Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12

Russian forces’ likely capture of Soledar on January 11 is not an operationally significant development and is unlikely to presage an imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 11 and 12 indicates that Russian forces likely control most if not all of Soledar, and have likely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the western outskirts of the settlement.[i] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks against Sil in Donetsk Oblast—a settlement over a kilometer northwest of Soledar and beyond previous Ukrainian positions.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff and other senior military sources largely did not report that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults against Soledar on January 12 as they have previously.[iii] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Soledar of remaining Ukrainian forces as of January 12.[iv] Russian milbloggers posted footage on January 12 of Wagner Group fighters freely walking in Soledar and claimed that they visited the settlement alongside Russian forces.[v] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not announced that Russian forces have captured Soledar, but Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov congratulated Russian forces for successful offensive operations in the settlement.[vi] All available evidence indicates Ukrainian forces no longer maintain an organized defense in Soledar. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s January 12 statement that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Soledar may be referring to defensive positions near but not in Soledar.[vii]

Russian information operations have overexaggerated the importance of Soledar, which is at best a Russian Pyrrhic tactical victory. ISW continues to assess that the capture of Soledar—a settlement smaller than 5.5 square miles—will not enable Russian forces to exert control over critical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut nor better position Russian forces to encircle the city in the short term.[viii] Russian forces likely captured Soledar after committing significant resources to a highly attritional tactical victory which will accelerate degraded Russian forces’ likely culmination near Bakhmut.[ix] Russian forces may decide to maintain a consistently high pace of assaults in the Bakhmut area, but Russian forces’ degraded combat power and cumulative exhaustion will prevent these assaults from producing operationally significant results.[x]

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks scapegoats for the Russian defense industrial base’s struggle to address equipment and technological shortages. Putin publicly criticized Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov for aviation industry enterprises not receiving state orders during a cabinet of ministers meeting on January 11.[xi] Putin stated that some enterprises have yet to receive state orders for 2023 and are not hiring more staff or preparing to increase output for potential orders in the future. Putin also interrupted Manturov’s explanation that the ministry had already drafted orders for civil and military industries, leading Manturov to admit that Russia had not issued a portion of documents for aircraft manufactures that would approve state funding for their projects. Putin argued that the enterprise directors informed him that they had not received any state orders amidst current “conditions” in Russia and urged Manturov to not “play a fool.” Manturov attempted to soften the demand by stating that the ministry will “try to do everything possible,” to which Putin responded that he should not try his best but instead complete the task within a month. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov later downplayed the altercation as “a normal workflow.”

This incident is likely part of an ongoing Kremlin information campaign to elevate Putin’s image as an involved wartime leader. The Kremlin could have cut out the disagreement from its official transcript (as it often does for most of Putin’s meetings, which are heavily edited and stage managed), but chose to publicize Putin’s harsh response, possibly to identify other officials within the Kremlin as the culprits for Russian defense industrial base’s challenges and possibly to threaten other officials. ISW previously reported that Putin began making more public appearances—including visiting defense industrial enterprises—in December and January, despite previously limiting his engagements throughout the span of the war in Ukraine.[xii] Putin is also likely attempting to appease Russian milblogger critiques regarding the lack of advanced military equipment and Russia’s inability to task its defense industrial base to accommodate the war effort. ISW had also previously reported that some private armament manufacturers have criticized the Kremlin for failing to arrange any state contracts with their firms on their Telegram channels, feeding in their critiques into the milblogger discourse.[xiii]

Manturov’s attempts to soften Putin’s timeline indicate his uncertainty that the Kremlin has the capacity to administer these contracts in a short time period. Manturov tried to explain to Putin that the ministry will authorize additional contracts “based on the opportunities that are formed by the budget, including the preferential program of the National Wealth Fund,” highlighting the differences between the Russian financial reality and Putin’s unrealistic objectives for a short-term revitalization of the Russian defense industrial sector.

