Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.

Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[1] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[2] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[3] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[4] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[5] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[6]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[7] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.[8] Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[9]

The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.^[10] Ukrainian volunteer drone initiative Victory Drones initially amplified in April 2024 preliminary information that the Russian military command was finalizing the establishment of the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment as part of the Central Military District (CMD).^[11] Victory Drones noted that the regiment had 1,342 servicemembers and that the regiment was staffed at 94 percent as of April 2024. Victory Drones noted that the regiment trained at the base of the Russian 473rd District Training Center (CMD) and consists of command elements, an unmanned systems strike battalion, three unmanned systems reconnaissance and strike battalions, and logistics support units such as signal, medical, and repair elements. Victory Drones reported that the Russian military command planned to form 102 subordinate component units within the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment, of which 41 are strike units and 61 are reconnaissance units. Several Russian volunteer groups began crowdfunding for the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment starting in July 2024 and implied that the regiment was operating in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.^[12]

Russian milbloggers observed throughout Fall 2024 that the Russian MoD began reorganizing informal drone detachments and other specialists, such as signalmen, medics, and engineers, into "joint technical battalions."[13] The Russian MoD also announced that it formed an unspecified number of unmanned systems detachments by October 2024 via the "Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies and announced the formation of five additional unmanned systems.[14] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov subsequently announced that the Russian MoD would complete the formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military in the third quarter of 2025.[15] Defense Analyst Konrad Muzyka assessed that the recent organizational changes within the Russian military and the formation of drone units suggest that similar regiments may emerge in other Russian military districts in the future.[16] Russian forces will likely gain augmented drone support capabilities should the Russian MoD successfully form these new unmanned systems regiments and centralize its procurement efforts under the Unmanned Systems Forces, although the success of this effort will depend on the Russian military's commitment to executing the necessary reforms and the availability of resources.[17]

A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger.[18] Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian sabotage acts.[19] The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.[20] The Kremlin's sabotage and destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast.[2] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at the end of December 2024.[3]

The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.[4] The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.[5] The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most."[6] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March or early April 2025.[7] Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and compliance of the contract with national and international law.[8] Transnistrian authorities have previously rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid.[9] ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.[11] Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[12] Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2025

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.[1] Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement.[2] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[4] A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat of encircling the brigade's elements.[5] ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV) drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area.[6] The brigade stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25 and 26.[7]

The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions.[8] The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure.[9] The Russian MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements.[11] The Russian MoD has not recently been announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January 26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area.[12] Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers, will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.

The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the area in Fall 2024.[13] Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October 2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months.[14] The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka. This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025.[15] The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.

Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.[16] Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations southwest of Toretsk for this purpose.[17] Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024.[18] A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.

Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City.[19] Geolocated footage shows a fire at a tank at the refinery.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.[21] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage.[22] Ukrainian official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships.[23] Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to 24.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military officers.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2025

Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time.[1] Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024.[2] Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."[3]

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine.[4] Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy.[5] ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.[6]

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[8] Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2025

The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1] Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011.[2] The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however.[3] ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.[4] These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the All-Russian Cossack Society, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5] The training will include drone piloting training and tactical, medical, and fire training. A separate portion of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack societies, following the March 2024 law enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve, are likely an effort to expand the number of well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.[6]

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7] The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia.[9] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month.[10] North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024.[11] This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors.[12] A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement.[13] Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner.[14] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.[15]

Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the Russian government, via a Russian military official based in Turkey, recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22, and these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of military equipment from the port. The milblogger claimed that the Russian and HTS-led governments continue to negotiate about the future of Russia's presence at the Tartus and Khmeimim military bases and noted that it is unclear if any other third-party might be interested in using the port of Tartus in the future.[17] Other Russian milbloggers expressed confusion over the situation in Syria and accused unspecified actors of spreading rumors about Russia's supposed agreement with the HTS-led government.[18] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated on January 22 that Russian and Syrian officials have not reached a final solution in the negotiations about future Russian military bases in Syria.[19]

