Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.

Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within. Putin gave an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" - Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian law prohibits elections during martial law.[1] Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other Ukrainian political and military leaders. Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian audiences. Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population. Putin has repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold elections in 2024 – in accordance with Ukrainian law – as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia cannot negotiate with Zelensky.[2] US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage in negotiations, and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky.[3] Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine.

Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021. Putin stated during the interview with Zarubin that Russia "has nothing against" the preservation of Ukrainian statehood but wants Ukraine to "turn into a friendly neighboring state" and for Ukrainian territory to "not be used as a springboard for an attack against Russia" in the future.[4] Putin's calls for Ukraine to "turn" into a "friendly" state demonstrate that Putin is still calling for the removal of the democratically elected government in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Kremlin government. The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine, and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands.[5] Putin has demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.[6]

Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine. Putin claimed to Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth materials.[7] Putin included mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in Russian rare earth minerals. Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the supply of Russian aluminum. Putin held a meeting with senior Kremlin officials on February 24 specifically about the importance of further developing Russia's domestic rare earth minerals industry and identified this as a priority effort.[8]

The Kremlin is framing any future US-Russian cooperation on rare earth minerals as conditional on the conclusion of a Russian-friendly peace deal on the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 25 that any US-Russia cooperation on rare earth minerals can only begin after normalizing bilateral relations and achieving a peace settlement in Ukraine.[9] ISW assessed that Russian officials used the recent US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia to start an effort to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.[10] ISW continues to assess that American acceptance of these Russian-offered economic measures — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties. Putin responded to Zarubin's question about Putin's assessment of Europeans' "demands" for the "right to vote in negotiations" about Ukraine, stating that he "does not see anything bad here."[11] Putin then claimed that "probably no one can demand anything here, especially from Russia" but they can try to make demands of someone else – signaling Russia's unwillingness to make compromises in future negotiations. Putin claimed that Moscow respects the positions of Russia's "friends" from BRICS and that "other countries have the right and can participate" in discussions about issues about the war and efforts to achieve peace. Putin specifically highlighted his recent call with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and applauded PRC efforts to discuss peace in Ukraine. The PRC and Brazil – two members of BRICS – have put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia, and Putin appears to be posturing these states as possible participants in future negotiations.[12]

Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran.[13] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that the delegations "touched upon" the situation in Ukraine and that Lavrov expressed gratitude to Iranian authorities for their "balanced position" and their understanding of the "root causes" of the war, including Russia's need to protect Russian-speaking minorities from alleged discrimination from the Ukrainian government.[14]  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency readout of the meeting noted that the delegations discussed Ukraine and Lavrov's statement about Iran's "balanced position" but notably did not mention discussions of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[15] Kremlin officials have recently increasingly referred to Russia's alleged need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[16] Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on February 20, and the Russian MFA claimed that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes," while the PRC's MFA official readout of the Wang-Lavrov meeting attributed all talk of the "root causes" of the war to Lavrov and not Wang.[17] Russia is attempting to use meetings with its allies to publicly reiterate its calls for regime change in Ukraine and posture Russia's allies as supportive of these efforts.

A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia, amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.[18] Russian and North Korean state media reported that Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Consular Department Head Andrei Klimov and North Korean Ambassador to Russia Sin Hong Chol met with a high-ranking North Korean delegation, including North Korean Politburo member Ri Hi Yong, in Moscow.[19] The Russian Embassy in Pyongyang reported on February 24 that the delegations will discuss increased cooperation between United Russia and the WPK in accordance with the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that entered into force in December 2024.[20] South Korean media outlet Korea JoongAng Daily reported on February 24 that commercial satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC shows a 110-meter-long vessel entering and leaving North Korea's Rason Port near the border with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.[21] The satellite imagery also shows a line of containers roughly 100 meters long on the pier at Rason Port next to the docked vessel. The vessel reportedly arrived at the inner side of Rason Port's pier on February 20 and moved to the outer side on February 21, indicating that the vessel unloaded containers on the pier's inner side and loaded new containers on the outer side before departing. ISW reported that North Korea likely used Rason Port to transfer munitions to Vladivostok, Russia in November 2023.[22]

Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing European officials, reported on February 25 that European Union (EU) countries, the United Kingdom (UK), and Norway provided Ukraine with military assistance worth approximately $25 billion in 2024 and that this is more than the United States sent to Ukraine in 2024.[23] An unspecified Western official also told the WSJ that Europe supplies about 25 percent of Ukraine's military hardware and that the United States supplies about 20 percent.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within.
• Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021.
• Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties.
• Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.
• A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia, amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.
• Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing these payments in January 2025.
• The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian government, military, and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption charges are fighting in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions, to form a new Russian elite composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the long term.
• Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24, 2022.[1] ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical part of deterring broader Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance, continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.

Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's full-scale invasion.[2] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since February 2022.[3] (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000 personnel, including about 250,000 dead.[4] Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona published a joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war.[5] Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and Meduza and Mediazone estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian loses significantly increased in 2024.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive operations and loss rates.[7]

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[8] The United States, Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution, while 93 countries supported it.[9] The People’s Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity."[10] The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict."[11]

Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war — casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term. A recent poll conducted by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles between February 5 and 13 showed that 46 percent of respondents do not support the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war goals.[12] The number of respondents who do not support such a Russian withdrawal had consistently decreased between February 2023 (47 percent) and September 2024 (31 percent) but then jumped back to February 2023 levels in February 2025. Fifty-four percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the war had negatively affected their daily lives. Thirty-six percent of respondents stated that their financial situation had worsened — an increase from 27 percent in September 2024. Thirty-six percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the Russian government should prioritize military spending in the budget — a decrease from 43 percent in September 2024. The number of respondents who stated that the most important area for Russian spending is the social sphere increased from 38 percent in September 2024 to 48 percent in February 2025.

Kremlin rhetoric about the relatively faster Russian tempo of advances on the battlefield in recent months and continued official statements about the need for Ukraine to "denazify," "demilitarize," and declare neutrality — Putin's original stated war aims — are likely influencing more Russians to reject a withdrawal in the belief that Russia can achieve these objectives through continued fighting.[13] Russia's protracted war in Ukraine, however, is straining Russia's economy, including by increasing inflation, spending down Russia's sovereign wealth fund, and exacerbating existing labor shortages.[14] Russia will likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in 12 to 18 months if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate — likely increasing the economic burden that the Russian population will feel in the future.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender. Russian state media largely ignored the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion during programming on February 24 and instead highlighted a meeting in which the Russian Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims Chairman Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin praised Putin for announcing and conducting the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin and other Kremlin officials have not abandoned their original war aims in Ukraine and continue to invoke their goals of "denazifying" and "demilitarizing" Ukraine and banning Ukraine's ability to join any security blocs in the future, despite Russia's failure to defeat Ukraine militarily over the last three years.[17]

Putin does not appear deterred by the idea of protracting the war further despite suffering significant and likely unsustainable personnel and materiel losses over the last three years.[18] ISW recently noted that the Russian military appears to be employing a method of advance in Ukraine based on the assumption that the war will continue indefinitely and that the Russian military does not need to make rapid or significant territorial gains in a single offensive operation.[19] ISW recently assessed that it would take Russian forces over 83 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine, assuming that they can sustain their current rate of advance and massive personnel losses indefinitely — which is unlikely.[20] Putin has articulated a theory of victory, however, that assumes that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West and continue to advance on the battlefield until Russia defeats Ukraine. Putin's recent statements rejecting the possibility of a peace agreement with Ukraine are indications of his willingness to protract the war.[21]  Putin continues to signal to the Russian military and society that he will not end the war until Ukraine capitulates completely  and that he has no interest in a negotiated peace agreement that requires Russia to compromise its long-standing war aims, despite Putin's efforts to signal interest in peace negotiations to Western leaders.

Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on February 24 during a press conference in Turkey that Russia will only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the "realities" of the battlefield.[22] Lavrov noted that any peace agreement must include provisions banning Ukraine from joining NATO in the future.[23] Russian state media TV channel Channel One (Pervyi Kanal) summarized Lavrov's statements as "[Russia] will only end combat operations" when negotiations end in a way that satisfies Russia.[24] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire RIA Novosti on February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the "root causes" of the war.[25] Ryabkov stated that a ceasefire that does not address the war's "root causes" is a path to a "quick resumption" of the war and reiterated that Russia considers NATO's post-1991 eastward expansion a root cause of the war. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also claimed on February 24 that it would be "impossible" to resolve the war in Ukraine without understanding and addressing its "root causes."[26] Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians within Ukraine.[27]

Russian officials also continue to frame Russia's demand for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from territory that Ukrainian forces currently control in eastern and southern Ukraine as a "compromise." Ryabkov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and abandon its goal of joining NATO contains "significant compromises" that could serve as the base of a future peace agreement.[28] Ryabkov claimed that Putin's June 2024 demands highlight Russia's desire to find a resolution to the war that "balances" Russia's and Ukraine's interests, despite the fact that Putin called for Ukraine to concede significant areas in exchange for no Russian concessions. ISW has previously noted that Ukrainian authorities rejected the 2022 Istanbul protocol as its terms effectively amounted to a full Ukrainian surrender, and Ukrainian authorities are likely to reject any future ceasefire or peace agreement that amounts to the same.[29]

European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a new military aid package for Ukraine consisting of 25 infantry fighting vehicles, two armored combat vehicles, a landing system for F-16 fighter jets, four F-16 flight simulators, ammunition, drone camera components, and first aid kits.[30] Swedish officials recently announced plans to provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Robotsystem-70 and Tridon Mk2 air defense systems valued at approximately $113 million.[31] Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda announced plans to deliver an unspecified number of RBS-70 short-range air defense systems to Ukraine, and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced a military aid package consisting of 10,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 750,000 rations packages.[32] Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin announced plans to supply Ukraine with an unspecified number of older air defense radar systems.[33] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an EU financial aid package for Ukraine valued at 3.5 billion euros ($3.6 billion) that the EU will distribute in March 2025.[34] British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 4.5 billion pounds ($5.6 billion) in military aid.[35] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pledged that Spain will deliver a new military aid package for Ukraine worth an estimated one billion euros ($1.05 billion) as part of a broader 10-year bilateral security and defense agreement that Ukraine and Spain signed in May 2024.[36] Icelandic Prime Minister Kristrún Mjöll Frostadóttir pledged to increase Iceland's monetary support to Ukraine by roughly 14.4 million euros ($15 million).[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.
• Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.
• The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war – casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.
• Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations.
• European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2025

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their ideal framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in Ukraine, as such a framework would force the West to concede to all of Russia's long-standing demands.[2] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft treaties from the March and April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that indicate that both sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership aspirations and be a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate in military blocs."[3] The draft treaties also reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel. The WSJ and NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes. The draft treaties reportedly listed the United States, United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor states were supposed to “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. The draft treaties did not specify if other non-guarantor states would have to terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is likely considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons. Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts.

Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals. The Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing demands to "denazify" — overthrow and replace the democratically elected Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet state — and "demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the point of being able to defend itself against future Russian aggression — Ukraine.[4] The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to Russia's demands that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from the Istanbul negotiations with the backing of Europe and the United States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky responded to a hypothetical question during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or immediate NATO membership for Ukraine.[5] Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the war ends and has no interest in being in power "for a decade" and reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law.[6] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[7] Zelensky has repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.[8]

Zelensky stated during the press conference that several European officials will visit Kyiv for the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2025 and reiterated that European countries should be involved in future peace negotiations about the war in Ukraine.[9] Zelensky noted that NATO membership is one of the best security guarantees that Ukraine could receive and that Ukraine would also consider membership in the European Union (EU), Western financing for an 800,000-person-strong Ukrainian military, and the presence of a Western peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as acceptable security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire with Russia.[10]

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" forum on February 23 that Ukraine produced 2.2 million first person view (FPV) drones and over 100,000 long-range drones in 2025 and intends to increase its drone production rate in 2025.[11] Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced 154 artillery systems in 2024 and intends to increase production of artillery systems in 2025 and noted that Ukraine is working to develop an analogue to the US-produced Patriot air defense system.[12] Zelensky noted that Ukraine funded 40 percent, European countries funded 30 percent, and the United States funded another 30 percent of Ukraine's domestic defense production in 2024. Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to fund 50 percent of its domestic defense production in 2025.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated at the forum that Ukraine has become the largest producer of tactical and long-range drones in the world and that 96 percent of the Ukrainian military's drones are purchased or produced in Ukraine.[13] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Ukraine intends to operationalize technology that will allow a single drone operator to control multiple drones in a "swarm" in 2025.[14] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces conducted 130 long-range operations and struck 377 objects in Russia in 2024.[15] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine has deployed over 1.3 million drones to the frontline and is working to increase its production of fiber-optic drones. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian long-range drones can strike targets up to 1,700 kilometers deep in Russian territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.[16] Dmitriev was part of the Russian delegation that met with US officials in Saudi Arabia on February 17, and a source close to the Kremlin told Russian opposition outlet Meduza in an article published on February 19 that Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States, likely given his experiences living and studying in the US at Standford University and Harvard University and working for US companies.[17]

Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 23 that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 267 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 138 Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 119 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones flew toward Belarusian airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that drones damaged infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Poltava, Kyiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts and that a missile damaged civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 23 that Russia launched the largest number of Shahed drones against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23.[20]

Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine. Iran has largely enabled Russia to launch near nightly series of large drone strikes as it has provided Russia with Iranian designed and produced Shahed drones and helped Russia establish its own Shahed drone production facility in Tatarstan Republic.[21] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 23 during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 that half of Russia's ammunition comes from North Korea and that North Korea has started large-scale deliveries of 170mm self-propelled artillery system and 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[22] Budanov added that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 148 ballistic missiles, presumably in 2025.[23]

Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 23 that footage circulating on social media shows a Russian servicemember executing a Ukrainian POW in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast.[24] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
• Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.
• Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
• Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial output.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2025

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.[1] The FT investigation provided additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war.[2] FT and experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), but noted that the situation warrants further investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations.[3] FT noted that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders.[4] FT noted that Ukrainian prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.

FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.[5] Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue [Russian] units." Global Rights Compliance President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting, and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.

Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating international law.[6] Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.[7] Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024.[8] FT reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems to incentivize such abuses.[10]

Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told South Korean outlet Chosun Ilbo in an article published on February 17 that roughly 4,000 North Korean forces have been killed or seriously wounded in Kursk Oblast.[11] Budanov noted that North Korean forces are embedded in Russian units and conduct joint operations in small groups with Russian forces and that North Korean forces move as part of larger Russian units to conduct joint operations. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast stated on February 20 that North Korean forces have changed their tactics in the area, reducing the size of their infantry assault groups from 50 personnel to 10 to 15 personnel and moving "more cautiously."[12] The commander noted that North Korean assault groups are still larger than Russian assault groups. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in November 2024 that North Korean forces had been training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units - traditionally more elite forces in the Russian military.[13] Budanov noted that there are more artillery and missile units in Kursk Oblast due to the presence of North Korean troops, but that the GUR has not observed additional North Korean deployments to Russia. GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi also told Chosun Ilbo that 1,000 North Korean troops are training on unspecified new military equipment in an unspecified area in Russia. Skibitskyi reported that North Korean forces have rapidly improved their combat effectiveness by adapting to new combat tactics and operating weapons such as tanks and drones. Budanov also confirmed a Reuters report from December 2024 that Russian missile experts have modified North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, which previously had a 500 to 1,500 meter margin of error, to make them more precise.[14] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in Kursk Oblast reported on February 16 that North Korean assault groups were attacking in more spread out formations as part of efforts to complicate Ukrainian efforts to strike the attacking forces.[15] North Korean forces reportedly recently withdrew from active combat operations in Kursk Oblast after suffering heavy casualties largely due to Ukrainian drone strikes, and reports that North Korean troops have adjusted their tactics on the battlefield to counter Ukrainian drone strikes indicates that North Korean forces may be learning lessons and internalizing valuable combat experience.

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20. Zelensky stated that he had a "good" conversation with Kellogg during which they discussed the battlefield situation, the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and effective security guarantees for Ukraine.[16] Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's readiness to make a "strong, effective investment and security agreement" with the United States and stated that Ukraine has proposed the "fastest and most constructive" ways to achieve such results.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the G20 Foreign Ministers' summit in South Africa on February 20. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)'s official readout stated that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes."[17] The PRC MFA's official readout of the meeting notably differed and stated that Lavrov stated that Russia, not the PRC, is committed to solving the "root causes" of the war.[18] The Russian MFA's likely purposeful misattribution reflects Russia's attempt to align the PRC's position on the war fully with its own in an effort to bolster its international standing and to shape Russian domestic perceptions of Russia’s relationship with China. Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
• Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 19 that Putin will appoint a negotiator for talks with the United States after the United States appoints its own negotiator.[1] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 19, citing a source close to the Kremlin, that the United States was the first to select its delegation for the February 18 bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia, after which Russia attempted to "select relevant" counterparts for each of the selected US officials.[2] The source claimed that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States. Another source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that Putin may appoint his aide Vladimir Medinsky to the Russian negotiations delegation if Ukrainian representatives join future negotiations because Medinsky took part in the Spring 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The source claimed that the Kremlin does not need to include Medinsky in the Russian delegation so long as negotiations remain bilateral between the United States and Russia. The Moscow Times reported on February 19, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the February 18 US-Russia meeting, that the Kremlin seeks to restore access to roughly $6 billion worth of frozen Russian Central Bank reserves in the US.[3] The source claimed that the Russian negotiations delegation in Saudi Arabia pushed for the United States to agree that both countries fully resume the operations of their diplomatic missions in the other country and to return Russian diplomatic property in the United States, which US authorities had previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 18 that the United States and Russia had agreed to restore "the functionality of [their] respective missions in Washington and Moscow."[4] The Kremlin appears to be attempting to push the United States to accept economic and diplomatic terms that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.[5] US acceptance of these economic and diplomatic terms — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.[6] Rubio, Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff gave an interview to CNN and the Associated Press (AP) on February 18 following bilateral talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in Saudi Arabia. Waltz stated that any future end to the war needs to be "permanent," not "temporary as we have seen in the past." Waltz stated that there is going to have to be "some discussion of territory...and security guarantees" and that future talks will discuss Russia's ability to retain any Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed since February 2022. Rubio answered a question about possible concessions from Russia, stating that these "kinds of things" will happen through "difficult diplomacy in closed rooms." Rubio later noted that there will have to be concessions "made by all sides" in order to bring about an end to the war. Rubio emphasized that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio answered a question about his assessment of Russia's desire to achieve peace following the talks in Saudi Arabia, stating that Russia appears willing to "begin to engage in a serious process to determine" the mechanism to end the war, but that an outcome will ultimately depend on the willingness of every side in the war to "agree to certain things."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace. Zelensky emphasized that security guarantees do not necessarily mean deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine.[7] Zelensky stated that it would be sufficient if the United States provided Ukraine with 20 Patriot air defense systems and the license to domestically produce Patriot missiles.[8] Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized Ukraine's need for additional Patriot systems and missiles to defend against Russian missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and his February 19 statements are consistent with previous statements that Ukraine needs a strong military of its own to deter and defend against future Russian aggression.[9]

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.[10] Kellogg met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, and Yermak emphasized that Ukraine remains interested in a strategic, long-term, and comprehensive partnership with the United States.[11]

Ukraine's European partners continue to support Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB). The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 19 that a new delivery of trucks, thermal imaging sights, and other military support arrived in Ukraine as part of a package worth 80 million euros (about $83.3 million) that Lithuania prepared during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on February 12.[12] The Lithuanian MoD estimated that Lithuania's military support for Ukraine in 2025 could reach one billion euros (about $1.042 billion) and stated that Lithuania plans to focus its support on Ukraine's air defense, ammunition, drone, and anti-drone needs and financing for Ukrainian domestic weapons production.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast on the night of February 18 and 19.[13] Kovalenko noted that the refinery has a processing capacity of 8.9 million tons of oil per year and produces fuel, jet fuel, and bitumen. Kovalenko stated that Russian refineries play an important role in supplying Russian troops. Kovalenko stated that the oil refinery stopped operating after the strike, and Reuters, citing two industry sources, also reported that the refinery suspended oil processing after the drone strike caused a fire at the primary refining unit.[14] The industry sources told Reuters that the Syzran refinery had been operating at only 4.7 million tons of capacity in 2024 at least in part due to previous Ukrainian strikes. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on February 19 of a fire at the refinery, which was later geolocated to within Syzran.[15] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Syzran Oil Refinery but that there was no "major" damage.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace.
• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian federal subjects are reportedly halting their recruitment of foreigners who do not speak Russian for service in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2025

Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment. NBC reported on February 18 that four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials stated that intelligence from the United States and unspecified close American allies shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine and that his goals "remain maximalist."[1] One congressional official stated that there is "zero" intelligence showing that Putin is interested in a "real peace deal right now." Intelligence officials stated that Putin has no plans to withdraw troops from Ukraine or to pull any personnel or equipment from western Russia. The six officials stated that Putin may agree to a ceasefire and peace deal in order to give the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, and there is an idea among Western officials that Putin may "go through the motions" of negotiations in order to see what concessions he can get and to reintegrate Russia back into the global community. The two congressional officials and a former senior US administration official noted that Putin's "broad ambitions" have remained unchanged from the end of the Biden administration into the new Trump administration.

Western intelligence assessments suggest that Putin has not changed his theory of victory in Ukraine and still believes that Russia's military superiority is such that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine on the battlefield. The six official sources told NBC that Putin still thinks that he can "wait out" Ukraine and Europe to eventually control all of Ukraine.[2] A Western intelligence official noted that Putin "thinks he is winning" and does not feel pressure to stop hostilities due to Russian battlefield losses. Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and that Russia did not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up similar to that in September 2022 because Russia is not trying to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine rapidly.[3] Putin's theory of victory assumes that the Russian military can sustain slow, creeping advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.

Many recent Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise. Kremlin officials have repeatedly denied Ukraine's sovereignty over its internationally recognized 1991 borders and the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov most recently claimed on February 16.[5] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have promoted false narratives that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" as part of efforts to claim that Zelensky does not have the authority to negotiate with Russia or that Russia does not have to honor any agreements that Zelensky may sign in the future.[6] Putin and other Russian officials have also demanded that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, while denying that Russia will make any territorial concessions of its own[7]

Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine.[8] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a boilerplate readout of the meeting, during which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.[9] Russian officials, including Peskov, Lavrov, and Ushakov, broadly stated that the talks went well, claiming that the discussions were the start of a long process and that Russia and the United States will continue dialogue on these issues.[10] Lavrov claimed that the meeting was "useful" and that Russia and the United States began to "hear each other" and share a "determination to move forward."[11] The Russian MFA's readout emphasized the Russian-American bilateral aspects of the talks, including normalizing bilateral relations, establishing a dialogue for future economic and energy cooperation, and resuming communications on international issues. The Russian MFA's readout also emphasized that Russia and the United States have a "special responsibility" as nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council to resume communicating on international issues. ISW continues to note that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as the heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status.[12] The Russian MFA readout only briefly mentioned Ukraine, claiming that the delegations "exchanged views" on the situation "around Ukraine" and mutually committed to resolving the war.[13]

Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that authorities in Romania and other unspecified EU states are discussing laying claim to Ukrainian territory.[14] Lavrov's claim is part of a wider Kremlin information operation that claims that Ukrainian territory is actually the historical territory of other states such that only a rump state in western Ukraine might be left independent after Russia and Ukraine's other neighbors had absorbed most Ukrainian territory.[15] The Russian MFA stated that the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia reiterated the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[16] Kremlin officials have defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[17] Kremlin officials have frequently referred back to Russia's alleged need to address these "root causes" in recent weeks, including during Putin's February 12 call with Trump. Claims about the "root causes" of the war are in direct reference to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands of the US and Ukraine, include demands that would force Ukraine to become a permanently neutral state that could never join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the Ukrainian government.[18] Moscow's presentation of the "root causes" of the war is intended to place the blame for Russia's full-scale invasion on Ukraine and present the start of this war of conquest as something Russia was compelled to undertake rather than the unprovoked aggression it actually was. This presentation denies the realities that Zelensky ran and took office on a platform of ending the ongoing conflict and sought to negotiate with Putin early in his term and that Putin refused to curtail his proxies' continuous violations of the terms of the Minsk II agreement.[19]

Lavrov also denied Russia's culpability for its deliberate and years' long strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Lavrov claimed that Russian forces did not intend to damage Ukrainian energy infrastructure despite ample evidence that Russian forces have consistently waged strike campaigns using high-precision weaponry to specifically target Ukraine's energy infrastructure.[20] Russian forces have also repeatedly experimented with different strike packages that aim to ensure that high-precision weapons are able to bypass Ukrainian air defense and reach their intended energy infrastructure targets.[21] Lavrov claimed that US officials at the bilateral meeting proposed a moratorium on strikes against Russian and Ukrainian energy facilities, and Lavrov responded that Russian forces only strike facilities that "directly support" the Ukrainian military. Lavrov is deliberately downplaying the Russian strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure that Russian forces have waged every winter of Russia's full-scale invasion.[22]

Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war. Zelensky has repeatedly demonstrated Ukraine's commitment to engaging in good faith negotiations that require compromises with Russia.[23] Zelensky recently expressed his willingness to negotiate directly with Putin.[24] Zelensky stated on February 11 that Ukraine is willing to commit to a territorial exchange with Russia as a condition for peace — a proposal that Russian officials rejected.[25] Ukraine hosted an international Summit on Peace in Switzerland in June 2024 to establish high-level dialogue before potential future peace talks with Russia, and Ukrainian officials announced in December 2024 that Ukraine was preparing another global peace summit.[26] Ukraine previously expressed its willingness to invite Russian representatives to any future peace summits.[27]

Russian officials in Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev, who was part of the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia, told CNN on February 17 that he had already met with several unspecified members from the US delegation in Riyadh prior to the official talks on February 18.[28] Dmitriev denied that Moscow primarily sought to lift sanctions against Russia, claiming instead that both the United States and Russia would benefit from economic cooperation. Dmitriev stated on February 18 that he would present the US delegation in Saudi Arabia with an estimate that US companies lost an alleged $300 billion by leaving the Russian market.[29] Dmitriev stated that major US oil companies "have had very successful business in Russia" and that the companies will return to Russia "at some point," reasoning that the companies would not "forego" the opportunities Russia offers in terms of access to Russian natural resources. Dmitriev claimed that the Russian delegation put forward a number of unspecified economic proposals that the United States is considering and that he thinks there could be progress on these areas in the next two to three months.[30] Dmitriev also called on Russia and the US to establish joint projects in the Arctic, and Minister-Counselor of the Russian Embassy in Canada Vladimir Proskuryakov, who is reportedly an Arctic specialist, notably attended the February 18 bilateral meeting.[31] The Kremlin appears to be engaging in an effort to push the United States to accept economic terms that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. American acceptance of these Russian-offered economic measures — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the United States than for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises in 2025 and 2026. Dmitriev claimed that previous US economic policies "undermined confidence in the dollar" and threatened the US economy.[32] Dmitriev claimed that sanctions have actually helped Russia become "more independent" while damaging the US dollar and American companies.[33] The Kremlin has been engaged in an information operation in recent months that aims to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable to international audiences, and Dmitriev's attempts to frame the United States as needing economic cooperation with Russia more than Russia needs such cooperation is a continuation of these efforts.[34] Russia, however, is facing a series of economic and military challenges and weaknesses, including rising inflation, decreases in the liquidity portion of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, and growing expenditures on the Russian military, that are forecasted to worsen in the next 12 to 18 months should current trends continue – as ISW's Christina Harward will outline in a forthcoming essay. Russia's strained economy and military would benefit from sanctions relief, the return of US companies to the Russian market, and US investment in Russian natural resources projects much more than the enormously larger US economy.

