Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15

Russian forces conducted the largest set of missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure since the start of the war. Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat reported on November 15 that Russian forces launched about 100 Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles at targets in Ukraine, primarily against Ukrainian critical infrastructure facilities.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian infrastructure with ten drones.[2] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces struck targets in Kyiv as well as in Rivne, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Odesa, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Volyn, and Kharkiv oblasts.[3]

The Russian military likely used a substantial portion of its remaining high-precision weapon systems in the coordinated missile strikes on November 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 73 Russian cruise missiles and all drones on November 15.[4] Ukrainian air defenses had previously shot down 43 cruise missiles out of 84 and 13 drones out of 24 during the October 10 coordinated Russian missile strikes.[5] Ukraine‘s increased shoot-down percentage illustrates the improvement in Ukrainian air defenses in the last month, and the Ukrainian General Staff attributed this improvement to the effectiveness of Western-provided air defense systems. ISW also assesses that Russian forces are greatly depleting their stock of high-precision weapons systems and will likely have to slow the pace of their campaign against critical Ukrainian infrastructure.[6] Russian missile strikes continue to pose a threat to the Ukrainian civilian population with Ukrainian Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Kyrylo Tymoshenko stating that the energy situation is rather “critical” in Ukraine.[7] Damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is unlikely to break Ukrainians’ spirit, however, given Ukraine’s improving air defenses and recent ground victories in Kherson Oblast.

Polish officials announced that a likely “Russian-made missile” landed in Poland within six kilometers of the international border with Ukraine. Western officials have yet to make definitive statements regarding the incident. The Polish Foreign Ministry stated on November 15 that a “Russian-made missile” killed two Polish citizens in the border village of Przewodow.[8] Polish President Andrzej Duda noted that Poland does not currently have information regarding the actor responsible for firing the missile but noted that the missile was “most probably Russian-made.”[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied Russia’s involvement in striking any targets near the Ukraine-Polish border and claimed that the incident is a “provocation.”[10] Russian forces, however, did target energy infrastructure in Lviv City, about 72km south of Przewodow.[11] US President Joe Biden stated that according to preliminary information it is unlikely that the missile was fired from territorial Russia but emphasized that the investigation is still ongoing as of the time of this publication.[12] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russia of staging a “serious provocation” on NATO territory.[13] ISW will continue to monitor the situation.

The Kremlin had prepared today’s massive missile campaign before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented his 10-point peace proposal at the G20 summit on November 15. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will negotiate with Russia if the Kremlin totally withdraws its forces from Ukraine, restores Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and ensures punishment for war crimes among other provisions on nuclear, energy, and food security.[14] The Kremlin likely deliberately planned a massive missile strike campaign on Ukraine in anticipation of Zelensky’s speech at the G20 summit given that a multi-direction missile campaign requires significant military preparation. The Russian pro-war community on Telegram claimed that the Kremlin retaliated for Zelensky’s “Russophobic” statements shortly after his speech, but the impossibility of launching such a massive attack on short notice highlights the Kremlin’s disinterest in setting the stage for negotiations with Ukraine.[15]

The Kremlin’s official narrative surrounding the G20 summit further confirms Russia’s disinterest in the prospect of peace negotiations with Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin did not appear at the summit and instead signed numerous decrees granting honorary titles to Russian-occupied Ukrainian cities.[16]  Putin’s Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia will continue its “special military operation” in Ukraine, accusing Zelensky of unwillingness to negotiate with Russia.[17] Lavrov called Ukraine’s conditions “unrealistic and inadequate,” which has been the Kremlin’s recurrent position throughout the war.[18] Peskov also made a point to emphasize that Russia will still treat liberated Kherson City as the capital of Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, and Secretary of Russia’s Security Council Nikolai Patrushev repeated the original false narratives used to justify the invasion that Russia needs to defend Donbas and that Ukrainian “Nazis” failed to comply with the Minsk agreements.[19]

Russian military commanders reportedly ignored existing plans for offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction and committed poorly trained reinforcements to costly assaults on Pavlivka out of impatience. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military commander Aleksandr Khodakovsky claimed on November 15 that Russian forces initially planned to attack in the Vuhledar area from two directions but that he and other commanders realized that the poor training of reinforcements and their inability to contact brigade commanders made such plans impossible.[20] Khodakovsky claimed that brigade commanders changed the plan completely and committed all Russian forces in the area to an attack on Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast.[21] ISW had previously reported that Russian forces prematurely impaled an insufficient concentration of mobilized personnel on offensive pushes aimed at seizing Pavlivka leading to extensive losses, particularly among the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet.[22]  Russian military officials likely abandoned their initial plans and committed poorly trained reinforcements to the assault on Pavlivka due to a sense of politically-driven urgency to restart the Donetsk offensive campaign before the planned Russian withdrawal from Kherson City.

