Iran Crisis Update, December 9

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Mass protester arrests and detentions are likely impacting protest turnout. An anti-regime Iranian human rights organization estimated in November that over 18,000 Iranians had been arrested for acts of dissidence since the Mahsa Amini protest wave commenced on September 16.[i] The regime has repeatedly promoted the arrest of individuals it claims to be protest organizers as well. The Qom Province IRGC Intelligence Organization announced on December 8 that it had arrested leaders of an anti-regime protest organization that was active on social media, for example.[ii] The arrest of protesters—particularly within key nodes of protest organizations—may have resulted in lower turnout for anti-regime demonstrations planned for December 5-7. Significant strike activity documented on these dates suggests that protest organizers are still capable of coordinating widespread acts of anti-regime defiance, however.[iii]

Some social media users voiced skepticism of groups purporting to represent local protest organizations on social media, reflecting the complex information environment in which dissidents are operating. The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj group issued a statement acknowledging distrust of the organization on December 9. The group claimed that it did not advertise a protest in Karaj, Alborz Province on December 8 because the protest was coordinated by regime actors.[iv] CTP cannot verify the authenticity of this protest group, nor can most protesters. However, the group’s statement and subsequent exchanges with its followers suggest that protest coordinators are being held accountable for their perceived successes and failures as they learn to operate in a heavily censored information space.[v] These exchanges also highlight efforts by Iranians to verify or discredit organizations with online presences. This process is vital for the success of the protest movement considering the real risk that regime agents posing as protest organizations could misdirect protesters.  It also adds an additional vulnerability to the movement, however, because the regime can use agents to cause mistrust of legitimate protest groups. Iranians are likely using a hybrid approach to validating calls for protests that involves both online and direct person-to-person communications.

The Iranian regime may exploit the death of a Sunni cleric to crack down on acts of dissidence in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Unidentified assailants reportedly kidnapped, shot, and killed Khash city Sunni Friday Prayer Leader Moulavi Abdol Vahed Rigi in the vicinity of Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on December 8. Pro-regime media outlets described Rigi as a “martyr” and circulated footage of Rigi showing support for Khamenei with Friday Prayer Leader Policy Council Chief Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari in November.[vi] The Supreme Leader dispatched a high-ranking delegation headed by Ali Akbari to Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 13 in a likely effort to escalate against prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, who has repeatedly voiced support for anti-regime demonstrations since Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16.[vii]

Some social media users alleged that regime actors killed Rigi, although there is no evidence to corroborate this claim.[viii] A state-run media outlet suggested that armed groups killed Rigi in an attempt to foment religious divisions within the province, citing a clip wherein Rigi alluded to threats he had received from unnamed terrorist groups.[ix] Pro-regime social media actors additionally accused Abdol Hamid’s followers of killing Rigi for supporting Khamenei.[x] The regime may seek to frame Abdol Hamid and his followers for Rigi’s death in an attempt to undermine Abdol Hamid’s popularity throughout Sistan and Baluchistan. Iranian leadership may also use Rigi’s death to justify violently suppressing protests throughout the province.

Key Takeaways

• Mass protester arrests and detentions are likely impacting protest turnout.
• Some social media users voiced skepticism of groups purporting to represent local protest organizations on social media, reflecting the complex information environment in which dissidents are operating.
• The Iranian regime may exploit the death of a Sunni cleric to crack down on acts of dissidence in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• At least eight protests took place in seven cities across five provinces on December 9.
• Several senior Iranian officials endorsed death penalties for arrested protesters and described executions as an effective means to discourage protest activity on December 9.
• The Iranian Special Clerical Court sentenced Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s niece Farideh Moradkhani to three years in prison on unknown charges.
• Senior US officials stated that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems.
• Iran is reportedly smuggling weapons to Lebanon through the Beirut International Airport in order to bypass blocked routes through Syria.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least eight protests took place in seven cities across five provinces on December 9. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Roudsar, Gilan Province[xi]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Protesters set a fire in the street protesting the execution of arrested protester Mohsen Shekari

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[xii]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Silent march
• Regime Repression: Security forces fired Kalashnikovs and shotguns at protesters
• Notes: At least seven protesters reported injured; several seized

Dehgolan, Kurdistan Province[xiii]

• Size: Medium
• Demographic: Mourners
• Protester Activity: Mourners gathered for the 40-day commemoration ceremony for Momen Zandkarimi
• Note: This protest likely occurred in the vicinity of Dehgolan, but not in Dehgolan proper

Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xiv]

• Size: Undetermined
• Demographic: Worshippers

Pishin, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xv]

• Size: Small

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xvi]

• Size: Medium to large
• Demographic: Worshippers, protests followed prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s weekly Friday prayer sermon
• Protester Activity: Protesters carried a flag without the Islamic Republic Symbol on it

Tehran, Tehran[xvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Mourners
• Protester Activity: Mourners gathered to around executed protester Mohsen Shekari’s home
• Note: In the vicinity of Narmak

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Tehran, Tehran[xviii]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Protesters gathered to chant anti-regime slogans
• Note: In the vicinity of Chitgar

Note: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and large protests as over 1,000.