US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for Ukraine. US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met bilaterally with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa on February 18 to discuss support to Ukraine.[35] Von der Leyen emphasized that the United States and Europe must collaborate to achieve a just peace in Ukraine and reaffirmed the EU's commitment to strengthening military support for Ukraine. Costa similarly stated that the EU remains ready to work with the United States to ensure lasting peace and security.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment.
• Many recent Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise.
• Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine.
• Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
• Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war.
• Russian officials in Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the US than for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises in 2025 and 2026.
• US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain that the Russian military command's lack of response to systemic issues is limiting Russian advances near Pokrovsk.
• Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported on February 18 that Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov announced that regional authorities are raising one-time payments for recruits who sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from 400,000 rubles ($4,369) to 1.1 million rubles ($12,015).
• Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2025

The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya stated during a UN Security Council meeting on February 17 that Ukraine has "irrevocably lost" Crimea, the "Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics" (referring to occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[1] Nebenzya insinuated that peace negotiations should "correct" the situation in these oblasts and that Ukraine should cede the remaining parts of the four oblasts that Ukraine currently controls. Nebenzya is calling for Ukraine to cede the roughly 30 percent of the total area in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia does not currently occupy. (Russian forces currently occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast.) Nebenzya also demanded that Ukraine become a "demilitarized" neutral state in the future and that Ukraine not join any alliances or security blocs.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed on February 17 the possibility of Russia making territorial concessions during future negotiations.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Ukraine should withdraw its forces from and cede any unoccupied territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia, and Nebenzya appears to be resurrecting this demand ahead of bilateral US-Russia negotiations.[4] US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted on February 16 that US President Donald Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty."[5]

Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia. Nebenzya claimed that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) are "incapable" of reaching any agreement with Russia and cannot be party to any future agreements about the war in Ukraine.[6] Nebenzya accused European countries of being "blinded" by Russophobia and unrealistic about peace negotiations. Lavrov questioned why European countries should participate in negotiations and insinuated that European leaders only want to prolong the war in Ukraine in order to defeat Russia and prepare for a future war between Russia and Europe.[7] Russian authorities have previously focused their information operations against NATO, accusing the alliance of conspiring and preparing for a future war with Russia. Russian accusations that European countries and the EU more broadly (implicitly as distinct from the US) are acting aggressively towards Russia is a notable informational inflection and likely indicates a new Kremlin effort to drive a wedge between the US and Europe taking advantage of tensions evident at the recent Munich Security Conference.[8]

The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West — notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia. Nebenzya reiterated Putin's demand that Ukraine must conduct elections before the implementation of any peace agreements, continuing the Kremlin's efforts to falsely portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate.[9] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk have also recently repeated the Kremlin's false claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" and implicitly that Russia thus is not obligated to honor agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government.[10] The Kremlin's apparent unwillingness to make territorial concessions, commit to honoring any future peace agreement with Ukraine, or involve any European leaders in these negotiations calls into question Putin's supposed willingness to engage in good faith negotiations that could bring about long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.[11] The Russian delegation includes Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the talks will focus on "restoring the entire complex of US-Russian relations" and preparing for possible future discussions about the war in Ukraine between US President Donald Trump and Putin.[12] Peskov added that Lavrov and Ushakov "will be able to send urgent reports" to Putin while in Riyadh — suggesting that the Russian delegation's purpose is to convey messages and inform the Kremlin, rather than to negotiate on Putin's behalf.[13]

Sergei Lavrov has served as the Russian foreign minister since 2004, but has reportedly been left out of previous key Kremlin decisions relating to the Russian invasions of Ukraine.[14] Sources in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told the BBC in August 2023 that the MFA had no previous knowledge of the Kremlin's ultimatums to the US and NATO in late 2021, and the Financial Times (FT) reported in February 2023 that Lavrov learned about the full-scale invasion a few hours before it started.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Kremlin did not notify Lavrov of Putin's June 2024 press conference at the MFA during which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining territories of four Ukrainian oblasts.[16]

Yuri Ushakov has served as Putin's foreign policy aide since May 2012.[17] Ushakov was Russia's ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1996 to 1998, served as the Russian Ambassador to the United States from 1999-2008, and became Deputy Head of Government Staff from 2008 to 2012.[18] Ushakov publicly dismissed US and Western intelligence about the impending Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as "hysteria" and "absurdity" in early February 2022.[19] Ushakov reportedly participated in early ceasefire talks with Ukraine shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.[20]

Kirill Dmitriev has been CEO of RDIF, a Russian sovereign wealth fund meant to develop foreign direct investment in Russia, since its creation in 2011 and also holds positions on the supervisory boards of the state-owned Gazprombank, Transneft, and Russian Railways.[21] Dmitriev studied economics at Stanford and Harvard universities in the 1990s and spent his early career working as a consultant at McKinsey & Company and Goldman Sachs and later ran the Ukrainian investment fund Icon Private Equity from 2007 to 2011.[22] Dmitriev enjoys close ties with Putin's family, and Dmitriev's wife, Natalia Popova, is reportedly a close friend and former classmate of Putin's daughter, Katerina Tikhonova.[23] Dmitriev has extensive experience working with Middle Eastern countries, as the RDIF's partners include the sovereign wealth funds of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Bloomberg, citing a person familiar with the exchange, reported on February 14 that Dmitriev recently played a key role in negotiations with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff to free American Marc Fogel from Russia.[24] Dmitriev accompanied Putin on his visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in 2023 and Beijing in May 2024.[25]

A key Putin ally will be notably absent from the meeting. Bloomberg reported on February 14 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin would participate in the Russian delegation going to Saudi Arabia – reports which ended up proving false.[26] Naryshkin is Putin's close ally who reportedly participated in Russia-Ukrainian negotiations shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 and discussions with former CIA director William Burns in Ankara in November 2022.[27] Putin has also stated that he decided to launch Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 after consulting with only the "leaders of [Russia's] special services and the defense ministry."[28] None of the members of the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia appear to be among the closest inner circle that Putin would likely empower to engage in serious negotiations on his behalf, but Putin may intend to include more trusted individuals in future rounds of talks or may have more confidence in these individuals in these particular talks.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the refinery has an annual refining capacity of about 6.6 million tons and specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil.[29] Kovalenko noted that the oil refinery supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine. Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Kavkazsky Raion, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the station is the largest pumping station in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.[30] The consortium confirmed that seven drones struck the Kropotkinskaya station, leading authorities to take the station out of operation.[31] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) conducted the drone strikes against the Ilsky Oil Refinery and Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station.[32] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that falling drone debris damaged houses in Ilsky and Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 70 drones overnight, including 24 drones over Krasnodar Krai.[34]

Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 17 that footage shows Russian forces executing three surrendering Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified location after a Russian commander orders the soldiers to kill two of the POWs.[35] ISW has long assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[36]

Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[37] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 17 Iran Update. The sources said that Russia is “close” to a deal that would keep at least some staff and equipment in Syria. One of the sources said that Russia hopes to keep the same air and naval bases that it used prior to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime, likely referring to Hmeimim Airbase and the naval base at Tartus. Russia also previously held several other airbases within central and northern Syria, including a helicopter base in Qamishli, though it is unclear whether the agreement will cover these sites. Russian forces have fully evacuated all their former positions in Syria except for Hmeimim Airbase and the Port of Tartus.[38] Other forces, such as the Syrian interim government or US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have taken many of these bases following Russian forces’ evacuation.[39]

The tone of engagement between Russia and the Syrian interim government has notably become more cooperative in recent weeks, which supports the sources’ claims that Russia may be in agreement with Syria. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara emphasized Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12.[40] Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra recently suggested that Syria could allow Russia to retain air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[41] It is not clear what “benefits“ Russia may be offering Syria in current negotiations. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 in a gesture that likely sought to foster goodwill with the Syrian government.[42] This gesture followed Syrian officials’ demands that Russia pay its debts to the Syrian state and Putin’s offer to Shara to assist with Syria’s economy.[43]

Unspecified sources also told Bloomberg that Russia could help with the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS efforts.[44] It is unclear based on this comment whether the Syrian interim government has discussed Russian forces re-deploying to Syria to fight against ISIS. The Syrian interim government is likely eager to obtain manpower to assist in counter-ISIS operations as the government contends with the political and material realities of forming and training the new Syrian army. Russian participation in the Assad regime campaign against ISIS failed to effectively degrade ISIS in Syria, however. Russian aircraft proved to be far more capable in targeting Syrian opposition groups on behalf of the regime than it was targeting ISIS.[45] The scale of a future Russian deployment to Syria would impact the success of any Russian counter-ISIS operations, and it is unclear if a ”reduced” military presence would be any more effective against ISIS than Russian forces were at the height of Russian deployments to Syria. US Central Command announced in July 2024 that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute in Syria following several years of decreased capability.[46] Russia would by no means provide a suitable replacement for the United States or SDF in counter-ISIS operations in the face of ISIS reconstitution efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations.
• Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia.
• The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.
• The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
• Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline.
• Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.
• Russian forces advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Convention by conscripting civilians in occupied Ukraine to serve in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2025

Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds (about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025.[i] The UK stated that it will provide Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of Spring 2025.[ii] Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine.[iii] Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one Ukrainian battalion each.[iv] The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles, Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.[v]

Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024.[vi] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and armored vehicles.[vii] IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[viii] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.

IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.[ix] ISW began observing indications in November and December 2024 that Russian forces were using fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast, particularly in areas where Russian forces had previously relied heavily on mechanized assaults to make significant tactical advances.[x] Russian forces have continued to use fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast and throughout the frontline, possibly due to Ukrainian drone operations, equipment constraints, or non-conducive ground conditions brought about by rainy weather. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 13 that successful Ukrainian drone strikes have been the main factor — and not poor weather and ground conditions — prompting Russian forces to use fewer armored vehicles along the frontline.[xi] Trehubov noted that Russian forces also have issues supplying shells to some unspecified frontline positions, possibly due to successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots, and have thus decreased the intensity of shelling in such areas.

It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units. IISS assessed that Russia refurbished and built over 1,500 tanks and 2,800 IFVs and APCs in 2024 — suggesting that Russia produced enough vehicles to replace all of its tank losses and three quarters of its armored vehicle losses last year.[xii] IISS assessed that Russia's ongoing effort to expand the Russian military and create new units is exacerbating equipment shortages and noted that Russia may also be suffering from a shortage of spare parts to refurbish tanks and armored vehicles. IISS assessed that it is highly likely that the Soviet-era tanks and armored vehicles remaining in Russia's stores are in a deteriorated condition, which may complicate Russia's ability to offset high equipment losses in 2025 and beyond. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russia is continuing to form new divisions, and former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia aimed to stand up 14 new military divisions in the coming years.[xiii] The Russian military command appears to be balancing allocating refurbished and newly-produced vehicles between new formations and formations that have been fighting on the frontline for several years. Russia may struggle to adequately equip its units with materiel in the long-term if the Russian military continues to burn through Soviet-era vehicle stocks without significantly increasing Russia's ability to produce new tanks and armored vehicles.

Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The EFIS published its annual intelligence report on February 12 which focused on Russian threats to Estonia, other NATO members, and the West.[xiv] The intelligence report noted that the pace of the Russian military's rearmament will depend on the duration and outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine. The EFIS also assessed that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia would allow Russia to permanently station more forces along the borders of NATO member states neighboring Russia than before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – consistent with ISW's longstanding assessments.[xv] The intelligence report highlighted Russia's efforts to increase, improve, and centralize drone operations and production.[xvi] The EFIS reported that Russia will allocate on average one million euros (about $1 million) annually until 2030 to its "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle" National Project, established in December 2023, which aims to establish 48 research and production centers across Russia, standardize drone productions and development, create an electronic database of drone industry experts, and integrate drone-related education into 75 percent of all Russian schools.[xvii] The EFIS assessed that Russia is attempting to use these research and development centers to reduce Russia's reliance on Western and foreign technology and components and that Russia continues to rely on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to procure Western components for drone production. The EFIS noted that up to 80 percent of sanctioned Western components likely reach Russia through the PRC.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on February 13 that Ukrainian drones destroyed two Valdai radar complexes in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast and noted that Russian forces used the radar complexes to detect and down drones over the airspace near Moscow City.[xviii] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on February 13 that Ukrainian drones targeted the Lipetsk water aeration station in Lipetsk City, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant, which is located near the station and produces about 20 percent of Russia's steel output.[xix] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), reported on February 13 that the SBU struck the Andreapol oil pumping station in Tver Oblast, causing a fire at the boiler equipment warehouse and a closed switchgear.[xx]

The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.[xxi] The Moldovan MFA noted that it summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov following Russian drone violations of Moldovan airspace and notified Vasnetsov of the intended closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, in response.[xxii] Moldovan President Maia Sandu reported on February 13 that Russian Shahed drones violated the country's airspace and that two drones exploded on Moldovan territory.[xxiii] Vasnetsov denied reports that Russian drones violated Moldovan territory.[xxiv] Geolocated footage published on February 13 shows the explosion and aftermath of a likely Russian Shahed strike in a field near Ceadir-Lunga, Moldova.[xxv] Azerbaijani outlets also reported on February 6 that Azerbaijani authorities announced the closure of the local Rossotrudnichestvo branch in Baku, Azerbaijan citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference."[xxvi] Russia currently has over 80 Rossotrudnichestvo branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[xxvii] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting.
• Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023.
• IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.
• It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units.
• Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises.
• The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk.
• Russian officials continue efforts to increase recruitment for the "BARS-Bryansk" volunteer territorial defense detachment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025

US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin negotiations.[1] Trump added that he planned to "inform [Zelensky] of the conversation" after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved through peaceful negotiations."[2] Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[3] Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference.[4] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones.[5] Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.[6] Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.[7]

Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The DDIS published a declassified intelligence assessment on February 11 detailing the growing Russian threat to Denmark and NATO members.[8] The intelligence assessment notes that Russia is rebuilding its military to fight NATO on an equal footing, aided by financial and material support from the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The intelligence assessment states that Russia's willingness to risk war with NATO may increase if European countries do not simultaneously build up their military capabilities in response to Russian capacity building efforts. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported on February 12 that Europe spent $457 billion on defense in 2024, while Russia by itself spent $462 billion on defense in last year.[9] The DDIS intelligence assessment notes that Russia has not yet decided to launch a full-scale war against NATO but is expanding its military capabilities to maintain that option.[10] Russia is currently avoiding actions that could trigger NATO's Article 5 — the commitment to mutual self-defense — but may take greater risks if it perceives a shift in the balance of power in its favor. The DDIS assessment states that if Russia deems NATO weakened either militarily or politically it could be more willing to attack a European NATO member, particularly if Russia doubts US military support to Europe. The intelligence assessment notably warns that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia will free up significant Russian military resources for their involvement in another future conventional conflict — consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment. The DDIS assessment outlines a timeline for Russia's growing military threat in the event of an end of hostilities in Ukraine: Russia could wage a local war against a neighboring state other than Ukraine within six months; Russia could credibly threaten NATO countries in the Baltic region in two years; and Russia could be prepared for a large-scale war in Europe, assuming NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, in five years. ISW previously assessed that Russia's efforts to restructure the Russian military, revive the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, and create long-term mechanisms to militarize and radicalize Russian society against Western ideals and values indicate that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO.[11]

Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike mainly targeting Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of February 11 and 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missiles targeted Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six missiles and 71 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported on February 12 that Russian missiles damaged buildings in the Obolonskyi, Svyatoshynskyi, Darnytskyi, and Holosiivskyi raions of Kyiv City and Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast, and caused five casualties.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 12 that Russian ballistic missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure and killed at least one person in Kyiv City.[14] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 12 that a Russian missile struck central Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian infrastructure.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat emphasized that Ukraine needs US-provided Patriot air defense missile systems to counter ballistic missile strikes.[16]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[17] The Ukrainian MoD officially launched the program on February 11 and noted that the program offers 18- to 24-year-olds the ability to join the military under a one-year contract and the option to either reenlist after one year or return to civilian life. The Ukrainian MoD will pay volunteers 200,000 UAH ($4,700) upon signing a one-year contract and an additional 800,000 UAH ($19,120) during their service in addition to a monthly salary of 120,000 UAH ($2,870). Volunteers will receive three months of training before deploying to the frontline. The Ukrainian government will subsidize future mortgages, education, and medical care for volunteers and will permit volunteers to travel abroad after their one year of service. The program also exempts volunteers from mobilization for 12 months after their one-year contract ends. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the "Contract 18-24" program is part of Ukraine's ongoing efforts to create a professional military. Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated that the MoD will pay one million UAH (about $23,900) to any Ukrainian servicemembers who were under the age of 25 when they signed a voluntary military service contract.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Putin affirmed Russia's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity and emphasized the need for a dialogue among political and ethno-religious groups within Syria. Putin pledged continued socio-economic aid to, and economic cooperation with Syria, and Putin and al Shara discussed recent negotiations between the interim Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[19] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government on Russian military basing rights at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus, however.[20] Russia likely continues to engage with the interim Syrian government in an effort to secure its presence at these bases.

The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).[21] Several Armenian civic organizations initiated the bill via a petition that garnered enough support (at least 50,000 signatures) for parliamentary consideration.[22] The legislation calls on Armenian authorities to launch EU accession talks in accordance with the will of the Armenian people.[23] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged Armenia’s “sovereign right” to pursue EU membership but urged Armenians to consider whether the EU shares this goal.[24] Peskov also emphasized the "benefits" Armenia gains as a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[25] Russian officials and information space commentators previously claimed that Armenia’s move toward EU membership signaled its withdrawal from the EAEU.[26] Armenia continues to strengthen its ties with the EU and the broader West amid escalating tensions with Russia and concerns that Russia is an unreliable security partner to Armenia.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.
• Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
• The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security. Zelensky stated during an interview with UK outlet The Guardian on February 11 that Europe will not be able to completely meet Ukraine's military needs and provide adequate security guarantees without US involvement.[1] Zelensky called for the West to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air-defense systems and noted that the United States has an irreplaceable role in supplying these systems to Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Ukraine's allies can help rebuild and restore Ukraine alongside Ukrainian companies and that Ukraine is prepared to discuss such plans in detail. Zelensky stated that he will provide US President Donald Trump during their next meeting with a more detailed plan for how the United States can be involved in Ukraine's reconstruction and the joint extraction of natural resources. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has Europe's largest uranium and titanium reserves and suggested that the West should not let these resources fall under Russia's control. Zelensky told Reuters on February 7 that he floated the idea of giving allies the opportunity to invest in critical mineral extraction during closed meetings in Fall 2024.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is offering its partners a "mutually beneficial partnership" to jointly develop Ukrainian resources and is not proposing "giving away" Ukraine's resources. Zelensky stated that the United States will receive prioritized access to this opportunity and that the United States and Ukraine are considering storing US liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Ukraine's underground gas storage sites.

Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.[3] The milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian military appears increasingly anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations with Russia.[4] Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian territory.

Russian forces continued to test new strike tactics and packages in a series of missile and drone strikes targeting energy infrastructure in Ukraine on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 19 sea-, air-, and land-based missiles against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast and 124 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 Shahed and other drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and that 67 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that strikes damaged infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and facilities at a Naftogaz gas production plant in Poltava Oblast.[6] Russian forces notably launched all the missiles in this strike package against a single target. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes forced Ukrainian energy operators to restrict electricity.[7] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that that Russian forces first launched Shahed drones, then launched cruise and ballistic missiles - including Kalibr cruise missiles - at a single target in order to complicate Ukrainian air defenses' abilities to intercept all incoming projectiles.[8] Khrapchynskyi stated that Russian forces recently began reducing their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles, which are launched from Tu-22 (Backfire) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic aircraft and are increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles launched from tactical Sukhoi aircraft. The Russians presumably prefer not to risk their strategic bombers in such strikes. Khrapchynskyi also stated that Russian forces are adapting their strike tactics following the provision of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and are prioritizing striking frontline and border areas where Ukrainian forces are less likely to operate F-16s.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and the Ukrainian military struck the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City causing a fire.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Saratov Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and over 20 types of petroleum products and provides fuel to the Russian military. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that a drone strike caused a fire at an industrial plant in Saratov Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in November 2024 and January 2025.[11] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied that Ukrainian forces also struck Engels Air Base, and Russian sources published footage purportedly showing Russian air defense operating in the area.[12]

The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11. Russian Duma deputies submitted the proposal to remove Gurulev from the Defense Committee and transfer him to the Regional Policy and Local Government Committee on February 7, and Gurulev expressed support for this move but did not claim responsibility for the initiative.[13] Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on February 7 that some of its sources stated that Gurulev's removal is due to his controversial statements that reflect badly on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] Gurulev has made statements that include proposing to introduce a tax on childless Russians and notably leaked the audio message of former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (SMD) Major General Ivan Popov in July 2023 in which Popov claimed that the Russian command dismissed him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces, resulting in an ongoing criminal case against Popov.[15]

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false-flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on February 11 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with assistance from unspecified Western countries intend to blow up a foreign vessel in the Baltic Sea to prompt NATO to block Russia's access to the Baltic Sea and start a direct armed conflict between Russia and NATO.[16] The SVR claimed that unspecified European intelligence services and Ukraine's GUR also plan to assassinate Russian opposition figures living abroad and blame Russia for the assassinations to undermine future peace negotiations. Russia's SVR has previously accused Ukraine and other Western states of planning false flag attacks to discredit Ukraine and drive a wedge in Western unity behind Ukraine, particularly at critical moments in Western discussions regarding support for Ukraine and a possible peace plan.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security.
• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.
• The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.
• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2025

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian positions.[1] Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only the first stage of the Drone Line project.[2] This project likely formalizes and provides additional support to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.

Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the Russian military bureaucracy.[3] The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.[5]

Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City.[6] Kovalenko noted that the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current air defense capabilities are unknown.[7] Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near Krasnodar City.[8] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building.[9] Kondratyev claimed that Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence.[10] Krasnodar City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly authorized systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on February 10 that accounts from two former Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) prison guards and a prison medical professional, official documents, interviews with Ukrainian POWs, and a person who has helped the Russian prison officials defect show that Russian authorities have instructed Russian prison authorities to engage in widespread torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons since March 2022.[12] The WSJ stated that Major General Igor Potapenko, the head of the FSIN in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, told elite prison "special forces" in March 2022 to "be cruel" to Ukrainian POWs and that there would be no restrictions on violence against the POWs. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty assessed that these "special forces" were likely the FSIN's special forces — as opposed to the Russian Main Directorate [GRU] Spetsnaz forces.[13]) The WSJ reported that other prison authorities across Russia received similar instructions in the first weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[14] One of the former prison guards stated that they believed they had permission from their leadership to "push their mistreatment of Ukrainians to a new level." Russian forces have increasingly executed Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[15] Reports that Russian authorities authorized the torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons as early as March 2022 also demonstrate the degree to which Russian authorities are complicit in these war crimes. Russian authorities notably appointed Potapenko as Vice Governor of St. Petersburg for Security and Migration Policy in 2024.[16] Russian authorities' complicity in these crimes and the promotion of war crime perpetrators to high-level positions within the Russian government further demonstrate the atrocities that Russian occupation inflicts on the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving to Russia to join either the Russian work force or the Russian military. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora claimed that North Korea and Russia are increasing educational cooperation and that professors from North Korean universities will travel to Moscow, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Vladivostok cities "for a long period of time" to teach Korean in Russian universities and that Russian universities are preparing three-month internships for North Korean students.[17] Matsegora's statement follows South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) report on February 9 that North Koreans are increasingly entering Russia on student visas to take construction jobs.[18] UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, which Russia voted for in 2017, prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[19] Matsegora's statement that North Korean professors are coming to Russia for work would likely violate UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[20]

A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment. Matsegora claimed that Russia has sent "hundreds" of wounded soldiers who fought against Ukraine to North Korea for rehabilitation and medical care and that North Korea refused Russia's offer of financial compensation for the medical care, food, and other expenses related to the Russians' stay in North Korea.[21] The Russian military command has reportedly been sending wounded personnel back into assault groups without treatment, demonstrating a general disregard for soldiers' health in the Russian military and calling into question official Russian claims to be sending Russian soldiers abroad for treatment, particularly to North Korea.[22] The arrival of combat experienced Russian soldiers, particularly if they include officers or non-commissioned officers, to North Korea may allow the Russian military to work with North Korean forces and disseminate lessons from the war in Ukraine while ostensibly recuperating.

