Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments, November 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2024

Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 29 that the Syrian opposition forces' offensive is an "encroachment on Syria's sovereignty" and that Russia advocates for Syrian authorities to restore "constitutional order."[i] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on the phone with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on November 30 to discuss the situation in Syria.[ii] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that both parties expressed serious concerns about the "dangerous developments" in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Lavrov and Fidan reportedly discussed the need to coordinate joint Russian-Turkish actions to stabilize the situation, primarily through the Astana Process that Russia, Turkey, and Iran launched in December 2016. (The Astana Process is a rival political process to the United Nations [UN]-led Geneva Process under UN Security Council Resolution 2254.) Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also reportedly initiated a telephone conversation with Lavrov on November 30, during which Lavrov and Araghchi expressed "extreme concern" about the "dangerous escalation" in Syria.[iii] Lavrov reportedly reaffirmed Russia's strong support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and both agreed to intensify joint efforts to stabilize and review the situation through the Astana Process. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin will be able to deploy additional assets to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime given the high tempo and operational requirements for Russia to continue conducting operations in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s priority theater. Russia withdrew S-300 systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine.[iv]  ISW collected unconfirmed reports in March 2022 that Russia withdrew Russian soldiers and Wagner militants from Syria, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine.[v]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.[vi] Belousov and Kim discussed the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and relations between the Russian and North Korean militaries.[vii] Kim reiterated support for Russia's war in Ukraine and boilerplate rhetoric that the Kremlin uses to forward its reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West into self-deterrence.[viii]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize poor Russian military command decisions and poor training and discipline among Russian personnel.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence. Putin addressed members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28 and reiterated several claims about the Oreshnik ballistic missile, with which Russian forces struck Dnipro City on November 21.[1] Putin's November 28 statements closely resembled the speeches he gave on November 21 and 22 immediately following the Oreshnik strike, again presenting the Oreshnik strike as the commensurate Russian response to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using Western-provided long-range missile systems such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALPs.[2] Putin detailed the purported technical specifications of the Oreshnik during his CSTO speech and subsequent press conference with journalists on November 28, highlighting the size and maximum internal temperature of its warhead, its launch speed, and its blast radius, and compared the Oreshnik to both a "nuclear weapon" and a "meteorite" in terms of the damage it can cause.[3] Putin threateningly claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian General Staff are "selecting targets for destruction" in Ukraine, including "decision-making centers in Kyiv," and later responded to a question about whether these are military or political targets by stating that "everything is possible."[4]

There is nothing particularly novel about the capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the Oreshnik missile does not portend a Russian escalation in the war.[5] Putin's efforts to stress the missile’s technical specifications are part of the larger reflexive control campaign that the Kremlin is currently pursuing, and highlighting its range and payload while comparing its destructive capabilities to that of a meteor is meant to threaten both Ukraine and the West and discourage further Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using Western-provided systems. Even Putin's threat of strikes on "decision-making centers" in Kyiv rings empty—Russian forces regularly strike civilian and critical infrastructure in Kyiv City with drones and nuclear-capable missiles.[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky summarized this fact on November 29 in response to Putin's CSTO statements and said that "Putin wants to add thousands more to the thousands of missiles that have already hit Ukraine."[7] Reuters, citing five sources close to US intelligence, reported on November 27 that the November 21 Oreshnik strike has not changed the US intelligence assessment that Russia is unlikely to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, even in retaliation for Ukrainian strikes into Russian with Western-provided weapons.[8] Putin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik and Russian missile capabilities therefore remains part of the Kremlin's reflexive control information operation and is unlikely to presage the development of particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.

The Russian military is considering establishing a separate service branch for unmanned systems, likely as part of the Russian MoD’s in a belated effort to catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in February 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the press conference during his visit to Kazakhstan on November 28 that the Russian MoD and General Staff are considering establishing a new unmanned system service within the Russian Armed Forces and emphasized that drones are one of the most important factors of combat operations.[9] A milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces explained that Russian drone detachments currently informally operate as part of other Russian military units while simultaneously being responsible for their official tasks such as conducting assault operations or performing medical and sapper functions.[10] Putin also praised Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, identified him as the lead on the establishment of the unmanned systems service, and called him a "modern defense minister." Belousov recently faced significant backlash from the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community for failing to adequately respond to the amassing deaths of Russian drone operators and specialists in assault operations in Ukraine, and Putin's mention of Belousov's involvement may be an attempt to restore Belousov's image among Russian ultranationalist and troops.[11]

A Kremlin insider source claimed that the establishment of the new service may take Belousov between six months to a year as it will require several reforms and expanding educational programs, registering new military specialties, and integrating volunteer projects into the Russian MoD bureaucracy.[12] Belousov notably established the "Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies in August 2024 on the base of an unspecified unmanned aircraft unit.[13] The "Rubikon" Center appears to be the Russian MoD's initiative to establish the educational and drone development foundation necessary for the establishment of the new unmanned systems service.

The Russian military's efforts to reorganize informal drone detachments into centralized, specialized military units are already introducing significant dysfunction into the Russian military. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger responded to Putin's November 28 discussion of the unmanned systems service, stating there is a risk that the Russian MoD will try to formalize and monopolize drone supplies to the new unmanned systems service, which will erode a competitive and flexible environment conducive to innovation.[14] The milblogger observed that it is also unclear how the Russian military command will integrate the new drone service with the other combat operations, namely how this centralized initiative will impact the Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complex. The milblogger added that the new unmanned systems service is unlikely to prevent the Russian military command from committing drone operators to assaults given that Russian tank, engineering, artillery, and signals specialists are actively fighting as infantry in the event of manpower shortages despite being different classes of forces. Russian milbloggers previously claimed that the Russian MoD had been trying to form "joint technical drone battalions" by systematically disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and connected these efforts to the establishment of the "Rubikon" Center.[15] Russian milbloggers previously observed that Russian military commanders may have been increasingly committing drone operators to deadly assault operations in anticipation that the Russian MoD would deprive them of necessary manpower by reallocating these forces into MoD-operated "technical drone battalions." Russian milbloggers also criticized the Russian MoD's efforts to establish separate, specialized “technical drone battalions,” citing the lack of a joint Russian communications system that would allow dedicated drone units to closely coordinate with assault units.[16]

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 188 drones and missiles against Ukraine on the night of November 27 to 28, including: three S-300 air defense missiles from Belgorod Oblast targeting Kharkiv Oblast; 57 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Volgograd Oblast; 28 Kalibr cruise missiles from vessels in the Black Sea; three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and 97 Shahed drones and unknown other strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Kursk, Oryol, and Rostov oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai as of 1030 local time on November 28.[17] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 Kh-101 missiles, three Kh-59/69 missiles, and 35 drones, and 62 Russian drones became “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces also downed 90 percent of the Russian Kalibr missiles and that at least 12 Russian drones and missiles successfully struck Ukrainian fuel and energy objects.[18]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 132 Shahed drones and unknown other strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Oryol, Rostov, and Kursk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 28 to 29 and that Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones over Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkassy, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts at of 900 local time on November 29.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 Russian drones became ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian EW interference, and that one Russian drone returned to Russian air space. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Chernivitsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts on November 28 and 29.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces have used large numbers of missiles and drones during recent strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and that Russian forces are launching thermal and radar interference devices and placing EW systems directly on missiles to defend against Ukrainian countermeasures.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces have also recently seized on poor weather conditions to conduct strikes under dense fog and cloud cover.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 29 that Ukrainian drone units recently destroyed a Russian Zoopark radar system in an unspecified area of Russia or occupied Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[22] The GUR reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a ”Podlyot” mobile radar system — which identifies targets for S-300/400 air defense systems — near occupied Kotovske, Crimea (north of Yevpatoria on Crimea‘s northwestern coast).[23] Geolocated footage published on November 29 purportedly shows Ukrainian forces also striking an S-400 air defense system near occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that Ukrainian drones struck the Atlas Oil Depot in Rostov Oblast and caused a fire at the oil depot.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Atlas Oil Depot supplies petrol products to the Russian military. Russian sources posted imagery claiming to show a fire near the Atlas Oil Depot and claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted a drone strike likely against an oil depot near Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai on November 28.[26] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Atlas Oil Depot in August 2024.[27]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov made an unannounced visit to Pyongyang, North Korea on November 29 amid intensifying Russian-North Korean cooperation. Belousov met with North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang Chol on November 29 and stated that the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in June 2024 is the foundation of a "new Eurasian security system" and will play a stabilizing role in northeast Asia.[28] Belousov also highlighted expanding Russian-North Korean military cooperation. No stated that strengthening military cooperation is the "highest priority" and that the Russian and North Korean defense ministries are already engaged in high-level exchanges.[29] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Interfax-Ukraine in an article published on November 29 that North Korea has supplied over five million rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition and 100 KN-23/24 (Hwasong-11Ga/Hwasongpho-11Na) ballistic missiles to Russia.[30] The GUR also reported that North Korea began supplying artillery systems to Russia on October 3 and has supplied over 100 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and M-1991 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS). The GUR reported that over 60 M-1939 Koksan artillery systems are in Russia and that Russia will transfer some to the Saratov Artillery Command School in Saratov City to train Russian military personnel. US Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs Robert Wood stated on November 27 that North Korea has transferred over 18,000 containers of munitions and munitions-related materiel and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia since November 2023.[31] Wood added that North Korea is preparing to transfer "even more" ballistic missiles to Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.[32] Head of Tabasaransky Raion in the Republic of Dagestan, Magomed Kurabanov, reported Muradov’s appointment on November 28, though the Russian MoD has yet to confirm Muradov's reported appointment as of this publication.[33] Muradov previously served as Eastern Military District (EMD) and Eastern Grouping of Forces commander until his dismissal in March or April 2023, likely due to battlefield failures and substantial personnel and equipment casualties near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast earlier in 2023.[34] Russian milbloggers extensively criticized Muradov for a previously failed offensive on Vuhledar and reiterated these criticisms of Muradov in response to his new appointment, with one milblogger criticizing the MoD’s pattern to reappoint incompetent generals perceived as loyal to the Kremlin to new positions.[35]  

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened additional investigations on November 28 into the apparent Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. The Prosecutor General reported that in the first instance, four Ukrainian soldiers surrendered to Russian troops near Petrivka (near Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast) on November 22, upon which Russian forces executed them with automatic weapons at close range.[36] Russian forces also captured six Ukrainian POWs near Novodarivka (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) and executed five POWs at close range on November 24.[37] In both instances the Ukrainian soldiers had clearly surrendered or been captured and disarmed, meaning that they were officially hors de combat and protected under international law. The abuse of execution of POWs is a violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs and a violation of Rule 47 of Customary International Humanitarian Law.[38]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky the appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Ukraine's new Ground Forces Commander on November 29, replacing Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk.[39] Zelensky also appointed Colonel Oleh Apostol as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky stated that these appointments are intended to increase Ukraine's combat capabilities, ensure quality training of Ukrainian forces, and introduce innovative management practices into the Ukrainian military.

Georgians protested in Tbilisi, Georgia in response to an initiative by the ruling pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party to delay European Union (EU) accession negotiations, prompting the Russian information space to resurrect information operations falsely framing the protests and Georgian opposition parties as potential threats to Georgian sovereignty. Georgian Prime Minister and Georgian Dream party member Irakli Kobakhidze announced on November 28 that Georgia is suspending EU accession negotiations until 2028 and is refusing any budget grants from the EU in the meantime.[40] Georgians protested this decision outside the Georgian parliament building in Tbilisi on November 28 and 29 and clashed with riot police, prompting authorities to detain protestors and use tear gas and water cannons in attempts to disperse the protests.[41] Russian media heavily covered the protests, and Russian milbloggers – including those with connections to the Kremlin – claimed that these protests are the Georgian opposition’s attempt at a "Maidan" revolution and that successful protests could result in the installation of a new government in Georgia and Georgia "losing its sovereignty" to the West.[42] Russian government officials and Georgian Dream affiliates have previously claimed that Western countries are pursuing "Maidanization" in Georgia — a specific reference to Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 — to justify efforts to derail long-term European integration efforts that play into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence.
• There is nothing particularly novel about the capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the Oreshnik missile does not portend a Russian escalation in the war. Putin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik and Russian missile capabilities therefore remains part of the Kremlin's reflexive control information operation and is unlikely to presage the development of particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.
• The Russian military is considering establishing a separate service branch for unmanned systems, likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) in a belated effort to catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in February 2024.
• Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov made an unannounced visit to Pyongyang, North Korea on November 29 amid intensifying Russian-North Korean cooperation.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.
• The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened additional investigations on November 28 into the apparent Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky the appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Ukraine's new Ground Forces Commander on November 29, replacing Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk.
• Georgians protested in Tbilisi, Georgia in response to an initiative by the ruling pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party to delay European Union (EU) accession negotiations, prompting the Russian information space to resurrect information operations falsely framing the protests and Georgian opposition parties as potential threats to Georgian sovereignty.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Vuhledar.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in Toretsk, near Pokrovsk, and near Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and BBC Russian Service reported that they have confirmed that at least 80,937 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, 2024

Ukrainian forces continue to leverage Western-provided weapons to conduct strikes using more complex strike packages against military objects in Russia's deep rear.[i] Russian and local Crimean sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a complex drone and missile strike against occupied Sevastopol on November 27, reportedly using Neptune anti-ship missiles, modified S-200 air defense missiles, unspecified ballistic missiles, Western-provided Storm Shadow missiles, and 40 strike drones.[ii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 25 Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea and the Black Sea.[iii] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the Nakhimov Higher Naval School in occupied Sevastopol and the nearby Belbek Airfield, and an image published on November 27 shows a smoke plume reportedly near the naval school.[iv] Russian sources denied reports that the strike damaged the school, however.[v] Ukrainian official military sources have not commented on this strike at the time of this report's publication. ISW continues to assess that the provision of long-range strike weapons to Ukrainian forces will allow Ukrainian forces to augment their existing long-range strike capabilities and scale up the effects Ukraine can generate through long-range strikes against Russian rear areas.[vi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met in Astana on November 27 and signed a joint statement deepening the Russian-Kazakh strategic partnership within the framework of Russia's efforts to establish a "new world order."[vii] Putin and Tokayev signed 19 other documents deepening Russian-Kazakh political, economic, energy, and transit cooperation.[viii] The Kremlin likely intends to deepen economic and transit relations with Kazakhstan, in part, to continue to leverage Kazakhstan as key intermediary to facilitate sanctions evasion schemes.[ix] Putin also published an article in Kazakh state-backed newspaper Kazakhstanskaya Pravda on November 27 emphasizing the strength of the Russian-Kazakh relationship largely in the same style as Putin's previous articles published in the state-backed newspapers of other states during bilateral visits.[x] Putin and Tokayev also agreed to expand Russian educational institutions and Russian language institutions in Kazakhstan, likely as part of an ongoing effort to expand Russian soft power influence in countries previously colonized by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[xi] Putin notably did not mention the war in Ukraine in his article, during his meeting with Tokayev, or in the package of the signed documents, likely omitting any mention of the war in order to posture Russia as an economically stable and viable partner ahead of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Astana on November 28.

The Russian military command may have imposed controversial restrictions on the use of personal vehicles by Russian volunteers delivering military and humanitarian aid to Russian troops on the frontlines, likely as part of an ongoing force centralization effort. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that overnight on November 26 and 27 many Russian milbloggers received audio messages in which the Russian military command threatened all servicemembers to stop using personal vehicles that are not registered for military operations in the combat zone.[xii] The audio message reportedly revealed that Russian commanders will punish servicemembers caught using personal vehicles by sending the servicemembers to fight as part of an assault group alongside any frontline commanders who authorized the use of private vehicles. The milblogger claimed that there are claims that the new Southern Military District (SMD) commander, likely referring to reportedly recently appointed Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik, issued the order but did not confirm or deny these claims.[xiii] The milblogger noted that the order will effectively allow the Russian military command to stop and confiscate any private vehicles belonging to volunteers delivering humanitarian aid and to commit the drivers and their commanders to frontline assaults as a punishment for violating the order. The milblogger noted that the timing and the harshness of this order may suggest that the order is fake, possibly in an effort to allow the Russian military command to later reverse its order and appear responsive to public outcry. Other Russian milbloggers complained that the order will severely impact the community of Russian volunteers that evacuate troops and deliver military and humanitarian supplies to the frontline and warned that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize humanitarian aid deliveries to Russian servicemembers will result in supply and provision shortages among frontline units.[xiv] The Russian military command had been trying to restrict the use of personal vehicles personal and certain personal electronic devices in the combat zone and set stricter guidelines for the grooming standards of men on the frontlines since January 2023 in a likely attempt to centralize control over Russian forces.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue to leverage Western-provided weapons to conduct strikes using more complex strike packages against military objects in Russia's deep rear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met in Astana on November 27 and signed a joint statement deepening the Russian-Kazakh strategic partnership within the framework of Russia's efforts to establish a "new world order."
• The Russian military command may have imposed controversial restrictions on the use of personal vehicles by Russian volunteers delivering military and humanitarian aid to Russian troops on the frontlines, likely as part of an ongoing force centralization effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, and within the main Ukrainian salient Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to militarize the Russian government at the local, regional, and federal levels as a way to prevent the return of "Afghan syndrome" in Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2024

Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin claimed on November 26 that Russia is open to negotiations but stated that Russia "categorically rejects" any "freezing" of the current frontline or the creation of a demilitarized zone.[1] Naryshkin alleged that the "elimination" of the reasons that "caused" Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is the only way to ensure peace — demonstrating that Russia continues to uncompromisingly demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Kremlin has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine relinquish areas of the four Ukrainian oblasts that the Kremlin has illegally annexed and that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[2] ISW also recently forecasted that the Russian military command is likely planning how to advance into the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — notably not one of the four illegally annexed oblasts — in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[3]

The Russian military's rate of advance since Fall 2024 has notably increased recently compared to its rate of advance in 2023 and the rest of 2024, but recent Western media reports comparing recent Russian gains to those at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion continue to mischaracterize the gradual and tactical nature of Russia's recent advances.[4] ISW assesses that Russian forces have gained 574 square kilometers since November 1, 2024 — an average rate of 22 square kilometers per day. This is remarkably less than the 1,265 square kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces were gaining in March 2022. Reuter's November 26 report that Russian forces "control" over 80 percent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is also misleading.[5] ISW assesses that while Russian forces occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, Russian forces only occupy about 66 percent of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have occupied almost the entirety of Luhansk Oblast since Fall 2022 but have occupied significantly less territory in Donetsk Oblast throughout the war. ISW recently assessed that Russian forces still need to seize over 8,000 square kilometers of territory to achieve the Kremlin's self-defined objective of seizing the territory of Donetsk Oblast.[6] Russian forces would seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in roughly one year should Russian forces continue their recent relatively quicker rate of advance — which is not a given. Russian forces notably have been bypassing Ukrainian strongpoints, and Ukraine still has several well-defended cities in Donetsk Oblast, such as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, that Russian forces likely cannot seize as rapidly as they have with the rural fields near Pokrovsk. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have not been able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield to make deep penetrations into Ukrainian positions, as seen in the initial months of the full-scale invasion.[7] Russian forces have instead been exploiting identified vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses to make gradual advances.[8]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed Ukraine's usage of US-provided ATACMS against Russia amid official Russian confirmation of recent Ukrainian ATACMS strikes. Kirby stated on November 25 that the Ukrainian forces are "able to use" ATACMS to "defend themselves" and that Ukrainian forces are already using them in and around Kursk Oblast.[9] Kirby's statement is the first official confirmation that the US authorized Ukrainian forces to use ATACMS to strike military objects in Russia.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on November 26 that Ukrainian forces recently struck military objects in Kursk Oblast.[11] The MoD stated that Ukrainian forces launched five ATACMS on November 23, damaging an S-400 air defense radar system in Lotarevka (northwest of Kursk City), and eight ATACMS on November 25, damaging infrastructure facilities and injuring military personnel in the Khalino Airfield. The Russian MoD published photos purportedly showing parts of the ATACMS from both strikes.[12] Geolocated footage published on November 25 shows the moment of the ATACMS strike that damaged the Khalino Airfield.[13] A former Ukrainian officer stated on November 25 that while Russian air activity from the Khalino Airfield has decreased in recent days — likely due to recent Ukrainian strikes, Ukraine's ability to inflict damage during long-range missile strikes is limited by the number of such missiles available to Ukrainian forces.[14] ISW assesses that Ukrainian long-range strikes against military objects within Russia’s rear are crucial for Ukraine's ability to degrade Russian military capabilities throughout the theater.[15]

Russian forces launched a record number of drones against Ukraine on the night of November 25 to 26 as Russia continued to increase their use of decoy drones in long-range strike packages targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.[16] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 188 Shahed and other unspecified drones — likely referring to decoy drones — from Voronezh, Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 25 to 26.[17] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all four Iskander-M missiles and 76 drones over Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Rivne, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts as of 0900 local time on November 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 95 Russian drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that five drones flew into Belarusian air space. Kyiv Oblast officials stated that Russian forces launched more than 10 drones at Kyiv City from different directions in several waves and that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the drones.[18] Ternopil Oblast officials stated that Russian strike drones destroyed energy infrastructure in Ternopil Oblast, causing power outages.[19] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M missiles at civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast during the day on November 25 and that Ukrainian forces intercepted one of the Iskander-M missiles.[20] Sumy Oblast officials stated that a Russian missile of an unspecified type struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City during the day on November 26.[21] Ukrainian reports that roughly half of the Russian drones became "lost" suggest that Russian forces likely used a large number of decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. ISW recently observed reports that Russia is increasing its use of decoy drones that resemble Shahed drones during combined long-range strikes and assesses that Russia will likely continue to use decoy drones and experiment with varying strike packages to increase the effectiveness of long-range strikes against Ukraine ahead of and during the winter.[22]

Russian state media reported that the Russian MoD replaced former Russian Southern Military District (SMD) and Southern Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Gennady Anashkin with Eastern Military District (EMD) acting commander Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik. Russian state outlet RBK reported in an article published on November 26 that a source in the Russian MoD stated that Sanchik replaced Anashkin as part of a "planned rotation" and that Anashkin will now head the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow.[23] A source close to the Russian MoD also told RBK that the Russian military appointed EMD First Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Andrei Ivanayev as EMD commander and that Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin is also serving as Northern Grouping of Forces Commander.[24] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on November 23 that the Russian military command removed Anashkin after Russian commanders in the Siversk direction in his area of responsibility submitted incorrect reports about Russian battlefield advances to their superiors, and the Russian MoD appears to be continuing its efforts to cover up these information space claims.[25]

Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a surge of recent Russian war crimes. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office reported on November 26 that Ukrainian law enforcement officials opened a pre-trial investigation into the execution of five Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces in Petrivka (south of Pokrovsk) on November 13 in violation of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs.[26] ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed an increasing trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appear to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders and the larger Russian military justice system.[27]

The Russian State Duma is preparing the legal mechanisms to remove the Taliban from the Russian government’s official list of banned terrorist organizations. Russian State Duma deputies submitted a bill to the Duma on November 26 proposing to amend the law "On countering terrorism" to allow the Russian government to remove banned terrorist organizations after the organization "ceases its activities aimed at promoting, justifying, and supporting terrorism or committing" terrorist acts. Russian law does not currently provide such a removal mechanism, and the amendments would allow Russia to remove the Taliban from the list — as Kremlin officials have repeatedly stated they intend to do.[28] A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin is unlikely to reach an official decision to remove the Taliban from Russia's list of terrorist organizations by the end of 2024.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks.
• The Russian military's rate of advance since Fall 2024 has notably increased recently compared to its rate of advance in 2023 and the rest of 2024, but recent Western media reports comparing recent Russian gains to those at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion continue to mischaracterize the gradual and tactical nature of Russia's recent advances.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed Ukraine's usage of US-provided ATACMS against Russia amid official Russian confirmation of recent Ukrainian ATACMS strikes.
• Russian forces launched a record number of drones against Ukraine on the night of November 25 to 26 as Russia continue to increase their use of decoy drones in long-range strike packages targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.
• Russian state media reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced former Russian Southern Military District (SMD) and Southern Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Gennady Anashkin with Eastern Military District (EMD) acting commander Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik.
• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a surge of recent Russian war crimes.
• The Russian State Duma is preparing the legal mechanisms to remove the Taliban from the Russian government’s official list of banned terrorist organizations.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• A Russian milblogger complained on November 25 that Russian forces often operate artillery without coordinating between different Russian elements, highlighting significant communications issues between armored vehicle and infantry units.
• Russian authorities continue to incentivize service in Ukraine through one-time payment offers, likely in order to avoid conducting another partial involuntary reserve callup.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2024

Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast and are coming closer to enveloping Velyka Novosilka and advancing towards important Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the rest of western Donetsk Oblast and running into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advancing to the eastern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka (just east of the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also made additional advances northeast and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[2] Russian EMD elements, including of the 2nd Battalion of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly advancing on the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[3]

Russian forces are also continuing efforts to eliminate the small pocket east of the O0510 Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka road (southeast of Kurakhove and northeast of Vuhledar). Geolocated footage published on November 25 indicates that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) have advanced up to Pobiedy Street in central Kurakhove.[4] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on November 25 that Russian forces seized Romanivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and made additional gains in fields surrounding the settlement.[5] While ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian forces operating within Romanivka, geolocated footage published on November 24 shows two separate Russian platoon-sized mechanized assaults just east of Romanivka near Illinka and Antonivka, indicating that Russian forces advanced towards Romanivka during these assaults.[6] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly conducted the mechanized assault near Antonivka.[7] Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces in this area are focusing on forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw westward towards Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[8]

ISW previously assessed on November 24 that the Russian military command has several potential courses of action (COAs) in this sector of the front, and Russian gains on November 24 and 25 lend themselves to two of the outlined COAs — the Russian effort to push west along the H15 to the Andriivka-Kostyantynopil line from Kurakhove, and the Russian effort to bypass Velyka Novosilka and threaten Ukrainian GLOCs into eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] Russian forces have already seized positions along the H15 road in eastern Kurakhove, and will likely use new positions along Pobiedy Street (which runs southward perpendicular to the H15 road) to further interdict and advance westward through Kurakhove and along the H15, towards Dachne and Andriivka (both west of Kurakhove). Recent Russian advances to Pobiedy Street in central Kurakhove place Russian forces about 15km east of Andriivka. Both Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets identified Andriivka as the Russian operational-level objective west of Kurakhove because the seizure of Andriivka would afford Russian forces a stronger position from which to envelop a chain of settlements along the O0510 highway northwest and northeast of Vuhledar.[10] Russian forces may continue advancing west along the H15 towards Andriivka while attacking into the pocket northeast of Vuhledar along the Uspenivka-Hannivka-Romanivka line with the intent to compel Ukrainian forces to withdraw westward to avoid encirclement. Such a maneuver could enable Russian forces to seize tactical positions in the area and level the frontline from Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) to Kostyantynopolske, placing Russian forces about 23km east of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border at its closest point.

Recent Russian advances near Velyka Novosilka are consistent with ISW's November 24 forecast that Russian forces could attempt to envelop Velyka Novosilka via its eastern and northeastern flanks.[11] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russian forces have crossed the Kashlahach River directly east of Velyka Novosilka, which they would have to do in order to begin fighting within the urban areas of the settlement. Russian forces are more likely to advance north of Velyka Novosilka by pushing southwest from Rozdolne towards Novyi Komar and supplement these attacks with advances northward to the west of Velyka Novosilka via Rivnopil. Ukraine's loss of Velyka Novosilka would be significant and potentially detrimental to Ukraine's ability to sustain the defense of the nexus between Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk noted on November 24 that Velyka Novosilka is an important logistics point for Ukrainian troops, the seizure of which would allow Russian forces to more actively threaten Hulyaipole and Orikhiv (both in Zaporizhia Oblast southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[12] The seizure of Velyka Novosilka would also afford Russian forces a stronger position from which to attack into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13]

Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast may become operationally significant if the Russian command properly exploits these recent tactical successes, which is not a given. Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast do not automatically portend the collapse of the Ukrainian frontline. Recent Russian mechanized assaults with elements of the SMD northeast of Vuhledar appear to cohere with EMD mechanized assaults near Velyka Novosilka, further supporting ISW's assessment that elements of the EMD and SMD are currently conducting mutually supportive offensive operations in this sector of western Donetsk Oblast.[14] Russian forces' ability to further advance towards the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblast borders will in large part be contingent on whether Russian EMD and SMD command elements continue to successfully coordinate combat operations on their respective sectors of the front. Furthermore, even if Russian forces are able to achieve all the operational COAs outlined above, Russian forces would need to seize over 8,000 square kilometers of territory to achieve Moscow’s self-defined objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast.[15] Potential Russian advances into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, given historical data about Russian offensive performance, are unlikely to be immediately rapid or threaten major Ukrainian military objects or large cities in the winter 2024-2025 campaign season. The Ukrainian theater is large and Russian tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast should not cause undue panic in the short-term. Russian gains remain tactical and Russian forces have not restored operational maneuver to the battlefield yet. The current Russian advances may fall short of their operational objectives, as did initial Russian frontal assaults against Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk earlier in 2024.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Kaluga Oblast and an airbase in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 25 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck several important Russian assets in Bryansk, Kursk, and Kaluga oblasts on the night of November 24 to 25, including an oil depot in Kaluga Oblast.[16] Geolocated footage published on November 24 and 25 shows an explosion at the oil depot near Kaluga City and a subsequent fire in the area.[17] Kaluga Oblast officials reported that Russian forces downed several drones in the area and that debris from a drone caused a fire near an unspecified industrial enterprise near Kaluga City.[18] Geolocated footage and imagery published on November 25 indicate that Ukrainian forces also struck the Khalino Airfield and fields near Kursk City with several ATACMS missiles and drones.[19] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least seven ATACMS missiles and 12 drones at the airfield, and Russian milbloggers acknowledged the strike but claimed that Ukrainian forces did not significantly damage the airfield.[20] A Russian insider source posted a photo claiming to show that a Ukrainian ATACMS strike recently destroyed the radar system of a Russian S-400 air defense system near Bolshoe Zhirovo (northwest of Kursk City), Kursk Oblast following Ukrainian reporting about the S-400 strike on November 24.[21]

Ukrainian military officials continue to warn of potential Russian ground operations against Zaporizhzhia City, though the timeline and scale of this offensive operation remain unclear due to the operational constraints imposed by ongoing Russian operations in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts. The Economist, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 24 that Russian forces are preparing for a future offensive operation with up to 130,000 personnel on Zaporizhzhia City, which is 30 kilometers from the current frontline, although the date of this forecasted operation is unknown.[22] A Ukrainian brigade commander stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast halted initial Russian plans for an assault on Zaporizhzhia City and that the Russian military command redeployed nearly half of the 20,000-30,000 Russian troops initially slated for the offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast. The battalion commander noted that continued Russian effort in Kursk may delay an offensive on Zaporizhzhia City, but that Russian forces may also conduct the attack with a smaller force grouping than originally intended.

Sources within Ukraine’s military command previously stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from launching a major offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months- consistent with the Ukrainian battalion commander's statements.[23] ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed forces from western Zaporizhia Oblast to respond to the Kursk incursion in August 2024.[24] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn warned on November 11 that Russian forces are moving trained assault groups to forward positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast but that it is unclear if the Russian military intends to conduct a unified offensive operation or separate localized assaults.[25] Voloshyn later noted on November 24 that Russian forces have not transferred large groups of forces to the Zaporizhzhia direction but rather are moving small units of assault personnel or drone operators from Donetsk Oblast in order to intensify Russian assaults in the south.[26] Voloshyn previously stated that Russian forces are concentrating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne and south of Zaporizhzhia City), Hulyaipole (northeast of Robotyne), and Robotyne itself, and are preparing to conduct intensified assaults in these areas.[27] ISW also observed intensifications of Russian activity near Kamyanske in early October 2024.[28]

Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk downplayed reports on November 24 of a possible Russian ground offensive on Zaporizhzhia City, however, noting instead the persistent threat of Russian airstrikes along the southern frontline is aimed at spreading fear among Ukrainian civilians.[29] Bratchuk addressed concerns of Russian preparations in this area by disclosing that Ukrainian forces have observed Russian units being transferred away from the Zaporizhzhia direction to the Kurakhove-Pokrovsk line in Donetsk Oblast for ongoing offensive operations. ISW is unable to independently confirm the large-scale redeployment of Russian troops at this time.

North Korea is reportedly expanding a key weapons facility likely used to supply Russia with ballistic missiles. Reuters, citing satellite imagery findings from a US-based think tank, reported on November 25 that North Korea is expanding its only weapons facility that assembles KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles, which Russia uses in Ukraine.[30] CNN reported on November 23 that about 60 of the total 194 ballistic missiles that Russia launched against Ukraine so far in 2024 were North Korean-supplied KN-23s.[31] ISW continues to observe increased North Korean support for Russia's war effort through the deployment of North Korean troops to the theater of war and the provision of ammunition and weapons.[32]

The Kremlin signaled that it would remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations amid intensified Russia-Taliban rapprochement. Afghan and Russian news outlets reported on November 25 that Russian Security Council Secretary General Sergei Shoigu stated that the Kremlin will soon remove the Taliban from its list of "terrorist organizations" during a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and a Taliban delegation.[33] ISW previously observed that the Kremlin has maintained direct contact with the Taliban since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 2021, although more explicit Russian recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government will likely enhance Russia-Taliban cooperation.[34] Russia has recently intensified outreach to the Taliban, in large part to leverage the Taliban's control of the Afghan government to degrade the Taliban's regional adversary, the Afghanistan-based Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast and are coming closer to enveloping Velyka Novosilka and advancing towards important Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the rest of western Donetsk Oblast and running into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast may become operationally significant if the Russian command properly exploits these recent tactical successes, which is not a given. Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast do not automatically portend the collapse of the Ukrainian frontline.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Kaluga Oblast and an airbase in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 24 to 25.
• Ukrainian military officials continue to warn of potential Russian ground operations against Zaporizhzhia City, though the timeline and scale of this offensive operation remain unclear due to the operational constraints imposed by ongoing Russian operations in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts.
• North Korea is reportedly expanding a key weapons facility likely used to supply Russia with ballistic missiles.
• The Kremlin signaled that it would remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations amid intensified Russia-Taliban rapprochement.
• Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Toretsk and south and southeast of Pokrovsk.
• Russian command posts are reportedly relying on Chinese-made radios for internal communications because Russia cannot domestically produce enough quality radios for the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2024

Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 24 that Russian forces have seized Katerynivka, Yelizavetivka, Illinka, and likely Romanivka (all northeast of Vuhledar along the C051104 highway), and geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Yelizavetivka.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Trudove (north of Vuhledar).[2] Russian forces also made recent confirmed advances in the Velyka Novosilka area, as geolocated footage published on November 23 and 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) and to western Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[3] Russian forces have significantly increased the tempo of their advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions since September 1, 2024, having gained at least 1,103 square kilometers in these areas since September 1, 2024. Russian forces, in contrast, only gained 387 square kilometers in all of 2023 due to Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive.

Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024. Russian forces notably have not been able to restore operational maneuver seen during the initial months of Russia's full-scale invasion, and the current Russian tactical advances, although quicker now than in the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024, is still far below the Russian rate of advance in March 2022.[4] Russian forces have succeeded in taking advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, contrary to an incorrect previous ISW assessment that forecasted otherwise.[5] ISW presents the following courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may be considering given Russian forces’ recent advances.

Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions present the Russian military command with several courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may attempt in the coming weeks and months. The Russian military command appears to be simultaneously attempting to encircle Velyka Novosilka while closing pockets with Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove. Russian forces are also pursuing supporting COAs to improve Russia’s battlefield geometry in southern Donetsk Oblast and reduce threats to Russian flanks. ISW presents the following COAs in no particular order, as each can be mutually beneficial, and none of these COAs are mutually exclusive.

• COA 1: Russian forces advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks, bypassing area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka. ISW assessed on November 4 that Russian forces seized Shakhtarske (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), and ISW has observed confirmation that Russian forces have advanced west and northwest of the settlement since.[6] ISW also recently observed confirmation that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka and northwest of Shakhtarske).[7] Russian forces have also increasingly advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka, having recently seized Rivnopil and advanced near Novodarivka.[8] Russian forces are confirmed to be within five kilometers northeast and 2.5 kilometers southeast of Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces appear to be trying to bypass Velyka Novosilka and the string of settlements south of the settlement as Ukrainian forces likely have better-prepared defenses in these areas. The potential future Russian seizure of Rozdolne and further advances north and northeast from the Novodarivka-Rivnopil line would continue to threaten Ukrainian defenses within Velyka Novosilka. The Russian military command likely intends for continued pressure on Velyka Novosilka's southwestern and eastern flanks to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the area without having to conduct frontal assaults on the settlement itself - demonstrating how Russian forces are attempting to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defensive lines in order to make gradual, increasingly threatening advances. Russian forces are also currently threatening Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the Ukrainian defense in Velyka Novosilka. ISW assesses that Russian forces are less than three kilometers from the T0518 highway that runs north from Velyka Novosilka to the H15 highway, which itself serves as a major GLOC for Ukrainian forces in and near Kurakhove. ISW also assesses that Russian forces are less than four kilometers from the O0510 highway that runs west from Velyka Novosilka to Hulyaipole. Continued Russian pressure on these Ukrainian GLOCs will likely threaten the sustainability of the Ukrainian defense in Velyka Novosilka.
• COA 2: Russian forces advance to Andriivka (along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the frontline. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets and Russian milbloggers recently identified that the Russian military command is likely trying to advance towards Andriivka from the Rozdolne-Maksymivka line.[9] Russian forces are currently attempting to envelop Ukrainian forces in the pockets north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and near the string of settlements northeast of Vuhledar along the C051104 highway. A potential Russian seizure of Andriivka would set preferable conditions for Russian forces to envelop both of these Ukrainian pockets at once. Further Russian advances southward and southwestward from Sontsivka (northeast of Andriivka) would also support this Russian effort to envelop a larger pocket of Ukrainian forces from Andriivka. The seizure of Andriivka would also allow Russian forces to increasingly level the flank from Rozdolne to the H15 highway - benefiting ongoing Russian efforts to level the frontline between Selydove and Rozdolne so as to enable renewed Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk in 2025.[10]
• COA 3: Russian forces advance west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes. Russian forces have continued to push west and southwest since seizing Selydove as of October 30.[11] Russian advances southwest of Selydove towards Novodmytrivka, Zorya, and Sontsivka aim to envelop Ukrainian forces defending in the area north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir (north of Kurakhove). Possible Russian advances to Andriivka from the south, as described in COA 2, would greatly limit Ukrainian egress routes out of the pockets north of the reservoir and northeast of Vuhledar along the C05114 highway. Russian advances to Andriivka could force Ukrainian forces in these pockets to withdraw along a narrow egress route northwestward towards the Bohdanivka area. Russian advances west and northwest of Selydove towards Zhovte, Pushkine, and Zorya could threaten this potential Ukrainian withdrawal towards Bohdanivka. Should Ukrainian forces be able to withdraw from the pockets near Kurkhove and Vuhledar before Russian forces are able to advance to Andriivka, Russian advances southwest and west of Selydove would still help to level the flank along the Shakhtarske-Zhovte line to enable the renewal of Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk.[12]

It remains unclear which of the COAs the Russian command will pursue, if any. None of the COAs in this analysis were part of the Russian command’s initial objectives for its Fall 2024/Winter 2024-2025 campaign in Donetsk Oblast. The COAs have only emerged as possibilities following the Russian seizure of Vuhledar in October 2024 and tactical advances south of Pokrovsk and near Velyka Novosilka. The Russian command’s self-identified priority in Donetsk Oblast in late 2024 was the seizure of Pokrovsk – an objective the Russian command temporarily abandoned following stiff Ukrainian resistance on Pokrovsk’s outskirts.[13] It is unclear how much advance preparation the Russian command has undertaken to exploit opportunities in this area of operations or what kind of resistance Ukrainian forces will provide as Russian forces advance. Ukraine notably blunted Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk in 2024.

The Russian military command is likely planning on how to advance into the southeastern most part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin’s stated objective of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast very likely presupposes ground operations in southern and eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop these Ukrainian positions. Russian forces are geographically close to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and may advance north into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to envelop Ukrainian forces in southwestern Donetsk Oblast. (The Russian Forward Line of Own Troops near Novodarivka is eight kilometers from the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary as of November 24, for example.) Such a Russian advance, if successful, could eventually force Ukrainian forces from the areas southwest of Pokrovsk, west of Kurakhove, and west and northeast of Velyka Novosilka. The Russian military would likely first have to successfully envelop or bypass Velyka Novosilka in order to interdict the T0518 Bahatyr-Velyka Novosilka highway – a significant undertaking that Russian forces may not be able to achieve. Russian forces may attempt to leverage water features as natural barriers to advance north along the Vorona River (just west of Velyka Novosilka) toward Velykomykhailivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (just east of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border) from the Rivnopil area (just east of the Vorona River). Russian forces may also try to advance along the Mokri Yaly River, which runs through and north of Velyka Novosilka, toward Novopavlivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast following a potential future Russian envelopment of Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces could leverage these advances into the southeasternmost parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to support operations to seize territory in southwestern Donetsk Oblast. Such a development would likely not be part of a direct drive against the interior of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the short-to-medium term, though the Kremlin likely seeks to eventually seize significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as well. Russian milbloggers have recently reignited calls for Russian forces to advance toward southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the Velyka Novosilka area in order to pressure the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove area from the west.[14]

Potential Russian efforts to secure the Kremlin's objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by occupying at least part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are consistent with Russia's commitment to pursuing Ukraine's total capitulation and destroying Ukraine's independence and territorial sovereignty. Ukrainian outlet Interfax Ukraine, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 20 that Interfax Ukraine viewed a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) document outlining Russia's objectives of partitioning Ukraine into three different parts: one acknowledging the full Russian annexation of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and occupied Crimea; another establishing a pro-Russian puppet state centered in Kyiv under Russian military occupation; and a third part designating Ukraine's western regions as "disputed territories" to be divided among Ukraine's westernmost neighboring countries.[15] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is notably not one of the four Ukrainian oblasts that the Kremlin has illegally annexed – for now. The Russian military may leverage limited advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set conditions for future operations to militarily occupy Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and other regions of eastern and central Ukraine in the long-term.

