Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET

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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed that Russian forces have encircled Dobropillya — an intensification of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare campaign alleging encirclements across various sectors of the frontline to falsely present Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. The Russian MoD claimed on September 22 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces encircled Dobropillya and are advancing toward Oleksandrivka (northwest of Dobropillya).[1] The MoD’s vague statement notably did not include a map or any evidence to support these false claims. ISW has observed no evidence to support the Russian MoD's encirclement claims, which are incompatible with recent Ukrainian statements. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion stated on September 22 that Russian forces have not made major advances in the Dobropillya direction and that the Russian military command frequently postpones its own deadlines due to heavy personnel casualties and inconsistencies between its plans and the battlefield realities.[2] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 20 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south and northeast of Dobropillya.[3]

The Kremlin is likely intensifying its encirclement claims against the backdrop of the ongoing UN General Assembly (UNGA) session and recent Ukrainian successes on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt. Russian military officials have repeatedly made false claims about the encirclement of Ukrainian forces, including in Kursk Oblast in October 2024, in Kupyansk in Fall and Winter 2025-2026, and in the Rubtsi direction (northwest of Lyman) in June 2026.[4] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers have most recently claimed an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Ukraine between the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions.[5] The Russian MoD is likely proliferating its claims of encirclement now to support Russian diplomatic engagements at the September 21-28 UNGA session that will aim to push for Ukrainian capitulation to end the war.

The Russian MoD's latest claim about Dobropillya also comes as Ukrainian forces have eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman in recent months, forcing the Russian military command to rethink its wider plans to use Russian offensive activity in the Lyman and Dobropillya directions to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast.[6] The MoD's false claim of an encirclement around Dobropillya aims in part to divert attention from these recent Ukrainian successes.

Russian authorities are reportedly training some regional government officials for possible mobilization scenarios. The Udmurt Republic will hold a two-day long “Organization of Mobilization Training in State and Local Government Bodies" training program for 20 state and municipal employees.[7] The program will reportedly run until December 5, and its modules will include lessons about the transition of the Russian economy to wartime conditions, the organization of mobilization planning, the military registration of citizens in the reserves, the protection of classified information, and the monitoring of mobilization preparations. The Udmurt Republic has reportedly held these training sessions before, but the program comes amid increasing indications that the Kremlin may conduct some form of mobilization in the near future and indicates that Russian authorities are preparing regional civil servants and government employees for the administrative and economic challenges inherent in mobilization.[8] The increasing Russian casualty rate and declining volunteer recruitment rate will likely force Russian President Vladimir Putin to order some form of mobilization in the near future to continue the current tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.[9] It is still unclear, however, if Putin has made a final decision about conducting a mobilization and, if he has, what kind of mobilization he will order. The Kremlin has heavily targeted Russian federal subjects with large ethnic minority groups like the Udmurt Republic for contract recruitment and covert force generation in recent years.[10] The Kremlin may attempt to minimize public backlash regarding a future mobilization by concentrating recruitment efforts in these regions while insulating wealthier and politically significant areas such as Moscow and Leningrad oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump expressed their willingness to end the war in Ukraine during a September 22 joint press conference on the sidelines of UNGA. Zelensky expressed hope that Trump could help end the war in Ukraine before the upcoming winter.[11] Trump stated that Russia and Ukraine “are going to make a deal” but did not announce specifics. Trump also noted that Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries has “dealt a serious blow” to Russia's diesel industry. Zelensky told journalists, after his closed meeting with Trump, that the United States will convey Ukraine’s proposal for a ceasefire of long-range strikes on energy infrastructure to Russia and noted his openness for a trilateral meeting with Trump and Putin.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed that Russian forces have encircled Dobropillya — an intensification of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare campaign alleging encirclements across various sectors of the frontline to falsely present Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.
• The Kremlin is likely intensifying its encirclement claims against the backdrop of the ongoing UN General Assembly (UNGA) session and recent Ukrainian successes on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt.
• Russian authorities are reportedly training some regional government officials for possible mobilization scenarios.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump expressed their willingness to end the war in Ukraine during a September 22 joint press conference on the sidelines of UNGA.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on September 22.  
• Russia launched 212 drones and an unspecified number of missiles against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range drone strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on September 21 and 22.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City

• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on September 21 and 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-UNPZ Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (roughly 1,338 kilometers from the international border) and the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara City (roughly 920 kilometers from the international border) on September 21 or overnight on September 21 to 22, causing fires at both facilities.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Bashneft-UNPZ Oil Refinery has a processing capacity of around 7.5 million tons of oil per year and that the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery has a processing capacity of around 7 million tons of oil per year. Geolocated footage published on September 22 shows smoke plumes and fires at the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery.[14] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi reported that satellite imagery and footage indicate that Ukrainian strikes on the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery damaged its AVT-5 primary processing unit.[15] Zelensky also stated that Ukrainian forces struck unspecified targets in the Black Sea on September 22.[16]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure continue to constrain Russia's oil processing capabilities. Three industry sources told Reuters on September 21 that the Gazpromneft-Moscow Oil Refinery halted crude oil processing following the September 20 Ukrainian drone strikes against the refinery.[17] The sources stated that the Ukrainian strikes caused fires at the refinery's primary crude distillation units and that repairs could take several weeks.

The Ukrainian General Staff provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Oryol Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on September 22 that the Ukrainian strike against a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site near Tsymbulova, Oryol Oblast (roughly 173 kilometers from the international border), on September 21 damaged at least three drone storage facilities, a jet-powered drone launch pad, and five drone launchers.[18]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers east of Velykyi Prykil (east of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on September 22, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[19]

Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against frontline settlements in northern Sumy Oblast to set conditions for future offensives. Russian forces conducted a FAB-1500 glide bomb strike against a Ukrainian position in Khotin (north of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on September 21.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 22 that Russian forces are advancing near Khotin.[21] Russian forces often conduct glide bomb strikes against settlements in the near rear, in part to create ruins that Russian infantry can use for cover and concealment during subsequent offensive operations.[22]

Russian forces continue efforts to use infiltration missions to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on September 20 that Russian forces maintain positions in a narrow strip of territory in the Sumy Oblast border areas, particularly near Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City) and are conducting infiltration missions in border areas in the Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Hrabovske directions in an attempt to establish a continuous barrier along the international border.[23] Trehubov noted that Russian claims that Russian forces have advanced 10 to 15 kilometers deep from the international border are false and that Russian forces along the border have only advanced a few kilometers from the border itself.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck Russian logistics trucks at a poultry plant near Oktyabrsky (roughly 12 kilometers from the international border) and a truck near the E-105 Kharkiv City-Belgorod City highway northwest of Golovino (roughly 18 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on September 21.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City) 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 21 and 22 but did not advance.[25] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 22 that Russian infantry groups infiltrated into Vasylivka and Blahodatne (both northeast of Kharkiv City) and that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate further in the area.[26]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 21 and 22 but did not advance.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 21 and 22 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Myrove (just east of Kupyansk) and in Kupyansk itself, as Russian forces attempt to advance along both banks of the Oskil River.[29]

Russian forces are struggling to consolidate positions after infiltration missions in and near Kupyansk due to Ukrainian drone activity and counterattacks. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on September 21 that Russian forces are attempting to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses and then intensify operations in those areas.[30] The commander stated that Ukrainian drone activity has limited Russian movement within 15 kilometers of the frontline. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on September 22 that Russian forces already in Kupyansk are facing supply shortages due to Ukrainian counterattacks against Russian positions on the western bank of the Oskil River between Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and Kupyansk.[31] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian drone activity north of Kupyansk is limiting Russian forces’ ability to infiltrate into Kupyansk through Holubivka (just north of Kupyansk), which Trehubov added is the only route through which Russian forces can reach Kupyansk. Trehubov noted that Russian forces are also attempting to advance from Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk). A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 22 that Russian forces only loosely hold positions in the northern outskirts of Kupyansk and are primarily infiltrating into Kupyansk through a gas pipeline.[32] The source claimed that there are slightly fewer than 150 Russian servicemembers in Kupyansk, that Russian infiltrations in Kupyansk itself are largely impossible, and that Ukrainian forces typically eliminate or drive away Russian infiltrators.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 22 and 23 but did not advance.[33]

