Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2023

May 26, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on May 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces continue to hand over positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and withdraw from the city. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 26 that the MoD is fulfilling its agreement by actively deploying regular Russian units to Wagner-held positions in Bakhmut city.[1] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner is conducting an organized withdrawal from Bakhmut and reiterated that the Russian MoD will fully control the city and its surrounding areas by June 1.[2] A Russian milblogger published footage of Prigozhin visiting Russian rear positions where Wagner forces are allegedly withdrawing to.[3] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of regular Russian forces taking up Wagner positions in Bakhmut itself or that Wagner is leaving the city. ISW has recently observed footage purporting to show elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 123rd Brigade, likely previously deployed near Siversk, operating in the Bakhmut area, and DNR forces may be replacing Wagner formations.[4]

Ukrainian sources claim that Wagner forces are still present in Bakhmut and that the tempo of Russian offensive operations around the city continues to decrease. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that regular Russian units have replaced Wagner units in Bakhmut’s suburbs, likely referring to areas on the flanks around Bakhmut.[5] Malyar claimed that Ukrainian forces still control positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city and that Wagner forces are still present in Bakhmut city itself.[6] Ukrainian sources continue to report that the tempo of Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut has declined since the claimed Russian capture of the city.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the direction of Predtechyne (15km southwest of Bakhmut) on May 26.[8]

Continued successful limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks may complicate the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] A prominent milblogger claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka caused elements of the “Veterany” private military company (PMC) to retreat up to a kilometer from their previously held positions in the area.[10] Milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured elevated positions along the E40 (Bakhmut to Slovyansk) highway near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and that fighting is ongoing in the area.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Klishchiivka and crossed the Siverskyi Donets Canal, possibly threatening to encircle the settlement and force Russian forces to retreat towards the east.[12] Geolocated footage published on May 24 and 25 indicates that Russian forces likely regained limited positions west of Klishchiivka, however.[13] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may struggle to conduct a relief in place of Wagner forces in Bakhmut, and successful limited and localized Ukrainian counterattacks will likely complicate their ability to do so.[14] The decreased tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and the reported ongoing relief in place operation are likely further providing Ukrainian forces in the area the initiative to launch a new phase of operations around the city if they so choose.[15]

Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile and drone strike across Ukraine on May 25 and 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched ten Kh-101/555 air-based cruise missiles at Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and launched eight S-300/400 anti-aircraft guided missiles at Dnipro City.[16] Russian forces also reportedly launched 31 Shahed-131/136 drones from the southern and northern directions on the night of May 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed all ten Kh-101/555 missiles and 23 Shahed-131/136 drones.[17] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Ruslan Kravchenko stated that Russian forces have conducted 13 missile attacks on Kyiv Oblast since beginning of May.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian forces struck a civilian hospital and residential buildings in Dnipro in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19]

The Kremlin is likely reviving its information campaign to coerce the West into forcing Ukraine to accept concessions and negotiate on terms favorable to Russia. The Kremlin claimed on May 26 that Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed “the openness of the Russian side to dialogue on the political and diplomatic track, which is still blocked by Kyiv and its Western sponsors” in a phone call with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.[20] Putin’s statement does not indicate that Russia is interested in pursuing negotiations with Ukraine, and the Kremlin has not established any serious grounds for negotiations nor abandoned its maximalist goals to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Kremlin is likely attempting to intensify its false claims about its readiness to negotiate with Ukraine amidst the arrival of the Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui in Moscow on May 26 to discuss a negotiated settlement to Russia’s war in Ukraine.[21] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Li previously urged European officials to end the conflict in Ukraine before it escalates during his visit to European states in the past week.[22] The WSJ also reported that a (likely European, but unspecified) diplomat who spoke to Li explained that freezing the conflict was not beneficial to international interests and that Europe would not withdraw its support for Ukraine. The WSJ also reported that another (likely European, but unspecified) diplomat claimed that China’s main interests are ensuring Russian victory and ensuring that Russia does not use nuclear weapons. The claimed interaction likely indicates that China may be attempting to push the West to influence Ukraine into accepting a ceasefire. The Kremlin is likely amplifying its false interests in negotiations ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive in order to discourage continued Western aid to Ukraine. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s peace negotiation information operations to deter Western support for Ukraine.[23]

The Wagner Group reportedly exchanged 106 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) for an unspecified number of Russian POWs on May 25, suggesting that Wagner may have conducted the exchange independently of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin published footage on May 25 showing Wagner forces conducting the exchange of Ukrainian POWs and Russian POWs.[24] Separate geolocated footage published on May 25 indicates that the exchange occurred near Bakhmut.[25] Ukrainian sources reported on May 25 that Ukraine received 98 soldiers and eight officers in the exchange.[26] Russian sources did not specify the number of returned Russian personnel but claimed that some were from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet and unspecified Chechen Akhmat formations.[27] ISW previously reported that Wagner has purportedly conducted a prisoner exchange without the Russian MoD’s involvement.[28]

Key Takeaways

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces continue to hand over positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and withdraw from the city.
• Ukrainian sources claim that Wagner forces are still present in Bakhmut and that the tempo of Russian offensive operations around the city continues to decrease.
• Continued successful limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks may complicate the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile and drone strike across Ukraine on May 25 and 26.
• The Kremlin is likely reviving its information campaign to coerce the West into forcing Ukraine to accept concessions and negotiate on terms favorable to Russia.
• The Wagner Group reportedly exchanged 106 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) for an unspecified number of Russian POWs on May 25, suggesting that Wagner may have conducted the exchange independently of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.
• Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine.
• Russian officials are continuing to form new volunteer formations to defend Russian regions that border Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continuing attempts to erase Ukrainian cultural heritage by looting Ukrainian artifacts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 26. Geolocated footage published on May 25 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal advances north of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka, Kharkiv Oblast (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna) on May 26.[30] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are attempting to capture positions in the Kupyansk direction to launch future offensive operations.[31] Malyar also stated that Russian forces conducted a 24-hour tactical pause in the Kreminna area.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the east bank of the Zherebets River in the Kreminna area and south of Kreminna in the Serebrianska forest area.[33]