The high costs associated with the Russian offensive push on Pavlivka continue to generate criticism of Russian military leadership. Khodakovsky claimed that Russian military leadership is trying to blame the “miserable results” on the commander of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet for not properly supporting the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.[23] Khodakovsky argued that the brigade commanders are guilty of the high costs of the assault and that the commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin, should not allow an “innocent” commander to take the blame for the poor planning of Russian military leadership.[24] ISW previously assessed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a rare statement on November 7 in response to the extensive Russian milblogger outcry concerning the losses associated with the Pavlivka offensive operation.[25] Khodakovsky’s criticisms of the Russian military command indicate that the Russian MoD likely failed to address the outrage fully and that Russian pro-war figures and milbloggers will continue to criticize Russian military commanders.

Russians are increasingly turning to various platforms on social media to express their dissatisfaction with mobilization problems, a phenomenon that has the ingredients to ignite organized online-based movements in Russia. Sixteen anti-war groups in Russia launched a petition demanding that Russian President Vladimir Putin demobilize all mobilized Russian men.[26] The petition has already garnered almost 38,000 signatories as of the time of this publication. About 1,500 mothers of disabled children and mothers with more than three children in their households also petitioned Putin to exempt their husbands from mobilization.[27] Russian opposition and non-governmental organizations such as Soldiers’ Mothers of St. Petersburg had voiced concerns with the Russian Armed Forces prior to the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine but did not receive significant attention within the Russian information space.[28] Grievances over mobilization issues, however, reached the milblogger community that was already critical of the Russian Ministry of Defense and that has been discussing issues with the execution of mobilization since the second day of the order.[29] These grievances are increasingly influencing both the opposition and the pro-war communities, which is a new phenomenon. While Russian police have consistently suppressed small-scale protests throughout the country the Kremlin has yet to regulate platforms such as Telegram that allow Russians across the country to share their discontent and demand action from local officials with the backing of prominent milbloggers.

Russian officials continued to set conditions to force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to recognize Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and thereby de facto recognize the Russian annexation of occupied Ukraine. The IAEA announced on November 14 that Russian ZNPP authorities rejected a Ukrainian proposal to bring two reactors to a low power state from a hot shutdown state and that Russian officials are increasingly making “significant operational decisions,” noting that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi expressed concern at “open contradictions” in decision making at the ZNPP.[30] The IAEA and Ukraine’s Resistance Center reported that Russia is increasingly importing technical staff from Russian nuclear power plants to the ZNPP.[31] The IAEA’s reporting and concerns about the decision-making hierarchy at the ZNPP is an inflection in the IAEA’s usual communications and suggests that Russian physical control and operational authority over the plant is increasing to a point that is alarming the IAEA.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted the largest set of missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure since the start of the war, likely using a substantial portion of their remaining high-precision weapon systems.
• Polish officials announced that a likely “Russian-made missile” landed in Poland within six kilometers of the international border with Ukraine.
• Russian military commanders reportedly ignored existing plans for offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction and committed poorly trained reinforcements to costly assaults on Pavlivka out of impatience, generating continued criticism of Russian military leadership.
• Russian officials continued to set conditions to force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to recognize Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and thereby de facto recognize the Russian annexation of occupied Ukraine.
• Russians are increasingly turning to various platforms on social media to express their dissatisfaction with mobilization problems, which could ignite organized online anti-war movements in Russia.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensives in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna, and Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian logistics to the rear of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.
• Premature reports of Ukrainian forces capturing territory on the left bank of the Dnipro River provoked backlash in the Russian information space.
• Russian logistics routes from Crimea into southern Ukraine are likely highly degraded.
• Russian forces are continuing to supply their diminishing supplies with Belarusian military equipment.
• Russian officials continued to minimize the role of proxy officials in occupied territories in favor of Russian officials.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna on November 15. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults within 13km northwest of Svatove in the direction of Stelmakhivka and Kuzemivka and that Ukrainian forces entrenched themselves on the western outskirts of Kuzemivka.[32] A Ukrainian source stated that there was heavy fighting in the area of Novomykilske (9km south of Svatove).[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults northwest of Kreminna in the direction of Chervonopopivka and south of Kreminna in the direction of Zolotarivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to advance towards Kreminna from the north and south but were unsuccessful and that fighting is ongoing 12km south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[35] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are accumulating near Makiivka (24km west of Kreminna) and are probing nearby Russian defensive positions.[36] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are amassing to launch future offensives on Svatove, Kreminna, Lysychansk, and Popasna, although ISW offers no assessment about claims regarding future Ukrainian operations.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground assault near Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (13km northwest of Svatove).[38] Russian forces continue to conduct limited counterattacks likely to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces and not to regain limited territory.