Elements of the Russian Central, Eastern, and Southern military districts (CMD, EMD, and SMD) are conducting simultaneous, mutually supportive offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and have recently made relatively rapid tactical advances. The Russian military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after three years of war, but the extent of this learning is currently unclear. The Russian military command has dedicated significant units and formations of the CMD and 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) to offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction and the area north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir; elements of the 8th CAA (SMD) to offensive operations east of Kurakhove and to the south of Kurakhove near Dalne; elements of the 68th AC (EMD) and 8th CAA (SMD) to offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar in the belt of settlements on the C051104 road; elements of the 36th CAA (EMD) north of Vuhledar; and elements of the 5th, 29th, and 36th CAAs (all EMD) south, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka.[16] This array of Russian forces to mutually supportive offensive operations represents an inflection in how Russian forces have conducted offensive efforts so far in this war, as Russian military districts have previously conducted successive and usually mutually exclusive efforts in their respective areas of responsibility in the theater.[17] More recent Russian offensive operations with operational-level objectives along mutually supportive axes have not resulted in the same relatively higher tempo of gains as those currently ongoing in southern Donetsk Oblast.[18] Russian forces have also largely struggled with interoperability and command and control (C2) when using disparate elements of multiple formations and force groupings in a single operational axis, often hindering advances during dedicated offensive efforts.[19]

The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances. Russian advances in the Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions in recent weeks have prioritized efforts to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces from the flanks over direct frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions. Russian forces along the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka line have not restored operational maneuver to the battlefield, however, and are making these relatively rapid gains in highly attritional offensive operations-- resulting in personnel and equipment casualties that Russian forces cannot sustain in the medium- or long-term.[20] United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey stated on November 9 that Russian casualty rates in October 2024 reached about 1,345 personnel per day, and Russian forces may have suffered roughly 80,110 casualties alone in September and October 2024.[21] Data compiled by Oryx founder Jakub Janovsky indicates that Russian forces also lost 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline in September and October 2024, and Russian forces are likely to run out of armored vehicles from Soviet-era stockpiles in mid-2025 or 2026.[22]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system radar in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck positions of the Russian 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and a S-400 radar in Kursk Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment conduct ground-to-ground strikes against stationary Ukrainian targets, including civilian objects. Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Russian forces downed 24 Ukrainian drones and two missiles over Kursk Oblast on the night of November 23 to 24.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used US-provided ATACMS missiles in the strike, but ISW cannot independently confirm these claims and has not observed official confirmation of these Russian claims.[25] Russia's S-400 air defense systems comprise part of Russia's air defense umbrella, which facilitates Russian long-range air- and ground-based strikes against Ukraine. Weakening Russia's air defense umbrella is key to Ukraine's defense and efforts to eliminate Russia's ability to use sanctuary space within Russia to launch strikes. Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella will enable more effective combined Ukrainian strike packages against Russian military objects and enable Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft to more freely operate. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on November 24 that Ukrainian drones crashed near Belorechensk, Krasnodar Krai, roughly 13 kilometers from the Russian military's Khanskaya Air Base in Adygea Republic.[26] Astra also reported on November 24 that sources in Kaluga Oblast's emergency services stated that a Ukrainian drone struck a Rosneft oil depot in Kaluga Oblast on November 22 and damaged several empty oil tanks.[27]

Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and Iran-backed Houthi movement. NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 24 ISW-CTP Iran Update. Financial Times (FT) reported on November 24 that Houthi-affiliated intermediaries recruited "hundreds" of Yemeni men since as early as July 2024 to travel to Russia after promising them lucrative jobs in the "security" and "engineering" fields and eventual Russian citizenship.[28] Russian authorities reportedly instead forcibly conscripted the largely inexperienced recruits into the Russian army and sent them to fight in the war upon their arrival in Russia. FT also highlighted growing ties between the Kremlin and the Houthis, citing US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, who confirmed that Russia is actively engaging with the Houthis and discussing weapons transfers. ISW has assessed that the Kremlin has in part sought to offset heavy battlefield losses and personnel shortages by enlisting migrants and foreign nationals, while avoiding another partial involuntary reserve callup in Russia.[29] ISW also observed growing engagement between Kremlin officials and Houthis amid enhanced Russia-Iran cooperation and Iranian support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
• Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions present the Russian military command with several courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may attempt in the coming weeks and months.
• COA 1: Russian forces advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks, bypassing area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka.
• COA 2: Russian forces advance to Andriivka (along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the frontline.
• COA 3: Russian forces advance west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes.
• The Russian military command is likely planning on how to advance into the southeastern most part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.
• Elements of the Russian Central, Eastern, and Southern military districts (CMD, EMD, and SMD) are conducting simultaneous, mutually supportive offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and have recently made relatively rapid tactical advances. The Russian military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after three years of war, but the extent of this learning is currently unclear.
• The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system radar in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 23 to 24.
• Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and Iran-backed Houthi movement.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23, 2024

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors. Russian milbloggers widely claimed on November 23 that the Russian military command removed Anashkin, the acting commander of the SMD and commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces, after Russian commanders in the Siversk direction in his area of responsibility submitted incorrect reports about Russian battlefield advances to their superiors.[1] Russian state outlet RBK reported that a source in the Russian MoD acknowledged Anashkin's dismissal but claimed that it was due to a "planned rotation" and praised Anashkin's military achievements.[2] Russian milbloggers widely applauded Anashkin's removal, claiming that this may lead to improvements in how Russian forces plan and conduct operations and may increase the value Russian commanders place on Russian soldiers' lives at the front.[3] One milblogger claimed that Anashkin's removal shows that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov is starting to get involved in "military management" and not just administrative and economic reforms within the MoD.[4] Russian milbloggers recently claimed that Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA), the 3rd CAA's chief of staff, and the commander of the 3rd CAA's 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade for submitting incorrect reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction, and Russian milbloggers have widely complained in recent weeks about the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes near Siversk.[5] The Russian MoD falsely claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction seized Bilhorivka on May 20 and Serebryanka in late October 2024, for example, despite Russian milblogger criticisms of these claims since.[6]

Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol. CNN, citing an anonymous Ukrainian security source reported on November 22 that North Korean technical advisers have arrived in Russian-occupied Mariupol, are performing support operations, and are detached from the Russian military units despite wearing Russian military uniforms. Ukrainian military officials also reportedly told CNN that radio intercepts suggest that North Korean troops are operating in Kharkiv Oblast and that North Korean troops are waiting for worsening weather conditions to conduct assault operations.[7] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces denied reports of the presence of North Korean personnel in Kharkiv Oblast and stated that the spokesperson cited in the CNN report is not an official Kharkiv Group of Forces spokesperson and commented on the situation outside of their responsibilities.[8] Reuters reported on November 23 that a large number of the 11,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast are still finishing military training.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors.
• Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia does not currently need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve callup as Russian authorities continue leaning into crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence. Putin held a meeting on November 22 with Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership, Russian defense industrial base representatives, and Russian missile developers, congratulating the Russian military for conducting a "successful" test of the Oreshnik ballistic missile in response to "those who are trying to blackmail" Russia.[i] Putin emphasized that the Oreshnik missile is not a modernization of an old Soviet missile and claimed that Russian designers created it "on the basis of modern, cutting-edge developments." Putin reiterated claims that no system exists to defend against the Oreshnik and reported that Russia is already planning to serialize its production. Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces Colonel General Sergei Karakayev told Putin that the Oreshnik can strike targets across Europe and stressed that there are no analogues to the Oreshnik anywhere in the world.[ii] US and Ukrainian reporting on the November 21 ballistic missile strike, however, emphasized that the Oreshnik missile is not inherently a novel Russian capability.[iii] White House and Pentagon officials confirmed that Russia launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Ukraine, and Pentagon Spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated that Russia based the IRBM on the existing Russian RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) model.[iv] Singh also reiterated that Ukraine has already faced Russian attacks with missiles that have "significantly larger" warheads than the Oreshnik.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on November 22 that Ukraine assesses that the IRBM that Russia launched on November 21 is actually a "Kedr" missile, which Russia has been developing since 2018-2019 in an effort to update the Yars ICBM model for shorter distances.[v] GUR Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov clarified that Ukraine believes that "Oreshnik" is the codename of the missile research and development project for the Kedr missile.[vi] ISW cannot independently confirm these GUR statements, but it is noteworthy and consistent with ISW's assessment that the November 21 Russian ballistic missile strike does not represent a fundamentally novel Russian capability.[vii] Russia benefits from the rhetorical fanfare surrounding the November 21 strike and likely hopes that stoking concerns over the Oreshnik missile launch will prompt the West to dial back its support for Ukraine.

Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar ballistic missiles in the coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect. Russian sources claimed that Russia will close part of its airspace on November 23 to 24 for a missile test, but did not specify what type of missile Russian forces are testing.[viii] GUR Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi warned on November 22 that Russia likely possesses up to 10 Oreshnik missiles and that Russia will likely conduct test launches for all these missiles in the future.[ix]

Russia has reportedly provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil and an unspecified number and type of air defense systems and missiles in return for North Korea's provision of manpower for Russia's war effort in Ukraine. The Open-Source Centre, a research group based in the United Kingdom (UK), citing satellite imagery, told the BBC on November 22 that Russia has supplied over one million barrels (56,000 tons) of oil to North Korea since March 2024.[x] The BBC noted that the satellite imagery shows over a dozen different North Korean oil tankers arriving empty at an oil terminal in Russia's Far East and departing with nearly full tanks 43 times over the last eight months. UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy told the BBC that the oil is payment for the weapons and troops that North Korea has provided Russia for its war in Ukraine. The BBC noted that Russia's provision of oil to North Korea is a clear violation of United Nations (UN) sanctions against North Korea. South Korean National Security Advisor Shin Won-sik stated on November 22 that South Korea believes that Russia has provided unspecified "[air defense] equipment and anti-air missiles" to strengthen North Korea's air defense umbrella.[xi] Shin noted that Russia has already declared its intention to support North Korea's satellite-related technology and supplied North Korea with various military technologies and forms of economic aid. Russia's provision of military equipment to North Korea also represents a clear violation of UN sanctions.

The quality and type of air defense system that Russia has provided to North Korea remains unclear, however. South Korean experts theorized that Russia may have provided S-400 air defense systems to North Korea, as North Korea is capable of building shorter-range systems domestically.[xii] Any Russian S-400 delivery to North Korea would be a significant inflection, however, as Russia reportedly decided earlier this year to delay the delivery of two promised S-400 air defense systems to India until August 2026 and continues to delay providing Iran with S-400 systems.[xiii] The decision to provide North Korea with an S-400 air defense system ahead of Iran or India would suggest a major reprioritization of Russia's alliances, and ISW has not yet observed indicators that this reprioritization is underway. Furthermore, ISW has observed indications that Russia is struggling to produce advanced air defense systems and radars at a rate rapid enough to replace the losses Russia continues to sustain as a result of Ukraine's long-range drone and missile strikes.[xiv] Russia has more likely provided North Korea with shorter-range missiles and systems, or possibly cannon-based air defense systems.

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened an investigation against another instance of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on November 22 that it was investigating a report that Russian forces executed five Ukrainian servicemembers near Vuhledar on October 2, in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs.[xv] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office also reported that in total it has opened 53 criminal cases investigating Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs – 37 of which occurred during 2024.[xvi] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that Ukrainian officials are investigating 13 cases of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs between October and November 2024 alone. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appear to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence.
• Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar ballistic missiles in the coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect.
• Russia has reportedly provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil and an unspecified number and type of air defense systems and missiles in return for North Korea's provision of manpower for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened an investigation against another instance of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced west of Svatove, south of Chasiv Yar, south of Toretsk, northeast of Vuhledar, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues to build its training capacity by establishing new service academies in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. Russian forces conducted a complex strike against critical infrastructure and industrial enterprises in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the morning of November 21, that reportedly included a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile fired from Tambov Oblast, seven Kh-101 cruise missiles fired from Volgograd Oblast, and an experimental medium-range ballistic missile with reentry vehicles – likely a modified RS-26 “Rubezh” intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) - fired from Astrakhan Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101 cruise missiles and that the remaining missiles did not cause significant damage.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that the strike damaged an unspecified industrial enterprise (likely Ukraine’s Pivdenmash factory that manufactures missiles and space rockets), a medical facility, and residential areas in Dnipro City, and reported that a Russian missile also damaged residential areas in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[3] Western officials told Western media that the ballistic missile that targeted Dnipro City was not an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and was more likely a ballistic missile with a shorter range.[4]

Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine. Putin gave an address on the evening of November 21 claiming that Russian forces conducted a combined missile strike against Dnipro City, including with a new "Oreshnik" non-nuclear ballistic missile (which is reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile), framing the strike as a direct response to recent Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes against military objects in Russia and alleged "aggressive actions" of NATO states against Russia.[5] Putin threatened to strike the military facilities of Western countries that allow Ukraine to conduct strikes into Russia. Putin's November 21 rhetoric is consistent with prior official Kremlin statements defining “red lines” that the Kremlin has attempted to use to deter Western states from supporting Ukraine. [6]

Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical. Putin's recent threats against the West have centered against Western states allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into “Russian territory,” but Ukrainian forces have been striking what the Kremlin illegally defines as “Russian territory” for a long time. The Kremlin has illegally defined occupied Crimea as part of Russia since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Ukrainian forces have routinely struck Crimea with US-provided ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles since April 2023.[7] The Kremlin's application of its "red lines" rhetoric has been wildly inconsistent, undermining the overall Russian escalation narrative.[8] Putin consistently escalates the war on his own without regard to Western decisions and has consistently declined to retaliate every time Western states have deepened their support of Ukraine. Putin previously threatened severe retaliation if Western states provided Ukraine with rocket artillery, tanks, warplanes, and the ability to strike into Russia, and Putin has constantly shifted the goalposts every time the West has called Putin’s bluff.

Neither the Oreshnik ballistic missile strike nor Putin's November 21 statement represent a significant inflection in Russian strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon. Russian forces fire nuclear-capable Iskander ballistic missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable Kh-101 cruise missiles against Ukraine on a regular basis. Previous Russian missile strikes have targeted industrial and critical infrastructure including within Dnipro City that caused greater damage.[9] The only fundamentally new characteristic of the Russian strikes against Dnipro City on November 21 was the Oreshnik missile itself, which ostentatiously showcased reentry vehicles to amplify the spectacle of the strike and further imply a nuclear threat.[10][11] The West maintains credible deterrence options and Putin's nuclear saber-rattling should not constrain Western officials from choosing to further aid Ukraine. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Bill Burns cautioned Western policymakers against fearing Putin's nuclear rhetoric in September 2024, describing Putin as a "bully" who will "continue to saber rattle from time to time."[12]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its full commitment to use the prospect of "negotiations" with Ukraine and the West to pursue nothing short of the total destruction of the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to peace negotiations. Ukrainian outlet Interfax Ukraine, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 20 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) drafted a document forecasting global military-political developments until 2045 and proposing Russia's vision of the future of Ukraine — which completely erases any semblance of a free and independent Ukrainian state or Ukrainian territorial sovereignty.[13] The Russian MoD document advocates partitioning Ukraine into three different parts: one acknowledging the full Russian annexation of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and occupied Crimea; another establishing a pro-Russian puppet state centered in Kyiv under Russian military occupation; and a third part designating Ukraine's western regions as "disputed territories" to be divided among Ukraine's westernmost neighboring countries. The document also outlines future global scenarios, prioritizing those where Russia defeats Ukraine and secures a Russian-led multipolar international order. ISW cannot confirm the existence of such a document and has not observed the content of the reported document itself, but the Interfax Ukraine report is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessments of the Kremlin's intent to impose full Ukrainian capitulation and disinterest in good-faith negotiations.[14] The content also reveals that the Kremlin, regardless of the US administration or Western actors, maintains the same uncompromising strategic objectives in its war of dismantling Ukrainian sovereignty and bringing about the waning of Western influence globally.

North Korean troops are reportedly training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on November 20 that the North Korean troops who have already deployed to Russia are training with Russian naval infantry and VDV formations and noted that some North Korean troops have already participated in combat.[15] Ukrainian intelligence sources previously reported on October 15 that Russia's 11th VDV Brigade was forming the dedicated "Special Buryat Battalion" staffed mainly by North Korean soldiers for combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[16] Russia's Eastern Military District (EMD) may have the mandate for training, integrating, and deploying North Korean troops—ISW previously noted that North Korean soldiers were training alongside various Russian motorized rifle formations that belong to the EMD.[17] The EMD’s chain of command includes Russia's Pacific Fleet, which is comprised of two naval infantry brigades — the 155th and the 40th — and Russia’s 11th and 83rd VDV brigades are located inside the EMD (though they are not part of the EMD’s chain of command), so the NIS' assessment suggests that North Korean troops are likely training with elements that are based physically close to North Korea.[18] ISW has observed reports that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 11th and 83rd VDV brigades are actively deployed to combat in Kursk Oblast, which is where Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence confirmed North Korean troops have initially deployed.[19] It is therefore likely that North Korean troops are currently training with elements of the 155th, 11th, and 83rd brigades in preparation for combat in Kursk Oblast. Russian VDV forces often act as partner units during multilateral military training exercises with partner states such as Belarus and Serbia, suggesting that the aforementioned VDV brigades could be training North Korean troops, as VDV forces have trained with other foreign troops.[20]

North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel. ISW has assessed at length that the distinctions in quality between various Russian formations that existed prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine have become increasingly obsolete because of the way Russia is prosecuting its war.[21] Russian formations that were once considered "elite" or more specialized in terms of the tactical tasks they were associated with, such as VDV or naval infantry units, are now essentially functioning as understrength motorized rifle units, relying on infantry-led frontal assaults to make tactical gains as opposed to employing any sort of doctrinally-unique tactics.[22] Russian casualty rates on the frontline have forced the Russian military command to prioritize rushing new recruits to backfill vacancies in new units over providing them with sufficient basic, much less specialist, training.[23] These practices will likely extend to, and greatly impact, the experiences of North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces. North Korean troops training with VDV or naval infantry formations are likely to deploy to combat in the same way in which VDV and naval infantry soldiers deploy to combat—essentially as regular infantry forces. If the Russian command uses North Korean troops the same way that it uses Russian troops, North Korean troops are likely to face comparable rates of attrition to the rates that Russia is currently facing.[24] The losses that North Korean forces accrue in combat on behalf of Russia will dilute whatever institutional lessons the North Korean military was hoping to learn by joining Russia as a co-belligerent against Ukraine, as ISW recently assessed.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21.
• Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities - a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.
• Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical.
• Neither the Oreshnik ballistic missile strike nor Putin's November 21 statement represent a significant inflection in Russian strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon.
• The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its full commitment to use the prospect of "negotiations" with Ukraine and the West to pursue nothing short of the total destruction of the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to peace negotiations.
• North Korean troops are reportedly training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units.
• North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast southeast of Sudzha.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Vuhledar. Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna, southeast of Chasiv Yar, in Toretsk, southeast of Kurakhove, northeast of Vuhledar, and likely advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a three-year federal budget with record defense expenditures from 2025-2027.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2024

Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike against military assets in the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20 using drones and Western-provided long-range weapons. The Guardian and Bloomberg both reported on November 20, citing anonymous sources, that Ukrainian forces have conducted the first strikes against military targets within Russia using UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles.[1] Geolocated footage published on November 20 shows the aftermath of a likely Storm Shadow strike near Marino, Kursk Oblast.[2] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched up to 12 Storm Shadow missiles at Kursk Oblast, fragments of which struck Marino.[3] The geolocated footage of the strike suggests that the Ukrainian target may have been the Baryatinsky Estate in Marino, which the Ukrainian defense-focused outlet Defense Express suggested was housing a command post for Russian and North Korean troops operating in Kursk Oblast.[4] ISW cannot confirm this claim at this time, but Marino is about 30km from the current Kursk Oblast salient, which would be an appropriate distance for an operational headquarters for troops conducting offensives along the salient.

Ukrainian forces also conducted a large-scale drone strike against the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20, particularly targeting military and defense industrial assets in Voronezh, Belgorod, and Novgorod oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense systems destroyed or intercepted a total of 44 Ukrainian drones as of the morning of November 20, including 20 over Novgorod Oblast; five over Kursk Oblast; four over Oryol Oblast; three each over Belgorod, Tula, and Tver oblasts; and two each over Bryansk, Moscow, and Smolensk oblasts.[5] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on November 20 that Ukrainian drones struck the 13th Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal near Kotovo, Novgorod Oblast, at which Russian forces were reportedly storing ammunition for tube artillery; mortar mines; "Grad," "Smerch," and "Uragan" multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) missiles; Iskander ballistic missiles; S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles; North Korean provided KN-23 ballistic missiles; and Tor surface-to-air system missiles.[6] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a command post of the Russian "Sever" (Nothern) Grouping of Forces in Gubkin, Belgorod Oblast.[7] Ukrainian and Russian sources additionally posted footage of the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian drone strike against the EFKO Factory in Alekseyevka, Belgorod Oblast, which Kovalenko stated produces cargo drones for the Russian military.[8] Russian sources reported that Ukrainian drones also hit an unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast and targeted an oil depot in Sosnovka, Samara Oblast.[9]

The November 19 to 20 strike series indicates that Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to assemble more complex and effective strike packages. Ukrainian forces notably utilized both long-range strike drones and Storm Shadow missiles in the November 19-20 strike and struck a diverse range of military targets across the Russian rear.

ISW has long assessed that the systems and capabilities that Western partners are providing Ukraine, alongside Ukraine's indigenous defense industrial production and innovation efforts, are all constituent components of wider capabilities that Ukraine requires to successfully wage a multi-domain large-scale modern war.[10] Ukraine has already proven itself effective in using often domestically-produced drones to strike a variety of military targets in the Russian rear, including air bases, command headquarters, and artillery depots.[11] Ukraine's arsenal already includes aerial and naval drones and Western-provided systems such as F-16s, HIMARS, and ATACMS, although the conditions of use on the latter systems have been restricted enough to limit the benefit Ukraine can accrue by using them.[12] The addition of more powerful and precise Western-provided systems, such as JASSMs and additional ATACMS, Storm Shadows, and SCALP systems, is crucial in enabling Ukraine to scale up the effects it can generate through long-range strikes against the Russian rear.

Russian forces, in contrast, have been experimenting and diversifying their strike packages to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, conducting frequent strikes with a combination of Iranian-provided or Russian-produced Shahed drones and drone variants, North Korean-provided and domestically produced ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and aerial bombs.[13]

Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian territory have limited Ukrainian capabilities in developing commensurate strike packages. Ukraine requires continued Western military assistance, as well as domestic innovation and production, in order to continue building and utilizing strike packages to target the Russian rear and generate tactical to operational-level impacts on the battlefield.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct optimized operational maneuver since Winter 2022-2023 due to legacy doctrinal and resource limitations, but both are learning, innovating, and adapting their respective tactics on the battlefield, emphasizing the dynamic nature of the current war. Ukrainian Missile and Artillery Forces Deputy Commander Colonel Serhiy Musienko reported in a November 18 article by Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine that Russian forces are facing ammunition shortages on select sectors of the frontline and are increasingly committing Soviet-era 122mm and 130mm howitzers to the battlefield.[14] Musienko stated that Russian forces began dispersing their artillery and command systems along the frontline to avoid grouping equipment in one area and increasing vulnerability to Ukrainian strikes. Musienko also stated that Russian forces are changing their assault tactics, using small teams of one-to-two Russian personnel running to cover, after which small groups accumulate and coordinate before launching a subsequent assault. Musienko stated that Russian forces are also using armored vehicles, motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies to quickly approach Ukrainian positions and engage in small-arms battles. Musienko commented on Russia's strike adaptations, stating that Russian forces have created a reconnaissance-strike complex consisting of reconnaissance drones and an Iskander launch battery located in occupied Crimea that can identify and strike targets in the Zaporizhia direction within 20-to-30 minutes.