The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on February 10 that Transnistria rejected 60 million euros (about $61.8 million) in EU aid to support continued gas deliveries to the breakaway republic, refusing to accept the aid's condition that Tiraspol gradually increase tariffs for consumers.[23] Recean outlined the scheme through which Transnistria will receive gas from the European market starting February 13. MET Gas and Energy Marketing, a Hungarian natural gas trader on the European market, signed a contract with Moldovagaz to transport gas for Transnistria to the Moldovan border; Dubai-based JNX General Trading LLC will pay for the gas; Moldovagaz and Tiraspoltransgaz reached an agreement to transit the gas through Moldova to Transnistria; and Transnistria will pay the transit costs in advance. Recean noted that Moldovan authorities have vetted both companies and did not find any violations of international or Moldovan law. Transnistria will reportedly undertake measures to demonstrate its "openness" in return, including releasing political prisoners, continuing to air Moldovan public television, and removing 11 checkpoints that Tiraspol installed in 2022. Recean stated that Tiraspol refused the EU offer of aid under pressure from Moscow, and a senior Moldovan government official told Politico that Russia blocked the EU-proposed solution.[24] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky claimed on February 10 that Russian "credit and functional support" made the Hungarian supply scheme possible and thanked the Russian Ministry of Energy for its assistance.[25] Russia's allocation of funds for Transnistria's purchase of European gas demonstrates that influence over Transnistria remains a priority for the Kremlin, despite Russia's ongoing economic strains at home.[26] Russia's role in financing the gas purchases indicate that Russia will continue to be the sole economic backer of the breakaway republic, despite select Transnistrian authorities' Western leaning political and economic interests.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Russian authorities reportedly authorized systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving to Russia to join either the Russian work force or the Russian military.
• A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment.
• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2025

Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.[3]

Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5] North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.

The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution.  

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training. German outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report, that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase, where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the operators in all six instances. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects" with modifications and are likely not commercially available. Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.

Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states. Russia has been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities, in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
• The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
• German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
• Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2025

Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka (just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack.[2] Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[3] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim.[4] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims.[5] ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.[6]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye (northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions that complicated Russian drone operations in the area.[8] Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient.[9] Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending in Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024. Putin stated during a meeting with acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 106th VDV Division, 76th VDV Division, and other Russian forces are still operating in Kursk Oblast and will be rewarded for their service in the future.[11] Putin's statement underlines the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned elements of these relatively elite formations in Kursk Oblast for the last six months, depriving Russia of the opportunity to redeploy these forces to higher priority areas of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW recently noted that the Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans and elements of most of Russia's elite VDV and naval infantry formations, to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[13] Putin has yet to prioritize expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast over continuing his gradual advances in Donetsk Oblast and continues to drag out the liberation of Kursk's border areas, despite domestic discontent.

Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) commemorated the milestone on February 6 by acknowledging that small SSO units infiltrated Russia's rear in Kursk Oblast as early as June 2024 — two months before the main incursion began in August 2024.[14] The SSO forces advanced behind Russian lines in Kursk Oblast to prepare for the Ukrainian incursion, conducting reconnaissance and targeted strikes to dismantle key elements of Russia's border defenses. The SSO noted that Ukrainian forces systematically destroyed Russian air defense and ammunition depots, limiting Russia's ability to respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The SSO also provided a detailed account of the operation and the technological adaptations the Ukrainian forces employed during the Kursk incursion. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also awarded honors to the Ukrainian personnel involved in the Kursk incursion for the anniversary, offering the first official Ukrainian statement regarding a comprehensive composition of Ukraine's force deployment in Kursk Oblast.[15] Zelensky reiterated that the incursion aimed to prevent a new Russian offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Zelensky noted that the Kursk incursion reinforced his "peace through strength" principle, provided Ukraine with a significant replenishment of POW "exchange funds," and forced Russia to divert elite military units to Kursk Oblast — impairing Russian operations elsewhere along the front. Ukrainian officials have previously noted that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled several Russian plans to attack northern Ukraine and complicated Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16]

A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) released results on February 6 of a survey of 1,600 Russians conducted from January 28 to February 2, showing that 67 percent of the people polled support Russia’s war in Ukraine and that 65 percent believe that the war is "going well" for Russia.[17] VCIOM’s Political Research Director Mikhail Mamonov stated that the public demands a swift, favorable conclusion to the war and supports measures that advance these goals while resenting Russian setbacks like the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast incursion, slow territorial gains, and economic hardship. VCIOM’s findings likely reflect Kremlin views and narratives and likely inflate the level of public support for the war, however. These results come amid rising casualties, Russian command controversies, and immense economic strain on the Russian economy during the war.[18] Successful renewed Ukrainian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast may also negatively impact the Russian public’s view of the war in the coming weeks.

North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities. Reuters, citing two Ukrainian military-affiliated sources, reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have shown significantly improved accuracy.[19] These North Korean missiles, previously accurate within 1 to 3 kilometers, can now strike within 50 to 100 meters of their intended targets. One Ukrainian source noted that Russia has launched over 20 North Korean missiles in recent weeks, all demonstrating enhanced precision. Reuters’ sources speculated that North Korea may have upgraded the navigation systems of its missiles, incorporated new steering mechanisms, or received improved targeting data and guidance components from Russia, although the exact modifications remain unclear. The North Korean missiles not only serve to bolster Russia’s arsenal but also likely allow North Korea to refine its capabilities for possible future military operations elsewhere. Other Russian allies, such as Iran, likely can improve their strike systems’ performance by leveraging Russia’s lessons learned from operations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base, causing an explosion and resulting in a fire at the facility.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base to store, prepare, and launch Shahed drones against Ukraine and to conduct maintenance for aircraft operating over occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of the explosion at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base.[21]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on February 6 that France transferred an unspecified number of French Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Ukraine — the first batch of Mirage jets Ukraine has received.[22] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6, 2024 that France would provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train several pilots to operate the jets.[23] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on February 6 that the Netherlands recently delivered an unspecified number of US-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.[24]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.[25] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 6 that Bakanov's appointment is part of a regular personnel rotation.[26] Several Russian milbloggers characterized the reshuffling, however, as a result of Kremlin officials' dissatisfaction with Roscosmos's underperformance under Borisov's leadership, including Borisov's inability to accelerate the development of a full-fledged portable satellite communications system for the Russian military by 2026.[27] A Russian insider source noted that Borisov served as Deputy Minister of Defense under former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu from 2018-2022 and was one of the last remaining nodes of Shoigu's patronal network that controlled the Russian Ministry of Defense prior to widespread arrests of Ministry of Defense officials in Summer 2024.[28] Bakanov previously served as the head of Russia's Gonets communication satellite program from 2011-2019.[29] Gonets is a possible civilian analogue to Western Starlink terminals.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
• Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.
• North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.[1] Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations. Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.[2]

Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[4] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[5]

Prominent Kremlin-linked figures continue to clearly articulate Russia's disinterest in negotiations while Putin propagates the information operation accusing Ukraine of being the unwilling party. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk, a close personal ally of Putin and father of Putin's goddaughter, reinforced the Kremlin's efforts to delegitimize Ukrainian statehood in a February 4 article, arguing that Russia must reclaim its so-called "historical lands."[6] Medvedchuk published an accompanying map depicting all Ukrainian territory east of Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts as part of "historical Russia." Medvedchuk claimed that Western support for Ukraine aims solely to collapse Russia from within and labeled Ukrainians as "modern barbarians" whom Russia must save through integration into the Russian state. Medvedchuk denied Ukraine's historical legitimacy, insisting that modern Ukraine is inherently Russian - a narrative consistently promoted by Kremlin officials and the Russian information space to justify Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine. Medvedchuk's rhetoric as a member of the Russian elite with extensive ties to Putin are representative of the Kremlin's systemic refusal to act in good faith regarding negotiations with Ukraine and the West and the Kremlin's core unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine - a state and government it considers illegitimate.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Zelensky added that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were KIA.[8] Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[9] Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to 70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Albashneft LLC oil depot in Novominskaya, Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the facility.[10] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of fire at the Albashneft oil depot and noted that the depot supplies straight-run gasoline (crude oil distillate), diesel fuel, and fuel oil to the Russian military.[11] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows a fire at the Albashneft oil depot.[12] Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev claimed on February 5 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil tank near Novominskaya.[13]

The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military district's "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[14] The decree replaces the "joint strategic command" of each military district with a "directorate" that presumably will exclusively oversee ground forces and appears to disaggregate naval and VKS assets back to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy and VKS command, respectively. The decree states that military districts will also be involved in helping Russian citizens enter the "mobilization manpower reserve" of the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed reorganizing military districts to optimize the army's command structure in June 2024.[15]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to re-establish military districts primarily as headquarters for Russian ground forces and disaggregate the peacetime administrative headquarters for Russia’s Navy and Air Force. Joint Russian operational groups will likely continue to be led by a combined-arms operational military command in wartime.[16] Disaggregating administrative control for Russian naval and air forces from the headquarters responsible for administrative control for ground forces would likely free up bureaucratic bottlenecks during peacetime and allow military district commanders to focus on training and preparing Russian ground forces for combat operations. Russia's efforts to refocus military districts on purely overseeing ground force assets could also help simplify and expedite Russia's activation of its ground forces during a future conflict. Russian forces will very likely continue to form and operate in interoperable joint force groupings under unified operational commanders during wartime, including during ongoing combat operations in Ukraine. It is unclear how or if this administrative restructuring will impact Russia's campaign in Ukraine in the long-term. Such a change is unlikely to affect the near-term battlefield situation since many Russian forces operating in Ukraine are currently organized under interservice groupings of forces. This restructuring may help Russian forces reconstitute multiple services more quickly than they otherwise could, as Russian ground, naval, and the air forces may not need to compete over the administrative resources of a single military district.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced on February 4 that it will enact a new migration regime that imposes severe restrictions on migrants residing in Russia starting on February 5.[17] The law requires migrants who have committed a criminal offense or are undocumented to register with Russian authorities, regularly share geolocated photos to the MVD, and obtain MVD approval for basic activities including buying property, driving a car, accessing banking services, and traveling outside their region. The law gives the MVD the right to deport migrants who violate these restrictions without a court hearing and penalizes those who provide undocumented migrants with services. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin reported that migrant-related crimes remain a "serious concern" for Russian authorities and the public and claimed that there was an 18 percent increase in court cases against migrants in 2024.[18] Bastrykin's statements reinforce Russian ultra-nationalist narratives that migrants pose a security threat by supposedly violating laws, moving "uncontrollably" within Russia, and committing crimes. The new MVD migration regime and Bastrykin's rhetoric demonstrate that Russian authorities are increasingly prioritizing efforts to appease particularly pro-war, xenophobic Russian ultranationalists and mitigate potential domestic security risks linked to rising anti-migrant sentiment rather than offsetting Russia's labor shortages and ongoing economic struggles, in part, with migrant labor.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on February 5 that Ukraine repatriated 150 Ukrainian POWs and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[19] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that the returned Ukrainian POWs suffer from serious injuries and illnesses.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia also received 150 Russian POWs.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run.
• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
• The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.[1] Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.[2] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power.[3] Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024.[4] Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves.[5] Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers.[6] Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.[7]

Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage."[8] Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline.[9] Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel.[10] These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.

The Russian military may be struggling to recruit enough new military personnel, however. ISW observed reports in late 2024 and January 2025 that the Russian military's monthly recruitment rate is likely equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one.[11] ISW also observed reports that select Russian federal subjects are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed a draft amendment on February 3 to reclassify some illnesses, diseases, and disorders for conscripts and those signing military service contracts. The Russian MoD proposed reclassifying syphilis, hypertension, central nervous system atrophy disorders, skin diseases, schizophrenia, psychotic disorders, affective disorders, and other health problems as more minor ailments that do not disqualify someone from service.[13] Radio Svoboda, citing the Russian Movement of Conscientious Objectors, reported that the Russian MoD's proposal would make it more difficult for conscripts to obtain military service exemptions for health reasons and would complicate dismissal procedures for mobilized personnel and servicemembers who signed a military service contract.[14]

Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claim that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in an interview with Russian state news wire RIA Novosti published on February 4 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia.[15] Ganchev claimed that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from Ukrainian shelling. Ganchev called on Russian forces to drive Ukrainian forces "as far west as possible." Ganchev claimed that occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast had a plan in August 2022 to hold a "referendum" on Russia's annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but that the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in early September 2022 prevented the referendum. Ganchev claimed that if it were not for the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kharkiv Oblast would have become the "fifth oblast to join Russia on September 30." Russian forces currently occupy parts of northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, but Russia has not attempted to illegally annex Kharkiv Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably did not include Kharkiv Oblast in his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even territories that Russian forces do not occupy in these regions.[16]

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[17] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[18] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[19] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[20] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[21] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[22] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet."[23]

Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria. The Ukrainian Resistance Center posted video evidence showing that it had gained access to the "Mosaik" system, an internal system that Russia reportedly uses to track Russian ship routes and cargo.[24] Data from the "Mosaik" system shows that the Sparta IV traveled between Tartus, Syria, and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in April 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Oboronlogistika logistics company owns the Sparta, Sparta II, and Sparta IV cargo ships.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian vessels stopped traveling between Russia and Syria via the Black Sea in Spring 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian naval drone strikes in the Black Sea.[26] Russian ships instead reportedly started traveling from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean despite the fact that this route is several times longer than the Black Sea route. The appearance of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean Sea on February 4 is consistent with reports that Russian ships are now traveling between Syria and Russia via the Atlantic.

