Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

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Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to aggrandize tactical details and exaggerate Russian battlefield gains to create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse. Gerasimov visited the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (GoF) command on March 16 and claimed that Russian forces seized 12 settlements in Ukraine in the first two weeks of March 2026 (between roughly March 1 and 14).[1] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized two settlements in the first two weeks of March 2026. Gerasimov exaggerated claimed Russian advances in tiny villages throughout the frontline in an effort to frame these advances as significant and convince the West and Ukraine to give in to Russian territorial demands. Gerasimov claimed that the Russian Western GoF seized Drobysheve, Yarova, Sosnove (all northwest of Lyman); that the Russian Southern GoF seized Riznykivka and Kalenyky (both east of Slovyansk) and Holubivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka); and that the Russian Dnepr GoF seized Veselyanka (northwest of Orikhiv).[2] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in 24 percent of Drobysheve, 50 percent of Yarova, and zero percent of Sosnove; that Russian forces have operated in 57 percent of Riznykivka and zero percent of Holubivka, Kalenyky, or Veselyanka. Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces pushed the frontline more than 12 kilometers west of Siversk and that the Russian Western GoF control more than 85 percent of Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[3] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced 4.55 kilometers and infiltrated 7.7 kilometers west of Siversk, but has not observed any evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy any part of Novoosynove. Gerasimov notably made similar speeches, exaggerating purported battlefield gains in mid-January and February 2026.[4] Gerasimov may conduct such briefings on a monthly basis going forward as part of a cognitive warfare campaign.

Gerasimov reiterated his December 29 claim that Russian forces control over half of Lyman, but presented it as a recent claim, likely to create a false impression that Russian forces are rapidly advancing on the battlefield.[5] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces likely cleared previously contested sections of Lyman on a prior date, given that the spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 17 that there is no Russian presence in Lyman whatsoever and that ISW has not observed evidence of Russian forces operating in Lyman since February 23, 2026.[6] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control over 60 percent of Kostyantynivka though ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only operated in 7.85 percent of Kostyantynivka.[7] A Russian milblogger criticized Gerasimov's false characterization of the situation in Kostyantynivka and Lyman and accused Gerasimov of ignoring and refusing to learn from the impacts of the Russian military command's false claims about the situation in Kupyansk, which Ukrainian forces largely liberated in December 2025, following premature and false Russian claims that Russian forces seized all of Kupyansk in November 2025.[8]

Gerasimov attempted to downplay Ukrainian successes in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, claiming that the Russian Eastern GoF maintain the initiative, are actively advancing, and are repelling all Ukrainian counterattacks from the directions of Pokrovske (just north of Oleksandrivka) and Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[9] Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated over 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions from late January 2026 to mid-March 2026 in two separate drives, however.[10] Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces continue to expand the “buffer zone” in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and highlighted the claimed seizures of Bobylivka, Rohizne, Chervona Zorya, Mala Bobylivka (all northwest of Sumy City), and Kruhle (northeast of Kharkiv City).[11] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are conducting limited cross-border attacks into these small villages to generate informational effects and convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing, such that Ukraine should concede to all of Russia’s demands.[12] Ukraine’s frontlines, in fact, are operationally stable, and Ukraine liberated more territory than Russian forces seized in the theater in February 2026.[13]

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu acknowledged the increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), including deep into Russian territory. Shoigu stated on March 17 that Ukrainian airstrikes (presumably referring to both drone and missile strikes) against “infrastructure” across all Russian federal subjects increased almost fourfold in 2025 to 23,000, up from 6,200 in 2024.[14] Shoigu further stated that Ukrainian forces have gained the ability to conduct airstrikes against targets in the Ural region and that the region is now in the “immediate threat zone.” Shoigu stated that unspecified states are developing weapons and methods at such a rate that not one region of Russia can feel safe,” and that the situation in the Middle East is increasing threats of terrorist attacks against critical Russian infrastructure. Shoigu’s acknowledgement of the increased effectiveness of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is noteworthy as Russian officials have typically downplayed its effects.[15] Shoigu’s statements may be part of an information space condition setting effort that aims to highlight that the impact of the war affects all of Russia rather than just border regions near the frontline, potentially to justify future rolling mobilization and continued broad internet shutdowns.[16]

