May 09, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov and Mason Clark

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian President Vladimir Putin declined to use his Victory Day address to make any significant rhetorical changes and reiterated existing narratives, preparing for a protracted war and framing Russia as successfully resisting the entire West. Putin stated in his annual address marking the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany on May 9 that “a real war has been unleashed against Russia” and that Russia has repelled international terrorism and will continue to “defend” residents in Donbas.[1] Putin has previously claimed the West is waging a global “war” against Russia.”[2] Putin has previously referred to the Russian military campaign in Ukraine as a “war” but this rhetoric, whether an intentional acknowledgement of the scale of the fighting or not, has not corresponded with any changes in the Kremlin’s approach to the “special military operation.”[3] Putin similarly declined to use recent notable events such as his annual New Year’s Eve address or his February 2023 address to the Federal Assembly to offer any concrete vision on how to reverse the Russian military’s setbacks in Ukraine or reframe the war.[4] Putin has instead used these events to reinforce long-standing rhetorical lines aimed at preparing the Russian public for a protracted war in Ukraine by evoking the memory of World War Two without calling on Russian society to support full mobilization.[5]

Putin additionally attempted to use Victory Day celebrations to rally Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) partners, many of which have sought to reduce their reliance on the Kremlin since February 2022. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev joined Putin at the Moscow Victory Day parade in Red Square.[6] Putin emphasized the importance of CIS leaders attending the event and repeated boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric that Russia is pursuing a multi-polar world order.[7] Putin’s latest efforts to rally CIS countries was muted by the reluctance of several Central Asian leaders initially expressed towards attending the Victory Day event, and Lukashenko did not join the rest of the leaders at an earlier wreath laying ceremony.[8] Lukashenko also did not deliver his traditional Victory Day address in Minsk, Belarus, although it is not immediately clear why.[9] Other non-Western states have largely rebuffed the Kremlin’s attempts to coalesce a potential anti-Western coalition, most notably China through its increasing rhetorical distancing from Russia.[10] ISW has previously assessed that the degradation of Russian military power in Ukraine has likely made this Russian effort even less attractive to other states.[11] The Victory Day events showcased far less military equipment than usual (including only a single World War Two–era T-34/85 and no modern tanks, which Russia badly needs in Ukraine) and demonstrated the further degradation of the Russian military, despite the Kremlin’s attempts in previous weeks to downplay Victory Day by downsizing parades and outright canceling events.[12]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin seized the Victory Day holiday as an opportunity to mock Putin and question his judgement. Prigozhin referred to a “happy grandfather” figure who “thinks that he is good” during a discussion of ammunition shortages and Russia’s future prospects in Ukraine.[13] Prigozhin then rhetorically asked what Russia and future generations should do and how Russia can win if the “grandfather” turns out to be a “complete asshole.” Prigozhin also noted that unnamed figures (likely referring to Putin and the senior Russian MoD figures) should stop showing off on Red Square. Prigozhin is likely referring to Putin, who is often referred to as “grandfather” (or more specifically
“Bunkernyi ded” or “bunker grandfather”), and Prigozhin has previously attacked other senior Russian officials and officers by name — but has not done so against Putin. Prigozhin has previously attempted to upstage Putin’s authority through similar rhetorical stunts.[14] Prigozhin’s escalating attacks on Putin may — if the Kremlin does not respond to Prigozhin’s thinly veiled criticism of Putin on Victory Day — further erode the norm in Putin’s system in which individual actors can jockey for position and influence (and drop in and out of Putin’s favor) but cannot directly criticize Putin.

Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces will not withdraw from Bakhmut by his previously stated deadline of May 10, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) failing to provide Wagner with additional shells. Prigozhin stated on May 9 that Wagner will continue to fight for Bakhmut and will continue to uphold its demands in the next few days.[15] Prigozhin stated that Wagner did not receive the total ammunition the Russian MoD allegedly promised it in a May 7 order, and claimed Wagner only received 10 percent of the requested ammunition on May 8. Prigozhin added that the Russian MoD order threatened Wagner with treason if Prigozhin withdrew his forces from Bakhmut, likely one of the reasons why Prigozhin is not following through on his May 5 threat to withdraw from Bakhmut if the Russian MoD failed to fully supply Wagner with ammunition by May 10, a threat he dropped on May 7.[16] Prigozhin also noted that he has not been able to contact deputy theater commander in Ukraine and intermediary between the Russian MoD and Wagner, Army General Sergey Surovikin.