Several senior Iranian officials endorsed death penalties for arrested protesters and described executions as an effective means to discourage protest activity on December 9. Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami praised Judiciary officials for executing arrested protester Mohsen Shekari on December 8 in his December 9 sermon and suggested that Shekari’s death would deter other acts of dissidence.[xix] Parliamentary Judiciary and Legal Committee Chairperson Mousa Ghazanfarabadi described Shekari’s execution as a warning to other protesters on December 9.[xx] President Ebrahim Raisi similarly stressed that relevant authorities would decisively punish actors involved in the death of killed security personnel on December 8.[xxi] Senior officials from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs additionally described Shekari’s death sentence as an effective deterrent against breaking the law and warned that other protesters will be punished.[xxii] Iranian officials’ rhetoric advocating for harsh sentences for arrested protesters mirrors Supreme Leader Khamenei’s calls for the judiciary to punish anti-regime actors on November 19.[xxiii]

Executions have the potential to reinvigorate the Mahsa Amini protest wave, however. CTP observed that protest coordinators and organizations condemned Shekari’s execution and promised to avenge his death on December 8.[xxiv] Several protest organizations reiterated calls to protest Shekari’s death on December 9. Protest groups are advocating for nation-wide demonstrations in Shekari’s memory on December 10.[xxv]

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid condemned the regime for executing Mohsen Shekari on December 8 in his weekly Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Abdol Hamid added that unknown actors will seek vengeance against security forces for killing innocent protesters, although he did not directly call on protestors to avenge these deaths. Abdol Hamid warned protestors that unspecified agents had infiltrated the protest movement.[xxvi] Abdol Hamid has notably continued to publicly criticize the regime despite reports that Iranian leadership is seeking to diminish his influence.[xxvii]

The Iranian Special Clerical Court sentenced Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s niece Farideh Moradkhani to three years in prison on unknown charges.[xxviii] The Special Clerical Court is a court system designed to prosecute clerics and only answers to Khamenei. It is noteworthy that this court sentenced Moradkhani, who is not a cleric. Iranian authorities arrested Moradkhani on November 23 for unclear reasons.[xxix] Moradkhani’s brother Mahmoud Moradkhani published a video of his sister criticizing the regime’s violent crackdown on ongoing, anti-regime protests on November 25.[xxx] Moradkhani’s lawyer tweeted that the court initially sentenced his client to 15 years in prison.[xxxi] Moradkhani’s mother also publicly criticized Khamenei on December 7, as CTP previously reported.[xxxii]

Several regime officials continued to promote mandatory veiling laws on December 9. Hardline Parliamentarian Hossein Jalali reiterated that women who do not adhere to state-imposed veiling standards should lose access to government services, benefits, and opportunities for employment.[xxxiii] Shiraz Friday Prayer Leader Lotfollah Dezhkam described veiling as inextricably linked to Iranian national identity in his weekly Friday prayer sermon.[xxxiv] Senior cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda similarly characterized women who disregard mandatory veiling as extensions of malign foreign networks.[xxxv] Alamolhoda is a Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader, Assembly of Experts member, and reportedly close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, who is his son-in-law.

Protesters targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) office in Darreh Shahr, Ilam Province on December 9.[xxxvi] Protesters were seen throwing a Molotov cocktail into the building. Protesters also set fire to the Razavieh Seminary school in Shiraz, Fars province.[xxxvii]

Note: The following text is included in ISW’s Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment for December 9:

Senior US officials stated that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems. NBC News reported on December 9 that senior US administration officials stated that Russia may be providing Iran with advanced military equipment and components, including helicopters and air defense systems, in exchange for Iranian-made high precision weapons systems that Russia has and intends to use in the war in Ukraine.[xxxviii] The officials specified that Russia may send Iran Su-35 aircraft within the next year and that Russia is possibly seeking to establish a joint Russian Iranian production line for drone systems in the Russian Federation.[xxxix] US intelligence officials stated on November 19 that Russian and Iranian officials finalized a deal in early November to manufacture Iranian drones on Russian territory.[xl] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 9 that air traffic monitors show that Iranian Air Force cargo planes resumed flights to Moscow on December 8 following a short break of such flights.[xli] ISW assessed that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran on December 3 likely to further discuss the sale of Iranian drones and missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine.[xlii] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military is increasingly reliant on Iranian-made weapons systems due the depletion of its arsenal of high precision weapons systems.[xliii]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The Times of Israel reported that Iran has is smuggling weapons to Lebanon through the Beirut International Airport to bypass blocked routes through Syria. The Times of Israel published an article claiming that the Israeli government was investigating commercial Meraj Airlines planes that are smuggling arms from Tehran and Damascus to Beirut.[xliv] The report claimed that Tel Aviv warned of strikes on the airport.