Ukrainian Severodonetsk Military Administration Head Oleksandr Stryuk stated that Russian forces still maintain a large military presence in the Severodonetsk area.[34] Stryuk added that Russian forces are not diverting their units in Luhansk Oblast to reinforce the Russian-Ukrainian international border following the pro-Ukrainian Russian raid on Belgorod Oblast.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

See topline text for Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Krasnohorivka (unclear whether the Krasnohorivka north or southwest of Avdiivka) and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on the southwestern approaches to Avdiivka and near Novokalynove (12km northwest of Avdiivka).[37] The Ukrainian Border Guards Service reported that Russian forces used chemical weapons in the Avdiivka area but did not specify what kind.[38]

Russian forces destroyed a dam west of Avdiivka on May 25. Geolocated footage published on May 25 shows that a Russian strike destroyed the Karlivskyi Reservoir dam near Karlivka (19km west of Avdiivka), causing flooding downstream.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck the dam with a S-300 missile.[40] Ukrainian Donetsk Military Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko stated that the destruction of the dam threatens to flood areas near Halytsynivka (22km west of Avdiivka) and Zhelanne (24km northwest of Avdiivka).[41] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used a road across the reservoir to support logistics towards Pisky (9km southwest of Avdiivka) and that subsequent flooding could impact Kurakhove (38km southwest of Avdiivka) and Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka), further disrupting Ukrainian logistics in the area.[42] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that flooding will not cause critical damage to Ukrainian logistics, however.[43]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 26.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched three KAB-500 (a FAB-500 variant) at Beryslav Raion in Kherson Oblast.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted Polohivskyi Raion in Zaporizhia Oblast with FAB-250/500 bombs.[46]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian-occupied Berdyansk and Melitopol in Zaporizhia Oblast on May 25 and May 26. A geolocated image published on May 25 shows the aftermath of an unspecified strike on Berdyansk.[47] Ukrainian officials reported six explosions on combat kit and fuel warehouses in Berdyansk.[48] Russian sources also claimed that several explosions occurred in Berdyansk and others claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike.[49] A Kremlin affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Melitopol on May 26, but did not provide visual proof of this claim.[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials are continuing to form new volunteer formations to defend Russian regions that border Ukraine. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovout announced that Kurst Oblast recruited 2,800 volunteers to staff local armed formations.[51] Starovout echoed milblogger complaints that Russian officials need to supply volunteers with necessary weapons to defend Russia’s borders. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Belgorod people’s militias currently defend border checkpoints alongside Russian Internal Ministry’s (MVD) personnel without weapons.[52] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the governor can authorize the purchase of supplies for the regional militias, and claimed that Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov stated that he would be imprisoned if he was to spend the region’s budget on supplies for the volunteers.[53] The Kremlin may be hesitant to authorize deliveries of weapons to border volunteer formations out of concern of wasting weapons that Russia could use in combat operations in Ukraine.

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that there are currently more than 7,000 Chechen fighters operating in Ukraine as of May 26.[54] ISW previously incorrectly estimated that Kadyrov may have up to 25,000 personnel serving in Ukraine based on his original claim that there are seven Chechen regiments and four battalions fighting in the war (and indicating that either these formations are severely under the typical strength of Russian regiments and battalions, or Chechen forces have formed fewer formations than Kadyrov previously claimed).[55] Kadyrov also previously claimed that the “Sever Akhmat” Special Purpose Regiment had 3,300 personnel.[56] Kadyrov also stated on May 26 that more than 26,000 Chechens served in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, including 12,000 volunteers. Kadyrov added that Chechen officials are actively working with the Russian MoD to form two regiments and have already recruited 2,400 men to staff these units.

The Republic of Bashkortostan reportedly formed another volunteer unit and deployed two volunteer units to an unspecified area for combat coordination.[57] A Russian branch of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that the Republic of Bashkortostan deployed the newly created “Sergei Zorin” tank battalion and “Sharif Suleimanov” anti-aircraft artillery battery for combat coordination.

BBC’s Russian Service established the names of 24,005 Russian servicemen who have died in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.[58] BBC estimated that at least 48,000 Russian servicemen may have died in the war and that Russia may have suffered more than 216,000 casualties in total.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continuing attempts to erase Ukrainian cultural heritage by looting Ukrainian artifacts. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian officials exhibited 120 artifacts stolen from historical and archeological reserve “Kamyana Mohyla” (Stone Tomb) in Zaporizhia Oblast in the Crimean museum-reserve “Khersones Tavriyskyi.”[59] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russians are stealing valuable paintings from the Berdyansk Art Museum. ISW has previously reported on Russian forces looting the Kherson Art Museum and its branch in Nova Kakhovka.[60]

Russian forces continue to intimidate civilians in Russian-occupied territory. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in Novopetrykivka in Donetsk Oblast conducted “counter-sabotage measures” including searching private homes, seizing mobile devise, and stealing possessions of residents.[61]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin held the annual meeting on “Military Security and Defense of the State” with heads of Minsk City and Belarusian oblasts.[62] Khrenin claimed that Belarusian Territorial Defense units have transformed from support units into combat formations.[63]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.