Prigozhin’s failure to follow through on his May 5 withdrawal threat indicates his cognizance of his dependence on the Russian MoD. Prigozhin attempted to blackmail the Russian MoD into reprioritizing the Bakhmut offensive so he could independently claim victory in the city at the expense of the Russian military’s likely preparations ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.[17] Prigozhin criticized officials in charge of allocating ammunition of pointlessly conserving shells and allowing Russian servicemen to die in battle, though the Russian MoD is likely (smartly) conserving limited ammunition to repel a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[18] Prigozhin likely expected the Russian MoD to entirely cave to his demands at the risk of abandoning their own objectives for regular Russian forces but likely realized he cannot follow through with his ultimatum at this time. Prigozhin also likely anticipated that Surovikin would be able to coerce the Russian MoD into satisfying Wagner demands; but his inability to reach Surovikin, if true, indicates that Prigozhin does not have as much leverage within the Russian MoD as he imagined.

Prigozhin continued to blame high casualties and the slow pace of advances in Bakhmut on other Russian irregular formations to frame Wagner as the only competent force operating in the area. Prigozhin accused the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps of abandoning a strategic position in Bakhmut which resulted in 500 Wagner casualties on May 9.[19] Prigozhin accused the Russian MoD (which he nicknamed “the Russian Ministry of Drama”) of focusing on internal conflicts instead of fighting, which he claimed leads forces to “run away.” Prigozhin also criticized the Russian “Potok” battalion — which is affiliated with Russian state energy company Gazprom — for fleeing. Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels previously accused “Potok” of abandoning Wagner’s flanks in Bakhmut, and ISW assessed that Prigozhin launched a campaign to undermine Russian state-affiliated private military companies (PMCs).[20]

Russian forces conducted another large-scale series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 9 that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all 8 Kalibr cruise missiles and 15 of the 17 Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles that Russian forces launched.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that three S-300 missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a concentrated strike on Ukrainian temporary deployment points and ammunition depots, successfully striking all targets.[23] The continuation of Russian missile strikes at a smaller scale than the daily strikes during the failed Russian campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure likely indicates that Russian forces are more focused on sustaining a regular series of missile strikes than the actual effectiveness of the strikes.[24] Russian forces may be attempting to conduct an almost daily series of missile strikes in order to portray themselves as constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, although the diminished effectiveness of the strikes is likely not significantly constraining Ukrainian actions.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin declined to use his Victory Day address to make any significant rhetorical changes and reiterated existing narratives, preparing for a protracted war and framing Russia as successfully resisting the entire West.
Putin additionally attempted to use Victory Day celebrations to rally Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) partners, many of which have sought to reduce their reliance on the Kremlin since February 2022.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin likely seized the Victory Day holiday as an opportunity to mock Putin and question his judgement in one of his most direct challenges of Putin to date.
Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces will not withdraw from Bakhmut by the previously stated deadline of May 10 despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) failing to resolve the claimed “shell hunger.”
Prigozhin’s failure to abide by the withdrawal threat he made on May 5 indicates that he is cognizant of his dependence on the Russian MoD.
Prigozhin continued to blame high casualties and the slow pace of advance in Bakhmut on other Russian irregular formations to frame Wagner as the only competent force operating in the area.
Russian forces conducted another large-scale series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 8 to 9.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within Bakhmut and continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka–Donetsk front.
Russian forces targeted Ukrainian positions west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson Oblast.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov opened a new military camp for the “Sever Akhmat” Special Purpose Regiment in the Republic of Chechnya.
Russian occupation officials continue to deport civilians deeper into Russian-occupied territory.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk), Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[25] Geolocated combat footage published on May 8 and 9 shows elements of the 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[26] Footage published on May 9 purportedly shows units of the 88th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) striking Ukrainian positions near Kreminna.[27] Footage published on May 8 purportedly shows elements of the 110th Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Donetsk direction.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within Bakhmut as of May 9. Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces likely advanced further within western Bakhmut.[29] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 8 that Wagner fighters advanced 130m within Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces currently control 2.36 square kilometers of the city.[30] Prigozhin and Russian sources claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on a Wagner operated prison facility near Bakhmut, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[31] The ”Nevsky” Volunteer Battalion claimed that it is operating near Bakhmut, and ISW has previously reported that Russian sources claimed that the "Nevsky” battalion deployed to Ukraine in a degraded state.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner fighters unsuccessfully attempted to break through to Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces are heavily interdicting the last remaining Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Bakhmut.[33] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported eight clashes in the Bakhmut area, possibly suggesting that recent claims of intensified Wagner operations in and around the city are not reflective of a sustained effort to increase the tempo of operations.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations within Bakhmut and near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Chasiv Yar (12km west of Bakhmut), and Stupochky (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[35]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles were ongoing near the H-20 (Kostyantynivka–Donetsk City) highway and Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) as of May 8.[37]

