Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.

Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2025

US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future. Trump stated during a phone call with NBC News on March 30 that he is "angry and pissed off" at Putin for disparaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as the leader of Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal" – possibly referring to a general ceasefire or long-term peace in Ukraine – then the United States will place secondary sanctions on all "oil coming out of Russia." Trump stated that the United States will put a "25 percent tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all [Russian] oil." Trump stated that the United States will not allow companies or countries that purchase Russian oil to "do business" in the United States and that the United States could begin imposing secondary sanctions within the next month if Russia, Ukraine, and the United States do not conclude a ceasefire agreement. Trump stated that he will speak with Putin at an unspecified time later this week. Putin reiterated long-standing Russian claims that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader of Ukraine on March 28.[2]

ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreement on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[3]

A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Russian Permanent Representative to the European Union Kirill Logvinov presented a detailed plan to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 30 that supports Putin's recent demand for the UN, United States, and European countries to establish a temporary government in Ukraine in the near future.[4] Logvinov argued that the UN should reach an agreement between the parties to the conflict following the implementation of a ceasefire, either directly or indirectly through intermediaries, on the appropriate transfer of power to the UN. Logvinov suggested that one of the parties, mediators, or the UN Secretary General should submit an official appeal that the UN establish a temporary internal administration in Ukraine. Logvinov specified that the UN Security Council (UNSC), particularly its permanent members, must support the mandate and that any UNSC member can submit a draft proposal on the composition and funding of the temporary government. Logvinov stated that the UN Secretary General should then prepare a report on the temporary administration, particularly noting staffing and budgetary guidelines, after which the UNSC should consider any proposals and submit a final decision on the interim government. Logvinov noted that the final proposal must also "receive the support of the members of the [UNSC], namely the permanent ones." Logvinov's proposal would notably allow Russia (a permanent member of the UNSC) to submit a proposal on the interim Ukrainian government and to veto any proposal that Russia considers unfavorable and would bar Ukraine from any role in the final approval process.

Logvinov and TASS are supporting Putin's recent effort to inject a new demand into discussions about the resolution to the war that is consistent with the Kremlin's long-standing effort to ensure the installation of a government friendly to Russia in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to dictate the sequencing and processes surrounding the demand while holding the ceasefire negotiation hostage to extract additional concessions from the West. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres rejected Putin's proposal to establish a temporary administration in Ukraine and stated that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected on March 28.[5]

Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of March 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 111 Shahed and decoys from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 65 drones over northern, southern, eastern, and central Ukraine and that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian Shahed drones struck a military hospital and civilian buildings in Kharkiv City.[7] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed on March 29 with a recent report from German outlet Bild that Russian forces have altered their long-range drone strike tactic and now have drones loiter several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[8] The milblogger further speculated that these tactics have facilitated recent Russian drone strikes on Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will establish a Space Policy Department.[9] The Ukrainian MoD stated that the Space Policy Department will serve as a single point of contact for domestic and foreign developers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and international partners. The Ukrainian MoD announced a ten-year roadmap to develop the space sector that includes conducting an audit of space infrastructure to identify Ukraine's critical needs and developing domestic satellite and space technology capabilities to integrate into and augment existing Ukrainian defense systems.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future.
• A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).
• Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of March 29 to 30.
• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will establish a Space Policy Department.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 29, 2025

Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified. Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy reported on March 26 that Ukraine and the United States agreed on a list of energy facilities that Russia must stop striking during an energy infrastructure ceasefire but that the US-Ukraine list is at odds with Russia's demands.[i] The Ministry stated that Russia’s list does not prohibit strikes on Ukrainian oil and gas facilities — although the Kremlin reported that the ceasefire protects Russian oil and gas facilities from strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 28 that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will present US officials with evidence of Russian ceasefire violations during Umerov's upcoming trip to the United States.[ii] The exact terms of the energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, as an official trilateral statement or agreement has not been released.

Zelensky stated that Turkey, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States, France, Romania, and Bulgaria could act as potential ceasefire monitors, including a Black Sea moratorium, but stated that all sides “will” hold internal and international consultations regarding “readiness” to conduct monitoring.[iii] US Vice President JD Vance stated on March 28 that the United States and Ukraine have “obviously” achieved an energy infrastructure ceasefire and were “almost done” negotiating a maritime ceasefire.[iv] US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials all appear to be under the impression that an energy infrastructure ceasefire is currently active despite the lack of a formal trilateral agreement or any apparent agreement on the exact terms of the ceasefire.[v]

The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief. Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding the European Union (EU) reconnect the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank), one of Russia's largest banks, to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to implementing a Black Sea truce with Ukraine and as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief.[vi] Unspecified sources close to the Kremlin said Russia is gauging what it can secure from the Trump Administration regarding sanctions in the negotiation processes and is viewing initial success on a Russian reconnection to SWIFT as a precursor to achieving broader sanctions relief in the future. Russia appears to be exploiting the ceasefire negotiations process in an effort to extract concessions from the West, possibly as a tactic to gain leverage for future negotiations and improve its economic situation after three years of diplomatic and economic isolation from the West. Russia, the United States, and Ukraine could implement a Black Sea truce without sanctions relief — as Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey did during the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022 and 2023.[vii] European leaders advised European countries on March 27 to refrain from lifting any sanctions against Russia as Russia continues to occupy and wage war against Ukraine.[viii]

European allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that European countries agreed at the "Coalition of the Willing" summit in Paris on March 27 to expand Ukraine's access to European intelligence, relevant technologies, and satellites and that several unspecified European countries agreed to grant Ukraine an unspecified degree of access to their ammunition stockpiles.[ix] Zelensky noted that Ukraine also agreed with unspecified partners on air defense production licenses, investments in Ukraine's production of drones and missiles, and to continue to work toward artillery licensing. It remains unclear whether the agreed upon licenses stipulate domestic production in Ukraine or foreign production elsewhere in Europe. Zelensky stated that the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany will organize a Ramstein meeting in April 2025. French President Emmanuel Macron pledged on March 26 to provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package valued at 2 billion euros (roughly $2.1 billion) that will include anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air defense missiles, armored vehicles, drones, and additional Mirage fighter jets.[x] Sweden instructed its armed forces on March 28 to allocate a total of 80 million Swedish Kronor (roughly $7.5 million) to Ukraine's Demining and Drone coalitions.[xi] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 27 that Denmark pledged an additional 300 million Danish Kroner (roughly $43.5 million) to a Ukrainian innovation fund that will focus on, among other things, further developing electronic warfare (EW) and drone capabilities.[xii]

Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations. The Associated Press (AP), citing Ukrainian officials, reported on March 29 that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive operation in an unspecified sector of the frontline in the coming weeks in order to maximize pressure on Ukraine and increase Russia's leverage in ongoing ceasefire negotiations.[xiii] Two diplomats from the Group of Seven (G7) countries told AP that they agree with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's recent warnings that Russia is preparing for intensified ground operations in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[xiv] Two Ukrainian commanders stated that Russian forces have recently intensified reconnaissance missions along the frontline and offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov told AP that Russian forces have "recovered" after conducting a temporary operational pause in the Pokrovsk direction in early March 2025. A Ukrainian servicemember stated that Ukrainian intelligence has observed indicators of a significant Russian force grouping near Selydove (south of Pokrovsk). A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Donetsk Oblast told AP that there are concerns that Russia may redeploy forces from the Kursk Oblast to other areas of the frontline, such as the Pokrovsk direction.

ISW has recently observed intensifications in Russian offensive operations in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Orikhiv directions and ongoing Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast aimed at pushing Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[xv] Russian forces have yet to make tactically significant advances in these directions as a result of the intensified activity, and ISW continues to observe localized Ukrainian counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions. Russian forces have at minimum advanced within three kilometers of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in two areas of the Pokrovsk direction, and the Kremlin will likely leverage future Russian advances into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to sow chaos and fear within the information space.[xvi] The Russian military command is unlikely to redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast if Russia intends to conduct a concerted offensive operation to seize or advance closer to Sumy City, and Russia likely does not have enough readily deployable operational-level reserves to conduct significant offensive operations against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia cities without redeploying forces already committed to other areas of the frontline.

It is unlikely that the Russian military is capable of conducting three significant offensive efforts against major Ukrainian cities even after conducting such redeployments, as Russia has suffered significant armored vehicle and personnel losses over the last three years of fighting and has not demonstrated the ability to conduct complex operations involving multiple simultaneous axes of advance since Winter 2022. The Kremlin has thus far appeared unable to generate enough new recruits via ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to significantly increase the Russian force grouping in Ukraine or Russia's strategic- and operational-level reserves available to enter combat in Ukraine  — unless Russian President Vladimir Putin chooses to conduct a deeply unpopular partial reserve call up in the near future, which currently appears unlikely.[xvii] ISW has not observed open-source reports of significant Russian redeployments to the Sumy, Kharkiv, or Zaporizhia directions — which would indicate preparation for a renewed offensive effort in these areas — as of this report and will continue to report on any notable Russian redeployments, though Russian forces may have conducted rotations not observed in open-source reporting. Russian forces may be attempting to advance within artillery range of these cities, however, ahead of a possible ground ceasefire in order to make civilian life in these settlements untenable or prepare for ground operations until a ceasefire is established. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin would likely use any gains into oblasts that Russian forces do not current occupy to gain leverage in future peace negotiations and justify future Russian demands for Ukraine to cede additional territory to Russia, including territory that the Kremlin currently does not demand beyond Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts.[xviii]

Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more deadly Russian strike tactics. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 29 that Russian forces launched 172 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight on March 28 to 29.[xix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 94 drones and that 69 decoy drones became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kryvyi Rih Military Administration Head Oleksandr Vilkul reported on March 29 that Russian forces also launched ballistic missile strikes against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xx] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged a hotel-restaurant complex, houses, and buildings in Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that Russia is targeting Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, contradicting US President Donald Trump's stated objective of using the temporary ceasefire to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.[xxii]

Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella. German outlet BILD reported on March 28 that Russia has intensified and adjusted its use of long-range strike drones, making it increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept them.[xxiii] BILD noted that more Russian drones have recently been successfully breaching the Ukrainian air defense umbrella and that Russian forces have altered their tactics and are now having drones loiter several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones. Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on any changes in Russian strike tactics.[xxiv]

Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on March 28 that Ukraine's MoD and General Staff initiated a large-scale reform of aviation management and established a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff with the aim of optimizing the development of Ukraine's air capabilities.[xxv] Zelensky appointed Oleksandr Kozenko as Deputy Defense Minister for Aviation tasked with heading the new effort.[xxvi] Zelensky noted that Kozenko has been involved in integrating the F-16 and Mirage aircraft into the Ukrainian Air Force. Zelensky also appointed Major General Oleksiy Marchenko as Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Aviation, Brigadier General Serhiy Holubtsov as Deputy Commander of the Air Force, and Colonel Oleksandr Dyakiv as Commander of Aviation and Deputy Commander of the Air Force. Ukrainian officials have not elaborated on the structure of the new chain of command or how it may impact interaction between Ukrainian air and ground forces in joint operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.
• The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief.
• European allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
• Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations.
• Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more deadly Russian strike tactics.
• Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
• Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the launch of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin reiterated longstanding boilerplate rhetoric during a visit to a Russian submarine command post in Murmansk Oblast on March 27, claiming that "Nazis" and people with "neo-Nazi views" have significant influence in the Ukrainian government and that "neo-Nazi groups" have the "actual power in their hands" in Ukraine.[1] Putin reiterated claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024 and additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials. The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[2] Putin claimed that "neo-Nazi formations" are ruling Ukraine in the absence of a legitimate Ukrainian government and questioned how Russia can negotiate with these groups. Putin has previously characterized the Ukrainian government as illegitimate in an effort to justify Russia's unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war and has consistently identified "denazification" – a phrase the Kremlin uses to make its demand for the removal of the Ukrainian government and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet regime – as a goal of his full-scale invasion since February 2022.[3]

Putin repeatedly accused Zelensky of being the illegitimate leader of Ukraine ahead of Putin's February 12 phone call with US President Donald Trump, but has made these accusations much less frequently in recent weeks.[4] Putin notably implicitly acknowledged Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner for the first time in late February 2025, and Putin's March 27 statement appears to be a reintensification of his accusations designed to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy.[5] ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[6]

Putin reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war. Putin claimed that Russia is committed to ending the war in Ukraine but only if a peace agreement addresses the "root causes" of the war.[7] Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for full Ukrainian capitulation with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and commitments of Ukrainian neutrality – the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion.

Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war. Putin proposed that the United Nations (UN), United States, and European countries install a temporary administration in Ukraine that would hold democratic elections to bring to power "a viable government that enjoys the people's trust."[9] Putin claimed that a temporary Ukrainian government would allow Russia to "begin negotiations [with the new Ukrainian administration] on a peace treaty" and "sign legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world." White House National Security Council Spokesperson James Hewitt rightly dismissed Putin's proposal to impose a temporary administration over Ukraine, stating that the Ukrainian Constitution and the Ukrainian people determine Ukraine's governance.[10] UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres also rejected Putin's proposal and stated that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected.[11]

Putin's new demand for an interim government in Ukraine as a precondition for peace negotiations demonstrates how the Kremlin continues to hold negotiations hostage and is attempting to extract additional concessions from the West following the progress made in the ongoing ceasefire negotiations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to its goal to prolong any negotiations for a temporary frontline ceasefire or permanent peace agreement in order to continue making incremental gains on the battlefield and establish favorable conditions to pursue Ukraine's complete capitulation.[12]

The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades into divisions. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 28 that the Russian General Staff approved a program to reorganize the Russian naval infantry forces from brigades into divisions.[13] Putin stated that two brigades, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), will become divisions in 2025, that two more brigades will become divisions in 2026, and that the final brigade will become a division in 2027. Putin also appointed the commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, Major General Mikhail Gudkov, to deputy commander of the Russian Navy on March 28. There are currently five naval infantry brigades in the Russian military: the Pacific Fleet's 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades, the Baltic Fleet's 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, the Northern Fleet's 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, and the Black Sea Fleet's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade.[14] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that Russia intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including the expansion of five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[15] Shoigu stated in January 2023 that Russia intended to only form 12 new maneuver divisions by 2026, however, and did not mention the five naval infantry formations.[16] Putin appears to be renewing this effort, indicating that Russia is likely working to form 17 maneuver divisions over several years.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Putin reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement -- a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war.
• Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war.
• The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades into divisions.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk and Kurakhove, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea. Zelensky stated on March 26 that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia must still resolve unspecified "technical" issues related to the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea but did reach agreements on these ceasefires during talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24 and 25.[1] Zelensky added that that the Ukrainian, US, and Russian technical teams have not yet determined the monitoring mechanisms for temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea, which makes it difficult to assess Russia's compliance.[2] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25 that Ukraine regards any movement of Russian military vessels outside of the eastern part of the Black Sea as a violation of the "commitment to ensure safe navigation of the Black Sea."[3] The Kremlin, however, said on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[4] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged on March 26 that the European Union (EU) must be involved in lifting sanctions on Russia.[5] European Commission Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against Russia only if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and "unconditonal[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[6]

Russia continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on March 27 that neither Ukraine nor Russia struck each other's energy facilities since March 25, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire agreement on the nights of March 25 to 26 and 26 to 27.[7] The temporary ceasefire does not include protections for civilian or non-energy critical infrastructure, and Russian forces have intensified strikes against these objects in recent days.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on the night of March 26 to 27, Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 86 Shahed and other drones from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones and that 26 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro, Sumy, and Kharkiv cities.[10] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 24 that Russia is intentionally targeting populated cities with drones in order to destroy infrastructure and terrorize the local civilian population.[11] Russian forces have repeatedly conducted large strikes against civilian areas in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast; and Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast and port infrastructure in Odesa City since early March 2025 amid discussions of a temporary ceasefire.[12] The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary general ceasefire (which Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected) as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement.[13] Continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, even under the conditions of an alleged ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, will be detrimental to the establishment of a sustainable peace in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that the Ukrainian drone strike destroyed 96 air-launched cruise missiles and that Russian forces intended to use these missiles in at least three separate strike series against Ukraine on unspecified dates in March and April 2025.[14] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted on March 20 that the Engels Airbase stored Kh-101 cruise missiles, suggesting that many or all of the 96 destroyed missiles were Kh-101s.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Engels Airbase drone strike also destroyed significant aviation fuel reserves that supplied Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[16] Russian forces have frequently used Kh-101 cruise missiles in overnight strike series against Ukraine and notablyhit the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in central Kyiv with a Kh-101 missile in July 2024.[17] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told Ukrainian state news outlet Ukrinform on March 26 that Russia is producing high numbers of Kh-101 and Kaliber cruise missiles and Iskander ballistic missiles to replenish its stockpiles and augment their strike packages with more accurate missiles with higher payloads.[18] Skitbitsky reported that Russia is also producing Kinzhal ballistic missiles and Zirkon hypersonic missiles.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Zelensky told French outlet Le Figaro on March 26 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to delay ongoing peace negotiations to buy time for an offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in Spring 2025.[19] Zelensky noted that Russian forces wanted to conduct these offensive operations in Fall 2024 but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 spoiled this plan. Zelensky warned on March 15 and 18 that Russian forces may be preparing for intensified ground operations in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts, although Ukrainian officials have expressed doubts about Russian forces' ability to conduct successful offensive operations in these areas, particularly against Sumy City.[20] Sumy City had a population of 256,000 in 2022 and is roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline. Putin also recently told Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border, including in Sumy Oblast.[21] Russian forces have been conducting intensified ground assaults within northern Sumy Oblast since early March 2025 as part of their effort to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi visited Ukranian forces in Sumy Oblast on March 27 and reported that Russian attacks have intensified in recent days.[22] These Russian assaults are not part of a new offensive effort in Sumy Oblast, although Russian forces could use new positions and momentum gained in the Sumy Oblast border area to support a potential spring offensive operation in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct a successful offensive operation to seize Sumy City but would likely leverage future offensive operations into Sumy Oblast and other oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy to demand that Ukraine cede additional territory to Russia, particularly amid discussions of a potential future peace in Ukraine.[23]

Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.[24] Leaders and representatives from 30 countries including the UK, Ukraine, France, and Germany discussed strengthening Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB) to deter future Russian aggression and ensure Ukraine is in the strongest possible position amid ongoing negotiations with Russia.[25] French President Emmanuel Macron stated that coalition members are developing a plan to send "reassurance forces" to "strategic locations" in Ukraine in the event of a peace treaty with Russia.[26] Macron stated that these forces will aim to deter potential Russian aggression against Ukraine and help train Ukrainian forces but will not serve as peacekeepers or be stationed on the frontlines to monitor possible ceasefires.[27] Macron stated that France and the UK will soon send a joint military delegation to Ukraine to assist in long-term Ukrainian military planning.[28] Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated that European countries should not lift sanctions against Russia as Russia continues to occupy and wage war against Ukraine.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea.
• Russia continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.
• Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts; near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk; and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26, 2025

The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear. Russia and Ukraine appear to agree that a ceasefire against strikes on energy infrastructure is active as of March 25, but US and Ukrainian statements continue to make clear that technical negotiations are ongoing.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on March 26 that Ukraine is still working to develop monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is consistent with US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements on March 25 jointly agreeing to develop measures to implement the energy infrastructure ceasefire.[2] Palisa stated that both ceasefires on Black Sea operations and strikes against energy infrastructure came into force upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian statement on March 25.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 26 that Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 18 order to adhere to the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes.[4] The absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating the specifics of these ceasefires difficult, and the ceasefire terms remain unclear.[5]

Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to strike energy infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25, gas infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on March 25 to 26, and electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff responded on March 26 and denied the Russian MoD's accusations.[7] Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein, Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz notably did not report Ukrainian drone strikes in their respective regions. Russian governors and occupation officials typically publicly announce when Ukrainian drones attempt to strike infrastructure in their regions. Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn stated on March 25 that Russian forces have conducted eight strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since March 18, when Putin claimed to have ordered the Russian military to stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities.[8] Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian overnight strike series have damaged civilian infrastructure across Ukraine almost every night since March 18 but have not specified which strikes specifically damaged energy infrastructure.[9]

Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March 19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can take control of the ZNPP.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP's territory or control over it to Ukraine or any other country is "impossible" and that the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country is "unacceptable."[11] The Russian MFA added that it would be "absurd" to allow any international organization to help operate the ZNPP. The Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia's illegal occupation of the ZNPP by claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 2022 decree legally brought the ZNPP under Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia is not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States.[12] The Kremlin routinely falsely portrays itself as the only safe operator of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian forces occupied the area in March 2022.[13] Russia has notably stored military equipment near the ZNPP reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP grounds to launch strike drones.[14] The Kremlin also routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these narratives to spoil ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.[15]

The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea. European Commission's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against Russia if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and "unconditonal[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[16] Hipper's statement is likely a response to the Kremlin's recent demand that it will not implement the terms of the ceasefire in the Black Sea with Ukraine until the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[17] The United States will likely require EU cooperation in order to lift some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and fertilizer markets.

Key Takeaways:

• The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear.
• Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
• Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk.
• Russia continues reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 25, 2025

US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine remains difficult. The White House issued one readout about the outcomes of the US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia from March 24 and another about the US-Ukrainian talks from March 25.[1] The Kremlin and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov each issued separate statements for Russia and Ukraine.[2] The American, Russian, and Ukrainian statements share some commonalities but differ from each other significantly in other regards. The US readouts, the Kremlin readout, and Umerov commonly stated that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to develop measures for implementing" US President Donald Trump's, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's "agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine."[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine also gave the United States a list of "strategic infrastructure objects" that Ukraine would like protected under a strikes ceasefire.[4] This list is not explicitly mentioned in the US or Russian readouts. The Kremlin later issued a list of Russian and Ukrainian facilities that Russian and American delegations agreed fall under the temporary ceasefire on strikes on the energy system.[5] The Kremlin stated that the list includes oil refineries; oil and gas pipelines and storage facilities, including pumping stations; electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, including power plants, substations, transformers, and distributors; nuclear power plants; and hydroelectric dams. It is unclear if the Russian list of objects is the same list of “strategic infrastructure objects” that Zelensky mentioned. The Kremlin stated that the temporary ceasefire is valid for 30 days starting from March 18, 2025, meaning that the ceasefire will by default expire on April 17, 2025, unless Russia and Ukraine mutually agree to renew it. The Kremlin stated that Russia and Ukraine have the right to consider themselves free from the obligations of the agreement if one of the parties violates the agreement. The mechanisms to monitor and address allegations of violations remain unclear. The Kremlin's list notably only includes energy infrastructure facilities, and it remains unclear whether discussions regarding Zelensky's list of other non-energy facilities that he wants protected under the ceasefire are still ongoing or whether the Kremlin has rejected Zelensky's proposal. Umerov also stated that Ukraine is ready to "ready to organize a separate meeting at the technical level to begin work on implementation mechanisms" for the strikes and Black Sea ceasefires and that "at this point, all parties are going to brief the relevant leadership, and we will announce the dates and times soon."[6] The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that Russia and Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as of March 25.

The US readouts of its bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia and Umerov noted that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea."[7] The Kremlin readout of the US-Russian talks similarly stated that the United States and Russia agreed to such measures as part of a "Black Sea Initiative," but added that there need to be "appropriate control measures through inspection of such vessels."[8] Umerov uniquely added that all Russian military vessels movement "outside of [the] eastern part of the Black Sea" will constitute a violation of the spirit of this agreement and that Ukraine will regard such movement as a violation of the commitment to ensure the safe navigation of the Black Sea and a threat Ukraine's national security.[9] Umerov stated that Ukraine will be able to exercise its right to self-defense in the event of such violations.

All readouts of the March 23 to 25 bilateral meetings noted that the parties "welcome the good offices of third countries with a view toward supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements" and that all parties "will continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace."[10] (Turkey notably helped facilitate the July 2022 grain deal by inspecting commercial vessels transporting foodstuffs in the Black Sea.)[11] The White House and Umerov stated that the United States and Ukraine "agreed that the United States remains committed to helping achieve prisoners of war (POWs) exchanges, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children."[12]

Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement. The US readouts for both its meetings with Russian and Ukrainian delegations noted that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides" of the war must stop, "as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — likely in reference to the unconditional 30-day general ceasefire on the frontline that Trump and Zelensky have already agreed upon, but that Putin rejected on March 18.[13]

The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[14] The Kremlin stated that unspecified actors — presumably the United States — must also reconnect Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations to SWIFT and lift restrictions on trade finance transactions. Additionally, they must lift sanctions restricting companies producing and exporting food and fertilizers and their insurance companies, lift restrictions on servicing ships in ports and sanctions against ships operating under the Russian flag involved in trading food and fertilizer products, and lift restrictions on supplying agricultural machinery and other tools used in food and fertilizer production to Russia. The United States did not provide Russia such demanded sanctions relief when Ukraine and Russia agreed to the grain deal in July 2022.[15] The White House and Kremlin readouts of the US-Russian meetings noted that the "United States will help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions," but the US readout notably did not include explicit language suggesting that Russia‘s acceptance and adherence to the Black Sea ceasefire would be conditional on preliminary US sanctions relief.[16] The United States will likely require European Union (EU) cooperation in order to lift some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and fertilizer markets.[17] US President Donald Trump responded to a question about the United States lifting some sanctions on Russia before Russia implements measures in the Black Sea and stated that the US is considering lifting some sanctions against Russia.[18] Establishing the initial grain deal in July 2022 did not require any sanctions relief, and reinstating the grain deal likely similarly does not require preliminary sanctions relief.[19] Establishing a temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea does not require preliminary sanctions relief.

The Kremlin's official statements are vague, stipulate requirements for the ceasefire that neither the United States nor Ukrainian official statements mention, and leave room for disagreement among the parties that would be involved in interpreting the agreements, lifting sanctions, and monitoring potential violations. The official Kremlin statement is vague on the specific sanctions and restrictions the Kremlin is demanding that the West preliminarily lift and the specific financial organizations and companies involved. The Kremlin statement also does not specify the actors that will interpret the parameters of these restrictions, monitor lifting these restrictions, and verify all parties' compliance. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States issued separate statements because the US-Ukrainian meetings did not discuss US-Russian efforts to assist restoring Russian access to agricultural and trade markets.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine remains difficult.
• The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that Russia and Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as of March 25.
• Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement.
• The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area, near Toretsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to deny rotations to soldiers who have been fighting in the war in Ukraine for years.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2025

US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks are "more technical in nature."[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks discussed proposals for the safety of energy and infrastructure facilities and that the talks were "productive and focused."[2] A source familiar with the bilateral negotiations in Saudi Arabia told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Russian-US meeting on March 24 will consider the ceasefire agreements that Ukraine agreed to on March 23.[3] The source stated that the discussions focused on moratoriums on strikes against energy facilities and civilian infrastructure and attacks in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Presidential Office Advisor Serhii Leshchenko stated that the US–Ukrainian talks concerned a ceasefire against strikes on Russian "facilities at seas and rivers" and against Ukrainian ports in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[4] Leshchenko stated that the Ukrainian delegation will hold additional discussions with the US delegation following the US–Russian talks on March 24.[5] Suspilne reported that the US delegation in the US–Russian talks includes State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and that the Russian delegation includes Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin and Advisor to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Colonel General Sergei Beseda.[6] Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya reported that US National Security Council member Andrew Peek is also participating in the US delegation in the US–Russian talks.[7] Kremlin wire TASS reported that the US and Russian delegations will release a joint statement on March 25.[8] ISW will report on the details of the various bilateral talks as information becomes available in the coming days.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[9] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced into southern Demidovka but denied that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[10] Ukrainian forces began limited attacks into northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 18 and have made marginal advances towards Grafovka (southeast of Demidovka) and Prilesye (south of Demidovka) over the last six days.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that Ukrainian forces also began attacking towards Popovka (west of Demidovka).[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and some armored vehicles and attacking in small infantry groups.[13] Russian sources claimed that Russia redeployed border guards, Chechen Akhmat forces, elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to respond to the Ukrainian attacks in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.[14] ISW will not offer an assessment of Ukraine's intent behind these attacks at this time.

Ukrainian forces appear to be leveraging long-range strikes to complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2) in the area. Ukrainian forces recently conducted two strikes on Russian command posts in western Belgorod Oblast, destroying communications equipment.[15] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 24 that Ukrainian forces downed four Russian helicopters over Belgorod Oblast.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently struck a bridge near Grafovka and another bridge near Nadezhevka (east of Grafovka), likely to complicate Russian logistics in the area.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes, shelling, and HIMARS strikes are also complicating Russian forces' ability to hold some positions in the area.[18]

The Kremlin is recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war. Kremlin officials are likely attempting to capitalize on the current lack of available details about the US–Ukrainian and US–Russian discussions in Riyadh on March 23 and 24. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Ukraine of being "well-bred Nazis" who lack agency as part of Kremlin efforts to justify the Kremlin's demand of "denazification" — or regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv — as a condition to end the war in Ukraine.[19] Lavrov also reiterated claims accusing European countries of seeking to prolong the war in Ukraine, likely to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of violating the proposed moratorium on energy strikes, despite the fact that the proposed moratorium agreement and its contours are not yet finalized and are currently under discussion in Riyadh.[20] Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova attempted to temper domestic expectations for the ongoing talks, stating that there is no need to expect breakthroughs and there is still a lot of work to do on technical issues.[21] These statements continue to signal to the domestic Russian audience that Russians should not expect a meaningful peace in Ukraine in the near term and support Kremlin condition-setting for a protracted war effort.[22]

Recent statements by Russian diplomats and academics indicate that the Kremlin likely aims to prioritize bilateral discussions with the United States over talks to end the war in Ukraine and will set this expectation within Russian society. Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vyacheslav Nikonov recently told the New York Times (NYT) that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees bilateral Russian-US relations as "more important than the question of Ukraine."[23] Other Russian officials and voices indicated to the NYT that it is more important for Russia to accomplish its goals in bilateral US–Russian relations regarding alleviating sanctions pressure, constraining NATO, and seeking a "broader deal" — which likely includes US–Russian bilateral terms — before agreeing to any ceasefire in Ukraine.[24]

Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 23 that Russian occupation officials are forcibly converting and reconsecrating Ukrainian churches into the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) in occupied Kherson Oblast.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that ROC MP priests watch Russian occupation officials torture Ukrainian Protestant Christian believers and force Ukrainian children to pray for the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian World) — a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompasses Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship.[26] ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Ukrainian Orthodox communities and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout southern Ukraine.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area.
• The Kremlin is recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23, 2025

US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea. An unnamed US official told the Financial Times (FT) on March 23 that the talks will cover the technical aspects of the temporary strikes moratorium, including monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that the talks will define the scope of this ceasefire.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov is leading the Ukrainian delegation, which also includes Ukrainian Presidential Office deputy heads Pavlo Palisa and Ihor Zhovka, Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk, MFA State Secretary Oleksandr Karasevich, and several unspecified military officers.[2] FT reported that the US delegation includes US National Security Council member Andrew Peek and State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton.[3] A Ukrainian official told the New York Times (NYT) that the US and Ukrainian delegations may hold additional talks on March 24 depending on the progress of negotiations.[4] The US-Ukrainian meeting is ongoing as of this publication and ISW will report on the details of the talks in-depth on March 24.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies. A Russian insider source claimed on March 23 that the Russian Federation Council Accounts Chamber (the Russian Federation’s highest audit body) recently initiated an audit of the Russian Central Bank to investigate its monetary policy from 2022 to 2024 and the impact of the interest rate on inflation, budget expenditures, and investment.[5] The source claimed that the investigation is "effectively" an attack on Nabiullina. The insider source claimed that a group of lobbyists from large Russian businesses seek interest rate reductions. ISW cannot independently verify this insider source's claim and has not observed other reporting about the alleged audit.

Russian inflation has been rising due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the Russian Central Bank decided in December 2024 to maintain the key interest rate at 21 percent – the highest Russian interest rate since 2003 – as part of efforts to curb growing inflation rates.[6] The Russian Central Bank‘s interest rate through 2025 has remained relatively conservative despite significant and growing inflationary pressures.[7] The Kremlin has claimed in recent months that the inflation rate is about nine to 10 percent, but these figures are likely far below the actual inflation rate, which is likely closer to 20 to 25 percent.[8] Russia's current interest rate should likely be higher, and the Kremlin likely pressured the Central Bank to keep the rate at 21 percent when the Central Bank should have increased it to curb inflation.[9]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has also attempted to shift blame for the rising inflation rate on the Central Bank, and on Nabiullina in particular. This was likely in an effort to draw the ire of the Russian business community away from the Kremlin and onto her, although Nabiullina likely has not been able to exercise fully independent monetary policy. The audit on the Central Bank may be part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to apply political pressure on the bank to prevent further interest rate hikes beyond the current rate of 21 percent, manage the expectations and frustrations of the Russian business community, and further the Kremlin's narrative about Russia's economic stability. The Kremlin’s continued manipulation of the Central Bank's decisions is likely hampering the Russian government's ability to enact sound wartime monetary policies.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea.
• Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2025

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically amplified a number of Russian demands, claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an interview on March 21. Witkoff told American media personality Tucker Carlson in an interview published on March 21 that Russia "100 percent" does not want to invade Europe and that Russia "does not need to absorb Ukraine."[1] Witkoff stated that Russia "reclaimed" five regions in Ukraine — Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — and that Russia "has gotten what [it] wants" and will not want more. The Kremlin has repeatedly and falsely claimed that Crimea and these four oblasts are Russian territory contrary to international law, and Witkoff's statement about Russia "reclaiming" these areas (which Russia has illegally occupied and annexed) amplifies the Kremlin's justifications for its expansionist territorial demands and multiple invasions of Ukraine.

Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences. Surkov previously served as a long-time close advisor to Putin and organized protests in Crimea against the Ukrainian government in 2014.[2] Surkov also oversaw the Kremlin's 2014-2015 project to promote the creation of "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) in eastern Ukraine.[3] Putin relieved Surkov of his duties as Presidential Aide in February 2020.[4] Surkov stated in an interview with French outlet L'Express on March 19 that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be the "military or military and diplomatic crushing of Ukraine" and the "division of this artificial quasi-state into its natural fragments."[5] Surkov stated that Russia will achieve this strategic objective — which Surkov stated has not changed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — even if there are "maneuvers, slowdowns, and pauses along the way." Surkov stated that the return of Ukraine to Russia's desired and self-defined sphere of influence has been a Russian objective since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Surkov claimed that "Ukraine is an artificial political entity" consisting of "at least" three regions — the "Russian" southern and eastern Ukraine, the "Russian-non-Russian" central area, and the "anti-Russian" west. Surkov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine "will separate the Russians and the anti-Russians" and will "confine" the "anti-Russians" to their "historical territory" such that they "stop spreading across Russian soil." Surkov claimed that "perhaps" Ukraine will exist as a "real state" in the future but as a much smaller entity. Surkov implied that Europe will be involved in the future partitioning of Ukraine, claiming that "a balanced division of Ukraine will have to include a share for Brussels." Surkov responded to a question about how he sees Russian borders, stating that the ideology of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) "has no borders" and exists "everywhere there is Russian influence," including cultural, military, economic, ideological, or humanitarian influence. Surkov claimed that Russia's influence varies across regions in the world, but "is never zero." Surkov claimed that Russia "will spread out in all directions." The Kremlin has repeatedly used the idea of the Russian World to justify Russian military interventions into former Soviet states and to claim that areas of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire are historical Russian territories.[6] Surkov's statements about Russia's claims over southern and eastern Ukraine and the future expansion of Russkiy Mir are in direct contrast to Witkoff's statement that Russia has no territorial ambitions beyond Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.

Surkov's statements are consistent with those made by Putin and senior Russian officials, who have recently and repeatedly stated that Russia intends to bring Ukraine under Russian control and establish suzerainty over neighboring countries in order to weaken the West and strengthen Russia's global influence. Senior Russian officials have recently reiterated that any future peace settlement must address the "root causes" of the war, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined as recently as March 10, 2025, as the alleged "threats to Russia's security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and the Russkiy Mir," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media.[7] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko acknowledged on March 17, 2025, that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[8] Putin's 2021 demands also stipulated that NATO commit to not accepting any countries as new members and that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; would ban any NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; would ban deployments of intermediate-range missiles in areas that could reach Russian or NATO state territory; and would ban the United States from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[9] The Kremlin has used the "Russkiy Mir" narrative for decades to justify Russian aggression in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and to set conditions to influence independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire.[10] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly propagated pseudo-history to deny Ukrainian statehood and nationhood and have falsely asserted that Ukraine's Western neighbors have legitimate claims to Ukrainian territory in an effort to sow division between Ukraine and Europe.[11] Putin has recently reamplified Russia's territorial demands that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy, amid ongoing bilateral US-Russia negotiations.[12] Putin and other Russian officials have also recently reamplified Russian narratives that "Novorossiya," which Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, is an "integral" part of Russia.[13] Putin has used the term "Novorossiya" to refer to eastern and southern Ukraine since 2014 to set informational conditions to justify Russia's occupation and territorial ambitions and claimed in 2023 that Odesa City, Crimea, and the entire "Black Sea region" have nothing "to do with Ukraine."[14]

Witkoff uncritically repeated several inaccurate Russian claims regarding the status of the Ukrainian territories that Russia illegally occupies. Witkoff claimed during the March 21 interview that Russian-occupied Crimea, Donbas, and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts are "Russian-speaking" and that "there have been referendums [in these regions] where the overwhelming majority of people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule."[15] Russia has long used similar claims to justify its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, having used the claim that Russia needs to "protect Russian-speakers" in eastern Ukraine to justify the launch of its full-scale invasion in 2022.[16] Russia has routinely undermined its own myth of "protecting Russian speakers" in Ukraine, however, destroying predominantly Russian-speaking cities in eastern Ukraine, killing Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and deporting Russian-speaking Ukrainian children to Russia in violation of international law.[17] The Russian invasions of Ukraine have never been about protecting Russian speakers.[18]

The assertion that the "overwhelming majority" of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation want to be under Russian control is also demonstrably false. Russian manipulations and coercive control tactics in occupied Ukraine are inconsistent with the claim that all residents of occupied Ukraine "want" to be part of Russia.  Russia staged sham referendums in Crimea and parts of Donbas in 2014 and then in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022 in an attempt to claim that most of the population "voted" to be annexed by Russia.[19] These referendums were all conducted under an intense Russian military presence and without legitimate election observers, and Russian authorities likely falsified attendance statistics and manipulated ballots.[20] Annexation referendums in 2022 did not account for the millions of Ukrainians who fled their homes to avoid living under Russian occupation.[21] Russian forces used physical intimidation to force Ukrainian civilians to vote for annexation during the 2022 referendums, with reports from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast suggesting that Russian occupation authorities instituted "at-home" voting in order to allow Russian security forces to enter the homes of Ukrainians and threaten them into voting for annexation at gunpoint.[22] Russian occupation officials also made their provision of humanitarian aid and basic necessities contingent on Ukrainians voting for annexation in the 2022 referendums.[23]

Russian demographic manipulations and mass indoctrination in occupied Ukraine are also at odds with the claim that Ukrainians living under occupation want to be under Russian control. Russian occupation administrators have had to institute coercive measures to force residents into obtaining Russian passports, threatening to deny Ukrainians access to basic services and medical care — demonstrating that there is no mass support in occupied Ukraine for Russian citizenship offers.[24] The extent of Russian pressure on populations in occupied areas is another strong indicator that residents of these areas do not want to be part of Russia but must be coerced to "Russify" — something that should be unnecessary among people who already identify as Russians. Russia has also embarked on a state-directed effort to deport Ukrainians from occupied Ukraine and to import Russians to live in occupied Ukraine, using manipulated demographic data to create the impression that there are more people willingly living in occupied areas.[25] Russia would not have to forcibly deport millions of Ukrainians to Russia if these Ukrainians actually wanted to be part of Russia.[26]

Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald Trump's stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the best interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Trump has said that the United States will try to return as much territory to Ukraine as possible.[27] Trump also recently stated that the United States is interested in taking control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can take control of the ZNPP.[28] Witkoff's March 21 presentation of Russia's territorial demands for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy — undermines Trump's efforts to achieve a resolution to the war favorable to US interests. Ceding territory in these four oblasts to Russia — either along the current frontlines or along the oblasts' administrative boundaries – would not provide Ukraine with the defensible lines required to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression in the future, hindering Trump's stated objective of securing a lasting, sustainable peace in Ukraine.[29] Witkoff also claimed that Ukrainian officials have "conceded" that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO — a preemptive US concession to Russia on one of the Kremlin's main demands as Russia continues to make no concessions in return. Witkoff's statements appear to yield to multiple Kremlin demands before the start of official negotiations for a peace settlement, ceding valuable US and Ukrainian leverage over Russia in future negotiations that the United States will need in order to achieve Trump's desired end to the war.

Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically amplified a number of Russian demands, claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an interview on March 21.
• Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences.
• Surkov's statements are consistent with those made by Putin and senior Russian officials, who have recently and repeatedly stated that Russia intends to bring Ukraine under Russian control and establish suzerainty over neighboring countries in order to weaken the West and strengthen Russia's global influence.
• Witkoff uncritically repeated several inaccurate Russian claims regarding the status of the Ukrainian territories that Russia illegally occupies.
• Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald Trump's stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the best interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to innovate new ways to leverage conscripts to increase the pool of servicemembers eligible for military service in the future.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2025

The Kremlin is weaponizing ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and terms of a future ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to the war. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 21 that Ukrainian forces blew up the Sudzha gas distribution station in Kursk Oblast while withdrawing on the night of March 20 to 21 in order to discredit Russian President Vladimir Putin's "peace initiatives" and to provoke Russia.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff denied the Russian MoD's claim and stated that Russian forces shelled the station, causing a fire.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff warned that Russian authorities are attempting to mislead the international community and discredit Ukraine. Footage published on March 21 shows a fire at the station, although ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the fire.[3] Russian officials seized on the fire to claim falsely that Ukrainian forces violated the proposed 30-day ceasefire banning Russian and Ukrainian strikes on civilian and energy facilities, which is not yet formally in effect and terms of which remain disputed.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russian forces are "implementing" an order from Putin to refrain from striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure in accordance with the US ceasefire proposal.[5] Russian milbloggers observed that the ceasefire proposal has not come into force yet, however, and acknowledged that Russia has continued nightly strikes on Ukraine, including Ukraine's port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, in recent days.[6] Founder of the Kremlin-awarded Rybar telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, recently published a video of himself mocking US officials for believing that Russia is currently or intends to commit to the proposed temporary ceasefire in the area.[7] The exact contours of Putin's supposed order or a future moratorium on energy and infrastructure strikes between Russia and Ukraine remain unclear as of this report.

Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic Russian audience. Peskov claimed in reaction to the Sudzha gas distribution station fire that Ukraine's denial of blowing up the station "shows how much one can believe and trust" Ukrainian officials.[8] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova asked how the United States will "manage" Ukraine given Ukraine's alleged violation of the moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes (that has yet to be finalized and implemented).[9] Zakharova's and Peskov's comments are an effort to revive the narrative that Ukraine is the aggressor in this war, that Ukraine only acts under guidance or pressure from the West, and that the war in Ukraine is an existential risk to the Russian state to which Russia must respond.[10] Russian authorities have also revived narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian nuclear power plants and committing war crimes against Russian civilians to undermine Ukraine's credibility and heighten the invented existential threat to domestic audiences. The Russian Investigative Committee published a summary on March 21 of ongoing criminal investigations, cases, and convictions of Ukrainian soldiers and high-level commanders for allegedly targeting the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and civilians in strikes.[11] ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin was preparing to intensify narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk Oblast to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay talks about temporary ceasefire proposals.[12]

The Kremlin has pushed these narratives consistently throughout the war in an attempt to distract from Russia's actions. Russian forces have committed numerous war crimes on the battlefield and in occupied Ukraine and have endangered the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP) by militarizing it, and a Russian long-range Shahed drone struck the containment structure of the Chornobyl NPP's Reactor No. 4 on February 14.[13] The Kremlin may seek to leverage its narratives falsely portraying Ukraine as recklessly endangering Russian NPPs and being an unsafe operator of the ZNPP to spoil US-Ukrainian bilateral talks, given recent US and Ukrainian official statements about possible US involvement in Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including the Russian-occupied ZNPP.[14]

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that US officials will conduct "shuttle diplomacy" to engage bilaterally with both Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Kellogg stated during an interview on March 20 that US technical teams will conduct "proximity talks," which Kellogg described as "shuttle diplomacy between rooms," in Riyadh with Ukrainian and Russian delegations.[15] CBS Senior Correspondent Jennifer Jacobs reported on March 21 that sources familiar with the matter stated that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz will not attend the upcoming discussions in Riyadh.[16] Jacobs reported that US technical teams intend to meet with the Ukrainian delegation on March 23, the Russian delegation on March 24, and may meet with the Ukrainian delegation again later on March 24 if there is significant progress. Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministry representatives will also not participate in the Riyadh meetings.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 21 that the Ukrainian delegation will present a list of Ukrainian facilities that the strikes moratorium should protect.[18] US and Russian officials previously stated that the March 24 Riyadh meeting will focus on achieving a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea and laying the groundwork for a "full ceasefire."[19]

Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite growing warnings from the US against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu traveled to North Korea on March 21 and met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, likely to discuss Russian-North Korean ties.[20] US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce condemned North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine on March 19, noting that North Korean support to Russia fuels and exacerbates the war in Ukraine.[21] Ukrainian and other Western officials have also continuously noted that North Korean involvement in Russia's offensive operations in Kursk Oblast and broader cooperation with Russia has particularly enhanced North Korea's military capabilities, posing potential security risks in the Asia-Pacific region.[22]

Russian officials also continue to deepen ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov met with PRC Security Minister Wang Xiaohong in Beijing on March 21 to discuss Russia-PRC bilateral relations.[23] Wang noted that the PRC is prepared to support multi-level meetings between Russian and Chinese law enforcement agencies and security services and to strengthen partnership in the fight against terrorism and transnational crime. ISW has observed that the PRC has supported Russia's war effort in Ukraine through sanctions evasion, rhetoric, and even direct military aid while posturing itself as a neutral actor and mediator to end the conflict.[24]

Ukraine's European allies continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Strategic Industries Minister Herman Smetanin announced on March 20 that an unspecified Ukrainian defense enterprise signed an agreement with Norwegian-Finnish ammunition manufacturer NAMMO to deepen bilateral defense industrial cooperation and create a joint venture for 155mm artillery shell production in Ukraine.[25] Deutsche Welle (DW) reported on March 21 that Germany's Bundestag Budget Committee and both houses of parliament approved an additional 3 billion euros (roughly $3.3 billion) in military aid for Ukraine, in addition to Germany's pledged amount of 4 billion euros (roughly $4.3 billion), for Ukraine in 2025 and 8.3 billion euros (roughly $8.9 billion) pledged from 2026 to 2029.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is weaponizing ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and terms of a future ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to the war.
• Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic Russian audience.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that US officials will conduct "shuttle diplomacy" to engage bilaterally with both Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
• Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite growing warnings from the US against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation.
• Russian officials also continue to deepen ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Ukraine's European allies continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian and Western defense officials estimated that the Russian monthly casualty rate is between 20,000 and 35,000 servicemembers.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of March 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 20 that elements of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck the Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast causing a fire, explosions, and a secondary detonation of ammunition in the vicinity of the airfield.[1] Geolocated footage and other footage published on March 20 show an explosion and fire at the Engels Airbase.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use Engels Airbase to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine, and an SBU source told Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne that Engels is a key base for Russian strategic aviation, housing Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160 strategic bombers as well as FAB and KAB glide bombs and cruise missiles storage facilities.[3] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed a large number of Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles that Russian forces use in nightly strikes against Ukraine.[4] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed on March 20 that Ukrainian forces conducted the "most massive drone strike of all time" against Saratov Oblast and that Ukrainian drones struck civilian infrastructure near Engels and caused a fire near the base.[5]

Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have not yet concluded the details of the moratorium against energy infrastructure strikes. The Ukrainian strike against Engels Airbase would not have been subject to this moratorium in any event because it is a military target. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly accused Ukraine of violating the Russia-Ukraine 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy infrastructure" by targeting the Engels Air Base.[6] Russian forces notably conducted strikes against Ukrainian energy and other infrastructure on both nights since Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 18 statements agreeing to the moratorium.[7]

The Kremlin announced that Russia and the United States will hold another round of talks in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia on March 24, and it is unclear whether these talks will include Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide for International Affairs Yuriy Ushakov announced on March 20 that Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director's advisor, Colonel General Sergei Beseda, will lead the Russian delegation in bilateral discussions on the technical details of a possible maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea with US officials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24.[8] Beseda served as the Director of the FSB's Fifth Directorate, which is officially tasked with overseeing operational information and international relations, from 2009 to 2024.[9] Karasin worked in Russia's MFA from the 1970s to 2019 and served as a Deputy Foreign Minister in 1996 and from 2005 to 2019, when Karasin joined the Federation Council.[10] Karasin has headed the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs since 2021. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on March 20 that Russian MFA representatives will not participate in the March 24 talks in Riyadh.[11] US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 19 in response to a question about whether these talks will be bilateral or trilateral that it is "still being discussed or arranged."[12]

Kremlin officials continue to amplify narratives indicating that Putin remains committed to his long-standing goal of conquering Ukraine and is attempting to leverage upcoming ceasefire negotiations to secure preemptive concessions from Ukraine and the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu reiterated claims on March 20 that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate and that Ukrainian authorities must repeal the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin before Ukraine and Russia can discuss the end of the war.[13] Shoigu also claimed that Ukraine must change its constitutional clauses regarding "territorial integrity." The Ukrainian Constitution recognizes occupied Crimea and Sevastopol and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as Ukrainian and forbids the Ukrainian government from amending the constitution if the amendment is "oriented towards the liquidation of [Ukraine's] independence or violation of [Ukraine's] territorial indivisibility."[14] Shoigu is likely calling for Ukrainian authorities to amend the constitution in order to allow Ukraine to recognize Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine.

Russian authorities have repeatedly mischaracterized the Ukrainian Constitution in order to legitimize Russian calls for regime change in Ukraine and to justify Putin's ongoing efforts to delay peace negotiations and blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward peace. Putin claimed that there are "serious risks" associated with Ukraine's "inability to negotiate" in the Kremlin readout of his March 18 call with US President Donald Trump, possibly referring to Putin's previous claims about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's supposed illegitimacy.[15] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian Constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government cannot legally lift martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[16]

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be amplifying Kremlin narratives and lending credibility to some of the Kremlin's demands. The CCP-operated English language China Daily outlet stated in an editorial published on March 19 that the West's unwillingness to halt all military and intelligence support to Ukraine in response to Putin's March 18 demand has "complicat[ed] the path of peace."[17] The editorial states that "no country should build its security on the insecurity of another." The Kremlin reported that Putin demanded that the West stop all military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine as a "key condition" for working towards ending the war during his March 18 call with Trump.[18] Putin has made similar demands for Ukraine to reject foreign military assistance and abandon its aspirations to join an external security bloc — particularly NATO — since the beginning of the war, and the China Daily's editorial appears to be at least in part justifying Putin's long-standing demand that the West cut all military aid to Ukraine.[19]

Kremlin officials are also working to exacerbate tension between the United States and its European allies in order to break Western support for Ukraine and undermine the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 20 that Europe's "plans to militarize" are "clearly at odds with" Putin's and Trump's efforts to pursue peace in Ukraine and that Europe has become a "war party."[20] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 7 that Europe is a "militarized union" that is "deliberately fueling" escalation between the West and Russia.[21] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have also recently framed European countries (in contrast with the United States) as aggressive towards Russia, indicating a new Kremlin effort to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.[22]

Putin continues to condition domestic Russian audiences to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine rather than a sustainable peace built on compromise. Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements in recent days and weeks perpetuating narratives about the difficulty of negotiations, the illegitimacy of Ukrainian officials, and US-European divisions reinforce messaging that Russia expects a prolonged war in Ukraine and peace only on Russian terms. Putin also reportedly directly told Russian businessmen to prepare for a protracted war. Russian business journalists Farida Rustamova and Maxim Tovkaylo reported on March 20 that Putin held a private meeting with Russian businessmen at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Congress ahead of Putin's call with Trump on March 18.[23] Rustamova and Tovkaylo cited two sources at the meeting and one source with knowledge of the meeting as saying that Putin told the businessmen that negotiations to end the war would be slow and difficult and advised the businessmen "not to be naive" given the people and issues involved in negotiations.[24] Putin also publicly stated at the congress that Russia should not expect the West to lift sanctions quickly.[25] The Kremlin has long broadcasted Russian demands for territorial and security concessions beyond the current frontlines as a return on investment for the Russian people to justify the war effort to its domestic audience.[26] Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely continue messaging to domestic audiences that the war in Ukraine remains a protracted Russian effort and that Russia will not make peace in Ukraine quickly.

The Kremlin is intensifying efforts to change the demographic makeup of occupied Ukraine in order to legitimize Putin's claim over occupied areas. Putin signed a decree on March 20 mandating that Ukrainian civilians who are "illegally" living in Russia and occupied Ukraine must "regulate their legal status" or leave Russia and occupied Ukraine by September 10, 2025.[27] The Kremlin has conducted a thorough passportization campaign to coerce Ukrainians living under occupation into obtaining Russian citizenship in efforts to legitimize Russia's territorial claims over occupied areas and tighten control over local populaces.[28] The Kremlin has also conducted Russian repopulation campaigns to artificially decrease the number of Ukrainians living in occupied Ukraine and inflate the number of Russians in these areas.[29] Putin's March 20 decree also obliges "foreigners," presumably including those with Ukrainian citizenship, and stateless persons entering occupied Ukraine to take Russian medical exams and blood tests.[30] The Kremlin has historically used these tests to obtain personal data to later exert pressure on Ukrainians to comply with occupation authorities and serve in the Russian military, as well as to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.[31]

The Kremlin also continues Russifying Ukrainian children in occupied areas to further the destruction of Ukrainian national and cultural identity and to portray Russia as the humane governor of occupied Ukraine. Kremlin Children's Rights Ombudsman Maria Lvova-Belova met with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin on March 20 and claimed that occupation authorities sent 127 ill Ukrainian children to medical treatment in unspecified locations, likely including in Russia, and that 1,346 Ukrainian children participated in the "Day After Tomorrow" social adaptation project for youths.[32] Lvova-Belova stated that occupation officials opened two youth centers in occupied Makiivka and Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and that these centers often host social events for youths, including Ukrainian minors under Russian guardianship.[33] The Kremlin has frequently used forced deportations of Ukrainian children and youth social organizations to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian military-patriotic education and eradicate their Ukrainian identities.[34] Lvova-Belova also proposed that Pushilin create a social system to place 500 Ukrainian children who are currently in state custody in occupied Donetsk Oblast with Russian families and noted that many of these children have relatives who can take in the children.[35] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukraine will not compromise on the return of Ukrainian children to unoccupied Ukraine, and the US-Ukrainian joint statement agreeing on a 30-day ceasefire similarly emphasized the importance of returning forcibly deported Ukrainian children.[36] The Kremlin's continued efforts to forcibly deport and indoctrinate Ukrainian children — instead of working with Ukrainian authorities to return these children to Ukraine — underscores how committed the Kremlin remains to eradicating Ukrainian identity and strengthening its claim over occupied Ukraine.

Kremlin officials continue advertising the possibility of future economic cooperation with the United States, likely to extract preemptive concessions from the United States in ceasefire or peace negotiations. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 20 that it obtained a copy of a letter in which Russian Federation Council Committee on Economic Policy Chairperson Andrei Kutepov proposed to Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov the creation of a rare earth metals fund for cooperation with foreign investors.[37] TASS claimed that the letter states that Russian actors will control the fund and will prevent foreign investors from holding shares directly in foreign projects but will still compensate them.[38] TASS reported that Kutepov first wrote the letter following a December 2024 meeting on subsoil licensing. TASS's decision to platform this letter only now amid ongoing US-Ukrainian talks about a mineral deal indicates that Russian state media likely intended for this letter to offer a more enticing deal to the United States and spoil the US-Ukrainian deal. Senior Russian officials, including Putin, have also recently emphasized economic incentives for the United States, likely in return for concessions favorable to Russia.[39] Trump noted during his March 18 call with Putin that the United States and Russia can conclude "enormous economic deals" after there is peace in Ukraine.[40]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Trump spoke about investments in Ukraine's energy infrastructure during their call on March 19. Zelensky reported on March 19 that the two leaders discussed how the United States can help restore the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[41] Zelensky indicated to Trump that Ukraine is open to US investment in Ukraine's energy infrastructure, including the ZNPP, but reiterated on March 20 that "all nuclear power plants belong to the people of Ukraine."[42] US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 19 that Trump believes a US company's ownership of Ukraine's nuclear power plants and energy facilities would be an effective deterrent against future Russian strikes and would contribute to a positive economic partnership between Ukraine and the United States that would increase Ukraine's economic viability.[43]

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce condemned North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine on March 19 and expressed concern about Russian support to North Korea.[44] Bruce emphasized that North Korea's military cooperation with Russia, including troop deployments, fuels and exacerbates the war in Ukraine. Bruce stressed that both Russia and North Korea bear responsibility for perpetuating the war in Ukraine and called for an end to military support by both sides. North Korea has supplied Russia with Kn-23 ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and personnel in its ongoing effort to support Russia's war against Ukraine.[45] Ukrainian and other Western officials have previously noted that North Korean involvement in Russia's offensive operations in Kursk Oblast and broader cooperation with Russia has particularly enhanced North Korea's military capabilities, possibly posing security risks in the Asia-Pacific region.[46]

Ukraine’s allies continue to provide financial and material military assistance to Ukraine, including funds from frozen Russian assets in Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 20 that Ukraine recently received “several” additional F-16s from unspecified partners.[47] The European Commission announced on March 20 that its exceptional Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan program issued Ukraine the second tranche of funds with revenue generated from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets worth one billion euros (roughly $1.08 billion).[48] The loan is part of the G7-led Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans initiative which plans to provide 45 billion euros (roughly $48.8 billion) in financial support to Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of March 19 to 20.
• Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have not yet concluded the details of the moratorium against energy infrastructure strikes. The Ukrainian strike against Engels Airbase would not have been subject to this moratorium in any event because it is a military target.
• The Kremlin announced that Russia and the United States will hold another round of talks in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia on March 24, and it is unclear whether these talks will include Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue to amplify narratives indicating that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-standing goals of conquering Ukraine and is attempting to leverage upcoming ceasefire negotiations to secure preemptive concessions from Ukraine and the United States.
• Kremlin officials are also working to exacerbate tension between the United States and its European allies in order to break Western support for Ukraine and undermine the NATO alliance.
• Putin continues to condition domestic Russian audiences to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine rather than a sustainable peace built on compromise.
• The Kremlin is intensifying efforts to change the demographic makeup of occupied Ukraine in order to legitimize Putin's claim over occupied areas.
• The Kremlin also continues Russifying Ukrainian children in occupied areas to further the destruction of Ukrainian national and cultural identity and to portray Russia as the humane governor of occupied Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue advertising the possibility of future economic cooperation with the United States, likely to extract preemptive concessions from the United States in ceasefire or peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump spoke about investments in Ukraine's energy infrastructure during their call on March 19.
• US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce condemned North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine on March 19 and expressed concern about Russian support to North Korea.
• Ukraine’s allies continue to provide financial and material military assistance to Ukraine, including funds from frozen Russian assets in Europe.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka
• Russia may extend military veteran status to Russian milbloggers and military correspondents covering the war in Ukraine, likely in an effort to further coopt and appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2025

Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire. Ceasefires take time to negotiate, execute, and monitor and require both sides to agree to cease attacks on specified targets at a specific time and date. Ceasefires also require both sides to agree to mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and to address allegations of violations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 19 that if Russia and Ukraine come to a temporary strikes ceasefire agreement, then Ukraine will prepare a list of "civilian objects, energy objects, infrastructure objects" to give to Ukraine's partners — indicating that Russia and Ukraine have not finalized the details of which targets would be off limits or agreed on an implementation date.[1]

Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet finalized the details of the agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 19 that the temporary ceasefire only applies to "energy infrastructure facilities," and Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Peskov declined to comment on the White House statement — likely referring to the March 18 White House statement following the call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin — that the ceasefire applied to "energy and infrastructure."[2] Trump told the Washington Examiner on March 18 after his call with Putin that Russia agreed to "an immediate ceasefire on energy and infrastructure."[3] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff similarly stated on March 18 after the call that the temporary ceasefire covers "energy and infrastructure in general."[4] The Trump administration's statement following Trump's March 19 call with Zelensky stated that Trump and Zelensky "agreed on a partial ceasefire against energy."[5] Zelensky stated on March 19 that Ukraine is "ready to implement" a ceasefire on strikes against "energy and civilian infrastructure."[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement. The Kremlin is attempting to posture Russia as already adhering to the temporary ceasefire while claiming that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire — even though both parties have not agreed on the details of the agreement or officially implemented the ceasefire. The Kremlin readout of the March 18 phone call between Putin and Trump stated that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military" an order that "corresponded" with his "positive response" to Trump's temporary ceasefire proposal.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that seven Russian drones were en route to striking Ukrainian energy facilities connected to defense industrial enterprises in Mykolaiv Oblast when Putin issued the order to the Russian military.[8] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces received orders to "neutralize" the drones and that Russian forces used Pantsir air defense systems to down six drones and that a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter jet destroyed the other. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 18 to 19, and Zelensky noted on March 19 that Russian drones had struck a hospital in Sumy Oblast and unspecified areas in Donetsk Oblast.[9] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an oil transshipment facility in Krasnodar Krai following the Trump-Putin call and attempted to frame the Ukrainian strike as a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[10] Russian claims that Russia adhered to the ceasefire by abstaining from conducting strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that Ukraine violated the ceasefire are inaccurate as Russia and Ukraine have not yet officially implemented the agreement. Such Russian claims are attempts to take advantage of the lack of clarity about the details of the ceasefire that the Kremlin is injecting. Putin's attempt to confuse and manipulate the temporary strikes ceasefire and blame Ukraine for violations even before the agreement has come into effect is an indicator of how Putin will likely exploit any future agreements.

The Kremlin continues to contradict Trump's report of his call with Putin on March 18. The Kremlin readout of the call stated that Putin called for a halt to all foreign military aid to Ukraine.[11] Peskov claimed on March 19 that Putin and Trump "touched upon" the topic of continuing military aid to Ukraine in their call.[12] Trump stated on March 18 that he and Putin "did not talk about aid at all."[13]

The Kremlin continues to demand that Ukraine cede Ukrainian territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to set conditions to make further territorial demands. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on March 18 that its sources said that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at a private meeting with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Congress on March 18 that Russia would not claim "Odesa and other territories" if unspecified countries — likely Ukraine, the United States and/or European countries — recognize Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia.[14] Putin and other Russian officials have recently reiterated their ongoing demand that Ukraine surrender the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[15] The Kremlin may have intentionally leaked Putin's statement to Kommersant in an attempt to portray Russia's extreme demands to seize the entirety of the four oblasts as reasonable and less extreme than alternatives. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine — including Odesa Oblast.[16] Putin has repeatedly referred to parts of occupied Ukraine as "Novorossiya," having most recently thanked employees of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office in "Donbas and Novorossiya" during a March 19 address to Prosecutor General's Office's Board.[17] Putin has also claimed that Odesa City is a "Russian city."[18] Putin and other senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine cede more territory to Russia as Russian forces continue to push in areas that Russia has not yet formally demanded. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 18 that Russian forces are concentrating in Kursk Oblast on the border with Sumy Oblast and may be preparing new attacks on Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[19] ISW continues to assess that Russia would likely leverage attacks into oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy to fabricate justifications for demands that Ukraine cede additional territory to Russia.