The New York Times (NYT) reported on November 20 that Ukrainian commanders stated that Ukrainian forces, in contrast to the situation faced by Russian forces as outlined by Musienko, continue to experience artillery shortages and are consequently relying more heavily on drone operations to constrain Russian advances along the frontline, with drone strikes resulting in upwards of 80 percent of Russian losses along the front.[15] The NYT stated that a Ukrainian drone pilot and platoon leader noted that Russian forces are targeting small drone teams with glide bombs. Musienko also noted that Ukrainian artillery and strike drones are critical for preventing Russian forces from approaching Ukrainian positions and engaging in small-arms firefights.[16]

ISW recently assessed that Ukrainian drone operations are playing a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver, slowing Russian advances to a foot pace, and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.[17] While neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces have discovered how to restore operational-level mechanized maneuver to the modern battlefield, the tempo of frontline fighting remains high, and the frontline remains dynamic. Frontline innovation and adaptation on both sides will continue to evolve modern warfare.

The US and Germany announced additional military assistance for Ukraine on November 20. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced its 70th tranche of military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) valued at $275 million, which includes HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds; drones; Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; small arms and ammunition; demolitions equipment; and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment.[18] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin confirmed that the United States is providing Ukraine with antipersonnel landmines with controlled detonations to help defend against Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.[19] The German government announced on November 20 that Germany has delivered additional weapons and equipment to Ukraine, including ammunition for Mardar infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), 47 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs), one TRML-4D aerial radar system, four Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers, 40,000 155mm artillery rounds, seven M109 155mm howitzer barrels, over 200 various reconnaissance drones, mine-clearing and logistics vehicles, and small arms ammunition.[20]

Ukrainian officials continue to launch investigations into Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and provide statistics on Ukrainians living in Russian captivity. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on November 20 that it launched an investigation into a case involving Russian forces executing two Ukrainian POWs near Novodmytrivka, Donetsk Oblast on November 10, in clear violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs.[21] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on November 20 that Ukraine has returned a total of 3,767 Ukrainians--mostly soldiers and 168 civilians-- from Russian captivity since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022, and that "tens of thousands" of Ukrainian military and civilian prisoners remain in Russian captivity.[22] ISW has previously documented systematic Russian mistreatment and executions of Ukrainian POWs, alongside a clear reluctance of Russian authorities to engage in good-faith POW exchanges with Ukraine.[23] ISW also assesses that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has likely incentivized Russian authorities to engage in more regular POW exchanges, likely driven by a rise in the capture of Russian POWs by Ukrainian forces.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike against military assets in the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20 using drones and Western-provided long-range weapons. The November 19 to 20 strike series indicates that Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to assemble more complex and effective strike packages.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct optimized operational maneuver since Winter 2022-2023 due to legacy doctrinal and resource limitations, but both are learning, innovating, and adapting their respective tactics on the battlefield, emphasizing the dynamic nature of the current war.
• The US and Germany announced additional military assistance for Ukraine on November 20.
• Ukrainian officials continue to launch investigations into Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and provide statistics on Ukrainians living under Russian captivity.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian military command's lack of proper treatment of Russian soldiers and continued reliance on "meat assaults" is likely contributing to mass desertions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2024

Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's full-scale invasion for 1,000 days and continue to demonstrate incredible resilience against Russian aggression. Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 under the incorrect assumption that Ukraine would fail to defend itself and that Russian forces would be able to seize Kyiv City and install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days.[i] One thousand days later, Ukrainian forces have successfully pushed Russian forces from their most forward points of advance in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava, and Mykolaiv oblasts and continue their daily fight to liberate occupied territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea.[ii] Russian forces are currently advancing throughout eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have recently warned about the possibility of an imminent Russian offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast.[iii] Russian President Vladimir Putin is simultaneously waging an informational war against the West, Ukraine, and the Russian population aimed at convincing the world that Russian victory is inevitable, and that Ukraine stands no chance.[iv] This informational effort is born out of Putin's fear and understanding that sustained Western military, economic, and diplomatic support for Ukraine will turn the tide of the war against Russia.

Russia has accumulated a significant amount of risk and a number of ever-increasing constraints on its warfighting capabilities over the last 1,000 days. Russia began the war with a poorly organized and understaffed military comprised of contract military personnel and limited number of conscripts due to his incorrect assumption that Ukraine would fold and fear that general mobilization could threaten the stability of his regime.[v] Russia largely relied on a combination of volunteer contract servicemembers, mobilized personnel, and irregular formations (such as the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR/LNR AC], the Wagner Group, and Russian Volunteer Corps) to wage Putin's war without general mobilization.[vi] This system has provided the Kremlin the manpower necessary to support operations so far, but there are mounting indicators that this system is beginning to teeter. Recent Western estimates of Russian manpower losses suggest that Russian forces are currently losing more troops per month than Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts can sustain, and open-source evidence indicates that Russia may not be able to sustain its current rate of armored vehicle and tank losses in the medium term as Russia burns through its stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment.[vii] The upcoming 2025 year will only increase the manpower and materiel constraints on the Russian military if Russia attempts to sustain its current offensive tempo, and Putin continues to appear averse to such measures given Russian society's growing disinterest in fighting in Russia’s war, the Russian economy’s limitations including a significant labor deficit and high inflation, and continual aversion to bearing the burden of additional wartime costs.[viii] Russia cannot maintain its current tempo indefinitely. Putin will likely need to take disruptive and drastic measures - including another involuntary call up of the mobilization reserve - to overcome these growing limitations as the war protracts.

Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to improve its warfighting capabilities and prepare itself to be self-sustainable in the long-term. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's "Internal Resilience Plan" to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) on November 19.[ix] The plan is comprised of 10 points that establish Ukraine's strategic objectives during and after the end of Russia's full-scale invasion.[x] The core points of the plan outline Ukraine's focus on maintaining unity and cooperation with its partners; specific measures to stabilize the frontline and increase Ukrainian military's technological efficiency; the expansion of Ukraine's domestic industrial base (DIB) production capabilities and joint DIB partnerships; the establishment of an economic policy to support Ukrainian industries and businesses; the protection of Ukraine's energy infrastructure; and the establishment of a new internal and border security system. The plan also outlines a vision to create effective local administrations, improve social and veteran policies, and strengthen Ukraine's cultural sovereignty both domestically and abroad. Zelensky emphasized in his speech to the Verkhovna Rada that Ukraine has taken many steps to improve its DIB and has already produced over 2.5 million mortar and artillery rounds in 2024.[xi] Zelensky added that Ukraine plans to produce at least 3,000 cruise missiles and 30,000 long-range drones in 2025 and that Ukrainian brigades should raise their own funding to appropriately supply themselves with drones without bureaucratic limitations. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on November 19 that the Verkhovna Rada approved the 2025 defense and security budget of 2.23 trillion hryvnias (around $54 billion) and allocated a record-breaking 739 billion hryvnias (around $17.9 billion) for the Ukrainian DIB and weapon procurement.[xii] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine has a chance to dramatically expand its DIB and stand on its own two feet in the future if its partners empower Ukraine now.[xiii]

Ukrainian forces conducted the first ATAMCS strike on Russian territory overnight on November 18 to 19, hitting a Russian ammunition depot in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast – days after obtaining permission to conduct such strikes. Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on November 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian military's 67th Main Military and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal of the 1046th Logistics Support Center near Karachev on the night of November 18 to 19 and that the strike caused an initial detonation and 12 secondary explosions.[xiv] A Ukrainian military source told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine on November 19 that Ukrainian forces used US-provided ATACMS missiles to conduct the strike.[xv] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the 67th GRAU arsenal contained artillery ammunition, including North Korean-provided shells, as well as guided glide bombs, air defense missiles, and rockets for multiple launch rocket launchers (MLRS).[xvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six ballistic missiles, including ATACMS, at a military facility in Bryansk Oblast and that Russian S-400 and Pantsir air defense systems shot down five missiles and damaged one.[xvii] The Russian MoD claimed that missile fragments fell onto a military facility in Bryansk Oblast, causing a fire, but that the strike did not cause any damages or casualties. Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the "Veza" ventilation plant and buildings in Karachev, Podsosonki, and Baykova.[xviii] Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the ATACMS strike and its aftermath.[xix]

Western officials also provided additional clarity on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range weapons systems to strike military objects in Russia. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on November 18 that the US authorized Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons up to 300 kilometers inside Russia.[xx] US Assistant Secretary of State Brian Nichols told Brazilian outlet O Globo on November 19 that US President Biden issued the authorization for Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike into Russia, stating that the authorization will give Ukraine a greater ability to defend itself.[xxi] ISW previously assessed that restrictions on Ukraine's ability to conduct long-range strikes into Russian territory enabled Russia to maintain sanctuary space within its near and far-rear and leverage that sanctuary space for its military operations against Ukraine.[xxii] Ukrainian long-range strikes against military objects within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater.[xxiii] These permissions, if as extensive as reported, are a new capability for Ukraine that may significantly degrade Russia’s war effort.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine on November 19 in a clear response to the Biden Administration's decision to greenlight long-range strikes into Russia and as part of Putin's ongoing efforts to influence Western decisionmakers into shying away from providing additional support to Ukraine. Putin signed the decree "On approval of the fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence" after stating in September 2024 that Russia was adjusting its nuclear doctrine to introduce "clarifications" on the necessary preconditions for Russian nuclear use.[xxiv] Russia last updated its nuclear doctrine in June 2020.[xxv] The 2024 doctrine states that Russia will exercise nuclear deterrence against states that provide "territory, air, and/or sea space and resources under their control" for the preparation and implementation of aggression against Russia; will consider aggression against Russia by any state that is part of a military coalition, bloc, or alliance as aggression by the entire coalition; and will consider aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state as a joint attack on Russia.[xxvi] The new doctrine added additional considerations to list of the "main military dangers that may develop into military threats" to Russia and against which Russia will carry out nuclear deterrence to include: the creation of new or expansion of existing military coalitions, blocs, or alliances that results in the coalition's military infrastructure "approaching" Russia's border; actions aimed at isolating part of Russia's territory, including the blocking of access to vital transport communications; actions aimed at the destruction of ecological hazardous objects in Russia; and the planning and conducting large-scale military exercises near Russia's border. The new doctrine states that Russia maintains the "possibility" of using nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Belarus or Russia's receipt of reliable information about a "massive" launch or take-off of air and space attack weapons, including strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, and hypersonic aircraft, and their crossing of the Russian state border. The new doctrine retains the same language as the 2020 doctrine describing Russia's receipt of information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking Russian territory or the territory or Russian allies as a condition "determining the possibility of Russia's use of nuclear weapons," and this language regarding ballistic missiles thus does not represent an inflection in Russia's nuclear doctrine despite some reporting suggesting otherwise. The updated doctrine no longer states that Russia regards nuclear weapons "solely" as a means of deterrence and adds that Russia will exercise nuclear deterrence against "potential" enemies.

Russia’s adoption of an amended nuclear doctrine is the latest iteration of now-frequent Russian nuclear saber-rattling and does not represent a substantial change in Russia’s nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns cautioned Western policymakers on September 7 against fearing boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling.[xxvii] Bloomberg reported on November 19 that an unspecified US National Security Council spokesperson stated that the US sees no reason to adjust its nuclear posture and that the Russian decision to adjust its doctrine was not a surprise and is a continuation of the same "irresponsible rhetoric" that Russia has used since invading Ukraine in 2022.[xxviii] Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated on November 18 that any Russian saber-rattling is "incredibly dangerous" and "reckless."[xxix] Singh stated that the US will continue to monitor Russian saber-rattling but has not seen any changes in Russia's nuclear posture. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[xxx]

The Kremlin has continuously attempted to use nuclear saber-rattling to deter Western military support for Ukraine, and the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to inject nuclear threats into the information space indicates that the Kremlin is concerned about the battlefield impacts of Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons. The Washington Post reported in September 2024 that the Kremlin may be reconsidering the effectiveness of its nuclear saber-rattling in influencing Western decision-making against supporting Ukraine.[xxxi] The Kremlin, however, has continued to use its same boilerplate nuclear threats in an attempt to dissuade Western decisionmakers from lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike legitimate military objects in Russia, indicating that the Kremlin fears the prospect of long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia. The Kremlin has routinely intensified its nuclear saber-rattling during key Western discussions about military assistance to Ukraine but has never previously escalated against any perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines."[xxxii] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to the updated Russian nuclear doctrine on November 19, complaining that Western countries no longer fear the Kremlin's nuclear threats and that the West's lack of fear is "narrowing Russia's room for maneuver."[xxxiii] The milblogger attributed this Western lack of fear to the Kremlin's unresponsiveness to prior Ukrainian strikes against military objects within Russia – one of the Kremlin's prior so-called red lines.[xxxiv] Other Russian milbloggers stated that they are waiting for the Russian government to react to the Ukrainian ATACMS strike in Bryansk Oblast on November 19.[xxxv] The Kremlin has not clearly responded to the ATACMS strike as of this writing. 

The contours of the Kremlin's nuclear blackmail remain unchanged despite the updates to Russia's nuclear doctrine, and factions within the Kremlin are reportedly arguing over a lack clarity about Russia’s own nuclear "red lines." A Russian insider source claimed on November 19 that Kremlin factions disagreed on the changes to the nuclear doctrine, with one faction arguing for the new nuclear doctrine to define clear "red lines" to deter the West from taking specific actions unfavorable to the Kremlin and another faction calling for the creation of a strategically ambiguous nuclear doctrine "in the fog of war" to prevent the West from being able to predict the Kremlin's response to specifications.[xxxvi] These reports, taken in the context of the Kremlin's continued reliance on vague threats of nuclear escalation without following through, suggests that Russian officials lack a clear understanding of where the Kremlin's actual "red lines" lie. The updated Russian nuclear doctrine remains vague, and actions by Russia's "potential enemies" as defined in the new doctrine will almost certainly not immediately trigger Russian nuclear weapons use. The decision to use Russian nuclear weapons lies with Putin, who has and will personally decide where Russia's "red lines" truly lie and how to respond - or not respond - to Western support of Ukraine.

Ukraine only recently has started receiving the weapons systems and military capabilities necessary to wage modern large-scale combat operations, and Ukraine may be able to conduct operationally significant counteroffensives in the future, provided the West reinforces building Ukrainian capabilities at scale. US officials are only now seriously evaluating depriving Russia of a sanctuary from which Russia wages war against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces only received F-16s and pilot training to operate F-16s in small quantities in 2024.[xxxvii] Ukrainian forces only received ATACMS for the first time in fall 2023 after Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive effectively culminated.[xxxviii] Ukrainian forces only received Western main battle tanks in small quantities for the first time in early 2023.[xxxix] The systems and capabilities that Ukraine has been receiving are all necessary to wage successful multi-domain large-scale-combat operations, and Ukraine has not yet been provided an opportunity to demonstrate what Ukrainian forces can achieve when properly resourced. Ukraine’s systems integration, capabilities, and battlefield performance likely can improve, provided Ukraine and its partners continue undertaking the difficult work necessary to build Ukrainian momentum.

Continued and enhanced Western military assistance remains necessary for Ukrainian forces to liberate occupied territory and inflict losses on the Russian military necessary to force Putin to rethink his calculus for this war. Ukraine must enter any future negotiations with Russia from a position of strength given the Kremlin's persistent refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations and its repeated calls for complete Ukrainian capitulation.[xl] Ukrainian determination and innovation alone likely cannot bring about these conditions, and it remains in the West's interests to strengthen Ukraine's position at any potential future negotiating table.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's full-scale invasion for 1,000 days and continue to demonstrate incredible resilience against Russian aggression.
• Ukraine continues to improve its warfighting capabilities and prepare itself to be self-sustainable in the long term.
• Ukrainian forces conducted the first ATAMCS strike on Russian territory overnight on November 18 to 19, hitting a Russian ammunition depot in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast — days after obtaining permission to conduct such strikes.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine on November 19 in a clear response to the Biden Administration's decision to greenlight long-range strikes into Russia and as part of Putin's ongoing efforts to influence Western decision-makers into shying away from providing additional support to Ukraine.
• Russia’s adoption of an amended nuclear doctrine is the latest iteration of now-frequent Russian nuclear saber-rattling and does not represent a substantial change in Russia’s nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons.
• The Kremlin has continuously attempted to use nuclear saber-rattling to deter Western military support for Ukraine, and the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to inject nuclear threats into the information space indicates that the Kremlin is concerned about the battlefield impacts of Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons.
• Ukraine only recently has started receiving the weapons systems and military capabilities necessary to wage modern large-scale combat operations, and Ukraine may be able to conduct operationally significant counteroffensives in the future, provided the West reinforces building Ukrainian capabilities at scale.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2024

Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 18 that the United States is "adding fuel to the fire" and that the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes against Russian military targets would be a "qualitatively new round of tension" and a "qualitative" change in US participation in the war.[1] Peskov reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's September 12 claims that Ukrainian strikes against Russia using Western-provided weapons would represent an escalation and directly involve Western countries in the war.[2] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also reiterated Putin's September statements and further claimed that Ukrainian long-range missile strikes on Russia would be a "radical change in the essence and nature" of the war and that the Russian response would be "adequate and tangible."[3] Russian State Duma and Federation Council deputies made similar threats, claiming that Russia would be "forced" to respond to this "escalation," including with strikes against Ukraine using unspecified "new" weapons systems, and that Russia's new nuclear doctrine will outline the consequences of this US decision.[4] Russia has not previously escalated militarily against any perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines" — as ISW has repeatedly observed.[5]

Select Russian officials and propagandists heavily emphasized that US officials have not yet formally confirmed the ATACMS strike authorization, likely in an attempt to convince the United States to back out of the decision and deny the media reports of the authorization. Zakharova stated that it is unclear if Western media outlets reporting on the US authorization are citing official sources, and Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov similarly questioned the credibility of the US media reports.[6]

Neither Ukrainian nor US officials have confirmed reports of the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes, but US officials noted that Russia escalated the war with the deployment of North Korean forces alongside Russian forces on the battlefield. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not directly confirm media reports of the US authorization of limited ATACMS strikes, but stated on November 17 that "strikes are not carried out with words" and "such things are not announced," but that "the missiles will speak for themselves."[7] US Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer also did not confirm the US strike authorization but noted that Russia escalated the war with the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield and the massive drone and missile strike series against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 16 to 17.[8] Finer directly responded to Peskov, stating that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine "lit the fire."[9] US outlet Axios reported on November 17 that a source with knowledge of the matter stated that the Biden administration granted Ukraine permission to use ATACMS in order to deter North Korea from sending more troops to Russia for the war.[10] Axios reported that US officials hope that North Korea might reconsider its decision to deploy military personnel to Russia if Ukrainian forces strike North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast.

Putin's introduction of North Korea as a new belligerent in his invasion of Ukraine was a major escalation. Allowing Ukraine to use US missiles against legitimate military targets in Russian territory in accord with all international laws and laws of armed conflict is a very limited response and cannot reasonably be characterized as an escalation in itself.

French and British sources clarified on November 18 that the reported US permissions regarding Ukraine's ability to use ATACMS for limited strikes within Russia do not inherently extend to Ukraine's ability to use French and UK-provided SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes in Russia. French outlet Le Figaro, which ISW cited on November 17, removed phrasing from its November 17 article reporting that the ATACMS permission would extend to SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles.[11] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot noted on November 18 that France remains open to the option of allowing Ukraine to use French-provided long-range missiles to strike within Russia but confirmed that France has not yet granted these permissions to Ukraine despite initial and erroneous reporting on November 17.[12] UK outlet The Times reported on November 18 that Downing Street sources stated that ATACMS have "different military specifications" from UK-provided Storm Shadows, and other UK outlets, including The Sun and The Guardian, noted on November 18 that the United States is "still blocking" Ukraine from using SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles against legitimate targets on Russian territory.[13] The UK and France jointly produce SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles, both of which utilize American-provided technologies and targeting intelligence, so all three parties would need to agree to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use either SCALP or Storm Shadow missiles in long-range strikes against targets on Russian territory.[14] Persistent restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles will continue to limit Ukraine's ability to fully target the Russian rear with a broad arsenal of suitable systems, thus allowing Russia to maintain sanctuary space within its near and far-rear to which it is not entitled by any principle of international law or norms.[15]

The Kremlin continues to state its unwillingness to accept any compromises, including those that would "freeze" the conflict along the current frontline – further demonstrating the Kremlin's insistence on complete Ukraine capitulation. Bloomberg reported on November 18 that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to submit a peace plan for Russia's war in Ukraine at the G20 summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from November 18 to 19 that would include the freezing of the conflict along the current frontlines, a 10-year postponement of Ukraine's NATO membership alongside assurances of Western provisions of military supplies to Ukraine, the establishment of a demilitarized zone in eastern Ukraine, and the stationing of foreign troops in Ukraine.[16] Pro-Turkish government outlet Daily Sabah reported that sources in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied reports that Erdogan would propose postponing Ukraine's NATO membership, however, but stated that the Turkish government supports diplomatic initiatives aimed at ending the war.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the initial reports of the Turkish peace proposal, stating that "freezing" the frontline is "a priori unacceptable" for the Kremlin and that Russian President Vladimir Putin's previously stated conditions for ending the war — which amounted to full Ukrainian capitulation — remain "fully relevant."[18] ISW has routinely assessed that the Kremlin's objective of total Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged, and Peskov's comment further demonstrates that Russian authorities are unwilling to engage in good-faith negotiations that result in compromises, even those on terms unfavorable to Ukraine, such as a freezing of the conflict. ISW continues to assess that a negotiated ceasefire on the current lines will only benefit Russia and will afford the Kremlin time to further radicalize and militarize Russian society against Ukraine and the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
• Putin's introduction of North Korea as a new belligerent in his invasion of Ukraine was a major escalation. Allowing Ukraine to use US missiles against legitimate military targets in Russian territory in accord with all international laws and laws of armed conflict is a very limited response and cannot reasonably be characterized as an escalation in itself.
• French and British sources clarified on November 18 that the reported US permissions regarding Ukraine's ability to use ATACMS for limited strikes within Russia do not inherently extend to Ukraine's ability to use French and UK-provided SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes in Russia.
• The Kremlin continues to state its unwillingness to accept any compromises, including those that would "freeze" the conflict along the current frontline – further demonstrating the Kremlin's insistence on complete Ukraine capitulation.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, in Kupyansk, west of Kreminna, and in the Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar directions.
• The Kremlin is continuing to militarize different levels of the Russian government by expanding the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) illegally conscripted Ukrainian youth in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of Russia's Fall 2024 conscription cycle.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2024

The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast. The NYT and Washington Post reported on November 17 that unspecified US officials expect Ukrainian forces to initially conduct strikes against Russian and North Korean forces within Kursk Oblast and that the Biden Administration could expand this authorization to use ATACMS against targets elsewhere in Russia in the future.[i] The US officials stated that the US authorized these limited Ukrainian strikes in response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield in Kursk Oblast to deter North Korea from deploying more forces to Russia. The US officials stated that the partial lifting of restrictions aims to generate a "specific and limited" battlefield effect and will not change the course of the war. French outlet Le Figaro reported on November 17 that France and the United Kingdom (UK) have authorized Ukrainian forces to use French and UK-provided SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles to strike within Russia.[ii] Le Figaro did not state if France and the UK had authorized Ukraine's SCALP/Storm Shadow usage only within Kursk Oblast. The partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided long-range weapons against military objects within Kursk Oblast will not completely deprive Russian forces of their sanctuary in Russian territory, as hundreds of military objects remain within ATACMS range in other Russian border regions.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will benefit from any partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on Ukraine's ability to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets within Russia's operational and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in Kursk Oblast.[iv]

Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed and strike drones of an unspecified type (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[v] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 120 missiles, including one Zirkon 3M22 hypersonic cruise missile, eight Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P cruise/anti-radiation missiles, and five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 42 drones and one Zirkon, seven Kinzhal, 85 Kalibr and Kh-101, two Kh-22/31P, and five Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian F-16 pilots shot down roughly 10 aerial targets during the strike.[vi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 drones were "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Russian-occupied Ukrainian airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that air defense was active in almost all Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in several oblasts and noted that energy recovery work is ongoing in Odesa, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts.[vii] Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian missile strike caused a fire at an infrastructure facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, damaged critical infrastructure in Rivne Oblast, and targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[viii] Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated that Russian strikes seriously damaged an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP) and noted that this was the eighth mass strike on a DTEK energy facility in 2024.[ix] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes caused power outages in many areas of Ukraine.[x]  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities forced Ukrainian authorities to reduce the energy production levels of several nuclear power plants (NPPs).[xi] Grossi reported that Russian strikes damaged several electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs, although the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves. Grossi stated that six out of the nine reactors at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs are currently operating at reduced capacity. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces struck a railway depot in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian strikes de-energized sections of several railway lines in southern, western, and northeastern Ukraine.[xii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Odesa oblasts.[xiii]

Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces notably included Kalibr cruise missiles in the strike package against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.[xiv] Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly noted that Ukrainian forces are able to down Kalibr cruise missiles, and Russian forces have rarely included Kalibr missiles in strike packages in recent months.[xv] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated in August 2024 that Russian forces only launch sea-based Kalibr missiles during combined strikes in order to overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[xvi] ISW recently observed reports that Russia is increasing its use of decoy drones that resemble Iranian-provided Shahed drones during combined long-range strikes and assesses that Russia will likely continue to use decoy drones and experiment with varying strike packages to increase the effectiveness of long-range strikes against Ukraine ahead of and during the winter.[xvii] Russian forces likely used decoy drones to additionally overload Ukrainian air defenses in the November 16-17 strike series, which contributed to Ukrainian forces' below average drone shoot down rate.

Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17. Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov claimed that a drone crashed on the morning of November 17, causing an explosion at a factory workshop in Izhevsk at the address Lenin 101.[xviii] Russian opposition outlets noted that the Kupol Electromechanical Plant is at this address.[xix] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that "unknown" drones struck the Kupol Electromechanical Plant that produces Tor air defense systems, radars, and components.[xx] Local residents reportedly stated to Russian opposition outlet Astra that the Kupol factory also produces drones.[xxi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not claim that Russian forces shot down any drones in the Udmurt Republic on November 17, and Russian state media noted that this is the first time Russian authorities have reported drone "crashes" in the republic.[xxii]

North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited. Financial Times (FT), citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 17 that North Korea has supplied Russia with weapons, including 50 170mm "Koksan" self-propelled howitzers and 20 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[xxiii] FT's source observed that these systems, which Russian forces reportedly deployed to Kursk Oblast, will offer North Korean forces an opportunity to test their capabilities and weapons systems in real combat scenarios. Bloomberg reported on November 17 that North Korea may deploy up to 100,000 North Korean troops to Russia in future waves if bilateral relations between the two countries continue to deepen.[xxiv] Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk claimed that North Korean forces are less combat experienced than Russian forces but that a North Korean deployment to fighting alongside Russian forces would alleviate pressure on Russian forces and Russian recruitment efforts and delay a potential decision for another partial involuntary reserve callup.[xxv] Zvinchuk also observed that North Korean forces deployed to fight alongside Russian forces will likely learn to conduct drone warfare, which North Korean forces would use in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea's ability to use drones, in addition to the already-announced decision to start serial drone production in North Korea, could pose a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.[xxvi]

ISW has repeatedly observed efforts by Russian authorities to delay highly unpopular involuntary reserve callups, and the gradual deployment of 100,000 North Korean personnel could help alleviate some of these concerns in the short term while increasing pressure on Ukrainian forces.[xxvii] A gradual deployment of 100,000 North Korean troops, however, will likely not address the eventual need for another Russian involuntary reserve callup as the reported number of North Korean personnel will not be sufficient to offset the current high Russian casualty rates. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously reported that Russian forces suffered a record high average daily casualty rate of 1,271 troops per day or about 38,130 casualties total in September 2024, and the US Department of Defense (DoD) assessed that Russian forces have suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties in September and October 2024.[xxviii]  The deployment of roughly 100,000 North Korean personnel would only replace Russian losses for less than three months. Such a limited deployment would also fail to address Russia's broader shortages of millions of workers due to demographic crises and the war and the resulting mid- to long term shortcomings in Russian defense industrial base (DIB) operations.[xxix]

Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints. Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk stated during an interview with  Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI on November 16 that Russian forces will seek to concentrate fighting in "populated areas and not in open fields" during Winter 2024-25 and offered Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove as examples of towns and cities where Russia will prioritize advances this winter.[xxx] Zvinchuk claimed that Russian forces are preparing to begin the fight for Pokrovsk and will approach Pokrovsk from the south and southeast now that Russian forces have seized Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk). Zvinchuk is a prominent voice within the Russian information space with ties to the Kremlin and may be privy to insider information about Russia's frontline objectives and campaign design. Russian forces have recently made advances into eastern Kupyansk and central Chasiv Yar, and such advances may be part of a concerted effort to advance into frontline cities in preparation for offensive operations in Winter 2024-2025.[xxxi] ISW has previously assessed that the seizure of Kupyansk or Chasiv Yar would have operationally significant impacts on the geometry of the frontline and threaten major Ukrainian defensive positions in their respective directions, and recent Russian advances into the cities would put Ukrainian defenses in both directions at higher but not immediate risk.[xxxii]

Zvinchuk claimed that Russian forces will also look to increase their combat capabilities during Winter 2024-2025, particularly Russian drone capabilities because of the importance of the "drone war" in winter.[xxxiii] Zvinchuk noted that Russian forces have an artillery advantage over Ukrainian forces, but that Russian forces currently cannot advance due to Ukrainian drone operations. Zvinchuk suggested that better trained and equipped forces may be able to advance more effectively against Ukrainian drone operators. ISW has previously noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be trying to centralize control over informal Russian drone units, and Zvinchuk's comments likely refer to this ongoing effort and indicate that the MoD may intend to intensify this effort during Winter 2024-2025.[xxxiv] ISW recently assessed that Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower and materiel constraints.[xxxv] The Russian military command may assess that urban combat is preferrable for Russia's current infantry-led style of fighting as multi-story buildings could provide Russian infantry with better cover from Ukrainian drone operators than trees in open areas. The Russian military command may also prefer to engage in urban combat to avoid prolonging the cost that advancing in rural fields and settlements imposes on Russian armored vehicle usage and reserves.[xxxvi] The Russian military command has likely assessed that offsetting Ukraine's drone advantages and reducing Russian armored vehicle losses through urban combat is worth the large numbers of Russian casualties that will come from grinding, attritional advances in frontline towns and cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated on November 17 that his recent phone conversation with Putin showed that "little has changed" in Putin's views on the war in Ukraine and that this is "not good news."[xxxvii] Mikhail Zvinchuk in his November 16 interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI responded to a question about the conditions under which Russia could agree to peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[xxxviii] Zvinchuk claimed that first Russia must gain full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, including the areas that Russian forces currently do not occupy - a demand that Putin first made explicitly in June 2024.[xxxix] Zvinchuk added that Ukraine must unblock the road through Odesa Oblast to Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic in eastern Moldova, so that Russia can have "communication with Transnistria and the Russian people there." Zvinchuk also called for Russia to gain access to the Danube River, the mouth of which lies on the Ukrainian-Romanian border, and for the creation of a "buffer zone" in border areas in which weapons will be prohibited. Zvinchuk notably did not mention what Russia would compromise on during potential peace talks in order to achieve these proposals, but claimed later in the interview that Russia laying claim to only the four illegally annexed oblasts is in and of itself a compromise - further demonstrating how the Russian ultranationalist community, one of Putin's key constituencies, is not supportive of good faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian access to Transnistria and the Danube River would essentially allow Russia to operate in and off the coasts of Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts even if Russian forces did not occupy these territories.[xl] Kremlin officials have long called for Russia's occupation of all of southern Ukraine, including Odesa City, and Zvinchuk appears to be proposing a new framing of this same demand.[xli] Russian access to Transnistria, areas near Odesa City, and the northwestern Black Sea would allow Russian forces to conduct a future attack on southern Ukraine and Odesa City after resting and reconstituting during a potential ceasefire.

Russian access to Transnistria and the Danube River would pose military threats to Ukraine and NATO as well. Ukrainian strikes have pushed Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) out of the northwestern Black Sea, but Russian access to the Danube would allow Russia to again operate in the area.[xlii] Russian control of Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts would deny Ukraine access to the Sea of Azov, and Russian access and possible control of the northwestern Black Sea would essentially landlock Ukraine. Russian access to the Danube River and to the road to Transnistria may also enable Russia to establish lines of communication to Transnistria - and possibly even Gagauzia in southern Moldova as Moldova has a port along the Danube River at its southernmost point at Giurgiulesti - to build up forces and means in Moldova for future military operations against Moldova, southeastern Ukraine, or Romania.[xliii] NATO is also currently constructing what will be its largest base near Constanta in southeastern Romania less than 100 kilometers from the mouth of the Danube River.[xliv]

Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania. The opposition initially stormed the de facto Abkhazian parliament building on November 15 demanding the dismissal of a proposed investment agreement with Russia that would grant Russian legal entities property ownership rights and privileges in Abkhazia but has ultimately expanded the scope of its demands to call for the resignation of Bzhania.[xlv] Bzhania stated on November 16 that he would resign and appoint a vice president as interim head of state before snap elections if the opposition left the premises of the parliament, but the protesters refused his demands and called for his unconditional resignation.[xlvi] Bzahnia called the protest an attempted coup, claimed that it is impossible to find compromise with the opposition, and refused to step down, prompting the opposition to continue the protests and propose the formation of an interim government.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17.
• North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited.
• Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.
• Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar .
• Russian milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2024

Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with Ukrainian media published on November 16 that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale exacerbated by delays in staffing and equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders necessary rest and rotation.[i] Zelensky stressed the importance of standing up new brigades to replace and reinforce Ukrainian forces currently serving on the frontline but noted that Russian forces also continue to take significant manpower losses in exchange for minimal gains. Zelensky estimated that Russian forces are currently losing between 1,500 and 2,000 troops per day in Ukraine and assessed that Russian forces cannot maintain their rate of advance while taking losses at this scale.

Zelensky's acknowledgement of morale issues and manpower constraints among frontline Ukrainian infantry suggests that Ukrainian drone operations are likely playing an outsized role in defending against and inflicting losses on advancing Russian forces. Zelensky noted during the interview that Russian advances have already slowed in some directions, and Ukrainian officials have previously observed that Ukrainian drone operations have played a role in slowing Russian advances to a foot pace.[ii] A Ukrainian drone operator stated in August 2024 that Russian forces were able to advance more successfully in the Pokrovsk direction by conducting ground attacks in groups of two to four soldiers under the cover of trees, making them harder for Ukrainian drone operators to detect.[iii] Subsequent Ukrainian reporting suggested that Russian forces began employing this tactic more widely throughout the Pokrovsk direction in September and October 2024.[iv] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted on November 16 that these small, infantry-led assaults are not the most efficient tactic for expedient advances in the rural settlements and fields near Selydove, where Russian forces have very little coverage from Ukrainian drone operations.[v] The milblogger suggested that Russian forces can currently only bring reinforcements and supplies forward when Ukrainian drone operators are engaged in another area of the frontline. The milblogger noted that unspecified "problems," possibly referring to Ukrainian drone operations or the Russian military command's insistence on conducting unnecessarily costly infantry assaults, continue to hinder Russian forces' ability to advance more rapidly along the frontline and fully exploit Ukraine's manpower constraints.

Ukrainian drone operations have also been crucial in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver throughout the frontline, particularly during early Summer 2024 when Ukrainian forces were facing severe artillery shortages as a result of delays in Western security assistance.[vi] Successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction in June 2024 may have played a role in the Russian military command's decision to limit mechanized assaults in this direction.[vii] Ukrainian drone operations have also played an important role in repelling Russian mechanized assaults in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts and near Kupyansk.[viii] Russian forces have attempted to innovate and deploy more effective drone protection systems for armored vehicles and tanks in recent months, but even the most "successful" Russian mechanized assaults that have resulted in several kilometers of gains have generated significant armor losses due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[ix] Ukraine's demonstrated ability to strike Russian mechanized columns effectively has prevented Russian forces from conducting mechanized breakthroughs and exploitations at scale. ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military command may not able to accept the current scale and rate of Russian vehicle losses in the coming months and years given the constraints on Russia's defense industrial production, declining Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver.[x] Further improvements to Ukraine's drone capabilities and continually improving integration of Ukrainian drones with ground operations remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against advancing Russian forces and liberate occupied territory in future counteroffensive operations.                  

Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement — no matter the negotiating platform or mediator — that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation. Zelensky stated that Ukraine must be "strengthened by some important elements" to negotiate with Putin, emphasizing that Ukraine cannot enter negotiations from a position of weakness.[xi] Zelensky stated that Putin does not want peace but would still be willing to come to the negotiating table in order to reduce Russia's diplomatic isolation and to secure concessions and Ukraine's capitulation. Zelensky stated that it is important that any negotiation platform and potential meditators remember that Russia violated Ukrainian territorial integrity and international law by invading Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and remarked that his conversations with US President-elect Donald Trump demonstrate that Trump is "on the side of supporting Ukraine" and has listened to Ukraine's position. Zelensky concluded that Ukraine must do everything to end the war by diplomatic means in 2025. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin is trying to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration.[xii] The Kremlin has consistently demonstrated that it is unwilling to compromise on the terms of any possible negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged.[xiii] Any future negotiations, no matter the platform or mediator, will require Ukraine to enter talks from a position of strength that forces Putin to change his calculus, engage in good faith talks, and accept compromises.

Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike packages to include decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and increase the damages of long-range strikes. The Associated Press (AP) reported on November 16 that Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones, has been producing "hundreds" of decoy drones and recently began producing drones with thermobaric warheads.[xiv] A Ukrainian military and electronics expert told the AP that more than half of the long-range strike drones that Russia has launched at Ukraine recently have been decoys. Acting Head of the Ukrainian Air Force Press Office Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told the AP that the decoy drones are indistinguishable from armed Shahed drones on Ukrainian radar systems, forcing Ukrainian forces to expend firepower and use electronic warfare (EW) mechanisms to down them. The AP noted that Russian forces attempt to take advantage of exhausted Ukrainian air defenses to get more powerful weapons, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, through Ukraine's air defense umbrella. The AP also noted that the decoy drones also allow Russian forces to locate Ukrainian air defense locations before Ukrainian air defenses and EW down the decoys, but that Russia is using various electronic components, including Ukrainian SIM cards and Starlink systems, to make the drone variants more resistant to jamming. The Ukrainian Air Force has increasingly been reporting that Russian forces are launching strike drones of an unknown type — likely referring to the decoy drones — during regular overnight drone and missile strikes on Ukraine.[xv] The Ukrainian Air Forces has also been noting that increasing numbers of drones have become "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian EW countermeasures — suggesting that Ukrainian forces have been successful in adapting their EW to down the new Russian decoy drones. Decoy drones are cheap, however, and the longer they remain airborne in Ukrainian airspace, the more the decoys can distract Ukrainian air defenses and provide targeting for future Russian strikes. Ihnat reported that Russian forces did not use any decoy drones overnight on November 14-15 — the first instance in weeks.[xvi]
The Ukrainian military and electronics expert stated that the thermobaric drones, which Russian forces began fielding in Summer 2024, account for between three and five percent of the long-range strike drones Russia has been launching at Ukraine recently.[xvii] Ukrainian military-focused sources recently reported that the thermobaric warheads on Shahed drones have 50 to 52 kilogram warheads and that Russian forces are equipping Shahed variants with ranges up to 140 kilometers longer with the warheads.[xviii] A weapons expert told the AP that thermobaric drones are particularly effective against buildings and could cause significant damage to Ukraine's power plants, which are particularly critical to maintaining Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) and heating the country.[xix] The Kremlin will likely continue to innovate its long-range strike drones in an attempt to bypass Ukrainian air defenses and may increasingly use decoy drones and drones with larger or more dangerous payloads to increase the effectiveness of its long-range strikes against Ukraine ahead of and during the winter.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean defense industrial enterprises to begin serial production of likely tactical strike drones – an example of how increasing Russian-North Korean military cooperation allows North Korea to learn from Russia's war in Ukraine. North Korean state news outlet KCNA reported on November 15 that Kim oversaw a test of "various types" of North Korean-produced strike drones and ordered the North Korean defense industrial base (DIB) to begin mass production of these drones "as early as possible."[xx] Kim emphasized that strike drones have had notable impacts in both "big and small" conflicts and stated that North Korea is focusing on combining unmanned systems with operational plans and principles of war in its military policy. A Russian milblogger commented on blurred images of the drones from North Korean media and suggested that the drones look like the Russian "Lancet" tactical strike drones.[xxi] ISW cannot independently verify the extent to which the North Korean drones may be based on Russian Lancets. It is currently unclear if North Korea intends to export any of these new strike drones to Russia or other countries after beginning serial production. North Korea will likely continue to learn lessons from Russia's war in Ukraine as it increases its military cooperation with Russia, thereby increasing its own military capabilities and the credibility of its threat to the Asia Pacific region.[xxii]

The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA] following inaccurate reports they made about alleged Russian advances near Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]), the 3rd CAA's chief of staff, and the commander of the 3rd CAA's 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade following widespread Russian milblogger complaints about Russian officers submitting incorrect reports to their superiors and planning "incomprehensible" assaults near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian authorities also removed the commanders of unspecified battalions and are inspecting the 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA). Another Russian source additionally claimed that Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade for concealing losses and the "real situation" in the Siversk direction from the Russian military command.[xxiv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that "the system is inert" and that there was no reaction to Russian milbloggers' initial complaints about false reports of Russian advances in the Siversk direction.[xxv] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command became aware of the problem when higher-ups wanted to visit Bilohorivka under the impression that Russian forces had seized the settlement and that the settlement was in the Russian near rear given the alleged Russian seizures of Serebryanka and Hryhorivka (both west of Bilohorivka). The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders had previously tried to stage interviews with Russian war correspondents in order to corroborate the commanders' false reports. ISW previously observed reports from July 2024 that Major General Alexei Kolesnikov is the commander of the 3rd CAA.[xxvi] Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes near Bilohorivka has become a point of neuralgia for the Russian milblogger community recently, particularly as Russian forces have repeatedly wasted manpower and armored vehicles on unsuccessful attempts to take the settlement since at least May 2022.[xxvii] ISW also observed geolocated footage published on November 8 indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in northern Bilohorivka — further demonstrating the significance of frontline Russian commanders' false reports to the Russian military command about Russian successes in the area. The Kremlin has previously demonstrated its sensitivity to the ultranationalist Russian milblogger community and responded to their criticisms, although it is unclear if the Russian military command arrested and removed the 3rd CAA commanders in response to the Russian milbloggers' repeated outcries about issues near Bilohorivka.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
• Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement – no matter the negotiating platform or mediator - that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.
• Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike packages to include decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and increase the damages of long-range strikes.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean defense industrial enterprises to begin serial production of likely tactical strike drones – an example of how increasing Russian-North Korean military cooperation allows North Korea to learn from Russia's war in Ukraine.
• The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA] following inaccurate reports they made about alleged Russian advances near Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Bank has recently issued significantly more loan deferments (credit holidays) for Russian military personnel, indicating that Russian military recruitment rates may have increased.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2024

The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on November 15 and reiterated several Kremlin information operations aimed at influencing the German government and other Western states to pressure Ukraine into premature peace negotiations instead of providing Ukraine with further military support.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the Scholz-Putin call "Pandora's box" and warned that the call helps Putin achieve his key goals: reducing his isolation in the international community and bringing about negotiations on Russia’s preferred terms "that will lead to nothing."[2]

Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently intensified rhetoric aimed at influencing the foreign policy of the incoming US government under President-elect Donald Trump.[3] The Kremlin has also recently reiterated its unwillingness to compromise on the terms of any possible future negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged.[4] The Kremlin likely aims to take advantage of uncertainty about the future US policy regarding Ukraine by intensifying its reflexive control campaign against Ukraine's European allies.[5] Senior Russian officials, including Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, have notably used phone calls with Western political and defense officials to spread Kremlin information operations and attempt to threaten the West into making premature concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity since 2022.[6]

Abkhazian oppositionists protested an agreement between the de facto government of Georgia’s Abkhazia region with Russia aimed at enhancing Russian investors’ rights in Abkhazia on November 15. Protesters in Abkhazia stormed the de facto parliament of the Russian-occupied and Kremlin-backed separatist region of Georgia, demanding the dismissal of a proposed investment agreement with Russia that would grant Russian legal entities property ownership rights in Abkhazia and Russian developers preferential tax exemptions.[7] Critics of the proposed legislation argued that the deal would inflate property prices, empower oligarchs, and undermine Abkhazia's desired autonomy.[8] The protesters, waving Russian flags, clarified their discontent was not directed at "fraternal" Russia but at the current Abkhaz government, citing the need to protect Abkhazia's "national interests."[9] The protesters also called for the resignation of the current de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.[10] The protests forced the Abkhaz parliament to postpone the vote on the agreement, with opposition leaders later announcing plans to present their demands to the current de facto Abkhaz leadership.[11]

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova urged Russians to avoid travel to Abkhazia, citing safety concerns, and warned that the crisis could deter future economic investments in Abkhazia.[12] The Russian information space reacted by calling the protesters ungrateful, and some milbloggers attributed the protests to external actors including Turkey, while others warned that the Abkhaz economy largely relies on Russia.[13]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with military support via various means and platforms. French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian "Anna Kyivska" Brigade has completed its training in France.[14] The Anna Kyivska Brigade is notably the first Ukrainian brigade that completed training in France and which France equipped as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in support of Ukraine.[15] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov noted that France has provided Ukraine with general and specialized military training and "state-of-the-art" equipment and weapons, including armored personnel carriers (APCs), self-propelled artillery systems, and situational awareness systems.[16]

Umerov also met with Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Ghar Støre and Norwegian Defense Minister Björn Arild Gram in Oslo on November 15, during which Norway announced it would join the "Danish format" of providing support for Ukraine via financing the domestic production of Ukrainian weapons and equipment.[17] Umerov, Gram, and Støre also discussed the creation of a "Norwegian format" that would provide external investment in Ukrainian defense technology companies.[18]

US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on November 15 that the US remains committed to disbursing around $7.1 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) assistance to Ukraine before President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2025.[19] Singh noted that the Pentagon plans to send military assistance packages to Ukraine on an "almost weekly" basis until the inauguration.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine.
• Abkhazian oppositionists protested an agreement between the de facto government of Georgia’s Abkhazia region with Russia aimed at enhancing Russian investors’ rights in Abkhazia on November 15.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with military support via various means and platforms.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand its "Time of Heroes" program to create a new social class comprised of veterans loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime and ideology.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2024

The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term. The Kremlin recently adopted several policies that aim to cut Russian government spending on wounded Russian servicemen, combat inflation, and address long-term demographic problems such as low birth rates and labor shortages. These policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as the Russian government postures. These policies also demonstrate that the Kremlin will not be able to sustain the protracted war effort for years and decades to come while shielding Russian society from economic challenges. Consistent Western and international support for Ukraine's resistance on the battlefield will further exacerbate Russia's economic problems.

Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy. Putin controversially changed Russian policy guaranteeing a one-time payment of three million rubles ($30,124) to all Russian servicemen who have been wounded in combat in Ukraine since March 2022.[1] Putin signed a decree on November 13 that restricted the one-time payments of three million rubles only to servicemen who sustained serious injuries in combat, only offering one million rubles ($10,152) to lightly wounded servicemen, and 100,000 rubles ($1,015) to servicemen who sustained minor injuries on the battlefield.[2] Putin's decree generated significant backlash from the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community, and Putin attempted to placate this community on November 14 by increasing the one-time payments to four million rubles ($40,136), but still only for Russian servicemen who sustain severe battlefield injuries that result in a disability.[3] A Russian milbloggers noted that Putin's authorization to increase compensation for disabled servicemen does not alter the fact that the Kremlin is reneging on promises to thousands of Russian servicemen who joined the Russian military solely due to large financial incentives.[4] The milblogger added that Russian military medical commissions are also becoming increasingly — and often deliberately unfairly — selective in diagnosing Russian servicemen with severe injuries.

Putin originally introduced the policy offering all wounded Russian servicemen three million rubles to incentivize military recruitment after he had decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022.[5] Financial incentives became the key pillar of the Russian military's recruitment campaign and personnel retention efforts over the past nearly three years, and the reversal of such incentives indicates that the system is becoming economically unsustainable for the Kremlin. ISW notably assessed in Summer 2022 that the Kremlin's reliance on high financial incentives for force generation was committing Russia to short- and long-term financial responsibilities to thousands of Russians, such as paying veterans pensions, compensations to families of deceased servicemen, and other state benefits.[6]

The Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy. The Russian Central Bank recently raised the key interest rate to 21 percent on October 25, which reportedly prompted discontent among Russian politicians, DIB CEOs, and elites. Kremlin-affiliated Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (TsMAKP) reported that the Russian economy is "effectively facing the threat of stagflation - simultaneous stagnation or even recession and high inflation" because of the Central Bank's tight monetary policy.[7] TsMAKP assessed that if the Russian Central Bank maintains the key interest rate at around 20 percent until mid-2025 then the composite leading indicator (CLI) for recession will exceed its critical threshold. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service similarly reported that the number of loans with a dynamic rate — which depends on a discount from the Central Bank — increased from 44 percent in late 2023 to 53 percent in late 2024.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service added that high interest rates may create a shock and a decline in production, which can result in bankruptcies and corporate defaults. A Kremlin insider source claimed that the Central Bank's tight monetary policy is restraining the Russian DIB's pace of development in the long term and has already complicated several Russian export projects, despite the fact that it had not yet directly impacted Russian military-technological support for the Russian war effort.[9]

The Russian DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these monetary policies. Foreign Policy (FP), citing OSINT analysts, reported that Russia has been losing around 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels per month but can only produce 20 per month.[10] FP reported that Russia will likely run out of cannon barrels in 2025 due to battlefield losses, dwindling Soviet stocks, and sanctions impacts. FP also cited OSINT estimates that Russian forces have lost at least 4,955 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) since February 2022 — about 155 IFVs per month. FP reported that Russia can only produce about 17 IFVs monthly or 200 annually. FP assessed that the Central Bank's policy of raising interest rates has made it difficult for nondefense companies to raise capital through loans, which is shrinking the civilian economy and may lead to significant post-war recession as returning Russian veterans will have a harder time finding employment.

The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB. Russian state outlet RBK claimed on November 14 that the Russian government has developed a draft Strategy of Action through 2036 to address Russia's increasingly dire demographic issues.[11] The Strategy of Action aims to increase birthrates and promote the family lifestyle by improving support system for families with children and providing birth incentives; solving housing problems to increase the availability of rental, social, and new housing; creating conditions for a more successful work-family balance; improving reproductive health of the population, in particular women's prenatal and infertility care; and enhancing family-positive propaganda in media and the Russian information space. The Strategy of Action is a part of broader efforts by Russian authorities to advance policies aimed at increasing the Russian population both through concrete legislation but also through rhetoric centered on "familial and traditional" values.[12]

ISW previously assessed that Russia's demographic challenges have been worsened by the war with an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 Russians-including many highly qualified workers- fleeing the country since February 2022 likely causing Russian authorities to rely more on migrant populations.[13] Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data shows that Russia’s labor shortage amounted to 4.8 million people in 2023, a problem that has reduced Russia’s economic output.[14] Rosstat also estimated in 2023 that Russia’s population will decline naturally at a rate of more than 600,000 people per year until 2032. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged Russia's ongoing labor shortage on November 7 and admitted to Russia's heavy reliance on migrants in order to mitigate the impacts of its waning population on the broader Russian workforce.[15] Putin warned, however, that reliance on migrant populations requires systematic assimilation efforts, likely in response to continued tensions between Russian ultranationalist rhetoric and the need to keep the Russian labor force capacity afloat through migration. Migrant populations are also not likely to yield the desired outcome in Russia given continued racist rhetoric and legislation and lack of skillsets among economic migrants needed to comprise a professional working class. FP reported that the Russian "civilian economy" has experienced personnel shortages and lack of qualified workers due to concerted Russian government efforts to attract Russian laborers to its DIB leading to possible future economic turmoil resulting from labor shortages and declining population. ISW has recently observed Russian authorities revoking migrants' Russian citizenship for refusing to register for military service, an increase in migrant deportations in 2024, protests, and violence against minority communities, among other rhetorical and legal realities that have created obstacles for migrants both to enter and to advance in the Russian workforce.[16] A combination of naturally declining population and aversion to creating conditions conducive to migration and enhancement of the skilled labor workforce will possibly impair the Russian economy and consequently Russian DIB in the mid- to long term.

Russian forces recently advanced into Kupyansk during a likely roughly company-sized mechanized assault, although ISW does not assess that Russian forces control the area. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows at least four Russian vehicles conducting an assault, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced southward along a railway line.[17] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces attacked in two armored vehicle columns and that one column consisted of one tank and three armored vehicles and the other column consisted of an unspecified composition and number of vehicles.[18] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in Kupyansk and prevented Russian forces from establishing positions in Kupyansk.[19] The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Kupyansk is fully under Ukrainian control and reiterated a Ukrainian General Staff report from November 13 stating that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on the settlement.[20] ISW assessed that Russian forces likely advanced in northeastern Kupyansk but very likely do not control the area, and ISW maps currently show areas in northeastern Kupyansk where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near Kupyansk within the last two months and ISW continues to assess that the Russian seizure of Kupyansk would generate operationally significant effects.[21] ISW is not prepared to assess whether Russian forces will be able to leverage recent tactical advances to make operationally significant gains, however. Russian forces also continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Zahryzove, Kucherivka on November 13 and 14.[22]

A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war. Kremlin newswire TASS amplified a poll conducted by the Russian state-affiliated Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences on November 14 revealing that 83 percent of respondents claimed that the "Special Military Operation" did not affect their daily life or affected it only to a slight extent.[23] Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), claimed on October 31 that  some segments of Russian society choose to "turn a blind eye" to the realities of the frontline and the hardships faced by those living in border areas near the conflict, although the war in Ukraine represents the "most urgent threat" to Russia.[24] Kirill condemned Russians who are unwilling to sacrifice their personal comforts, instead relying on "superficial distractions" to avoid confronting the hard realities of the war. ISW assessed that Kirill's remarks likely reflect underlying concerns among Russian authorities, as they suggest possible waning public support for the war effort, potential difficulties in future recruitment efforts, and a growing societal divide between portions of the Russian population most directly affected by the war and those largely insulated from its impacts.[25]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war."[26]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term.
• Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy.
• The Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy.
• The Russian DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these monetary policies.
• The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB.
• Russian forces recently advanced into Kupyansk during a likely roughly company-sized mechanized assault, although ISW does not assess that Russian forces control the area.
• A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war."
• Russian forces advanced in the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk Oblast, west of Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion, in the Chasiv Yar direction, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian sources are speculating that North Korea may have provided North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 "Koksan" self-propelled artillery systems to Russia. Russian milbloggers published images showing a train transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery systems in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2o24

The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The manner in which the Kremlin is trying to set its terms for negotiations strongly signals that Russia's objectives remain unchanged and still amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin does not appear any more willing to make concessions to the incoming Trump administration than it was to the current administration. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on November 13 that Western officials are lying about their interest in peace in Ukraine and that "peace" can only be achieved when the West stops providing military assistance to Ukraine.[1] Zakharova's statement indicates that Russia continues to assert that the West must end all provisions of military assistance to Ukraine as a prerequisite for peace negotiations.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also claimed on November 13 that the start of Trump's presidency would not fundamentally change the US position on Ukraine and that any proposals to freeze the frontline are "even worse" than the Russia-favorable Minsk Agreements that followed Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.[3]

Lavrov's pre-emptive rejection of the potential suggestion to freeze the current frontline further indicates that Russia is not interested in softening its approach or demands in negotiations and maintains its objective of total Ukrainian capitulation, which Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly outlined in June 2024.[4] Zakharova's and Lavrov's statements also undermine Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in a willingness to "restore" US–Russian relations with the new US presidential administration and instead indicate that Putin likely is taking for granted that the Trump administration will defer to the Kremlin's interests and preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in return.[5] Russian officials notably made these statements against the backdrop of reports that the Trump administration intends to appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war" and announcements of multiple Trump national security cabinet picks, suggesting that Russia will maintain its goals in Ukraine regardless of the make-up of the incoming Trump administration.[6]

Ukrainian security services reportedly assassinated a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) official in occupied Crimea on November 13. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on November 13 that sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that the SBU conducted a successful special operation in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and planted an explosive on the car of the BSF's 41st Missile Boat Brigade Chief of Staff Captain First Rank Valery Trankovsky.[7] Trankovsky died from his injuries after the explosion.[8]  SBU sources noted that Trankovsky ordered Russian cruise missile strikes from the Black Sea at civilian objects in Ukraine in 2022.[9] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev reported that a car exploded in Sevastopol on the morning of November 13, killing a Russian servicemember, but did not identify the deceased.[10] Razvozhaev claimed that Russian authorities did not rule out sabotage — suggesting that the Russian occupation administration will likely further crackdown against those it deems to be pro-Ukrainian in retaliation for the attack. Geolocated footage shows the aftermath of the car explosion in occupied Sevastopol.[11] Likely Ukrainian partisans have conducted three assassinations of Russian occupation and military officials since late September 2024.[12]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia's three largest oil companies. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 13, citing unspecified "people," that Russian President Vladimir Putin shot down the proposal to merge Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft, state-affiliated Rosneft, and independently owned Rosneft.[13] FT's sources attributed the proposed merger to Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, the husband of Putin's cousin and Russian State Secretary — Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva. Former Russian oil executives told FT that, while the merger would have given Gazprom Neft and Rosneft access to Lukoil's UAE-based trading arm, concerns over the ability to circumvent Western sanctions and temporarily reduced oil production also contributed to Putin's rejection of the proposed merger. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) first reported on the proposed merger on November 9 but noted that the Kremlin and Rosneft denied the talks while Gazprom Neft and Lukoil did not comment.[14]

Contradictory reporting on the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of Putin and Russian energy executives. FT reported that Tsivilev attempted to utilize his family connection to Putin to promote the deal but that Russian energy executives also had the political leverage to oppose the proposed merger.[15] Rosneft Head Igor Sechin and Gazprom Head Alexey Miller are both longtime friends and supporters of Putin, and Putin reportedly rejected Tsivilev's proposal on their behalf despite reportedly desiring more direct Kremlin control over Russian oil production and his family connection to Tsivilev.[16] The initial reports of a merger may have been intended to weaken Sechin in particular. The WSJ reported that Sechin was a "main player" in the merger talks and was a possible, but not definite, candidate to lead the resulting company, though Rosneft rejected notions that "Evil Sechin" had "insidious intentions to take over the assets" of other oil companies."[17]

South Korean and US intelligence separately confirmed that North Korean troops have deployed into combat alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed on November 13 that it "assesses that the North Korean troops deployed to Russia" are already participating in combat after having completed their training and gradual battlefield deployment over the past two weeks.[18] US State Department Spokesperson Vedant Patel stated during a briefing on November 12 that over 10,000 North Korean troops deployed to eastern Russia, most of whom have now moved to western Kursk Oblast "where they have begun engaging in combat operations with Russian forces."[19] ISW assessed on November 5 that North Korean troops had entered combat in Kursk Oblast, citing reports by Ukrainian intelligence and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The manner in which the Kremlin is trying to set its terms for negotiations strongly signals that Russia's objectives remain unchanged and still amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin does not appear any more willing to make concessions to the incoming Trump administration than it was to the current administration.
• Lavrov's pre-emptive rejection of the potential suggestion to freeze the current frontline further indicates that Russia is not interested in softening its approach or demands in negotiations and maintains its objective of total Ukrainian capitulation, which Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly outlined in June 2024.
• Ukrainian security services reportedly assassinated a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) official in occupied Crimea on November 13.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia's three largest oil companies. Contradictory reporting on the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of Putin and Russian energy executives.
• South Korean and US intelligence separately confirmed that North Korean troops have deployed into combat alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar.
• Russian forces continue to heavily rely on refurbished tanks and armored vehicles pulled from storage to replace vehicle losses during ongoing combat operations, but likely will not be able to sustain these losses in the long term.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2o24

Russian forces recently advanced during two company-sized mechanized assaults within and south of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zaporizkyi Street in northeastern Kurakhove during a company-sized mechanized assault.[i] The Ukrainian brigade that defended against the mechanized assault reported that Russian forces attacked with 12 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian artillery and drones destroyed three tanks and six infantry fighting vehicles.[ii] The Ukrainian brigade reported that three groups of Russian infantry also unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Vovcha River north of Kurakhove at the same time as the mechanized assault. Additional geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Dalne (south of Kurakhove) during a reduced company-sized mechanized assault consisting of at least nine armored vehicles, and Russian forces' recent advances northeast of Dalne and in the fields east and southeast of the settlement are likely a result of the same reduced company-sized mechanized assault.[iii] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the Dalne mechanized assault reported that Ukrainian artillery and tanks destroyed two Russian tanks and six armored vehicles.[iv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 12 that forward units of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the Russian advance into Dalne.[v] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported on November 12 that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults of an unspecified echelon near Katerynivka and Antonivka (both northeast of Vuhledar and south of Kurakhove along the C051104 highway) in order to level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast.[vi] Russian advances near Dalne are likely aimed at bypassing the string of settlements north of Vuhledar along the C05114 highway that could have posed a notable challenge to advancing Russian forces.[vii] ISW continues to assess that further Russian advances into Dalne and west of the settlement could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in the pocket north and northeast of Vuhledar, allowing Russian forces to advance along the C051104 highway relatively uncontested and further pressure Ukrainian positions in Kurakhove from the south.[viii]

Russian forces continued assaults in other areas of the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions on November 12. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Kurakhove near Voznesenka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[ix] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka, Sontsivka, and Zorya; north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka, Voznesenka, and Kreminna Balka; east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; south of Kurakhove near Dalne; northeast of Vuhledar near Illinka, Antonivka, and Katernyivka; and northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove on November 11 and 12.[x] A Russian source claimed that worsening weather conditions in the Kurakhove direction are not significantly impacting the tempo of Russian advances.[xi] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and drone operators of the "Aleppo" detachment of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[xii] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces are attacking towards Rozlyv (northwest of Vuhledar and north of Shakhtarske) and that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and the 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking towards Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[xiii]

Geolocated footage confirms reports that an explosion damaged the Ternivska Dam at the Kurakhivske Reservoir on November 11. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows an explosion at the Ternivska Dam south of Stary Terny (northwest of Kurakhove).[xiv] Ukrainian Kurakhove City Military Administration Head Roman Padun and Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on November 11 and 12, respectively, that the explosion and subsequent flooding did not impact any nearby homes, with Filashkin further noting that settlements along the Vovcha River west of the reservoir have not flooded.[xv] Padun stated that water continues to flow from the dam but that the entire reservoir will not empty, and Filashkin reported that 15 million cubic meters of water had spilled from the reservoir. Padun reported that Russian forces have been targeting the dam with guided glide bombs for three months (since about August 2024), and ISW observed claims in September 2024 from Russian sources that Russian forces had struck the dam.[xvi] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported the damage to the dam on November 11 but disagreed about who was responsible for the strike.[xvii] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces could have struck the dam on November 11 in order to cause significant, long-lasting flooding west of the Kurakhivske Reservoir that could facilitate Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove.[xviii] The potential advantages that Russian forces could gain by damaging the dam are currently unclear, however, as the extent and duration of the resulting flooding is reportedly minimal. ISW is unable to attribute who or what damaged the dam.

Recent Western and Ukrainian estimates about the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast do not represent a significant inflection, as Russian forces have spent several months gathering forces for a future counteroffensive effort to expel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. Ukrainian officials and Western media recently reported that Russia has concentrated a rough total of 50,000 personnel, including about 8,000 - 10,000 North Korean forces, in Kursk Oblast in preparation for an operation to push Ukrainian forces from Russian territory before late January 2025 and suggested that Russia has not redeployed any of these forces from eastern Ukraine.[xix] Ukrainian sources estimated in September and October 2024 that Russian forces had already concentrated between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, including an estimated 35,000 personnel from Russia's Northern Grouping of Forces who were operating in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts and northern Kharkiv Oblast prior to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[xx] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that 8,000 North Korean soldiers are also currently operating as part of the larger Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast.[xxi] A Ukrainian servicemember stated on November 11 that Russian forces are also redeploying additional elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and several battalions of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not observed independent indications of these redeployments as of this report.[xxii] ISW observed reports in mid-October 2024 that elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment were operating near Chasiv Yar.[xxiii] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on November 11 that the Russian military is frequently transferring new reserves to Kursk Oblast due to high personnel and equipment losses.[xxiv] These reserves are likely intended to replace personnel losses and not significantly bolster the existing Russian force grouping in the area.