Russia continues to expand its intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on March 17, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Russia has been providing Iran with satellite imagery and drone technology and advice to support Iran's strike campaign against Israeli and the US forces.[17] Anonymous sources familiar with the matter, including a senior European intelligence officer, told the WSJ that Russia provided Iran with modified Shahed drone components meant to improve communication, navigation, targeting, and specific advice for conducting drone strikes, including at what altitude and how many drones Iran should launch. A senior European intelligence officer and a Middle Eastern diplomat reported that Russia provided Iran with satellite imagery, which another official said came from satellites the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) manage, to assist recent Iranian strikes on US forces in the Middle East and US allies in the region. ISW continues to assess that Russia sees aiding Iran’s strike campaign as an effort to weaken the United States, as Russia has self-defined the United States as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.[18]

Telegram founder Pavel Durov has not commented on the widely discussed possibility that Russian authorities may ban Telegram outright. Durov has not made any public statements responding to reports that Russian authorities are cracking down on and criminalizing Telegram since his initial response to the Kremlin's February 9-10 Telegram throttle.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov additionally stated on March 17 that he is unaware of any contact between the Russian government and Telegram management.[20] Russian authorities notably opened a criminal case against Durov on February 24 on suspicion of aiding terrorism, possibly as part of a pretext to justify a future Telegram ban.[21] The Russian government has implemented increasingly stringent Telegram restrictions since early February and very well may ban the app entirely in the coming weeks or months as part of its ongoing effort to reassert control over the Russian information space.[22] The Russian government has also more frequently restricted internet access since early March, particularly in Moscow City and St. Petersburg, as part of the Kremlin's escalating internet censorship campaign since late 2025 and early 2026.[23] The Government of St. Petersburg’s Committee on Information Technology and Communications stated on March 17 that Russian authorities may impose mobile internet outages in some parts of St. Petersburg “for security reasons.”[24] The Kremlin will likely continue these censorship measures in the future, particularly as the Kremlin faces increasingly difficult and unpopular decisions to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.

Ukraine is leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) integration and deepening defense cooperation with the UK to enhance battlefield effectiveness and long-term technological advantages. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced on March 17 that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is establishing the A1 Defense AI Center with UK support to operationalize battlefield data into autonomous systems and expand capabilities across drone warfare, mid-range strike, deep strike, and artillery domains.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer released a joint statement on March 17 stating that Ukraine and the UK will expand joint-defense industrial cooperation, including drone production, to support Ukraine's needs on the battlefield and develop British expertise.[26] Fedorov noted on March 12 that Ukraine began providing its battlefield data to allies and partners for the first time ever to train AI models for unmanned systems based on real battlefield data.[27] Fedorov stated that Ukrainian forces are using this combat data to train neural networks within its Delta system — the expansive open-architecture command and control common operating picture software that is designed to gather and analyze data to support decision making — to automatically identify ground and aerial targets.[28] Ukraine's continued development and integration of its AI-enabled systems, particularly through Delta, is enhancing battlefield effectiveness, in line with ISW's previous assessments about Ukrainian capabilities development.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to aggrandize tactical details and exaggerate Russian battlefield gains to create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu acknowledged the increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), including deep into Russian territory.
• Russia continues to expand its intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East.
• Telegram founder Pavel Durov has not commented on the widely discussed possibility that Russian authorities may ban Telegram outright.
• Ukraine is leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) integration and deepening defense cooperation with the UK to enhance battlefield effectiveness and long-term technological advantages.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.
• Ukrainian forces likely struck Russian defense industrial infrastructure. Russian forces launched 178 drones against Ukraine, including Odesa, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian air defense systems in border regions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Tor-M2U air defense system near Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 40 kilometers from the international border) on March 16 or the night of March 16 to 17.[30]

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian aircraft repair plant in Novgorod Oblast on the night of March 16 to 17. Russian opposition source Astra stated on March 17 that local social media groups reported a drone strike against the 123rd Aircraft Repair Plant in Staraya Russa, Novgorod Oblast.[31] A Ukrainian source posted footage reportedly showing a drone strike against the plant and stated that Russian aviation monitoring channels reported that there were two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at the plant at the time.[32]

