Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2023

June 10, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10. Russian sources reported Ukrainian activity in Luhansk Oblast near Bilohorivka.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,400m in unspecified areas of the Bakhmut front, and Russian milbloggers reported Ukrainian advances northwest and northeast of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted localized attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, particularly in the Velyka Novosilka area.[3] Geolocated footage posted on June 10 additionally indicates that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast made localized gains during counterattacks southwest and southeast of Orikhiv, and Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces in this area are successfully defending against attempted Ukrainian advances.[4]

Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine are relying on three main components: early detection and destruction of Ukrainian assault formations, massive use of anti-tank weapons, and mining of territories near Russian defensive positions.[5] The milblogger claimed that minefields have a twofold effect by initially damaging Ukrainian armored vehicles when they attempt to breakthrough the minefield and then again when they retreat from the area.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces responded to the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast following established Russian doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, and a second echelon of forces to counterattack against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Russian reporting of Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine in recent days suggests a pattern in which Ukrainian forces conduct limited breakthroughs and temporarily occupy new positions before Russian forces later recapture or push Ukrainian forces out of those positions.[8] This tactical pattern indicates that Russian forces have likely maintained doctrinally sound defensive operations in southern Ukraine, though as ISW previously reported, defending units of the 58th CAA are likely some of the most effective Russian units currently deployed in Ukraine.[9]

Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian EW units are disrupting Ukrainian communications as well as aviation units and alleged that some Ukrainian mechanized groups were not prepared to fight without communications or with suppressed GPS.[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted their own “electronic counter measures” against Russian reconnaissance and control capabilities in areas where there are Ukrainian assaults but that these attempts were unsuccessful.[11] Russian forces have reportedly successfully improved their EW use throughout the invasion of Ukraine.[12]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are launching assaults at night because Western-provided equipment provides Ukrainian forces with “excellent” night vision optics.[13] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov also claimed that night assaults allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively use Western-provided equipment.[14] Russian sources have widely claimed that Ukrainian forces have started or intensified assaults at night in recent days, and Ukrainian forces may be increasingly leveraging the advantages provided by Western systems.[15]

Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems against Ukrainian attacks, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days. Geolocated footage published on June 8 and 9 confirms that Ukrainian forces have used Western precision munitions (reportedly the Paladin 155mm artillery system) to destroy at least two Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems – highly destructive but scarce artillery assets controlled at the Russian military district level – in western and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) highlighted the role of Russian thermobaric artillery systems in striking Ukrainian positions on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian thermobaric artillery units have consistently fired on Ukrainian forces on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border and in western Zaporizhia Oblast for the past several days and characterized the units as essential to repelling Ukrainian frontal assaults.[18] Russian forces’ apparent reliance on specific artillery assets is noteworthy, as precision Ukrainian strikes on these systems could potentially complicate Russian defensive capabilities and Russian forces are unlikely to possess enough TOS-1A systems to provide the same level of fire support all along the front line.

Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations. Ukrainian forces are unsurprisingly taking casualties in initial attacks against some of the best-prepared Russian forces in Ukraine. However, initial attacks – and particularly selected footage that Russian sources are intentionally disseminating and highlighting – are not representative of all Ukrainian operations. The Russian military remains dangerous and Ukrainian forces certainly face a hard fight, but Ukraine has not yet committed the vast majority of its counteroffensive forces and Russian defenses are not uniformly strong along all sectors of the front line.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian MoD and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin in a statement on June 9. Kadyrov published a post to Telegram on June 9 outlining the details of a private phone call that occurred between Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in late May after Kadyrov and Prigozhin reportedly reached an agreement for Chechen forces to replace Wagner in Bakhmut.[19] The interactions between Kadyrov and Prigozhin rapidly deteriorated in subsequent days, but Prigozhin claimed that he personally called Kadyrov on June 1 to resolve their dispute.[20] Kadyrov claimed on June 9 that he genuinely believed he was doing his best to help Prigozhin by offering for Chechen troops to replace Wagner fighters but that Prigozhin’s tone towards Kadyrov and the Chechen troops changed suddenly, and Kadyrov felt as though he had to personally mitigate.[21] Kadyrov also noted that he himself has occasionally criticized the Russian MoD but rhetorically drew a line against criticizing Putin directly, claiming he has always understood that Putin’s position as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces means that Putin has the best understanding of battlefield realities.[22] Kadyrov then criticized Wagner for being a weak and ineffective force when faced with the same operational restraints as Chechen forces in previous phases of the war.[23] Kadyrov’s message likely sought to signal his loyalty to Putin and portray Prigozhin as further at odds with the overall Russian military leadership.

Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10. Ukrainian Air Force Command reported on June 10 that Russian forces launched eight ground-based missiles of various types and 35 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine from the northern and southern directions and hit an operational airfield in Poltava Oblast with Iskander ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and Iranian-made drones.[24] Poltava Oblast Head Dmytro Lunin noted that the strike damaged airfield infrastructure and other unspecified equipment.[25] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) spokesperson Eduard Basurin praised the strike for “finally” targeting Ukrainian airfields.[26] ISW recently assessed that Russia is conducting a new air campaign to target Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities, and Russian sources will likely use reporting of such strikes to frame the current air campaign as proactive and effective over the backdrop of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout the theater.[27]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10.
• Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine.
• Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems.
• Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems in defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days.
• Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10.
• Russian forces made marginal advances northeast of Kupyansk and continued ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and have made marginal gains in the area as of June 10.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 10 that it plans to formalize the organization of volunteer formations.
• Russia is further consolidating a centralized media apparatus in occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces made marginal advances northeast of Kupyansk on June 10. Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances northwest of Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk).[28] The Russian MoD reported that Russian forces suppressed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novomlynsk (20km northeast of Kupyansk), Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), and Orlianka (22km east of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast and Stelmakhivka, Luhansk Oblast (16km northwest of Svatove).[29]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that combat engagements continue near Bilohorivka and that a Russian artillery unit repelled a small Ukrainian mechanized group that attempted to break through Russian defenses in the area.[31]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik claimed on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Lysychansk (15km southwest of Kreminna) 15 times over the past week.[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian missile targeting administrative buildings in Luhansk City on June 9.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 10. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian troops advanced up to 1,400m in different unspecified areas of the Bakhmut front.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks and advanced northwest of Bakhmut, particularly near Berkhikvka (2km northwest of Bakhmut) and Yahidne (on the western outskirts of Bakhmut), and northeast of Bakhmut near Krasnopolivka (10km northeast).[35] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) are defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area.[36] The Russian MoD claimed that troops of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut) and Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[38]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Donetsk City near Sieverne and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City in Marinka.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued unsuccessful assaults on Sieverne from the south, near Opytne.[40] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) posted footage reportedly showing the DNR’s 110th Brigade striking a Ukrainian infantry fighting vehicle near Pervomaiske, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and have made marginal gains in the area as of June 10. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Russian forces retreating from positions west of Storozheve (3km south of Velyka Novosilka), though it is unclear if Ukrainian forces captured these positions.[42] The Russian MoD claimed on June 10 that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian ground attacks near south and southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[43] Battle maps from Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Rivnopil (9km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances south of Neskuchne (immediately south of Velyka Novosilka).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), and a battalion of the 5th Motorized Infantry Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) are defending against Ukrainian forces in the area.[46]

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on June 9 to 10 and made gains in the area. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces advanced west and south of Lobkove (24km southwest of Orikhiv) and west of Novopokrovka (14km southeast of Orikhiv).[47] Battle maps from Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured Lobkove.[48] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks and that Russian forces struck Ukrainian armored vehicles south and southeast of Orikhiv.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, chiefly elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army, repelled Ukrainian ground attacks south of Orikhiv) overnight on June 9 to 10.[50] Russian milbloggers praised the 70th and 291st Motorized Rifle regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) for conducting successful defensive operations south of Orikhiv.[51] Russian sources also claimed that the 22nd and 45th Separate Guards Spetsnaz brigades (both of the GRU) also destroyed Ukrainian armored vehicles southeast of Orikhiv.[52]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian rear areas of Kherson Oblast and Crimea on June 10. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows the aftermath of reported Ukrainian strikes against Zalizhnyi Port (45km west of Skadovsk on the Black Sea coast) overnight.[53] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian Hrim-2 ballistic missiles over occupied Crimea.[54] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have fired the missiles using modified S-200 systems, however.[55]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD announced on June 10 that it plans to formalize the organization of volunteer formations. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu signed an order on June 10 defining the procedure for organizing the official activities of volunteer formations.[56] The Russian MoD claims that the order stipulates that volunteers need to sign individual contracts with the MoD or their respective volunteer formations by July 1.[57] The MoD stated that these contracts will give volunteer formations necessary legal status and extend social protection and support measures to volunteers and their family members.[58] The order suggests that some volunteers may be serving without contracts or under contracts that the MoD does not recognize as fully legitimate. The MoD asserted that the formalization of volunteer formations will allow Russian officials to increase contract recruitment. State Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov added at a MoD meeting about contract recruitment on June 10 that there are currently more than 40 volunteer formations serving alongside the Russian Armed Forces.[59] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev previously claimed that the Russian military has recruited more than 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[60] The formalization of irregular volunteer formations is likely to generate tensions within the MoD’s organizational apparatus, particularly as it continues to rely on volunteer formations for ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