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military logistics and concentration areas in Luhansk Oblast on November 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian artillery units struck Russian positions in Kreminna and that the personnel from degraded units are planning to escape from the city.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian headquarters south of Svatove in Mylovatka, Luhansk Oblast, killing at least 30 Russian military personnel and wounding more than 20 others.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian artillery units are massively shelling the Olshana-Pervomaiske-Orlianka-Yahidne line.[41] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck Denezhnykove, Luhansk Oblast with three HIMARS rockets.[42] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted routine air, missile, and artillery strikes along the line of contact in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts.[43]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, and northeast of Bakhmut near Bilohorivka and Bakhmutske along the T1302 highway.[44] Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that Russian forces established positions in southeastern Mayorsk.[45]  A Russian source claimed that intense fighting is ongoing north of Horlivka (about 27km south of Bakhmut).[46] Geolocated footage showed the aftermath of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a Russian base in Horlivka.[47] Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine artillery strikes around  Bakhmut.[48]

Russian forces continued to carry out offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on November 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krasnohorivka and Pervomaiske on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and Marinka and Novomykhailivka on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Novokalynove (about 42km northwest of Donetsk City).[50] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, Nevelske (about 19km northwest of Donetsk City), and Opytne (about 12km northwest of Donetsk City).[51] The Donetsk People’s Republic Territorial Defense reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Opytne and plan to advance on Avdiivka.[52] Another Russian source reported that Russian forces are on the northern outskirts of Opytne, indicating that Russian forces do not currently control the entire settlement.[53] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine artillery strikes along the contact line in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on November 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground assault near Vremivka, Donetsk Oblast.[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reiterated claims that Russian forces completely captured Pavlivka on November 14 and claimed that Russian forces killed up to 1,400 Ukrainian personnel during the offensive, which is highly implausible.[56] Donetsk Oblast Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko reported that Russian forces shelled Pavlivka and Prechystivka (12km west of Vuhledar).[57] A Russian source claimed that Russian artillery repelled a Ukrainian offensive against Novosilka (48km west of Vuhledar) and that Ukrainian forces withdrew to their original positions.[58] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes against Vuhledar and noted the presence of the Russian 36th Combined Arms Army in the Vuhledar direction.[59] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[60]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued establishing defensive positions east of the Dnipro River and pulling back from the coast of the left (east) bank as of November 15. Geolocated satellite imagery shows that Russian forces are establishing defensive lines just south of the Krasnoznamyanskyi Canal near Bekhtery, about 50km southwest of Kherson City.[61] Such lines indicate that Russian forces see western Kherson Oblast near the Kinburn Peninsula and Spit as operationally significant. Russian forces would likely struggle to hold these defensive lines against a Ukrainian ground offensive due to terrain that favors mechanized warfare, however. Ukraine’s Operational Command South stated that Russian forces finished regrouping on the left bank of the Dnipro River and are establishing defensive positions 15-20km back from the river.[62] Ukrainian Southern Forces Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to interdict Russian logistics routes in rear areas of southern Kherson Oblast.[63]

Premature reports of Ukrainian forces capturing territory on the left bank of the Dnipro River provoked backlash in the Russian information space. Reports emerged that Ukrainian forces had reached Nova Kakhovka, Oleshky (about 10km southeast of Kherson City), and the Kinburn Spit, but Ukrainian officials later refuted these claims.[64] The Ukrainian Mayor of Oleshky Yevhen Ryshchuk insinuated that Ukrainian forces liberated Oleshky but later deleted the social media post.[65] Humenyuk stated that the military situation around the Kinburn Spit is developing and called for operational silence.[66] Geolocated footage posted on November 15 shows Russian journalists fleeing from Oleshky, which is consistent with reports that Russian forces are withdrawing from the immediate eastern bank of the Dnipro River.[67] Russian sources refuted claims that Ukrainian forces crossed the Dnipro River and one even claimed that “the enemy is grasping at [Russian] pain points” with such reports.[68]

Russian forces continued routine artillery and airstrikes in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts and on the right bank of Kherson Oblast on November 15.[69] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces fired on Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, and Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are using positions in Ochakiv to prepare for operations against the Kinburn Spit.[70] Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[71]

Russian logistics routes from Crimea into southern Ukraine are likely highly degraded. A Russian source reported that Russian officials elected to delay repairing the Kerch Strait rail bridge until summer or autumn 2023 as weather conditions are too dangerous to conduct the repairs and noted that one rail line is still usable.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian officials only allow passenger traffic over the Kerch Strait road bridge and transport all other vehicles across the strait via ferry.[73] The severely limited Russian use of the Kerch Strait Bridge for military logistics likely has and will continue to cause long-term issues supplying forces in eastern Kherson Oblast, especially as Ukrainian forces can now interdict supply lines previously considered to be in rear areas.

