. This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[xxiii] Talabani reiterated his commitment to securing the border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxiv] This marked the first time an Iranian President travelled to Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxv]

Pezeshkian also visited religious sites in Karbala and Najaf on September 12.[xxvi] Pezeshkian emphasized the need for unity amongst Muslims in a meeting with Iraqi elites, academics, and nomads in Basra on September 13.[xxvii] Pezeshkian reiterated his support for concepts that would enable the free movement of people between Muslim countries in a fashion similar to the European Union.[xxviii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi accompanied Pezeshkian on the trip.[xxix] Pezeshkian returned to Tehran from Basra on September 13.[xxx]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai claimed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will soon begin their fourth phase of operations against Israel.[xxxi] Walai explained in an interview to Iranian state-owned media this phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and another Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. Walai outlined the previous three operational phases. Walai said that in the first phase, Iraqi groups attacked US bases before attacking Israel in the second phase. In the third phase, Iranian-backed Iraqi groups conducted joint operations with the Houthis.[xxxii] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, conducted over 170 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023-January 2024.[xxxiii] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted occasional attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since January 2024, but the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted Israel in most of its attacks after January 2024.[xxxiv]  CTP-ISW has also reported extensively on how the military relationship between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias has deepened in recent months.[xxxv] The Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq first claimed to conduct a joint drone attack targeting Israel on June 6. The last joint attack occurred on June 15.[xxxvi] A US self-defense strike on July 30 targeting a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility killed a Houthi drone expert who had traveled to Iraq to train other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in drone tactics, indicating the deepening relationship between Iraqi groups and the Houthis.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The US Embassy in Baghdad assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted the attack a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10. CTP-ISW also assessed on September 11 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the September 10 attack.
• Gaza Strip: The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—claimed on September 11 that its fighters continue to engage Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not claimed many individual attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, however.
• West Bank: The IDF said on September 13 that it discovered a small tunnel during a multi-day operation in Tulkarm. The IDF said that the tunnel was near a hospital in the Tulkarm refugee camp. The IDF added that the tunnel had only one entrance, which could indicate the tunnel was still under construction, according to an Israeli journalist. Multiple entrances and exits to a tunnel network improve its resilience.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Pentagon announced on September 12 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and is en route to the Indo-Pacific area of command.
• Iran: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian concluded his official three-day trip to Iraq on September 13.

[i] https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1834487174286262565

[ii] https://www.barrons.com/news/us-embassy-says-baghdad-airport-blast-was-attack-on-diplomatic-compound-444dbded

[iii] https://www.barrons.com/news/us-embassy-says-baghdad-airport-blast-was-attack-on-diplomatic-compound-444dbded

[iv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-12-2024

[v] https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1834487174286262565

[vi] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-al-sudani-2/ ; https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-sudani-3/

[vii] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا ; www dot almanar.com.lb/12467193

[viii] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا  

[ix] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا

[x] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا

[xi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-9-2024

[xii] www dot alqassam.ps/arabic/تقارير-القسام/20035/اليوم-ال-341-القسام-يقصف-موقعا-شمال-فلسطين-المحتلة

[xiii] www dot alqassam.ps/arabic/تقارير-القسام/20035/اليوم-ال-341-القسام-يقصف-موقعا-شمال-فلسطين-المحتلة  

[xiv] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/gallant-hamas-as-military-formation-in-gaza-is-gone-now-only-guerrilla-warfare/

[xv] www dot idf.il/230293; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1834590659988140260

[xvi] www dot idf.il/230293

[xvii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1834590659988140260

[xviii] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hkpbcoira

[xix] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3904376/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

[xx] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/igphoto/2003502192/

[xxi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/23/3157701

[xxii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157587

[xxiii] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=299491; https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/deep-dive-iran-inks-security-accord-with-iraq-as-regional-diplomacy-revved-up

[xxiv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157587

[xxv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157587

[xxvi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157585

[xxvii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/690459

[xxviii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/690459 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-11-2024

[xxix] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1834603170472902689

[xxx] https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1834585552319824151

[xxxi] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/09/13/733175/%E2%80%98Several-resistance-fronts-ready-to-execute-operations-against-Israel%2C-allies%E2%80%99

[xxxii] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/09/13/733175/%E2%80%98Several-resistance-fronts-ready-to-execute-operations-against-Israel%2C-allies%E2%80%99

[xxxiii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024 ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-us-strikes-militias-e2d31a579001f62a12b55b4cbf16ab48

[xxxiv] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis

[xxxv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2024

[xxxvi] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1173 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1220

[xxxvii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

Iran Update, September 12, 2024

• Syria: Israeli special operations forces conducted a highly unusual raid into Syria to destroy a major Iranian-backed precision missile factory and recover intelligence from it. The raid is part of a concerted Israeli effort to disrupt Iranian-backed weapons supply networks in the Levant.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: A Hamas delegation met with Egyptian and Qatari mediators to discuss the number of Palestinian prisoners freed in a potential agreement. Egyptian and Qatari mediators pressed Hamas to lessen its demands.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162^nd Division commander announced that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade is “dismantled” and that the IDF has secured control of the urban Rafah area. Recent Hamas attacks in Rafah indicate that the brigade is severely degraded.
• Iraq: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued his official visit to Iraq. Pezeshkian met with Iranian-backed politicians and militia leaders in Baghdad. Pezeshkian has traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet with local officials there.
• Caucasus: Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project that would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. Neither Iran nor Russia likely seek to antagonize the other, especially as they pursue bilateral arms deals.

Iran Update, September 11, 2024

The IDF Southern Command’s fire control commander said that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.[1] Destruction is doctrinally defined as physically rendering an enemy force unable to fight until reconstituted.[2] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent interviewed the outgoing Southern Command fire control commander on September 11.[3] The commander said that all of Hamas brigades are “damaged to the point of disbandment” and that Hamas fighters almost exclusively conduct guerilla-style attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.[4] He said that within a year he expects that the IDF would have "complete freedom of action” in the Gaza Strip.[5] The commander also said he believes it is possible to degrade Hamas to an extent it can never recover from. The commander’s assessment aligns with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s assertion on September 9 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[6] The fire control commander and Gallant’s comments suggest that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military under structured command hierarchies.