Russia has also reportedly used vessels belonging to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that it gained access to correspondence between an unspecified branch of the Russian Administration of Sea Ports and the Sparta's captain in which Russian authorities asked the Sparta and Sparta II to monitor Latvian patrol ships in the Baltic Sea off the western coast of Latvia in April 2023.[27] NATO notably conducted its Aurora 23 exercise near Sweden in April and May 2024.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities
• Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.
• A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.
• Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.
• Russia has also reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2025

Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared to previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1 square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670 casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024. The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025, coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024.[2] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024 through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.[3]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City and the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant near Astrakhan City.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike damaged the primary processing units at the Volgograd refinery and that a fire started at the Astrakhan plant. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Volgograd Oil Refinery is one of the top ten refineries in Russia and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes gas condensate and produces gas and diesel fuel.[5] A source in the SBU told Radio Liberty that the Volgograd Oil Refinery processes almost six percent of all Russian oil and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes 12 billion cubic meters of gas condensate per year.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that an employee at the Astrakhan plant stated that the strike damaged a gas condensate processing plant.[7] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces repelled a massive Ukrainian drone strike against the oblast overnight and intercepted and neutralized "most" of the drones.[8] Bocharov claimed that falling drone debris caused a fire at an oil refinery and short-term power outages. Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct a drone strike against fuel and energy facilities and that a fire started after a drone fell.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 25 drones over Volgograd Oblast and seven over Astrakhan Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd City on the night of January 30 to 31.[11]

Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi stated in an interview with Radio Liberty published on February 3 that Ukrainian forces are working on developing new technologies but are not disclosing them for as long as possible in order to maintain the technological initiative and prevent Russian forces from making their own analogues.[12] Sukharevskyi reported that the Unmanned Systems Forces conducted over 220 strikes against Russian territory in 2024 using over 3,500 weapons. Sukharevskyi noted that Ukrainian forces have struck over 15 "Buk-M3" and "Tor" air defense systems in December 2024 and January 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces stuck a "Buk-M3" 57 kilometers from the frontline in mid-January 2025. Sukharevskyi reported that Ukrainian forces' use of first-person view (FPV) drones to hunt Russian reconnaissance drones has led to a tenfold decrease in Russian reconnaissance drone usage. Sukharevskyi highlighted Ukraine's production of first-person view (FPV) and other drones made entirely of Ukrainian-made components and stated that Ukraine is working to develop a way to counter Russian forces' fiber optic cable FPV drones and to produce its own fiber optic cable drones. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that the Ukrainian military continues to increase the number of unmanned systems in formations and units of the Ground Forces, Airborne Assault Forces, Naval Infantry Corps, and Unmanned Systems Forces.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race to adapt and innovate their strike and anti-drone capabilities and that Ukraine's ability to field technological adaptations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's quantitative materiel advantages.[14]

The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The UN HRMMU reported that it has observed Russian forces execute 79 Ukrainian POWs in 24 separate incidents since late August 2024 and that Russian forces perform many of the executions as Ukrainian soldiers surrender to Russian forces.[15] UN HRRMU Head Danielle Belle reported that the Russian executions "did not arise out of nowhere" as Russian officials have "openly called for the ill treatment and even execution" of Ukrainian POWs, and the UN HRRMU recorded at least three incidents of Russian officials making such calls. The UN HRRMU reported that statements to "give no quarter" are violations of humanitarian law and a war crime, and Belle emphasized that military commanders and political leaders "must issue clear and unambiguous orders to ensure the protection and humane treatment" of all POWs and individuals no longer participating in combat. ISW has previously assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[16] Ukrainian Commissioner for Missing Persons in Special Circumstances Artur Dobroserdov stated on February 3 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating images purportedly showing a beheaded Ukrainian serviceman.[17]

Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."[18] Using corps structures is not entirely new for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been using corps since 2023. Ukraine formed the 9th and 10th army corps and restructured its Reserve Corps to the 11th Army Corps in 2023, and Ukraine is currently forming the 4th Army Corps.[19] Further restructuring to systematically form an echelon between Ukraine’s numerous separate brigades and Ukraine’s various operational groups of forces, and the creation of appropriate command staff headquarters at this new intermediary echelon, would likely improve command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations.

Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014. Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" (Armenian Battalion) Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade) that is currently operating in Kursk Oblast, died on February 3 after an explosive attack at his apartment building in Moscow City.[20] Sargsyan founded the Arbat Battalion, reportedly on instructions from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), in September 2022, and the battalion signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in July 2023.[21] Sargsyan is wanted in Ukraine for organizing violence against protestors in the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that Sargsyan was a member of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's inner circle.[22] The SBU used explosives to assassinate Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow in December 2024.[23] Ukrainian officials have not commented on Sargsyan's death, and ISW cannot independently confirm the responsible actor.

The far-right Russian paramilitary unit "Rusich" Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group reacted to Sargsyan's assassination, claiming that "the Motherland will lose nothing from one dead bandit" and that Sargsyan and his "ethnic mafia" only caused problems for Russia.[24] "Rusich" Group leader Alexei Milchakov — who is a self-declared Nazi - and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov notably met in January 2025 following Rusich's repeated criticisms of Akhmat forces.[25] Alaudinov and Milchakov expressed their support for each other and promote a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony. Rusich's response to Sargsyan's death, however, highlights the group's continued xenophobic and ultranationalist sentiments and calls into question the sincerity of Milchakov's reconciliation with Alaudinov.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared to previous months in late 2024.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects.
• The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."
• Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the Dnipro direction.
• The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a former boarding school dormitory holding 84 local Russian civilians preparing to evacuate and four Ukrainian police officers.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike wounded four people and killed four.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force warned that Russian sources are attempting to blame Ukraine for the strike.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and senior Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike from Sumy Oblast against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha.[4] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike.[5] Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo reported that Russian state-run TV stations Channel One (Perviy Kanal) and NTV claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha but also reported Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] ISW is unable to independently verify the details of the strike at this time.

Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022 and that Ukraine has repatriated 1,189 children with support from humanitarian organizations and Qatar, South Africa, and the Vatican.[7] Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have killed Ukrainian parents, kidnapped their children, and transported the children to "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea. Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have also separated children from their families in illegal filtration camps. Ukraine's Regional Human Rights Center identified 13 such "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea alone. Russian authorities reportedly use the camps in occupied Crimea to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children before further deporting them to Russia for adoption. Herasymchuk warned that Russian authorities are increasingly attempting to mobilize Ukrainian teenage boys into the Russian military - a violation of the Geneva Convention.[8] ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[9] The United Nation's Genocide Convention Article 2 defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine.
• Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2025

Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia's favor.[1] Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian government.[2] ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's future negotiating positions.[3] TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.

Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.[4] Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations.[5] This position suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called "root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning [of] a number of provisions on which NATO's existence and functioning are based."[6] Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss the possibility of "reducing the level of [NATO's] military presence," presumably along Russia's borders, but noted that this is unlikely to happen.

Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders.[7] Putin issued a series of demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things.[8] The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations.[9] Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.

Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more broadly.[10] Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness" and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even including elements of [a] bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.[11]

People's Republic of China (PRC)–based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine. RFE/RL, citing its own Ukrainian bureau's investigative unit Schemes, reported on January 30 that at least two dozen PRC-based firms "untouched" by Western sanctions are directly supplying Russia with gallium, germanium, and antimony — key elements used in Russian drones and missiles.[12] Schemes found that PRC-based firms send these materials to Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies including Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, which supplies nearly 80 percent of the Kremlin's weaponry used in Ukraine. At least a third of these suppliers are reportedly linked to the PRC government, which has repeatedly denied aiding Russia's war. Schemes also noted that the Russian subsidiary of a Japanese company imported antimony from the PRC and supplied silicon wafers to Russian military microelectronics manufacturers. ISW has previously noted that PRC companies are directly and indirectly supplying Russia with drones, machine tools, and microelectronic products that Russia uses to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions used in Ukraine.[13]

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.[14] The resolution called for unwavering European support to Ukraine and noted that sustainable peace negotiations can only be achieved from a position of Ukrainian strength. The resolution stated that negotiations regarding an end to the war in Ukraine can only be conducted with direct Ukrainian involvement and if Russia abandons its “imperial ambitions.” The resolution also condemned Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and commended Ukraine's progress towards European Union (EU) membership. Zelensky has previously highlighted that sustainable and just peace in Ukraine should be achieved through enhanced military support to Ukraine, especially given Russia's reluctance to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued maximalist and imperialist ambitions.[15]

The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine. A US defense official told CNN and three sources with knowledge of the transfer told US outlet Axios on January 28 that the US military transferred roughly 90 decommissioned Patriot missiles from storage facilities in Israel to Poland.[16] The Patriot missiles are expected to be transferred to Ukraine on an unspecified date.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.
• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.
• People's Republic of China (PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.
• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty."[i] Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance.[ii] Putin is correct, however, that additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance.[iii] Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer 2022.[iv] Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for the almost three years of war.

Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[v] ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in funding US military assistance to Ukraine.[vi]

Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin. Putin claimed that any peace agreement that Russia and Ukraine conclude before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rescinds his 2022 decree will be invalid.[vii] Putin further claimed that that Zelensky is no longer able to legally rescind the decree because he is no longer the "legitimate" president of Ukraine and that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada could rescind the decree but does not seem interested in doing so. The Ukrainian constitution does not empower the Verkhovna Rada to unilaterally rescind presidential decrees, however, and a decision to do so could itself violate the Ukrainian constitution.[viii] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberately false interpretations of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is the illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to its law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[ix] Putin would likely seize on any unconstitutional act by the Verkhovna Rada — even one he is now calling for — to declare the act and Verkhovna Rada "illegitimate" and stand up another strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in serious negotiations that recognize Ukraine as an independent state. Putin has previously claimed that the Verkhovna Rada is the only "legitimate" government branch in Ukraine and thus the only Ukrainian government entity with which Russia could negotiate.[x] Putin may intend to declare the Verkhovna Rada "illegitimate" in the future in order to justify his demands for complete regime change in Kyiv and his unwillingness to negotiate with Ukrainian authorities.

Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreement with Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly claimed that every Ukrainian government since the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine has been illegitimate.[xi] Putin has nevertheless engaged in negotiations and reached agreements with Ukrainian officials, including regarding the resolution of armed conflict with the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015.[xii] Putin has also consistently violated these agreements and used similar claims about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government to justify these violations.[xiii] Even if Zelensky or other parts of the Ukrainian government agreed to lift the decree banning negotiations with Putin, Putin would likely violate any peace or other agreement that he reaches with Ukraine under the false justification that such agreements are "invalid" as long as he believes that he can achieve his maximalist war aims through military operations. Putin likely also intends to leverage false claims about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the limitations that the decree places on the possibility of peace negotiations to falsely portray Ukraine — rather than Russia — as the party prolonging the war and unwilling or unable to engage in meaningful negotiations to his domestic and international audiences.

Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiation framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government. Putin's January 28 statements are part of a continued effort to position himself as Trump's equal and reinforce his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.[xiv] Putin's statements also set conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreements with Ukraine that Trump may hope to mediate and are yet another indication that Putin is not interested in compromising on his demands of complete regime change and the crippling of Ukraine's military as conditions for peace.[xv] Putin's efforts to strongarm Trump are also part of a concerted Russian effort to force the West to acknowledge and endorse Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government and an enduring Ukrainian state. ISW previously noted that Western acquiescence to all of Russia's demands in Ukraine would require the West to acknowledge and agree that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and that a Ukrainian identity and state independent from Russia either does not currently exist and/or does not deserve to exist in the future.[xvi]  

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire.[xvii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17 million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military.[xviii] Geolocated footage posted on January 28 and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery.[xix] Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started a fire in an industrial area.[xx]  Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building and three other buildings.[xxi] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September 2024.[xxii]

The Russian MoD confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces. Sanchik briefed Russian Defense Minister Belousov on Ukrainian activity along the front line in the Southern Grouping of Force's area of responsibility (AoR) and the Russian MoD posted footage showing Sanchik speaking with Belousov.[xxiii] Sanchik previously served as commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD), and ISW first observed claims that Russian authorities appointed Sanchik commander of the Southern Grouping of Forces and Southern Military District [SMD] in November 2024.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression.
• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin.
• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreements with Ukraine.
• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.
• Volunteer recruitment rates in in Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[1] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[2] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[3] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[4] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[5] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[6]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[7] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.[8] Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[9]

The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.^[10] Ukrainian volunteer drone initiative Victory Drones initially amplified in April 2024 preliminary information that the Russian military command was finalizing the establishment of the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment as part of the Central Military District (CMD).^[11] Victory Drones noted that the regiment had 1,342 servicemembers and that the regiment was staffed at 94 percent as of April 2024. Victory Drones noted that the regiment trained at the base of the Russian 473rd District Training Center (CMD) and consists of command elements, an unmanned systems strike battalion, three unmanned systems reconnaissance and strike battalions, and logistics support units such as signal, medical, and repair elements. Victory Drones reported that the Russian military command planned to form 102 subordinate component units within the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment, of which 41 are strike units and 61 are reconnaissance units. Several Russian volunteer groups began crowdfunding for the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment starting in July 2024 and implied that the regiment was operating in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.^[12]

Russian milbloggers observed throughout Fall 2024 that the Russian MoD began reorganizing informal drone detachments and other specialists, such as signalmen, medics, and engineers, into "joint technical battalions."[13] The Russian MoD also announced that it formed an unspecified number of unmanned systems detachments by October 2024 via the "Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies and announced the formation of five additional unmanned systems.[14] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov subsequently announced that the Russian MoD would complete the formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military in the third quarter of 2025.[15] Defense Analyst Konrad Muzyka assessed that the recent organizational changes within the Russian military and the formation of drone units suggest that similar regiments may emerge in other Russian military districts in the future.[16] Russian forces will likely gain augmented drone support capabilities should the Russian MoD successfully form these new unmanned systems regiments and centralize its procurement efforts under the Unmanned Systems Forces, although the success of this effort will depend on the Russian military's commitment to executing the necessary reforms and the availability of resources.[17]

A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger.[18] Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian sabotage acts.[19] The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.[20] The Kremlin's sabotage and destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast.[2] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at the end of December 2024.[3]

The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.[4] The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.[5] The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most."[6] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March or early April 2025.[7] Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and compliance of the contract with national and international law.[8] Transnistrian authorities have previously rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid.[9] ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.[11] Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[12] Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2025

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.[1] Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement.[2] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[4] A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat of encircling the brigade's elements.[5] ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV) drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area.[6] The brigade stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25 and 26.[7]

The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions.[8] The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure.[9] The Russian MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements.[11] The Russian MoD has not recently been announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January 26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area.[12] Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers, will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.