Ukrainian intelligence confirmed that senior Russian military leadership is preparing for significant military reforms in the coming year, though ISW continues to assess Russia will struggle to quickly—if at all—implement planned reforms. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on January 12 that Russian military leadership plans to increase military personnel to 1.5 million (from roughly 1.35 million as of September 2022) and form at least 20 new military divisions in 2023, which Hromov noted indicates “the Kremlin's intentions to engage in a long-term confrontation and preparations for conducting large-scale hostilities.”[xiv] Hromov stated that Russia’s significant personnel, weapons, and equipment losses; the effects of international sanctions; and structural weaknesses in the Russian military apparatus have reduced Russia’s force generation capabilities and ultimately raise doubts about whether Russian forces can implement these reforms within undisclosed deadlines.[xv] Hromov’s statements come the day after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a major restructuring of the senior command structure for Russian operations in Ukraine and suggest that the Russian military apparatus writ large is engaged in a concerted campaign to reform and restructure multiple tactical, operational, and strategic aspects.[xvi] ISW has also previously reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed the expansion of the size of the Russian military and the formation of 17 new maneuver divisions at a Russian MoD Collegium in Moscow on December 21, 2022—it is unclear what additional 3 divisions Hromov is referring to.[xvii] ISW assessed that the Russian MoD has been steadily reversing the 2008 Serdyukov reforms (which sought to streamline the Russian ground forces and move to a brigade-based structure) by restoring maneuver divisions across Russian military districts since 2013, but that the Kremlin is unlikely to implement these reforms on a timeline that is relevant for Russia’s war on Ukraine.[xviii]  Restructuring of senior command structures, coupled with efforts to expand the military base in 2023, suggest that Russia is setting conditions for a long-term, concerted effort in Ukraine. The Russian MoD may also hold highly unrealistic expectations of its own ability to quickly restructure its ground forces.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces have likely captured Soledar on January 11, but this small-scale victory is unlikely to presage an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks scapegoats for the Russian defense industry base’s struggle to address equipment and technological challenges, and retains unrealistic expectations of Russian capacity to rapidly replace losses.
• Ukrainian intelligence confirmed that senior Russian military leadership is preparing for significant military reforms in the coming year, though ISW continues to assess Russia will struggle to quickly—if at all—implement planned reforms.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities may be preparing for the mass deportation of Ukrainian citizens from occupied territories to the Russian Federation.
• Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrei Kartapolov announced that Russian military recruitment offices may increase the age of eligibility for conscription as early as this spring’s conscription cycle.
• Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Oleg Salyukov (who was appointed as one of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s three “deputies” as theater commander in Ukraine), arrived in Belarus to take control of combat coordination exercises for the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove).[xix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups within 44km northwest of Svatove near Kyslivka, Vilshana, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, and Pershotravneve in Kharkiv Oblast.[xx] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Kreminna, which may indicate that Ukrainian forces have made further advances towards the settlement.[xxi] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that heavy fighting continued on the approaches to Kreminna over the last two days and that Russian forces have transferred elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to the vulnerable Kreminna sector of the front line.[xxii] The UK MoD suggested that Russian commanders are attempting to deploy VDV units in their doctrinal role as an elite rapid reaction force, instead of the past Russian practice in Kherson Oblast of deploying these formations as long-term, ground-holding forces.[xxiii] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian forces improved their tactical positions near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and are preventing Russian forces from attacking the settlement.[xxiv]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

See topline text for information regarding Russian offensive operations in Soledar.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself; within 19km northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka, Sil, Krasna Hora, Paraskoviivka, and Pidhorodne; and within 22km southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Mayorsk.[xxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are storming Ukrainian positions near Blahodatne (11km northeast of Bakhmut) and that Wagner Group elements are attempting to advance in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[xxvi] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces completely captured Opytne (4km south of Bakhmut), although ISW cannot independently verify that Russian forces have done so.[xxvii] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are conducting assaults on Bakhmut from the direction of Opytne and circulated footage purporting to show Russian forces engaging in small arms fire with Ukrainian forces in southern parts of the city.[xxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka) and near Krasnohorivka (23km southwest of Avdiivka).[xxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to attack near Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) from Opytne (4km southwest of Avdiivka) and conducted an assault in the direction of Nevelske (15km southwest of Avdiivka).[xxx] Another Russian milblogger posted footage on January 11 purporting to show Russian forces on the western outskirts of Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and claimed that he was able to walk around the western outskirts as Russian forces now completely control the settlement.[xxxi] ISW cannot independently verify that Russian forces have completely captured Marinka. Geolocated footage posted on January 11 shows that Russian forces hold positions further west of Novoselivka Druha (10km northeast of Avdiivka).[xxxii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[xxxiii]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on January 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 12 that Russian forces constructed a network of trenches and dugouts in Radensk, Kherson Oblast (25km southeast of Kherson City along the E97 Kherson City-Kalanchak highway), using shipping containers that they had previously used at hospitals in the surrounding areas.[xxxiv] Russian sources claimed on January 12 that Russian forces still control part of Velyki Potemkin Island, southwest of Kherson City in the Dnipro River delta, although ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[xxxv] Russian forces continued routine strikes on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 12.[xxxvi]