Hamas information captured by the IDF and released by Israel supports the assertion that the IDF has severely degraded Hamas’ military capabilities. Gallant released a captured Hamas letter on September 11 authored by Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah in which Salamah told Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar informing him of the damage sustained by the Khan Younis Brigade.[7] Salamah wrote the letter at an unspecified point before his death in July 2024.[8] The IDF withdrew from Khan Younis in April 2024 and has conducted intermittent raids since then that have encountered scattered resistance.[9] Salamah told Sinwar that his brigade had lost 50% of its fighters and that another 25% of the remaining fighters were mentally or physically unfit to fight.[10] Salamah also said that the brigade had depleted or lost control over 60% of its small arms and at least 65-70% of its anti-tank weapons.[11] The degradation of Hamas‘ military structure and capabilities is not limited to Khan Younis—Israeli military sources said in late August 2024 that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade, for example.[12] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, indicating a lack of unit cohesion or adherence to a command structure.[13] CTP-ISW continues to observe Hamas attacking Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip although at a significantly diminished rate in recent months.[14] Hamas likely continues to operate in small, de-centralized cells of fighters throughout the Gaza Strip.

Degradation is a temporary military effect and must be sustained by further military action or policy options to, at minimum, disrupt or prevent reconstitution. Reconstitution requires space and time for a degraded force to disengage, rest its forces, and train new personnel. IDF operations, including airstrikes, deny Hamas this space and time. Interdiction of Hamas resupply efforts under the Philadelphi Corridor is equally important to preventing reconstitution, given that new personal weapons and anti-tank systems would presumably enter the Strip from under the Philadelphi Corridor.

Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants attacked a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[15] The militants appear to have conducted the attack without approval from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The US Embassy in Baghdad announced that an attack took place at the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound, which is a US diplomatic facility.[16] The attack notably took place hours before Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Baghdad.[17] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.[18] It is more likely, however, that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—rather than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conducted the attack. An unspecified military official told AFP that the fighters launched two Katyusha rockets targeting the facility.[19] The official stated that one of the rockets fell on the wall of an Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service compound while the other rocket landed inside an international coalition base. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have frequently used Katyusha rockets to target US forces in Iraq.[20] ISIS does not frequently directly target US forces in Iraq, opting instead to target Iraqi Security Forces, which are a comparably “softer“ target. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah claimed on September 11 that “suspicious hands” conducted the attack with the aim of “disrupting” Pezeshkian’s visit to Baghdad, indicating that Kataib Hezbollah--and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq more broadly--did not order or sanction the attack.[21] Unspecified fighters previously conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces stationed at Baghdad International Airport in October 2023.[22]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Baghdad on September 11, marking his first visit abroad since becoming president in July 2024.[23] Iranian and Iraqi officials signed 14 cooperation agreements covering a variety of topics, including free trade zones, media, commerce, and transportation.[24] Iran, Iraq, and Syria have increasingly discussed establishing a free trade zone since former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Syria in May 2023.[25] CTP-ISW previously assessed that a free trade zone through Iran, Iraq, and Syria would allow Iran to move materials across borders with less oversight.[26]

Pezeshkian met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan on September 11.[27] Pezeshkian called for implementing existing security agreements between Iran and Iraq during a joint press conference with Sudani, likely in reference to the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad.[28] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[29] Iranian media recently reported on September 8 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan evacuated its headquarters in Iraq near the Iranian border as part of this agreement.[30] Sudani emphasized that Iraq will not allow “any group to commit transnational aggression against Iran.”[31] Pezeshkian separately called for “removing the borders of Islamic countries...similar to the experience of the European Union” during a meeting with Rashid.[32] This statement may reflect Iran’s desire to facilitate greater economic cooperation and integration with its regional partners, particularly Iraq and Syria.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNCS) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for a BRICS security commission and “Joint economic mechanisms” to address a number of security issues during a BRICS security meeting on September 11.[33] The meeting, hosted in St. Petersburg, Russia, gathered high-ranking security officials from BRICS countries. Ahmadian proposed forming a “BRICS Security Commission” and “joint economic mechanisms,” to address issues related to terrorism, border security, maritime security, and cyber security.[34] Ahmadian emphasized that BRICS members have the potential to be “the founders of a new [global] security system.”[35] Ahmadian expressed his support for a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine and referenced peace initiatives proposed by China and Brazil.[36] High-ranking security officials from Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia attended the summit.[37] Ahmadian will hold further meetings with some of his counterparts on the summit's sidelines on September 11 and 12.[38]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will almost certainly reject a deal for his safety in exchange for Hamas surrender. Israeli hostage coordinator Gal Hirsch told Bloomberg News that he extended an offer to Hamas on September 8 that would give Sinwar free passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the return of the hostages, demilitarization, de-radicalization and a new political system in the Gaza Strip.[39] These stipulations would achieve all Israeli war aims in the Gaza Strip, thus resulting in a Hamas surrender. There have been no indications that Sinwar would moderate his stance to protect his own life or benefit himself, either in this war or during previous negotiations with Israel. Sinwar has maintained his hardline stance in negotiations and has repeatedly resisted pressure to moderate Hamas’ ceasefire position from both his former superiors and his military subordinates in the Gaza Strip during this war.[40] Sinwar has previously rejected conciliation or cooperation with Israel, and he is willing to absorb significant personal sacrifice to advance his objectives.[41] Sinwar opposed the 2011 prisoner deal in which Israel released Sinwar and other top Hamas leaders in exchange for Hamas-held IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, for example.[42] Sinwar was reportedly insistent on freeing Hamas fighters serving multiple life sentences and was willing to remain in prison and “pay a heavy price for principle,” according to a former Israeli prison official.[43] Sinwar also appears to be deeply committed to his belief that he and Hamas can destroy the Israeli state, suggesting he would not trade his personal safety for the collapse of the movement.

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas’ Military Effectiveness: An IDF officer said that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. Hamas information captured by the IDF and released by Israel supports the assertion that the IDF has severely degraded Hamas’ military capabilities. Degradation is a temporary military effect and must be sustained by further military action or policy options to, at minimum, disrupt or prevent reconstitution.
• Iraq: Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants attacked a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. It is more likely, however, that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—rather than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conducted the attack. An unspecified military official told AFP that the fighters launched two Katyusha rockets targeting the facility.
• Iran and BRICS: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNCS) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for a BRICS security commission and “Joint economic mechanisms” to address a number of security issues during a BRICS security meeting on September 11.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will almost certainly reject a deal for his safety in exchange for Hamas surrender. There have been no indications that Sinwar would moderate his stance to protect his own life or benefit himself, either in this war or during previous negotiations with Israel. Sinwar has maintained his hardline stance in negotiations throughout the war and he previously opposed the prisoner-hostage exchange deal in 2011 that freed him. Sinwar opposed the 2011 deal on the grounds that other Hamas fighters serving multiple life sentences were not freed alongside him.