The United States, Ukraine, and Europe continue to agree that Ukraine and Europe must be involved in peace negotiations to end the war, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to exclude Ukraine and Europe from such negotiations. Bloomberg reported on March 18, citing people familiar with the matter, that US officials told European officials that the EU must be involved in any future peace agreement since the Kremlin wants the EU to lift its sanctions on Russia as part of a peace deal. The sources stated that the United States told the EU that America's first priority is "to stop the fighting," after which the United States will discuss "potential security arrangements" for Ukraine.[20] US President Donald Trump told the Washington Examiner on March 18 after his call with Putin that both Russia and Ukraine would have to agree to a "full ceasefire and a [peace] deal."[21] Trump's statement rejects Putin's calls for ongoing negotiations about a ceasefire and future peace negotiations to occur in "bilateral mode" between the United States and Russia.[22]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on March 19. Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 175 POWs, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Russia returned an additional 22 severely wounded Ukrainian soldiers.[23] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for mediating the exchange.[24] The Kremlin initially announced the POW exchange following Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 18 call with US President Donald Trump, during which Putin claimed that Russia would transfer an additional 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian servicemembers in a "gesture of goodwill."[25]

The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent Russian deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention. Alaudinov claimed in a March 19 interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Russian forces recently used blue electrical tape identification marks during an operation in which Russian forces used an underground pipeline to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast and noted that Ukrainian forces also use blue electrical tape.[26] Alaudinov claimed that Russian forces used the blue tape in order to "prevent the Ukrainian military from understanding what was happening" and so that Ukrainian forces "would think that their own units were advancing." Alaudinov noted that Ukrainian drone operators would have "seen people with blue electrical tape" and would have "decided that these were their own units." Alaudinov claimed that Russian forces were attempting to "create panic in [Ukrainian ranks]," allowing Russian force to "inflict maximum damage" while Ukrainian forces "were sorting it out." Alaudinov claimed that Russian forces "were supposed to have blue tape for the first 24 hours of the operation and then change it to red [tape]" — which Russian forces use for identification marks. The Geneva Convention defines perfidy as "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence."[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire.
• Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet finalized the details of the agreement.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement.
• The Kremlin continues to contradict Trump's report of his call with Putin on March 18.
• The Kremlin continues to demand that Ukraine cede Ukrainian territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to set conditions to make further territorial demands.
• The United States, Ukraine, and Europe continue to agree that Ukraine and Europe must be involved in peace negotiations to end the war, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to exclude Ukraine and Europe from such negotiations.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on March 19.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent Russian deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian government should give military awards and social benefits to military instructors and Russian defense industrial base (DIB) employees.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.[1] Putin and US President Donald Trump held a phone call on March 18.[2] The Kremlin's official readout of the call stated that Putin emphasized the need to address the "root causes" of the war.[3] Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian officials’ calls for the elimination of these "root causes" amount to Russian demands for Ukraine's permanent neutrality and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv.[4]

Putin demanded on March 18 that Ukraine stop mobilizing (i.e. recruiting and training) forces during a potential temporary ceasefire. Putin also called for a halt to all foreign military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine but did not discuss Russia's military support from North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran.[5] Putin claimed that Russia and the United States should continue their efforts toward a peace settlement in "bilateral mode," excluding Ukraine or Europe from future negotiations about the war in Ukraine. Putin's demands on the March 18 call parallel the demands he made on March 13.[6]

ISW continues to assess that Putin is attempting to hold the temporary ceasefire proposal hostage in order to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.[7] ISW also continues to assess that Putin's demands for the removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the weakening of the Ukrainian military such that it cannot defend against future Russian aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence remain unchanged.[8] The persistence of Putin's demands for Ukraine's capitulation demonstrates that Putin is not interested in good-faith negotiations to pursue Trump's stated goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time. The Kremlin stated that Putin accepted Trump's proposal for a 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy infrastructure" and that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order," whereas the White House stated that Putin and Trump agreed to "an energy and infrastructure ceasefire."[9] It is unclear which targets are explicitly prohibited under the 30-day moratorium given the difference in language between the two readouts of the call.

The Kremlin also stated that Putin "informed" Trump that Russia and Ukraine will each exchange 175 prisoners of war (POWs) on March 19 and that Russia will also transfer 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers, whom Putin claimed are currently undergoing medical treatment in Russian hospitals, as a "gesture of goodwill." The March 11 US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukrainian and American delegations discussed POW exchanges as part of the peace process, particularly during a potential temporary ceasefire on the frontline.[10] The White House stated on March 18 that Russia and the United States will "immediately" begin negotiations in an unspecified country in the Middle East about a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, a "full ceasefire," and a permanent peace settlement.[11] The Kremlin stated that the United States and Russia are creating "expert groups" to continue efforts to achieve a peace settlement "in bilateral mode."[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky endorsed the Trump-Putin energy strikes moratorium agreement on March 18 and said that Ukraine expects to receive additional information from Trump about the proposal.[13] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not accept a situation in which Russia strikes Ukrainian energy infrastructure and Ukraine is unable to respond.

Putin continues to hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine. Putin rejected a temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea but agreed to participate in negotiations on such an agreement, which Putin will likely use to delay or spoil negotiations for a permanent peace agreement.[14] Putin also did not accept the US-Ukrainian temporary frontline ceasefire and continued to cite concerns that call back to his pre-war demands amounting to Ukraine's total capitulation and regime change. The Kremlin readout stated that Putin and Trump discussed the development of bilateral economic and energy cooperation, though White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that future US-Russian relations would include "enormous economic deals...only when peace has been achieved."[15]

Putin spoke at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Congress before his call with Trump on March 18 and claimed that some Western companies that left Russia following the February 2022 full-scale invasion now seek to return or are taking steps to return to Russia and that Russia will consider this return through the lens of prioritizing Russian businesses.[16] Putin ordered the Russian Cabinet of Ministers to create a procedure for Western businesses to return to Russia.[17] Putin is likely attempting to bypass the Trump administration's stated conditions of concluding economic deals after achieving peace in Ukraine by extracting concessions for sanctions relief or other economic concessions in preliminary talks for a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, as other Kremlin officials have attempted in recent weeks.[18]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area, likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to make battlefield gains. Geolocated footage published on March 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Stepove (east of Kamyanske).[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Shcherbaky (east of Kamyanske), north of Pyatykhatky (southeast of Kamyanske), and toward Lobkove (southeast of Kamyanske).[20] Russian forces continued attacking near Mali Shcherbaky (east of Kamyanske), Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Lobkove on March 18.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 247th and 108th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are responsible for recent Russian advances along the Shcherbaky-Stepove-Pyatykhatky line.[22]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 17 that Russian forces have become more active in the Zaporizhia direction and are taking advantage of improving weather.[23] Voloshyn noted that mud is drying out, and trees are regaining their foliage, so Russian forces are trying to improve their tactical positions by attacking in assault groups of five to seven people. Voloshyn also noted that the number of first-person view (FPV) drones that Russian forces use per day has increased in March 2025 by about 50 drones to about 400 to 420 drones per day.

Russian forces are likely intensifying offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast to push towards Zaporizhzhia City amid continued Kremlin demands that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia Oblast to Russia.[24] Russian forces are also likely trying to draw and fix Ukrainian forces to additional areas of the frontline to allow Russian forces to prioritize certain efforts and make grinding gains across the theater as the weather improves and Russia protracts negotiations.

Ukrainian officials warned in November 2024 about a possible intensification of Russian activity in the Zaporizhia direction, and Russian milbloggers began claiming in late February 2025 that Russian forces intensified activity northwest of Robotyne, especially near Pyatykhakty and Kamyanske.[25] Russian forces have only attempted occasional localized offensive operations west of Orikhiv since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 7 that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to redeploy forces from southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, preventing Russian forces from launching the attack on Zaporizhzhia City they had been planning.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.
• Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time.
• Putin continues to hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area, likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to make battlefield gains.
• Ukrainian forces recently near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova.
• The Russian military is reportedly increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war. Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18 and "want[s] to see if [he and Putin] can bring the war to an end."[i] Trump added that he and Putin will "be talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets."[ii] The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and concurrent implementation."[iii] The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement. Putin rejected the temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war.[iv] Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal negotiations to end the war. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or assets. Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims. The acceptance of these Russian demands in the context of negotiations for an immediate ceasefire would cede valuable US and Ukrainian leverage during future negotiations to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.   

Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed in an interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya on March 17 that Russia continues to demand that Ukraine be a neutral state and that NATO states refuse to accept Ukraine as a member.^[v] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated to RBK Ukraine on March 17 that no country should have a "veto" over Ukraine's choice to participate in alliances, including the EU or NATO.^[vi] Syhiba noted that Ukraine's NATO aspirations are enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution and reflect a "strategic choice of the Ukrainian people." A Russian "veto" of Ukraine's choices about these matters would amount to a denial of Ukraine's ability to make choices about its alliances and security arrangements as a sovereign and independent state. Grushko acknowledged during his interview that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine — demonstrating how Russia's demands to destroy Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state have remained unchanged.^[vii]

The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war. Grushko stated on March 17 that Russia will not accept peacekeepers from the EU, NATO, or individual Western states in post-war Ukraine as Russia considers all of these possible peacekeeping contingents to be "NATO contingents."^[viii] Grushko claimed that any talks about future international peacekeeping missions in Ukraine should only occur after the conclusion of the final peace agreement to end the war and only if parties to the peace agreement agree that the peace agreement requires international support. The Kremlin appears to be trying to dictate the timing and sequence of talks, demanding that final peace talks precede any discussions about peacekeeping missions in post-war Ukraine.^[ix] Russia continues to make clear its rejection of any European involvement in post-war Ukraine — in contradiction to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter. Trump stated on February 26 that Europe should be responsible for security guarantees for Ukraine, and the joint US-Ukrainian March 11 statement outlining the temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukraine reiterated its positions that European partners should be involved in the peace process.^[x] Sybiha stressed the importance of European support to assist in monitoring and enforcing the terms of a permanent ceasefire in Ukraine and noted that Ukraine is already discussing specific details with those European countries willing to deploy peacekeeping forces to Ukraine.[xi] Significant European involvement in post-war Ukraine is critical for any peace settlement that aims to establish an enduring peace in Ukraine.

A strong Ukrainian military backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterrence of future Russian aggression. Sybiha emphasized that there can be no restriction on Ukraine's defensive capabilities or military strength in any future peace agreement and that Ukraine must keep working towards a self-sufficient defense industrial sector to deter further Russian aggression.[xii] Sybiha, responding to a question about Ukraine's fundamental stipulations in "any" future negotiations, stated that Ukraine will not compromise its territorial integrity and sovereignty and "will never recognize occupied territories." Discussions on the permanent status of occupied Ukrainian territory should properly only be a part of negotiations on a permanent settlement of the war.

The United States announced its withdrawal from war crimes monitoring agencies related to the war in Ukraine — essentially a unilateral concession to Russia with no Russian concessions in return. The New York Times, citing an internal letter from the US Department of Justice (DoJ), reported on March 17 that the US DoJ notified the International Center for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression (ICPA) against Ukraine that the United States would withdraw from the organization by the end of March 2025 after having participated in the organization since November 2023.^[xiii] The EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), the ICPA's parent organization, confirmed to SkyNews that the United States is withdrawing from the ICPA.^[xiv] The ICPA is responsible for investigating the leaders directly accountable for crimes committed in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.^[xv] The New York Times also reported that the Trump administration intends to scale back the US DoJ's War Crimes Accountability Team (WarCAT), which the US DoJ established in 2022 to coordinate the DoJ's efforts to hold Russians accountable for war crimes committed in Ukraine.^[xvi]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Barhylevych with Major General Andriy Hnatov on March 16.^[xvii] Zelensky appointed Hnatov to Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on January 26, 2025, and Hnatov previously served as the Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander and Joint Forces Commander.[xviii] Zelensky appointed Barhylevych to serve as the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Inspector General, who monitors compliance with military standards and reform processes.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war.
• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.
• The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war.
• A strong Ukrainian military backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterrence of future Russian aggression.
• The United States announced its withdrawal from war crimes monitoring agencies related to the war in Ukraine – essentially a unilateral concession to Russia with no Russian concessions in return.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Barhylevych with Major General Andriy Hnatov on March 16.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian occupation officials continue to develop analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" programming in occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16, 2025

US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.[1] Waltz also stated that the United States is considering "the reality of the situation on the ground" in diplomatic talks when discussing an end to the war in Ukraine.[2] It is not clear exactly what Waltz meant by "the reality of the situation on the ground." Russian officials have frequently used the narrative that any negotiations must consider the "realities on the ground" to refer to the current frontline in Ukraine and their claims of the inevitability of further Russian battlefield gains.[3] Waltz's acknowledgement that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees is a key aspect of achieving US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine, but stopping hostilities on indefensible lines would limit the effectiveness of security guarantees.

The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression. Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 30 kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for the extremely difficult task of conducting an opposed river crossing undisturbed, significantly increasing the likelihood of success in such an endeavor. Stopping a well-prepared, major mechanized offensive cold is extremely rare in war, which means that a renewed Russian assault would likely threaten both Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia cities, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt," almost immediately. Russia is constructing a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and Russia, which will reinforce Russia's hold on occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern Ukraine.[4]

The US and Europe would likely need to provide military aid to Ukraine more rapidly, in much larger volumes, and at higher cost the closer the ultimate ceasefire lines are to the current frontline. Ukraine would likely need an even larger military with greater capabilities to play its critical role in deterring and, if necessary, defeating future aggression along current frontline (both within Ukraine and along Ukraine’s international border with Russia) that is over 2,100 kilometers long. Enforcing a ceasefire along the current frontline would also require the commitment of large numbers of Western forces. Helping Ukraine regain strategically critical territory, as Trump has suggested he intends to do, could significantly reduce the cost and difficulty of securing a future peace.[5] A ceasefire along more defensible positions would also place Russian forces in a more disadvantaged position for renewed offensive operations, making future Russian aggression less likely.

Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have consistently demanded that Ukraine surrender the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not already occupy, and have reiterated these claims in recent weeks.[6] Russian state media has also recently amplified similar sentiments from Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces.[7] Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[8] Russia currently occupies a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and Russian forces are advancing towards the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. Continued Kremlin statements demanding that Ukraine cede unoccupied Ukrainian territory indicate that the Kremlin and Putin remain committed to these territorial goals despite ongoing negotiations.

Russian officials have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine. Accepting Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine would be a significant concession for Putin. Putin has repeatedly called for Ukraine to permanently abandon its goals of joining NATO or any security bloc and to reject future offers of foreign military assistance, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently claimed that Russia will reject the future deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine and consider any such deployment as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in the war.[9] Russian officials also appear to be generating increased support for their demands in Russian society despite the costs of Russia's protracted war effort, and Putin likely remains committed to securing a return for Russia's investment in the war he regards as sufficient.[10] Putin and Kremlin officials have been regularly broadcasting their demands for Ukrainian territorial and security concessions beyond the current frontlines to the Russian people, underscoring how unlikely Putin is to abandon his ambitions in Ukraine even after a ceasefire.

Russia continues to seize on diplomatic engagements with the United States to normalize its war demands. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on the phone on March 15 and discussed next steps in discussions about a peace agreement in Ukraine.[11] Rubio and Lavrov agreed to continue working toward restoring dialogue between the United States and Russia. The US Department of State's and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' readouts differ, however. Russian readouts emphasized that Rubio and Lavrov discussed implementing "mutual understandings" that were reached during the February 18 bilateral meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, but did not mention more recent US-Russian diplomatic engagements, whereas the US State Department's did not refer to "mutual understandings" reached in Riyadh.[12] This discrepancy in messaging indicates that the Kremlin is seizing specifically on the Riyadh meeting as part of ongoing narrative efforts to portray the United States and Russia as in complete agreement on how to settle the war in Ukraine and to draw attention away from Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.

The United Kingdom (UK) convened a virtual Coalition of the Willing summit on March 15 to reiterate support for Ukraine and discuss plans for peace. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer chaired a virtual meeting with 29 international leaders, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and officials from Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, who have agreed to continue pressuring Russia, supplying military aid to Ukraine, and tightening economic restraints on Russia "to weaken Putin's war machine and bring him to the [negotiating] table."[13] Starmer stated that the Kremlin's delay over the US ceasefire proposal contradicts Putin's stated desire for peace.[14]

An unnamed military source told The Sunday Times on March 16 that 35 countries within the coalition have agreed to supply weapons, logistics, and intelligence support aimed at deterring Putin from resuming offensive operations in the future.[15] The Sunday Times reported on March 16 that Starmer outlined plans to deploy a Western peacekeeping contingent of over 10,000 troops to Ukraine, and an unnamed senior official told the outlet that officials are working at an "unprecedented" speed to establish the contingent. Starmer stated that the coalition will reconvene on March 20 to accelerate efforts to support a potential peace deal in Ukraine.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.
• The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression.
• Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine.
• Russia continues to seize on diplomatic engagements with the United States to normalize its war demands.
• The United Kingdom (UK) convened a virtual Coalition of the Willing summit on March 15 to reiterate support for Ukraine and discuss plans for peace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Russian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to posture as solving issues with the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 15, 2025

Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers published maps on March 14 and 15 showing Russian and Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast that do not indicate Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces, and two Russian milbloggers explicitly denied Putin's claim that Russian forces encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in the area on March 13 and 14.[1] One milblogger characterized Putin's claims as a narrative intended to influence US President Donald Trump ahead of peace negotiations.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to encircle Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, that no encirclement currently exists, and stated that Putin is attempting to delay discussion of the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal by spreading these claims.[3] Independent Ukrainian sources also denied Putin's claims about Russian encirclements of Ukrainian forces and noted that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to maneuver from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast despite a difficult tactical situation.[4] ISW has still not observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated footage suggesting that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian forces appear to maintain egress routes across the international border from their positions in Kursk Oblast as of this publication.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Basivka (northeast of Sumy City in Sumy Oblast).[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on March 15 that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha) and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized the entirety of these settlements.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and are clearing Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Oleshnya and Gornal (both southwest of Sudzha).[8] Russian forces continued attacking near Rubanshchina, Gogolevka, and Guyevo.[9] Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Gogolevka, and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[10]

Ukrainian officials expressed concern about Russian ground operations in northern Sumy Oblast but doubt Russia's ability to conduct an effective concerted offensive operation against Sumy City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian military is accumulating forces along Ukraine's eastern border, indicating Russia's interest in "striking" Sumy Oblast.[11] Zelensky may be referring to Russian efforts to advance far enough into northern Sumy Oblast to get within artillery range of Sumy City. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces are preparing for more "active actions" in the Sumy Oblast border area and to "strike" Sumy Oblast but not conduct an offensive operation against Sumy City.[12] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian assault groups and sabotage and renaissance groups continue to operate along the Sumy Oblast border and are attempting to advance into Ukraine.[13]

The Kremlin is likely preparing to intensify a narrative that accuses Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk Oblast in an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay straightforward discussions about the 30-day ceasefire that US President Donald Trump proposed to Putin. Russian President Vladimir Putin, other facets of the Russian government, Russian state media, and pro-Kremlin mouthpieces have recently intensified claims accusing Ukrainian forces of committing war crimes in Kursk Oblast during their seven-month incursion. Putin asked on March 13, in reaction to the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal, whether Russia should let Ukrainian forces leave Kursk Oblast "after they committed a lot of crimes against civilians" and reiterated claims on March 14 that Ukrainian forces committed "terrorism" in Kursk Oblast.[14] The Russian Investigative Committee announced on March 12 that it is opening investigations into alleged Ukrainian war crimes in areas of Kursk Oblast that endured heavy fighting and announced the conviction of two Ukrainian soldiers for alleged "terrorism" and "war crimes" in Kursk Oblast on March 14.[15] Russian ultranationalist voices, including those with Kremlin affiliations, have been amplifying Putin's statements and Russian state media claims accusing Ukrainian forces of war crimes, including executing civilians in Kursk Oblast, more frequently in recent days.[16] Russian state media has amplified pro-Kremlin voices, including Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein, accusing Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk Oblast since the start of the incursion in August 2024 but has intensified these efforts since February 2025.[17] These claims are unsubstantiated.

Putin likely intends to use this narrative falsely portraying Ukrainian forces as brutal war criminals - as the Kremlin did in late 2021 and 2022 to justify Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine - to spoil or delay discussions about a 30-day ceasefire, especially when contrasted with Putin's efforts to portray himself as a merciful leader.[18] Russian ultranationalist voices used Putin's and Russian state media's allegations of Ukrainian war crimes to support their calls for Russia to reject any ceasefire in Ukraine whatsoever and to justify the brutal treatment of Ukrainian forces on the battlefield.[19] ISW has frequently reported on the sharp uptick of confirmed Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield in 2024 and early 2025 likely under orders from the Russian military command, and ISW observed a report of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs near Sudzha on March 13.[20]

Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 14 to 15, including conducting their third double-tap strike against Ukraine in the past week. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 15 that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 178 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[21] Ukrainian forces downed 130 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts and 38 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that two ballistic missiles struck Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv and Sumy cities and Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast.[22] Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported on March 15 that Russian forces conducted three drone strikes each one hour apart on a residential area of Bohoduhiv, Kharkiv Oblast, likely in an effort to injure and kill Ukrainian first responders in the area.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted double tap strikes against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with missiles on the night of March 11 to 12 and a hospital in Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast with drones on the night of March 13 to 14.[24]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the official Ukrainian delegation to "engage with Ukraine's international partners" in the negotiation process to end the war on March 15. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak will lead the delegation, and the delegation will also include Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Deputy Presidential Administration Head Pavlo Palisa.[25] This is the same delegation who attended the US–Ukrainian meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 11.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication.
• Ukrainian officials expressed concern about Russian ground operations in northern Sumy Oblast but doubt Russia's ability to conduct an effective concerted offensive operation against Sumy City.
• The Kremlin is likely preparing to intensify a narrative that accuses Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk Oblast in an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay straightforward discussions about the 30-day ceasefire that US President Donald Trump proposed to Putin.
• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 14 to 15, including conducting their third double-tap strike against Ukraine in the past week.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the official Ukrainian delegation to "engage with Ukraine's international partners" in the negotiation process to end the war on March 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2025

ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have "isolated" Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is "impossible" for small groups of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast.[i] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave Kursk at all "if" Russian forces can conduct a "physical blockade" in the coming days. Putin stated during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have "blocked" unspecified Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged "encirclement" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in order to influence the political and informational scene.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.

Russian milbloggers have also not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or "blocked" a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[iv] At least one Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs into rear Ukrainian areas.[v]

Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces "encircled" 2,000 Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim.[vi] Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.

Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. President Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on March 14 that Russian forces have "completely surrounded" "thousands" of Ukrainian forces, presumably in Kursk Oblast, and called on Putin to "spare" their lives.[vii] Putin responded directly to Trump's request during the March 14 security council meeting and claimed that Russian forces will guarantee the "life and decent treatment" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast if Ukrainian forces surrender.[viii] Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast have committed crimes against Russian civilians in the area and said that Russia considers the Ukrainian incursion an act of "terrorism." Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities must order Ukrainian forces to surrender in order for Russia to implement Trump's request. Putin is attempting to present himself as a reasonable and merciful leader whom President Trump can engage with and to generate a new narrative to distract from Putin's decision to reject the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on March 13.[ix]

Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Putin received Witkoff in Moscow on the evening of March 13 and reiterated that Putin "supports Trump's position on the settlement in Ukraine" but that there are "questions that need to be answered together."[x] Peskov said that Putin gave Witkoff information to pass to Trump and that Russia and the United States understand that Putin and Trump need to have a conversation and will determine the details of a Putin-Trump phone call in the future.[xi] Neither the Kremlin nor the US government have provided further details about this meeting as of this report.

Peskov's emphasis on a direct Putin-Trump call and Putin's continued refusal to accept the US-Ukrainian proposed ceasefire suggests that Putin likely intends to distract from and prolong any negotiations for a future ceasefire in Ukraine. Putin's recent calls for a direct phone call with Trump are only the latest development in Putin's efforts to posture Russia and the United States as equal on the global stage.[xii] Russian insider sources recently claimed that Putin aims to protract negotiations about a possible temporary ceasefire, and Putin's recent public statements are consistent with these insider claims.[xiii] Leaked documents from a think tank close to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)'s Fifth Service reportedly state that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept a ceasefire in Ukraine before 2026.[xiv] ISW assessed on March 12 that these Russian insider source leaks may have been intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.[xv]

US intelligence reportedly continues to assess that Putin is unwilling to end the war in Ukraine and remains committed to conquering Ukraine, which is consistent with ISW's long-term assessment of Putin's objectives in Ukraine and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. The Washington Post, citing unspecified people familiar with the matter, reported that classified US intelligence reports assess that Putin remains committed to his goal of dominating Ukraine.[xvi] The Washington Post reported that a US intelligence assessment dated March 6, 2025, concluded that Putin remains determined to "hold sway" over Ukraine. Current and former US officials told the Washington Post that if Putin did agree to a temporary ceasefire, Russia would use the ceasefire to rest and refit Russian forces and that Putin would likely break the agreement and falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire. Four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials told NBC on February 18 that intelligence from the United States and US allies shows that Putin still aims to control all of Ukraine and that there is no intelligence suggesting that Putin is ready for a peace deal.[xvii] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, and the Kremlin has maintained its expansionist rhetoric despite recent talks with the Trump administration about peace in Ukraine.[xviii]

Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced within Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha).[xix] Russian forces likely also seized Goncharovka (west of Sudzha), given that NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data from March 14 indicates heavy fighting in the area and that Russian sources recently claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[xx] Other Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka, Goncharovka, and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), and that Russian forces advanced near Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and up to the southern outskirts of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha along the international border).[xxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not yet entered Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha along the international border), and another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions within Oleshnya, Guyevo, and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo along the international border).[xxii] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha), and a milblogger claimed that Russian forces are regrouping for further advances within Kursk Oblast.[xxiii] Elements of the Russian "Kurskiye Vityaz" Assault Battalion, reportedly of the "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), are reportedly operating near Sudzha, and elements of the 1st Battalion of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha).[xxiv]

Russian forces also reportedly continued to advance in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 14 that small Russian assault groups are continuing to attack into northern Sumy Oblast and are trying to advance towards Novenke and Zhuravka (both northeast of Sumy City).[xxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novenke and into northern Basivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxvi] A Russian milblogger reiterated claims on March 14 that Russian forces may attempt to create a "sanitary zone" in Sumy Oblast in the future.[xxvii] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk responded to recent speculation about the possibility of a Russian cross border attack into Chernihiv Oblast and stated that Ukrainian forces have the situation along the international border in Chernihiv Oblast under control and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have operated in the area "for a long time."[xxviii]

Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas, including in Moscow Oblast. Krasnodar Krai authorities reported that Ukrainian drone strikes hit the Tuapse Oil Refinery overnight and caused a fire at one of the oil tanks that burned an area of over 1,000 square meters.[xxix] Geolocated footage published on March 14 shows a burning oil depot in Tuapse.[xxx] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Tuapse Oil Refinery is one of Russia's largest refineries and can process up to 12 million tons of oil per year, supporting Russian military needs in southern Russia and in the Black Sea.[xxxi] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian drone strikes also damaged multiple unspecified facilities in Moscow Oblast on the morning of March 14. Russian authorities and sources claimed that downed Ukrainian drones damaged residential areas in Moscow Oblast while en route to Moscow City and did not report damage to other facilities, however.[xxxii] Footage published on March 14 shows a drone striking a building near the 333rd Combat Training Center in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[xxxiii] Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are also based in Mulino.[xxxiv] Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian state-news outlet Ukrinform on March 14 that SBU drones recently struck gas compressor stations in Saratov and Tambov oblasts and a storage facility for S-300/S-400 air defense missiles near Radkovka, Belgorod Oblast.[xxxv]

Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian drones were able to successfully infiltrate Moscow City's airspace and strike infrastructure in the area despite Russia's efforts to concentrate air defenses around Moscow Oblast.[xxxvi] Kovalenko suggested that Russian authorities have concentrated air defense systems around Moscow City at the expense of other areas in Russia due to a significant shortage of radars and air defense systems. Kovalenko noted that Ukrainian drone strikes have destroyed a significant number of air defense systems and radars both along the front line and within rear areas in Russia and in occupied Ukraine, highlighting that tactical Ukrainian drone strikes have likely significantly degraded Russia's ability to effectively defend strategic-level military and industrial assets in deep rear areas.

The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a corps structure. Ukraine's 3rd Separate Assault Brigade announced on March 14 that the Ukrainian military command restructured the unit as the 3rd Army Corps.[xxxvii] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian military into a "corps structure."[xxxviii] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's efforts to form an echelon between Ukraine’s brigades and operational groups of forces and create a command staff headquarters at this new intermediary echelon will likely improve command and control for Ukrainian brigades and facilitate more effective operations.

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation. Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson announced on March 13 an artillery package for Ukraine worth three billion Swedish Kroner (roughly $300 million), including 18 additional Archer artillery systems, five ARTHUR counter-battery radar systems, and financial support for the Ukrainian shell initiative and domestic artillery production.[xxxix] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov signed a bilateral agreement with Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles on March 14 to strengthen defense cooperation and support Ukrainian military training.[xl] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Dutch Representative Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius to discuss the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal and possible future supply of F-16 jets, drones, and ammunition and Dutch support in further developing Ukrainian weapons production.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine.
• Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
• Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.
• Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas, including in Moscow Oblast.
• The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a corps structure.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed on March 13 that he "agrees" with the temporary ceasefire proposal and that the "idea itself is correct" but that the cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war.[1] Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precede formal negotiations to end the war.[2] Putin also claimed that there are questions that "require painstaking research from both sides." Putin questioned several aspects of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin asked what would happen to the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue to mobilize forces, train newly mobilized soldiers, and receive military aid from its partners and allies. Putin questioned the control and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire and who would give the orders to stop fighting. Putin suggested that he may call President Trump to discuss the "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal. Putin postured military strength during his rejection of the ceasefire proposal, highlighting recent Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and claiming that Russian forces are advancing in "almost all areas of combat."

Putin's rejection of the ceasefire is consistent with March 12 reports from Russian insider sources about the Kremlin's likely response to the proposal.[3] Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account." A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition of the temporary ceasefire. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree. The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to strengthen Russia's negotiating position. ISW assessed on March 12 that these Russian insider source leaks may have been intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.[4] Putin's response to the ceasefire offer suggests that they may also have been at least partially accurate.

Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. The US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal calls for a renewable 30-day cessation of combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and a cessation of operations in the Black Sea.[5] The proposal allows for Russia and Ukraine to extend the ceasefire and assumes the continuation of US intelligence sharing and US and other military assistance to Ukraine. The US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal was explicitly aimed at allowing Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness to make peace and separates the temporary ceasefire from future negotiations to end the war.

Putin's envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly disproportionate advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew hostilities on terms extremely favorable to Russia. Putin's envisioned ceasefire agreement would likely require the United States and Ukraine's other supporters to pause military assistance to Ukraine and require Ukraine to stop recruiting and training personnel. Such a ceasefire agreement would begin to disarm Ukraine if renewed for a long period of time by preventing its military from reconstituting, training, and equipping itself and would cause Ukraine and the West to surrender significant leverage to Russia. Putin did not suggest that Russia would also cease military recruitment efforts, the production of military equipment, and the receipt of military aid from Russia's allies. Russia's ability to continue these measures during a potential ceasefire while preventing Ukraine from doing so would allow Russia to resume offensive operations with better manned and equipped units at a time of its choosing. Russian forces are currently on the offensive across the theater, as Putin observed, so demands that would prevent Ukrainian forces from reconstituting can only be intended to preserve or enhance Russia's ability to resume the offensive at a later date.  Such demands would seem a clear indication that Putin is not, in fact, committed to making peace.

Putin's attempts to introduce a new ceasefire agreement on terms that asymmetrically benefit Russia ignore Trump's stated intention that the ceasefire set conditions for negotiations toward a more comprehensive peace agreement in the future. An agreement along the lines Putin appears to be offering would undermine the Trump administration's stated objective of bringing about a sustainable peace in Ukraine, would reinforce Putin's belief that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine, and would incentivize Putin to resume military operations against Ukraine rather than making any concessions in formal negotiations to end the war.

Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. Putin refused to accept the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on its own terms and is instead demanding additional conditions that would contribute directly to the Kremlin's war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 that the US will "know what the impediment is to peace" in Ukraine if Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal.[6] ISW continues to assess that Putin is disinterested in good faith peace negotiations to end the war.[7] Putin remains committed to accomplishing his long-term goals of installing a pro-Russian puppet regime in Ukraine, undermining Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression and preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO. Putin's rejection of the ceasefire proposal underscores Putin's commitment to securing his objectives in Ukraine, particularly Ukraine's demilitarization, and disinterest in any pause in fighting that does not result in Ukrainian capitulation or at least set conditions for a successful renewal of Russian offensive operations in the future.

Russian forces continue to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs as Russian troops advance closer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on March 13 compared to recent days. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 12 that he ordered Ukrainian forces to withdraw from some unspecified positions within the Kursk salient and move to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast in order to save Ukrainian lives.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, claimed that Russian forces seized and cleared Sudzha and are attacking the remaining settlements along the international border.[9] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are clearing Sudzha and seized Podol (immediately south of Sudzha), Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha), Zaoleshenka (just northwest of Sudzha), Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), and Molovoi (south of Sudzha).[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing towards Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha immediately on the Russian-Ukrainian border) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Oleshnya, Gogolevka (northeast of Oleshnya), Guyevo (south of Sudzha), and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo immediately on the Russian-Ukrainian border).[11] A Russian milblogger continued to claim that renewed Ukrainian HIMARS strikes are slowing the rate of Russian advances south of Sudzha.[12] Drone operators from the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[13]

Russian forces also marginally advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Basivka (northeast of Sumy City).[14] Syrskyi stated that Russian airborne (VDV) and Spetsnaz forces are attacking along the international border and attempting to advance further into Sumy Oblast.[15] Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 12 that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the international border near Novenke (northeast of Sumy City).[16] A Ukrainian source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on March 13 that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in northern Sumy Oblast and are attempting to leverage their manpower advantage to advance in the area.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zhuravka, Basivka, and Novenke (all northeast of Sumy City).[18]

Russian milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces may launch an organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the coming weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.[19] One Russian milblogger claimed that an offensive into Sumy Oblast would significantly strengthen Russia's position in future peace negotiations.[20] Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[21] Putin and other Kremlin officials previously justified Russia's offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an attempt to establish a "buffer zone" to protect Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling.[22] Putin may assess that Russian forces can make significant advances into northern Ukraine following their relatively quicker advances in Kursk Oblast over the previous week, despite the fact that Russian forces have failed to make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast over the last ten months.

