June 14, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2023

June 14, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on June 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 14 that Ukrainian troops have advanced between 200 to 500 meters in unspecified sectors of the Bakhmut front and 300 to 350 meters in unspecified parts of the Zaporizhia direction.[1] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing counterattacks on the northwestern, northeastern, and southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[2] Ukrainian and Russian sources additionally reported that fighting continued in western Donetsk Oblast, particularly around Makarivka (directly south of Velyka Novosilka), and in western Zaporizhia Oblast south of Orikhiv.[3] Russian milbloggers speculated that heavy rain and poor weather in southern Ukraine may have decreased the tempo of Ukrainian attacks, but Malyar emphasized that weather conditions do not always have an impact of Ukrainian offensive actions.[4] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen noted that Ukrainian forces in the Tavrisk (Zaporizhia) direction are prioritizing strikes on Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, and ISW has previously assessed that Russian EW capabilities have been critical in complicating Ukrainian attacks on this sector of the front.[5] US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh affirmed the United States’ commitment to partially replacing Ukrainian losses of the US-provided equipment used in counteroffensive operations but noted that there may not be a one-for-one replacement ratio.[6]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders. ISW has observed both of the 20th CAA’s divisions, the 144th and 3rd Motorized Rifle Divisions, operating in the Kreminna area for the past several months and could not confirm which division was struck by the Ukrainian forces.[7] Russian sources claimed that the division waited two hours in one location while waiting for 20th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Sukhrab Akhmedov to arrive and deliver a speech before the division conducted offensive operations.[8] One milblogger suggested that the reported Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed around 100 Russian personnel and wounded another 100, although ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of the strike or its aftermath.[9]

Milbloggers rightfully criticized the poor decision to concentrate a large number of Russian forces within range of Ukrainian fire for such a long time and used the situation to reiterate longstanding critiques of ineffective Russian command.[10] The outrage is reminiscent of previous instances of notable irresponsible Russian military actions resulting in dramatic losses, particularly the December 31, 2022, Ukrainian strike on a large Russian force concentration in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast.[11] Russian milbloggers previously urged for Russian officials to hold the Russian military leadership accountable for the Makiivka strike, and milbloggers have routinely attempted to place the blame for large scale Russian military failures on individual commanders.[12] Milbloggers complained that Akhmedov and similar commanders continue to occupy key positions instead of being held accountable, a longstanding complaint that is indicative of widespread disdain for the traditional Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) establishment.[13] One milblogger even called for the responsible commanders to be shot in front of their formations, whether they are colonel or generals.[14]

Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition. Some Russian sources claimed on June 14 that Delimkhanov was dead or wounded, and some claimed a Ukrainian strike killed or wounded him in an unspecified location.[15] Other Russian sources including Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmat Special Forces Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov, and Russian Duma Deputy Andrey Kartopolov later claimed that Delimkhanov was alive and unharmed.[16] Kadyrov published a video on June 14 of himself with Delimkhanov on an unspecified date after rumors began circulating about Delimkhanov’s condition.[17] Kadyrov then claimed that Ukrainian media was circulating reports of Delimkhanov’s death (ignoring that many of the reports originated from Russian sources) as part of an information operation, but did not elaborate on the intent of the supposed information operation.[18]

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched six Kh-22 cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles, and 10 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Kh-22 missiles and nine Shaheds.[19] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev reported that Russian forces targeted infrastructure facilities in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa oblasts.[20]

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders.
  • Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition.
  • Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction and south of Kreminna.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area as of June 14.
  • Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14.
  • Satellite imagery suggests that Russian helicopters defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine are likely deployed to an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • A Russian State Duma bill aimed at raising the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin may be aiming to shield specific generations from the demographic and social impacts of the war in Ukraine.
  • Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction and south of Kreminna on June 14. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces conducted seven ground attacks on Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Vesele and Rozdolivka (both 30km south of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[23] Geolocated footage published on June 14 shows that elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division continue to operate near Kreminna.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced between 200 to 500 meters in unspecified areas on the flanks of Bakhmut over the past day.[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted on June 13 that the intensity of hostilities in the Bakhmut area decreased slightly and reported that regular Russian elements, including airborne (VDV) units, continue to deploy to the Bakhmut area to take over former Wagner Group positions.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka (8km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest), northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (1km northwest), and Berkhivka (3km northwest), and northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka (15km northeast).[27] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) firing at Ukrainian drones on the flanks of Bakhmut.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne, Berkhivka, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest) and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (3km southwest) and Bila Hora (13km southwest).[29]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Avdiivka and in Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[30] Geolocated footage posted on June 13 shows that Russian forces have made an incremental advance in western Marinka.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka and in Marinka.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area as of June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 300 to 350m in the Zaporizhia direction over the previous day.[33] Ukrainian officials also reported that fighting continues near Makarivka (6km south of Velyka Novosilka).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Makarivka on the evening of June 13 after Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement earlier in the day.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces introduced reserves to positions south of Velyka Novosilka to stop Ukrainian advances in the area and that Russian troops are currently counterattacking south and southwest of Makarivka.[36] Geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces retain control over Makarivka.[37] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian assaults southwest and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[38] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are defending in western Donetsk Oblast area in accord with Russian tactical defensive doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of defense forces to repel or slow attacking forces while a second echelon of forces counterattacks against any enemy breakthrough.[39] ISW also previously noted that initial Ukrainian assaults and Russian defensive operations should not be extrapolated to predict the outcome of all Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[40]

