Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2025

April 11, 2025, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on April 11 that Germany will provide Ukraine with four IRIS-T air defense systems, 33 missiles for the systems, 120 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Leopard tanks, 14 artillery systems, and 130,000 155mm artillery shells.[1] Pistorius stated that Germany recently provided 30 Patriot missiles to Ukraine as well. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 11 that Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are establishing an electronic warfare (EW) coalition for Ukraine.[2] The UK MoD announced a military aid package worth 450 million pounds (about $588 million) drones, radars, and anti-tank mines.[3] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that Estonia will deliver 10,000 155mm artillery shells and 750,000 rations packages to Ukraine; Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated that the Netherland will provide 150 million euros (about $170 million) to strengthen Ukraine's air defenses; and Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will allocate 20 million euros (about $22 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of ammunition.[4]

US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting would continue discussions about the war in Ukraine, that Putin would listen to the points that Witkoff delivers from US President Donald Trump, and that the meeting is a good chance for Russia to convey its "main concerns" to Trump via Witkoff.[6] Peskov claimed that the officials may discuss a future meeting between Trump and Putin and that Trump and Putin could "theoretically" have a phone call following the Putin-Witkoff meeting.[7] Peskov claimed that one should not "expect any breakthroughs" during the Putin-Witkoff meeting and that Russia and the United States are in the process of normalizing relations and "searching" for a way to settle the war in Ukraine.[8] Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting and the April 10 US-Russian bilateral meeting in Istanbul are not related but are "two different tracks with one common process."[9] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 11 that the Putin-Witkoff meeting is another step in the negotiating process toward a ceasefire and an "ultimate peace deal" in the war in Ukraine.[10] Dmitriev stated that his meeting with Witkoff was "productive."[11]

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on April 11, following a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will have to accept territorial concessions and that it is "impossible" for Ukraine to return to its 1991 borders – Ukraine's internationally recognized borders.[12] Lavrov attempted to deflect blame for Russia's intransigence onto Zelensky and Ukraine's alleged mistreatment of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to explicitly demonstrate its unwillingness to make compromises and cede Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine as part of any future peace negotiations – in contrast to Ukrainian officials who have expressed their willingness to make territorial compromises in a future peace agreement.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin has even demanded that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy and claimed that Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts are "historically Russian lands."[14]

Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on April 11 that commercial air services between Russia and the United States should only resume as the "consequence" of the United States lifting sanctions imposed on Russian state-owned airline Aeroflot.[15] Lavrov claimed that the United States agreed to Russia’s proposal during talks in Riyadh on February 27, but that the United States has not taken any corresponding action. Lavrov’s recent statements demanding sanctions relief from the United States directly contradict CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev’s April 3 statements on Fox News that Russia is not requesting sanction relief and further showcases the Kremlin’s inconsistent messaging.[16]

Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will prioritize in Spring and Summer 2025. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa told Reuters on April 10 that Russian forces will likely intensify offensive operations in Ukraine in April and May 2025 and that Russia will continue to prioritize offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in coming months.[17] Palisa noted that Russian forces could also attempt to advance near Kupyansk, Lyman, or Novopavlivka in eastern Ukraine or towards Zaporizhzia City in southern Ukraine but reiterated that he assesses that the Pokrovsk direction will be Russia's "absolute priority." A source in the Ukrainian General Staff told BBC's Ukraine Service on April 11 that Russian forces intend to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and threaten Sumy City in the coming months.[18]

Russian forces are currently attempting to advance throughout the frontline in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine, although Russian forces currently appear to be prioritizing the Toretsk and Novopavlivka directions. ISW recently noted that Russian forces appear to be pursuing several diverging tactical efforts in the Pokrovsk direction, and ISW is reorganizing the eastern axis section in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to account for the concerted Russian push towards Novopavlivka.[19] Russian forces also appear to be conducting a concerted offensive operation aimed at advancing further into northern Sumy Oblast in the direction of Sumy City after eliminating most of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast in March 2025.[20] ISW will continue reporting on Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and possible future activity along Ukraine's northern border in the new Northern axis section in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces. Putin held a meeting on April 11 to discuss Russia's development strategy for the Russian Navy through 2050.[21] Putin claimed that the Russian Navy plays a "vital role" in ensuring Russia's security and defense and in protecting Russia's national interests in the "World Ocean." Putin stated that one of Russia's priority tasks is to strengthen its naval strategic nuclear forces. Putin stated that Russia has allocated "significant funds" towards constructing 49 vessels in the past five years and that Russia has allocated 8.4 trillion rubles (about $100.9 billion) toward the construction of new vessels in the coming decade. Putin noted that Russia has introduced four Borei-A class nuclear submarines and four Yasen-M class nuclear submarines into the navy between 2020 and 2024.