The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the area in Fall 2024.[13] Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October 2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months.[14] The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka. This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025.[15] The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.

Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.[16] Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations southwest of Toretsk for this purpose.[17] Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024.[18] A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.

Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City.[19] Geolocated footage shows a fire at a tank at the refinery.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.[21] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage.[22] Ukrainian official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships.[23] Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to 24.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military officers.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2025

Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time.[1] Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024.[2] Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."[3]

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine.[4] Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy.[5] ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.[6]

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[8] Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2025

The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1] Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011.[2] The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however.[3] ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.[4] These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the All-Russian Cossack Society, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5] The training will include drone piloting training and tactical, medical, and fire training. A separate portion of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack societies, following the March 2024 law enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve, are likely an effort to expand the number of well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.[6]

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7] The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia.[9] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month.[10] North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024.[11] This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors.[12] A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement.[13] Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner.[14] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.[15]

Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the Russian government, via a Russian military official based in Turkey, recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22, and these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of military equipment from the port. The milblogger claimed that the Russian and HTS-led governments continue to negotiate about the future of Russia's presence at the Tartus and Khmeimim military bases and noted that it is unclear if any other third-party might be interested in using the port of Tartus in the future.[17] Other Russian milbloggers expressed confusion over the situation in Syria and accused unspecified actors of spreading rumors about Russia's supposed agreement with the HTS-led government.[18] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated on January 22 that Russian and Syrian officials have not reached a final solution in the negotiations about future Russian military bases in Syria.[19]

A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing its own sources, reported on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline, using the Cyprus-based company Obzor Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant, citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform (RBP) for natural gas transmission, reported that Obzor Enterprises booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February 1 to March 1, volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs. Kommersant reported that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the gas. Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching Transnistria. Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to Transnistria through the European spot market, but Moldovan President Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.[21] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on the night of January 15 to 16.[1] The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire.[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the second strike started another fire at the facility.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast.[4] Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant.[5] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment.[6] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that falling drone debris caused fires.[7] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC) (CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic cooperation.[14] Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin readout of the call did not mention these topics.[15] Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.[16]

Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Khinshtein to this post on December 5, 2024, following intense backlash for failing to communicate with or support Kursk Oblast residents displaced by the Ukrainian incursion - scapegoating then-Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to respond.[17] Russian opposition media and local Kursk Oblast news outlets reported that residents of Sudzhansky, Korenevsky, Bolshesoldatsky, and Glushkovsky raions – all on the frontline in Kursk Oblast – protested in front of the Kursk Oblast Administration building on January 18 and 21, demanding to meet with Khinshtein.[18] The protestors recorded an appeal to Khinshtein on January 21 asking him to address insufficient permanent housing for residents, issues with temporary accommodation centers, and his lack of dialogue with Kursk Oblast residents – the latter of which was one of Khinshtein's stated priorities following his appointment.[19] Local Kursk Oblast media reported that Khinshtein's advisor, Viktoria Penkova, met with the protestors, and the Kursk Oblast Administration Press Service stated that authorities informed the protestors of "necessary explanations and consultations" during the meeting.[20] Putin likely appointed Khinshtein to appear dedicated to solving social issues in Kursk Oblast and to quell local protests, and Khinshtein's failure to thus far fulfill this role in his tenure as acting governor undermines this intended effect.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation.
• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military failures.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.[1] Syrskyi stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024.[2] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall-Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump.[4] Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine.[5] Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government.[6] Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[7]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 20 that unspecified drones struck Russian military facilities in Kazan.[8] Russian opposition outlet Astra posted footage of a fire at the Gorbunov Aircraft Plant in Kazan, and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram account geolocated a picture of the aftermath of the strike to the fuel tanks of the Gorbunov plant.[9] The Gorbunov Aircraft Plant is a subsidiary of the Russia Tupolev United Aircraft Company, which produces and repairs Tu-160 strategic bombers.[10] Tatarstan authorities claimed on January 20 that Russian forces shot down all the drones and that the strike caused no damage or casualties.[11] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 20 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise on the outskirts of Kaluga City.[12] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 20 that sources within the Kaluga Oblast emergency services stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against Lyudinovo on January 17 damaged three diesel fuel tanks and one gas fuel tank.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast on the night of January 17 to 18, causing a fire at the facility.[14]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on January 20 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia's military facilities, including oil refineries and those that produce ammunition, missile components, and dual-use products, have significantly disrupted Russian forces' combat capabilities and ability to maintain a high intensity of combat operations.[15] Syrskyi noted that Russian forces are using half as many artillery shells per day than they were an unspecified period of time ago. Syrskyi emphasized that Ukrainian forces target Russia's ammunition, missile component, and dual-use production enterprises as well as oil refining facilities that support Russia's war efforts. ISW has observed reports from Ukrainian personnel in the field noting decreases in Russia's artillery usage and of Russia's overall artillery advantage in some areas.[16]

Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas. Russian and Transnistrian authorities were reportedly recently discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025, but Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted on January 16 that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria.[17] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky stated on January 20 that Transnistria will allow Moldovagaz to supply Transnistria with gas, presumably from Europe, despite initially refusing offers in early January 2025 from Moldovagaz to help Transnistria obtain gas from European platforms.[18] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistria can guarantee payment – possibly referring to Moscow's recent reported proposal to use Russian budget funds to buy European gas for Transnistria's domestic consumption.[19] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz sent a letter to Moldovagaz on January 18 requesting that Moldovagaz outline the procedure for supplying gas to Transnistria.[20] Moldovan President Maia Sandu responded on January 20 that Krasnoselsky's proposal does not appear to be about Transnistria's purchase of gas through Moldovagaz but that Krasnoselsky rather is proposing that "someone else" buys the gas and delivers it to Moldovan territory, after which Moldovagaz transports it through Moldova to Transnistria.[21] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities are currently determining which companies would be involved in this process, since Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion.[2] Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery.[3] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.[4] Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.[5]

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast.[6] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations.[7] North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future.[8] South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast.[9] North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.[10] The agreement outlines the UK's commitment to Ukraine's possible future NATO membership as a means to guarantee Ukraine's security and calls for strengthening bilateral defense and security ties, building consensus on Ukraine's NATO membership prospects, enhancing maritime security, expanding economic and trade cooperation, and boosting collaboration  in the energy, climate, and justice spheres. Starmer highlighted during a press conference on January 16 that the UK intends to provide military aid to Ukraine annually and will provide Ukraine with a loan backed by funds from frozen Russian assets.[11] Starmer highlighted that the UK will also expand its training program for Ukrainian military personnel and provide Ukraine with 150 artillery barrels and a new Danish-funded mobile air defense system.[12]

Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that unspecified sources stated that Russia and Transnistria are discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025.[13] Kommersant stated that Moscow tentatively proposed using Russian budget funds to buy up to three million cubic meters per day of gas that would cover Transnistria's domestic consumption but would not support producing Transnistria's electricity exports to Moldova. Kommersant estimated that this volume of gas would likely cost Russia $164 million from January to April 2025. Natural Gaz DC co-owner Arkady Vikol stated on January 15 that the company had signed a contract with Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz to supply two-to-three million cubic meters of European gas per day to Transnistria.[14] Transnistria President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia would provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery method.[15] Russia is likely seeking alternative routes to supply Transnistria with gas as the Trans-Balkan pipeline transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Ukraine stopped transiting Russian gas through its territory on January 1, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on January 15 that Ukraine was in discussions to help Transnistria but that the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is "generally unacceptable."[16] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have recently noted how Russia is trying to use its artificially created gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections, and Russia may cease gas supplies to Transnistria again in April 2025.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and other energy infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast.[3] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes.[4] Ukrenergo has since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy consumption following the strikes.[5] Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.[6]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on January 15 that Ukraine received 25 Ukrainians who suffer from serious injuries and illnesses and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[7] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that Ukraine received a civilian previously captured by Russian forces during the exchange.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia received 25 Russian POWs.[9] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced on January 6 that Ukraine and Russia had reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025 and that Ukraine will prioritize returning seriously ill and wounded Ukrainians.[10]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Russian forces are unable to field tanks and armored vehicles in frontline areas where Ukraine has deployed at least two Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) strike drone companies and two Ukrainian reconnaissance drone companies operate because Ukrainian drone operators strike most or all Russian armored vehicles three to six kilometers from the frontline.[11] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are also unable to field tanks in frontline areas where Ukrainian forces have a sufficient number of shells due to the high accuracy of Ukrainian artillery strikes. The milblogger complained that Russian drones are less effective than the Ukrainian drones and that the Russian military command only supplies Russian FPV operators advanced FPV models operating on non-standard frequences and fiber-optic drones — both of which are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) — to priority sectors of the frontline. The milblogger further claimed that an insufficient amount of Russian artillery coupled with insufficient Russian drone capabilities in select sectors of the frontline allow Ukrainian forces to field tanks more easily for indirect and direct fire. Effective Ukrainian drone and artillery operations in select areas of the frontline may be straining Russia's ability to field tanks amid reports that Russian forces continue to accrue vehicles losses that are likely unstable in the medium term.[12] Ukraine's ability to damage and destroy Russian armored vehicles and tanks with FPV drones and artillery will likely strain Russia's ability to replace such losses as current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that these losses will be prohibitive over the longer term.

Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.[13] Krasnoselsky visited Moscow from January 10 to 14 and negotiated possible gas deliveries to Transnistria with the Russian Energy Ministry.[14] Krasnoselsky added that Russia will provide Transnistria with enough gas for thermal power engineering, industrial enterprises, and civilian use, noting that Russia will not be supplying the rest of Moldova with gas.[15]

Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia. The US State Department reported on January 14 that Armenia and the US launched the US–Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission, signaling a significant step in their bilateral relations.[16] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan formalized the agreement aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation in economic, security, defense, and governance sectors. Blinken emphasized US support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov criticized the partnership agreement, accusing the US of destabilizing the South Caucasus.[17] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed dissatisfaction with Armenian government’s January 9 approval of a European Union (EU) accession bill. Overchuk and Lavrov argued that Armenia's potential future EU membership is incompatible with Armenia's membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and framing Armenia’s EU accession bill as a potential withdrawal from the EAEU.[18] Overchuk and Lavrov also claimed that such decisions are Armenia’s sovereign right yet highlighted potential consequences, reinforcing Kremlin’s longstanding pattern of threatening and pressuring neighboring countries through indirect and direct means. The Kremlin reactions to Armenia’s deepening ties with the West demonstrate a broader Russian strategy of undermining the sovereignty of neighboring and previously colonized countries through initial ultimatums and veiled coercion, often escalating to direct action and military violence when Russia’s influence is challenged, as is the case in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.
• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.
• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000 Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kvitkova Street and reached the northwestern administrative boundary of Toretsk.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Pyrohova Street in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 90 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has only observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces occupy approximately 71 percent of the settlement as of January 7.[3] Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024, likely to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the area and deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas in the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, both of which were Russian main efforts at the time.[4] Russian forces originally committed limited combat power, including elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), Territorial Troops, and some elements of the Central Military District [CMD], to intensified operations near Toretsk in June 2024.[5] Russian forces have made creeping and grinding gains within Toretsk and the nearby settlements since June 2024 but have intensified offensive operations in recent weeks and made tactical gains within northern and northwestern Toretsk.[6]

Russian forces appear to be shifting assault tactics in Toretsk in order to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and facilitate tactical gains within the settlement. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in fireteams of roughly five personnel.[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that Russian forces had made recent gains in Toretsk by attacking in multiple areas at once instead of focusing attacks in one location.[8] Russian forces are likely leveraging their superior manpower quantities to intensify offensive operations and advance within Toretsk.

Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces may intend to consolidate their positions in northwestern Toretsk and central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) to advance along the T-05-16 highway towards Kostyantynivka through Nelipivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillia and the fields around these settlements in an effort to threaten the southern tip of Ukraine's Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk fortress belt, which forms the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defense. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage further advances northwest of Toretsk and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in this area and level the frontline west and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Such advances would complicate Ukraine's ability to counterattack into Russia's near rear southeast of Chasiv Yar, including towards Klishchiivka, and would allow Russian forces to deploy additional artillery systems within range of Kostyantynivka and operate first-person-view (FPV) drones within range of the town. Russian forces may also attempt to advance west and northwest of Niu York and Leonidivka towards the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway to pressure Kostyantynivka further from the south and create a more stable southern flank for a push on Kostyantynivka. Russian forces will likely be able to accomplish more rapid advances in the fields and small settlements north and west of Toretsk than they have been able to make in their grinding advances in urban Toretsk. Russian units in this area may attempt to replicate the short, tactically significant mechanized assaults that Russian forces conducted in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 if they have adequate armored vehicle reserves for this sector.[9]

Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk. Russian forces may attempt to leverage gains within Toretsk and in the Toretsk-Shcherbynivka-Niu York area with recent Russian gains east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket between Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Toretsk. Russian advances east of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk may be part of an ongoing effort to make opportunistic gains that seize any territory, regardless of that territory’s relative insignificance.

Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months. Russian forces achieved their most rapid rates of advance while operating in the fields and small settlements in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 but have struggled to make rapid advances in urban areas including Toretsk.[10] Russian forces have spent the last six months advancing roughly 12 kilometers through Toretsk and have been fighting through Chasiv Yar since April 2024.[11] Russian forces have, in contrast, advanced roughly 18 kilometers west of Selydove since Russian forces seized the settlement in late October 2024 and roughly 20 kilometers north and northwest of Vuhledar since Russian forces seized the settlement in early October 2024.[12] Russian positions in northwestern Toretsk are currently 12 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and Russian forces would likely attempt to advance directly along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Russian forces could possibly be able to threaten significant Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka within the coming two or three months but only if they are able to achieve a rate of advance in the open areas northwest of Toretsk similar to the rate at which they have advanced in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions. The Russian force grouping in Toretsk is likely smaller than the groupings in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions, however, likely does not have prioritized access to Russian reserves, and may not be capable of committing enough troops and materiel to the frontline to accomplish these rates of advance.

Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), including its 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, have been the main forces conducting offensive operations in Toretsk.[13] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in mid-December 2024 that elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are also operating in Toretsk, but ISW has not observed Russian reporting of this brigade operating in the area.[14] The Russian military command may decide to continue offensive operations in the Toretsk direction with the 51st CAA forces that are currently deployed in the area, which would likely result in slower, gradual advances as these limited forces are likely degraded after six months of urban combat.

The Russian military command could choose to redeploy forces from other sectors of the front to the Toretsk direction. The Russian military command could redeploy forces from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions to the Toretsk direction in the future. The Russian military command has been prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions recently and would likely not redeploy forces from these areas to the Toretsk direction until Russian forces had achieved their objectives in these areas. Russian forces' priority objective in the Pokrovsk direction remains unclear at this time, however, as Russian forces appear to be advancing east and southwest of Pokrovsk in order to envelop the town while also advancing westward from the area south of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[15] Russian forces in the Kurakhove direction are currently focused on eliminating the Ukrainian pocket near the Sukhi Yaly River but may also prioritize continued advances westward towards the border area in the future.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that the Russian military command recently withdrew elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) from combat operations near Kurakhove in order to rest and reconstitute and will redeploy these forces to an unspecified frontline area at a future date.[17] The Russian military command will likely choose to recommit the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the front, which could be Toretsk if the command chooses to make that a priority.

The Russian military command may continue to prioritize the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction but deprioritize offensive operations in another sector of the front, such as the Kupyansk or Borova directions, in order to redeploy forces to the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations at varying intensities along the entire front as part of efforts to pin down Ukrainian forces and maintain the strategic initiative.[18] The Russian military command may prefer to maintain this continuous pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline over redeploying forces to the Toretsk direction, although the Russian offensive operations towards Kostyantynivka from the Toretsk area may offer Russian forces the opportunity to make the most operationally significant advances along the frontline. ISW is not prepared to offer a forecast of how the Russians will weigh the effort near Toretsk at this time.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report if the strike killed or wounded Russian personnel. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a strike, reportedly with HIMARS, against a different 810th Naval Infantry Brigade command post near Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 25, killing the brigade’s deputy commander and other staff officers.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area.
• Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months.
• Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas.
• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2025

 Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast. The tempo of Russian offensive operations has remained low east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, along the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) line, and further east near Novooleksandrivka and Arkhanhelske since September 2024 when Russian military command reprioritized offensive operations aimed at seizing Selydove (southwest of Pokrovsk), Kurakhove, and Vuhledar over efforts to seize Pokrovsk.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Russian forces began intensifying offensive operations east of Pokrovsk, and geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[20] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces have likely also seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (both east of Pokrovsk) in recent days and advanced into southeastern Yelyzavetivka (south of Pokrovsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units consolidated positions north of Tymofiivka and along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that Russian forces advanced north of Vozdvyzhenka toward Baranivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Zelene Pole.[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 5 that Russian forces recently resumed attacks in the Mykolaivka-Promin and Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad areas (both east of Pokrovsk) and reinforced the Russian grouping in this area with elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 137 Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 41st CAA, CMD).[23]

The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on December 27.[24] Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest in the near future.[26] The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the fields and small settlements along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.

Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic, aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia's long-term objective of advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[28] The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.

Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30] The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between at least two sectors of the frontline.[31] ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA's AoR within the past month. The Russian military's decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade as a tactical penetration force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.
• Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.
• Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.
• Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.
• The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.
• Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
• Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assesment, January 4, 2025

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[i] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[ii]

Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[iii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[iv] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[v] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[vi] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[vii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[viii] The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses.[ix] Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[x]

Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows damage to the Novatek gas terminal in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[xi] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that its sources stated that Russian forces shot down most of the drones over the port terminal of Novatek subsidiary Novatrans LLC, causing minor damage to a building at the port.[xii] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces downed three drones near Luga Bay but that there was no damage.[xiii] Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces destroyed a total of four drones over Leningrad Oblast.[xiv] The Ust-Luga sea trade port is the second largest in Russia after Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against the Novatek gas terminal at the port in January 2024.[xv]

Astra reported that its sources in the Russian emergency services stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City with at least five drones on the night of January 3 to 4 and that Russian forces shot down all the drones.[xvi] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed at least five drones over Voronezh City overnight and that several drones fell on residential buildings.[xvii] Astra also reported on January 4 that its sources in the Kursk Oblast emergency services stated that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast on January 2 killed seven Russian servicemembers.[xviii] Ukrainian and Russian sources previously stated that the strike targeted a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]).[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.
• Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.
• Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assesment, January 3, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace." Zelensky stated on January 2 that achieving a "just peace" in future negotiations – a concept Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Year’s address – requires a strong Ukrainian military, security guarantees from Western allies, and Ukraine's future membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) in order to deter Russia from renewed aggression against Ukraine.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine cannot achieve a just peace with a small military, such as "40,000 or 50,000 soldiers" – a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial demand during the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and only maintain a force of roughly 50,000 personnel.[2] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded conditions for ending the war that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation, including the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government and Ukraine's demilitarization.[3] These demands have not changed since 2021.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal. Zelensky stated on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine's "arguments for a just peace."[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and "drone-missiles" and at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) will also increase production capacity to about $30 billion worth of goods and attract $1 billion in foreign investment in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is working to mass produce the "Trembita" cruise missile, which has a 90-mile range, a 40-pound payload, and costs $10,000 per missile to produce.[6]

Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities will be able to consider lifting martial law when the "hot phase" of the war comes to an end and when Ukraine is in a "strong position" with a "strong army, a strong package of weapons, [and] security guarantees." Ukraine's law, "On the legal regime of martial law," originally passed in 2000, states that Ukrainian authorities can end martial law "provided that the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity has been eliminated."[8] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberate misreadings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[9] The Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya. The GUR reported on January 3 that the Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship, the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, and the Sparta cargo ship are scheduled to arrive at Tartus on January 5 while the Sparta II cargo ship and the Ivan Skobelev tanker are scheduled to arrive on January 8 to transfer Russian military assets to an unspecified location in Libya.[10] The GUR previously reported in mid-December 2024 that Russia had deployed the Ivan Gren, Alexander Otrakovsky, Sparta, and Sparta II from northern Russia to Syria.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace."
• Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal.
• Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2025

 Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Russian and Ukrainian authorities confirmed that Russian gas ceased flowing through Ukrainian territory as of the morning of January 1, and Russian officials and media largely projected confidence that the cessation of gas supplies through Ukraine will harm Europe but not Russia.[1] The loss of gas revenue will likely negatively affect Russian state energy operator Gazprom, which has been struggling with decreasing gas revenue from Europe since 2022.[2] Bloomberg estimated on January 2 that Gazprom will likely lose $6 billion in gas revenues per year due to the cessation of gas transports through Ukraine.[3] The BBC Russian Service noted on January 1 that Gazprom's main source of income in 2021 came from Russia's 45 percent share of the European gas market at the time but that Russia now has only one remaining route to export gas to Europe — the TurkStream pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Black Sea to Turkey — and that Russian gas currently only accounts for five percent of the European market.[4] The BBC noted that Slovakia and Austria — the final destinations of the blocked Russian gas through Ukraine — have both fully met their energy needs through alternative sources. The Kremlin's efforts to project confidence about the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine mirrors its efforts to coerce Europe into authorizing Russian gas transit to Europe through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Winter 2021–2022, and the Kremlin's renewed posturing in Winter 2024–2025 likely aim to extract economic or diplomatic concessions from Europe, undermine unity within the European Union (EU), and drive a wedge between the US and EU.[5]

Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova. Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Transnistria via Ukraine on January 1, claiming that Moldova failed to pay a debt worth $709 million.[6] An audit by British and Norwegian audit firms, however, found in 2022 that Moldova owed Gazprom only $8.6 million.[7] Moldova recently held talks with Gazprom about transporting gas to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey, but Gazprom refused and did not make the arrangements to do so by the deadline on December 16.[8] Free Gazprom gas has long powered Transnistria's Cuciurgan power station, which exported a significant amount of electricity to Moldova and used the profits from these sales to support Transnistria's budget.[9] The Cuciurgan power station switched to coal reserves on January 1, which reportedly can last about 50 days.[10] Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz stopped gas supplies to most consumers in Transnistria and shut off most of the hot water and heat on January 1.[11] Moldova increased its electricity imports from Romania to make up for lost supplies from Transnistria.[12] Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom offered on January 1 to provide Tiraspoltransgaz technical and commercial assistance to obtain gas from European markets after successful tests on December 31, 2024 to supply Moldova with gas through Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.[13]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations. Zelensky stated in his New Years Eve address on December 31, 2024, that Ukraine seeks to accomplish a "just peace" in the war and announced that Ukraine is once again building its own missiles and produced over one million drones in 2024.[14] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is producing large quantities of "Palyanytsya," "Peklo," "Ruta," "Neptune," and "Sapsan" missiles, some of which Ukrainian forces have yet to use. Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) produced 30 percent of all military equipment that Ukrainian forces used on the frontlines in 2024. Zelensky described Ukrainian missiles and drones as Ukrainian "arguments for a just peace" and noted that Ukraine can only accomplish such a peace if it is strong.

Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies. ZNPP occupation director Yuriy Chernichuk announced on January 1 that Russian occupation officials intend to obtain licenses from Moscow to operate all six of the ZNPP's nuclear reactors by 2028, obtaining a license for the operation of the first reactor by the end of 2025.[15] Ukrainian licenses for the first ZNPP reactor will expire in December 2025, and the Kremlin claimed in 2022 that all licenses would be valid until their expiration or until the ZNPP received Russian licenses.[16] Chernichuk also announced on January 2 that occupation officials plan to replace the ZNPP's foreign-sourced equipment with Russian-made equipment, that Russia will use the ZNPP reactors to supply energy to all of occupied Ukraine, and that Russia will also use the ZNPP to generate power for Russian regions west of the Ural mountains.[17] Chernichuk's stated goal of acquiring licenses for Russia to operate ZNPP's nuclear reactors signals Moscow's long-term territorial intentions and aligns with Russia's broader efforts to de facto legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and further steal Ukraine's critical energy supply.

Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post. Geolocated footage published on January 2 showed a damaged building and Russian military vehicles after a Ukrainian missile strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike, possibly with HIMARS, against the command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the settlement, while Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that the strike damaged the House of Culture in the area.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was holding an award ceremony at the House of Culture.[20]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea. The GUR reported on January 2 that a Ukrainian Magura V5 naval drone used missiles to destroy two Russian Mi-8 helicopters and damage one in the Black Sea on December 31.[21] The GUR previously reported that the naval drone strike only destroyed one helicopter and damaged another.[22] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk doubted Russian reports that there were eight crewmembers aboard the helicopters but noted that the loss of highly trained helicopter crews is significant.[23] Pletenchuk also noted that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea have deprived Russian forces of sustainable logistics in the area, including by damaging the railway on the Kerch Strait Bridge and ferries that transported railway cars and fuel tankers.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military vessels are trying to hide from Ukrainian naval strikes in bays and ports and that Russian forces will only be able to repel Ukrainian naval drones equipped with missiles with jet and fighter aircraft.[25] ISW assesses that increased Ukrainian offensive capabilities in the Black Sea will most likely threaten Russian control over occupied Crimea.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary.
• Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations.
• Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel.

Previous Updates

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