The March 15-16 Ukrainian strike reportedly set almost the entire Labinsk oil depot on fire.[33] Astra reported on March 17 that its sources in the Krasnodar Krai emergency services stated that four Ukrainian drones caused nine gasoline tanks, nine diesel fuel tanks, and seven fuel tankers to catch fire.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for additional unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 17 that Russian forces seized Sopych (northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[34] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Potapivka (just southeast of Sopych) but that there are no reports of large-scale offensive operations in the area.[35] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Potapivka and south of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[36]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including northwest of Sumy City near Sopych, north of Sumy City toward Mala Korchakivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and southwest of Sumy City near Hrabovske, on March 16 and 17.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sopych.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and vehicles in the Sumy direction.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya and toward Pishchane, Verkhnya Pysarivka, Bochkove, and Okhrimivka on February 16 and 17.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Prylipka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[41]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported fighting in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 17.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked within and near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka, Hlushkivka, and Novoosynove on March 16 and 17.[42]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that roughly 20 Russian servicemembers remain in central Kupyansk.[43] Trehubov stated that Russian forces cannot reach the town's administrative borders and that the soldiers within Kupyansk are therefore cut off from ground supplies, relying entirely on drone drops.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones over Kurylivka.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Borova itself and north of Borova near Novoplatonivka on March 16 and 17.[45]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[46]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian air defense assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system in an unspecified area of occupied Luhansk Oblast on March 15 or 16.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

See topline text for additional unconfirmed Russian claims of advance in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 17 that there is no Russian presence in Lyman, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely cleared previously contested parts of Lyman on a prior date.[48]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in central Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle (FEBA).[49]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman) and southwest of Riznykivka.[50]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Lypivka and toward Ozerne and Dibrova; south of Lyman toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan; northeast of Slovyansk near Platonivka; east of Slovyansk near Zakitne, Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, Kalenyky, and Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and Fedorivka Druha on March 16 and 17.[51]

Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps [AC] spokesperson Oleksandr Borodin reported that Ukrainian forces down over 1,500 Russian first-person-view (FPV) drones in the direction each week within the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR) in the Lyman direction.[52]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are clearing Ukrainian positions south of Riznykivka.[53] Artillery elements of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly struck a Ukrainian drone control point near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed that Russian forces seized Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka), in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), east of Dovha Balka, and west of Illinivka (both southwest of Kostyantynivka).[56] A second milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced southeast of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[57]

Refinements of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in southwestern Kostyantynivka, an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[58] Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in the eastern outskirts of and in central Illinivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces are present in these areas, contrary to Russian claims.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Holubivka, Pryvillya, Mykolaivka, and Novomarkove; north of Kostyantynivka toward Podilske; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Pavlivka, and Novopavlivka on March 16 and 17.[60]

The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast State Emergency Service reported on March 17 that Russian forces shelled Oleksandrivka (likely referring to the Oleksandrivka west of Kramatorsk, approximately 27 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 16 to 17, damaging residential infrastructure and killing two civilians.[61] ISW previously assessed that the February 26 and 27 Russian shelling of Bilenke (immediately northeast of Kramatorsk) marked the likely start of artillery preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[62]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction stated on March 17 that Russian forces continue to use both accumulated small infantry groups and mechanized assaults to break through Ukrainian defenses.[63]

Order of Battle: Vertical take-off and landing first-person view (VTOL FPV) drone operators and other elements of the Russian 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) and positions in southern and southwestern Kostyantynivka.[64] Artillery elements of the 1442nd and 1008th motorized rifle regiment (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian positions in northern Kostyantynivka.[65] Artillery elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in the eastern Illinivka.[66] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian UGVs near Novomykolaivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[67]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Nove Shakhove on March 17 but did not advance.[68]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communication systems, equipment, and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Dobropillya, Krasnopodillya (south of Dobropillya), and Nadiia (southwest of Dobropillya).[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and toward Serhiivka (west of Pokrovsk).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka and Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novopidhorodne, Molodetske, and Udachne on March 16 and 17.[71]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces possess fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and concentration areas.[72] The spokesperson stated that improved weather conditions have not significantly affected the battlefield situation.

Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) non-commissioned officer (NCO) and Hero of Russia Vladislav Ivikeyev claimed on March 17 to Kremlin newswire TASS that elements of his unit disguised themselves as local civilians for two months while conducting reconnaissance in the Ukrainian near rear — admitting to committing an act of perfidy.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[74]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian BM-21 Grad Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) near Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk, approximately 8 kilometers from the frontline).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on March 17 but did not advance.