Kremlin officials continue to use narratives similar to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational conditions to justify future aggression against NATO member states. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Russian national security-focused magazine National Defense published on March 13 that NATO "traditionally" uses threats as its main instrument in interstate relations and that NATO's "European wing" is continuing its policy on "blocking" Russia in the Baltic region. Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK) is "orchestrating" NATO's "aggravation of the situation" as part of efforts to disrupt negotiations on Ukraine and Russian and American attempts to normalize their bilateral relations. Patrushev also claimed that the Finnish population, unlike Finnish authorities, is friendly to Russia and that the UK has approved Finnish authorities to "do everything to deprive their country [Finland] of its sovereignty." Patrushev threateningly claimed that the Gulf of Finland has a historical "geographic affiliation with Russia" and that "it should not be forgotten that Finland was part of the Russian Empire." Patrushev claimed that the Russian Empire "respected" and "preserved" the Finnish people and language in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Patrushev appeared to try to compare Russia's current war against Ukraine to the Soviet-Finnish Winter War in 1939–1940. Patrushev claimed that Finnish attempts to seize Soviet lands and "actively militarize" created a threat to the USSR and that Finland was "indiscriminately exterminating" the Slavic population in Karelia. Patrushev claimed that the West is "again turning [Finland] into a springboard" for aggression against Russia. The Kremlin has used similar false narratives about the Ukrainian government's discrimination of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine and the military threats that Ukraine supposedly poses to Russia in order to justify Moscow's invasions of Ukraine. Patrushev's claims that the UK is "orchestrating" Finland's and the Baltic states' allegedly threatening behavior are likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to drive wedges between the United States and Europe and to weaken NATO[23] The Kremlin appears to be using the same general narrative playbook that it has used against Ukraine and other former Soviet states but is adjusting its narratives to exploit any tensions among Western states.

Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 13 that there is footage of Russian forces allegedly executing five unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area.[24] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on March 13 that there is footage reportedly filmed near Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast) showing five deceased Ukrainian POWs.[25] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[26]

Russia will likely expand its permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance Russia’s force posture against NATO’s eastern flank. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met in Moscow on March 13 and ratified the Russian-Belarus Union State treaty on security guarantees.[27] The treaty permits Russia to establish military bases and infrastructure in Belarus.[28] Putin noted that the treaty on security guarantees defines Russia's and Belarus' mutual allied obligations to ensure their defense and security using "the entire available arsenal of forces and means." Putin noted that Russia has deployed a joint Regional Group of Forces, modern Russian defense systems, and tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory — all of which Putin claimed "reliably covers" the western borders of Belarus and Russia. ISW forecasted in 2021 that Russia may deploy a permanent Russian force presence in Belarus in order to increase Russia's capacity to threaten NATO's eastern flank and continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the Union State framework to advance its strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
• Putin's envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly disproportionate advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew hostilities on terms extremely favorable to Russia.
• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.
• Russian forces continue to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs as Russian troops advance closer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on March 13 compared to recent days.
• Russian milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces may launch an organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the coming weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.
• Kremlin officials continue to use narratives similar to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational conditions to justify future aggression against NATO member states.
• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law
• Russia will likely expand its permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance Russia’s force posture against NATO’s eastern flank.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.
• Russia continues its crypto-mobilization efforts against the backdrop of US efforts to start the negotiation process to end the war.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2025

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded to a question about Russia's response to the joint temporary ceasefire proposal, stating that "we don't want to get ahead of ourselves."[i] Peskov stated that Russia expects US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to inform the Kremlin about the details of the US-Ukrainian negotiations.[ii] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that its sources in the Russian government stated that the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal surprised the Kremlin, and a source close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin expected the United States to discuss such a proposal with Russia in private before publicly announcing it, thereby providing the Kremlin time to formulate a prepared response.[iii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started. Reuters reported on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address [Russia's] concerns."[iv] Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account."[v] A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire, but did not specify whether such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select countries. Suspending US or other military assistance to Ukraine during a ceasefire would be extremely advantageous to Russia, which continues to receive critical supplies and assistance from Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China.[vi] Such an enormous concession would also destroy US leverage in future negotiations, in addition to violating the conditions under which Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire in the first place.[vii]

Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree.[viii] The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to strengthen Russia's negotiating position. The source added that the conditions of the temporary ceasefire "must suit Russia" and that Russia's agreement to a temporary ceasefire during which Ukraine continues to receive weapons and financing from its partners and allies is "stupid." These leaks may be intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.

Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them. The US-Ukrainian joint statement announcing the temporary ceasefire proposal on March 11 noted that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction between their March 11 temporary ceasefire proposal and future peace negotiations.[ix] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 following the US-Ukrainian talks in Jeddah that the best goodwill gesture Russia can give would be to accept the ceasefire proposal and that if Russia says no, "then we'll know the impediment to peace."[x] Rubio characterized Ukraine's agreement to the ceasefire as the "kind of concession you would need to see in order to end the conflict."[xi] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 12 that Ukraine will use the 30-day ceasefire to prepare agreements with partners regarding a sustainable peace and long-term security guarantees.[xii] The Kremlin's reported intention to make demands supporting its overall war objectives before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire violates the stated purpose of the ceasefire and the sequence of negotiations that US President Donald Trump has laid out. If the Kremlin holds the ceasefire hostage to demand preemptive concessions while continuing to pursue battlefield victories, that would strongly indicate that Russia lacks any urgency about ending the war and is uninterested in making any meaningful concessions.

Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months. Putin outlined in June 2024 — and reiterated in December 2024 — his prerequisite demands for agreeing to a ceasefire.[xiii] These demands include the full Ukrainian withdrawal from the territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy and Ukraine's official abandonment of its goal of joining NATO. Kremlin officials have repeatedly insisted that any peace negotiations to take into consideration the "realities on the ground," and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably claimed on February 24 that Russia would only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the "realities" of the battlefield.[xiv] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire RIA Novosti on February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the "root causes" of the war.[xv] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly claimed that any peace agreement must take into account the "root causes" of the war, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[xvi]

A leaked February 2025 document from a think tank close to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that outlined a possible Kremlin negotiating strategy is largely in line with the Kremlin's recent public rhetoric and the March 12 Russian insider source reports. The Washington Post reported on March 12 that a European intelligence service obtained a document from a Russian think tank close to the Russian FSB's Fifth Service (which oversees operations in Ukraine among other things) written in the week before the February 18 US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia.[xvii] The document states that a peace settlement to the war in Ukraine "cannot happen before 2026," rejects the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine, and calls for recognition of Russia's sovereignty over occupied Ukraine. The document calls for the creation of a buffer zone on the international Ukrainian-Russian border, including near Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts, and a "demilitarized zone" in southern Ukraine near Odesa Oblast and occupied Crimea. The document also states that Russia needs to "completely dismantle" the current Ukrainian government and rejects a possible Ukrainian commitment to not join NATO or to hold elections that include pro-Russian parties as insufficient measures. The document rejects any US plans to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine after any future peace deal and any Ukrainian plans to maintain its current number of military personnel. The document outlines ways in which Russia can strengthen its negotiating position by exacerbating tensions between the United States and both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the EU. The document also calls for Russia to grant the United States access to Russian-controlled minerals in occupied Ukraine and for the Kremlin to focus on normalizing its relations with the United States by restoring embassy functions and appointing Alexander Darchiev as the Russian Ambassador to the United States.

The Kremlin has followed through with many of the document's suggestions in recent weeks. Kremlin officials have recently rejected the possible deployment of European peacekeepers to Ukraine, have identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul (that would have effectively disarmed Ukraine, banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons, and forced Ukraine to commit never to participate in military blocs), and have offered to sign investment deals with the United States to extract minerals in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xviii] Recent Russian rhetoric has also increasingly attempted to drive wedges between the United States and Europe.[xix] Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[xx]

US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine. The SVR Press Bureau reported about the call on March 12 and claimed that Naryshkin and Ratcliffe agreed to main regular contacts to help "ensure international stability and security" and "reduce confrontation" in bilateral relations.[xxi]

Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Sudzha and advanced to southern Zaoleshenka (immediately northwest of Sudzha).[xxii] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on March 12 that Ukrainian forces have started withdrawing from Sudzha.[xxiii] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) with the seizure of Sudzha and claimed that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations in the settlement.[xxiv] Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Basivka (west of Sudzha across the international border in Sumy Oblast).[xxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), west of Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha), within Zaoleshenka, within southeastern Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha), west of Kurilovka, north of Guyevo (both south of Sudzha), and southwest of Zhuravka (west of Sudzha in Sumy Oblast) and west Oleksandriia (south of Sudzha in Sumy Oblast).[xxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Zaoleshenka, Goncharovka, and Guyevo and just across the international border in Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka, Novenke, and Basivka (all west of Sudzha).[xxvii] A Russian milblogger called for Russian forces to create a buffer zone — likely in Sumy Oblast — after Russian forces push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[xxviii]

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes against Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[xxix] ISW cannot independently verify these Russian claims, however. Western media reported on March 5 that the Trump administration specifically suspended intelligence sharing supporting target designation for Ukrainian HIMARS strikes, and US and Ukrainian officials confirmed on March 11 that the United States restarted intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[xxx]

Russan President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin visited a command post in Kursk Oblast and heard reports from Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[xxxi] Gerasimov specifically commended elements of the "Veterany" Assault Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), 11th VDV Brigade, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), and "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Detachment for conducting the operation in which Russian forces used an underground pipeline to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Sudzha. Putin thanked elements of the 76th and 106th VDV divisions, 11th and 83rd VDV brigades, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla), 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), "Akhmat" Spetsnaz, and "Veterany" Assault Detachment for their efforts in Kursk Oblast. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces have yet to completely push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and stated that Russian forces must seize all of Kursk Oblast "in the shortest possible time."

This is only the second time that Putin has visited Russian forces on the frontline since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin visited the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces' headquarters in occupied Kherson Oblast and the "Vostok" Rosgvardia headquarters in occupied Luhansk Oblast in April 2023.[xxxii] Putin wore a military uniform during his visit to the Kursk Oblast headquarters — a notable move as he wore a suit in his April 2023 visits to the frontline. Putin is likely trying to posture himself as an engaged wartime leader and to include himself among the Russian military-political leaders responsible for recent Russian advances in Kursk Oblast.[xxxiii] Putin is also likely attempting to portray himself as a strong and effective military commander ahead of US-Russian meetings, including a meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 during which the delegations will likely discuss the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started.
• Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.
• Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months.
• US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12.
• Russan President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2025

The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on Russia's agreement, and the United States reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.[i] US and Ukrainian representatives met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11 for bilateral talks and agreed to the ceasefire proposal, which the United States will soon propose to Russia. The US-Ukrainian joint statement emphasized that Russia's reciprocity to this ceasefire proposal is the key to achieving peace and noted that the ceasefire can be extended if all parties agree. The joint statement noted that the United States will immediately lift its suspension on intelligence sharing and military assistance to Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine also agreed to finalize a deal on minerals as soon as possible. Ukraine reiterated in the joint statement that European partners will be involved in the peace process. The United States and Ukraine also discussed humanitarian relief to Ukraine, especially during the ceasefire, including the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa confirmed on March 11 that the United States has already resumed the flow of military assistance to Ukraine.[ii] A source close to the Ukrainian government told CNN that the United States also fully restored intelligence sharing to Ukraine on March 11.[iii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the ceasefire would encompass a cease in combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and the cessation of operations in the Black Sea and would begin as soon as Russia agrees to the US proposal.[iv] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded during a press conference on March 11 to a question about a deadline for Russia to respond, stating that the deadline is "as quickly as possible," that the United States will inform Russia about the ceasefire proposal through multiple diplomatic channels, and that the "ball is now in [Russia's] court."[v] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated that he will speak with his Russian counterpart in the coming days and clarified that the resumed US military assistance to Ukraine includes the provision of material authorized under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).[vi] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron expressed support for the 30-day ceasefire proposal and emphasized that the onus to respond is now on Russia.[vii]

Russian ultranationalist voices, including a Russian State Duma deputy, largely rejected the ceasefire proposal on March 11. Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-coopted milbloggers, rejected the ceasefire proposal because the United States and Ukraine will allegedly "abandon" peace "at the first opportunity" and the war in Ukraine is existential for Russia.[viii] One milblogger claimed that accepting the ceasefire would be "pure betrayal and sabotage," and another milblogger questioned the purpose of accepting this ceasefire proposal without achieving Russia's war aims.[ix] Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev stated after the publication of the joint statement that Russia should not agree to the "unacceptable" 30-day ceasefire proposal because it would allow Ukraine to rearm and regroup.[x]

The Kremlin has not officially responded to the ceasefire proposal as of this publication, and Russian state media is attempting to frame earlier official Russian statements about bilateral US-Russian negotiations as responses to the ceasefire proposal. Following the publication of the ceasefire proposal, Russian state media largely amplified a statement from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova from earlier in the day on March 11 saying that Russia "does not rule out" contacts with the United States in the next few days.[xi] Russian State Duma Security Committee member Mikhail Sheremet stated before the joint statement was released that Russia is interested in a settlement in Ukraine but will not allow itself to be deceived, and Russian state media only amplified Sheremet's statement after the ceasefire proposal.[xii] Russian state media is likely attempting to portray the immediate Russian reaction as moderate for domestic audiences until Kremlin officials make public statements and provide a framing for broader Russian media coverage of the proposal.

Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees — the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 11 that France "will refuse any form of demilitarization of Ukraine" and that the "first guarantee of security remains the Ukrainian army."[xiii] Reuters reported that 34 military officials from European NATO states, EU states, Asia, and Oceania, met on March 11 in Paris to assess their militaries' capabilities to maintain Ukraine's long-term military strength and to guarantee Ukrainian security in the event of a permanent ceasefire in the war.[xiv] French President Emmanuel Macron stated after the meeting that Ukraine's partners must "define credible security guarantees" for Ukraine.[xv] A French military official told the Associated Press on March 10 that the meeting would discuss a French and British plan for the creation of a multinational force that would aim to reassure Ukraine and deter another large-scale Russian offensive.[xvi] The official stated that the envisaged force could include heavy weaponry and weapons stockpiles that participating militaries could deploy to help Ukraine defend itself in "hours or days" in the event of a renewed Russian attack. A strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees continues to be the strongest deterrent against another Russian invasion in the future, and Russia has been repeatedly insisting on Ukraine's "demilitarization" and disarmament in order to deny Ukraine this deterrent and allow Russia to renew attacks against Ukraine at a time of Moscow's choosing in the future.

Bloomberg reported on March 11 that Western security officials stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "no intention" of making compromises on territory, peacekeepers, or Ukrainian neutrality and that Putin is prepared to continue fighting if he doesn't achieve his objectives in his war in Ukraine.[xvii] The officials stated that Putin has deliberately made "maximalist" demands, knowing that Ukraine and Europe would likely find these demands unacceptable. Western security officials' reports of the Kremlin's intention to achieve its "maximalist" goals in Ukraine are consistent with Putin's and other Russian officials' public statements, even as the Kremlin has attempted to posture itself as open to negotiations and ending the war.[xviii]

Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have likely begun attacking Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Bondarevka (east of Sudzha), Zamostye, and Makhnovka (both southeast of Sudzha).[xix] Additional geolocated footage published on March 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Zazulevka (north of Sudzha), in the southeastern outskirts of Kolmakov (southeast of Sudzha), and south of Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[xx] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 11 that Russian forces seized Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha), and recent Russian gains north of Kazachya Loknya and east of Sudzha have likely forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Kazachya Loknya and Knyazhiy 2 (north of Sudzha and immediately south of Kazachya Loknya).[xxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kolmakov and Dmitryukov (both southeast of Sudzha) and advanced east of Sverdlikovo along the 38K-030 Koronevo-Sudzha highway.[xxii] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) seized Knyazhiy 1 (north of Sudzha).[xxiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced to the outskirts of Zaoloshenka (just north of Sudzha) and that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are advancing into Sudzha itself from Mirny (east of Sudzha).[xxiv] Russian forces continued attacking within Sudzha itself; north of Sudzha near Kazachya Loknya, Yuzhny, Kubatkino, and Ivashkovsky; and near the international border in Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka.[xxv] Elements of the Russian "Veterany" Assault Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating east of Sudzha near Mirny.[xxvi]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov visited a command post in Kursk Oblast on March 11. Gerasimov heard reports from Kursk Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk and other unspecified Russian commanders about Russian operations in the area.[xxvii]

Russian forces continue conducting raids along the Sumy-Kursk oblast international border. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces, reportedly a sabotage and reconnaissance group, recently advanced southwest of Tetkino (northwest of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast).[xxviii] The assistant head of a Ukrainian border guards detachment stated on March 11 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are conducting operations along the international border in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[xxix] Ukrainian military officials stated that small Russian infantry groups are attempting to gain a foothold in unspecified areas in Sumy Oblast and that Russian forces recently intensified drone and artillery strikes against Sumy Oblast border areas.[xxx]

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and other Ukrainian forces military struck "a number of strategic objects" in Russia on the night of March 10 to 11.[xxxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery's production facilities, which process 11 million tons of oil per year and provide 40 to 50 percent of Moscow City's diesel and gasoline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported explosions near an energy facility in Stalnoi Kon, Oryol Oblast that controls processes within the Druzhba oil pipeline and supplies oil to the Ust-Luga seaport in Leningrad Oblast. Moscow City and Oblast officials claimed that drone debris fell in Domodedovo and Leninsky Raion and struck civilian infrastructure and industrial enterprises in Ramenskoye and Domodedovo.[xxxii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that it geolocated footage reportedly filmed on the morning of March 11 showing the aftermath of drone strikes against the Oka-Tsentr oil depot in Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast.[xxxiii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 343 drones overnight, including 91 over Moscow Oblast.[xxxiv] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that drones struck Moscow City, the Dyagilevo Airbase in Ryazan City, and Kursk Oblast.[xxxv] Astra also stated that locals in Ryazan City reported explosions as drones reportedly struck the Dyagilevo Airbase.[xxxvi] Ryazan Oblast Governor claimed that Russian forces destroyed 22 drones over the oblast and that there was no material damage.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on Russia's agreement, and the US reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.
• Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees – the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement.
• Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have likely begun attacking Sudzha.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Robotyne and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to expand social benefits for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including soldiers who have fought for the militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 10, 2025

Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered. Reuters reported on March 9 that two US officials stated that the US is planning to use the March 11 US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia "in part to determine whether Ukraine is willing to make material concessions to Russia to end the war."[1] One US official stated that Ukraine cannot say both "I want peace" and "I refuse to compromise on anything" at the upcoming talks. The other US official stated that the US wants "to see if the Ukrainians are interested not just in peace, but in a realistic [emphasis added] peace." The Financial Times reported on March 9 that unspecified officials briefed on the upcoming US-Ukrainian negotiations stated that Ukraine will propose a partial ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and combat operations in the Black Sea.[2] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on March 10 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian delegation's position stated that Ukraine will also propose a prisoner of war (POW) exchange.[3] The Ukrainian source noted that these proposals are "realistic to implement quickly" and to "control." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky first suggested a ceasefire in the air and sea on March 5, and Ukraine is offering the kind of ceasefires that are more straightforward and do not require extended negotiations or a complex monitoring process.[4] A ceasefire along the thousand kilometers of complex front line characterized by multiple “gray zones” where the lines of opposing forces are blurred would be extremely difficult to negotiate and monitor.  Zelensky has also indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace.[5]

Russian officials, in contrast, continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2021 and 2022 demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war.[6] Lavrov defined the "root causes" of the war as the alleged "threats to Russia's security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and the Russian World [Russkiy Mir]," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. Lavrov similarly defined the alleged "root causes" of the war in late December 2024, and the Kremlin's rhetoric on this topic has not changed in the over two months, even after the start of US-Russian bilateral talks in February 2024.[7] Russia's repeated rhetoric about the "root causes" of the war and constant reiteration of its specific unchanged demands contrast sharply with the flexibility Ukraine has shown.[8]

Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to the "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that US and Russian diplomats voted the same way for the first time in three years against the Ukrainian- and European-backed United Nations (UN) resolution on February 24.[9] This resolution commemorated the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[10] Lavrov claimed that the "ultraliberal ruling elites of the West," support Ukraine and that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) maintain "predatory, colonial habits." Lavrov notably did not mention the United States, likely in an attempt to drive a perceived ideological wedge between the United States and Europe. Lavrov's use of the "ruling elites" narrative echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin's February 27 claim that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun.[11] Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on March 10 that the UK government is prioritizing "undermining Trump's peace efforts" and has tasked non-governmental organizations with "demonizing" Trump.[12] The SVR notably made such claims ahead of the UK’s hosting of a virtual meeting on March 15 with mainly European and British commonwealth countries to support a ceasefire agreement.[13] Russian officials are likely attempting to leverage Trump administration statements and actions to divide the United States and Europe and will likely continue such efforts to secure maximum concessions on Ukraine from the US, Europe, and Ukraine as well as to fracture the US-Europe relationship to Russia’s benefit.[14]

Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[15] Elements of the Russian 44th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly attacking near Martynovka.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Agronom and Kolmakov (both east of Sudzha), Mikhailovka (northeast of Sudzha), and Bogdanovka (north of Sudzha).[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in Mirny (east of Sudzha) and Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha).[18] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also attacking the outskirts of Sudzha, north of Sudzha near Ivashkovskiy, east of Sudzha near Dmitryukov, and south of Sudzha near Melovoi and Guyevo.[19] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and up to two battalions of North Korean forces are reportedly attacking south of Sudzha near Kurilovka and Guyevo.[20]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the international border. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 10 that Ukraine is reinforcing its force grouping in Kursk and Sumy oblasts with additional drone and electronic warfare (EW) units and that Ukrainian forces are successfully countering the threat of Russian encirclement in Kursk Oblast and along the international border.[21] Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that Ukrainian forces are working to repel Russian attacks in the direction of Novenke and Zhuravka (both northeast of Sumy City) and noted that Russian forces are trying to cut Ukraine's main ground line of communication (GLOC) along the Sumy City-Sudzha H-07 highway.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novenke, Zhuravka, and Basivka (also northeast of Sumy City).[23] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are operating in Zhuravka.[24] Demchenko stated that Russian forces do not currently have the capacity to conduct a significant cross border operation into other areas of northern Ukraine.[25]

Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov signed a memorandum of understanding with German defense manufacturer Diehl Defense on March 9 to triple the supply of IRIS-T air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine and establish longer-term industrial projects that will strengthen Ukraine's air defense.[26] Director of the Procurement Policy Department of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) Hlib Kanevsky reported on March 10 that the MoD plans to purchase approximately 4.5 million first-person view (FPV) drones from domestic producers in 2025 — the projected limit of Ukrainian domestic drone production for 2025.[27] The MoD announced that it will allocate an estimated 102 billion Ukrainian hryvnia (approximately $2.4 billion) to this initiative. Ukrainian Armor LLC CEO Vladyslav Belbas announced on March 10 that the company is on track to produce at least 50 percent more Novator armored vehicles in 2025 compared to 2024 and that the company aims to provide Ukrainian forces with several hundred armored vehicles.[28] Belbas noted that the company delivered over 100 armored vehicles to Ukrainian forces as of August 2024.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered.
• Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe.
• Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days.
• Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions for the Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to Russian veterans, which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2025

Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya (just south of Novaya Sorochina), and Lebedevka (south of Malaya Loknya), and the fields between the settlements.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Malaya Loknya and that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) seized Lebedevka.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pravda and Ivashkovshyi (both north of Sudzha) and positions along an unspecified area of the railway line between Malaya Loknya and Sudzha.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) participated in the seizure of Kubatkin (north of Sudzha ) and Pravda and that additional elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are advancing into Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha)  from Lebedevka.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops hold limited positions in Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) but that most Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from positions in the northern part of the salient towards Kazachya Loknya and Sudzha.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that preparatory Russian efforts to destroy the bridges north and south of Sudzha have significantly complicated Ukraine's ability to withdraw back to Sudzha.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Malaya Loknya.[7]

Russian forces reportedly advanced in Sudzha itself with support from North Korean forces. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into the industrial area in northeastern Sudzha and that Russian forces maintain positions in the town along the east bank of the Sudzha River.[8] One Russian milblogger claimed that some areas of the industrial zone are a contested "gray zone."[9] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance into central Sudzha and crossed to the west bank of the Sudzha River in at least one place in the town.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced into Knyazhiy 1 and Knyazhiy 2 (both northwest of Sudzha) and the Zamoste Microraion in southeastern Sudzha.[11] Ukrainian sources told the Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on March 9 that up to two battalions of North Korean forces operating near Sudzha appear to be better trained and "acting more coherently."[12]

Russian forces recently advanced just across the international border of the Kursk Oblast salient into Sumy Oblast and reportedly advanced south of Sudzha City. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Novenke (northeast of Sumy City and just across the international border in Sumy Oblast).[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced to Melavoy (south of Sudzha) and Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha).[14] A Ukrainian soldier operating in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces advanced south of Sudzha due to support from North Korean forces and Russian forces' "massive" use of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked near the Sudzha border checkpoint (southwest of Sudzha along the H-07 highway) and that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) attacked near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Melovoy and Goncharovka (immediately west of Sudzha).[17]

The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy. Russia has been attempting to push Ukrainian forces from the salient in Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the incursion began in August 2024. Russia later deployed roughly 12,000 North Korean military personnel in October 2024 to assist in repelling the incursion, but Russian forces continued to make only gradual gains.[18] The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, although there continue to be conflicting reports about the details about the US suspension.[19] Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7.[20] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence started reporting more rapid Russian advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5.[21] A source in the Ukrainian government stated in a March 8 Time article that the US intelligence sharing suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most.[22] The Russian military has not previously prioritized the effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast over making further advances in eastern Ukraine despite concentrating a sufficient force grouping to do so in late 2024.[23] A direct link between the suspension of US intelligence sharing and the start of the collapse of Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast is unclear, although Kremlin officials have recently announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground" during the limited time frame before the possible future resumption of US intelligence sharing and military aid to Ukraine.[24]

Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia. Forbes stated on March 7 that the Trump administration has halted US support for Ukraine's F-16 fighter jet radar jammers.[25] The Wall Street Journal reported on March 8 that a source familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine is currently able to fire one artillery shell for every three that Russian forces fire – even with Ukraine's current supplies of US shells.[26] The suspension of US support to Ukrainian F-16 radar jammers will likely hamper Ukraine's ability to continue to use the aircraft to defend against Russian strikes into Ukraine's rear.[27] Ukrainian officials indicated in December 2024 that Ukrainian forces had been able to gain an artillery advantage of 1.5 to one or three-to-one in some areas of the front, and Russia's current artillery advantage over Ukraine will likely continue to grow as Ukraine's stockpiles of US ammunition decrease further following the US suspension of military aid.

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and financial aid to Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 8 that France will use accrued interest from frozen Russian assets to provide Ukraine with military aid worth 195 million euros (roughly $211 million).[28] Lecornu noted that the funds will facilitate France’s delivery of 155mm artillery shells and AASM Hammer missiles to Ukraine, which are compatible with Ukraine's French-supplied Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Lecornu added that France is accelerating the transfer of unspecified older armored fighting vehicles to Ukraine. Norway’s Parliament agreed on March 6 to increase military aid to Ukraine to a total of 85 billion Norwegian kroner (roughly $7.8 billion) in 2025 - an increase from Norway’s November 2024 pledge to allocate roughly 35 billion Norwegian kroner (roughly  .[29]

Ukraine's European partners may be able to independently supply commercially available satellite imagery to Ukraine amid the suspension of Ukraine's access to US portals with such imagery. The Financial Times reported on March 8 that Anders Linder, the head of the international division of commercial satellite imagery supplier Maxar Technologies, stated that any of Maxar's commercial customers – including US allies and partners – can use the data that they purchase from Maxar "however they see fit," including by "sharing it with their allies, such as Ukraine."[30] Politico reported on March 7 that Maxar stated that the Trump administration had "decided to temporarily suspend Ukrainian accounts in G-EGD" - the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery System, which is the main portal for accessing commercial imagery that the US government has purchased.[31] European states have reportedly been discussing ways to compensate for the intelligence that the US has stopped providing Ukraine.[32]

Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia. Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran announced on March 9 the opening of their annual trilateral “Maritime Security Belt – 2025" naval exercise in Chabahar Port, Iran.  Iranian state-affiliated media outlet Mehr News Agency stated that the exercises will begin on March  11.[34] Russia, the PRC, and Iran conducted the exercise in 2019, 2022, 2023, and 202 4,  and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the objective of the exercise is to “ensure maritime security, combat piracy and terrorism at sea, and protect sea communications.”[35] The PRC MoD claimed that the exercises are aimed at "deepening mutual trust and pragmatic cooperation between the armed forces of the three  countries."[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area.
• The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy.
• Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and financial aid to Ukraine.
• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2025

The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear. The Washington Post reported on March 7 that a statement by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) noted that the NGA "temporarily suspended [Ukraine's] access" to the system that provides Ukraine with commercial satellite imagery that the United States has purchased.[1] Ukraine can reportedly still access imagery that it has purchased with its own accounts. A Ukrainian servicemember told the Washington Post that satellite service near Pokrovsk "simply disappeared" but that Ukrainian forces will "use [their] own plans." CNN reported on March 7 that two US defense officials stated that the United States is still sharing intelligence with Ukraine that can help Ukrainian forces "defend" themselves but has "scaled back" the sharing of intelligence that Ukrainian forces could use for offensive targeting of Russian forces.[2] Politico reported on March 8 that a European official familiar with the intelligence capabilities of allies was "still puzzling" over the extent of the US intelligence sharing suspension and stated that European states may not be able to "bridge the gap."[3] A source familiar with talks among the NATO allies about how to handle the US suspension reportedly stated that NATO members are not prohibited from sharing some US intelligence with Ukraine but that such sharing could be very limited as the NATO allies are trying to avoid "jeopardizing" their relationships with the United States or with each other. Politico reported that one NATO official stated that there is no pressure from the Trump administration to reduce or curtail allies' intelligence sharing or weapons deliveries to Ukraine.

Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects. Time reported on March 8 that five senior Western and Ukrainian officials and military officers stated that the suspension of US intelligence to Ukraine has helped Russian forces advance on the battlefield.[4] An unspecified officer told Time that the suspension has left Ukrainian forces unable to use "some of their best weapons systems." A source in the Ukrainian government stated that the suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most and that Ukrainian forces have lost the ability to detect Russian aircraft approaching Ukraine — compromising Ukrainian authorities' ability to warn civilians and military personnel about incoming Russian strikes. CNN reported on March 8 that a Ukrainian official stated that Ukrainian forces may run out of artillery shells by May or June 2025 — likely referring only to stockpiles of US-supplied ammunition.[5] A Ukrainian official also told CNN that Ukraine may exhaust its stockpile of Patriot air defense missiles, upon which Ukraine relies to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles, "in a matter of weeks." ISW cannot independently verify statements about the effects on the ground of the US intelligence sharing suspension. ISW continues to assess, however, that the complete suspension of US intelligence sharing would damage Ukraine's ability to use long-range strikes to generate battlefield effects and defend against Russian offensive operations and would allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).[6]

European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Christophe Lemonde stated on March 8 that European states discussed how to try to compensate for the intelligence that the United States "may stop providing" during that March 6 EU summit.[7] French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 6 that France would continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine.[8] French outlet Intelligence Online reported on March 7 that Safran.AI, a subsidiary of French defense corporation Safran, will provide Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with a data fusion platform to analyze French satellite imagery and that Safran.AI and the GUR signed the agreement at the end of February 2025 — before the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[9] Two Ukrainian officers told Time that some European intelligence agencies are trying to fill the gap following the US suspension of intelligence sharing to Ukraine but that it will take time for European authorities to deploy these capabilities and that Europe is unlikely to entirely make up for the US intelligence capability "any time soon."[10]

Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are advancing near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye.[12] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) units seized Lebedevka (west of Sudzha), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and advanced up to eight kilometers into the Ukrainian salient.[13] A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing along the Lebedevka-Kubatkin-Bondarevka line (northwest and east of Sudzha), but that the situation in this area is unclear.[14]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division), seized Viktorovka and Nikolayevka and that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing near Malaya Loknya (all northwest of Sudzha).[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are attacking Nikolskyi (northwest of Sudzha).[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz units seized Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) and that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are advancing west of Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently took advantage of an unsuccessful Ukrainian rotation in order to advance near Sudzha, and an unnamed Ukrainian commander operating in Kursk Oblast told the New York Post that roughly eight to 10 Russian vehicles recently broke through Ukrainian positions near Sudzha and were able to swiftly advance — likely referring to recent Russian advances south of Sudzha between Kurilovka and Guyevo.[18]

Russian forces also began attacks on Sudzha itself on March 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Chechen "Aida" Spetsnaz Group, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11th VDV Brigade, "Veterany" Assault Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are attacking near Sudzha.[19] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces attempted to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Sudzha via an underground gas pipeline but issued contradictory claims about the outcome of the attack.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking central Sudzha and Sudzha's industrial zone.[21] Russian milbloggers reiterated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Sudzha and claimed that some Ukrainian forces are falling back to Sudzha from positions north of the town.[22]

Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed a bridge north of Sudzha along the H-07 Sumy City-Sudzha highway (known as the R-200 highway in Russia) and that Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing to Sudzha.[23] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment destroyed a bridge over the Psel River between Myropillya, Sumy Oblast, and Gornal, Kursk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance slowly in northern Sumy Oblast near Basivka and Novenke (both northeast of Sumy City) and that Russian shelling has interdicted the H-07 highway.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces intend to interdict the H-07 to complicate Ukrainian logistics in Kursk Oblast and support Russian efforts to envelop the Ukrainian salient from the south.[26]

The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.[27] Alaudinov credited elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, "Veterany" Assault Detachment, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment with conducting the main assaults. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command ordered Russian Spetsnaz units to identity and destroy Ukrainian communications equipment in Kursk Oblast on the night of March 7 to 8 in order to complicate Ukraine's ability to defend against intensified Russian offensive operations.[28] Russian forces have been working to slowly eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast over the last seven months but have been struggling to make significant progress in recent months after retaking the western part of the salient in Fall 2024.[29] Russian forces may be attempting to exploit any immediate impacts that the suspension of US intelligence sharing and military aid is having on Ukraine's capabilities in Kursk Oblast. ISW has not observed reports of Ukrainian HIMARS or ATACMS strikes to support Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast on March 7 or 8, and Ukrainian forces may be struggling to leverage these systems amid the pause in US intelligence sharing.[30]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any Russian ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles and one Iskander-K cruise missile from Rostov Oblast and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of March 7 to 8.[31] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down the Iskander-K cruise missiles and 79 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Odessa oblasts and that 54 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Forces notably did not report that Ukrainian forces shot down the two ballistic missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Donetsk, Poltava, Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts.[32] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, noted on March 8 that Russian forces have struck DTEK energy facilities in Odesa City seven times in the past three weeks.[33] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast (north of Pokrovsk) overnight with Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Tornado-S MLRS, and Shahed drones, killing 11 people and injuring at least 50.[34] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces struck Dobropillya a second time after Ukrainian rescue workers arrived on the scene following the initial strike.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on the evening of March 8 that Russian forces conducted a strike, likely with Iskander-M ballistic missiles, against Bila Krynytsya, Kherson Oblast (northeast of Kherson City) and Novoselivka (possibly referring to Novoselivka, Mykolaiv Oblast roughly 65 kilometers northwest of Bila Krynytsya).[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles, particularly Patriot missiles that are vital to Ukraine's defense against ballistic missiles.[37]

The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded on March 7 to the March 6 EU summit by characterizing EU initiatives to increase military spending and financial aid to Ukraine as "deliberately fueling" escalation between the West and Russia and described the EU as a "militarized union" that is "obsessed" with inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia.[38] Zakharova claimed that the EU is playing "dangerous geopolitical games" and is "delaying" the possibility of negotiations to end the war. Zakharova's comments ignore an ongoing Kremlin effort to rally domestic support for the war in Ukraine and justify Russia's long-term efforts to militarize Russian society by claiming that Russia is fighting a proxy war with the West in Ukraine and must prepare for a future war with the West.[39]

Russia's efforts to strengthen its force grouping in Belarus, expand its military capabilities, and militarize its society in the long term reflect Russia's preparations for a potential future war with NATO. Russia deployed several S-300 air defense systems to Belarus in late August 2021 and Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) forces to Belarus in September 2021 and has continued to build out its force presence in Belarus over the last three years.[40] Russia and Belarus have continually used the Union State Treaty to deepen their bilateral military agreements.[41] Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in November 2024 to expand its nuclear umbrella to encompass Belarus and explicitly stated that Russia might employ tactical nuclear weapons located in Belarus in the event of aggression against Belarus.[42]

Russia is engaged in significant force restructuring, military industrial, and hybrid war efforts that underline Russia's efforts to prepare for and possibly initiate a future conflict with the West. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in March 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, demonstrating Russia's clear intention to expand its military in the coming years.[43] Russia is attempting to build out its long-term warfighting capabilities by expanding and nationalizing its defense industrial base (DIB).[44] Various European law enforcement agencies and authorities have identified Russia's ongoing hybrid warfare efforts across Europe for the better part of a decade, including reports that Russia forced several commercial aircraft to turn back after targeting the aircraft with GPS jamming devices in April 2024.[45] The Kremlin is likely advancing this narrative as part of its efforts to exacerbate tensions between the United States and Europe and undermine the wider Western alliance supporting Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[46] Zelensky confirmed that he will meet with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on March 10 before the US-Ukrainian talks. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is "fully committed" to constructive dialogue and has been seeking peace since the start of the war.

Key Takeaways:

• The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear.
• Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects.
• European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension.
• Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8.
• Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any Russian ballistic missiles.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2025

Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike. Russian forces launched the largest combined strike package against Ukraine since November 2024 on the night of March 6 to 7.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 67 missiles including 35 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles, four S-300 air defense missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 194 Shahed and decoy drones.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, all eight Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 100 Shahed and decoy drones and that 86 decoy drones and up to 10 missiles did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed Russian targets using F-16 and Mirage-2000 aircraft and that this was the first instance of Ukrainian forces using Mirage-2000s, which arrived one month ago, to defend against Russian strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian gas production facilities during the strike.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Ternopil oblasts.[4] Ternopil Oblast Military Administration reported that two Russian missiles struck a critical infrastructure facility, causing a fire.[5] Ukraine's largest private energy company DTEK stated that the strikes damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.[6]

Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations. ISW observed reports that Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their larger strike packages in October and November 2024, and reports indicate that Russia has increased the production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other drone components in December 2024.[7] Russia has likely leveraged the increased production of Shahed drones to increase the total number of drones launched in each strike package. Russian forces launched an average 83.4 drones per strike package in January 2025, an average of 139.3 drones per strike package in February 2024, and an average of 128.8 drones per strike package from March 1 through 7. Russian forces have only sporadically included missiles in the January, February, and March 2025 strike packages, and the 67 missiles launched in the March 6 to 7 strike series is a larger amount than in previous missile strikes this year. Russian forces likely increased the combined number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles in the March 6 to 7 strike packages to inflict maximum damage on select targets in Ukraine while using the large number of Shahed drones, decoy drones, and Kalibr cruise missiles to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups.

Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles. US intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes and its suspension will likely impact Ukraine's ability to rapidly respond to adapting Russian strike packages.[8] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently reported that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant.[9] Russan forces will likely attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones per strike package in addition to increasing the number of missiles in select strike packages to destroy Ukrainian energy and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. Russia also likely intends to force Ukraine into quickly depleting its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors - which Ukraine relies on to defend against Russian ballistic missiles - during the pause in US military aid and intelligence sharing to maximize the damage of subsequent strikes. Ukrainian forces will likely have to be more selective in intercepting strikes as their stock of interceptors decreases with no resupply on the horizon, and successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will likely have lasting effects on Ukraine's ability to generate power for DIB and civilian use.

Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to Ukraine. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka direction in recent weeks and continue efforts to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast and seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces previously leveraged Ukrainian materiel shortages prompted by a delay in US aid in Spring 2024 to make significant advances in Donetsk Oblast and launch an offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast, and the Kremlin likely intends to exploit expected Ukrainian materiel shortages to make additional gains if the suspension of US military assistance persists.[10]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on March 5 that US weapons supplies to Ukraine will "most likely resume" but that Russia's "main task" remains "inflicting maximum damage" on Ukraine "on the ground" during this limited window.[11] Russian forces appear to be further intensifying offensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar direction and likely intend to exploit the near-term impacts of the cutting of US aid, particularly intelligence sharing, to accomplish Russian operational objectives in these areas.

Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other objectives. Geolocated footage published on March 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Basivka (northeast of Sumy City) just across the international border in Sumy Oblast.[12] Russian forces marginally advanced into northern Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka (northwest of Badivka) in mid-January 2025 as part of their efforts to bypass Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha) from the south and have continued to operate in the area over the last six weeks.[13] Russian milbloggers recently claimed that Russian forces seized Basivka and Novenke (north of Basivka), and Ukrainian sources stated on March 7 that Russian forces have been gradually advancing in the area in recent weeks.[14] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on March 7 that Russian forces are concentrating forces in Novenke, attempting to advance towards Basivka, and attacking the Sumy City-Sudzha H-07 highway near Yunakivka (south of Basivka).[15] Russian forces are currently six kilometers from the H-07 highway and nine kilometers from Yunkivka at their furthest point of advance in northern Sumy Oblast and will have to identify or establish usable crossings over the Loknya River if they intend to advance directly southeast towards the highway from the Basivka area.

The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to cut the H-07 highway in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the Kursk salient and as part of a longer-term Russian effort to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Kursk Oblast under the threat of envelopment. Russian forces reportedly made limited advances into Sumy Oblast south of Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha) in early January 2025, and Russian forces may be attempting to advance along the southern flank of the Ukrainian salient and interdict Ukrainian egress routes from Kursk Oblast from the east and west.[16] Russian forces likely intend to cut Ukraine's main obvious egress route along the H-07 and force the Ukrainian military to withdraw from the Kursk salient to Ukraine via fields and smaller roads. Russian forces are likely also aiming to complicate Ukrainian logistics and troop redeployments to Kursk Oblast by interdicting the H-07 highway.

Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly conducting the attacks near Zhuravka, Novenke, and Basivka and additional elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating near Plekhovo.[17] The Russian military command may have tasked these relatively more elite units to lead Russian efforts to envelop the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast from the south. Russian forces would have to close a gap of roughly 35 kilometers in order to envelop Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, and this operation will likely be difficult should Ukrainian forces choose to defend the highway to support their remaining salient in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces are unlikely to conduct a significant offensive operation further towards Sumy City as long as Ukrainian forces hold positions in Kursk Oblast, however.

Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the railway line and Chekhova Street in southwestern Chasiv Yar during a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the area.[18] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault stated that Russian forces attacked in a single column of 25 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed 16 of the vehicles.[19] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces damaged several of the Russian armored vehicles at the front of the column, causing a "jam" as Russian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal and forcing Russian forces to retreat under Ukrainian shelling and drone strikes. The officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on March 6 that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division conducted the mechanized assault.[20] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 7 that Russian forces attacked from two directions and that one Russian armored group unsuccessfully attempted to advance near the Avanhard Stadium in central Chasiv Yar.[21] Zaporozhets reported that the Russian military command ordered Russian forces in the area to seize Chasiv Yar by March 1, 2025 and assessed that Russian forces may undertake increasingly desperate attacks in the coming days and weeks.

The March 6 Russian mechanized assault is part of an ongoing Russian effort to seize and break out of Chasiv Yar, advance on the northeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and pressure Ukraine's "fortress belt" – a 50-kilometer-long line of four major cities that forms the backbone of Ukraine's defenses in Donetsk Oblast.[22] ISW previously assessed that a multi-axis campaign against Ukraine's "fortress belt" would take Russian forces several years to complete, but this assessment is highly dependent on the provision of Western aid.[23] Any long-term pauses or the cessation of US aid to Ukraine will likely significantly impact Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian advances and frontline strikes in the Kostyantynivka direction and will advantage Russian offensive operations along the entire frontline.

Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals. Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter in Moscow, reported on March 7 that Russian officials told US officials in a bilateral meeting in Riyadh on February 18 that "Russia is willing to discuss a temporary truce in Ukraine provided there is progress toward a final peace settlement."[24] Bloomberg, citing those familiar with the issue, reported that Russia will insist on establishing a clear understanding of the principles and parameters of an eventual peacekeeping mission as part of the final peace accord.

Russian officials have since repeatedly and explicitly articulated Russia's unwavering demand that Ukraine concede to Moscow's pre-war demands – showcasing Russia's long-standing two-fold effort to portray itself as open to negotiations while remaining unwilling to make concessions in future negotiations with the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.[25] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 6 that Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along the frontline is unacceptable.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February that "a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia will be inevitable if Western troops are sent to Ukraine."[27] Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Andrei Kelin stated in an interview published on March 6 that Russia's territorial advances in Ukraine "should be recognized" as part of any peace deal and that Ukraine should be "a neutral, non-nuclear state," underscoring Russia's ongoing demands for regime change and de-militarization in Ukraine.[28] Russia violated the agreement under which Ukraine returned its Soviet-era nuclear weapons stockpile to Russia and became a nuclear-free state by invading in 2014 and again in 2022. That treaty obliged Russia to respect Ukraine's pre-2014 borders and to refrain from any sort of coercion against Ukraine.[29]

Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The Lithuanian State Security Service (VSD) and Second Department of Operational Services (AOTD) published a declassified National Threat Assessment on March 6 and assessed that Russia's further development of military capabilities may encourage Russian leadership to use military force if Russian officials calculate that the NATO alliance is sufficiently ill-equipped to react decisively such that Russia could localize an attack on a NATO member state and obtain a swift and decisive victory.[30] The VSD and AOTD assessed that a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine is unlikely in the short term as Russia's main objective to subjugate Ukraine has not changed. The VSD and AOTD assessed that Russia has enough domestic political support to continue its war in Ukraine for "years."

Lithuania's assessment largely coheres with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia is uninterested in a peace agreement to end the war in Ukraine in the near-term and Western estimates for the timeline of a Russian attack on a NATO member state correlate closely with ongoing Western sanctions limiting Russia's defense industrial capabilities. Any effort by Western powers to alleviate sanctions pressure on the Russian regime will accelerate Russia's capacity to optimize its military and further embolden Russian leadership, as Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) remains constrained by financial mechanisms in the medium- to long-term.

The United Kingdom (UK) issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on March 7 that the UK issued Ukraine the first tranche of funds with revenue generated from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets worth nearly $1 billion.[31] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will use the funds to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike.
• Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations.
• Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles.
• Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other objectives.
• Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals.
• Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The United Kingdom (UK) issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to fill government positions with veterans of its war in Ukraine as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal Russian officials.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 6, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6. Putin stated during a visit to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation's Moscow branch on March 6 that Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations.[1] Putin stated that Russia must choose a peace option that best suits Russia and will ensure peace in the long-term. Putin noted that Russian societal unity is critical for Russian victory in Ukraine.[2] Putin alluded to the Russian Revolution, noted that Russian society collapsed during the First World War, and urged Russians to maintain support and unity as the war continues. Putin stated that Russia "will not give up" its "own" territory in future peace negotiations — likely referring to illegally annexed territory in occupied Ukraine.[3] The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023 to oversee social support for veterans, elevate veterans within Russian society, and monopolize control over veterans activities in Russia.[4] Putin has also declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" — underlining Putin's efforts to prioritize militarizing Russian society and rallying support behind Russia's war effort in Ukraine in 2025.[5]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed during a press conference on March 6 that Russia will reject any proposals to station European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire agreement.[6] Lavrov stated that Russia sees "no room for compromise" on this issue and will consider the presence of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine as akin to a NATO deployment in Ukraine. Lavrov stated that Russia will consider the deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in the war and that Russia will reject such a deployment. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along the frontline as unacceptable.[7] Lavrov and Zakharova are explicitly rejecting US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's February 12 suggestion that European and non-European countries should station troops in Ukraine to enforce any future peace agreement.[8]

Lavrov said that any peace agreement must account for the alleged "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, including guarantees that NATO will stop expanding, trying to "swallow" Ukraine, and developing threats against Russia.[9] Lavrov claimed that US President Donald Trump "understands" the need to eliminate these "root causes" while European countries are attempting to ignore the "root causes." Lavrov previously identified the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[10] Russian officials often invoke the concept of "root causes" to allude to their demands for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and to blame the West and Ukraine for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.

Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable. The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, stated on March 6 that Russia should consider conducting a full-scale mobilization, which would build up the Russian military to "at least a couple million [troops]."[11] Alaudinov added that "now is the time" when either "NATO will fall apart" and "[Russia] will destroy Europe" or Europe "can make peace" with Russia and claimed that "it is impossible to defeat Russia on the battlefield."[12] Alaudinov is likely intensifying the false narrative of Russia's inevitable victory to scare the United States and Europe into making concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity at a time when the US has already severely limited its support for Ukraine. Alaudinov, who is the Deputy Head of a Russian MoD directorate responsible for disseminating propaganda within the Russian military, is also likely intensifying this false narrative to maximize Russian morale and drive Russian territorial gains while frontline dynamics are increasingly fluid due to the pause in US military aid.

The Kremlin welcomed a Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the United States is a participant in the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized Russia's war in Ukraine as a "proxy war" between the United States and Russia in an interview with Fox News published on March 5.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 6 that the Kremlin agrees with Rubio's characterization of Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war."[14] Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets portrayed Rubio as "admitting" that the United States is waging a proxy war against Russia through Ukraine, supporting the false Kremlin narrative and Putin's personal claims that the war in Ukraine is an existential war between the United States and Russia.[15] Kremlin officials, including Putin, Lavrov, and Permanent Russian Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya, have consistently used this "proxy war" narrative to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine since the earliest months of the war in 2022.[16] This narrative aims to falsely portray Ukraine as a puppet state that lacks sovereignty, justify the war to Russian audiences, and discourage US and other Western support for Ukraine by stoking fears of escalation. The Kremlin and Russian state media likely aim to portray the Trump administration as conceding to the Kremlin and its false narrative ahead of future peace negotiations and bilateral talks.

US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on March 5 that he had a phone conversation with US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to discuss the "next steps toward a just and lasting peace" and has scheduled a bilateral US-Ukrainian meeting in the near future.[17] Western media reported on March 6 that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Waltz will meet with a Ukrainian delegation led by Yermak next week.[18] Witkoff stated on March 6 that the US-Ukrainian bilateral meeting is intended to "get down a framework for a peace agreement and an initial ceasefire."[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 6 that he will meet with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on March 10 after which his team will remain in Saudi Arabia to meet with US officials.[20]

US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg emphasized on March 6 that the early 2022 Istanbul protocols are not an "equitable framework" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and stated that the US should "develop something entirely new."[21] Witkoff previously referred to the Istanbul protocols as "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23.[22] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their framework for future peace negotiations to "end" Putin's war in Ukraine on Russia's terms, as such a framework would force the West to concede all of Russia's long-standing demands and amount to Ukraine's total capitulation.[23] Russia's demands in the Istanbul protocols included banning Ukraine from joining any military blocs, including NATO; limiting the size of the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems; limiting the range of Ukranian missiles to 40 kilometers (25 miles); prohibiting Ukraine from having any foreign-suppled weapons; and requiring Ukraine to terminate any agreements incompatible with "permanent neutrality."[24]

Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war. Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stated on March 6 that Ukraine should only hold presidential elections once martial law ends, and former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko stated that she also opposes holding elections during the war.[25] Poroshenko stated that Ukraine should hold elections as soon as it is constitutionally acceptable — roughly 180 days after the end of martial law — and Tymoshenko reiterated that Ukraine is committed to peace negotiations to end the war. The Ukrainian constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[26] Kremlin officials have repeatedly called for Ukraine to hold elections and replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who Russia claims is "illegitimate."[27]

European countries continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian military. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 6 that France will continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine following the March 5 US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[28] Lecornu stated that French President Emmanuel Macron instructed the French government to accelerate various military assistance packages to compensate for the lack of US military assistance to Ukraine.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Macron on March 6 and discussed the need for additional and more substantive steps to end the war in Ukraine and protect all of Europe.[30] Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof announced on March 6 that the Netherlands will reserve a 3.5 billion euros ($3.8 billion) fund for Ukraine in 2026, including 700 million euros ($755 million) to invest in Ukrainian drones, and that the Netherlands could use these funds in 2025 if necessary.[31] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a new 30-million-pound ($38.6 million) contract with US-UK defense technology company Anduril UK to provide Ukraine with Altius 600m and Altius 700m strike drones.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6.
• Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable.
• The Kremlin welcomed a Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the United States is a participant in the war.
• US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week.
• Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war.
• European countries continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian military.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to assuage Russian fears about conscripts going to war amid continued reports that Russian military units are forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2025

The Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters. Details about the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine vary in different reports, but the Trump administration has suspended some level of intelligence sharing with Ukraine with some reporting indicating that the suspension affected all intelligence sharing.[1] Western media reported that the Trump administration specifically suspended the sharing of intelligence that Ukraine uses for early warning systems to protect against Russian long-range missile and drone strikes, for target designation for HIMARS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) strikes, and for target designation for long-range strikes within Russia.[2] British outlet Daily Mail reported that the United States also prohibited the United Kingdom from sharing US intelligence with Ukraine.[3] The Kremlin has repeatedly insisted on an end to the provision of all foreign assistance to Ukraine as part of any peace agreement, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov March 4 specifically stated on March 4 that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data such as satellite reconnaissance data.[4]

The suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and civilian targets. Ukrainian forces have leveraged their ability to strike within Russia and destroy significant amounts of materiel in order to increase pressure on Russia. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on the night of September 17 to 18, 2024, destroying two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply.[5] The Toropets facility also stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition.[6] Ukrainian forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 20 to 21, 2024, which at the time contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea.[7] Russian forces previously leveraged their quantitative artillery ammunition advantage and glide bomb strikes to facilitate battlefield gains by destroying settlements before deploying infantry to attack the area — most notably near Avdiivka in February 2024 during delays in US military aid to Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian strikes on Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities have previously relieved pressure on Ukrainian forces across the frontline by preventing Russian forces from leveraging their artillery advantage to secure gains. Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Russia also pushed Russian aviation operations further from Ukraine into Russia's rear areas, hindering Russia's ability to conduct glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline positions from Russian airspace.[9] Ukraine's inability to conduct ATACMS and HIMARS strikes against Russian air defense systems within Russia and occupied Ukraine will likely impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and expand Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and near rear Ukrainian cities.[10]

The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). US intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities, allowing Ukrainian authorities and civilians to prepare once Russian forces launch missiles and drones.[11] The suspension of US intelligence on Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear, coupled with the US suspension of supplies of Patriot air defense missiles that Ukraine relies upon to defend against Russian ballistic missiles, would have severe impacts on the safety of Ukrainian rear areas.[12]

Russian drone and missile strikes have heavily targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure and DIB.[13] The likely intensification of these strikes following the US suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine will hinder Ukraine's ongoing progress towards expanding its DIB to be able to supply the Ukrainian military with all of its materiel needs.[14] A self-sufficient Ukrainian DIB would allow Ukraine to defend itself over the long-term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance, and it is in America's core national security interests that Ukraine be able to continue its efforts towards self-sufficiency.

The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war. These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 4 that "Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer."[15] Zelensky also offered to exchange Ukrainian and Russian prisoners of war (POWs), to ban missile and long-range drone strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in the Black Sea.[16] Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin and numerous Kremlin officials have, in contrast, offered no meaningful concessions. They continuously repeat demands that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation as well as the rolling back of NATO from Eastern Europe.[18]

Russia's war effort in Ukraine has brought about a series of materiel, manpower, and economic challenges for Moscow that will worsen in the coming months if Ukraine is able to sustain its defensive military operations.[19] The United States should leverage these Russian challenges in order to secure concessions necessary to achieve a just and sustainable peace. US policies suspending military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine reduce the leverage US President Donald Trump's needs to achieve his stated policy objective of bringing about an end to the war in Ukraine on acceptable terms, a task that requires increasing pressure on Russia, not Ukraine.[20]

Kremlin officials announced their intention of taking advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to make additional battlefield gains. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on March 5 that US weapons supplies to Ukraine will "most likely resume" but that Russia's "main task" remains "inflicting maximum damage" on Ukraine "on the ground."[21] Medvedev's statement is consistent with ISW assessment that Russian forces will likely attempt to take advantage of the pause in US aid in order to make further gains in eastern and southern Ukraine to justify Russia's territorial claims to the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[22] Medvedev also indicated that Russia is aware that it may have a limited time frame in which to leverage the US suspension of aid to "inflict maximum damage" on Ukrainian forces. Russian forces exploited the previous suspension of US military aid in early 2024, including by trying to seize Kharkiv City in May 2024 before US military aid resumed flowing to Ukrainian forces on the frontline.[23]

Russian officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to a question about Zelensky's willingness to negotiate, claiming that Lavrov cannot "get into [Zelensky's] head" and that Zelensky "is not human."[24] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova continued to claim that Zelensky's 2022 ban on negotiating with Russia is a prominent roadblock to negotiation progress — the latest in Kremlin efforts to portray Zelensky — not Putin — as unwilling to negotiate.[25] Both Zelensky and the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) have explicitly and publicly declared Ukraine's willingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and presented substantive ceasefire proposals — in stark contrast to the Kremlin.[26]

Kremlin officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands of the United States and to push the United States to de facto recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 4 that Russia is open to working with US companies, including in areas of occupied Ukraine.[27] Peskov questioned, however, how Russia could cooperate with US companies while the US continues to sanction Russia.[28] Peskov is likely setting conditions for Russia to demand that the United States remove its sanctions before Russia would conclude any of the economic cooperation deals that American and Russian delegations have discussed in recent meetings.[29] Peskov's inclusion of Russia's illegally annexed areas of Ukraine in potential future US-Russian economic cooperation deals is part of Russian efforts to coerce the United States into de facto recognizing these territories as Russian. Peskov's rhetoric mirrors the Kremlin's strategy of leveraging international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize Russian control over Ukrainian territories.[30] The Kremlin has used discussions with IAEA officials about the ZNPP to assert that the facility lies on Russian territory.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters.
• The suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and civilian targets.
• The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war. These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.
• Kremlin officials announced their intention of taking advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to make additional battlefield gains.
• Russian officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands of the United States and to push the United States to de facto recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Over 50,000 Russian servicemembers are reportedly listed as having abandoned their units and are absent without leave (AWOL) between February 2022 and mid-December 2024.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 4, 2025

US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel. An anonymous White House official told the Wall Street Journal on March 3 that the United States is "pausing and reviewing" military aid to Ukraine until Trump "determines that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a good-faith effort towards peace negotiations with Russia."[i] The White House official did not provide clarification about what conditions the White House is expecting Zelensky to meet in order to resume aid.  

The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.[ii] Pauses in this aid will harm Ukraine's warfighting capabilities, although it will likely take from weeks to months for the suspension of US aid to affect the frontline.[iii] Western officials estimated in late February 2025 that Ukraine will be able to sustain its current pace of operations until about mid-2025 (roughly June 2025) as long as the United States continues to provide the aid contracted under the Biden administration on the previously anticipated timelines.[iv] A Ukrainian official told CNN on March 4 following the suspension that Ukraine may run out of US-provided artillery shells by May or June 2025 but warned that Patriot air defense missiles could run out "in a matter of weeks."[v] Ukraine relies heavily on US Patriot systems for its air defense umbrella to protect against Russian missile strikes against Ukraine's rear areas. The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters lack an analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes, particularly those including ballistic missiles.[vi] As Ukraine runs short on Patriot missiles, Kyiv will have to make difficult decisions about which population centers to prioritize in terms of air defense protection. If it runs out of Patriots entirely then Ukrainian cities will lie open to Russian ballistic missiles.   

The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time. Two anonymous US officials told ABC News on March 3 that about 90 percent of the weapons that the United States committed to Ukraine through past Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages has already arrived in Ukraine, including munitions and anti-armor systems.[vii] ABC News reported that the remaining 10 percent of PDA equipment is still slated to arrive in Ukraine by August 2025 and that private weapons contracts between Ukraine and US companies - many of which Ukraine has already paid for — will likely facilitate at least a small flow of arms deliveries to Ukraine "for at least the next several years."[viii]  The United States reportedly supplies about 30 percent of Ukraine's arsenal with Ukraine's European partners supplying another 30 percent and Ukraine itself supplying domestically supplies about 40 percent from domestic production according to the editor-in-chief of Ukrainian defense-focused outlet Defense Express, Oleh Katkov.[ix] Ukraine will continue to fight with the materiel it currently has, with the materiel European partners have given and will continue to provide, and with the materiel Ukraine itself produces. The Trump administration's aid pause will detrimentally impact Ukraine's ability to defend itself and pursue offensive operations at its current rate, but it will not collapse the front entirely in the coming months.

Russian forces will likely exploit expected Ukrainian materiel shortages if the suspension of US military assistance persists, as Russian forces did during the previous suspension of US military assistance in early 2024. Russian forces significantly increased their tempo of operations in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in early 2024 in order to take advantage of Ukrainian supply shortages.[x] Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces had a roughly 20 to one artillery shell advantage and "overwhelming air superiority" over Ukrainian forces in this direction during the peak of the Ukrainian supply shortage in May and June 2024 and that these were the main factors enabling Russian forces' creeping and costly advances northwest and west of Avdiivka at the time.[xi] Russian forces also began offensive operations in May 2024 along the Belgorod-Kharkiv Oblast international border as part of efforts to seize Kharkiv City, likely as part of attempts to take advantage of delays in US aid disbursement and to advance before US military assistance reached Ukrainian forces on the frontline once US aid resumed.[xii] Russian forces are currently conducting active offensive operations in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts, have recently intensified efforts in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and continue attempts to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[xiii] Russian forces will likely attempt to take advantage of the pause in US aid in order to make further gains in eastern and southern Ukraine in order to justify their territorial claims to the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.

The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on March 4 the five-part ReArm Europe Plan that aims to help EU member states "quickly and significantly increase expenditures in defense capabilities."[xiv] Von der Leyen stated that the EU is ready to significantly increase its defense spending in order to both "respond to the short-term urgency to act and to support Ukraine" and "to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for...European security." The first part of the ReArm Europe Plan calls for the EU to activate the "national escape clause" of the Stability and Growth Pact in order to allow EU member states to increase their defense spending without triggering the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The Stability and Growth Pact limits the budget deficits of EU members, and the activation of the "national escape clause" would allow EU states to maintain larger budget deficits than usual in order to increase their defense spending.[xv] Von der Leyen stated that should EU member states increase their defense spending by 1.5 percent of their GDPs on average, this would make close to 650 billion euros (about $687 billion) available over four years. The second part of the plan would provide 150 billion euros (about $159 billion) of loans to EU member states for defense investments, including in air and missile defense, artillery systems, missiles, drones, and anti-drone systems. Von der Leyen stated that EU member states will have to "pool demand and buy together" and that EU states can "massively step up their support to Ukraine" with this equipment. The third part of the plan calls for the use of "the power of the EU budget" to direct additional funds to defense related investments. Von der Leyen stated that the last two parts of the proposed plan aim to mobilize private capital by accelerating the Savings and Investment Union and through the European Investment Bank. Von der Leyen concluded that the ReArm Europe plan could "mobilize" close to 800 billion euros (about $849 billion).

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 4 that he spoke with Finnish President Alexander Stuff, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and German Christian Democratic Union party leader Friedrich Merz about support for Ukraine.[xvi] Zelensky highlighted that the European Commission's defense funding will support additional air defense systems and missiles for Ukraine and create a "solid additional foundation" for Ukrainian efforts to end the war. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing European officials, reported on February 25 that EU countries, the UK, and Norway provided Ukraine with military assistance worth approximately $25 billion in 2024 and that this was more than the United States sent to Ukraine in 2024.[xvii]

Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and medium-term. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on March 4 that Ukraine currently domestically produces about 33 percent of the weapons Ukraine uses on the battlefield and currently produces $35 billion worth of weapons and ammunition annually — exceeding the production capabilities of many of Ukraine's partners.[xviii] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine should be able to meet at least 50 percent of its total military needs by the end of 2025, with Ukraine meeting all of its artillery system needs and much of its 80mm and 120mm mortar shell and 105mm, 122mm, and 155mm artillery shell requirements. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine has significantly increased its defense production since 2023 - tripling its artillery production, increasing its ammunition production by a factor of 2.5, doubling its production of anti-tank weapons, and increasing its production of armored personnel carriers fivefold. Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine currently domestically produces nearly all of the air-, sea-, and ground-based drones that Ukrainian forces use in combat operations. Shmyhal previously stated that Ukraine increased its drone production tenfold in 2024 and invested an additional 7.9 billion hryvnia (about $189 million) to boost drone production in 2025.[xix] Shmyhal stated that Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom has grown to become one of the 50 most productive defense companies in the world.[xx] Shmyhal credited European investments in the Ukrainian defense industry for much of Ukraine's defense industrial growth, especially the Danish initiative for joint defense production initiatives.[xxi] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine attracted nearly $1 billion in European defense investments in 2024, including $351 million from Denmark, $436 million from the EU, $67 million from the UK, and $45 million from Norway. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine has created a number of joint defense enterprises with European states, especially with the UK and Germany. Shmyhal stated that at least three international defense companies have provided licenses for Ukraine to start producing NATO- and EU-standard weapons within Ukraine. Ukraine has dramatically built out its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2023 but still requires investments and time to reach full self-sufficiency.[xxii] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's prospects for sustaining its military needs in the future with limited foreign assistance are excellent.[xxiii] Ukraine's DIB expansion continues to rely on monetary investment from partner states, and continued military assistance from partners gives Ukraine the time to continue to develop its DIB towards self-sufficiency.