A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing its own sources, reported on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline, using the Cyprus-based company Obzor Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant, citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform (RBP) for natural gas transmission, reported that Obzor Enterprises booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February 1 to March 1, volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs. Kommersant reported that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the gas. Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching Transnistria. Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to Transnistria through the European spot market, but Moldovan President Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.[21] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on the night of January 15 to 16.[1] The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire.[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the second strike started another fire at the facility.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast.[4] Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant.[5] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment.[6] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that falling drone debris caused fires.[7] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC) (CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic cooperation.[14] Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin readout of the call did not mention these topics.[15] Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.[16]

Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Khinshtein to this post on December 5, 2024, following intense backlash for failing to communicate with or support Kursk Oblast residents displaced by the Ukrainian incursion - scapegoating then-Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to respond.[17] Russian opposition media and local Kursk Oblast news outlets reported that residents of Sudzhansky, Korenevsky, Bolshesoldatsky, and Glushkovsky raions – all on the frontline in Kursk Oblast – protested in front of the Kursk Oblast Administration building on January 18 and 21, demanding to meet with Khinshtein.[18] The protestors recorded an appeal to Khinshtein on January 21 asking him to address insufficient permanent housing for residents, issues with temporary accommodation centers, and his lack of dialogue with Kursk Oblast residents – the latter of which was one of Khinshtein's stated priorities following his appointment.[19] Local Kursk Oblast media reported that Khinshtein's advisor, Viktoria Penkova, met with the protestors, and the Kursk Oblast Administration Press Service stated that authorities informed the protestors of "necessary explanations and consultations" during the meeting.[20] Putin likely appointed Khinshtein to appear dedicated to solving social issues in Kursk Oblast and to quell local protests, and Khinshtein's failure to thus far fulfill this role in his tenure as acting governor undermines this intended effect.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation.
• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military failures.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.[1] Syrskyi stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024.[2] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall-Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump.[4] Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine.[5] Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government.[6] Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[7]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 20 that unspecified drones struck Russian military facilities in Kazan.[8] Russian opposition outlet Astra posted footage of a fire at the Gorbunov Aircraft Plant in Kazan, and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram account geolocated a picture of the aftermath of the strike to the fuel tanks of the Gorbunov plant.[9] The Gorbunov Aircraft Plant is a subsidiary of the Russia Tupolev United Aircraft Company, which produces and repairs Tu-160 strategic bombers.[10] Tatarstan authorities claimed on January 20 that Russian forces shot down all the drones and that the strike caused no damage or casualties.[11] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 20 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise on the outskirts of Kaluga City.[12] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 20 that sources within the Kaluga Oblast emergency services stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against Lyudinovo on January 17 damaged three diesel fuel tanks and one gas fuel tank.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast on the night of January 17 to 18, causing a fire at the facility.[14]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on January 20 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia's military facilities, including oil refineries and those that produce ammunition, missile components, and dual-use products, have significantly disrupted Russian forces' combat capabilities and ability to maintain a high intensity of combat operations.[15] Syrskyi noted that Russian forces are using half as many artillery shells per day than they were an unspecified period of time ago. Syrskyi emphasized that Ukrainian forces target Russia's ammunition, missile component, and dual-use production enterprises as well as oil refining facilities that support Russia's war efforts. ISW has observed reports from Ukrainian personnel in the field noting decreases in Russia's artillery usage and of Russia's overall artillery advantage in some areas.[16]

Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas. Russian and Transnistrian authorities were reportedly recently discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025, but Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted on January 16 that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria.[17] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky stated on January 20 that Transnistria will allow Moldovagaz to supply Transnistria with gas, presumably from Europe, despite initially refusing offers in early January 2025 from Moldovagaz to help Transnistria obtain gas from European platforms.[18] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistria can guarantee payment – possibly referring to Moscow's recent reported proposal to use Russian budget funds to buy European gas for Transnistria's domestic consumption.[19] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz sent a letter to Moldovagaz on January 18 requesting that Moldovagaz outline the procedure for supplying gas to Transnistria.[20] Moldovan President Maia Sandu responded on January 20 that Krasnoselsky's proposal does not appear to be about Transnistria's purchase of gas through Moldovagaz but that Krasnoselsky rather is proposing that "someone else" buys the gas and delivers it to Moldovan territory, after which Moldovagaz transports it through Moldova to Transnistria.[21] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities are currently determining which companies would be involved in this process, since Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion.[2] Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery.[3] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.[4] Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.[5]