Iran Update, September 10, 2024

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[i] Blinken confirmed that Russia has received an unspecified number of SRBM shipments and warned that Russian forces will likely use them on the battlefield "within weeks." Iranian officials continue to deny that Tehran has sent weapons to Moscow. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy affirmed on September 10 that the United States and United Kingdom are "completely aligned" on the need to tackle Iranian influence both in Ukraine and the Middle East.[ii] France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly condemned Iran's SRBM deliveries and emphasized that they are taking steps to cancel bilateral air services with Iran (including by sanctioning Iranian national airline Iran Air), designate individuals and organizations involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and in the transfer of SRBMs to Russia, and sanction Russian cargo ships.[iii] UK outlet the Times, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported that Iran had delivered over 200 Fateh-360 SRBMs to Russia via a Caspian Sea port on September 4. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia will use Iranian-supplied SRBMs to target Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the coming months, thus alleviating the strain on Russia's domestic missile production capacity.[iv]

The United States and several European countries imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia on September 10 following Iran’s shipment of ballistic missiles to Russia. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned ten individuals and six entities based in Iran and Russia for enabling Iran’s delivery of weapons components and systems to Russia and thus supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.[v] OFAC sanctioned the following Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry officials:

• Rouhollah Katebi. Katebi is the Russian point of contact for the Iranian defense ministry. Katebi participated in Russian preparations to receive the Iranian Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles.
• Ebrahim Bahrami. Bahrami has been a point of contact in Iran for the Russian government and the training of Russian military personnel in Iran. Bahrami is an employee of Shahid Kharrazi Industries, which the United States previously sanctioned in January 2018.
• Ali Jafar Abadi. Jafar Abadi is the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force’s Salam Farsi Space Command and has overseen satellite launches in Iran. Russia has previously helped Iran launch satellites into orbit, including in August 2022 and February 2024.[vi]

OFAC also sanctioned the following entities:

• Iran Air. Iran Air has shipped electronics and aircraft parts to Russia. OFAC previously sanctioned Iran Air in November 2018 and identified 67 of its aircraft as blocked property.[vii] The US State Department separately designated Iran Air on September 10 for ”materially contributing to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.”[viii]
• Iran-based Azadegan Transportation Company. The Azadegan Transportation Company is an IRGC-affiliated company that is “critical to the logistics operations of the IRGC.”
• Iran-based Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau. The Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau has provided Russian weapons makers with samples of its engines in support of Russian cruise missile development. Farzanegan manufactures numerous types of engines, including turbojet engines, and previously claimed that it produced Iran’s first ramjet engine, according to the US Treasury Department.

The United Kingdom’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), France’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Germany’s Federal Foreign Office announced, as the E3, that they will cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran and sanctioned three individuals and four entities.[ix] Cancelling bilateral air services will restrict Iran Air’s ability to fly to the United Kingdom and Europe.[x]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly plans to appoint Kazem Gharib Abadi as the lead Iranian nuclear negotiator with the West.[xi] This appointment would further signal the willingness of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations given Gharib Abadi’s experience. Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2018-21, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[xii] Gharib Abadi claimed that the United States and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have failed to uphold their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[xiii] Abadi currently serves as deputy judiciary chief for international affairs and secretary of the Iranian Supreme Human Rights Council.[xiv]

The appointment of Gharib Abadi as lead nuclear negotiator would come as Araghchi has selected other experienced diplomats for key positions. Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for policy on September 9.[xv] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani.[xvi] Araghchi also appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as his personal adviser.[xvii] Bagheri Kani was appointed as lead nuclear negotiator in 2021 under former President Ebrahim Raisi.[xviii] Bagheri Kani reiterated Tehran’s willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West in July 2024.[xix]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone targeting three senior Hamas commanders on September 9.[xx] The IDF stated that it targeted Hamas commanders in a command-and-control compound within the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in Khan Younis.[xxi] The IDF killed the head of Hamas’ aerial system in the Gaza Strip, Samer Ismail Hader Abu Daqa, the head of targeting and surveillance in Hamas’ military intelligence, Osama Tabash, and senior Hamas fighter Ayman Mabhouh.[xxii] The IDF stated that the three commanders were directly involved in the October 7 attack and continued to conduct attacks against Israeli forces and Israel itself.[xxiii] The IDF stated that it collected ”extensive” intelligence and conducted aerial observation in the hours prior to the attack to verify the commanders’ presence in the area.[xxiv] A security source told Israeli Army Radio that there is a ”high level” of intelligence indicating that the three Hamas commanders were present at the site of the attack.[xxv] IDF clearing operations in recent months have forced senior Hamas officials to leave underground tunnels and hide among civilians in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[xxvi]

Palestinian sources, including the Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry, reported that the IDF killed at least 19 and wounded over 60 people in the strike.[xxvii] The Hamas-run Government Media Office claimed that the strike killed 40 Palestinians.[xxviii] US White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby called the reports of high civilian casualties in the strike “deeply concerning” and added that the United States would not be "bashful" about pressing Israel for more information about the attack.[xxix] The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres condemned the airstrike.[xxx] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce civilian harm from the strike, including through the use of specific munitions and aerial surveillance.[xxxi] The IDF added that the Hamas-run Government Media Office’s figures on Palestinian casualties are inconsistent with the IDF’s information.[xxxii] The IDF stated that Hamas continues to concentrate its operatives and infrastructure in the humanitarian zone, despite IDF measures to keep Gazans out of combat zones.[xxxiii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[xxxiv] Gallant told reporters on September 9 that Hamas’ “military formation no longer exists.”[xxxv] Gallant’s comments suggest that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military. Prior to October 2023, Hamas structured its al Qassem Brigades to survive Israeli military action by building a resilient military organization with doctrinally correct unit echelons and command hierarchies.[xxxvi] This organization was meant to facilitate recovery in the face of the loss of militia leaders or the destruction of elements of units. The al Qassem Brigades organized themselves into echelons from the squad all the way to the brigade level just as conventional militaries do.[xxxvii] IDF operations in the Gaza Strip have significantly reduced Hamas’ ability to operate under these structured command hierarchies, however. Israeli military sources said in late August 2024 that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade, for example.[xxxviii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, indicating a lack of moral cohesion or adherence to a command structure.[xxxix] Furthermore, the lack of clear tactical or operational objectives in recent Hamas attacks in Rafah are inconsistent with those of an effective military unit. Israeli tactics responding to Hamas rocket fire have resulted in a significant decrease in rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel as well.[xl]

Hamas continues to operate in the Gaza Strip from the remnants of its former structure. Gallant said that the IDF continues to engage Hamas fighters and pursue Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip.[xli] CTP-ISW continues to observe Hamas attacking Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip although at a significantly diminished rate in recent months.[xlii] Hamas likely continues to operate in small, de-centralized cells of fighters throughout the Gaza Strip.