The Russian MoD also claimed that the number of contract recruits has increased in recent months. Pankov claimed that 13,500 recruits signed contracts in the first ten days of June, claiming that to be 2.1 times the number of recruits in the first ten days of May and 3.1 times the number of recruits in the first ten days of April.[61] Pankov specifically highlighted Moscow and Sevastopol cities; Altai, Ingushetia, Bashkortostan, Karachay-Cherkess, Komi, Chechnya, and Tuva republics; Astrakhan, Voronezh, Murmansk, Penza, Sakhalin, and Tyumen oblasts, and the Jewish Autonomous Okrug as successfully implementing contract service recruitment plans.[62]

Chechen Human Rights organization North Caucasus SOS (SK SOS) published an investigation on June 10 detailing how Chechen authorities have used coercive measures to support recruitment campaigns since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. SK SOS reported that each Chechen official, imam, and commander received quotas for the number of Chechen residents they had to recruit into volunteer units.[63] SK SOS reported that Chechen authorities began detaining residents under false pretexts and using threats and blackmail to impress Chechens into military service when Chechen officials started to fail to meet these quotas.[64] SK SOS reported that Chechen authorities also held residents in detention centers without documentation or legal proceedings and only allowed residents to leave if they agreed to fight in Ukraine.[65]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia is further consolidating a centralized media apparatus in occupied areas. Russian outlet Vedemosti reported on June 10 that the occupation authorities of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts are “systematizing” information resources on the basis of centralized Russian-controlled news agencies operating in each oblast.[66] Vedemosti interviewed a Russian political scientist who noted that this measure aims to crackdown on the rise of military correspondents, private media sources, and Telegram channels in occupied regions.[67] The centralization of the media apparatus in occupied Ukraine will likely further restrict the information environment in these areas and allow occupation authorities greater oversight of the predominant propaganda lines in occupied territories.

A Ukrainian report claimed that Crimea is suffering with water supply issues following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam. The Ukrainian Resistance Center claimed that the Kremlin instructed the Crimean occupation administration to solve the issue of water supply to Crimea and that the Crimean occupation administration is avoiding wide coverage of the water supply issue.[68] A Russian source amplified a footage reportedly showing that the North Crimean Canal, which has supplied water to occupied Crimea from the Dnipro River during the Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast, has become dry.[69] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov has previously claimed that Crimea faces no water supply issues.[70] Russia notably was able to maintain water supplies to occupied Crimea prior to the 2022 full scale invasion and the capture of parts of Kherson Oblast, as ISW has previously reported.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting, and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/yurii_yurov_XXI/4990; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11762

[2] https://suspilne dot media/503290-ukrainski-voini-se-bilse-prosunulis-vpered-pid-bahmutom/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88569

[3] https://t.me/wargonzo/13135; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21957; https://t.me/wargonzo/13144; https://t.me/mod_russia/27282

[4] https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1667391840536993793?s=20; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1667321094083158017?s=20; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1667347478633390084?s=20; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1667293696025395202?s=20; https://twitter.com/Bodbe6/status/1667297756082237441?s=20; https://t.me/readovkanews/60501; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47016 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47018; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11759; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7937 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7941; https://t.me/rybar/48327; https://t.me/voin_dv/3119; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88549; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26411; https://t.me/wargonzo/13124; https://t.me/wargonzo/13125; https://t.me/wargonzo/13126; https://t.me/wargonzo/13148; https://t.me/epoddubny/16338 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16342

[5] https://t.me/milchronicles/2034

[6] https://t.me/milchronicles/2034

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2023

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2023 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2023

[10] https://t.me/sashakots/40297 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7937

[11] https://t.me/epoddubny/16338

[12] https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf; https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf.

