Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2023

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on June 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. 

Russian and Ukrainian officials are signaling the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. ISW offers no assessment of these signals at this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a “large-scale offensive” across five sectors of the frontline in southwestern Donetsk Oblast on June 4.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks and assigned Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to oversee the southwestern Donetsk frontline.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar noted on June 5 that Ukrainian forces are “transferring to offensive actions” in some unspecified areas of the front.[3] Malyar added that Russian sources are actively spreading information about the Ukrainian counteroffensive to deflect attention from Russian losses in the Bakhmut direction. The Russian MoD’s claims that Russian forces immediately repelled Ukrainian counteroffensives are consistent with previous false Russian claims made during past counteroffensives. Ukrainian forces are likely making limited gains despite Russian denials. ISW will not attempt to assess at this time whether or not these gains are part of broader counter-offensive operations. ISW observed an increase in combat activity in different sectors of the frontline but will not speculate about the intent, weight, or focus of Ukrainian counteroffensives operations.[4] A successful counteroffensive operation may take days, weeks, or even months before its outcome becomes fully clear, during which time Russian sources may falsely claim to have defeated it.

Ukrainian forces made limited advances north and southwest of Bakhmut on June 5. Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations on the eastern front in the Bakhmut area and advanced 200 to 1,600 meters in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), and 100 to 700 meters near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[5] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that mechanized Ukrainian forces also advanced from 300 meters to one kilometer in the direction of Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked the Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut direction for “moving forward” in their areas of responsibility on June 5.[7] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified part of Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) and criticized the Russian military command for previously withdrawing Russian forces from the Berkhivksy Reservoir on May 12 to protect their positions in the settlement.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the direction of Soledar (12km northeast of Bakhmut), likely referring to the wider area north and northeast of Bakhmut.[9] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces fought Ukrainian forces near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut).[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Russian positions in an unspecified location in the Siversk (31km northeast of Bakhmut) area.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault near Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut) and north of Horlivka (26km south of Bakhmut).[12] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut associated with these limited offensives on June 5.

The pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) claimed that it continues to operate in a Russian border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows the RDK personnel operating in Novaya Tavolzhanka (a small settlement about 3km from the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border).[13] The Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), which conducted a raid into Belgorod Oblast with the RDK, published footage purportedly showing LSR forces striking Russian tanks and armored vehicles near the Shebekino checkpoint, about 7km northeast of Novaya Tavolzhanka.[14] The Russian MoD claimed on June 5 that Russian forces and the Russian Border Guard Service repelled two attacks near Novaya Tavolzhanka on June 4, but did not respond to the RDK’s claim that RDK personnel still operate in the settlement.[15]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen forces are ready to defend against raids in Belgorod Oblast, likely in part to keep his forces out of combat in Ukraine. Kadyrov claimed on June 5 that he has 70,000 Chechen servicemen serving in unspecified formations in the Russian military who could defend against the raids into Belgorod Oblast due to their extensive anti-terrorism training.[16] Kadyrov notably stated that the Russian “Commander-in-Chief” – implying Russian President Vladimir Putin – “knows better,” but that Kadyrov wanted to “remind” everyone that Chechen units could have dealt with ”terrorists who invaded Belgorod Oblast.” Kadyrov’s suggestion for Chechen forces to operate in Belgorod Oblast follows Putin‘s order deploying Chechen units to areas along the Donetsk frontline on May 31.[17] Kadyrov’s rhetorical shift towards suggesting that Chechen forces get involved in Belgorod Oblast may suggest a desire to preserve his forces from engaging in combat in more challenging sectors of the front.[18] ISW previously assessed that Kadyrov appeared to have been conserving forces and did not deploy forces to participate in large-scale offensive operations since summer 2022.[19] Kadyrov previously claimed on May 26 that 7,000 Chechen servicemen are operating in Ukraine.[20] If Kadyrov’s claims are close to accurate, only about 10 percent of available Chechen forces are serving in Ukraine, but his statements are impossible to verify.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is attempting to mitigate complications with logistical support in occupied Crimea by shifting resources to mainland Russia. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk reported on June 5 that Russian forces are transferring the Black Sea Fleet’s logistics centers from Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[21] Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are moving the logistics centers because of widespread logistical and ammunition provision issues in occupied Crimea.[22] Humenyuk noted that Russian amphibious ships are continuing to maneuver in the Black Sea and enter Sevastopol, but that the overall center of gravity of the Black Sea Fleet appears to be shifting towards Novorossiysk.[23] Recent strikes on Russian concentration areas, logistics hubs, and transportation assets in southern Ukraine may be causing increased anxiety over the security of the Black Sea Fleet, and the move to Krasnodar Krai is likely in part reflective of this fact.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to exacerbate the divide between the Wagner Group and the Russian MoD. Prigozhin’s press service published a video on June 4 showing a Wagner fighter interrogating a Russian soldier who identified himself as Lieutenant Colonel Roman Venevitin of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps).[24] Venevitin admitted on camera that he ordered his unit to fire on a Wagner vehicle while intoxicated due to his own “personal animosity” towards Wagner.[25] Venevitin appeared to have sustained facial injuries during the time of his capture by Wagner.[26] Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner personnel engaged in a small skirmish with Russian MoD personnel in Semihirya (15km southeast of Bakhmut) on May 17 after the MoD personnel fired on Wagner fighters when they tried to stop the MoD personnel from laying mines in Wagner’s rear.[27] As ISW has previously assessed, Prigozhin continues to inject such anti-MoD narratives into the Russian information space in order to retain his status in the information space following the culmination of Wagner’s Bakhmut offensive and Wagner’s withdrawal from combat in Ukraine.[28] The suggestion that units operating under the Russian MoD are actively firing on Wagner while intoxicated strengthens Prigozhin’s argument that the Russian MoD is a combat-ineffective and somewhat nefarious force.

Russian milbloggers responded to the video of Lieutenant Colonel Venevitin with concern, indicating that several prominent pro-war voices are becoming increasingly concerned over the ramifications of the Wagner-MoD divide. One prominent milblogger called for Venevitin to be tried by the military prosecutor’s office, which would be normal practice in such cases, but noted that the Wagner-MoD conflict “continues to be unhealthy.”[29] Another milblogger who claimed to have personally spoken to Wagner commanders accused both Wagner and MoD units of not knowing what they are fighting for and all of trying to outcompete each other to be “heroes.”[30] Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin noted that the video of Venevitin is another step towards “troubles” regardless of the circumstances of the incident and that Prigozhin is provoking an open war between units ostensibly on the same side of the war.[31] As Prigozhin continues his efforts to maintain informational relevance his rhetorical charades will likely further deepen the divide between the MoD and Wagner, thus hindering the overall combat-effectiveness of both forces and additionally generating increasing discontent in the information space that used to back him.

Key Takeaways

• Russian and Ukrainian officials are signaling the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited successful offensives north and southwest of Bakhmut.
• The pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) claimed that it continues to operate in a Russian border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 5.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen forces are ready to defend against raids in Belgorod Oblast, likely partially in order to keep his forces out of combat in Ukraine.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet is attempting to mitigate complications with logistical support in occupied Crimea by shifting resources to mainland Russia.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to exacerbate the divide between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian milbloggers responded to the video of Lieutenant Colonel Venevitin with concern, indicating that several prominent pro-war voices are becoming increasingly concerned over the ramifications of the Wagner-MoD divide.
• Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations northeast of Kharkiv City and continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and made further limited tactical gains.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine.
• Iran has allegedly signed contracts with Russia for about $1.74 million in ammunition for Russia to use in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources and Belarusian sources indicated that Belarus has been involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations northeast of Kharkiv City on June 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Russian border into Ukraine near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City).[32]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[33] Russian milbloggers also claimed that fighting was ongoing near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka.[34] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk (21km northeast of Kupyansk), while other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the settlement.[35] ISW has not observed visual evidence that Russian forces advanced toward or seized Novomlynsk. The pace of Russian attacks seemingly decreased since June 4.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