The Ukrakian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine. Verkhovna Rada leadership and parliamentary factions and groups issued a joint statement welcoming Trump's efforts to begin peace negotiations and reiterating the need to develop a strategic partnership with the United States through the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[xxiv] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table "as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer."[xxv] Zelensky added that he and his administration are ready to "work under President Trump's strong leadership" to achieve a lasting peace and proposed a partial ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia to advance a possible peace settlement. Zelensky offered for Ukraine and Russia to release prisoners of war (POWs), to ban missile and long-range drone strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in the Black Sea. Zelensky thanked the United States for its support of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, expressed regret over the meeting with Trump at the White House on February 28 that "did not go the way it was supposed to," and reiterated Ukraine's readiness to sign the mineral deal. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably has not made any ceasefire offers since Trump assumed office on January 20. Kremlin officials instead formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than Ukraine's and the West's complete capitulation in late February 2025.[xxvi]

The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses. Russian forces have been conducting highly attritional, infantry-led assaults along the frontline that result in high losses but only return disproportionately limited territorial gains.[xxvii] Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia is unable to secure a rapid victory in the war and so Russian forces are instead pursuing a more gradual victory.[xxviii] Putin claimed at the time that Russian forces are trying to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control." Putin is committed to gradual, creeping gains at the expense of high losses and likely believes that these limited gains can set conditions over time for Russia to demand more Ukrainian territory during future peace negotiations or allow him to conquer Ukraine entirely. Putin's desire to continue this deadly approach is driving the high loss rates on the battlefield. Russia is also conducting nightly drone and missile strikes against rear Ukranian areas that are killing civilians and destroying and damaging Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure – further increasing the death toll in the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the US military aid pause in a statement to Kremlin propagandist Pavel Zarubin on March 4, noting that Russia can hope "without indulging in excessive optimism" that the military aid suspension will "incline" the Ukrainian government towards "peace."[xxix] Peskov deliberately misrepresented the Kremlin's desired outcome of the war — a full Ukrainian surrender brought on by the end of Western military aid to Ukraine — as a "peaceful" outcome. Peskov also remarked that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data, such as satellite reconnaissance data - likely in an attempt to set informational conditions for the Kremlin to demand that the United States stop providing intelligence support to Ukraine as a precondition for a future "peaceful settlement." Peskov additionally demanded that the United States remove sanctions on Russia as a precondition for improving US-Russia bilateral relations.[xxx] Russian officials and propagandists also continued to falsely frame increased European support for Ukraine as an obstacle to a peaceful resolution to the war.[xxxi] On March 3, Peskov framed European support for Ukraine as the emergence of a European "pro-war party," and the Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to demand that the United States cease arms sales to Europe that support Ukraine's defense.[xxxii] The Kremlin's rhetoric aims to confuse and mislead US policymakers into committing the United States and Ukraine to make additional preemptive concessions under the guise of setting preconditions for "peace," while the Kremlin continues to avoid making any concessions of its own.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel.
• The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.
• The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time.
• The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine.
• Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and medium-term.
• The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses.
• The Kremlin continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July 2025, likely to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of Russian mobilized troops for over two years.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 3, 2025

Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with RBK-Ukraine published on March 3 that there are 620,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, about 200,000 of whom are actively fighting on the frontline.[1] Skibitskyi stated that there are roughly 35,000 additional Rosgvardia troops protecting rear areas and that these personnel can become a second line of defense if necessary. Skibitskyi stated in November 2024 there were about 580,000 Russian soldiers operating against Ukraine (presumably both within Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast), and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in January 2025 that the total Russian force grouping in Ukraine was about 600,000 troops.[2]

Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term. Skibitskyi reported on March 3 that Russian authorities recruited 440,000 military personnel in 2024 — 10,000 more than their quota for the year — and fulfilled their January 2025 recruitment quota by 107 percent.[3] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in July 2024 awarding 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,400) to anyone who signed a contract with the Russian MoD between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024 - more than double the previous federal award of 195,000 rubles (roughly $2,100).[5] This increased federal reward likely contributed to Russia's successful recruitment drive in 2024. Russian federal subjects offered additional high regional bonuses to those who signed military service contracts in late 2024 and early 2025, but select federal subjects have started to reduce these regional payments following the expiration of these limited time offers, indicating that such measures are not sustainable indefinitely.[6] Skibitskyi stated that 15 percent of Russian recruits in 2024 were people under criminal investigation, in prison, or serving suspended sentences and that this figure will increase to roughly 30 percent in 2025. Russian officials reported in 2024 that Russia was shutting down some prisons after Russia's prison population significantly dropped due to the Russian prison recruitment drives.[7] Russia has recently been increasingly recruiting defendants in pretrial detention centers, likely as the pool of prison recruits has dwindled.[8] ISW continues to assess that increased military spending, including large payments and benefits to Russian servicemembers, is hurting the Russian economy at the macro level and that the Kremlin is reducing this spending on military personnel as part of efforts to mitigate the impacts of such initiatives.[9] Russian authorities are unlikely to sustain such high financial incentives as part of their recruitment drives in the medium- and long-term as the Russian economy continues to decline.

Skibitskyi noted that Russian authorities have previously adjusted their annual quotas throughout the year, having originally called for Russian authorities to recruit 375,000 to 380,000 personnel in 2024 before increasing this number to 430,000.[10] Adjustments to the 2024 recruitment quotas were likely meant to account for Russia's increased tempo of offensive operations in the last few months of 2024 that resulted in the highest casualty rates Russia experienced since early 2022.[11] Skibitskyi concluded that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[12] Russian authorities will likely have to adjust their 2025 quotas as they did in 2024 should they want the current tempo of offensive operations to continue and should Russian forces continue to suffer high losses while advancing at a slower rate.[13] Russian authorities are unlikely to generate enough forces to significantly increase the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in the near future. Continued Western military aid would help Ukrainian forces inflict additional losses on the Russian military that would likely intensify Russia's economic and military issues and force Putin into making concessions during meaningful negotiations in 2025.[14]

Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella. Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces launch missiles from several different directions and currently launch 150 to 200 drones during a single overnight strike series.[15] Skibitskyi noted that Russian forces previously launched missiles from a single direction and used an average of 20 to 30 drones in a single overnight strike series. Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces alternate launching missiles and drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. Skibitskyi noted that Russian forces begin launching drones in the evening such that the drones reach Ukraine at around 2300, and that strikes continue until the morning. ISW observed reports that that Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their larger strike packages in October and November 2024 and have been launching between 100 to 200 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones in February 2025.[16] Russian forces most likely use large numbers of Shahed and decoy drones to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defense and mobile fire groups. Increasing numbers of drones in overnight Russian strike packages indicate that Russia is likely not currently facing domestic Shahed or decoy drone production constraints or constraints in Iranian-provided components to make Shahed drones. It remains unclear whether Russia will be able to produce or source a sufficient number of components to avoid drone production constraints in the long-term, however.

Russian missile production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses. Skibitskyi stated that Russia has marginally increased its missile production by a factor of 1.2 to 1.5 throughout 2024 and is "redistributing" its production capabilities.[17] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are producing more Kh-101 cruise missiles and fewer of the less effective Kalibr cruise missiles and intend to produce more Kinzhal and Iskander-M ballistic missiles in the near future. Russian forces rarely used Kalibr cruise missiles in strike packages against Ukraine in January or February 2025 and continue to mainly use Kalibr missiles to pad larger strike packages and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[18]

The GUR reported on February 18 that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant.[19] The GUR reported that Russia has equipped some new Shahed-136 ("Geran-2") drones with a new type of warhead weighing 90 kilograms, moved the drones' navigation and power systems from the nose to the tail, and installed an additional ballast to help with the drones' stability. The GUR reported that Russia is increasingly relying on components manufactured in Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran to produce and assemble Shahed drones. The GUR reported that the Geran-3 drone is an analogue to the Shahed-238 and can fly at a speed of up to 550 to 600 kilometers per hour and has a range of 2,500 kilometers. ISW previously assessed that Russia likely intended to further increase its production and use of Shahed drones and other Shahed-variants following the signing of the Russian-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024.
• Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
• Russian missile production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote its "Time of Heroes" veterans' program as part of efforts to militarize the Russian government and society.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 2, 2025

Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on February 23 to a question about the US-Ukraine mineral deal and whether US pressure would push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to "finally sell out all of Ukraine," including Russia's illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.[1] Peskov claimed that the people in occupied Ukraine decided "long ago" that they wanted to join Russia so "no one will ever sell off these territories" — implying that Zelensky may "sell out" other areas of Ukraine. Russian state television evening news program Vesti claimed on February 24 that the United States is "blackmailing" Ukraine with the mineral deal.[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 22 that "there is nothing good for Kyiv" in a new version of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[3] The milblogger claimed that the mineral deal is "humiliating" for Ukraine and that Zelensky would be "selling the benefits of his country for nothing" should he sign the deal.

Kremlin officials are also trying to prevent the United States and Ukraine from concluding a mineral deal by making competing offers. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth materials.[4] Putin referred to mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in "Russian" rare earth minerals (claiming minerals in occupied Ukraine as Russia's own). Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the supply of Russian aluminum. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev told CNN on February 24 that Russia is open to economic cooperation with the United States, that the first stage of cooperation would be in the energy sphere, and that such cooperation is key for a "more resilient global economy."[5]

Russian state media is delaying coverage of select Kremlin statements in order to exploit changing dynamics in the US-Ukrainian relationship and drive wedges between Ukraine and the United States. Zarubin and Russian state media outlets TASS and RIA Novosti amplified on March 2 a previous statement from Peskov about the US decision on February 24 to vote alongside Russia against a Ukrainian- and European-backed UN resolution that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war.[6] Peskov claimed on February 26 that the Trump administration is "rapidly changing" all of its foreign policies in ways that "largely coincide with [Russia's] vision," but TASS, RIA Novosti, and Zarubin only reported Peskov's statements on March 2.[7] Russian state media headlines on March 2 deliberately misrepresented Peskov's statements such that they appeared to be in response to the February 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[8]

The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. The Kremlin is investing significant time and effort into undermining and misrepresenting the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, indicating that the Kremlin views the deal as an impediment to accomplishing Russian President Vladimir Putin's objectives in Ukraine.[9] The mineral deal, even one that does not include text about an American security guarantees for Ukraine, will represent a long-term US economic investment in Ukraine and could be a building block towards additional US assistance or military sales to Ukraine in the future, as US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent observed in an interview to CBS on March 2.[10] Any agreement that ties the United States to an independent and sovereign Ukraine is contrary to Russia's long-term goals of isolating and conquering Ukraine. Putin likely assesses that preventing the US-Ukrainian mineral deal is a necessary step towards pushing the United States into stopping military assistance to Ukraine and abandoning Ukraine altogether. Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine — which assumes that Russia can continue slow, gradual advances in exchange for significant personnel and materiel losses — rests on the assumption that Russia can outlast and overcome US and European security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize its economy and population to support its defense.[11] Putin is likely attempting to undermine the US-Ukrainian mineral deal in order to prevent deepening US-Ukraine ties in the hope that Russia will be able to destroy or extract significant territorial concessions from Ukraine during future negotiations before Russia's own wartime economic and force generation issues begin to significantly impede Russia ability to advance on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond.[12]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on March 2 that plans to introduce European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in the future are a continuation of European leaders' supposed efforts to "incite" Ukraine to "war against [Russia]."[13] Lavrov claimed that the West brought Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to power using "bayonets" and will use future peacekeeping forces as "bayonets" to "prop up" Zelensky. Lavrov claimed that Europe wants to continue the war in Ukraine through these peacekeeping forces whereas the United States is openly stating its desire to end the war.[14] Lavrov claimed that the introduction of peacekeepers to Ukraine would not eliminate the "root causes" of the war.[15] Lavrov has previously defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[16] The Kremlin has recently attempted to use this phrase to justify its calls for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov is exploiting the ongoing discussions in the West about the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine in the future to make yet another argument for Russia's longstanding demand for regime change. Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have recently engaged in rhetoric similarly attempting to exacerbate US-European divisions and falsely portraying European countries as wanting to continue the war in Ukraine.[17] The Kremlin is likely attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe to extract concessions in Russia's favor in future peace negotiations and other talks.[18]

European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. The United Kingdom (UK) hosted leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania as well as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Hakan Fidan, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council Antonio Costa.[19] UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the summit that the UK and France, along with other unspecified countries, have expressed their commitment to develop a "coalition of the willing" that will deploy peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.[20] Starmer revealed at the summit a plan aimed at assisting Ukraine: keeping military aid flowing while the war continues and increasing economic pressure on Russia; ensuring that any peace deal upholds Ukraine's sovereignty and security and that Ukraine is at the negotiating table; and committing European leaders to aim to deter any future invasion of Ukraine.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the defense summit was dedicated to Ukraine and a common European future and noted that "European unity is at an extremely high level."[22] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is continuing discussions about security guarantees and conditions for a just peace with partner states and is working with Europe to create a "reliable basis of cooperation" with the United States about Ukrainian peace and guaranteed security. Zelensky met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the summit to discuss the development of a joint action plan to end the war in Ukraine.[23] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also met with UK Defense Secretary John Healey on the sidelines to discuss the UK's readiness to increase military assistance to Ukraine, the prospect of purchasing weapons with profits from frozen Russian assets, and the UK's role in the Ramstein format.[24]

European countries announced additional military assistance packages for Ukraine before and during the summit. The UK announced on March 1 a loan worth 2.6 billion pounds (roughly $3.2 billion) to bolster Ukraine's defense backed by profits from frozen Russian assets.[25] The UK stated that the first tranche of the loan will arrive later next week. Zelensky stated that the UK loan will fund Ukrainian weapons production.[26] Starmer announced on March 2 an additional 1.6 billion pound (roughly $2 billion) deal that will allow Ukraine to purchase 5,000 lightweight-multirole missiles from the UK.[27] The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 1 that it will allocate 20 million euros (roughly $20.7 million) to purchasing Ukrainian-produced weapons for Ukraine and to develop a joint weapons production facility in Lithuania.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives.
• The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine.
• European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1, 2025

Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine. The New York Times and Washington Post, citing unnamed senior Trump Administration officials, reported on February 28 that the Trump Administration is considering canceling all US military assistance to Ukraine, including any final aid shipments that former US President Joe Biden approved.[1]

Ukrainian forces, enabled by essential US assistance, are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the United States great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war. ISW has repeatedly highlighted the importance of continued and timely Western military assistance to Ukraine and observed a correlation between the magnitude of the Russian gains in Ukraine and delays or halts in Western military support.[2] Ukrainian forces have leveraged US-supplied military systems, including Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS and ATACMS long-range strike systems, to defend against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, enhance Ukraine's strike capabilities, complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2), and disrupt Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian efforts, aided by the steady flow of Western aid, have significantly slowed Russian advances along the front, inflicted significant Russian personnel and equipment losses, and undermined Russia's efforts to project economic and domestic stability amid rising pressures from the war.[3] Russia's economic, force generation, and defense industrial constraints provide key opportunities that Ukraine, the United States, and its Western allies could leverage to extract concessions from Putin in peace negotiations.

The cessation of US military assistance and monetary assistance aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defense industry could help tip the balance of the war and give Russia greater advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine, increasing the likelihood of a Russian victory in Ukraine. Russia would leverage the cessation of US aid to Ukraine to seize more territory in Ukraine and attempt to exhaust European support – the approach Putin has outlined in his theory of victory.[4] Ending US aid to Ukraine and enabling further Russian gains would also embolden Putin and strengthen his belief that Russia can seize and control Ukraine and other former Soviet countries, including current NATO member states. The Kremlin will likely intensify its military campaign in Ukraine and attempt to exploit any delay or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine - as the Kremlin did in Spring 2024.[5]

Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries. Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have formed a bloc aimed at defeating the United States and its allies around the world and are currently testing the limits of US commitment to its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region.[6] PRC President Xi Jinping stated during a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin in late February 2025 that the PRC and Russia are "true friends" who "cannot be moved away" from each other and will not be influenced by "any third party."[7] Russia established bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership agreements since the start of the war with the PRC in May 2023, North Korea in October 2024, and Iran in January 2025.[8] Putin continues to rely on Iranian drones and North Korean ballistic missiles and troops in his war against Ukraine.[9] US aid to Ukraine is a demonstration of the United States' commitment to defending democracies against ongoing and future aggression around the world, including but not limited to Ukraine, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Russia-led bloc will likely see the United States abandoning Ukraine as an indicator that the United States will abandon its other allies and will seek to test the limits of US commitment around the world. The Russia-led bloc is searching for easily exploitable divisions between the United States and its allies to isolate and weaken the United States on the global stage, allowing adversaries to rise up and dictate where and how the United States can engage the world. Cutting US aid to Ukraine plays directly into these adversaries' goals and is a step toward curtailing US influence in the world.

Putin, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine. Zelensky has continuously reiterated his commitment to obtaining a just and lasting peace in Ukraine through negotiations. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and even his own tenure in office to secure a just and sustainable peace.[10] These concessions align with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's February 26 statement that "what Ukraine really needs is deterrence...to make it costly for anyone to come after them again in the future" and that both the United States and Europe "can be involved" in such deterrence efforts.[11]

Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have by contrast continuously reiterated their commitment to Putin's initial war aims in Ukraine, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, replacing the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, and Ukrainian commitments to neutrality and demilitarization — all of which would leave Ukraine nearly helpless against future Russian aggression and destabilization efforts.[12] Putin and other Kremlin officials are repackaging these demands in efforts to appear willing to negotiate in good faith with the United States, likely to extract concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine.[13] Achieving a meaningful peace in Ukraine will require the United States and its allies to help Ukraine continue to inflict significant losses on Russia and to undertake a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign aimed at forcing Putin to abandon his insistence on full Ukrainian surrender and efforts to weaken Europe and the United States.

The Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS asked former Austrian Foreign Minister and current head of the St. Petersburg State University Geopolitical Observatory for Russia's Key Issues (GORKI) Center Karin Kneissl on March 1 if Russia has won the war in Ukraine.[14] Kneissl stated that "Russia has won in the sense that it was not defeated," "the [Russian] population supports the government," and "no one expected Russia to be so stable" after years of war. This new narrative is likely part of an ongoing rhetorical effort aimed at depicting Russian victory over Ukraine as inevitable in order to deter further Western military assistance and other support of Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently warned that the Kremlin was preparing to declare "victory" over Ukraine amid reports that the Kremlin had ordered Russian state media personalities to intensify narratives intended to fracture Ukrainian society and discredit Ukraine among Western allies.[15]

European countries remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2. Norwegian company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace President Eirik Lie announced on February 28 that the company, which produces NASAMS air defense systems, is establishing a joint venture in Ukraine.[16] Lie stated that the company's priority will be to "mass produce" NASAMS missiles using unspecified Ukrainian technology. European leaders expressed widespread support for Ukraine following Zelensky's meeting with Trump at the White House on February 28.[17] British Prime Minister Keir Starmer welcomed Zelensky to London on March 1 and emphasized that "[Ukraine has] full backing across the United Kingdom."[18] Zelensky will attend a European defense summit in London on March 2 to discuss peace plans in Ukraine and joint defense issues.[19] Leaders from France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania, as well as NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and European Council President Antonio Costa will attend the summit.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces enabled by essential US assistance are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the US great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war.
• Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries.
• Putin, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine.
• The Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine.
• European countries remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit medically unfit soldiers in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.[i] Zelensky observed that Russia has repeatedly violated previous ceasefire agreements, as ISW has reported.[ii] Zelensky said that Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire agreement with Russia without sufficient external security guarantees, as such an agreement will fail to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent war in Europe in the long-term. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes have not "completely destroyed" Ukraine and that Ukraine is "alive" and continuing to defend itself against Russian aggression. Zelensky reiterated that no country wants to end the war more than Ukraine and that any negotiations to end the war will be between Ukraine and Russia with US and European mediation efforts. Trump declined to comment on the possibility of future US security guarantees for Ukraine and US troop deployments to Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told Zelensky to leave the White House following the meeting, and the White House cancelled the afternoon press conference and the signing of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[iii] ISW continues to assess that supporting Ukraine is a vital American national security interest, as is a strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Ukraine.[iv]

Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met separately with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on February 28 to discuss bilateral security issues and international and regional matters.[v] Shoigu and Xi also underlined the need to continue coordinating efforts at key international platforms including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and diplomatic efforts about "solving the Ukrainian crisis."[vi] Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC relationship has reached "unprecedented" heights, and Russian state media highlighted statements from Xi and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian's praise of close bilateral relations.[vii]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and Chairperson of the ruling United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev met with North Korea's Workers' Party (WPK) Central Committee member Ri Hi-yong on February 26 in Moscow to express United Russia's desire "for closer cooperation with the WPK and for expanding contracts and exchanges in all areas."[viii] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Ri on February 27, but the Kremlin's readout did not provide further details about the meeting.[ix] Representatives of the Kursk Oblast Chamber of Commerce signed a cooperation agreement with the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce on February 27 to develop bilateral economic ties and expand municipal production opportunities between Kursk Oblast and North Korean enterprises.[x] The agreement also includes trade and economic ties; cooperation in industry, agriculture, and processing; and joint logistical projects. Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Serhiy Boyev met with a South Korean delegation led by National Assembly Member Yu Yong-weon in Kyiv on February 28 to discuss Ukraine-South Korea bilateral relations and North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine.[xi] The delegations discussed exchanging defense industrial experience, and Yu expressed interest in organizing a joint seminar between Ukrainian and South Korean defense manufacturers. This meeting follows a recent South Korean report that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025 to support Russia's war effort against Ukraine.[xii] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov highlighted on February 24 that North Korean forces are gaining valuable combat experience and enhancing their weapons systems while fighting in Kursk Oblast and cooperating with Russia.[xiii]

Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot containing thermobaric artillery ammunition near occupied Selydove, Donetsk Oblast overnight on February 27 to 28.[xiv] Geolocated footage published on February 28 shows a facility on fire and secondary explosions in eastern Selydove.[xv] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a forward command post of the Russian 14th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near occupied Ivanivka, Kherson Oblast and a drone control point of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv), Zaporizhia Oblast on February 26.[xvi]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on February 27 to 28.[xvii] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery on February 9 and 17.[xviii]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.[xix] Darchiev headed the Russian delegation to the February 27 US-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul, Turkey, and his recent appointment indicates that he will likely continue to be a key member of any future US-Russian bilateral engagements.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.
• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States.
• Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive veteran civil societies.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Putin stated in his February 27 address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya."[i] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia.[ii] Putin and other Russian officials have previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian ultranationalists.[iii] Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[iv] Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts.[v] Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial concessions. Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the Kremlin may use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that Ukraine surrender even more territory.[vi] ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations that require compromises and thinks that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term.[vii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that if Russia is "making maximalist demands that [Russia] know[s] can’t be met," then the United States will know that Putin is not "serious" about engaging in negotiations.[viii] US President Donald Trump reiterated on February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations and reiterated on February 27 that the United States will "certainly try to get as much [land] as [it] can back [for Ukraine]."[ix]

Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 27 that sources in Russian state media who are close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin has not given "strict" instructions to media about how to cover recent US–Russian contacts.[x] A source who regularly participates in Kremlin meetings with major media editors reportedly stated that the Kremlin told media outlets to emphasize "in every way" that Russia is in contact "not with some abstract Americans, but with Trump's team" and to demonstrate that Trump is "a man who was oppressed in every way both at home and in Europe." Multiple sources reportedly told Verstka that they had received instructions to create an image of Trump as a man who "had the wisdom" to respond to the Kremlin's "outstretched" hand. Putin praised the Trump administration on February 27, claiming that Russia's first contacts with the administration "inspire certain hopes" and that the Trump team is displaying a "reciprocal determination" to restore US–Russian relations.[xi] Putin claimed that "ideological cliches" have started to "destroy the Western community ... from within," as evidenced by alleged problems in Western states' economies and domestic politics. Putin claimed that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Putin's claim that "some Western elites" — but not the Trump administration — are against US–Russian talks is likely an attempt to drive wedges between Trump and other US actors and European leaders. The Kremlin has similarly recently framed European leaders as interested in prolonging the war in Ukraine as part of efforts to falsely portray the US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different and to discredit any possible European role in negotiations.[xii]

US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 27 that the Russian delegation in Istanbul is working to develop the agreements reached during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia.[xiii] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the bilateral meeting would include discussions on the resumption of the work of the US and Russian embassies in each state.[xiv] Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Denis Davydov claimed that Director of the North American Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Alexander Darchiev headed the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[xv] Darchiev served as the Russian Ambassador to Canada from 2014 to 2021.[xvi] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported in November 2024 that three informed sources stated that Darchiev is the most likely candidate to become the new Russian Ambassador to the United States.[xvii] Peskov stated in November 2024 that the Kremlin had chosen a candidate and would announce the appointment "in the foreseeable future."[xviii] The Russian State Duma reportedly held closed consultations in November 2024 with Darchiev about the appointments of Russian diplomats abroad.[xix] Reuters reported on February 27 that a US official stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter led the US delegation in Istanbul.[xx]

The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. Bloomberg, citing a source familiar with the topic, reported on February 27 that CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev — who was part of the Russian delegation during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia — convinced Putin to seek negotiations with the United States through business opportunities.[xxi] The Kremlin reportedly viewed US President Donald Trump's interest in a mineral deal with Ukraine as a chance to initiate economic cooperation discussions between the United States and Russia, giving Dmitriev an opportunity to take the lead on such initiatives.

North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia. South Korean news outlet JoongAng reported on February 27, citing multiple sources familiar with the matter, that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025 — in line with a reported recent South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessment that North Korea deployed an unspecified amount of military personnel to Kursk Oblast.[xxii] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 24 that North Korean forces are gaining valuable combat experience and enhancing their weapons systems while fighting in Kursk Oblast and cooperating with Russia.[xxiii] Budanov noted that North Korean Kn-23 ballistic missiles initially missed their targets by over 1.5 kilometers but that Russian specialists worked with North Korean specialists in unspecified "factories" to modernize and improve the missiles' precision. Budanov also emphasized that North Korean forces have learned drone warfare tactics and will likely bring this knowledge back to North Korea to improve North Korean military capabilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean Politburo member Ri Hi Yong on February 27 to discuss Russian–North Korean relations.[xxiv] ISW assesses that Russia continues to consolidate a bloc of America's most significant adversaries even as the Kremlin pretends to seek improved ties with the United States.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy.
• Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West.
• US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations.
• The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.
• North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within. Putin gave an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" - Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian law prohibits elections during martial law.[1] Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other Ukrainian political and military leaders. Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian audiences. Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population. Putin has repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold elections in 2024 – in accordance with Ukrainian law – as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia cannot negotiate with Zelensky.[2] US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage in negotiations, and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky.[3] Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine.

Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021. Putin stated during the interview with Zarubin that Russia "has nothing against" the preservation of Ukrainian statehood but wants Ukraine to "turn into a friendly neighboring state" and for Ukrainian territory to "not be used as a springboard for an attack against Russia" in the future.[4] Putin's calls for Ukraine to "turn" into a "friendly" state demonstrate that Putin is still calling for the removal of the democratically elected government in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Kremlin government. The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine, and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands.[5] Putin has demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.[6]

Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine. Putin claimed to Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth materials.[7] Putin included mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in Russian rare earth minerals. Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the supply of Russian aluminum. Putin held a meeting with senior Kremlin officials on February 24 specifically about the importance of further developing Russia's domestic rare earth minerals industry and identified this as a priority effort.[8]

The Kremlin is framing any future US-Russian cooperation on rare earth minerals as conditional on the conclusion of a Russian-friendly peace deal on the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 25 that any US-Russia cooperation on rare earth minerals can only begin after normalizing bilateral relations and achieving a peace settlement in Ukraine.[9] ISW assessed that Russian officials used the recent US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia to start an effort to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.[10] ISW continues to assess that American acceptance of these Russian-offered economic measures — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties. Putin responded to Zarubin's question about Putin's assessment of Europeans' "demands" for the "right to vote in negotiations" about Ukraine, stating that he "does not see anything bad here."[11] Putin then claimed that "probably no one can demand anything here, especially from Russia" but they can try to make demands of someone else – signaling Russia's unwillingness to make compromises in future negotiations. Putin claimed that Moscow respects the positions of Russia's "friends" from BRICS and that "other countries have the right and can participate" in discussions about issues about the war and efforts to achieve peace. Putin specifically highlighted his recent call with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and applauded PRC efforts to discuss peace in Ukraine. The PRC and Brazil – two members of BRICS – have put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia, and Putin appears to be posturing these states as possible participants in future negotiations.[12]

Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran.[13] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that the delegations "touched upon" the situation in Ukraine and that Lavrov expressed gratitude to Iranian authorities for their "balanced position" and their understanding of the "root causes" of the war, including Russia's need to protect Russian-speaking minorities from alleged discrimination from the Ukrainian government.[14]  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency readout of the meeting noted that the delegations discussed Ukraine and Lavrov's statement about Iran's "balanced position" but notably did not mention discussions of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[15] Kremlin officials have recently increasingly referred to Russia's alleged need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[16] Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on February 20, and the Russian MFA claimed that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes," while the PRC's MFA official readout of the Wang-Lavrov meeting attributed all talk of the "root causes" of the war to Lavrov and not Wang.[17] Russia is attempting to use meetings with its allies to publicly reiterate its calls for regime change in Ukraine and posture Russia's allies as supportive of these efforts.

A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia, amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.[18] Russian and North Korean state media reported that Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Consular Department Head Andrei Klimov and North Korean Ambassador to Russia Sin Hong Chol met with a high-ranking North Korean delegation, including North Korean Politburo member Ri Hi Yong, in Moscow.[19] The Russian Embassy in Pyongyang reported on February 24 that the delegations will discuss increased cooperation between United Russia and the WPK in accordance with the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that entered into force in December 2024.[20] South Korean media outlet Korea JoongAng Daily reported on February 24 that commercial satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC shows a 110-meter-long vessel entering and leaving North Korea's Rason Port near the border with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.[21] The satellite imagery also shows a line of containers roughly 100 meters long on the pier at Rason Port next to the docked vessel. The vessel reportedly arrived at the inner side of Rason Port's pier on February 20 and moved to the outer side on February 21, indicating that the vessel unloaded containers on the pier's inner side and loaded new containers on the outer side before departing. ISW reported that North Korea likely used Rason Port to transfer munitions to Vladivostok, Russia in November 2023.[22]

Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing European officials, reported on February 25 that European Union (EU) countries, the United Kingdom (UK), and Norway provided Ukraine with military assistance worth approximately $25 billion in 2024 and that this is more than the United States sent to Ukraine in 2024.[23] An unspecified Western official also told the WSJ that Europe supplies about 25 percent of Ukraine's military hardware and that the United States supplies about 20 percent.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within.
• Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021.
• Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties.
• Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.
• A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia, amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.
• Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing these payments in January 2025.
• The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian government, military, and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption charges are fighting in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions, to form a new Russian elite composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the long term.
• Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24, 2022.[1] ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical part of deterring broader Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance, continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.

Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's full-scale invasion.[2] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since February 2022.[3] (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000 personnel, including about 250,000 dead.[4] Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona published a joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war.[5] Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and Meduza and Mediazone estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian loses significantly increased in 2024.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive operations and loss rates.[7]

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[8] The United States, Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution, while 93 countries supported it.[9] The People’s Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity."[10] The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict."[11]

Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war — casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term. A recent poll conducted by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles between February 5 and 13 showed that 46 percent of respondents do not support the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war goals.[12] The number of respondents who do not support such a Russian withdrawal had consistently decreased between February 2023 (47 percent) and September 2024 (31 percent) but then jumped back to February 2023 levels in February 2025. Fifty-four percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the war had negatively affected their daily lives. Thirty-six percent of respondents stated that their financial situation had worsened — an increase from 27 percent in September 2024. Thirty-six percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the Russian government should prioritize military spending in the budget — a decrease from 43 percent in September 2024. The number of respondents who stated that the most important area for Russian spending is the social sphere increased from 38 percent in September 2024 to 48 percent in February 2025.