Gallant said that the IDF is “wrapping up [its] missions in the south” and will shift its focus from the Gaza Strip toward the Israel-Lebanon border.[xliii] Gallant visited Israel’s northern border on September 10 and spoke to Israeli forces simulating a military exercise in northern Israel.[xliv] Gallant told Israeli forces that they must be ready to execute the IDF’s mission along the northern front “when the time comes.”[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia cooperation: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that Iran sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. The United States and European countries imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia in response.
• Iranian Nuclear negotiations: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Kazem Gharib Abadi, further signaling the willingness of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is instead operating from the remnants of its conventional military structure.

Iran Update, September 9, 2024

Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[1] An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4.[2] Iran has previously transferred weapons from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.[3] Iran and Russia previously signed an agreement in December 2023 for Iran to send Fateh-360 missiles and Ababil close-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[4] European intelligence sources told Reuters in August 2024 that Russian military personnel are training in Iran to operate Fateh-360 missiles.[5] Fateh-360 missiles have a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[6] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure in the coming months.[7]

The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Iranian charge d’affaires in Ukraine, Shahriar Amouzegar, on September 9 following recent reports that Iran delivered hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry harshly warned Amouzegar about the “devastating and irreparable consequences” for Ukrainian-Iranian relations if recent reports about Iran sending ballistic missiles to Russia prove true.[9] Ukraine previously “downgraded” its diplomatic ties with Iran in September 2022 after Iran began supplying Russia with drones for its invasion of Ukraine.[10]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.[11] IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi highlighted an ongoing increase in Iran's 20% and 60% enriched uranium reserves, citing the IAEA’s May 2024 report on Iran’s nuclear program.[12] His statements are consistent with an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report which reportedly noted that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium has increased by 22.6 kilograms (15.90 percent) since the IAEA's last report in May 2024.[13] Grossi added that Iran has taken no steps in the last 15 months to implement an agreement to cooperate with the IAEA and allow the IAEA to "implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities" on a voluntary basis.[14] Grossi said that "there has been no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues" with Iran and that the IAEA has limited awareness of the current locations of Iran's nuclear material and equipment.[15] Grossi stated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian agreed to a bilateral meeting to resume "dialogue and cooperation between the [IAEA] and Iran." Grossi previously indicated that the meeting would be in the “near future.”[16]

Iran continues to deny that its nuclear program is violating any agreements.[17] Iran’s representation in the United Nations Office in Vienna called the IAEA’s report on Iran’s undeclared nuclear materials "fake and invalid."  The note said the IAEA "did not provide Iran with credible documents" to back its claims and that Iran has no obligation to answer the IAEA's questions.[18]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.[19] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said that Israel is "shaken" by the "nightmare of Iran's decisive action" and that "Israelis will taste the bitter taste of revenge."[20]  Salami’s comments are notable because he is a senior operational commander in the IRGC chain of command, meaning he and his subordinates would be responsible for the planning and execution of an attack on Israel. Salami’s comments reiterated recent claims from the Iranian military establishment that emphasize that the Iranian delay is intentional for its psychological effect on the Israeli population.[21] Salami also noted that the attack would "definitely be different," which is consistent with statements from other Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force officers.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[23]

The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. The Jordanian truck driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[24] The Jordanian Foreign Affairs and Expatriates spokesperson said that initial investigations confirmed the attack “was an individual act.”[25] The attacker was a former Jordanian Armed Forces soldier and a member of a powerful tribe aligned with the Jordanian monarchy. Both of these links suggest that he was not linked to Hamas or Shia militia groups.[26] The attacker’s tribe also released a statement stating that he had no party or political affiliations.[27]

It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[28] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[29] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that supports the idea that the ”Islamic Resistance in Jordan” exists and operates in Jordan. CTP-ISW assessed in April that Moanes’ declaration was likely aspirational and did not accurately represent Kataib Hezbollah‘s reach in Jordan.[30] Other Axis of Resistance groups and anti-Israel factions in Jordan also attempted to capitalize on the Allenby Bridge border crossing attack. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad both called the attack a confirmation of the Arab world’s rejection of Israeli ”crimes” and ”massacres.”[31] A Jordanian civil society group that organized protests in spring 2024 held a demonstration attended by thousands of Jordanians in Amman celebrating the attack.[32] The civil society group also released a statement in response to the attack that called on the Jordanian monarchy to end normalization with Israel and withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.[33]

The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Unspecified US officials said Hamas’ execution of six hostages and demands to release 100 more Palestinian prisoners led to “significant pessimism” within the White House over the feasibility of Hamas and Israel agreeing to a new proposal.[34] US officials said that President Biden does not want to “reward” Hamas with concessions after it killed the hostages and pushed for more demands.[35] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media that the US is re-considering whether its negotiators will introduce another bridging proposal at all.[36] Four unspecified senior Israeli officials said that the US and Israel recently attempted to organize another round of negotiations in Cairo but Egypt did not allow talks to move forward after expressing displeasure with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Netanyahu said that Egypt enabled weapons smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor.[37] The Biden administration’s focus has reportedly shifted to encouraging the Egyptian and Qatari mediators to pressure Sinwar to concede some of Hamas’ demands.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah. The IDF likely conducted several airstrikes into Syria on September 8, including one targeting a Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) site in Masyaf, Hama Governorate, used to produce advanced weapons including precision guided munitions.[39] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent called the strike “exceptional“ and large, adding that the strike hit an underground weapons facility at the SSRC site. FIRMS data showed significant fires in southern Masyaf and in a valley southwest of Masyaf that holds an underground facility and tunnel network.[40] The airstrikes killed 16 people and injured 43 others.[41] Iran reportedly uses the SSRC site in Masyaf to develop weapons for the members of the Axis of Resistance, including the Lebanese Hezbollah.[42] The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the airstrikes but denied the presence of any Iran-operated military site in the area.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence. An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4. Iran has previously transferred weapons to Russia from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.
• Jordan: The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal.
• Syria: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Lebanon: A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.