[13] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7915

[14] https://t.me/vrogov/10211 ; https://t.me/vrogov/10210

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2023

[16] https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1667206234590662657?s=20; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1667245444844474368?s=20; https://t.me/grey_zone/19064; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1667258165891682314?s=20; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1666829209828720641?s=20

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/27281; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1667390261905829891?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/3118

[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47039

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053123

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060323

[21] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3683

[22] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3683

[23] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3683

[24] https://t.me/kpszsu/2558; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667433876816273409?s=20; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/10/vnochi-syly-ppo-znyshhyly-2-rakety-i-20-shahed-protyvnyka/

[25] https://suspilne dot media/503257-rosijska-armia-obstrilala-mirgorod-na-poltavsini/; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1667434528086937600?s=20

[26] https://t.me/basurin_e/2774

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051423

[28] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1667565131876782083?s=20; https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1667560917876236289?s=20

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/27282

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xzCaTFwcpCJV22dZmfGBKoKqBmr6RrVTCpEm81MMqiZ5DRyhNnyGLwvZFMAikhwHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c9Tn8ttwnC5UfDWnXeLsh27TXhQZABWoAUvF9owAW9GLwUP6wx2J2qDnoFk4wcNNl

[31] https://t.me/yurii_yurov_XXI/4990

[32] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11761

[33] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17978649 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/60486

[34] https://suspilne dot media/503290-ukrainski-voini-se-bilse-prosunulis-vpered-pid-bahmutom/

[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47076; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88569

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47076; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21991

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/27282

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c9Tn8ttwnC5UfDWnXeLsh27TXhQZABWoAUvF9owAW9GLwUP6wx2J2qDnoFk4wcNNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xzCaTFwcpCJV22dZmfGBKoKqBmr6RrVTCpEm81MMqiZ5DRyhNnyGLwvZFMAikhwHl

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02c9Tn8ttwnC5UfDWnXeLsh27TXhQZABWoAUvF9owAW9GLwUP6wx2J2qDnoFk4wcNNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xzCaTFwcpCJV22dZmfGBKoKqBmr6RrVTCpEm81MMqiZ5DRyhNnyGLwvZFMAikhwHl

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/13135

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10438

[42] https://twitter.com/sternenko/status/1667135239980711938?s=20; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1667553742537801729?s=20

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/27282

[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/13135; https://xn----7sbaj0b2akkg.xn--p1ai/

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/13144

[46] https://t.me/rybar/48346; https://t.me/milinfolive/101980; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88581; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21957

[47] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1667321094083158017?s=20; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1667347478633390084?s=20; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1667293696025395202?s=20; https://twitter.com/Bodbe6/status/1667297756082237441?s=20; https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1667391840536993793?s=20

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/13135; https://xn----7sbaj0b2akkg.xn--p1ai/

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/27282

[50] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/18282 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9297 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/17388 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/13125; https://t.me/rusich_army/9299 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9297; https://t.me/rusich_army/9305 ; https://t.me/rybar/48320; https://t.me/vrogov/10215 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47008 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47001 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47018; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47016 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47018; https://t.me/wargonzo/13148; https://t.me/wargonzo/13135; https://t.me/wargonzo/13125; https://t.me/wargonzo/13126

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47016 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47018; https://t.me/vrogov/10215 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47008 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47001 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47018

[52] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26411; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46995 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/101957; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7936; https://t.me/voenacher/46353; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10184; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47069; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10200

[53] https://twitter.com/ItsArtoir/status/1667522816927756292?s=20 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/9349; ttps://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1667528302213357570?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1667447743822852099?s=20

[54] https://t.me/vrogov/10209 ; https://t.me/Aksenov82/2651; https://t.me/readovkanews/60506; https://t.me/bbcrussian/47644; https://t.me/rybar/48333 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47023; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88558

[55] https://t.me/rybar/48350

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/27277

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/27277

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/27277

[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/27277

[60] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/27277

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/27277

[63] https://sksos dot org/chechentsy-na-voyne-v-ukraine/

[64] https://sksos dot org/chechentsy-na-voyne-v-ukraine/

[65] https://sksos dot org/chechentsy-na-voyne-v-ukraine/

[66] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/06/09/979430-rabota-osnovnih-smi-dnr-lnr-hersonskoi-i-zaporozhskoi-oblastei-budet-sistematizirovana

[67] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/06/09/979430-rabota-osnovnih-smi-dnr-lnr-hersonskoi-i-zaporozhskoi-oblastei-budet-sistematizirovana

[68] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/okupanty-v-krymu-ne-znayut-yak-vyrishyty-problemy-z-vodopostachannyam-cherez-terakt-na-ges/

[69] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/25426

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023

[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21