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to fight Russian forces near Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully conducted limited assaults southwest of Orikhiv and are continuing reconnaissance-in-force operations in the area.[42]

Satellite imagery suggests that Russian helicopters defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine are likely deployed to an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces deployed 20 new helicopters to the airfield in Berdyansk between May 31 and June 13, which corresponds with the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.[43] The imagery shows that Russian forces have a total of 27 helicopters at the airfield, including five Ka-52 helicopters, nine Mi-8 or Mi-24 helicopters, and 13 Ka-29 helicopters.[44] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian helicopters are actively defending in areas where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations and that Russian forces continue to destroy Western-provided Ukrainian equipment.[45]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian State Duma bill aimed at raising the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin may be aiming to shield specific generations from the demographic and social impacts of the war in Ukraine. The Russian State Duma adopted the first reading of a bill introducing an incremental increase of the military service draft age.[46] The bill proposes that the draft age range will be 19-30 years old in 2024, 20 to 30 years old in 2025, and 21 to 30 years old in 2026. The bill also stipulates that those aged 18 and older can still join the Russian military regardless of the draft age brackets. ISW previously assessed that the gradual increase in the minimum age of conscripts could suggest that the Kremlin is targeting the generation currently suffering losses due to the war in Ukraine and attempting to shield the younger generation from economic, social, and demographic impact of the war.[47]

The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize foreigners to serve in the Russian military. The Russian State Duma adopted the second reading of a bill aimed at simplifying the process of issuing residence permits to foreign highly skilled workers who signed contracts with the Russian military since the start of the war in February 2022.[48] The law will only apply to highly skilled workers who have already worked in Russia in their specialties for a minimum of two years.[49] ISW has previously reported on Russian legislation aimed at incentivizing military service, which now appears to be extending to incorporate foreigners living in Russia.[50]

The Kremlin continues efforts to increase drone production. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list of instructions aimed at developing the market for drones, including eliminating administrative barriers for drone usage and integrating all drones into the unified Russian airspace.[51] The Kremlin will also establish drone support, design and production centers in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan; Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Samara, Sakhalin, Tomsk, and Tula Oblasts; and the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Russian-occupied Sevastopol.[52] ISW previously reported that Iran is helping Russia establish a drone manufacturing factory in Tatarstan, suggesting that Russia may be partially trying to leverage its relationship with Iran to increase drone production.[53]

Russian forces reportedly doubled the trained dolphins defending the Russian naval base in Sevastopol in occupied Crimea. Online news outlet Naval News reported on June 14 that Russian forces have likely increased the number of dolphins defending the naval base from about three to four to about six to seven and will likely increase their patrol frequency.[54]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on June 14 that he signed agreements on “trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural relations” with the occupation government of Crimea and the Republic of Kalmykia while at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.[55]

Russian sources claimed that unidentified actors unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate an occupation official in Melitopol on June 14. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that an unknown person planted an improvised explosive device (IED) under the car of the head of the occupation department for the “Road Administration of Zaporizhia Oblast” near an apartment building in Melitopol.[56] Rogov reported that the owner of the car noticed the IED and reported it before it could detonate.[57] The Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Investigative Committee opened a criminal case in response to the attempted attack.[58]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/annamaliar/846

[2] https://t.me/wargonzo/13239; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47298

[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/846; https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2224; https://t.me/rybar/48474 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/8059 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47272; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89004; https://t.me/wargonzo/13249; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47261

[4] https://t.me/rusich_army/9381; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/13/sytuacziya-na-fronti-dynamichno-rozvyvayetsya-ganna-malyar/; https://t.me/vrogov/10289

[5] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/14/rosijski-kompleksy-reb-odni-z-priorytetnyh-czilej-dlya-nashoyi-artyleriyi-valerij-shershen/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/14/u-rajoni-maryinky-nashi-zahysnyky-vidbyly-vsi-vorozhi-ataky-valerij-shershen/

[6] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3427251/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/ ; https://suspilne dot media/507070-pentagon-ne-pidtverdzue-zaavi-rf-pro-vtrati-ukraini-u-bronetehnici/

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023

[8] https://t.me/strelkovii/5439 ; https://t.me/rybar/48491 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/19136 ; https://t.me/voenacher/46645 ; https://t.me/rybar/48493 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/17852

[9] https://t.me/zlochan/6615 ; https://t.me/astrapress/29765.