Iran Update, September 8, 2024

A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.[1] The driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[2] Israeli forces at the border crossing killed the shooter.[3] The gunman killed three Israeli civilians working at the border crossing.[4] The Israel Airports Authority—the Israeli government entity responsible for airports and land-to-land border crossings—closed Allenby Bridge, the Rabin crossing, and Jordan River crossing with Jordan until further notice following the shooting attack.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Jordan on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[6] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said on April 1 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[7] Moanes said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to equip Jordanian fighters, so that Iraq and Jordan can jointly attack Israel to ”defend” the Palestinian cause. Jordanian Interior Minister Mazin Abdullah Hillal al Farrayeh said that the driver acted alone.[8] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify Kataib Hezbollah’s September 8 claim.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi claimed on September 7 that Iran will “certainly” conduct a “second True Promise Operation,” in reference to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[9] Naghdi claimed that Iran will retaliate “at the right time” to ensure that its retaliation generates “more effects.”[10] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran fired toward Israel in April 2024, and the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage on Israel than Tehran intended.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[12]

Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Richard Moore stated on September 7 that he still expects Iran to retaliate against Israel the killing of Haniyeh.[13] Moore stated that “we won’t be able to let our guard down for the type of activity that the Iranians might try and prosecute in that direction.”

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.
• Iranian Retaliation: Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck and killed Hamas’ eastern Khan Younis Battalion rocket commander on September 3. The IDF said on September 8 that the commander launched rockets at towns near the Gaza Strip and central Israel throughout the war.

Iran Update, September 7, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted three airstrikes targeting Hamas command and control centers in Gaza City and Deir al Balah since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on September 6. One airstrike in Deir al Balah killed PIJ’s eastern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Hatem Abu al Jedian and PIJ’s southern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Abdullah Khattab.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: CIA Director Bill Burns said on September 7 that whether Israel and Hamas accept a new ceasefire proposal will be determined by political will.
• Northern Israel: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 6.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed one Houthi drone and one Houthi “support vehicle” in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on September 6.

Iran Update, September 6, 2024

The rate of Palestinian militia rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks. Israeli media reported that this decrease is due to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) beginning to immediately evacuate Gazan residents in areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.[16] This approach often includes Israeli airstrikes targeting rocket launch sites.[17] The IDF has reportedly pursued this approach regardless of the volume of rockets fired or where the rockets landed.[18] CTP-ISW has observed rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory decrease significantly since June 2024, which is consistent with the reporting of this new Israeli approach. The decrease is also likely due to the Hamas stockpile of rockets dwindling.[19] Gazan residents have reportedly pressured Hamas to refrain from firing rockets from certain neighborhoods in response to this new Israeli approach.[20] Clashes have erupted between Hamas members and local residents in some cases, according to Israeli military officials. An IDF source said that, in one incident, a Gazan clan attacked Palestinian fighters with clubs as the fighters tried to fire a rocket.[21]

Hamas has begun exploring new ways to pressure the Israeli public as firing rockets has become harder. Hamas has relied on its rockets for years to impose such pressure. But the loss of its stockpile and new Israeli approach have made this option decreasingly viable. Hamas has thus begun calling for suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians in Israel.[22] Hamas claimed responsibility for an attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in August 2024, marking the first time that Hamas has made such a claim since 2008.[23]

Hamas continued to conduct an information operation to decrease Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas. Hamas released two propaganda videos on September 5 and 6 depicting two recently killed hostages calling for a ceasefire.[24] These videos are meant to drive the Israeli public to pressure the Israeli government to accept an immediate ceasefire-hostage deal with Hamas. Hamas has separately issued new demands in recent days by increasing the number of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel must release in a ceasefire-hostage deal, according to anonymous US officials.[25] The return of these Palestinian prisoners would support Hamas’ efforts to rebuild its military wing. The issuance of new demands has made the United States doubt whether Hamas sincerely wants a ceasefire-hostage deal.[26]

Israeli officials are reportedly pessimistic about the prospects of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with his national security team on September 5 to discuss how to respond to Hamas recently executing six hostages.[27] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli officials left the meeting feeling ”pessimistic” and added that ”the chances of a deal are slim.”[28]

Iranian officials have continued expressing their opposition to Azerbaijan’s efforts to connect its mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave by going through Armenia.[29] These comments are in response to Russia changing policy to support this connection, which is known as the Zangezur Corridor.[30] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei said that Russian support for the Zangezur Corridor is unacceptable and contradicts the Iran-Russia strategic partnership.”[31] Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani similarly told reporters on September 6 that “dreams about the Zangezur [Corridor] will not come true.”[32] IRGC-affiliated media separately published an article stating that Russia has “adopted a wrong position regarding that Zangezur Corridor that is incompatible with Iran’s interests and red lines.”[33] Tehran has long opposed the development of the corridor because it would sever Iranian land access to Europe and Russia via Armenia.[34]

Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration on September 4. Yahya Rahim Safavi, who is a senior military adviser to Khamenei, met Pezeshkian’s foreign minister, health minister, interior minister, and science minister.[35] Safavi stressed the importance of ”constructive interaction” between the Iranian armed forces and Pezeshkian administration. Ali Akbar Velayati, who is a senior foreign policy adviser to Khamenei, separately met with some senior policy officials in the Pezeshkian administration.[36] Iranian opposition outlets have described these meetings as ”unprecedented,” which is consistent with CTP-ISW's tracking. The meetings between Khamenei’s advisers and the Pezeshkian administration reflect the close coordination between them.[37] Pezeshkian has repeatedly emphasized his subordination to Khamenei and appears to be coordinating his agenda and policies with Khamenei’s inner circle directly.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia will likely use the missiles to attack Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure over the coming months.
• Gaza Strip: The rate of Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks partly due to the IDF beginning to immediately evacuate areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to conduct an information operation to erode Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal on terms favorable to Hamas.
• Caucasus: Iranian officials have continued expressing opposition to Azerbaijani efforts to link Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave going through Armenia. Tehran is responding to Russia changing its policy to support this connection.
• Iran: Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration. These meetings reflect the close coordination between Khamenei’s and Pezeshkian’s circles.

Iran Update, September 5, 2024

The Biden administration is reportedly reevaluating its approach to ceasefire-hostage negotiations after Hamas killed six hostages, according to an unspecified US officials cited by Axios on September 5.[i] US officials reported that the Biden administration is considering applying pressure and implementing unspecified accountability measures against Hamas instead of pushing Israel to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would give the group additional concessions. Hamas’ decision to increase the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released in a ceasefire-hostage deal has lowered the administration’s confidence that Hamas is willing to reach a deal. Officials are concerned that if the United States pressures Israel to withdraw its forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, as Hamas has demanded, that Hamas will reject a different part of the proposal.

