Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2023

October 31, 2023, 4:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation. Kadyrov responded to the riots in Dagestan by praising Russian President Vladimir Putin's accusation that the West orchestrated the situation to destabilize Russia.[1] Kadyrov later called on Chechen security forces to immediately detain instigators of any potential riots in Chechnya or to "fire three warning shots in the air and after that, fire the fourth shot in the head."[2] Kadyrov's reactions to the riots in Dagestan suggest that he is first and foremost concerned with maintaining the perception of his unwavering support of Putin and secondly with demonstrating the strength of his authoritarian rule over Chechnya by threatening a violent response to potential future riots.[3]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi to discuss the situation on the front in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Kherson directions.[5]

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M missiles and an S-300 air defense missile at targets in Ukraine.[6] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Yurii Malashko reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with a missile.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Shahed-131/136 drones at targets in Khmelnytskyi and Poltava oblasts and that Ukrainian air defenses activated in these oblasts.[8]

Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on October 30 that Russian authorities detained two Russian military contract servicemen originally from the Russian Far East as suspects for the murder on October 29 in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast.[9] The Investigative Committee stated that the preliminary investigation indicates that the motive of the murders was of a “domestic” nature. A Russian insider source claimed on October 31 that the two detainees were a part of the Russian 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet).[10] Attacks on civilians hors de combat (in rear areas far removed from active combat zones) by representatives of an occupying power constitute a clear violation of multiple international legal norms and very likely rise to the level of a war crime or crime against humanity.[11]

A court in Uzbekistan has reportedly sentenced the first Uzbek citizen to prison for serving as a mercenary for Russian forces in Ukraine. A court in Uzbekistan found an Uzbek man, who reportedly served in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military from 2014-2015, guilty of violating the Uzbek law against mercenarism.[12] Relatives of the convicted man claimed that he did not participate in the war in Ukraine and was in Russia during the indicated years.[13] This sentencing may heighten tensions between the governments of Russia and Central Asian countries as Russian authorities have increased efforts to coerce Central Asian migrants into Russian military service.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31.
• Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31.
• Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted combined missile strikes against Sevastopol and elsewhere in occupied Crimea on October 30.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremmina line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• Former Wagner Group fighters continue to redeploy to Ukraine as part of other Russian formations.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian language and culture in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 31. Ukrainian officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff, reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Nadiya (16 west of Svatove) but did not conduct any offensive actions in the Lyman direction.[15] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked near Synkivka, Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) on October 30 but did not specify an outcome.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 30 that positional battles continued near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[17]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 31. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka, Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make any confirmed advances on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces consolidated control over positions east of the railway line near Andriivka and marginally advanced south of the settlement.[21]

Russian forces counterattacked near Bakhmut on October 31 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivdenne (23km southwest of Bakhmut).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut).[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division operating north of Bakhmut.[24]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Avdiivka but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 31. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near the Avdiivka waste heap northwest of Avdiivka.[25] Russian milbloggers diverged in their claims about the intensity of fighting in the Avdiivka direction, with one milblogger claiming that the tempo of operations is increasing while another claimed it was decreasing.[26]

Russian sources continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 31 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Avdiivka.[27] Additional geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 and 31 that Russian forces are advancing near the Avdiivka Coke Plant immediately north of Avdiivka.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 31 that Russian forces are not actively attacking the coke plant and are still preparing for a ground assault.[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of the Avdiivka industrial zone.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also advancing near Krasnohorivka, Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[32] One Russian source criticized other sources on October 29 for writing “victorious” reports about the ongoing operation and preemptively claiming that Russian forces have captured certain positions, suggesting that some Russian correspondents still have a negative perception of the tactical situation near Avdiivka.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 31 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Keramik (10km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Tonenke, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske.[34]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west or southwest of Donetsk City on October 31.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on October 31 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced south of Novomykhailivka (20km southwest of Donetsk City).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 31 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (just west of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka.[36] A Russian news aggregator claimed that there were positional battles on Marinka’s western outskirts on October 30.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 31.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 31 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Prechystivka (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[38] A Russian media aggregator claimed that there was fighting near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on October 30.[39]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[40] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne, Verbove (9km east of Robotyne), Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne), Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne), and Nesteryanka (12km northwest of Robotyne).[41]

Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to restore lost positions near Robotyne.[42] A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces back from positions near Verbove.[43] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a successful counterattack from Verbove in the direction of Robotyne.[44] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claimed Russian advances.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions and continue ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as of October 31. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and near the Antonivsky roadway and railway bridges.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near Krynky and the Antonivsky Railway Bridge and that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defenses near Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and Poyma (12km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[46] Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group stated on October 31 that elements of the Russian 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, either of the 18th Combined Arms Army or the Black Sea Fleet), which is based near Simferopol, are currently operating in the Kherson direction.[47]

Russian forces continued airstrikes with glide bombs against targets on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 31. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched 45 glide bombs at targets in Kherson and Bersylav raions over the past day.[48]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted combined missile strikes against Sevastopol and elsewhere in occupied Crimea on October 30.[49] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that sources stated that Ukrainian forces damaged a Russian S-300 air defense system near Molochne (71km northwest of Sevastopol).[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Former Wagner Group fighters continue to redeploy to Ukraine as part of other Russian formations. A prominent Russian milblogger wrote an article for Kremlin-affiliated outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda on October 30 detailing the experience of several former Wagner fighters who have returned to Ukraine under the control of various other Russian formations.[51] The milblogger cited a Russian commander in the Kreminna area of Luhansk Oblast who stated that there are "plenty" of former Wagner fighters in his sector of the front and that former Wagner fighters are signing new contracts and returning to combat zones. The milblogger also noted that over 170 former Wagner fighters are reportedly fighting in the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz regiment as part of the "Kamerton" detachment.[52] The article notes that some Wagner fighters have entered contracts with Rosgvardia, some have entered volunteer formations, and some have become part of the regular Russian forces.[53]

A Ukrainian HIMARS strike on October 29 reportedly destroyed an entire battalion of mobilized soldiers from Chuvashia. A Chuvashia-based Telegram channel announced on October 31 that the Russian 1st battalion of the 1251st Motorized Rifle Regiment lost over 120 soldiers killed and wounded in a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on the battalion's convoy in an unspecified location in Ukraine.[54] The Telegram channel and other Russian opposition outlets stated that the Chuvashian regional government has remained silent about the issue, calling attention to efforts by many regional authorities to obfuscate the scale of Russian losses in Ukraine.[55]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 31 that Russian forces will soon receive infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) that will be equipped with electronic warfare (EW) systems that provide special protection from FPV drones.[56] The milblogger claimed that the Kurganmashzavod enterprise in Kurgan Oblast will produce these special IFVs.[57]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian language and culture in occupied Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on October 27 that “[he] will not allow the Ukrainian language to reappear as a state or privileged language” in occupied Donetsk Oblast and claimed that no schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast have chosen to teach Ukrainian language.[58]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on October 31 that more than 400,000 Ukrainian citizens have passed through 17 Russian filtration centers in occupied Donetsk Oblast since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[59] The Resistance Center stated that Ukrainian citizens are subjected to pressure and torture at these filtration centers.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian sources continue to claim that the antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 29 were the result of a Ukrainian information operation.[60] Telegram founder Pavel Durov announced on October 30 that Telegram blocked the “Utro Dagestan” channel, which played a major role in organizing the antisemitic riots, due to “call[s] for violence.”[61]

Russian Chief of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov reiterated boilerplate rhetoric in a routine briefing about alleged American military-biological activities in Ukraine and other countries in Africa and the Middle East.[62]

Russia is continuing efforts to intensify Russian social and cultural influence over Russian-occupied Transnistria, Moldova. Russian newswire TASS reported on October 27 that the Chisinau-based Russia House transferred 2,500 modern Russian textbooks to Transnistria last week in order to facilitate the transfer of schools in Transnistria to Russian educational standards.[63] A prominent Russian milblogger responded to the report and claimed that it is a positive sign of the development of Russian "soft power" in Transnistria, but the Moldovan Foreign Ministry condemned the transfer of textbooks as "unacceptable".[64] The Kremlin frequently weaponizes discourse surrounding Transnistria in an attempt to destabilize Moldova, as ISW has previously reported.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

A Ukrainian military observer stated on October 31 that as of October 29, there are 1,800 to 2,000 Belarusian military personnel along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, including two air assault battalions of the 38th Separate Air Assault Brigade, two combined tactical detachments of the 5th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, a tactical group of the 51st Artillery Brigade, and a rocket artillery battery of the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.