Ukrainian forces confirmed that previous Ukrainian strikes against a pipeline that supplied Russian forces have interdicted Russian logistics and hindered offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on September 21 that Ukrainian strikes shut down a Russian pipeline from Voronezh Oblast that supplied 50 percent of the total diesel fuel for Russian forces in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[34] The 3rd Army Corps reported that Russian tankers must now transport fuel along a 400-kilometer route from Russia to maintain fuel supplies and noted that fuel shortages resulting from the pipeline shutdown will make it more difficult for Russian forces to run generators, charge drone batteries, and operate electronic warfare (EW) equipment. The 3rd Army Corps' intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast degraded Russian fuel supplies to the frontline, supporting successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations north of Lyman in recent months.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian military officials continue to provide additional details about Ukrainian tactics north and northwest of Lyman during Operation Vivaldi. A staff officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on September 22 that Ukrainian forces were able to covertly accumulate forces, inflict heavy fire damage on Russian positions, and strike Russian drone launch points ahead of the Ukrainian counterattacks that liberated Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and Derylove (north of Drobysheve).[36] The officer noted that Ukrainian forces timed their strikes against Russian positions to allow Ukrainian infantry to move covertly into position for the subsequent counterattacks. Ukrainian forces have liberated at least 125 square kilometers in the area north of Lyman during Operation Vivaldi and demonstrated innovative tactics that have enabled Ukrainian forces to break out of positional warfare and reintroduce limited elements of mechanized maneuver in a limited way at the tactical level.[37]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continue counterattacks in the Lyman direction, including southeast of Lyman, as Russian forces are attempting to use redeployments to stabilize the area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger and a source reporting the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks toward Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and the Zherebets River.[38] The source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying additional reserves to the Lyman direction to stabilize the situation and to hold defensive positions along the Zherebets River.[39]

Russian forces continue attempts to falsely portray Russian advances in the Lyman area as more successful than the available evidence indicates. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are attaching flags to drones and flying them to areas that Russian assault infantry cannot reach, which is consistent with the observed pattern of Russian sources using the presence of Russian flags in Ukrainian-held areas to make false claims of Russian advances.[40] The Russian military has fostered a pervasive culture of lying within its ranks, leading Russian forces to fabricate claims of tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka and toward Mykolaivka and Fedorivka Druha on September 21 and 22 but did not advance.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 22 that Russian forces attacked east of Kramatorsk toward Malynivka and Vasylivska Pustosh.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and southwest of Kostyantynivka on September 21 and 22 but did not advance.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are concentrating their offensive operations toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka through Kostyantynivka and along the Kryvyi Torets River (which flows through Druzhkivka, Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka).[45] The milblogger claims indicate that Russian forces may be attempting to infiltrate toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka without first consolidating their positions in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces’ quantitative drone advantage near Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka is preventing Russian forces from consolidating their positions in the area.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

See topline for further reports of Russian claims about the Dobropillya area.

Russian forces will likely leverage foggy weather to deploy armored vehicles in the Dobropillya direction. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Dobropillya direction stated on September 22 that Russian forces may take advantage of foggy, fall weather conditions to transfer armored vehicles for mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya direction but that Russian forces are currently still relying on infiltration tactics.[47] The chief of staff stated that Russian forces will likely struggle to deploy armored vehicles to the Dobropillya direction, however, as Ukrainian forces use optical and radar reconnaissance equipment and drones to detect and strike Russian equipment in the area. The chief of staff noted that Russian forces continue to indiscriminately strike areas in the battalion's area of responsibility (AoR), including with glide bombs, to destroy all infrastructure.