Putin specifically highlighted the Zircon cruise missile, claiming that the missile has a range of over 1,000 kilometers and a speed of nearly Mach 10. Putin also called for Russia to develop ship-based unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned underwater and surface boats and to integrate these unmanned systems into a "single reconnaissance and strike [system], linked to [Russia's] satellite group." Russian forces have launched a limited number of Zircon cruise missiles in ground attack mode against Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces have successfully shot down some of the Zircon missiles.[22]

Russian forces recently executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war. The Associated Press (AP) reported on April 10 that it obtained a video from Ukrainian and Russian drones showing Russian soldiers executing Ukrainian POWs surrendering in Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne).[23] Ukrainian officials reacted to the footage confirming the executions and reiterated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs are "systematic."[24] ISW observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs in violation of international law.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.
• US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will prioritize in Spring and Summer 2024. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces.
• Russian forces recently executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian opposition media provided additional details regarding Russia's efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violations
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 11, without evidence, that Ukrainian forces struck "Russian" energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk and Zaporizhia oblasts and Bryansk and Kursk oblasts five times in the past day.[26]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continue to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on April 11, but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near the St. Nicholas Monastery northeast of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha near the international border).[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the monastery.[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Gornal, Guyevo (south of Sudzha), and Oleshnya (west of Sudzha).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Oleshnya.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[31]

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in Belgorod Oblast on April 11.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka.[32]

A Russian milblogger claimed that half of Demidovka is a contested "gray zone."[33]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 11 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zhuravka (north of Sumy City near the international border) and advanced in central Loknya (southeast of Zhuravka).[35]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Veselivka and northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Loknya.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Basivka and Loknya.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 11 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 11 that Russian forces are advancing in the eastern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 10 and 11.[39]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 11 that Russian forces primarily launch infantry assaults in this area, though they occasionally use civilian vehicles in their attacks.[40] The spokesperson also noted that many of the Russian personnel operating in the Kharkiv direction are contract soldiers with minimal training, including some who are former prisoners.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 11 shows Russian forces conducting an attack with the support of four armored vehicles, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[41]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on April 10 and 11.[43] Ukraine's Khortystia Group of Forces reported on April 11 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of four armored vehicles toward Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed all the vehicles.[44] The Khortytsia Group of Forces also reported that Russian forces conducted an at least reduced company-sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction on April 10 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed eight infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and damaged one IFV.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova toward Hrekivka and Olhivka on April 10 and 11.[46]

Order of Battle: Anti-tank units of the 1st Tank Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) are reportedly operating near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Nove, Katerynivka, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on April 10 and 11.[48]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on April 10 that Russian forces are attacking in small groups of two to three infantry and are not currently conducting as many mechanized assaults.[49] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on April 11 that Russian forces are primarily using armored vehicles to transport infantry to "unloading points" before the infantry continues to attack on foot.[50] The NCO stated that Russian forces are concealing their armored vehicles from Ukrainian drone strikes and that Russian tanks are only operating between concealed and semi-concealed positions.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Confirmed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hyrhorivka and Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 10 and 11.[52] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 11 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Ivano-Darivka with armored vehicle support.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Kurdyumivka on April 10 and 11.[54]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are trying to leverage snow, rain, and fog to transport infantry to the frontline with armored vehicles and only conduct infantry attacks during good weather conditions when Ukrainian reconnaissance drones are more active.[55] The spokesperson stated that the number of Russian drones with fiber optic cables has increased significantly and that the fiber optic cables are "tangled" over all of eastern Ukraine.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions west of Predtechyne.[56]

Russian forces advanced further northwest of Toretsk during a recent assault with armored vehicle support, but it is unclear if Russian forces maintain enduring positions in the area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk) during a recent assault along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[57] It is unclear if Russian forces maintain enduring positions along the highway, given that the footage shows Ukrainian forces striking the Russian vehicles involved in the assault. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced near Nelipivka as part of a Russian push that reached anomalously far ahead of the main Russian line, not that Russian forces maintain a sustained presence in the area. ISW defines a Russian advance as territory where Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks from, but over which Russian forces do not exercise control. ISW will refine the Russian salient northwest of Toretsk as additional information becomes available.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are clearing Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Toretsk and that Russian forces have seized most of the town.[58]

Russian forces continued assaults in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; west of Toretsk in the direction of Romanivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Valentynivka, and Oleksandropil on April 10 and 11.[59]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated on April 11 that the situation in this direction remains tense and that Russian forces are focusing on trying to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the area.[60] The deputy commander stated that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian assault west of Toretsk - likely referring to the recent assault near Nelepivka.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 174th Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division), and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[61]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on April 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Kalynove and Tarasivka, east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane and Zvirove, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and in the direction of Serhiivka on April 10 and 11.[62]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[63]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters from Preobrazhenka toward Troitske (both east of Novopavlivka) and near Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[64]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenvika; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Sribne, and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 10 and 11.[65]