Russian force attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 16 and 17.[76]

Geolocated footage published on March 17 shows Russian forces conducting a roughly reduced company-sized motorized and mechanized assault toward Novopavlivka along the T-04-28 Novopavlivka-Dachne highway on March 17.[77] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source stated March 17 that Russian forces conducted the assault with 15 motorcycles, six all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), three Lada Nivas, and one armored personnel carrier.[78]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Novoivanivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[79]

Russian forces attacked south of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske and toward Zlahoda and Danylivka on March 16 and 17.[80]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Obratne (southeast of Oleksandrivka) on the night of March 16 to 17.[81]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 17 that Russian forces have been unable to retake any of the territory that they recently lost to Ukrainian forces.[82] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are continuing small group infiltration attempts in that direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Novomykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[83] Drone operators of the 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 29th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[84] Drone operators of the Martyn Pushkar Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Orestopil (east of Oleksandrivka).[85] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[86]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian communications node near occupied Manhush (roughly 100 kilometers from the front line) on the night of March 16 to 17.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 that shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian infantry and a motorcyclist in southern Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[88]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipole) and advanced to and northeast of Hulyaipilske (just north of Charivne) and north of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[89]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka, Zirnytsya, Boikove, and Rizdvyanka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Zelene, and Varvarivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne, Hulyaipilske, and Charivne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke on March 16 and 17.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Charivne.[91]

Ukrainian forces continue to target frontline Russian drone operators in the near rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Hulyaipole on March 16 or the night of March 16-17.[92]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces southeast of Hulyaipilske, and drone operators of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Verkhnya Tersa.[93] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Hirke.[94] Drone operators of the Martyn Pushkar Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Solodke (north of Hulyaipole) and Myrne.[95] Counter-drone elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly downing Ukrainian drones in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely referring to the Hulyaipole direction.[96]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[97]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk on March 16 and 17.[98]

Stepnohirsk Military Administration Head Iryna Kondratyuk reported on March 17 that roughly 35 civilians remain in Stepnohirsk and Prymorske and that Russian shelling has destroyed almost 70 percent of the infrastructure in Stepnohirsk.[99]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Novodanylivka.[100] Elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[101] Elements of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[102]

Ukrainian forces continued their short- and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot of the Russian 58th CAA in occupied Terpinnya (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on March 16 to 17.[103] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse in occupied Melitopol (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) and ammunition depots in occupied Terpinnya and Stepne (roughly 88 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[104] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricant depot and Tor-M2U and Tor-M2 air defense systems in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on March 16.[105]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi island on March 17 but did not advance.[106]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators and artillery elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Kherson City.[107]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in and near occupied Crimea overnight on March 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone training center near occupied Henicheska Hirka, Kherson Oblast, and a concentration area of a missile battalion of the Russian 15th Separate Coastal Missile Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) equipped with the Bastion coastal missile system near occupied Verkhnekurhanne in occupied Crimea.[108] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) published geolocated footage on March 17 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian missile system command post and mobile fire group near occupied Verkhnekurhanne and a disguised S-400 air defense system component near occupied Shkilne.[109] Geolocated footage confirms a Ukrainian strike against a logistics depot at Khersones Air Base near occupied Sevastopol that Ukrainian sources reported on March 16.[110]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone attacks against Ukraine on the night of March 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 178 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which over 110 were Shahed drones — from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[111] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 154 drones, that 22 drones struck 12 locations, and that drone debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, port, commercial, residential, and administrative infrastructure in Odesa, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts, leaving over 7,000 subscribers without power in Odesa Oblast and injuring seven in Zaporizhia Oblast.[112]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia continues its efforts to use the Union State framework to de facto annex Belarus. The Russian State Duma ratified on March 17 the Russian-Belarussian agreement on mutual enforcement of court rulings.[113] Russia and Belarus signed the agreement in December 2024, and Belarus ratified it in mid-2025. The agreement allows for each state to enforce court decisions in civil and criminal cases from the other. Such policies erode Belarus’ sovereignty and represent alarming progress in the Kremlin’s effort to annex Belarus de facto by granting Russian law enforcement jurisdiction in Belarus and implicitly subjecting Belarusians to Russian civil and criminal law, as ISW has argued.[114]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.