[10] https://t.me/strelkovii/5439 ; https://t.me/rybar/48491 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/19136 ; https://t.me/voenacher/46645 ; https://t.me/rybar/48493 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/17852 ; https://t.me/rybar/48494 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/102130 ; https://t.me/rybar/48497 ; https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/49498 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/17838 ;

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010423

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122722 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar1115422 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102822 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010423

[13] https://t.me/grey_zone/19136 ; https://t.me/rybar/48494 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/102130 ; https://t.me/rybar/48497 ; https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/49498

[14] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11955

[15] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89014; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89013 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/60881 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47280

[16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18005195; https://t.me/sotaproject/60888; https://t.me/pravda_oborona/3164 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/60885; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7954

[17] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3699

[18] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3700

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02acZu9LP18HMs8s1GCm4q1EYijYSfvv7qNKL3L4MiDx2qg4AejH3nXVSJdsM2ZcxWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wh4kpmF5TQP5kZiWbYFAN6WYfs8j1ThWXURpGde4f2gKeanmfEKz4atFeVjQTt6Jl

[20] https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2224

[21] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/13/desantni-pidrozdily-rf-yaki-minyayut-vagnerivcziv-pid-bahmutom-prybuvayut-na-pozycziyi-vzhe-demotyvovanymy-sergij-cherevatyj/

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EC5KFCXQ2fVMQZUtXcqG2rBVRAnSYmaWNdrVt2aXgZKagXdRAmvsMfh7v9uZpuoCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02acZu9LP18HMs8s1GCm4q1EYijYSfvv7qNKL3L4MiDx2qg4AejH3nXVSJdsM2ZcxWl

[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/13239

[24] https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1668844857958318080?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1668901388846260225?s=20

[25] https://t.me/annamaliar/846

[26] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/13/desantni-pidrozdily-rf-yaki-minyayut-vagnerivcziv-pid-bahmutom-prybuvayut-na-pozycziyi-vzhe-demotyvovanymy-sergij-cherevatyj/

[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/13239; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47298

[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47265

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02acZu9LP18HMs8s1GCm4q1EYijYSfvv7qNKL3L4MiDx2qg4AejH3nXVSJdsM2ZcxWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EC5KFCXQ2fVMQZUtXcqG2rBVRAnSYmaWNdrVt2aXgZKagXdRAmvsMfh7v9uZpuoCl

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02acZu9LP18HMs8s1GCm4q1EYijYSfvv7qNKL3L4MiDx2qg4AejH3nXVSJdsM2ZcxWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EC5KFCXQ2fVMQZUtXcqG2rBVRAnSYmaWNdrVt2aXgZKagXdRAmvsMfh7v9uZpuoCl

[31] https://t.me/SOLOVEY144/12 ; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1669037699154444289?s=20

 

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/13239

[33] https://t.me/annamaliar/846

[34] https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2224 ; https://t.me/annamaliar/846

[35] https://t.me/rybar/48474 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/8059

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47259 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47272 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47285 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89004; https://t.me/wargonzo/13249

[37] https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1668988717627736064?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1669009732714070016?s=20

[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47272 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47285 ; https://t.me/rybar/48478 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/27427 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/27427

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060823

[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061023

[41] https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2224 ; https://t.me/annamaliar/846

[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47261 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47295 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/13239

[43] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-rosiya-perekynula-helikoptery-berdyansk-aerodrom/32457944.html; https://twitter.com/cxemu/status/1668688240218349582?s=20

[44] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-rosiya-perekynula-helikoptery-berdyansk-aerodrom/32457944.html ; https://twitter.com/cxemu/status/1668688240218349582?s=20

[45] https://t.me/kommunist/17615 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47299 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89011

[46] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18010721; https://t.me/sotaproject/60919 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/14/gosduma-prinyala-v-pervom-chtenii-zakonoproekt-o-povyshenii-prizyvnogo-vozrasta-do-30-let

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2023

[48] https://tass dot ru/politika/18007349; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12778

[49] https://tass dot ru/politika/18007349

[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023;

[51] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/71423

[52] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/71423

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023

[54] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/06/russia-dolphins-ukrainian-attacks/

[55] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3514

[56] https://t.me/vrogov/10307

[57] https://t.me/vrogov/10307 ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2023/06/14/7406787/ ; https://t.me/sledcom_zaporozhye/46

[58] https://t.me/sledcom_zaporozhye/46


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