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 21 and 22 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in both areas.[48]

Ukrainian strikes are preventing Russian forces from establishing cohesive defensive positions in the Oleksandrivka direction.[49] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction stated that Ukrainian forces are retaining the tactical initiative in this sector but that Russian forces continue infiltration missions. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes, including those conducted by High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), prioritize Russian drone launch and control points, artillery systems, logistics, and personnel concentrations to deprive Russian forces of several elements of their overall combat capability simultaneously.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Ukrainian forces are leveraging drone and artillery strikes to degrade Russian drone operations and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Hulyaipole direction. The chief of the Air Defense Directorate of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces are specifically targeting Russian drone operators, particularly from Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems units, in the corps' AoR, striking six to eight of these drone control points every day.[50] The commander noted that Ukrainian forces’ transition to a corps system in early 2025 has improved coordination between Ukrainian units and increased their mobility to deploy firepower. Geolocated footage posted on September 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian ammunition depot in Hulyaipole after using a reconnaissance drone to track a Russian vehicle travelling to the depot.[51] Geolocated footage published on September 21 and 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking several bridges near Ukrainske and Polohy (between seven and 13 kilometers from the frontline).[52] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on September 22 that these strikes degrade Russian forces' ability to transfer heavy equipment and ammunition to the Orikhiv direction.[53] Ukrainian forces are leveraging a combination of strike assets to conduct a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russia’s operational and near rear in the Hulyaipole direction. This campaign is the continuation of Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics that partially enabled Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction between January and August 2026 that threatened the rear of the Russian force grouping in the Hulyaipole direction.[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in eastern Orikhiv, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 21.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces consolidated positions in several windbreaks south of Lukyanivske (west of Orikhiv and southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), as Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Lukyanivske from the southwest.[56]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of intermediate-range strikes against Russian vehicles in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a van northwest of Udachne (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline) and a truck along the E-58 Mariupol-Berdyansk highway west of occupied Novovasylivka (roughly 93 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 21.[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 22.

Ukrainian forces conducted an intermediate-range strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian mobile fire team in a truck along the T-2209 Melitopol-Chonhar highway near occupied Martivka (roughly 87 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 21.[58]

Ukrainian forces are denying the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) the ability to conduct repairs and maintenance at its ports in Novorossiysk and occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on September 22 that three BSF Kalibr-carrying vessels — the Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov Project 11356 Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and a Project 21631 Buyan-M class corvette — continue to operate despite sustaining damage from previous Ukrainian strikes.[59] Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces cannot fully repair and maintain BSF vessels because the dry docks remain within the range of Ukrainian drones. Pletenchuk added that Ukraine's strike campaign has effectively cut off the BSF from its main repair base in Crimea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[60]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 22 that Russian forces launched eight Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the airspace over Belgorod Oblast; an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles from Rostov Oblast; an unspecified number of Iskander-M, S-400, or KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk, Rostov, and Voronezh oblasts; and four Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force also reported that Russian forces launched 212 Shahed-type (including jet-powered ones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 177 drones, all eight Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and one Kalibr cruise missile; that unspecified air vehicles struck 22 locations; and that debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, logistics, industrial, critical, transportation, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[62]

Russian drone and artillery strikes caused widespread energy outages across Ukraine on September 22. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on September 22 that Russian drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts on the morning of September 22.[63] Chernihiv Oblast energy operator Chernihiv Oblenergo reported on September 22 that Russian strikes against an energy facility in an unspecified neighboring oblast left 100,000 consumers in Chernihiv Oblast without electricity.[64]  

Russian forces struck an out-of-service Ukrainian oil and gas facility with ballistic missiles overnight on September 21 to 22. Ukrainian state-owned energy company Naftogaz reported on September 22 that Russian forces struck a closed down oil and gas facility in Poltava Oblast with at least five ballistic missiles.[65] Naftogaz noted that Russian forces have repeatedly struck the facility and caused critical damage that renders the facility irreparable.

Russian forces struck a World Health Organization (WHO) warehouse and damaged its medical supplies on September 22.WHO Ukraine reported on September 22 that Russian forces struck a WHO warehouse compound near Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast, overnight, damaging a temperature-controlled room where the WHO stores medical supplies.[66]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Trump signaled an interest in purchasing potash from Belarus on September 21, although Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko denied that Belarus has the spare export capacity. Trump stated on September 21 that the United States was interested in importing Belarusian potash, a common agricultural fertilizer.[67] Lukashenko claimed on September 22 that Belarus does not currently have the spare capacity to export potash to the United States “even if [Belarus] wanted to” and has “reoriented to the east” due to continuing European Union (EU) sanctions on Belarusian exports.[68]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.