See topline for Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions near Nevelske (17km northwest of Donetsk City) and Marinka (20km west of Donetsk City).[37] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), with one source characterizing the attacks as reconnaissance-in-force operations.[38] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[39] The Russian MoD reported that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) units continued to conduct offensive actions near Marinka.[40] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to seize the initiative in Marinka and seized unspecified Russian positions south of Marinka.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and made further limited tactical gains on June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 4 and 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka and within 1.5km northwest of Storozheve (5km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the Shaitanka River and conducted assaults near Novodonetske (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) throughout the day.[43] Milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Novodonetske and maintained a presence within the settlement as of the evening of June 5.[44] Russian ”Vostok” volunteer battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky, who is reportedly commanding forces near Novodonetske, confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within the settlement.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 36th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” Operational Combat Tactical Formation also defended against Ukrainian advances around Novodonetske.[46] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian “battalion tactical groups” (BTGs) reinforced with tanks that attacked IVO Novodonetske and Blahodatne (5km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[47] Ukrainian forces are not organized in BTGs so it is unclear what echelon of Ukrainian forces the Russian MoD claims is participating in these ground attacks. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces recaptured Neskuchne (2km south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 5, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces did so.[48] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to advance near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Rivnopil (11km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Neskuchne and unsuccessfully attempted to seize Russian positions near Pryiutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Levadne (20km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced 500 to 3,000 meters near Rivnopil and Neskuchne.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Novodarivka either on June 4 or 5, although a prominent milblogger claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control the settlement.[51]

Ukrainian forces continue to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander of the Tavria Group of Troops Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 18 Russian anti-aircraft guns and five ammunition storage areas in southern Ukraine.[52] Russian sources claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka (40km north of Melitopol) with unspecified heavy fire and launched a missile strike on Melitopol.[53] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces have recently started to target Russian rear areas in Zaporizhia Oblast more heavily, particularly with Tochka-U and Storm Shadow missiles.[54] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces are primarily targeting transport logistics and other infrastructure facilities.[55]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Iran has reportedly signed contracts with Russia to provide Russian with about $1.74 million in ammunition to use in Ukraine. An anonymous source reportedly showed Sky News two arms contracts between Russia and Iran.[56] The first document purportedly showed samples of artillery and tank ammunition worth over $1 million dated September 14, 2022, and the second document included a contract for artillery shells and barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers worth $740,000. Sky News reported that it was unable to independently verify the authenticity of the documents.

Russian forces are reportedly improving their missile production and increasing missile stockpiles. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the Kremlin is continuing attempts to transition the Russian economy to support the war effort by improving and increasing missile production.[57] Malyar stated that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) is not likely able to entirely replenish its stockpiles to adjust for all the missiles Russian forces have used but can still replenish some of the missiles. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s renewed focus on missile production.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian sources and Belarusian sources indicated that Belarus has been involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration reported on June 5 that the Belarusian Anti-Crisis Administration has recorded at least 2,150 deported Ukrainian children in Belarus since the start of the war.[59] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration noted that the “Dolphin Foundation” and the “Belarusian Foundation” have helped to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children and identified three “places of stay” in Minsk Oblast and one in Gomel Oblast.[60] ISW has previously reported that Ukrainian officials are aware of the Belarusian facilitation of deportation schemes.[61]

Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is intensifying counter-partisan activity in occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 5 that the FSB recently transferred agents to occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and are working with youth collaborators to identify underground partisan networks.[62] The Resistance Center also stated that the FSB is checking private homes in occupied Kherson Oblast to identify partisan activity and threaten local populations into receiving Russian passports.[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.