Hamas is using its execution of the six hostages to conduct a series of information operations that are designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.[ii] Hamas released a fourth video September 4 depicting two of the six recently killed hostages.[iii] This video—like the others—featured scripted statements calling for a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[iv] The two hostages in the September 4 video, who were under duress, accused the Israeli government of failing to rescue the hostages from the Gaza Strip and failing to reach a ceasefire-hostage proposal that would bring hostages home alive.[v] Both hostages called on Israeli civilians to protest in favor of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Hamas is intentionally releasing these videos at this time to capitalize on Israeli outrage towards Netanyahu and to coerce the Israeli state into softening its demands. The softening of the current Israeli demands—which include a presence on the Philadelphi Corridor and the exile of many Palestinian prisoners released under any deal—would threaten to cause an Israeli defeat by enabling Hamas to rebuild itself. Hamas would very likely reconstruct smuggling tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor if it regained control over that area. Those tunnels would enable Hamas to rebuild its military wing with new weapons and supplies, including concrete to repair tunnels. Returning Palestinian prisoners—if they are allowed to return to the Palestinian territories—could serve as key commanders, replacing commanders Israel has killed in the ongoing war. Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations.[vi]

Israel, Hamas, and international mediators have not resolved opposing demands relating to the hostage-prisoner release and the presence of Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor. An anonymous White House official cited by the Washington Post reported that negotiations still have not determined who will be released in a hostage-prisoner release or when.[vii] Hostage-prisoner release negotiations have become more ”complicated” since Hamas killed six hostages, ”some” of whom were reportedly listed to be released in the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal.[viii]  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also stated that Israel will maintain at least a reduced presence along the Philadelphi Corridor, which is a demand that is in direct opposition to Hamas’ demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip.[ix] Netanyahu has argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005 enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[x] Netanyahu said that he would only consider a full withdrawal in the second stage of ceasefire-hostage negotiations if another entity demonstrated that it could interdict Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[xi]

Unspecified US and regional officials cited by The New York Times claimed that international mediators are “finalizing” a new ceasefire-hostage proposal to “narrow” remaining gaps between Israel and Hamas.[xii] Two Israeli officials and a senior official from an unspecified mediating country reported that the United States, Qatar, and Egypt are reviewing a series of Egyptian- and Qatari-drafted proposals.[xiii] Netanyahu stated during a TV segment on September 5 that ”there is not a deal in the making.”[xiv]

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Inspection Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi claimed that Iran must inflict “the largest blow” on Israel for Haniyeh’s death in an interview with Iranian armed forces-run media on September 5.[xv] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xvi] Several senior Iranian military officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Operations Deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Chizari, have made similar statements to Iranian armed forces-run media in recent days.[xvii] The coordination deputy of the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, Brigadier General Saeed Farjian Zadeh, separately warned on September 3 that Iran will respond to Israel “in a precise and calculated manner at the right time and under the right conditions.”[xviii]

The Iranian foreign minister called regional stability a pillar of Iranian national security on September 5, stressing that any attempts to redraw borders will be a “red line” for Iran. Araghchi’s comments were in reference to an earlier statement by the Russian foreign minister that supported the Turkish-Azerbaijani Zangezur Corridor project.[xix] Araghchi’s warning follows a meeting between Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou and Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2 in which Demirchi Lou expressed the need respecting internationally recognized borders.[xx] Both the meeting and Araghchi’s comments were likely triggered by a statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in which Lavrov stated his support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[xxi] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued messaging that they will retaliate for Israel killing Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly reevaluating its approach to ceasefire-hostage negotiations after Hamas killed six hostages, according to an unspecified US officials cited by Axios on September 5. Hamas is using its execution of the six hostages to conduct a series of information operations that are designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.
• Caucasus: Iranian and Russian officials met to discuss the Caucasus amid growing differences between Moscow and Tehran.

Iran Update, September 4, 2024

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Armed Forces General Staff Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi claimed on September 4 that Israel “must bury [its] dream that Iran will not respond” to Haniyeh's death.[1] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Operations Deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Chizari separately warned that Iran will “definitely” give a “crushing response” to Israel in an interview with Iranian armed forces-run media on September 4.[2] Chizari stated that Iran seeks to “surprise” Israel, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran is likely trying to generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise ahead of its expected attack.[3] Chizari also discussed Lebanese Hezbollah’s recent drone and rocket attack targeting Israel and claimed that Iran’s response to Israel will be “different.”[4] It is unclear whether Chizari meant that Iran’s retaliation will be different from Hezbollah’s recent attack or from Iran’s April 2024 drone and missile attack targeting Israel. Chizari is a senior Quds Force official who previously supported efforts to preserve the Bashar al Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[5] The United States sanctioned Chizari in 2012 for committing human rights abuses against Syrians.[6] Senior Quds Force commanders in particular may desire a direct strike on Israel given that Israel killed Haniyeh at an IRGC Quds Force facility in northern Tehran.[7] The Quds Force’s participation in an Iranian strike on Israel could mean that Iran would use more than just drones and missiles—as it did in its April 2024 attack—to attack Israel. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its attack model—possibly by including militia attacks on US positions in Syria—to try to inflict greater damage on Israel than it did in April 2024.[8]

Chizari separately praised Palestinian militias’ response to recent Israeli operations in the West Bank, claiming that Israel will not be able to prevent the “formation and strengthening of resistance” in the West Bank.[9] Israeli forces have conducted a large-scale counterterrorism operation in the West Bank since August 27 in order to degrade Palestinian militia networks there.[10] The operation is partly a response to Palestinian militias in the West Bank building the capability and setting conditions to conduct suicide bombing attacks in Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his plan for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor during an English-language press conference on September 4.[11] This is Netanyahu’s second press conference about the corridor this week amid domestic pressure to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement following Hamas’ execution of six Israeli hostages.[12] Netanyahu used the English-language press conference to explain to an international audience why he demands that Israel retain control of the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.[13] Netanyahu argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005 enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[14] Netanyahu warned that international pressure would make it difficult for Israel to return militarily to the corridor if it withdrew as part of the first stage of a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[15] Netanyahu said that he would only consider a full withdrawal in the second stage of ceasefire-hostage negotiations if another entity demonstrated that it can interdict Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[16] Netanyahu's close aide, Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, separately criticized Egyptian President Abdel Fatteh al Sisi on September 4 for failing to stop Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[17]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou met with the Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2.[18] The meeting followed Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov‘s statement in support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[19] Demirchi Lou underlined the need to respect internationally recognized borders, regional stability, and mutual interests of the Caucasus states, especially ahead of the upcoming 3+3 meeting with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Russia, as well as a meeting between the Iranian, Russian, and Azerbaijani foreign ministers.[20] Lavrov expressed support for the Zangezur corridor in an interview with Russian media during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, on August 19.[21] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued messaging that they will retaliate for Israel killing Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
• Caucasus: Iranian and Russian officials met to discuss the Caucasus amid growing differences between Moscow and Tehran.