Ukraine's Vuhledar Group of Forces stated on April 10 that Russian forces conduct 25 to 35 assaults toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border area each day and are leveraging buggies, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and motorcycles to advance and transport infantry to frontline positions.[66] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian attacks are becoming less intense in the area, however.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using "swarms" of drones to prevent Russian advances near Kotlyarivka.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 11 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Odradne and near Bahatyr (both west of Kurakhove).[69]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 10 and 11.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked with armored vehicle support from near Bahatyr.[71]

Order of Battle: An engineering and sapper battalion of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[72]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[73]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered southern Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced northeast of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Fedorivka, Vesele, and Pryvilne on April 10 and 11.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Burevestnik" detachment and "Volki" Brigade are reportedly operating near Fedorivka.[76] Elements of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (west of Velyka Novosilka).[77]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky on April 11.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[79]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 11 but did not advance.[80]

The "Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on April 10 that elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) complained that some servicemembers have been operating on Nestryha and Buhaz islands (southwest of Kherson City) without rotations since January 2025.[81] The "Atesh" group noted that Russian forces deliver limited supplies via drones and evacuated wounded personnel using rubber boats. Atesh's sources stated that the prolonged exposure to damp, unsanitary conditions – combined with a lack of medical supplies – is causing health issues among Russian soldiers operating in the area.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 39 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on April 10 to 11.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 24 drones over northern, southern, eastern, and central Ukraine and that 13 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones damaged infrastructure in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[83]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on April 11 that Russian forces have launched 67,000 glide bombs, thousands of missiles, and 22,400 Shahed drones against Ukraine since February 2022.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces have downed 2,496 cruise missiles, 465 guided missiles, 97 ballistic missiles, 40 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, and 17,575 Shahed drones since the beginning of the war and attributed much of the successes to Western-supplied air defense systems.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition media provided additional details regarding Russia's efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.[85] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii, citing official documentation and contract recruitment data from June 2023 to May 2024, reported on April 11 that Russian registration and enlistment offices in Moscow Oblast processed at least 51 Chinese nationals applying to service in the Russian military between June 2023 and May 2024. Vazhnye Istorii reported that most of the Chinese nationals arrived in Moscow shortly before signing military service contracts with some arriving in pairs at the recruitment point and that at least four Chinese nationals returned to the People's Republic of China (PRC) after visiting the recruitment office. Vazhnye Istorii reported that several Chinese nationals have reportedly returned to the PRC after concluding their one-year term of service with the Russian MoD. One former contract soldier who returned to the PRC in March 2024 told Vazhnye Istorii that he complained about poor medical care in the Russian military to the PRC embassy, indicating that some PRC officials may be aware that Chinese nationals are participating in military operations in Ukraine.

UK outlet The Guardian reported on April 10 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is circulating recruitment ads designed to target young men on Chinese social media.[86] The Guardian noted that numerous recruitment ads on Chinese social media platforms are emphasizing recruitment salaries ranging from 60,000 to 200,000 Chinese Yuan (roughly $8,200 to $27,300). The fact that many of these recruitment ads and videos of Chinese influencers promoting Russian military recruitment have circulated on Chinese social media platforms for months may suggest that Chinese authorities are either unwilling to or uninterested in combating such informational campaigns. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Russian authorities are actively leveraging Chinese social media to recruit Chinese nationals.[87]

The Russian MoD appears to be recruiting contract servicemembers at an increased rate. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on April 11 that statistics from the Unified Selection Point show that monthly contract recruitment rates have almost doubled in late March and early April 2025 compared to January 2025.[88] Verstka noted that there was a sharp increase in the recruitment rate in mid-March 2025 after Russian forces retook most of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reported that more than 6,300 people have signed military service contracts since the beginning of 2025. An unnamed Russian recruiter told Verstka that money is still the most common motivating factor for new recruits. An unnamed Russian source in Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s office told Vertska that Russian authorities are trying to attract new recruits with intensified patriotic appeals instead of financial incentives, indicating that Russian authorities are likely having to develop various recruitment strategies based on other motivating factors due to Russia’s deepening economic constraints. An unnamed source close to Moscow Metro management told Verstka that Russian authorities and recruitment organizations are intensifying military recruitment campaigns and opened new recruitment points at several Moscow metro stations on April 1 that operate during morning rush hour. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is unable to provide ever-increasing financial incentives to boost recruitment efforts as Russia is forced to confront compounding economic challenges.[89]

Russia continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of its war in Ukraine to regional administrative positions as part of long-term efforts to militarize Russian society and establish an insulated framework of Kremlin loyalists. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev appointed Time of Heroes participant Oleg Lymar as an advisor on veteran issues on April 11.[90] Russian authorities appointed Time of Heroes participant Viktor Kvasov to deputy director of the Tyumen Oblast Department for Physical Culture, Sports, and Additional Education on April 10.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Ukrainian sources warned on April 10 that Russian forces have begun dropping delayed-action fragmentation grenades from drones in frontline and rear areas and noted that the time delay of these objects is currently unknown, increasing the grenades' lethality.[92]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems.

Click here to read the latest Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.