Ukrainian forces likely made additional marginal gains in a recent counterattack southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely made further marginal advances north of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) in an area where ISW assesses Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counterattack as of April 30.[38] ISW has previously assessed that reports of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout Donetsk Oblast appear to be a part of an ongoing pattern of localized and limited counterattacks.[39]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Novodonetsk (50km southwest of Donetsk City) and made marginal advances in the area.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces targeted Ukrainian positions west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson Oblast on May 9. Geolocated combat footage published on May 9 shows elements of the 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Russian Black Sea Fleet) shelling Ukrainian positions on Velykyi Potemkin Island.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a small group of Ukrainian forces from landing on an unspecified island in Kherson Oblast.[42] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces do not have an established presence on the east (left) bank and that Russian forces control the approaches to the islands in the Dnipro River delta.[43] Ukrainian Southern Operational Forces Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are constantly shelling Kherson and Beryslav raions and are using guided aerial bombs to strike Kizomys (20km southwest of Kherson City) out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive and Ukrainians landing on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[44]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov opened a new military camp for the “Sever Akhmat” Special Purpose Regiment in the Republic of Chechnya on May 8.[45] Kadyrov claimed that about 3,300 servicemen of the regiment lined up in full gear at the parade celebrating the opening of the camp. Kadyrov claimed that the regiment is ready to deploy to Ukraine at “any moment,” indicating that Kadyrov may be conserving his forces. The claimed size of the unit is larger than a traditional Russian regiment. Kadyrov is unlikely to send the regiment to Bakhmut before May 10 as he previously promised to do (as part of Prigozhin's threat to withdraw Wagner from Bakhmut) if this regiment is still located at the training camp in Chechnya.[46]

Wagner Group is continuing to advertise recruitment into irregular formations such as Wagner units and regional militias. A Russian opposition outlet reported that Wagner began mailing letters to Novosibirsk residents to promote recruitment into Wagner.[47] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 8 that the Belgorod Oblast People’s Militia is continuing to train at the Wagner training base.[48] Prigozhin is likely attempting to advertise Wagner’s training capabilities to attract other recruits into Wagner PMC units.

A Russian branch of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty confirmed that at least 4,941 Russian servicemen from the Volga region died since the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.[49] The outlet counted deaths acknowledged by the Russian government, relatives of the deceased servicemen, or public institutions and organizations. The actual unconfirmed death toll is likely higher.