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast.[6] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations.[7] North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future.[8] South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast.[9] North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.[10] The agreement outlines the UK's commitment to Ukraine's possible future NATO membership as a means to guarantee Ukraine's security and calls for strengthening bilateral defense and security ties, building consensus on Ukraine's NATO membership prospects, enhancing maritime security, expanding economic and trade cooperation, and boosting collaboration  in the energy, climate, and justice spheres. Starmer highlighted during a press conference on January 16 that the UK intends to provide military aid to Ukraine annually and will provide Ukraine with a loan backed by funds from frozen Russian assets.[11] Starmer highlighted that the UK will also expand its training program for Ukrainian military personnel and provide Ukraine with 150 artillery barrels and a new Danish-funded mobile air defense system.[12]

Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that unspecified sources stated that Russia and Transnistria are discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025.[13] Kommersant stated that Moscow tentatively proposed using Russian budget funds to buy up to three million cubic meters per day of gas that would cover Transnistria's domestic consumption but would not support producing Transnistria's electricity exports to Moldova. Kommersant estimated that this volume of gas would likely cost Russia $164 million from January to April 2025. Natural Gaz DC co-owner Arkady Vikol stated on January 15 that the company had signed a contract with Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz to supply two-to-three million cubic meters of European gas per day to Transnistria.[14] Transnistria President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia would provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery method.[15] Russia is likely seeking alternative routes to supply Transnistria with gas as the Trans-Balkan pipeline transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Ukraine stopped transiting Russian gas through its territory on January 1, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on January 15 that Ukraine was in discussions to help Transnistria but that the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is "generally unacceptable."[16] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have recently noted how Russia is trying to use its artificially created gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections, and Russia may cease gas supplies to Transnistria again in April 2025.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and other energy infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast.[3] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes.[4] Ukrenergo has since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy consumption following the strikes.[5] Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.[6]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on January 15 that Ukraine received 25 Ukrainians who suffer from serious injuries and illnesses and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[7] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that Ukraine received a civilian previously captured by Russian forces during the exchange.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia received 25 Russian POWs.[9] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced on January 6 that Ukraine and Russia had reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025 and that Ukraine will prioritize returning seriously ill and wounded Ukrainians.[10]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Russian forces are unable to field tanks and armored vehicles in frontline areas where Ukraine has deployed at least two Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) strike drone companies and two Ukrainian reconnaissance drone companies operate because Ukrainian drone operators strike most or all Russian armored vehicles three to six kilometers from the frontline.[11] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are also unable to field tanks in frontline areas where Ukrainian forces have a sufficient number of shells due to the high accuracy of Ukrainian artillery strikes. The milblogger complained that Russian drones are less effective than the Ukrainian drones and that the Russian military command only supplies Russian FPV operators advanced FPV models operating on non-standard frequences and fiber-optic drones — both of which are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) — to priority sectors of the frontline. The milblogger further claimed that an insufficient amount of Russian artillery coupled with insufficient Russian drone capabilities in select sectors of the frontline allow Ukrainian forces to field tanks more easily for indirect and direct fire. Effective Ukrainian drone and artillery operations in select areas of the frontline may be straining Russia's ability to field tanks amid reports that Russian forces continue to accrue vehicles losses that are likely unstable in the medium term.[12] Ukraine's ability to damage and destroy Russian armored vehicles and tanks with FPV drones and artillery will likely strain Russia's ability to replace such losses as current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that these losses will be prohibitive over the longer term.

Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.[13] Krasnoselsky visited Moscow from January 10 to 14 and negotiated possible gas deliveries to Transnistria with the Russian Energy Ministry.[14] Krasnoselsky added that Russia will provide Transnistria with enough gas for thermal power engineering, industrial enterprises, and civilian use, noting that Russia will not be supplying the rest of Moldova with gas.[15]

Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia. The US State Department reported on January 14 that Armenia and the US launched the US–Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission, signaling a significant step in their bilateral relations.[16] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan formalized the agreement aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation in economic, security, defense, and governance sectors. Blinken emphasized US support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov criticized the partnership agreement, accusing the US of destabilizing the South Caucasus.[17] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed dissatisfaction with Armenian government’s January 9 approval of a European Union (EU) accession bill. Overchuk and Lavrov argued that Armenia's potential future EU membership is incompatible with Armenia's membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and framing Armenia’s EU accession bill as a potential withdrawal from the EAEU.[18] Overchuk and Lavrov also claimed that such decisions are Armenia’s sovereign right yet highlighted potential consequences, reinforcing Kremlin’s longstanding pattern of threatening and pressuring neighboring countries through indirect and direct means. The Kremlin reactions to Armenia’s deepening ties with the West demonstrate a broader Russian strategy of undermining the sovereignty of neighboring and previously colonized countries through initial ultimatums and veiled coercion, often escalating to direct action and military violence when Russia’s influence is challenged, as is the case in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.
• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.
• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000 Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kvitkova Street and reached the northwestern administrative boundary of Toretsk.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Pyrohova Street in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 90 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has only observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces occupy approximately 71 percent of the settlement as of January 7.[3] Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024, likely to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the area and deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas in the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, both of which were Russian main efforts at the time.[4] Russian forces originally committed limited combat power, including elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), Territorial Troops, and some elements of the Central Military District [CMD], to intensified operations near Toretsk in June 2024.[5] Russian forces have made creeping and grinding gains within Toretsk and the nearby settlements since June 2024 but have intensified offensive operations in recent weeks and made tactical gains within northern and northwestern Toretsk.[6]

Russian forces appear to be shifting assault tactics in Toretsk in order to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and facilitate tactical gains within the settlement. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in fireteams of roughly five personnel.[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that Russian forces had made recent gains in Toretsk by attacking in multiple areas at once instead of focusing attacks in one location.[8] Russian forces are likely leveraging their superior manpower quantities to intensify offensive operations and advance within Toretsk.

Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces may intend to consolidate their positions in northwestern Toretsk and central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) to advance along the T-05-16 highway towards Kostyantynivka through Nelipivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillia and the fields around these settlements in an effort to threaten the southern tip of Ukraine's Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk fortress belt, which forms the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defense. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage further advances northwest of Toretsk and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in this area and level the frontline west and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Such advances would complicate Ukraine's ability to counterattack into Russia's near rear southeast of Chasiv Yar, including towards Klishchiivka, and would allow Russian forces to deploy additional artillery systems within range of Kostyantynivka and operate first-person-view (FPV) drones within range of the town. Russian forces may also attempt to advance west and northwest of Niu York and Leonidivka towards the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway to pressure Kostyantynivka further from the south and create a more stable southern flank for a push on Kostyantynivka. Russian forces will likely be able to accomplish more rapid advances in the fields and small settlements north and west of Toretsk than they have been able to make in their grinding advances in urban Toretsk. Russian units in this area may attempt to replicate the short, tactically significant mechanized assaults that Russian forces conducted in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 if they have adequate armored vehicle reserves for this sector.[9]

Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk. Russian forces may attempt to leverage gains within Toretsk and in the Toretsk-Shcherbynivka-Niu York area with recent Russian gains east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket between Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Toretsk. Russian advances east of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk may be part of an ongoing effort to make opportunistic gains that seize any territory, regardless of that territory’s relative insignificance.

Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months. Russian forces achieved their most rapid rates of advance while operating in the fields and small settlements in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 but have struggled to make rapid advances in urban areas including Toretsk.[10] Russian forces have spent the last six months advancing roughly 12 kilometers through Toretsk and have been fighting through Chasiv Yar since April 2024.[11] Russian forces have, in contrast, advanced roughly 18 kilometers west of Selydove since Russian forces seized the settlement in late October 2024 and roughly 20 kilometers north and northwest of Vuhledar since Russian forces seized the settlement in early October 2024.[12] Russian positions in northwestern Toretsk are currently 12 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and Russian forces would likely attempt to advance directly along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Russian forces could possibly be able to threaten significant Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka within the coming two or three months but only if they are able to achieve a rate of advance in the open areas northwest of Toretsk similar to the rate at which they have advanced in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions. The Russian force grouping in Toretsk is likely smaller than the groupings in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions, however, likely does not have prioritized access to Russian reserves, and may not be capable of committing enough troops and materiel to the frontline to accomplish these rates of advance.

Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), including its 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, have been the main forces conducting offensive operations in Toretsk.[13] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in mid-December 2024 that elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are also operating in Toretsk, but ISW has not observed Russian reporting of this brigade operating in the area.[14] The Russian military command may decide to continue offensive operations in the Toretsk direction with the 51st CAA forces that are currently deployed in the area, which would likely result in slower, gradual advances as these limited forces are likely degraded after six months of urban combat.

The Russian military command could choose to redeploy forces from other sectors of the front to the Toretsk direction. The Russian military command could redeploy forces from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions to the Toretsk direction in the future. The Russian military command has been prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions recently and would likely not redeploy forces from these areas to the Toretsk direction until Russian forces had achieved their objectives in these areas. Russian forces' priority objective in the Pokrovsk direction remains unclear at this time, however, as Russian forces appear to be advancing east and southwest of Pokrovsk in order to envelop the town while also advancing westward from the area south of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[15] Russian forces in the Kurakhove direction are currently focused on eliminating the Ukrainian pocket near the Sukhi Yaly River but may also prioritize continued advances westward towards the border area in the future.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that the Russian military command recently withdrew elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) from combat operations near Kurakhove in order to rest and reconstitute and will redeploy these forces to an unspecified frontline area at a future date.[17] The Russian military command will likely choose to recommit the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the front, which could be Toretsk if the command chooses to make that a priority.

The Russian military command may continue to prioritize the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction but deprioritize offensive operations in another sector of the front, such as the Kupyansk or Borova directions, in order to redeploy forces to the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations at varying intensities along the entire front as part of efforts to pin down Ukrainian forces and maintain the strategic initiative.[18] The Russian military command may prefer to maintain this continuous pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline over redeploying forces to the Toretsk direction, although the Russian offensive operations towards Kostyantynivka from the Toretsk area may offer Russian forces the opportunity to make the most operationally significant advances along the frontline. ISW is not prepared to offer a forecast of how the Russians will weigh the effort near Toretsk at this time.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report if the strike killed or wounded Russian personnel. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a strike, reportedly with HIMARS, against a different 810th Naval Infantry Brigade command post near Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 25, killing the brigade’s deputy commander and other staff officers.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area.
• Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months.
• Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas.
• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2025

 Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast. The tempo of Russian offensive operations has remained low east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, along the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) line, and further east near Novooleksandrivka and Arkhanhelske since September 2024 when Russian military command reprioritized offensive operations aimed at seizing Selydove (southwest of Pokrovsk), Kurakhove, and Vuhledar over efforts to seize Pokrovsk.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Russian forces began intensifying offensive operations east of Pokrovsk, and geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[20] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces have likely also seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (both east of Pokrovsk) in recent days and advanced into southeastern Yelyzavetivka (south of Pokrovsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units consolidated positions north of Tymofiivka and along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that Russian forces advanced north of Vozdvyzhenka toward Baranivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Zelene Pole.[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 5 that Russian forces recently resumed attacks in the Mykolaivka-Promin and Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad areas (both east of Pokrovsk) and reinforced the Russian grouping in this area with elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 137 Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 41st CAA, CMD).[23]

The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on December 27.[24] Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest in the near future.[26] The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the fields and small settlements along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.

Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic, aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia's long-term objective of advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[28] The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.

Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30] The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between at least two sectors of the frontline.[31] ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA's AoR within the past month. The Russian military's decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade as a tactical penetration force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.
• Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.
• Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.
• Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.
• The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.
• Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
• Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assesment, January 4, 2025

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[i] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[ii]

Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[iii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[iv] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[v] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[vi] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[vii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[viii] The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses.[ix] Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[x]

Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows damage to the Novatek gas terminal in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[xi] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that its sources stated that Russian forces shot down most of the drones over the port terminal of Novatek subsidiary Novatrans LLC, causing minor damage to a building at the port.[xii] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces downed three drones near Luga Bay but that there was no damage.[xiii] Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces destroyed a total of four drones over Leningrad Oblast.[xiv] The Ust-Luga sea trade port is the second largest in Russia after Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against the Novatek gas terminal at the port in January 2024.[xv]

Astra reported that its sources in the Russian emergency services stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City with at least five drones on the night of January 3 to 4 and that Russian forces shot down all the drones.[xvi] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed at least five drones over Voronezh City overnight and that several drones fell on residential buildings.[xvii] Astra also reported on January 4 that its sources in the Kursk Oblast emergency services stated that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast on January 2 killed seven Russian servicemembers.[xviii] Ukrainian and Russian sources previously stated that the strike targeted a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]).[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.
• Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.
• Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assesment, January 3, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace." Zelensky stated on January 2 that achieving a "just peace" in future negotiations – a concept Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Year’s address – requires a strong Ukrainian military, security guarantees from Western allies, and Ukraine's future membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) in order to deter Russia from renewed aggression against Ukraine.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine cannot achieve a just peace with a small military, such as "40,000 or 50,000 soldiers" – a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial demand during the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and only maintain a force of roughly 50,000 personnel.[2] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded conditions for ending the war that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation, including the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government and Ukraine's demilitarization.[3] These demands have not changed since 2021.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal. Zelensky stated on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine's "arguments for a just peace."[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and "drone-missiles" and at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) will also increase production capacity to about $30 billion worth of goods and attract $1 billion in foreign investment in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is working to mass produce the "Trembita" cruise missile, which has a 90-mile range, a 40-pound payload, and costs $10,000 per missile to produce.[6]

Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities will be able to consider lifting martial law when the "hot phase" of the war comes to an end and when Ukraine is in a "strong position" with a "strong army, a strong package of weapons, [and] security guarantees." Ukraine's law, "On the legal regime of martial law," originally passed in 2000, states that Ukrainian authorities can end martial law "provided that the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity has been eliminated."[8] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberate misreadings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[9] The Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya. The GUR reported on January 3 that the Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship, the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, and the Sparta cargo ship are scheduled to arrive at Tartus on January 5 while the Sparta II cargo ship and the Ivan Skobelev tanker are scheduled to arrive on January 8 to transfer Russian military assets to an unspecified location in Libya.[10] The GUR previously reported in mid-December 2024 that Russia had deployed the Ivan Gren, Alexander Otrakovsky, Sparta, and Sparta II from northern Russia to Syria.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace."
• Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal.
• Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2025

 Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Russian and Ukrainian authorities confirmed that Russian gas ceased flowing through Ukrainian territory as of the morning of January 1, and Russian officials and media largely projected confidence that the cessation of gas supplies through Ukraine will harm Europe but not Russia.[1] The loss of gas revenue will likely negatively affect Russian state energy operator Gazprom, which has been struggling with decreasing gas revenue from Europe since 2022.[2] Bloomberg estimated on January 2 that Gazprom will likely lose $6 billion in gas revenues per year due to the cessation of gas transports through Ukraine.[3] The BBC Russian Service noted on January 1 that Gazprom's main source of income in 2021 came from Russia's 45 percent share of the European gas market at the time but that Russia now has only one remaining route to export gas to Europe — the TurkStream pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Black Sea to Turkey — and that Russian gas currently only accounts for five percent of the European market.[4] The BBC noted that Slovakia and Austria — the final destinations of the blocked Russian gas through Ukraine — have both fully met their energy needs through alternative sources. The Kremlin's efforts to project confidence about the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine mirrors its efforts to coerce Europe into authorizing Russian gas transit to Europe through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Winter 2021–2022, and the Kremlin's renewed posturing in Winter 2024–2025 likely aim to extract economic or diplomatic concessions from Europe, undermine unity within the European Union (EU), and drive a wedge between the US and EU.[5]

Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova. Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Transnistria via Ukraine on January 1, claiming that Moldova failed to pay a debt worth $709 million.[6] An audit by British and Norwegian audit firms, however, found in 2022 that Moldova owed Gazprom only $8.6 million.[7] Moldova recently held talks with Gazprom about transporting gas to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey, but Gazprom refused and did not make the arrangements to do so by the deadline on December 16.[8] Free Gazprom gas has long powered Transnistria's Cuciurgan power station, which exported a significant amount of electricity to Moldova and used the profits from these sales to support Transnistria's budget.[9] The Cuciurgan power station switched to coal reserves on January 1, which reportedly can last about 50 days.[10] Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz stopped gas supplies to most consumers in Transnistria and shut off most of the hot water and heat on January 1.[11] Moldova increased its electricity imports from Romania to make up for lost supplies from Transnistria.[12] Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom offered on January 1 to provide Tiraspoltransgaz technical and commercial assistance to obtain gas from European markets after successful tests on December 31, 2024 to supply Moldova with gas through Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.[13]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations. Zelensky stated in his New Years Eve address on December 31, 2024, that Ukraine seeks to accomplish a "just peace" in the war and announced that Ukraine is once again building its own missiles and produced over one million drones in 2024.[14] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is producing large quantities of "Palyanytsya," "Peklo," "Ruta," "Neptune," and "Sapsan" missiles, some of which Ukrainian forces have yet to use. Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) produced 30 percent of all military equipment that Ukrainian forces used on the frontlines in 2024. Zelensky described Ukrainian missiles and drones as Ukrainian "arguments for a just peace" and noted that Ukraine can only accomplish such a peace if it is strong.

Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies. ZNPP occupation director Yuriy Chernichuk announced on January 1 that Russian occupation officials intend to obtain licenses from Moscow to operate all six of the ZNPP's nuclear reactors by 2028, obtaining a license for the operation of the first reactor by the end of 2025.[15] Ukrainian licenses for the first ZNPP reactor will expire in December 2025, and the Kremlin claimed in 2022 that all licenses would be valid until their expiration or until the ZNPP received Russian licenses.[16] Chernichuk also announced on January 2 that occupation officials plan to replace the ZNPP's foreign-sourced equipment with Russian-made equipment, that Russia will use the ZNPP reactors to supply energy to all of occupied Ukraine, and that Russia will also use the ZNPP to generate power for Russian regions west of the Ural mountains.[17] Chernichuk's stated goal of acquiring licenses for Russia to operate ZNPP's nuclear reactors signals Moscow's long-term territorial intentions and aligns with Russia's broader efforts to de facto legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and further steal Ukraine's critical energy supply.

Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post. Geolocated footage published on January 2 showed a damaged building and Russian military vehicles after a Ukrainian missile strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike, possibly with HIMARS, against the command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the settlement, while Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that the strike damaged the House of Culture in the area.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was holding an award ceremony at the House of Culture.[20]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea. The GUR reported on January 2 that a Ukrainian Magura V5 naval drone used missiles to destroy two Russian Mi-8 helicopters and damage one in the Black Sea on December 31.[21] The GUR previously reported that the naval drone strike only destroyed one helicopter and damaged another.[22] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk doubted Russian reports that there were eight crewmembers aboard the helicopters but noted that the loss of highly trained helicopter crews is significant.[23] Pletenchuk also noted that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea have deprived Russian forces of sustainable logistics in the area, including by damaging the railway on the Kerch Strait Bridge and ferries that transported railway cars and fuel tankers.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military vessels are trying to hide from Ukrainian naval strikes in bays and ports and that Russian forces will only be able to repel Ukrainian naval drones equipped with missiles with jet and fighter aircraft.[25] ISW assesses that increased Ukrainian offensive capabilities in the Black Sea will most likely threaten Russian control over occupied Crimea.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary.
• Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations.
• Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel.

Previous Updates

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