Ukrainian military officials warned that Russian forces may intensify assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn told Reuters in a November 11 article that Russian forces are moving trained assault groups to forward positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast but that it is unclear if the Russian military intends to conduct a unified offensive operation or separate assaults.[xxv] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces may intensify assaults with armored vehicles, buggies, and motorcycles in the near future since Russian forces have conducted preliminary reconnaissance operations in the area and have increased the number of air strikes in southern Ukraine by 30 to 40 percent in the past two to three weeks.[xxvi] Voloshyn stated on November 9 that Russian forces are concentrating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne and south of Zaporizhzhia City), Hulyaipole (northeast of Robotyne), and Robotyne and are preparing to conduct intensified assaults in these areas.[xxvii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction also reported on November 12 that the Russian military is concentrating forces to conduct assaults in the area.[xxviii] The spokesperson also noted that Russian forces are conducting daily infantry assaults in groups of 10 to 20 personnel. ISW has not observed reports that Russian forces have redeployed forces to the Zaporizhia direction from other areas of the frontline, however. Russian forces resumed conducting small-scale attacks on the Zaporizhia frontline near Kamyanske and the Velyka Novosilka salient after a nearly year-long hiatus in early October 2024.[xxix]

Select Russian defense officials appear to be contradicting Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent assertion that Russia is not interested in forming a unified security bloc against the West. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi on November 12 and emphasized that both Russia and the PRC "act from a united position" within international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), UN Security Council, G20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).[xxx] Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC strategic partnership is not a "military-political alliance similar to those developed during the Cold War" but "surpasses" these relationships. Russian Military-Technical Cooperation Deputy Director Mikhail Babish also stated on November 12 that Russia is ready to discuss the joint development and production of weapons with the PRC — demonstrating growing military support within the Russia-PRC relationship.[xxxi] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed during a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) defense ministerial meeting on November 12 that BRICS member states recently supported the Kremlin's initiative to establish a "multipolar world" and claimed that the CIS must cooperate to build "indivisible Eurasian security."[xxxii] Belousov claimed that BRICS is focused on finding peaceful settlements in conflicts in the world and forming a multipolar order in order to oppose the "collective West," which Belousov claimed is "trying to undermine regional stability." Putin notably criticized political blocs on November 7, calling for a new world order without blocs, and Shoigu's emphasis on the unity of the Russian-PRC relationship and Belousov's statements seemingly posturing BRICS as in opposition to the "collective West" appear to contradict Putin's statement.[xxxiii] BRICS member states also notably adopted the Kazan Declaration during the BRICS summit on October 23, which demonstrated that the Kremlin had not secured the support for or created this alternative security structure, as ISW previously assessed.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced during two company-sized mechanized assaults within and south of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Geolocated footage confirms reports that an explosion damaged the Ternivska Dam at the Kurakhivske Reservoir on November 11.
• Recent Western and Ukrainian estimates about the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast do not represent a significant inflection, as Russian forces have spent several months gathering forces for a future counteroffensive effort to expel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
• Ukrainian military officials warned that Russian forces may intensify assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future.
• Select Russian defense officials appear to be contradicting Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent assertion that Russia is not interested in forming a unified security bloc against the West.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kurakhove and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce conscripts into signing Russian military service contracts, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2o24

Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in early September 2024 and are currently attempting to envelop Kurakhove from the north and south and to level the frontline between Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar).[i] Russian forces seized Vuhledar as of October 1 and have advanced north and northwest of Vuhledar in a series of successful mechanized and infantry assaults over the last month.[ii] Russian forces have also marginally advanced northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka and Katerynivka, but ISW is yet to observe confirmation of Russian advances into Yelizavetivka and further west along the C051104 highway.[iii] Russian forces are currently several kilometers south of the Romanivka-Uspenivka-Sukhyi Yar line — a string to settlements north of Vuhledar that could pose a notable challenge to Russian forces should Ukrainian forces be able to establish defenses in these settlements. Russian forces appear to be attempting to bypass this line of settlements, however, as geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Dalne (south of Kurakhove and northwest of Yelizavetivka) and likely hold positions in the fields east and southeast of Dalne.[iv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Dalne itself, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these maximalist claims.[v] Further Russian advances into Dalne and west of Dalne could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in the pocket north and northeast of Vuhledar and allow Russian forces to advance along the C051104 highway relatively uncontested. Such advances would allow Russian forces to further pressure Ukrainian positions in Kurakhove from the south. ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.

Russian forces also continued to advance in other areas of the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions on November 10 and 11. Additional geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) recently advanced into central Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove).[vi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novoselydivka and advanced near Novooleksiivka and into Sontsivka (both northwest of Kurakhove).[vii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced into the eastern outskirts of Kurakhove and that there is fighting along Stantsiyna and Kozatska streets.[viii] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced into the outskirts of Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar) and further north and east of Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar).[ix] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports of Russian forces entering Yelizavetivka.[x] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka, and Sontsivka; north of Kurakhove near Voznesenka, Illinka, Berestky, and Novoselydivka; south of Kurakhove near Dalne; northeast of Vuhledar near Maksymilyanivka, Antonivka, and Katerynivka; and northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove, Kostyantynopolske, Uspenivka, Bohoyavlenka, and Maksymivka on November 10 and 11.[xi]

Russian forces reportedly continue to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka may begin to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka. ISW assessed on November 4 that Russian forces seized Shakhtarske (northeast of Velyka Novosilka and northwest of Vuhledar), and Russian sources have claimed further Russian advances north and west of Shakhtarske since.[xii] Russian forces notably resumed tactical ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in mid-October 2024.[xiii] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 that Russian forces advanced in southern Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar), with some milbloggers claiming that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raised a flag over an unspecified area of the settlement.[xiv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Russian forces attacked south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka; southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zeleny Pol.[xv] This November 11 report and previous Russian milblogger claims suggest that Russian forces are likely engaged in a concerted offensive effort to advance towards Velyka Novosilka from the south and southwest.[xvi] Russian forces would have to first advance through settlements south of Velyka Novosilka, including Blahodatne, Neskuchne, and Vremivka, in order to reach the southern and southwestern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka, and advances through these settlements could prove costly and time-consuming should Ukrainian forces choose to defend here. Russian forces will likely also leverage positions within Shakhtarske and in the fields south of the settlement to pressure Ukrainian positions in the area and attempt to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from defensive positions south of Velyka Novosilka.

Russian forces have advanced in western Donetsk Oblast at a moderate tempo, but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to be able to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that could successfully encircle Ukrainian forces. Russian forces have advanced just over 10 kilometers from the Vuhledar-Prechystivka line over the past five weeks, and the current rate of Russian advance in western Donetsk Oblast — should it continue - would allow Ukrainian units ample time to withdraw from frontline positions without risk of encirclement. The possible future elimination of the Ukrainian salient around Kurakhove does not portend the collapse of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, moreover, as settlements further west could provide suitably defensible positions for Ukrainian forces in the future. Grinding Russian assaults in western Donetsk Oblast and throughout the frontline will likely continue in the coming weeks and months as the Russian military continues efforts to retain the theater-wide initiative that are degrading Russian manpower and materiel. It remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit further advances in western Donetsk Oblast should Russian forces successfully close this pocket, and the future culmination of Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast will provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to contest and possibly seize the battlefield initiative.

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on November 11 that damage to a dam of the Kurakhivske Reservoir is causing limited flooding in nearby settlements. Ukrainian Kurakhove City Military Administration Head Roman Padun reported on the morning of November 11 that water is flowing near the Ternivska Dam but that Ukrainian authorities cannot inspect the dam to confirm the damage due to constant Russian shelling.[xvii] Padun stated that there was flooding in Velykonovosilkivska Hromada (west and southwest of the dam). Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on the evening of November 11 that the water level in Velykonovosilkivska Hromada had risen by 1.2 meters, but no houses had flooded as of 1600 local time.[xviii] Filashkin stated that flooding may affect settlements along the Vovcha River in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported that sources in Ukrainian emergency services stated that unspecified actors shelled Kurakhove in the morning of November 11, destroying the Ternivska Dam.[xix] The channel reported that there was no flooding in Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil (all west of the dam along the Vovcha River). Another Ukrainian Telegram channel stated that roads near the dam are usable but that the movement of armored vehicles on dirt roads is limited.[xx] Russian milbloggers and opposition outlets noted that photos circulating on the internet purporting to show damage to the Ternivska Dam actually show the Kozarovytska Dam, which Ukrainian forces destroyed in February 2022 to prevent Russian advances near Kyiv at the start of the full-scale invasion.[xxi]

Ukrainian and Russian sources disagreed about who was responsible for damaging the dam, but Russian forces reportedly struck the dam in September 2024. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on the evening of November 11 that Russian forces struck the dam.[xxii] Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces struck the dam to prevent further Russian advances, but some milbloggers noted that these claims are unconfirmed.[xxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed in September 2024 that Russian forces increased their air and ballistic missile strikes targeting dams of the Kurakhove Reservoir in order to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and force Ukrainian forces to use dirt roads near Bahatyr.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted several strikes against the Ternivska Dam on September 18 that disabled the lock control system but did not result in flooding in nearby settlements.[xxv]

Russian forces may have struck the dam in order to cause significant, long-lasting flooding west of Kurakhivske Reservoir that could facilitate Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove. Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations north, southeast, south, and southwest of Kurakhove as part of wider efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in the Kurakhove direction. Russian offensive operations northwest and north of Kurakhove along the Sontsivka-Voznesenka-Novoselydivka line aim to advance southwestward and southward to envelop the Ukrainian pocket north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir. Russian forces are also attacking along a wide front along the Shakhtarske-Trudove-Antonivka line in order to envelop the Ukrainian salient south of Kurakhove. The Kurakhivske Reservoir is a significant water barrier separating the Ukrainian force groupings north and south of Kurakhove, and Russian forces may have struck the Ternivska Dam in order to flood settlements along the Vovcha River west of the reservoir, extending the water barrier separating these Ukrainian groupings. Russian forces may have also intended for flooding along the river to prevent Ukrainian forces from using the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway, a significant Ukrainian GLOC that runs through Kurakhove and just south of the Vovcha River. The potential advantages that Russian forces could gain from the damage to the dam are currently unclear, however, as the extent and duration of the flooding remain unknown at this time.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied on November 11 reports of a recent phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President-elect Donald Trump.[xxvi] Peskov dismissed reports of Putin and Trump's phone call, claiming that Russian officials have no plans to organize a call between Putin and Trump. The Washington Post reported on November 10 that Trump spoke with Putin on November 7 and advised Putin to refrain from further escalation in Ukraine.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.
• ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.
• Russian forces reportedly continue to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka may begin to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces have advanced in western Donetsk Oblast at a moderate tempo, but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to be able to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that could successfully encircle Ukrainian forces.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on November 11 that damage to a dam of the Kurakhivske Reservoir is causing limited flooding in nearby settlements.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources disagreed about who was responsible for damaging the dam, but Russian forces reportedly struck the dam in September 2024.
• Russian forces may have struck the dam in order to cause significant, long-lasting flooding west of Kurakhivske Reservoir that could facilitate Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied on November 11 reports of a recent phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kreminna and Kurakhove.
• Russian regional governments continue to commit large portions of their social budgets towards payments to Russian veterans, likely as part of ongoing efforts to incentivize Russian military service.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2o24

Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024. United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey told UK outlet The Telegraph on November 9 that UK defense intelligence estimates that Russian casualties "reached a new high" in October 2024 and that Russian forces suffered an average daily casualty rate of 1,345 troops per day or about 41,980 casualties in October 2024.[1] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, previously reported that Russian forces suffered a record high average daily casualty rate of 1,271 troops per day or about 38,130 casualties in September 2024.[2] Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties over the last two months – roughly 20,000 more casualties than US forces suffered during almost 20 years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[3] Data compiled by Oryx founder Jakub Janovsky indicates that Russian forces also lost 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline in September and October 2024.[4] Russian forces seized and recaptured a total of 1,517 square kilometers--an area less than a third the size of Delaware--throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast over the last two months in exchange for these losses. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Selydove, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast over the last two months and have managed to advance at a marginally faster rate than Russian forces have advanced over the last two years.[5] Russian forces recently seized Vuhledar and Selydove but have yet to make operationally significant advances, and Russian forces have made most of their advances during this time through open fields and small settlements.

Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains. ISW previously observed data indicating that Russian forces have lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion alone since October 2023.[6] Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment in priority frontline areas, but dwindling Soviet-era tank and armored vehicle stockpiles and current armored vehicle production rates will likely make such losses prohibitive over the longer term.[7] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that Russian forces are suffering roughly 1,200 casualties per day, or about 36,000 casualties per month, and ISW has recently observed indications that the Russian military has been struggling to recruit enough soldiers to replace its frontline losses.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin notably acknowledged Russia's ongoing labor shortages and dependence on migrants to meet these labor shortages during his September 7 Valdai Club address, and ISW noted that Russia also depends on coercing migrants to join the Russian military to meet its manpower requirements.[9] The Russian military almost certainly cannot indefinitely sustain a daily casualty rate of over 1,200 people so long as Putin remains committed to avoiding another involuntary call-up of reservists.[10] Even an involuntary reserve mobilization will not resolve the larger problem Putin apparently faces in finding enough people to work in Russia's industries while also feeding the front.

Select Russian milbloggers continue to complain about disproportionately high personnel losses, and wider discontent about losses within the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community may also influence Putin's calculus in the future. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger complained on November 8 that it takes at least six months to train assault personnel but that the Russian military command is treating assault personnel as "meat" who do not require a high level of training and whose primary task is to "catch drones [and] shrapnel."[11] The milblogger claimed that Russian infantry losses are high due to the ongoing Russian tactic of sending small assault groups in multiple, successive waves in an attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian forces, which the milblogger labeled as "stupid" and "improperly organized." The milblogger concluded that Russian advances "do not seem proportionate to the irretrievably spent resources – human and material." The Russian milblogger community recently criticized the deaths of specialized drone operators whom their commanders sent on assaults as punishment, and the continued use of Russian servicemembers, particularly specialized troops, in unorganized, highly attritional, infantry-led "meat" assaults that result in disproportionately small gains may continue to anger the milblogger community – a group towards which the Kremlin has shown itself to be especially sensitive.[12]

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes on the Aleksin Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast on the night of November 8 to 9. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on November 9 that its sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that the SBU and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) launched at least 13 drones at the Aleksin Chemical Plant and that a successful strike caused a fire, halting the plant's operations and eventually causing a chemical explosion on the afternoon of November 9.[13] The SBU sources stated that the Aleksin Chemical Plant is a subsidiary of the Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec and that the plant produces ammunition, gunpowder and other products for the Russian defense industrial base.[14] Footage published on November 9 purportedly shows a strike on the Aleksin Chemical Plant and the subsequent fire.[15] Suspilne's sources stated that Ukrainian drone strikes also damaged a power transmission line at the nearby Aleksinskaya Thermal Power Plant.[16] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike near Aleksin but that falling drone debris damaged several houses.[17]

Russian authorities are reportedly considering merging Russia's three largest oil companies -- Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, likely to help Russia reach more advantageous energy deals with non-Western states. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 9, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Russian officials and executives are negotiating a possible merger between state-affiliated Rosneft, state-owned Gazprom Neft, and independently-owned Lukoil that would create the second-largest crude oil production company in the world.[18] The WSJ reported that Rosneft Head and close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin Igor Sechin is a "main player" in the ongoing talks and that the merger may be aimed at extracting higher prices for Russian oil from India or the People's Republic of China (PRC). The WSJ's sources stated that the deal is still subject to change and that it is unclear whether Sechin would head the merged company, and representatives of the Kremlin, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Rosneft all denied the talks. Gazprom Neft's parent company, Gazprom, has lost significant revenues from a drop in energy sales since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.[19] Longtime Gazprom Head Alexey Miller reportedly failed to reach a deal with the PRC in early 2024 due to disagreements over the proposed Power of Siberia-2 (PS-2) gas pipeline, and Putin emphasized in his November 7 Valdai Club address that Russia is willing to sell oil, gas, and nuclear energy to the PRC to compensate for the PRC's energy supplies lost due to Western sanctions.[20] The Kremlin may be trying to consolidate its influence in the global energy market to reach more advantageous energy deals, particularly with the PRC, amid falling revenues from international energy exports and increased federal spending on national security and defense.

Russian authorities arrested a former Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) construction official for fraud on November 9. Russian authorities arrested former Russian MoD Special Construction Directorate Head Alexander Molodchenko and two other unspecified defendants on suspicion of fraud after reportedly "misleading" Russian MoD officials about the fulfillment of state construction contracts.[21] Molodchenko was reportedly dismissed from his post as MoD Special Construction Directorate head in September 2024.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) reportedly stated on November 8 that it will send a "small number" of US defense contractors to rear areas of Ukraine to repair US-provided weapons and equipment. The Washington Post reported that the US defense contractors will repair F-16 fighter jets, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and unspecified air defense systems.[22] An unspecified US defense official told CNN that the contractors will be located "far from" the frontline and noted that F-16s and Patriot air defense systems "require specific technical expertise to maintain."[23] The DoD told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in a November 9 article that keeping these weapons systems mission capable is "critical" for Ukraine's defense.[24] A senior Biden administration official told the WSJ that the US is also providing over 500 interceptors for Patriot missile systems and NASAMS to Ukraine, which will likely arrive in the coming weeks.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024.
• Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes on the Aleksin Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast on the night of November 8 to 9.
• Russian authorities are reportedly considering merging Russia's three largest oil companies -- Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, likely to help Russia reach more advantageous energy deals with non-Western states.
• Russian authorities arrested a former Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) construction official for fraud on November 9.
• The US Department of Defense (DOD) reportedly stated on November 8 that it will send a "small number" of US defense contractors to rear areas of Ukraine to repair US-provided weapons and equipment.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on November 9 that Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russia will be able to produce 30 percent more artillery shells than all European Union (EU) countries combined in 2025 should the EU fail to implement additional measures, such as sanctions, against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms. Putin addressed the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on November 7 and advocated for a reset of US–Russia relations. Putin implied that that Trump’s presidential campaign expressed a "desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis" and later noted that Russia is open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the United States."[1] Putin attempted to blame the United States for undermining US–Russia relations, noting that the United States imposed sanctions and restrictions on Russia, and chose to support Kyiv - without mentioning that these measures were in response to Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin's statement implies that Russia would only accept any reset in US–Russia relations if the US dropped sanctions and restrictions against Russia and stopped supporting Ukraine — effectively entirely on terms that benefit Russia at the expense of US interests. Putin reiterated the boilerplate narrative that NATO is a "blatant anachronism," accused the West of maintaining a bloc-oriented mentality, and deliberately misrepresented his invasion of Ukraine as NATO's efforts to remain relevant. Putin attempted to frame BRICS as a non-bloc alternative to NATO and falsely implied that Russia is not interested in becoming a hegemon, despite the fact that the Kremlin has been forming a new anti-Western bloc composed of Iran, North Korea, and China.

A recent failed Russian assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka prompted outrage from some Russian ultranationalist milbloggers over Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes. Russian milbloggers claimed that the commander of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) ordered the brigade's 1st, 2nd, and 3rd motorized rifle battalions and 4th Tank Battalion to conduct a simultaneous frontal assault against Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka without adequate fire support on November 2.[2] The milbloggers complained that the assault was unsuccessful and resulted in steep personnel, tank, and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) losses. The milbloggers reiterated their long-standing critiques that Russian military field commanders produce "beautiful reports" and maps that deliberately inflate Russian frontline advances and send these false reports to senior Russian military leadership. Russian milbloggers claimed that field commanders send these false reports to secure promotions at the cost of Russian servicemen's lives and military equipment losses.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had claimed in late October 2024 that Russian forces had seized Serebryanka (just west of Bilohorivka), and Russian milbloggers may have been referring to this claim in their critiques.[4] Bilohorivka is a particular sore spot for the Russian ultranationalist community because Russian forces have impaled themselves on assaults to take the settlement since at least May 2022. The Russian military command most notably launched a catastrophic river crossing to take Bilohorivka in May 2022 that failed, resulting in significant Russian armored vehicle losses.[5]

A Russian brigade commander and a sniper platoon commander were reported killed in combat recently in the Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar directions. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on November 7 that Major General Pavel Klimenko, commander of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA]), was killed in combat in Ukraine.[6] Klimenko had reportedly served in occupied Crimea before Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 and was promoted to Major General in May 2024. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported in August 2024 that soldiers under Klimenko's command had been involved in the torture of conscientious objectors and Russian personnel in an abandoned mine near Donetsk City.[7] ISW recently observed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade fighting in the Kurakhove direction.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 5 that Russian Deputy Commander of the Sniper Platoon of the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) Pavel Alexandrovich Apalkov, nicknamed "Joker," was killed in combat in the Chasiv Yar direction.[9]

Ukrainian authorities continue to report systematic Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), noting a clear increase in such executions in 2024. Head of the Department for Combating Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office Denys Lysenko stated on November 6 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating 49 criminal cases involving the Russian execution of 124 Ukrainian POWs.[10] Lysenko stated that the number of Russian forces' executions of Ukrainian POWs increased sharply since the end of 2023 and reached "unprecedented levels" in 2024. The highest numbers of executions occurred in Donetsk Oblast, where Russian forces executed 62 Ukrainian POWs in 17 separate incidents, followed by Zaporizhia and Kharkiv oblasts. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs and has observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.[11]

Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Western sanctions are reportedly disrupting Russia's energy industry. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported on November 6 that Russian authorities partially halted operations of the Russia's Volgograd; Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai; and Yaisky, Kemerovo Oblast oil refineries in October 2024 due to failure to complete scheduled repairs of damage caused by Ukrainian strikes.[12] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service stated that the shutdowns will reduce domestic Russian refining capacity, hinder exports, worsen fuel supply issues in Russia, and raise maintenance and modernization costs. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service noted that Russian authorities could not complete the repairs because they lacked the necessary Western equipment and components as a result of Western sanctions and failed import substitution efforts. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported that Russian manufacturers only supply 30 to 45 percent of the necessary components for Russian oil refineries and that the Russian reliance on Chinese equipment has proven problematic due to compatibility issues, which is increasing the repair costs. ISW previously reported on the effectiveness of Western sanctions and the need to strengthen them to prevent Russia form evading their impact via third parties, as well as the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes on targets inside Russia.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms.
• A recent failed Russian assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka prompted outrage from some Russian ultranationalist milbloggers over Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes.
• A Russian brigade commander and a sniper platoon commander were reported killed in combat recently in the Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar directions.
• Ukrainian authorities continue to report systematic Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), noting a clear increase in such executions in 2024.
• Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Western sanctions are reportedly disrupting Russia's energy industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities are reportedly creating "fake" non-combat volunteer battalions in occupied Ukraine and merging them with existing Cossack organizations led by occupation administrations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 6, 2024

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval base in Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan for the first time on November 6 damaging several missile ships of the Russia Caspian Sea Flotilla. Ukrainian media outlets, citing Ukraine’s military intelligence, reported that the Ukrainian drones struck a naval base in damaging the Tatarstan and Dagestan Gepard-class frigates (Project 11661) and possibly damaging several nearby Buyan-class corvettes (Project 21631).[1] Republic of Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov claimed on November 6 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Kaspiysk without specifying the consequences.[2] Satellite imagery collected on November 6 indicates the presence of three likely Russian Buyan-class vessels, two likely Buyan-M-class vessels, one likely Tarantul-class vessel, one likely Gepard-class vessel, and one likely Karakurt-class vessel present on the day of the strike in the port of Kaspiysk, although the images are insufficient for identifying damage to ships or naval piers.[3] Geolocated footage published on November 6 shows drones striking near port infrastructure in Kaspiysk.[4]

Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces executed at least 109 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) since the start of the full-scale invasion amid new reports of Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Head off the Department of Combating Crimes Committed in Conditions of Armed Conflict, Yuri Bilousov, reported on November 1 that Russian forces have executed at least 109 Ukrainian POWs since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that Russian forces have intensified the number of POW executions they commit in 2024.[5] The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on November 5 that it has launched an investigation into new reports of Russian forces executing six captured Ukrainian POWs: three near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on October 23 and three others also in the Pokrovsk direction on November 1.[6] ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.[7]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval base in Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan for the first time on November 6 damaging several missile ships of the Russia Caspian Sea Flotilla.
• Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces executed at least 109 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) since the start of the full-scale invasion amid new reports of Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Svatove, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• A prominent Russian brigade commander and official indicated that Russian commanders and civilian leadership explicitly view Russian military volunteers as expendable resources, consistent with high casualty rates across the frontline.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2024

The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated in an interview with South Korean national broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast but emphasized that it will take more time for the entire contingent of North Korean forces to deploy to Kursk Oblast and enter combat.[1] A source in Ukraine's special services also told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the first combat clashes between Ukrainian and North Korean forces have occurred but stated that these are not "large connections" between Ukrainian and North Korean forces.[2] Umerov noted that it would be difficult for Ukrainian forces to quickly ascertain North Korean casualty counts from the initial fighting because North Korean soldiers have been "mixed in" with the Russian army and are "disguised" as soldiers from the Republic of Buryatia, which notably suggests that the Russian military is trying to integrate North Korean combat power into the Russian force structure, as opposed to maintaining separate North Korean units fighting under Russian command.[3] North Korean force structure under Russia’s command remains unclear, however. Umerov forecasted that more North Korean personnel will finish deploying within a few weeks once they complete training in the Russian Far East.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky estimated on November 4 that there are already 11,000 North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast, although the majority of this number is likely not yet on the frontline.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage North Korean manpower to first and foremost repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and that in return North Korean troops hope to gain combat and military-technical experience in the conditions for a contemporary and technologically driven war.[6]

The Kremlin appointed the first-ever "Time of Heroes" program participant to a federal-level position, furthering its ongoing effort to staff government positions with pro-war veterans and set long-term conditions for the militarization of Russian government bodies from local to federal levels. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on November 4 appointing Yevgeny Pervyshov as Acting Head of Tambov Oblast.[7] Pervyshov is a veteran of the war in Ukraine and an alumnus of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program and is the first veteran of the war in Ukraine to hold the position of head of a Russian federal subject.[8] ISW previously reported that Putin met with Pervyshov during a "Time of Heroes" meeting on June 14, during which Pervyshov told Putin that he believes that "Time of Heroes" participants and alumni like himself would make effective government officials and emphasized his personal political experience as a State Duma Deputy and former mayor of Krasnodar City.[9] Putin offered Pervyshov a job as a regional head in response.[10] Pervyshov previously fought in the "Grom-Kaskad" unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Brigade, formerly part of the (now-disbanded) BARS "Kaskad" Battalion that formed in 2017 as part of the Donetsk People's Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs (DNR MVD).[11] Putin also notably appointed Maria Kostyuk, the head of the "Time of Heroes" program whose son died fighting in Ukraine in August 2022, to the position of acting governor of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.[12] Putin's appointments of Pervyshov and Kostyuk support ISW's assessment that the Kremlin is using the "Time of Heroes" program to cultivate a cadre of loyal pro-war veterans who will assume government roles to appease the Russian servicemembers who make up one of Putin's core constituencies, to boost domestic support for the war, and militarize Russian local and federal government in the medium to long-term.[13]

Russia launched two Iranian-made satellites into orbit on November 5 via a Russian space-launch vehicle, furthering a trend of Russian-Iranian bilateral space cooperation.[14] The Russian Soyuz 2.1b launch vehicle took off from the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Amur Oblast on the morning of November 5, launching 53 satellites into a 500-kilometer-heigh orbit. Iranian media reported that the launch included the Iranian "Kousar" and "Hodhod" satellites.[15] The "Kousar" satellite is reportedly a high-resolution sensing satellite that images the Earth's surface for agricultural, natural resource management, and environmental purposes, whereas the "Hodhod" satellite is designed to create satellite communications and Internet of Things (IoT) networks to enable communications with hard-to-reach areas.[16] A private Iranian company — Omid Faza — built and designed the satellites.[17] Russia previously launched the Iranian "Khayyam" (alternatively referred to as the Kanopus-V) remote-sensing satellite and the Pars-1 research satellite into orbit in August 2022 and February 2024, respectively.[18] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran may leverage these satellites to enable long-range targeting capabilities for attacks abroad.[19] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger hailed the "Kousar" and "Hodhod" launches as the latest example of "growing bilateral cooperation" between Russia and Iran in the space sector.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin appointed the first-ever "Time of Heroes" program participant to a federal-level position, furthering its ongoing effort to staff government positions with pro-war veterans and set long-term conditions for the militarization of Russian government bodies from local to federal levels.
• Russia launched two Iranian-made satellites into orbit on November 5 via a Russian space-launch vehicle, furthering a trend of Russian-Iranian bilateral space cooperation.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Kreminna, in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, northeast of Kurakhove, near Vuhledar, and north of Robotyne.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of Chasiv Yar.
• The Russian military is struggling to maintain a sufficient number of quality personnel within traditionally elite forces.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2024

Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections. The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed on November 4 that Sandu won 55.35 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo.[1] Numerous world leaders congratulated Sandu on November 3 and 4, and international election observers largely commended the conduct of the elections in spite of Russian attempts to sway the outcomes against Sandu.[2] Pro-Russian opposition parties and officials attempted to discredit Sandu’s victory, with the Moldovan Socialist party calling her “an illegitimate president”; Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor telling Russian state TV channel Rossiya-24 that the Moldovan opposition has 'evidence' of mass falsifications in favor of Sandu; and pro-Kremlin former Moldovan president Igor Dodon telling Kremlin newswire TASS that Sandu only won because of the Moldovan diaspora vote.[3] The Russian information space, including Russian milbloggers, echoed the words of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition claiming that Moldovan elections were controlled by 'European bureaucrats' and that Moldovans had no agency in determining the outcome of the elections.[4] ISW previously reported on Russia’s systematic efforts to interfere in the Moldovan election in order to derail the passage of Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum and Sandu’s victory.[5]

Georgian civil society and opposition resumed peaceful demonstrations on November 4 against the highly contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for continued resistance and further investigations into large-scale voting irregularities. Thousands of Georgians gathered in the center of Tbilisi and reiterated their refusal to acknowledge the increasingly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party’s victory in an election marred by large-scale evidence of voting irregularities and Russian influence.[6] The opposition outlined three main goals for the protest movement: 1) continuing efforts to collect evidence demonstrating the elections were not free and fair; 2) urging the international community to refrain from acknowledging the election results; and 3) practicing their right to assemble and to resist the results.[7] Georgian legal entities ranging from the Tbilisi City Court to the Georgian Prosecutor's Office have dismissed some of the demands of the Georgian opposition and civil society and cast doubt on allegations of systematic voter fraud, while showing some willingness to conduct investigations into claims of irregularity.[8] The opposition announced its intention to conduct regular protests while calling for international investigations into election falsification and internationally administered snap elections.[9]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial 2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its own.[10] RFE/RL reported on November 4 that it obtained a draft of the treaty that Russia offered to Ukraine on March 7, 2022, entitled "Treaty on the Settlement of the Situation in Ukraine and the Neutrality of Ukraine." The draft document includes seven provisions, all of which amount to Ukraine's complete surrender and disarmament and the abandonment of its sovereignty, lands, and people. The document calls for Ukraine to reduce its army from nearly 197,000 personnel to 50,000 personnel, which RFE/RL notes would have meant that the Ukrainian army would be smaller than the Belarusian army, despite the fact that the Belarusian population in 2022 was one-fifth of the Ukrainian population. The document also states that Ukraine would not be able to develop, produce, buy, or deploy missile systems with a range of more than 250 kilometers; that Ukraine would have to recognize occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as independent Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR) and cede parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that Ukraine still controlled in March 2022; that Ukraine would have to commit to the financial costs of rebuilding parts of the Donbas that Russia had destroyed following its initial 2014 invasion; that Ukraine and the international community would lift all sanctions and cancel all lawsuits that had been levied against Russian since 2014; that Ukraine would grant the Russian language the status of a "state language" and restore all property rights of the Kremlin-controlled Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate; and that Ukraine would re-legalize Soviet and communist symbols.[11] In essence, Moscow was asking Ukraine to willingly give up its military, its offensive and defensive capabilities, its land, a significant portion of its population and economic capacity, and cease protecting its language, history, and culture.

The Kremlin has been incessant in its claims that it set out to negotiate in March 2022 (after illegally invading Ukraine) but that it was Ukraine and the collective West that destroyed the prospect of negotiations.[12] The RFE/RL investigation supports ISW's long-standing assessment that this was never the case, however, and that Russia never intended to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine.[13] Russia presented outrageous demands calling for Ukraine to surrender its security and sovereignty, knowing that Ukraine would (rightly) refuse to do so, and then blamed Ukraine for the supposed "failure" of negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia has constructed a narrative around the concept of negotiations that it is using in an effort to encourage the West to make concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the RFE/RL investigation emphasizes that Russia's "diplomatic" engagements with Ukraine and the West since the full-scale invasion have always been oriented around this destructive objective.[14]

Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Summer 2024 reportedly significantly impacted Ukrainian electrical generation capacity compared to March 2024, though it is unclear whether Russia had been able to inflict significant further damage on the Ukrainian energy grid since. Ukrainian energy experts told Politico in an article published on November 4 that Ukrainian power generation capacity decreased by over nine gigawatts between March 2024 and Summer 2024 after Russian forces launched more than 200 missiles and drones at Ukraine’s power production facilities in late August 2024.[15] Experts estimated that Ukrainian power production facilities generated 37.6 gigawatts of electricity in early 2022, likely referring to the period prior to the start of the Russian drone and missile campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in October 2022; 18.3 gigawatts in April 2023; 21.4 gigawatts in March 2024; and 12.1 gigawatts in Summer 2024. Politico noted that the extent of the damage that Russian strikes inflicted on Ukrainian power production facilities in August 2024 is unknown, and the data does not represent Ukraine's most updated energy generation capacity as of November 2024. A Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs additional air defense systems to protect its energy infrastructure. Artur Lorkowski, Director of The Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), also stated that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment like auto transformers.

The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project attempted to falsely portray himself as a non-Kremlin actor in the Western media and confirmed the Kremlin’s efforts to establish “media schools” abroad. In an interview with the Washington Post published on November 4, Rybar founder and director Mikhail Zvinchuk commented on the US Department of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice’s reward offer for information about the whereabouts of nine Rybar employees reportedly involved in interfering with US elections.[16] Zvinchuk denied reports of his and Rybar’s election interference and used the opportunity to falsely portray Rybar as a "think tank" that is involved in "defending [Russia’s] informational borders." Zvinchuk also claimed that Rybar has an organized "worldwide" network consisting of over 250 channels in 28 languages and confirmed that Rybar is opening "media schools" in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Kyrgyzstan. Rybar reportedly has 60 employees and has taught a class at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Zvinchuk also seized on a question about Rybar's previous appearance on the investigation list for "discrediting" the Russian military in an attempt to portray Rybar employees as "patriots" who occasionally call out problems in Russia. Zvinchuk’s efforts to misrepresent Rybar as a Western-style think tank that is occasionally critical of Russia is likely part of the Kremlin’s wider effort to infiltrate Western and international media via new online-based sources such as Rybar. The Kremlin holds significant power over the Russian information space and civil society, and Rybar’s large-scale operations in Russia and abroad likely would not be possible without Kremlin’s direct funding. Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably awarded Rybar with several state honors, and Rewards for Justice noted that Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec currently funds the channel.[17]

Russian authorities arrested Rosgvardia's Deputy Head of Logistics Major General Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.[18] Russian authorities have notably arrested several high-ranking Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials on bribery charges after Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and moved him to the position of Security Council Secretary in May 2024.[19] A Russian insider source speculated that arrests of senior security officials may spread outside of the Russian MoD to Rosgvardia (which operates separately of the Russian MoD) following Mirzaev's arrest.[20] The source claimed that Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov has maintained a "fairly good reputation and strong position" in Russia's security apparatus but noted that Mirzaev's arrest may lead to additional Rosgvardia arrests and reduce Zolotov's influence.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections.
• Georgian civil society and opposition resumed peaceful demonstrations on November 4 against the highly contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for continued resistance and further investigations into large-scale voting irregularities.
• Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial 2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its own.
• Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Summer 2024 reportedly significantly impacted Ukrainian electrical generation capacity compared to March 2024, though it is unclear whether Russia had been able to inflict significant further damage on the Ukrainian energy grid since.
• The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project attempted to falsely portray himself as a non-Kremlin actor in the Western media and confirmed the Kremlin’s efforts to establish “media schools” abroad.
• Russian authorities arrested Rosgvardia's Deputy Head of Logistics Major General Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.
• Russian forces advanced near Novy Put, Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to form a cadre of loyal military journalists in an effort to control the pro-war Russian information space and centralize control over Russia’s war coverage.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2024

Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21. A Russian Telegram user, who claims to be an employee of an unspecified branch of the Russian special services, claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS strike against a Russian S-300/400 air defense system near occupied Mospyne (just southeast of Donetsk City) and that their sources are still clarifying the damage to the system.[1] The Telegram user claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the air defense systems with six ATACMS missiles and that Russian forces downed three of the missiles. The Telegram user claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Podlet" radar station near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea with a drone on October 23 and that Russian forces have not evacuated the damaged station for repairs yet.[2] A Ukrainian division posted footage on October 31 purportedly showing a successful Ukrainian strike against a Russian Buk air defense system in an unspecified frontline area, and the footage showed secondary detonations consistent with a successful strike against such a system.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system and destroyed the radar system of another Buk-M2 air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of October 24 to 25.[4] Official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Buk-M2 system in southern Ukraine on October 23 and a Buk-M3 air defense system on the night of October 20 to 21 in an unspecified frontline area.[5] ISW has previously observed indications that Russia has struggled to source the microelectronic components necessary to produce complex weapons and air defense systems due to Western sanctions, and Russia may not be able to produce or repair a sufficient number of air defense systems to maintain the current density of Russia's air defense coverage over occupied Ukraine if Ukraine destroys a significant number of Russian systems.[6] Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella, particularly over occupied Ukraine, may impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and could limit Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and rear Ukrainian cities.

South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul stated on November 1 that "all possible scenarios are under consideration" in response to a question about possibly sending weapons to Ukraine following the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia.[7] Cho emphasized that South Korea will monitor North Korean troop involvement in Russia and the "benefits" that North Korea receives from Russia to determine a course of action. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that Russian forces transferred 7,000 additional North Korean personnel to unspecified areas near the border with Ukraine in the last week (since about October 26).[8] The GUR reported that Russian forces have armed North Korean soldiers with 60mm mortars, AK-12 assault rifles, RPK/PKM machine guns, SVD/SVCh sniper rifles, Phoenix anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and have equipped North Korean forces with some night vision devices, thermal imagers, and other optical equipment.

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts on November 2. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development announced on November 2 a new registration mechanism for social media channels with over 10,000 subscribers on the state services portal.[9] Channels must register with the Russian government by January 1, 2025, and provide “minimal” personal information about the identity of their operators via a special platform or risk restrictions on advertising and their right to be reposted by other channels. Outcry about the deanonymization effort from Russian milbloggers previously prompted Roskomnadzor to slightly alter the program and may have caused a slight delay in its implementation, marking a significant example of how the Russian ultranationalist information space maintains some sway over Kremlin decision making.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21. 
• South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine. 
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts on November 2. 
• Ukrainian and Russian forces marginally advanced north of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kurakhove in Donetsk Oblast.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed to have rescinded an order for his Akhmat Spetsnaz soldiers to not take Ukrainian servicemembers as prisoners in the war in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2024

Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31. Kirill offered his assessment of the main external and internal threats to the Russian state during a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the World Russian People's Council, which include ethno-religious conflict, migration, and Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.[1] Kirill noted that while the war in Ukraine is the "most pressing threat" to the Russian state, some people within Russian society "prefer to ignore" what is happening on the frontline in Ukraine and the struggles of people who live in Russian border areas closer to the combat zone. Kirill criticized Russians who are unwilling to "give up their personal comforts" and who are relying on "frivolous entertainment" to distract them from the reality of the war.

Kirill's rebuke of Russians who are apathetic and disinterested in the war suggests that the Kremlin may be increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Russian society's support for the war. Recent Russian opinion polls have suggested that support for local Russian government entities and some Kremlin policies, including the invasion of Ukraine, may be wavering, although Russian citizens continue to widely support Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] Additional polling has suggested that most Russians, particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine, are largely apathetic to the invasion and are able to avoid thinking about the invasion entirely as long as it does not personally affect them.[3] The Kremlin may be concerned about the growing cleavage between Russian citizens who have been immediately impacted by the invasion and Russians who have successfully insulated themselves and their families from the invasion. The Kremlin may also be concerned about apathy towards the invasion in the context of the possible societal reaction to conducting a second wave of mobilization, to which most Russians remain averse.[4] Kirill has previously acted as a key figure in injecting Kremlin narratives into the Russian information space, and the Kremlin may be in the early stages of justifying and preparing Russian society to support a future wave of mobilization.[5]

Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.[6] Kirill stated on October 31 that neo-pagan preachers are trying to revive paganism and instill a "cult of brute force and cruelty” in Russia. Kirill added that neo-pagans are introducing a false belief that Christianity discourages personal heroism and valor and that "holy" Russian servicemen disprove this belief with their conduct, but he then noted that "neo-paganism" is present in the Russian army. Kirill concluded the segment by criticizing Halloween celebrations in Russia, and Kirill likely used the occasion to introduce a discussion about Russian servicemen committing brutal and cruel acts on the frontlines or upon their return to Russia from the frontlines.

ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian military personnel, especially former Wagner Group fighters, committing gruesome acts against fellow Russian servicemen on the frontlines, Ukrainian forces and civilians, and Russian citizens upon their return from the frontlines.[7] Russia is likely to see a significant rise of brutality and cruelty in its communities upon the arrival of more traumatized Russian servicemen home as long as it continues to brutalize its soldiers; refuses to provide the necessary psychological assistance to returning veterans; and militarizes its society, educational institutions, and government.

Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue. Kirill identified "issues with migrants" and ethno-religious tensions as key internal threats to the Russian state during his October 31 speech, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev noted on October 31 that Russia needs to address its migration issues.[8] Medvedev suggested that Russia should introduce "digital migrant profile[s]," which would reportedly allow Russian authorities to stop foreigners at any time and identify foreigners via electronic immigration or travel documents. ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.[9]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow on November 1, securing strong affirmations of North Korea's support for Russia amid updated Western reports on the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia.[10] Lavrov emphasized that Russia and North Korea share "respect and reverence" for their common history and claimed that Russian-North Korean relations are developing "at an accelerated pace in terms of the qualitative level of interaction in all areas."[11] Choe claimed that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un instructed North Korea to support Russia's "holy war" against Ukraine until Russia's victory.[12] Choe's invocation of the concept of a "holy war" against Ukraine is notable, as the Russian Orthodox Church has used parallel language to rhetorically justify Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine as an existential and civilizational struggle—a struggle into which North Korea has now willingly entered.[13]

Choe's visit to Moscow comes against the backdrop of reports that North Korean troops have already deployed to Kursk Oblast and will soon enter combat alongside Russian forces. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun on October 31, during which Austin assessed that 8,000 North Korean soldiers are in Kursk Oblast and will enter into combat against Ukrainian forces in "the coming days."[14] Austin stated that Russian forces have trained North Korean troops on how to use artillery systems, operate drones, and conduct basic tactical infantry maneuvers.

North Korean troops are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns, despite Choe's comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort. Austin reported that Russian forces are suffering over 1,200 casualties a day (or about 36,000 casualties a month), and recent US estimates placed Russian recruitment at between 25,000-30,000 new soldiers per month—meaning Russia is just shy of being able to replace its current rate of frontline losses at a 1:1 ratio.[15] The 8,000 North Korean soldiers reportedly preparing to enter combat in Kursk Oblast thus represent about one week's worth of casualties across the entire frontline. North Korea has committed an estimated total of 12,000 troops to Russia.[16] It remains unclear exactly how Russia intends to leverage North Korean manpower, but the commitment of North Korean troops into the type of highly attritional offensive operations that Russia has been pursuing is very likely to lead to high North Korean casualty rates.

ISW recently assessed that North Korea likely decided to engage in the war on Russia's behalf in order to gain valuable combat experience in a modern war but noted that the way that the Russian command uses North Korean troops in combat will impact the ability of North Korean forces to meaningfully internalize and disseminate combat experience.[17] If North Korean troops face the same casualty rates as Russian forces, then the battlefield lessons Pyongyang hopes to learn will be undermined, and Kim is unlikely to commit his forces to face such losses on the battlefield indefinitely.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on November 1. The new tranche, which is drawn from DoD stockpiles, includes Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs); munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS ammunition; 105mm and 155mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems.[18] The package also includes small arms and ammunition, medical equipment, and other equipment. US-provided equipment, in particular Stryker APCs, could assist Ukrainian forces in kitting or resupplying new or existing Ukrainian brigades, possibly alleviating some burdens that Ukrainian officials have previously identified in equipping new Ukrainian brigades.[19]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline. Roskomnadzor and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development published a draft resolution on October 4 requiring social media pages with an audience of over 10,000 subscribers to register their identity and contact information with the Russian government.[20] Russian officials specified that public discussion of the resolution would continue until October 31, meaning that the resolution should have come into force on November 1. A Russian milblogger claimed that he contacted Roskomnadzor on October 31 to verify if the resolution would go into effect on November 1 and that Roskomnadzor officials responded that the "law is still in development."[21] Roskomnadzor reportedly told the milblogger that it will publish additional information about the law on Roskomnadzor’s website soon. Russian milbloggers commented on Roskomnadzor's response, with one stating that Russia is passing "draconian laws" to leak milbloggers’ data but had failed to instruct the milbloggers on how to abide by the law before it was supposed to come into force.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31.
• Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.
• Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow on November 1, securing strong affirmations of North Korea's support for Russia amid updated Western reports on the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia.
• North Korean troops are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns, despite Choe's comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on November 1.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha.
• Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk. Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced a new system on November 1 allowing Russian veterans and their families to confirm their veteran statuses digitally.