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces are continuing to replenish their diminishing supplies with Belarusian military equipment. Belarusian group “Society of Railway Personnel of Belarus” claimed that Belarusian forces delivered 98 T-72 tanks, 40 BMP-2 armored vehicles, 20 dismantled BMPs, and 53 Ural trucks from the Belarusian 969th tank reserve base located in Minsk Oblast, Belarus throughout October.[74] Russian forces are also continuing to face challenges with insufficient training personnel responsible for preparing mobilized men for combat and are continuing to rely on Belarusian training facilities. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Western Military District (WMD) are training at Belarusian training grounds, and ISW has previously reported that Belarusian forces are accommodating Russian mobilized personnel in Belarus.[75] Social media users also showed footage of Iranian-made bulletproof vests reportedly belonging to Russian mobilized personnel, further indicating the extent of likely Russian supply shortages.[76]

Russian forces are continuing to conduct covert mobilization in Russia and proxy republics despite the end of the declared mobilization period. Russian opposition sources reported that the Republic of Udmurtia and certain cities in Samara and Rostov oblasts continued to issue summonses under the pretext of clarifying information past November 1.[77] Russian forces consistently used similar practices prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February in an attempt to lure more men into signing military contracts. A Moscow City military recruitment center also issued second-wave mobilization notices to previously mobilized men who did not deploy during the first wave because they do not have non-core registration specialties.[78] Ukrainian officials also noted that Russian forces are continuing to forcefully mobilize men in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[79]

Russian officials are continuing to make promises to deliver payments to Russian mobilized servicemen amidst growing dissatisfaction with the lack of payments among mobilized and their families. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Tatyana Shevtsova stated on November 14 that the mobilized will receive December payments by December 25, instead of in January.[80] Shevtsova justified this modification as an effort to ensure Russian families receive payments ahead of the New Year celebrations. It is unclear whether Russian officials will actually act upon such promises, given that the Russian MoD announced the start of monthly payments of 195,000 rubles (about $3,175) to mobilized servicemen on November 8.[81]

Low morale and poor discipline continue to plague Russian mobilized personnel as a result of insufficient military equipment and a lack of proper military command. Fighters of a Dagestani assault group published a video complaint noting that they had to purchase equipment with their own money.[82] Residents of Kazan complained that six drunk mobilized men, who supposedly escaped from their unit, trespassed into an apartment building.[83] A Russian outlet reported that 12 Russian mobilized personnel engaged in an armed fight following a drunk verbal altercation in Melitopol.[84] Russian opposition outlets also reported that at least 38 mobilized personnel died before even reaching Ukraine as of November 14.[85]  

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continued to minimize the role of proxy officials in occupied territories in favor of Russian officials as of November 15. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 15 that Russian officials have almost completely replaced Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials in the occupation administration in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast.[86] ISW previously reported that Russian officials likely excluded DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) officials from attempts at integrating LNR and DNR forces into the Russian military.[87] Russian officials will likely continue to minimize the roles of former proxy officials in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast as they seek to further cement administrative and political control over these illegally annexed territories.

Partisans likely targeted an occupation official in Russian-occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 14. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 15 that unspecified actors detonated an IED at the apartment of Melitopol occupation official Dmitry Trukhin, who is currently in an intensive care unit as a result of the explosion.[88] Zaporizhia occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian affiliated actors conducted the IED attack on November 14.[89] Ukrainian partisans will likely continue to target occupation officials in Russian-occupied territories.

Russian occupation officials continued forced evacuation measures on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 15. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on November 15 that Russian occupation officials will continue to evacuate people from the 15km zone on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast until all people who have decided to leave have left.[90] Saldo claimed that 115,000 Kherson Oblast residents evacuated from the right bank of the Dnipro River and that most residents are currently residing on the left bank.[91] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 15 that Russian officials are evacuating residents from Kherson Oblast to the Southern Federal District of the Russian Federation, particularly Krasnodar and Stavropol krais.[92] Russian occupation officials will likely continue forced evacuation measures in Kherson Oblast for the foreseeable future.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.