Iran Update, September 3, 2024

Hamas has continued to exploit Israeli hostages in an information operation likely in order to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Hamas likely calculates that this effort could create more favorable terms for Hamas in such an agreement while weakening the Israeli state. Hamas continued to insist on September 3 that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations. Hamas released a propaganda video for the third time since recently killing six Israeli hostages. The most recent video—like the others—featured a recently executed Israeli hostage who called for a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[1] Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida separately blamed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly for Hamas killing the six Israeli hostages.[2] Abu Obeida added that Hamas had issued new unspecified instructions for what its fighters who are guarding hostages should do if Israeli forces approach them.[3] Hamas released the hostage propaganda videos and Obeida’s comments in Arabic, English, and Hebrew, indicating that the messages are meant for Israeli, Palestinian, and Western audiences, among others.[4] These messages are meant to undermine domestic and international support for Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and increase support for a ceasefire-hostage deal that meets Hamas’ demands. Senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi told al Jazeera on September 3 that the release of Israeli hostages in Gaza will only occur through a prisoner exchange deal, which will only be achieved by a total Israeli withdrawal from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors.[5] The end of Israeli operations and a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has been one of Hamas’ principal demands since the beginning of negotiations and has since become the greatest hurdle to the talks.[6]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended and reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor during a press conference on September 3.[7] The press conference comes amid domestic pressure to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement following Hamas’ execution of six Israeli hostages.[8] Netanyahu said that control of the Philadelphi Corridor is central to Israeli war aims.[9] Netanyahu argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[10] Netanyahu added that “the axis of evil needs the Philadelphi Corridor and, for the same reason, we must control it.”[11] Netanyahu lastly warned that international pressure would make it difficult for Israel to return militarily to the corridor if it withdrew.[12]

US White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby said on September 3 that Israel previously agreed to a US-outlined ceasefire-hostage proposal in May 2024 that required the IDF to withdraw from “all densely populated areas,” including around or adjacent to the Philadelphi Corridor.[13] Kirby said that this “essential element” had not changed in subsequent ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[14] Kirby’s comments are not necessarily inconsistent with Netanyahu’s promise to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor. Netanyahu has reportedly agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from a one- to two-kilometer section of the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire-hostage deal.[15]

An outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) published on September 2 an analytical report examining the possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[16] The report assessed that the most likely course of action in the coming months is a continuation of limited fighting around the Israel-Lebanon border. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into southern Lebanon due to:

• Israeli forces being already stretched by militia activity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
• The threat of an Iranian attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh;
• Internal divisions within the Israeli government; and
• The United States opposing an all-out war ahead of its presidential election.

The report ignored the repeated statements from senior Israeli officials vowing to drive Hezbollah forces out of southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006.[17]

It is unclear to what extent this report reflects Iranian leaders’ thinking about attacking Israel while deterring Israel from launching an offensive into Lebanon. The report nevertheless suggests that at least some in the Iranian security establishment are considering how the threat of an attack on Israel could shape Israeli decision-making vis-a-vis Hezbollah. Iran has repeatedly signaled its opposition to an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] Iran relies on Hezbollah to establish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and to project force and influence throughout the Levant. Hezbollah has also adopted an increasingly prominent role in helping Iran manage the Axis of Resistance in recent years.

Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood, according to a report by the Associated Press.[19] The report cited experts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The report found that some of the Emad medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran used had a circular error probable of around 1.2 kilometers.[20] The circular error probable is a measurement of the median error radius of a weapon system. Tehran previously advertised that the Emad missile has a circular error probable of 50 meters, while international observers estimated that it was closer to 500 meters.[21] Both measurements suggest a much greater degree of accuracy than demonstrated in the Iranian April 2024 attack on Israel. Analysts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessed that Iran tried to strike Israeli F-35I fighter jet hangars at the Nevatim airbase with the Emad missiles.[22]

Iran using Emad missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States. The inaccuracy of these missiles would risk causing severe collateral damage, including civilian casualties, even if Iran does not intentionally target civilian areas in Israel.[23] Iranian military commanders have reportedly considered attacking military targets around Haifa and Tel Aviv, where the risk of harming civilians would be particularly high given the population density.[24]

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to exploit Israeli hostages in an information operation to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Hamas likely calculates that this effort could create more favorable terms for Hamas in such an agreement.
2. Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended and reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor that separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu said that controlling the corridor is central to Israeli war aims and that withdrawing from the corridor would make it hard for Israel to ever return.
3. Lebanon: An IRGC-affiliated outlet published an analytical report examining possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into Lebanon for several reasons, including the imminent threat of an Iranian attack on Israel.
4. Iran: Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood. Iran using such missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States.

Iran Update, September 2, 2024

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs.[i] Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1.[ii] The P5+1 is composed of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.[iii] Ravanchi also served as the Iranian ambassador to the UN between April 2019 and August 2022.[iv] Pezeshkian’s appointment of Araghchi—who himself played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations under Rouhani—as Iranian foreign affairs minister and Araghchi’s appointment of Ravanchi as his political deputy underscores the Pezeshkian administration’s serious intent to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi separately stated that Pezeshkian has indicated to him “a potential for renewed dialogue aimed at ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya on September 2.[v] Grossi previously indicated on August 30 that Pezeshkian had agreed to a bilateral meeting in the “near future.”[vi] It is unclear to what extent Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will permit the Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, although Khamenei has expressed support in recent weeks for engaging in negotiations in order to remove international sanctions on Iran.[vii]

Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[viii] An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia "within a matter of days.”[ix] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[x] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran on how to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving Russia's own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[xi]

Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.”[xii] Moghaddam claimed that Iran will have a “wise reaction” to Ismail Haniyeh’s death. Moghaddam’s statements are consistent with those from senior Iranian officials discussing Iran’s “psychological war” against Israel.[xiii] Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing ”psychological warfare” against Israel.[xiv]  

Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state. Hamas released propaganda videos featuring six recently executed Israeli hostages on September 2 calling for a ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[xv] Hamas also released a graphic in Hebrew stating that Israel will only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations not military operations.[xvi] Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations.[xvii] These videos are part of an information operation that aims to undermine Israeli public support for the ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Hamas leaders likely seek to exacerbate the tensions in the Israeli domestic sphere and cause further psychological distress by airing this propaganda. Hamas leaders may believe that that the Israeli public and officials will increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to drop demands from ceasefire negotiations that Hamas dislikes, such as a continued control over the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.[xviii]

Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israeli’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[xix] Gallant reportedly argued in a private cabinet meeting that prioritizing IDF control over the Philadelphi Corridor for six weeks over securing the release of dozens of living hostages is the wrong decision and should be reversed.[xx] Gallant said that the IDF could retake the corridor in eight hours if it withdrew.[xxi] Netanyahu argued that repealing the security cabinet’s decision would send the wrong message to Hamas and incentivize the militias to kill more Israeli hostages.[xxii] Netanyahu added that the Philadelphi Corridor is Hamas’ ”oxygen pipe” and a withdrawal from the corridor would restore Hamas’ rule and military capabilities.[xxiii] Several other members of the cabinet disagreed with Gallant’s public suggestion to reverse the August 29 cabinet decision.[xxiv]

Israel's national workers union announced a general strike on September 2 in support of an immediate ceasefire deal and hostage-release.[xxv] Israeli media reported that hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated in support of a ceasefire in major Israeli cities.[xxvi] The recovery of six Israeli hostages who had been executed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on September 1 spurred the strike and protests.[xxvii] Ben Gurion International Airport and some schools shut down during the strike.[xxviii] The Israeli labor court ruled on September 2 that the strike was political and therefore illegal.[xxix] The national workers union agreed to end the strike prematurely due to the court ruling.[xxx] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly condemned the protests and said that the demonstrations supported Hamas.[xxxi]  

The Biden administration is considering submitting a new “final” ceasefire-hostage deal proposal to Israel and Hamas in the coming days, according to Axios.[xxxii]  National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk told hostage family members on September 1 that the United States may present a new bridging proposal after mediators made significant progress on the specifics of the hostage-prisoner exchange component of the ceasefire deal over the last week of talks.[xxxiii] The United States last submitted a “bridging proposal“ to Israel and Hamas on August 16.[xxxiv] The new text is expected to include a US proposal about Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor. The Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor is currently a major hurdle in talks.[xxxv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added a stipulation in July that Israeli forces would maintain control over the corridor for the first phase of the ceasefire deal, which would be six weeks long.[xxxvi]

Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.[xxxvii] Hayya clearly stated that Hamas would not agree to a ceasefire and hostage exchange without a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor.[xxxviii] Hayya told al Jazeera that the past two weeks of ceasefire talks in Doha and Cairo have achieved nothing and are ”like grinding water.””[xxxix] Hayya criticized US officials for simultaneously expressing false optimism and not pressuring Israeli leaders to allow greater concessions in negotiations.[xl]  US President Joe Biden indicated on September 2 that he thought Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not doing enough to reach a deal.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs. Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal.
• Russo-Iranian Relations: Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Iranian Retaliation: Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.” Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing ”psychological warfare” against Israel.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state.
• Israeli Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.

Iran Update, September 1, 2024

A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander reiterated Iran’s support for Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands on September 1.[i] IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi expressed support for Hamas’ maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[ii] Masjedi stated that Hamas will continue to fight Israel unless Israel accepts its demands. Accepting Hamas’ maximalist demands would prevent Israel from being able to achieve its stated war aim of destroying Hamas as a military organization and governing authority. Israel’s acceptance of Hamas’ demand for a complete Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, for example, would mean that the IDF could no longer operate along the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.[iii]

IRGC-affiliated media indicated on August 31 that some elements of the Iranian regime are likely continuing to try to delay a retaliatory strike on Israel until the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations conclude. Basirat claimed that Iran’s response to Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh will be “strong, decisive, and deterrent,” but noted that Iran does not seek to derail the ongoing ceasefire talks.[iv] International mediators, including Qatar, have kept Iranian officials apprised of negotiation progress since the latest round of negotiations started in Doha in mid-August 2024.[v] Unspecified Iranian officials previously told Western media on August 13 that Iran will "delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[vi]

Lebanese Hezbollah Representative to Iran Abdallah Safi al Din met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Iran on September 1.[vii] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that Safi al Din and Araghchi discussed the “latest situation of the anti-Israel front in Lebanon.”[viii] Safi al Din and Araghchi likely discussed the Hezbollah drone and rocket attack targeting Israel in some capacity, though neither official would be responsible for planning or executing military operations against Israel. The United States sanctioned Safi al Din in May 2018 for acting as a conduit between Iran and Hezbollah and serving as an interlocutor between Iran and Hezbollah on financial issues.[ix]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages from a tunnel in Rafah on September 1.[x] Israeli security sources said that Hamas executed the hostages two to three days before the hostages were found and recovered.[xi] An IDF spokesperson said that the hostages were executed by Hamas guards "shortly before IDF forces reached them.”[xii] The Israeli forces did not encounter Palestinian fighters inside or near the tunnels while discovering and recovering the hostages.[xiii]  The IDF located the hostages one kilometer away from where they rescued living hostage Farhan al Qadi on August 27.[xiv]  IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, IDF Southern Command commander Major General Yaron Finkelman, and hostage talks negotiator Major General (res.) Nitzan Alon visited the recovery site in Rafah on September 1.[xv]

Hamas blamed Israel for the hostage’s death and recovery, claiming that Israel is ultimately responsible for the deaths by failing to agree to a ceasefire.[xvi] Hamas did not deny killing the hostages but attempted to shift overall blame to Netanyahu and the United States.[xvii] Netanyahu's statement blamed Hamas for continuing to “firmly refuse any [ceasefire-hostage deal] offer” and said that the execution of the hostages demonstrates Hamas does not want a deal.[xviii] Israeli security sources speaking to state-funded, IDF-supported Israeli Army Radio, said that the three of the hostages were supposed to be released in the first stage of a ceasefire-hostage deal.[xix] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israeli’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain and IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor—a major hurdle in a ceasefire-hostage deal—in response to the execution of the six hostages.[xx] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the hostages were likely executed around the time the security cabinet approved retaining an IDF presence on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border on August 29.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Talks: A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander reiterated Iran’s support for Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands on September 1. IRGC-affiliated media indicated on August 31 that some elements of the Iranian regime are likely continuing to try to delay a retaliatory strike on Israel until the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations conclude.
• Hostage Recovery: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages from a tunnel in Rafah on September 1. Hamas blamed Israel for the hostage’s death and recovery, claiming that Israel is ultimately responsible for the deaths by failing to agree to a ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A humanitarian pause began September 1 in the central Gaza Strip to enable humanitarian aid groups to start a mass polio vaccination campaign.
• West Bank: The IDF continued raids in Jenin for the sixth consecutive day as part of the IDF effort to degrade Palestinian militia networks in the West Bank.

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