Russian forces are continuing efforts to establish further control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as of January 12. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are bringing engineers from Russia to the ZNPP as existing ZNPP workers continue to refuse to sign a contract with Rosatom.[xxxvii]

Russian forces continued routine artillery and MLRS strikes west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia Oblast and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 12.[xxxviii] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xxxix]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to institute measures suggesting they are preparing for a second wave of mobilization. A Russian Telegram channel, citing unspecified internal sources, claimed on January 11 that preparation for a second wave of mobilization is well underway in the upper echelons of the Russian state.[xl] The report stated that officials are already visiting residences in Crimea and handing out mobilization summons, and that the local military registration and enlistment office in Saratov Oblast is preparing an order for a printing house to issue a large batch of summonses.[xli] Another Russian source reported that employment advertisements for positions in military enlistment and registration offices across Russia have been popping up en masse since December 2022.[xlii]

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrei Kartapolov announced on January 11 that Russian military recruitment offices may implement Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s December 21 suggestion to increase the age of eligibility for conscription as early as this spring’s conscription cycle.[xliii] Kartapolov stated that the full transition to the new system will take place in three years and raise the minimum age of conscription from 18 to 21 years old and the maximum from 27 to 30 years.[xliv] Karatapolov noted that the full transition to this system would require “a whole range of amendments to the existing legislation,” particularly on the law on military duties and military service.[xlv]  Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 12 that Russian President Vladimir Putin conceptually supported the idea of raising the conscription age but noted that the concept would first have to be presented to the Russian MoD.[xlvi] ISW previously reported that Putin signed a decree on December 30, 2022 that suspended the previous age limits for mobilization in occupied territories until 2026.[xlvii] The apparent discrepancy between mobilization policies for Russia and occupied territories of Ukraine suggests that Russian military leadership views occupied areas as a colonial resource from which to limitlessly exploit force generation capacity.

The Russian government may exempt IT workers that have fled Russia from conscription in an effort to lure them back into the country. Russian media sources reported on January 11 that the Russian Ministry of Digital Development began holding meetings with representatives from the Russian IT sector on how to incentivize the return of the Russian IT specialists who fled the country earlier in 2022 due to the war in Ukraine.[xlviii]  Representatives from the Ministry of Digital Development reportedly stated that these meetings have the purpose of “developing additional measures to support the development of IT companies operating in Russia" and that the Ministry of Digital Development is working to offer a guaranteed protection against conscription into Russian forces for Russian IT specialists.[xlix]