German outlet Bild reported that the German Federal Statistical Office assessed that countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are allowing Russia to import German goods and bypass sanctions.[50] German exports to Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Georgia doubled since the start of the full-scale invasion, and exports to Tajikistan increased by 150 percent. German exports to Belarus increased by 77 percent and to Kyrgyzstan by 994 percent. German authorities reportedly believe that Russia is using the Eurasian Economic Union to bypass sanctions.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport civilians deeper into Russian-occupied territory. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 9 that Russian occupation officials began forcibly deporting children, their parents, teachers, and public sector employees from Kamianka-Dniprovska to Berdyansk in Zaporizhia Oblast.[51] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on May 8 that Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials removed about 3,000 civilians including 1,000 minors, 300 patients of neuropsychiatric centers, and an unspecified number of children in orphanages from areas along the frontline to “safe areas” of Zaporizhia Oblast.[52] Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian occupation authorities are deciding on the percentage of young men and women to send to Russia under rest and rehabilitation schemes.”[53]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71104;

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71104;

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122222

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar12312022 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022123

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022123

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71104;

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71104;

[8] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/09/lukashenko-vopreki-traditsii-ne-vystupil-s-rechyu-na-tseremonii-vozlozheniya-tsvetov-k-monumentu-pobedy-v-minske-zhurnalisty-pisali-chto-on-nezdorov; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/09/lukashenko-propustil-zavtrak-v-moskve-i-vskore-posle-parada-vernulsya-v-minsk-zhurnalisty-predpolagayut-chto-u-nego-problemy-so-zdoroviem ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2023

[9] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/09/lukashenko-vopreki-traditsii-ne-vystupil-s-rechyu-na-tseremonii-vozlozheniya-tsvetov-k-monumentu-pobedy-v-minske-zhurnalisty-pisali-chto-on-nezdorov; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/09/lukashenko-propustil-zavtrak-v-moskve-i-vskore-posle-parada-vernulsya-v-minsk-zhurnalisty-predpolagayut-chto-u-nego-problemy-so-zdoroviem

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423

[13] https://meduza dot io/video/2023/05/09/prigozhin-zapisal-video-k-9-maya-pro-pobedu-dedov-i-kakogo-to-schastlivogo-dedushku-kotoryy-mozhet-okazatsya-zakonchennym-mudakom

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122022

[15] https://meduza dot io/video/2023/05/09/prigozhin-zapisal-video-k-9-maya-pro-pobedu-dedov-i-kakogo-to-schastlivogo-dedushku-kotoryy-mozhet-okazatsya-zakonchennym-mudakom; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/923 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/09/prigozhin-zayavil-chto-brigada-minoborony-rf-9-maya-bezhala-so-strategicheskogo-platsdarma-v-bahmute

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2023

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2023

[18] https://meduza dot io/video/2023/05/09/prigozhin-zapisal-video-k-9-maya-pro-pobedu-dedov-i-kakogo-to-schastlivogo-dedushku-kotoryy-mozhet-okazatsya-zakonchennym-mudakom

[19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/923 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/09/prigozhin-zayavil-chto-brigada-minoborony-rf-9-maya-bezhala-so-strategicheskogo-platsdarma-v-bahmute

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jmqVpmjZpNQNAWZwWp4U1vBnH9ZYZCJHMgJPowHvNgcLV68RKgMWZXYiHcwXyX2l; https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid02RaZJzt6cM9tATtxV3dUA9KN42S8hSeQ7XY3uQUaHKP6QaQuPdCGAtS42VHGN5pSil

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02UvWoRasFHtwm6GPMLB6opX1xeXcLbSkvEiW4dKcpu44Rz6XQyBA9NKpvMxPHZgL8l

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/26388

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2023

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02UvWoRasFHtwm6GPMLB6opX1xeXcLbSkvEiW4dKcpu44Rz6XQyBA9NKpvMxPHZgL8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNT977Ae4gAnMsForcf5pRkxXp1imddAzWxxxZZMuyJsqVAya6bnQy2Tr22VBhKml; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10358

[26] https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1655639841491636224?s=20; https://t.me/kremlinprachka/24155; https://t.me/kremlinprachka/24168; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1655894716125159424?s=20

[27] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10504

[28] https://t.me/astrahandm/8401

[29] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1655633526333530119?s=20 ; https://t.me/Tushonka_ZSU/50 ; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1655699489636663298?s=20

[30] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/919

[31] https://t.me/readovkanews/58561; https://t.me/readovkanews/58553; https://t.me/readovkanews/58558 ; https://t.me/brussinf/5953 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/929 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/927 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/924

[32] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/25159 ; https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/230 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040723

[33] https://t.me/milchronicles/1891 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/12388