Russian soldiers continue to complain about  poor living conditions and mistreatment on the front. A video published on January 11 shows Russian troops from the 10th company of the 3rd battalion of the 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment appealing to military leadership concerning their unlivable conditions and “lawlessness” at the front.[l] The video shows troops trying to break through the ice in frozen trenches, admitting to stealing funds to supply themselves with equipment, and complaining that they have been “living like this for 11 months.”[li]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities may be preparing for the mass deportation of Ukrainian citizens from occupied territories to the Russian Federation. Bloomberg reported on January 6 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin issued a government order in mid-December on “revenue mobilization” that allocated 175 billion rubles ($2.6 billion) in extra spending for the potential resettlement of 100,000 residents from Kherson Oblast to the Russian Federation. [lii] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk responded to the Russian government’s order on January 12 and stated that Russian officials and occupation authorities may be planning to deport more than 100,000 Kherson Oblast residents to Russia under fears that Russian forces may lose further territory in Kherson Oblast.[liii] Vereshchuk also stated on January 11 that Russian officials have forcibly resettled an unspecified number of Ukrainian citizens to 57 regions in Russia, including those in the Far East and Siberia.[liv] ISW continues to assess that the forced deportation of Ukrainian citizens to the Russian Federation likely amounts to a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign, in addition to apparent violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[lv]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing efforts to consolidate economic control in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities published an inventory of residents’ immovable and movable property and classified the inventory as nationalization in an unspecified settlement in the occupied Kakhovka district of Kherson Oblast.[lvi] Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 12 that Russian occupation authorities are failing to remove the hryvnia from circulation in occupied territories because Ukrainians continue to circulate hryvnias through local businesses.[lvii] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 12 that Russian occupation authorities are checking the phones of residents in occupied territories and demanding that Ukrainians delete all Ukrainian applications from their phones, particularly targeting applications for Ukrainian banks.[lviii] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on January 12 that Russian occupation authorities are citing decrees on transitioning occupied territories to the ruble zone as cause for searching the phones of residents in occupied territories.[lix]

Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to intensify law enforcement measures to identify pro-Ukrainian civilians and partisans in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 12 that Russian forces are actively searching citizens, conducting raids, and checking phones at checkpoints as Russian occupation authorities have strengthened the police-administrative regime in occupied territories.[lx]

Russian forces continue to face logistical issues in treating wounded Russian servicemen in occupied territories. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 12 that Russian forces are running out of space to house and treat wounded Russian servicemen in Luhansk Oblast and emphasized that Russian forces are importing doctors from Russia.[lxi]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to target Ukrainian children in an effort to consolidate social control in occupied territories. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushenko stated on January 12 that Russian occupation authorities in Mariupol are prioritizing lessons in Russian history and the Russian language as they continue to proliferate Russian propaganda in Mariupol schools.[lxii]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 12 that Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Oleg Salyukov (who was appointed as one of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s three “deputies” as theater commander in Ukraine on January 11), arrived in Belarus to take control of combat coordination exercises for the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV).[lxiii] The MoD claimed that Russian forces will continue intensive combat training at Belarusian training grounds but did not specify the exercises’ parameters.[lxiv] ISW will expand its assessment of Salyukov’s arrival to Belarus in a January 15 special edition update

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on January 12 that Russian forces will break its established pattern for annual strategic command staff exercises and will conduct Zapad (West) 2023 exercises with Belarusian forces instead of the previously planned Center 2023 exercises.[lxv] The last Zapad exercises—which historically occurred once every four years—were in 2021.[lxvi] Hromov stated that Russian and Belarusian forces additionally still plan to conduct Union Shield-2023 exercises and that Russia will continue deploying forces to Belarus for Zapad 2023 and Union Shield 2023.[lxvii]
• Hromov stated on January 12 that Belarusian authorities extended restrictions on civilian aircraft in Brest and Gomel Oblasts until April 1, 2023.[lxviii] Hromov stated Russian forces are organizing an aviation group in Belarus under the guise of conducting joint tactical flight exercises from January 16 to February 1 and deployed at least 10 Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters to the Machulishchi airfield in Minsk Oblast in the past week.[lxix]
• Belarusian units continue conducting exercises. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that elements of the Belarusian 19th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted exercises on January 12.[lxx] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that elements of the 11th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted exercises as part of the RGV on January 12.[lxxi]
• Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Vadym Prystaiko stated on January 11 that Ukrainian forces deployed formations to northern Ukraine because an “attack from Belarus is possible.”[lxxii] Prystaiko stated that a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine would lead to the collapse of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s government and that Russian forces are deployed to Belarus in a likely effort to fix Ukrainian forces to the northern border.[lxxiii]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant-General Serhiy Nayev stated on January 12 that the situation in Belarus is not a direct threat to Ukraine and that Ukrainian officials have not observed changes in the quantity or quality of Belarusian military units deployed along the border with Ukraine.[lxxiv]
• Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on January 12 that there are currently no signs of Russian forces forming a strike group in Belarus.[lxxv]
• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 12.[lxxvi]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.