Kremlin rhetoric about the relatively faster Russian tempo of advances on the battlefield in recent months and continued official statements about the need for Ukraine to "denazify," "demilitarize," and declare neutrality — Putin's original stated war aims — are likely influencing more Russians to reject a withdrawal in the belief that Russia can achieve these objectives through continued fighting.[13] Russia's protracted war in Ukraine, however, is straining Russia's economy, including by increasing inflation, spending down Russia's sovereign wealth fund, and exacerbating existing labor shortages.[14] Russia will likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in 12 to 18 months if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate — likely increasing the economic burden that the Russian population will feel in the future.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender. Russian state media largely ignored the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion during programming on February 24 and instead highlighted a meeting in which the Russian Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims Chairman Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin praised Putin for announcing and conducting the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin and other Kremlin officials have not abandoned their original war aims in Ukraine and continue to invoke their goals of "denazifying" and "demilitarizing" Ukraine and banning Ukraine's ability to join any security blocs in the future, despite Russia's failure to defeat Ukraine militarily over the last three years.[17]

Putin does not appear deterred by the idea of protracting the war further despite suffering significant and likely unsustainable personnel and materiel losses over the last three years.[18] ISW recently noted that the Russian military appears to be employing a method of advance in Ukraine based on the assumption that the war will continue indefinitely and that the Russian military does not need to make rapid or significant territorial gains in a single offensive operation.[19] ISW recently assessed that it would take Russian forces over 83 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine, assuming that they can sustain their current rate of advance and massive personnel losses indefinitely — which is unlikely.[20] Putin has articulated a theory of victory, however, that assumes that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West and continue to advance on the battlefield until Russia defeats Ukraine. Putin's recent statements rejecting the possibility of a peace agreement with Ukraine are indications of his willingness to protract the war.[21]  Putin continues to signal to the Russian military and society that he will not end the war until Ukraine capitulates completely  and that he has no interest in a negotiated peace agreement that requires Russia to compromise its long-standing war aims, despite Putin's efforts to signal interest in peace negotiations to Western leaders.

Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on February 24 during a press conference in Turkey that Russia will only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the "realities" of the battlefield.[22] Lavrov noted that any peace agreement must include provisions banning Ukraine from joining NATO in the future.[23] Russian state media TV channel Channel One (Pervyi Kanal) summarized Lavrov's statements as "[Russia] will only end combat operations" when negotiations end in a way that satisfies Russia.[24] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire RIA Novosti on February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the "root causes" of the war.[25] Ryabkov stated that a ceasefire that does not address the war's "root causes" is a path to a "quick resumption" of the war and reiterated that Russia considers NATO's post-1991 eastward expansion a root cause of the war. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also claimed on February 24 that it would be "impossible" to resolve the war in Ukraine without understanding and addressing its "root causes."[26] Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians within Ukraine.[27]

Russian officials also continue to frame Russia's demand for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from territory that Ukrainian forces currently control in eastern and southern Ukraine as a "compromise." Ryabkov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and abandon its goal of joining NATO contains "significant compromises" that could serve as the base of a future peace agreement.[28] Ryabkov claimed that Putin's June 2024 demands highlight Russia's desire to find a resolution to the war that "balances" Russia's and Ukraine's interests, despite the fact that Putin called for Ukraine to concede significant areas in exchange for no Russian concessions. ISW has previously noted that Ukrainian authorities rejected the 2022 Istanbul protocol as its terms effectively amounted to a full Ukrainian surrender, and Ukrainian authorities are likely to reject any future ceasefire or peace agreement that amounts to the same.[29]

European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a new military aid package for Ukraine consisting of 25 infantry fighting vehicles, two armored combat vehicles, a landing system for F-16 fighter jets, four F-16 flight simulators, ammunition, drone camera components, and first aid kits.[30] Swedish officials recently announced plans to provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Robotsystem-70 and Tridon Mk2 air defense systems valued at approximately $113 million.[31] Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda announced plans to deliver an unspecified number of RBS-70 short-range air defense systems to Ukraine, and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced a military aid package consisting of 10,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 750,000 rations packages.[32] Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin announced plans to supply Ukraine with an unspecified number of older air defense radar systems.[33] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an EU financial aid package for Ukraine valued at 3.5 billion euros ($3.6 billion) that the EU will distribute in March 2025.[34] British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 4.5 billion pounds ($5.6 billion) in military aid.[35] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pledged that Spain will deliver a new military aid package for Ukraine worth an estimated one billion euros ($1.05 billion) as part of a broader 10-year bilateral security and defense agreement that Ukraine and Spain signed in May 2024.[36] Icelandic Prime Minister Kristrún Mjöll Frostadóttir pledged to increase Iceland's monetary support to Ukraine by roughly 14.4 million euros ($15 million).[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.
• Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.
• The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war – casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.
• Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations.
• European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2025

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their ideal framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in Ukraine, as such a framework would force the West to concede to all of Russia's long-standing demands.[2] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft treaties from the March and April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that indicate that both sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership aspirations and be a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate in military blocs."[3] The draft treaties also reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel. The WSJ and NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes. The draft treaties reportedly listed the United States, United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor states were supposed to “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. The draft treaties did not specify if other non-guarantor states would have to terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is likely considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons. Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts.

Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals. The Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing demands to "denazify" — overthrow and replace the democratically elected Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet state — and "demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the point of being able to defend itself against future Russian aggression — Ukraine.[4] The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to Russia's demands that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from the Istanbul negotiations with the backing of Europe and the United States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky responded to a hypothetical question during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or immediate NATO membership for Ukraine.[5] Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the war ends and has no interest in being in power "for a decade" and reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law.[6] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[7] Zelensky has repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.[8]

Zelensky stated during the press conference that several European officials will visit Kyiv for the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2025 and reiterated that European countries should be involved in future peace negotiations about the war in Ukraine.[9] Zelensky noted that NATO membership is one of the best security guarantees that Ukraine could receive and that Ukraine would also consider membership in the European Union (EU), Western financing for an 800,000-person-strong Ukrainian military, and the presence of a Western peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as acceptable security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire with Russia.[10]

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" forum on February 23 that Ukraine produced 2.2 million first person view (FPV) drones and over 100,000 long-range drones in 2025 and intends to increase its drone production rate in 2025.[11] Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced 154 artillery systems in 2024 and intends to increase production of artillery systems in 2025 and noted that Ukraine is working to develop an analogue to the US-produced Patriot air defense system.[12] Zelensky noted that Ukraine funded 40 percent, European countries funded 30 percent, and the United States funded another 30 percent of Ukraine's domestic defense production in 2024. Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to fund 50 percent of its domestic defense production in 2025.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated at the forum that Ukraine has become the largest producer of tactical and long-range drones in the world and that 96 percent of the Ukrainian military's drones are purchased or produced in Ukraine.[13] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Ukraine intends to operationalize technology that will allow a single drone operator to control multiple drones in a "swarm" in 2025.[14] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces conducted 130 long-range operations and struck 377 objects in Russia in 2024.[15] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine has deployed over 1.3 million drones to the frontline and is working to increase its production of fiber-optic drones. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian long-range drones can strike targets up to 1,700 kilometers deep in Russian territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.[16] Dmitriev was part of the Russian delegation that met with US officials in Saudi Arabia on February 17, and a source close to the Kremlin told Russian opposition outlet Meduza in an article published on February 19 that Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States, likely given his experiences living and studying in the US at Standford University and Harvard University and working for US companies.[17]

Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 23 that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 267 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 138 Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 119 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones flew toward Belarusian airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that drones damaged infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Poltava, Kyiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts and that a missile damaged civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 23 that Russia launched the largest number of Shahed drones against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23.[20]

Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine. Iran has largely enabled Russia to launch near nightly series of large drone strikes as it has provided Russia with Iranian designed and produced Shahed drones and helped Russia establish its own Shahed drone production facility in Tatarstan Republic.[21] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 23 during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 that half of Russia's ammunition comes from North Korea and that North Korea has started large-scale deliveries of 170mm self-propelled artillery system and 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[22] Budanov added that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 148 ballistic missiles, presumably in 2025.[23]

Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 23 that footage circulating on social media shows a Russian servicemember executing a Ukrainian POW in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast.[24] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
• Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.
• Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
• Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial output.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2025

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.[1] The FT investigation provided additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war.[2] FT and experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), but noted that the situation warrants further investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations.[3] FT noted that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders.[4] FT noted that Ukrainian prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.

FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.[5] Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue [Russian] units." Global Rights Compliance President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting, and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.

Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating international law.[6] Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.[7] Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024.[8] FT reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems to incentivize such abuses.[10]

Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told South Korean outlet Chosun Ilbo in an article published on February 17 that roughly 4,000 North Korean forces have been killed or seriously wounded in Kursk Oblast.[11] Budanov noted that North Korean forces are embedded in Russian units and conduct joint operations in small groups with Russian forces and that North Korean forces move as part of larger Russian units to conduct joint operations. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast stated on February 20 that North Korean forces have changed their tactics in the area, reducing the size of their infantry assault groups from 50 personnel to 10 to 15 personnel and moving "more cautiously."[12] The commander noted that North Korean assault groups are still larger than Russian assault groups. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in November 2024 that North Korean forces had been training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units - traditionally more elite forces in the Russian military.[13] Budanov noted that there are more artillery and missile units in Kursk Oblast due to the presence of North Korean troops, but that the GUR has not observed additional North Korean deployments to Russia. GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi also told Chosun Ilbo that 1,000 North Korean troops are training on unspecified new military equipment in an unspecified area in Russia. Skibitskyi reported that North Korean forces have rapidly improved their combat effectiveness by adapting to new combat tactics and operating weapons such as tanks and drones. Budanov also confirmed a Reuters report from December 2024 that Russian missile experts have modified North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, which previously had a 500 to 1,500 meter margin of error, to make them more precise.[14] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in Kursk Oblast reported on February 16 that North Korean assault groups were attacking in more spread out formations as part of efforts to complicate Ukrainian efforts to strike the attacking forces.[15] North Korean forces reportedly recently withdrew from active combat operations in Kursk Oblast after suffering heavy casualties largely due to Ukrainian drone strikes, and reports that North Korean troops have adjusted their tactics on the battlefield to counter Ukrainian drone strikes indicates that North Korean forces may be learning lessons and internalizing valuable combat experience.

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20. Zelensky stated that he had a "good" conversation with Kellogg during which they discussed the battlefield situation, the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and effective security guarantees for Ukraine.[16] Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's readiness to make a "strong, effective investment and security agreement" with the United States and stated that Ukraine has proposed the "fastest and most constructive" ways to achieve such results.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the G20 Foreign Ministers' summit in South Africa on February 20. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)'s official readout stated that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes."[17] The PRC MFA's official readout of the meeting notably differed and stated that Lavrov stated that Russia, not the PRC, is committed to solving the "root causes" of the war.[18] The Russian MFA's likely purposeful misattribution reflects Russia's attempt to align the PRC's position on the war fully with its own in an effort to bolster its international standing and to shape Russian domestic perceptions of Russia’s relationship with China. Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
• Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 19 that Putin will appoint a negotiator for talks with the United States after the United States appoints its own negotiator.[1] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 19, citing a source close to the Kremlin, that the United States was the first to select its delegation for the February 18 bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia, after which Russia attempted to "select relevant" counterparts for each of the selected US officials.[2] The source claimed that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States. Another source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that Putin may appoint his aide Vladimir Medinsky to the Russian negotiations delegation if Ukrainian representatives join future negotiations because Medinsky took part in the Spring 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The source claimed that the Kremlin does not need to include Medinsky in the Russian delegation so long as negotiations remain bilateral between the United States and Russia. The Moscow Times reported on February 19, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the February 18 US-Russia meeting, that the Kremlin seeks to restore access to roughly $6 billion worth of frozen Russian Central Bank reserves in the US.[3] The source claimed that the Russian negotiations delegation in Saudi Arabia pushed for the United States to agree that both countries fully resume the operations of their diplomatic missions in the other country and to return Russian diplomatic property in the United States, which US authorities had previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 18 that the United States and Russia had agreed to restore "the functionality of [their] respective missions in Washington and Moscow."[4] The Kremlin appears to be attempting to push the United States to accept economic and diplomatic terms that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.[5] US acceptance of these economic and diplomatic terms — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.[6] Rubio, Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff gave an interview to CNN and the Associated Press (AP) on February 18 following bilateral talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in Saudi Arabia. Waltz stated that any future end to the war needs to be "permanent," not "temporary as we have seen in the past." Waltz stated that there is going to have to be "some discussion of territory...and security guarantees" and that future talks will discuss Russia's ability to retain any Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed since February 2022. Rubio answered a question about possible concessions from Russia, stating that these "kinds of things" will happen through "difficult diplomacy in closed rooms." Rubio later noted that there will have to be concessions "made by all sides" in order to bring about an end to the war. Rubio emphasized that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio answered a question about his assessment of Russia's desire to achieve peace following the talks in Saudi Arabia, stating that Russia appears willing to "begin to engage in a serious process to determine" the mechanism to end the war, but that an outcome will ultimately depend on the willingness of every side in the war to "agree to certain things."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace. Zelensky emphasized that security guarantees do not necessarily mean deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine.[7] Zelensky stated that it would be sufficient if the United States provided Ukraine with 20 Patriot air defense systems and the license to domestically produce Patriot missiles.[8] Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized Ukraine's need for additional Patriot systems and missiles to defend against Russian missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and his February 19 statements are consistent with previous statements that Ukraine needs a strong military of its own to deter and defend against future Russian aggression.[9]

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.[10] Kellogg met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, and Yermak emphasized that Ukraine remains interested in a strategic, long-term, and comprehensive partnership with the United States.[11]

Ukraine's European partners continue to support Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB). The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 19 that a new delivery of trucks, thermal imaging sights, and other military support arrived in Ukraine as part of a package worth 80 million euros (about $83.3 million) that Lithuania prepared during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on February 12.[12] The Lithuanian MoD estimated that Lithuania's military support for Ukraine in 2025 could reach one billion euros (about $1.042 billion) and stated that Lithuania plans to focus its support on Ukraine's air defense, ammunition, drone, and anti-drone needs and financing for Ukrainian domestic weapons production.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast on the night of February 18 and 19.[13] Kovalenko noted that the refinery has a processing capacity of 8.9 million tons of oil per year and produces fuel, jet fuel, and bitumen. Kovalenko stated that Russian refineries play an important role in supplying Russian troops. Kovalenko stated that the oil refinery stopped operating after the strike, and Reuters, citing two industry sources, also reported that the refinery suspended oil processing after the drone strike caused a fire at the primary refining unit.[14] The industry sources told Reuters that the Syzran refinery had been operating at only 4.7 million tons of capacity in 2024 at least in part due to previous Ukrainian strikes. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on February 19 of a fire at the refinery, which was later geolocated to within Syzran.[15] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Syzran Oil Refinery but that there was no "major" damage.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace.
• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian federal subjects are reportedly halting their recruitment of foreigners who do not speak Russian for service in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2025

Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment. NBC reported on February 18 that four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials stated that intelligence from the United States and unspecified close American allies shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine and that his goals "remain maximalist."[1] One congressional official stated that there is "zero" intelligence showing that Putin is interested in a "real peace deal right now." Intelligence officials stated that Putin has no plans to withdraw troops from Ukraine or to pull any personnel or equipment from western Russia. The six officials stated that Putin may agree to a ceasefire and peace deal in order to give the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, and there is an idea among Western officials that Putin may "go through the motions" of negotiations in order to see what concessions he can get and to reintegrate Russia back into the global community. The two congressional officials and a former senior US administration official noted that Putin's "broad ambitions" have remained unchanged from the end of the Biden administration into the new Trump administration.

Western intelligence assessments suggest that Putin has not changed his theory of victory in Ukraine and still believes that Russia's military superiority is such that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine on the battlefield. The six official sources told NBC that Putin still thinks that he can "wait out" Ukraine and Europe to eventually control all of Ukraine.[2] A Western intelligence official noted that Putin "thinks he is winning" and does not feel pressure to stop hostilities due to Russian battlefield losses. Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and that Russia did not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up similar to that in September 2022 because Russia is not trying to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine rapidly.[3] Putin's theory of victory assumes that the Russian military can sustain slow, creeping advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.

Many recent Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise. Kremlin officials have repeatedly denied Ukraine's sovereignty over its internationally recognized 1991 borders and the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov most recently claimed on February 16.[5] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have promoted false narratives that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" as part of efforts to claim that Zelensky does not have the authority to negotiate with Russia or that Russia does not have to honor any agreements that Zelensky may sign in the future.[6] Putin and other Russian officials have also demanded that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, while denying that Russia will make any territorial concessions of its own[7]

Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine.[8] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a boilerplate readout of the meeting, during which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.[9] Russian officials, including Peskov, Lavrov, and Ushakov, broadly stated that the talks went well, claiming that the discussions were the start of a long process and that Russia and the United States will continue dialogue on these issues.[10] Lavrov claimed that the meeting was "useful" and that Russia and the United States began to "hear each other" and share a "determination to move forward."[11] The Russian MFA's readout emphasized the Russian-American bilateral aspects of the talks, including normalizing bilateral relations, establishing a dialogue for future economic and energy cooperation, and resuming communications on international issues. The Russian MFA's readout also emphasized that Russia and the United States have a "special responsibility" as nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council to resume communicating on international issues. ISW continues to note that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as the heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status.[12] The Russian MFA readout only briefly mentioned Ukraine, claiming that the delegations "exchanged views" on the situation "around Ukraine" and mutually committed to resolving the war.[13]

Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that authorities in Romania and other unspecified EU states are discussing laying claim to Ukrainian territory.[14] Lavrov's claim is part of a wider Kremlin information operation that claims that Ukrainian territory is actually the historical territory of other states such that only a rump state in western Ukraine might be left independent after Russia and Ukraine's other neighbors had absorbed most Ukrainian territory.[15] The Russian MFA stated that the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia reiterated the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[16] Kremlin officials have defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[17] Kremlin officials have frequently referred back to Russia's alleged need to address these "root causes" in recent weeks, including during Putin's February 12 call with Trump. Claims about the "root causes" of the war are in direct reference to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands of the US and Ukraine, include demands that would force Ukraine to become a permanently neutral state that could never join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the Ukrainian government.[18] Moscow's presentation of the "root causes" of the war is intended to place the blame for Russia's full-scale invasion on Ukraine and present the start of this war of conquest as something Russia was compelled to undertake rather than the unprovoked aggression it actually was. This presentation denies the realities that Zelensky ran and took office on a platform of ending the ongoing conflict and sought to negotiate with Putin early in his term and that Putin refused to curtail his proxies' continuous violations of the terms of the Minsk II agreement.[19]

Lavrov also denied Russia's culpability for its deliberate and years' long strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Lavrov claimed that Russian forces did not intend to damage Ukrainian energy infrastructure despite ample evidence that Russian forces have consistently waged strike campaigns using high-precision weaponry to specifically target Ukraine's energy infrastructure.[20] Russian forces have also repeatedly experimented with different strike packages that aim to ensure that high-precision weapons are able to bypass Ukrainian air defense and reach their intended energy infrastructure targets.[21] Lavrov claimed that US officials at the bilateral meeting proposed a moratorium on strikes against Russian and Ukrainian energy facilities, and Lavrov responded that Russian forces only strike facilities that "directly support" the Ukrainian military. Lavrov is deliberately downplaying the Russian strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure that Russian forces have waged every winter of Russia's full-scale invasion.[22]

Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war. Zelensky has repeatedly demonstrated Ukraine's commitment to engaging in good faith negotiations that require compromises with Russia.[23] Zelensky recently expressed his willingness to negotiate directly with Putin.[24] Zelensky stated on February 11 that Ukraine is willing to commit to a territorial exchange with Russia as a condition for peace — a proposal that Russian officials rejected.[25] Ukraine hosted an international Summit on Peace in Switzerland in June 2024 to establish high-level dialogue before potential future peace talks with Russia, and Ukrainian officials announced in December 2024 that Ukraine was preparing another global peace summit.[26] Ukraine previously expressed its willingness to invite Russian representatives to any future peace summits.[27]

Russian officials in Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev, who was part of the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia, told CNN on February 17 that he had already met with several unspecified members from the US delegation in Riyadh prior to the official talks on February 18.[28] Dmitriev denied that Moscow primarily sought to lift sanctions against Russia, claiming instead that both the United States and Russia would benefit from economic cooperation. Dmitriev stated on February 18 that he would present the US delegation in Saudi Arabia with an estimate that US companies lost an alleged $300 billion by leaving the Russian market.[29] Dmitriev stated that major US oil companies "have had very successful business in Russia" and that the companies will return to Russia "at some point," reasoning that the companies would not "forego" the opportunities Russia offers in terms of access to Russian natural resources. Dmitriev claimed that the Russian delegation put forward a number of unspecified economic proposals that the United States is considering and that he thinks there could be progress on these areas in the next two to three months.[30] Dmitriev also called on Russia and the US to establish joint projects in the Arctic, and Minister-Counselor of the Russian Embassy in Canada Vladimir Proskuryakov, who is reportedly an Arctic specialist, notably attended the February 18 bilateral meeting.[31] The Kremlin appears to be engaging in an effort to push the United States to accept economic terms that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. American acceptance of these Russian-offered economic measures — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the United States than for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises in 2025 and 2026. Dmitriev claimed that previous US economic policies "undermined confidence in the dollar" and threatened the US economy.[32] Dmitriev claimed that sanctions have actually helped Russia become "more independent" while damaging the US dollar and American companies.[33] The Kremlin has been engaged in an information operation in recent months that aims to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable to international audiences, and Dmitriev's attempts to frame the United States as needing economic cooperation with Russia more than Russia needs such cooperation is a continuation of these efforts.[34] Russia, however, is facing a series of economic and military challenges and weaknesses, including rising inflation, decreases in the liquidity portion of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, and growing expenditures on the Russian military, that are forecasted to worsen in the next 12 to 18 months should current trends continue – as ISW's Christina Harward will outline in a forthcoming essay. Russia's strained economy and military would benefit from sanctions relief, the return of US companies to the Russian market, and US investment in Russian natural resources projects much more than the enormously larger US economy.

US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for Ukraine. US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met bilaterally with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa on February 18 to discuss support to Ukraine.[35] Von der Leyen emphasized that the United States and Europe must collaborate to achieve a just peace in Ukraine and reaffirmed the EU's commitment to strengthening military support for Ukraine. Costa similarly stated that the EU remains ready to work with the United States to ensure lasting peace and security.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment.
• Many recent Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise.
• Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine.
• Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
• Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war.
• Russian officials in Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the US than for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises in 2025 and 2026.
• US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain that the Russian military command's lack of response to systemic issues is limiting Russian advances near Pokrovsk.
• Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported on February 18 that Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov announced that regional authorities are raising one-time payments for recruits who sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from 400,000 rubles ($4,369) to 1.1 million rubles ($12,015).
• Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2025

The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya stated during a UN Security Council meeting on February 17 that Ukraine has "irrevocably lost" Crimea, the "Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics" (referring to occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[1] Nebenzya insinuated that peace negotiations should "correct" the situation in these oblasts and that Ukraine should cede the remaining parts of the four oblasts that Ukraine currently controls. Nebenzya is calling for Ukraine to cede the roughly 30 percent of the total area in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia does not currently occupy. (Russian forces currently occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast.) Nebenzya also demanded that Ukraine become a "demilitarized" neutral state in the future and that Ukraine not join any alliances or security blocs.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed on February 17 the possibility of Russia making territorial concessions during future negotiations.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Ukraine should withdraw its forces from and cede any unoccupied territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia, and Nebenzya appears to be resurrecting this demand ahead of bilateral US-Russia negotiations.[4] US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted on February 16 that US President Donald Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty."[5]

Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia. Nebenzya claimed that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) are "incapable" of reaching any agreement with Russia and cannot be party to any future agreements about the war in Ukraine.[6] Nebenzya accused European countries of being "blinded" by Russophobia and unrealistic about peace negotiations. Lavrov questioned why European countries should participate in negotiations and insinuated that European leaders only want to prolong the war in Ukraine in order to defeat Russia and prepare for a future war between Russia and Europe.[7] Russian authorities have previously focused their information operations against NATO, accusing the alliance of conspiring and preparing for a future war with Russia. Russian accusations that European countries and the EU more broadly (implicitly as distinct from the US) are acting aggressively towards Russia is a notable informational inflection and likely indicates a new Kremlin effort to drive a wedge between the US and Europe taking advantage of tensions evident at the recent Munich Security Conference.[8]

The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West — notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia. Nebenzya reiterated Putin's demand that Ukraine must conduct elections before the implementation of any peace agreements, continuing the Kremlin's efforts to falsely portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate.[9] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk have also recently repeated the Kremlin's false claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" and implicitly that Russia thus is not obligated to honor agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government.[10] The Kremlin's apparent unwillingness to make territorial concessions, commit to honoring any future peace agreement with Ukraine, or involve any European leaders in these negotiations calls into question Putin's supposed willingness to engage in good faith negotiations that could bring about long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.[11] The Russian delegation includes Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the talks will focus on "restoring the entire complex of US-Russian relations" and preparing for possible future discussions about the war in Ukraine between US President Donald Trump and Putin.[12] Peskov added that Lavrov and Ushakov "will be able to send urgent reports" to Putin while in Riyadh — suggesting that the Russian delegation's purpose is to convey messages and inform the Kremlin, rather than to negotiate on Putin's behalf.[13]

Sergei Lavrov has served as the Russian foreign minister since 2004, but has reportedly been left out of previous key Kremlin decisions relating to the Russian invasions of Ukraine.[14] Sources in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told the BBC in August 2023 that the MFA had no previous knowledge of the Kremlin's ultimatums to the US and NATO in late 2021, and the Financial Times (FT) reported in February 2023 that Lavrov learned about the full-scale invasion a few hours before it started.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Kremlin did not notify Lavrov of Putin's June 2024 press conference at the MFA during which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining territories of four Ukrainian oblasts.[16]

Yuri Ushakov has served as Putin's foreign policy aide since May 2012.[17] Ushakov was Russia's ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1996 to 1998, served as the Russian Ambassador to the United States from 1999-2008, and became Deputy Head of Government Staff from 2008 to 2012.[18] Ushakov publicly dismissed US and Western intelligence about the impending Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as "hysteria" and "absurdity" in early February 2022.[19] Ushakov reportedly participated in early ceasefire talks with Ukraine shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.[20]

Kirill Dmitriev has been CEO of RDIF, a Russian sovereign wealth fund meant to develop foreign direct investment in Russia, since its creation in 2011 and also holds positions on the supervisory boards of the state-owned Gazprombank, Transneft, and Russian Railways.[21] Dmitriev studied economics at Stanford and Harvard universities in the 1990s and spent his early career working as a consultant at McKinsey & Company and Goldman Sachs and later ran the Ukrainian investment fund Icon Private Equity from 2007 to 2011.[22] Dmitriev enjoys close ties with Putin's family, and Dmitriev's wife, Natalia Popova, is reportedly a close friend and former classmate of Putin's daughter, Katerina Tikhonova.[23] Dmitriev has extensive experience working with Middle Eastern countries, as the RDIF's partners include the sovereign wealth funds of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Bloomberg, citing a person familiar with the exchange, reported on February 14 that Dmitriev recently played a key role in negotiations with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff to free American Marc Fogel from Russia.[24] Dmitriev accompanied Putin on his visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in 2023 and Beijing in May 2024.[25]

A key Putin ally will be notably absent from the meeting. Bloomberg reported on February 14 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin would participate in the Russian delegation going to Saudi Arabia – reports which ended up proving false.[26] Naryshkin is Putin's close ally who reportedly participated in Russia-Ukrainian negotiations shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 and discussions with former CIA director William Burns in Ankara in November 2022.[27] Putin has also stated that he decided to launch Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 after consulting with only the "leaders of [Russia's] special services and the defense ministry."[28] None of the members of the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia appear to be among the closest inner circle that Putin would likely empower to engage in serious negotiations on his behalf, but Putin may intend to include more trusted individuals in future rounds of talks or may have more confidence in these individuals in these particular talks.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the refinery has an annual refining capacity of about 6.6 million tons and specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil.[29] Kovalenko noted that the oil refinery supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine. Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Kavkazsky Raion, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the station is the largest pumping station in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.[30] The consortium confirmed that seven drones struck the Kropotkinskaya station, leading authorities to take the station out of operation.[31] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) conducted the drone strikes against the Ilsky Oil Refinery and Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station.[32] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that falling drone debris damaged houses in Ilsky and Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 70 drones overnight, including 24 drones over Krasnodar Krai.[34]

Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 17 that footage shows Russian forces executing three surrendering Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified location after a Russian commander orders the soldiers to kill two of the POWs.[35] ISW has long assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[36]

Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[37] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 17 Iran Update. The sources said that Russia is “close” to a deal that would keep at least some staff and equipment in Syria. One of the sources said that Russia hopes to keep the same air and naval bases that it used prior to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime, likely referring to Hmeimim Airbase and the naval base at Tartus. Russia also previously held several other airbases within central and northern Syria, including a helicopter base in Qamishli, though it is unclear whether the agreement will cover these sites. Russian forces have fully evacuated all their former positions in Syria except for Hmeimim Airbase and the Port of Tartus.[38] Other forces, such as the Syrian interim government or US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have taken many of these bases following Russian forces’ evacuation.[39]

The tone of engagement between Russia and the Syrian interim government has notably become more cooperative in recent weeks, which supports the sources’ claims that Russia may be in agreement with Syria. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara emphasized Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12.[40] Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra recently suggested that Syria could allow Russia to retain air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[41] It is not clear what “benefits“ Russia may be offering Syria in current negotiations. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 in a gesture that likely sought to foster goodwill with the Syrian government.[42] This gesture followed Syrian officials’ demands that Russia pay its debts to the Syrian state and Putin’s offer to Shara to assist with Syria’s economy.[43]

Unspecified sources also told Bloomberg that Russia could help with the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS efforts.[44] It is unclear based on this comment whether the Syrian interim government has discussed Russian forces re-deploying to Syria to fight against ISIS. The Syrian interim government is likely eager to obtain manpower to assist in counter-ISIS operations as the government contends with the political and material realities of forming and training the new Syrian army. Russian participation in the Assad regime campaign against ISIS failed to effectively degrade ISIS in Syria, however. Russian aircraft proved to be far more capable in targeting Syrian opposition groups on behalf of the regime than it was targeting ISIS.[45] The scale of a future Russian deployment to Syria would impact the success of any Russian counter-ISIS operations, and it is unclear if a ”reduced” military presence would be any more effective against ISIS than Russian forces were at the height of Russian deployments to Syria. US Central Command announced in July 2024 that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute in Syria following several years of decreased capability.[46] Russia would by no means provide a suitable replacement for the United States or SDF in counter-ISIS operations in the face of ISIS reconstitution efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations.
• Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia.
• The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.
• The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
• Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline.
• Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.
• Russian forces advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Convention by conscripting civilians in occupied Ukraine to serve in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2025

Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds (about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025.[i] The UK stated that it will provide Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of Spring 2025.[ii] Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine.[iii] Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one Ukrainian battalion each.[iv] The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles, Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.[v]

Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024.[vi] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and armored vehicles.[vii] IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[viii] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.

IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.[ix] ISW began observing indications in November and December 2024 that Russian forces were using fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast, particularly in areas where Russian forces had previously relied heavily on mechanized assaults to make significant tactical advances.[x] Russian forces have continued to use fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast and throughout the frontline, possibly due to Ukrainian drone operations, equipment constraints, or non-conducive ground conditions brought about by rainy weather. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 13 that successful Ukrainian drone strikes have been the main factor — and not poor weather and ground conditions — prompting Russian forces to use fewer armored vehicles along the frontline.[xi] Trehubov noted that Russian forces also have issues supplying shells to some unspecified frontline positions, possibly due to successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots, and have thus decreased the intensity of shelling in such areas.

It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units. IISS assessed that Russia refurbished and built over 1,500 tanks and 2,800 IFVs and APCs in 2024 — suggesting that Russia produced enough vehicles to replace all of its tank losses and three quarters of its armored vehicle losses last year.[xii] IISS assessed that Russia's ongoing effort to expand the Russian military and create new units is exacerbating equipment shortages and noted that Russia may also be suffering from a shortage of spare parts to refurbish tanks and armored vehicles. IISS assessed that it is highly likely that the Soviet-era tanks and armored vehicles remaining in Russia's stores are in a deteriorated condition, which may complicate Russia's ability to offset high equipment losses in 2025 and beyond. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russia is continuing to form new divisions, and former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia aimed to stand up 14 new military divisions in the coming years.[xiii] The Russian military command appears to be balancing allocating refurbished and newly-produced vehicles between new formations and formations that have been fighting on the frontline for several years. Russia may struggle to adequately equip its units with materiel in the long-term if the Russian military continues to burn through Soviet-era vehicle stocks without significantly increasing Russia's ability to produce new tanks and armored vehicles.

Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The EFIS published its annual intelligence report on February 12 which focused on Russian threats to Estonia, other NATO members, and the West.[xiv] The intelligence report noted that the pace of the Russian military's rearmament will depend on the duration and outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine. The EFIS also assessed that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia would allow Russia to permanently station more forces along the borders of NATO member states neighboring Russia than before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – consistent with ISW's longstanding assessments.[xv] The intelligence report highlighted Russia's efforts to increase, improve, and centralize drone operations and production.[xvi] The EFIS reported that Russia will allocate on average one million euros (about $1 million) annually until 2030 to its "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle" National Project, established in December 2023, which aims to establish 48 research and production centers across Russia, standardize drone productions and development, create an electronic database of drone industry experts, and integrate drone-related education into 75 percent of all Russian schools.[xvii] The EFIS assessed that Russia is attempting to use these research and development centers to reduce Russia's reliance on Western and foreign technology and components and that Russia continues to rely on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to procure Western components for drone production. The EFIS noted that up to 80 percent of sanctioned Western components likely reach Russia through the PRC.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on February 13 that Ukrainian drones destroyed two Valdai radar complexes in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast and noted that Russian forces used the radar complexes to detect and down drones over the airspace near Moscow City.[xviii] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on February 13 that Ukrainian drones targeted the Lipetsk water aeration station in Lipetsk City, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant, which is located near the station and produces about 20 percent of Russia's steel output.[xix] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), reported on February 13 that the SBU struck the Andreapol oil pumping station in Tver Oblast, causing a fire at the boiler equipment warehouse and a closed switchgear.[xx]

The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.[xxi] The Moldovan MFA noted that it summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov following Russian drone violations of Moldovan airspace and notified Vasnetsov of the intended closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, in response.[xxii] Moldovan President Maia Sandu reported on February 13 that Russian Shahed drones violated the country's airspace and that two drones exploded on Moldovan territory.[xxiii] Vasnetsov denied reports that Russian drones violated Moldovan territory.[xxiv] Geolocated footage published on February 13 shows the explosion and aftermath of a likely Russian Shahed strike in a field near Ceadir-Lunga, Moldova.[xxv] Azerbaijani outlets also reported on February 6 that Azerbaijani authorities announced the closure of the local Rossotrudnichestvo branch in Baku, Azerbaijan citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference."[xxvi] Russia currently has over 80 Rossotrudnichestvo branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[xxvii] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting.
• Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023.
• IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.
• It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units.
• Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises.
• The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk.
• Russian officials continue efforts to increase recruitment for the "BARS-Bryansk" volunteer territorial defense detachment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025

US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin negotiations.[1] Trump added that he planned to "inform [Zelensky] of the conversation" after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved through peaceful negotiations."[2] Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[3] Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference.[4] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones.[5] Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.[6] Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.[7]

Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The DDIS published a declassified intelligence assessment on February 11 detailing the growing Russian threat to Denmark and NATO members.[8] The intelligence assessment notes that Russia is rebuilding its military to fight NATO on an equal footing, aided by financial and material support from the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The intelligence assessment states that Russia's willingness to risk war with NATO may increase if European countries do not simultaneously build up their military capabilities in response to Russian capacity building efforts. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported on February 12 that Europe spent $457 billion on defense in 2024, while Russia by itself spent $462 billion on defense in last year.[9] The DDIS intelligence assessment notes that Russia has not yet decided to launch a full-scale war against NATO but is expanding its military capabilities to maintain that option.[10] Russia is currently avoiding actions that could trigger NATO's Article 5 — the commitment to mutual self-defense — but may take greater risks if it perceives a shift in the balance of power in its favor. The DDIS assessment states that if Russia deems NATO weakened either militarily or politically it could be more willing to attack a European NATO member, particularly if Russia doubts US military support to Europe. The intelligence assessment notably warns that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia will free up significant Russian military resources for their involvement in another future conventional conflict — consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment. The DDIS assessment outlines a timeline for Russia's growing military threat in the event of an end of hostilities in Ukraine: Russia could wage a local war against a neighboring state other than Ukraine within six months; Russia could credibly threaten NATO countries in the Baltic region in two years; and Russia could be prepared for a large-scale war in Europe, assuming NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, in five years. ISW previously assessed that Russia's efforts to restructure the Russian military, revive the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, and create long-term mechanisms to militarize and radicalize Russian society against Western ideals and values indicate that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO.[11]

Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike mainly targeting Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of February 11 and 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missiles targeted Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six missiles and 71 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported on February 12 that Russian missiles damaged buildings in the Obolonskyi, Svyatoshynskyi, Darnytskyi, and Holosiivskyi raions of Kyiv City and Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast, and caused five casualties.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 12 that Russian ballistic missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure and killed at least one person in Kyiv City.[14] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 12 that a Russian missile struck central Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian infrastructure.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat emphasized that Ukraine needs US-provided Patriot air defense missile systems to counter ballistic missile strikes.[16]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[17] The Ukrainian MoD officially launched the program on February 11 and noted that the program offers 18- to 24-year-olds the ability to join the military under a one-year contract and the option to either reenlist after one year or return to civilian life. The Ukrainian MoD will pay volunteers 200,000 UAH ($4,700) upon signing a one-year contract and an additional 800,000 UAH ($19,120) during their service in addition to a monthly salary of 120,000 UAH ($2,870). Volunteers will receive three months of training before deploying to the frontline. The Ukrainian government will subsidize future mortgages, education, and medical care for volunteers and will permit volunteers to travel abroad after their one year of service. The program also exempts volunteers from mobilization for 12 months after their one-year contract ends. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the "Contract 18-24" program is part of Ukraine's ongoing efforts to create a professional military. Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated that the MoD will pay one million UAH (about $23,900) to any Ukrainian servicemembers who were under the age of 25 when they signed a voluntary military service contract.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Putin affirmed Russia's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity and emphasized the need for a dialogue among political and ethno-religious groups within Syria. Putin pledged continued socio-economic aid to, and economic cooperation with Syria, and Putin and al Shara discussed recent negotiations between the interim Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[19] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government on Russian military basing rights at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus, however.[20] Russia likely continues to engage with the interim Syrian government in an effort to secure its presence at these bases.

The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).[21] Several Armenian civic organizations initiated the bill via a petition that garnered enough support (at least 50,000 signatures) for parliamentary consideration.[22] The legislation calls on Armenian authorities to launch EU accession talks in accordance with the will of the Armenian people.[23] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged Armenia’s “sovereign right” to pursue EU membership but urged Armenians to consider whether the EU shares this goal.[24] Peskov also emphasized the "benefits" Armenia gains as a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[25] Russian officials and information space commentators previously claimed that Armenia’s move toward EU membership signaled its withdrawal from the EAEU.[26] Armenia continues to strengthen its ties with the EU and the broader West amid escalating tensions with Russia and concerns that Russia is an unreliable security partner to Armenia.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.
• Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
• The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security. Zelensky stated during an interview with UK outlet The Guardian on February 11 that Europe will not be able to completely meet Ukraine's military needs and provide adequate security guarantees without US involvement.[1] Zelensky called for the West to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air-defense systems and noted that the United States has an irreplaceable role in supplying these systems to Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Ukraine's allies can help rebuild and restore Ukraine alongside Ukrainian companies and that Ukraine is prepared to discuss such plans in detail. Zelensky stated that he will provide US President Donald Trump during their next meeting with a more detailed plan for how the United States can be involved in Ukraine's reconstruction and the joint extraction of natural resources. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has Europe's largest uranium and titanium reserves and suggested that the West should not let these resources fall under Russia's control. Zelensky told Reuters on February 7 that he floated the idea of giving allies the opportunity to invest in critical mineral extraction during closed meetings in Fall 2024.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is offering its partners a "mutually beneficial partnership" to jointly develop Ukrainian resources and is not proposing "giving away" Ukraine's resources. Zelensky stated that the United States will receive prioritized access to this opportunity and that the United States and Ukraine are considering storing US liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Ukraine's underground gas storage sites.

Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.[3] The milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian military appears increasingly anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations with Russia.[4] Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian territory.

Russian forces continued to test new strike tactics and packages in a series of missile and drone strikes targeting energy infrastructure in Ukraine on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 19 sea-, air-, and land-based missiles against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast and 124 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 Shahed and other drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and that 67 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that strikes damaged infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and facilities at a Naftogaz gas production plant in Poltava Oblast.[6] Russian forces notably launched all the missiles in this strike package against a single target. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes forced Ukrainian energy operators to restrict electricity.[7] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that that Russian forces first launched Shahed drones, then launched cruise and ballistic missiles - including Kalibr cruise missiles - at a single target in order to complicate Ukrainian air defenses' abilities to intercept all incoming projectiles.[8] Khrapchynskyi stated that Russian forces recently began reducing their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles, which are launched from Tu-22 (Backfire) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic aircraft and are increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles launched from tactical Sukhoi aircraft. The Russians presumably prefer not to risk their strategic bombers in such strikes. Khrapchynskyi also stated that Russian forces are adapting their strike tactics following the provision of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and are prioritizing striking frontline and border areas where Ukrainian forces are less likely to operate F-16s.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and the Ukrainian military struck the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City causing a fire.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Saratov Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and over 20 types of petroleum products and provides fuel to the Russian military. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that a drone strike caused a fire at an industrial plant in Saratov Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in November 2024 and January 2025.[11] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied that Ukrainian forces also struck Engels Air Base, and Russian sources published footage purportedly showing Russian air defense operating in the area.[12]

The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11. Russian Duma deputies submitted the proposal to remove Gurulev from the Defense Committee and transfer him to the Regional Policy and Local Government Committee on February 7, and Gurulev expressed support for this move but did not claim responsibility for the initiative.[13] Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on February 7 that some of its sources stated that Gurulev's removal is due to his controversial statements that reflect badly on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] Gurulev has made statements that include proposing to introduce a tax on childless Russians and notably leaked the audio message of former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (SMD) Major General Ivan Popov in July 2023 in which Popov claimed that the Russian command dismissed him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces, resulting in an ongoing criminal case against Popov.[15]

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false-flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on February 11 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with assistance from unspecified Western countries intend to blow up a foreign vessel in the Baltic Sea to prompt NATO to block Russia's access to the Baltic Sea and start a direct armed conflict between Russia and NATO.[16] The SVR claimed that unspecified European intelligence services and Ukraine's GUR also plan to assassinate Russian opposition figures living abroad and blame Russia for the assassinations to undermine future peace negotiations. Russia's SVR has previously accused Ukraine and other Western states of planning false flag attacks to discredit Ukraine and drive a wedge in Western unity behind Ukraine, particularly at critical moments in Western discussions regarding support for Ukraine and a possible peace plan.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security.
• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.
• The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.
• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2025

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian positions.[1] Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only the first stage of the Drone Line project.[2] This project likely formalizes and provides additional support to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.

Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the Russian military bureaucracy.[3] The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.[5]

Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City.[6] Kovalenko noted that the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current air defense capabilities are unknown.[7] Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near Krasnodar City.[8] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building.[9] Kondratyev claimed that Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence.[10] Krasnodar City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly authorized systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on February 10 that accounts from two former Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) prison guards and a prison medical professional, official documents, interviews with Ukrainian POWs, and a person who has helped the Russian prison officials defect show that Russian authorities have instructed Russian prison authorities to engage in widespread torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons since March 2022.[12] The WSJ stated that Major General Igor Potapenko, the head of the FSIN in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, told elite prison "special forces" in March 2022 to "be cruel" to Ukrainian POWs and that there would be no restrictions on violence against the POWs. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty assessed that these "special forces" were likely the FSIN's special forces — as opposed to the Russian Main Directorate [GRU] Spetsnaz forces.[13]) The WSJ reported that other prison authorities across Russia received similar instructions in the first weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[14] One of the former prison guards stated that they believed they had permission from their leadership to "push their mistreatment of Ukrainians to a new level." Russian forces have increasingly executed Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[15] Reports that Russian authorities authorized the torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons as early as March 2022 also demonstrate the degree to which Russian authorities are complicit in these war crimes. Russian authorities notably appointed Potapenko as Vice Governor of St. Petersburg for Security and Migration Policy in 2024.[16] Russian authorities' complicity in these crimes and the promotion of war crime perpetrators to high-level positions within the Russian government further demonstrate the atrocities that Russian occupation inflicts on the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving to Russia to join either the Russian work force or the Russian military. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora claimed that North Korea and Russia are increasing educational cooperation and that professors from North Korean universities will travel to Moscow, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Vladivostok cities "for a long period of time" to teach Korean in Russian universities and that Russian universities are preparing three-month internships for North Korean students.[17] Matsegora's statement follows South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) report on February 9 that North Koreans are increasingly entering Russia on student visas to take construction jobs.[18] UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, which Russia voted for in 2017, prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[19] Matsegora's statement that North Korean professors are coming to Russia for work would likely violate UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[20]

A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment. Matsegora claimed that Russia has sent "hundreds" of wounded soldiers who fought against Ukraine to North Korea for rehabilitation and medical care and that North Korea refused Russia's offer of financial compensation for the medical care, food, and other expenses related to the Russians' stay in North Korea.[21] The Russian military command has reportedly been sending wounded personnel back into assault groups without treatment, demonstrating a general disregard for soldiers' health in the Russian military and calling into question official Russian claims to be sending Russian soldiers abroad for treatment, particularly to North Korea.[22] The arrival of combat experienced Russian soldiers, particularly if they include officers or non-commissioned officers, to North Korea may allow the Russian military to work with North Korean forces and disseminate lessons from the war in Ukraine while ostensibly recuperating.

The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on February 10 that Transnistria rejected 60 million euros (about $61.8 million) in EU aid to support continued gas deliveries to the breakaway republic, refusing to accept the aid's condition that Tiraspol gradually increase tariffs for consumers.[23] Recean outlined the scheme through which Transnistria will receive gas from the European market starting February 13. MET Gas and Energy Marketing, a Hungarian natural gas trader on the European market, signed a contract with Moldovagaz to transport gas for Transnistria to the Moldovan border; Dubai-based JNX General Trading LLC will pay for the gas; Moldovagaz and Tiraspoltransgaz reached an agreement to transit the gas through Moldova to Transnistria; and Transnistria will pay the transit costs in advance. Recean noted that Moldovan authorities have vetted both companies and did not find any violations of international or Moldovan law. Transnistria will reportedly undertake measures to demonstrate its "openness" in return, including releasing political prisoners, continuing to air Moldovan public television, and removing 11 checkpoints that Tiraspol installed in 2022. Recean stated that Tiraspol refused the EU offer of aid under pressure from Moscow, and a senior Moldovan government official told Politico that Russia blocked the EU-proposed solution.[24] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky claimed on February 10 that Russian "credit and functional support" made the Hungarian supply scheme possible and thanked the Russian Ministry of Energy for its assistance.[25] Russia's allocation of funds for Transnistria's purchase of European gas demonstrates that influence over Transnistria remains a priority for the Kremlin, despite Russia's ongoing economic strains at home.[26] Russia's role in financing the gas purchases indicate that Russia will continue to be the sole economic backer of the breakaway republic, despite select Transnistrian authorities' Western leaning political and economic interests.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Russian authorities reportedly authorized systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving to Russia to join either the Russian work force or the Russian military.
• A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment.
• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2025

Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.[3]

Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5] North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.

The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution.  

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training. German outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report, that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase, where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the operators in all six instances. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects" with modifications and are likely not commercially available. Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.

Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states. Russia has been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities, in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
• The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
• German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
• Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2025

Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka (just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack.[2] Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[3] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim.[4] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims.[5] ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.[6]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye (northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions that complicated Russian drone operations in the area.[8] Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient.[9] Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending in Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024. Putin stated during a meeting with acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 106th VDV Division, 76th VDV Division, and other Russian forces are still operating in Kursk Oblast and will be rewarded for their service in the future.[11] Putin's statement underlines the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned elements of these relatively elite formations in Kursk Oblast for the last six months, depriving Russia of the opportunity to redeploy these forces to higher priority areas of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW recently noted that the Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans and elements of most of Russia's elite VDV and naval infantry formations, to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[13] Putin has yet to prioritize expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast over continuing his gradual advances in Donetsk Oblast and continues to drag out the liberation of Kursk's border areas, despite domestic discontent.

Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) commemorated the milestone on February 6 by acknowledging that small SSO units infiltrated Russia's rear in Kursk Oblast as early as June 2024 — two months before the main incursion began in August 2024.[14] The SSO forces advanced behind Russian lines in Kursk Oblast to prepare for the Ukrainian incursion, conducting reconnaissance and targeted strikes to dismantle key elements of Russia's border defenses. The SSO noted that Ukrainian forces systematically destroyed Russian air defense and ammunition depots, limiting Russia's ability to respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The SSO also provided a detailed account of the operation and the technological adaptations the Ukrainian forces employed during the Kursk incursion. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also awarded honors to the Ukrainian personnel involved in the Kursk incursion for the anniversary, offering the first official Ukrainian statement regarding a comprehensive composition of Ukraine's force deployment in Kursk Oblast.[15] Zelensky reiterated that the incursion aimed to prevent a new Russian offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Zelensky noted that the Kursk incursion reinforced his "peace through strength" principle, provided Ukraine with a significant replenishment of POW "exchange funds," and forced Russia to divert elite military units to Kursk Oblast — impairing Russian operations elsewhere along the front. Ukrainian officials have previously noted that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled several Russian plans to attack northern Ukraine and complicated Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16]

A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) released results on February 6 of a survey of 1,600 Russians conducted from January 28 to February 2, showing that 67 percent of the people polled support Russia’s war in Ukraine and that 65 percent believe that the war is "going well" for Russia.[17] VCIOM’s Political Research Director Mikhail Mamonov stated that the public demands a swift, favorable conclusion to the war and supports measures that advance these goals while resenting Russian setbacks like the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast incursion, slow territorial gains, and economic hardship. VCIOM’s findings likely reflect Kremlin views and narratives and likely inflate the level of public support for the war, however. These results come amid rising casualties, Russian command controversies, and immense economic strain on the Russian economy during the war.[18] Successful renewed Ukrainian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast may also negatively impact the Russian public’s view of the war in the coming weeks.

North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities. Reuters, citing two Ukrainian military-affiliated sources, reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have shown significantly improved accuracy.[19] These North Korean missiles, previously accurate within 1 to 3 kilometers, can now strike within 50 to 100 meters of their intended targets. One Ukrainian source noted that Russia has launched over 20 North Korean missiles in recent weeks, all demonstrating enhanced precision. Reuters’ sources speculated that North Korea may have upgraded the navigation systems of its missiles, incorporated new steering mechanisms, or received improved targeting data and guidance components from Russia, although the exact modifications remain unclear. The North Korean missiles not only serve to bolster Russia’s arsenal but also likely allow North Korea to refine its capabilities for possible future military operations elsewhere. Other Russian allies, such as Iran, likely can improve their strike systems’ performance by leveraging Russia’s lessons learned from operations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base, causing an explosion and resulting in a fire at the facility.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base to store, prepare, and launch Shahed drones against Ukraine and to conduct maintenance for aircraft operating over occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of the explosion at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base.[21]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on February 6 that France transferred an unspecified number of French Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Ukraine — the first batch of Mirage jets Ukraine has received.[22] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6, 2024 that France would provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train several pilots to operate the jets.[23] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on February 6 that the Netherlands recently delivered an unspecified number of US-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.[24]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.[25] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 6 that Bakanov's appointment is part of a regular personnel rotation.[26] Several Russian milbloggers characterized the reshuffling, however, as a result of Kremlin officials' dissatisfaction with Roscosmos's underperformance under Borisov's leadership, including Borisov's inability to accelerate the development of a full-fledged portable satellite communications system for the Russian military by 2026.[27] A Russian insider source noted that Borisov served as Deputy Minister of Defense under former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu from 2018-2022 and was one of the last remaining nodes of Shoigu's patronal network that controlled the Russian Ministry of Defense prior to widespread arrests of Ministry of Defense officials in Summer 2024.[28] Bakanov previously served as the head of Russia's Gonets communication satellite program from 2011-2019.[29] Gonets is a possible civilian analogue to Western Starlink terminals.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
• Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.
• North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.[1] Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations. Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.[2]

Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[4] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[5]

Prominent Kremlin-linked figures continue to clearly articulate Russia's disinterest in negotiations while Putin propagates the information operation accusing Ukraine of being the unwilling party. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk, a close personal ally of Putin and father of Putin's goddaughter, reinforced the Kremlin's efforts to delegitimize Ukrainian statehood in a February 4 article, arguing that Russia must reclaim its so-called "historical lands."[6] Medvedchuk published an accompanying map depicting all Ukrainian territory east of Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts as part of "historical Russia." Medvedchuk claimed that Western support for Ukraine aims solely to collapse Russia from within and labeled Ukrainians as "modern barbarians" whom Russia must save through integration into the Russian state. Medvedchuk denied Ukraine's historical legitimacy, insisting that modern Ukraine is inherently Russian - a narrative consistently promoted by Kremlin officials and the Russian information space to justify Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine. Medvedchuk's rhetoric as a member of the Russian elite with extensive ties to Putin are representative of the Kremlin's systemic refusal to act in good faith regarding negotiations with Ukraine and the West and the Kremlin's core unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine - a state and government it considers illegitimate.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Zelensky added that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were KIA.[8] Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[9] Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to 70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Albashneft LLC oil depot in Novominskaya, Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the facility.[10] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of fire at the Albashneft oil depot and noted that the depot supplies straight-run gasoline (crude oil distillate), diesel fuel, and fuel oil to the Russian military.[11] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows a fire at the Albashneft oil depot.[12] Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev claimed on February 5 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil tank near Novominskaya.[13]

The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military district's "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[14] The decree replaces the "joint strategic command" of each military district with a "directorate" that presumably will exclusively oversee ground forces and appears to disaggregate naval and VKS assets back to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy and VKS command, respectively. The decree states that military districts will also be involved in helping Russian citizens enter the "mobilization manpower reserve" of the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed reorganizing military districts to optimize the army's command structure in June 2024.[15]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to re-establish military districts primarily as headquarters for Russian ground forces and disaggregate the peacetime administrative headquarters for Russia’s Navy and Air Force. Joint Russian operational groups will likely continue to be led by a combined-arms operational military command in wartime.[16] Disaggregating administrative control for Russian naval and air forces from the headquarters responsible for administrative control for ground forces would likely free up bureaucratic bottlenecks during peacetime and allow military district commanders to focus on training and preparing Russian ground forces for combat operations. Russia's efforts to refocus military districts on purely overseeing ground force assets could also help simplify and expedite Russia's activation of its ground forces during a future conflict. Russian forces will very likely continue to form and operate in interoperable joint force groupings under unified operational commanders during wartime, including during ongoing combat operations in Ukraine. It is unclear how or if this administrative restructuring will impact Russia's campaign in Ukraine in the long-term. Such a change is unlikely to affect the near-term battlefield situation since many Russian forces operating in Ukraine are currently organized under interservice groupings of forces. This restructuring may help Russian forces reconstitute multiple services more quickly than they otherwise could, as Russian ground, naval, and the air forces may not need to compete over the administrative resources of a single military district.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced on February 4 that it will enact a new migration regime that imposes severe restrictions on migrants residing in Russia starting on February 5.[17] The law requires migrants who have committed a criminal offense or are undocumented to register with Russian authorities, regularly share geolocated photos to the MVD, and obtain MVD approval for basic activities including buying property, driving a car, accessing banking services, and traveling outside their region. The law gives the MVD the right to deport migrants who violate these restrictions without a court hearing and penalizes those who provide undocumented migrants with services. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin reported that migrant-related crimes remain a "serious concern" for Russian authorities and the public and claimed that there was an 18 percent increase in court cases against migrants in 2024.[18] Bastrykin's statements reinforce Russian ultra-nationalist narratives that migrants pose a security threat by supposedly violating laws, moving "uncontrollably" within Russia, and committing crimes. The new MVD migration regime and Bastrykin's rhetoric demonstrate that Russian authorities are increasingly prioritizing efforts to appease particularly pro-war, xenophobic Russian ultranationalists and mitigate potential domestic security risks linked to rising anti-migrant sentiment rather than offsetting Russia's labor shortages and ongoing economic struggles, in part, with migrant labor.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on February 5 that Ukraine repatriated 150 Ukrainian POWs and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[19] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that the returned Ukrainian POWs suffer from serious injuries and illnesses.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia also received 150 Russian POWs.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run.
• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
• The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.[1] Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.[2] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power.[3] Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024.[4] Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves.[5] Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers.[6] Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.[7]

Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage."[8] Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline.[9] Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel.[10] These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.

The Russian military may be struggling to recruit enough new military personnel, however. ISW observed reports in late 2024 and January 2025 that the Russian military's monthly recruitment rate is likely equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one.[11] ISW also observed reports that select Russian federal subjects are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed a draft amendment on February 3 to reclassify some illnesses, diseases, and disorders for conscripts and those signing military service contracts. The Russian MoD proposed reclassifying syphilis, hypertension, central nervous system atrophy disorders, skin diseases, schizophrenia, psychotic disorders, affective disorders, and other health problems as more minor ailments that do not disqualify someone from service.[13] Radio Svoboda, citing the Russian Movement of Conscientious Objectors, reported that the Russian MoD's proposal would make it more difficult for conscripts to obtain military service exemptions for health reasons and would complicate dismissal procedures for mobilized personnel and servicemembers who signed a military service contract.[14]

Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claim that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in an interview with Russian state news wire RIA Novosti published on February 4 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia.[15] Ganchev claimed that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from Ukrainian shelling. Ganchev called on Russian forces to drive Ukrainian forces "as far west as possible." Ganchev claimed that occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast had a plan in August 2022 to hold a "referendum" on Russia's annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but that the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in early September 2022 prevented the referendum. Ganchev claimed that if it were not for the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kharkiv Oblast would have become the "fifth oblast to join Russia on September 30." Russian forces currently occupy parts of northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, but Russia has not attempted to illegally annex Kharkiv Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably did not include Kharkiv Oblast in his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even territories that Russian forces do not occupy in these regions.[16]

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[17] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[18] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[19] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[20] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[21] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[22] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet."[23]

Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria. The Ukrainian Resistance Center posted video evidence showing that it had gained access to the "Mosaik" system, an internal system that Russia reportedly uses to track Russian ship routes and cargo.[24] Data from the "Mosaik" system shows that the Sparta IV traveled between Tartus, Syria, and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in April 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Oboronlogistika logistics company owns the Sparta, Sparta II, and Sparta IV cargo ships.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian vessels stopped traveling between Russia and Syria via the Black Sea in Spring 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian naval drone strikes in the Black Sea.[26] Russian ships instead reportedly started traveling from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean despite the fact that this route is several times longer than the Black Sea route. The appearance of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean Sea on February 4 is consistent with reports that Russian ships are now traveling between Syria and Russia via the Atlantic.

Russia has also reportedly used vessels belonging to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that it gained access to correspondence between an unspecified branch of the Russian Administration of Sea Ports and the Sparta's captain in which Russian authorities asked the Sparta and Sparta II to monitor Latvian patrol ships in the Baltic Sea off the western coast of Latvia in April 2023.[27] NATO notably conducted its Aurora 23 exercise near Sweden in April and May 2024.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities
• Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.
• A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.
• Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.
• Russia has also reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2025

Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared to previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1 square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670 casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024. The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025, coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024.[2] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024 through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.[3]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City and the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant near Astrakhan City.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike damaged the primary processing units at the Volgograd refinery and that a fire started at the Astrakhan plant. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Volgograd Oil Refinery is one of the top ten refineries in Russia and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes gas condensate and produces gas and diesel fuel.[5] A source in the SBU told Radio Liberty that the Volgograd Oil Refinery processes almost six percent of all Russian oil and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes 12 billion cubic meters of gas condensate per year.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that an employee at the Astrakhan plant stated that the strike damaged a gas condensate processing plant.[7] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces repelled a massive Ukrainian drone strike against the oblast overnight and intercepted and neutralized "most" of the drones.[8] Bocharov claimed that falling drone debris caused a fire at an oil refinery and short-term power outages. Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct a drone strike against fuel and energy facilities and that a fire started after a drone fell.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 25 drones over Volgograd Oblast and seven over Astrakhan Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd City on the night of January 30 to 31.[11]

Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi stated in an interview with Radio Liberty published on February 3 that Ukrainian forces are working on developing new technologies but are not disclosing them for as long as possible in order to maintain the technological initiative and prevent Russian forces from making their own analogues.[12] Sukharevskyi reported that the Unmanned Systems Forces conducted over 220 strikes against Russian territory in 2024 using over 3,500 weapons. Sukharevskyi noted that Ukrainian forces have struck over 15 "Buk-M3" and "Tor" air defense systems in December 2024 and January 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces stuck a "Buk-M3" 57 kilometers from the frontline in mid-January 2025. Sukharevskyi reported that Ukrainian forces' use of first-person view (FPV) drones to hunt Russian reconnaissance drones has led to a tenfold decrease in Russian reconnaissance drone usage. Sukharevskyi highlighted Ukraine's production of first-person view (FPV) and other drones made entirely of Ukrainian-made components and stated that Ukraine is working to develop a way to counter Russian forces' fiber optic cable FPV drones and to produce its own fiber optic cable drones. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that the Ukrainian military continues to increase the number of unmanned systems in formations and units of the Ground Forces, Airborne Assault Forces, Naval Infantry Corps, and Unmanned Systems Forces.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race to adapt and innovate their strike and anti-drone capabilities and that Ukraine's ability to field technological adaptations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's quantitative materiel advantages.[14]

The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The UN HRMMU reported that it has observed Russian forces execute 79 Ukrainian POWs in 24 separate incidents since late August 2024 and that Russian forces perform many of the executions as Ukrainian soldiers surrender to Russian forces.[15] UN HRRMU Head Danielle Belle reported that the Russian executions "did not arise out of nowhere" as Russian officials have "openly called for the ill treatment and even execution" of Ukrainian POWs, and the UN HRRMU recorded at least three incidents of Russian officials making such calls. The UN HRRMU reported that statements to "give no quarter" are violations of humanitarian law and a war crime, and Belle emphasized that military commanders and political leaders "must issue clear and unambiguous orders to ensure the protection and humane treatment" of all POWs and individuals no longer participating in combat. ISW has previously assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[16] Ukrainian Commissioner for Missing Persons in Special Circumstances Artur Dobroserdov stated on February 3 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating images purportedly showing a beheaded Ukrainian serviceman.[17]

Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."[18] Using corps structures is not entirely new for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been using corps since 2023. Ukraine formed the 9th and 10th army corps and restructured its Reserve Corps to the 11th Army Corps in 2023, and Ukraine is currently forming the 4th Army Corps.[19] Further restructuring to systematically form an echelon between Ukraine’s numerous separate brigades and Ukraine’s various operational groups of forces, and the creation of appropriate command staff headquarters at this new intermediary echelon, would likely improve command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations.

Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014. Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" (Armenian Battalion) Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade) that is currently operating in Kursk Oblast, died on February 3 after an explosive attack at his apartment building in Moscow City.[20] Sargsyan founded the Arbat Battalion, reportedly on instructions from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), in September 2022, and the battalion signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in July 2023.[21] Sargsyan is wanted in Ukraine for organizing violence against protestors in the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that Sargsyan was a member of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's inner circle.[22] The SBU used explosives to assassinate Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow in December 2024.[23] Ukrainian officials have not commented on Sargsyan's death, and ISW cannot independently confirm the responsible actor.

The far-right Russian paramilitary unit "Rusich" Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group reacted to Sargsyan's assassination, claiming that "the Motherland will lose nothing from one dead bandit" and that Sargsyan and his "ethnic mafia" only caused problems for Russia.[24] "Rusich" Group leader Alexei Milchakov — who is a self-declared Nazi - and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov notably met in January 2025 following Rusich's repeated criticisms of Akhmat forces.[25] Alaudinov and Milchakov expressed their support for each other and promote a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony. Rusich's response to Sargsyan's death, however, highlights the group's continued xenophobic and ultranationalist sentiments and calls into question the sincerity of Milchakov's reconciliation with Alaudinov.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared to previous months in late 2024.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects.
• The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."
• Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the Dnipro direction.
• The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a former boarding school dormitory holding 84 local Russian civilians preparing to evacuate and four Ukrainian police officers.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike wounded four people and killed four.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force warned that Russian sources are attempting to blame Ukraine for the strike.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and senior Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike from Sumy Oblast against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha.[4] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike.[5] Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo reported that Russian state-run TV stations Channel One (Perviy Kanal) and NTV claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha but also reported Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] ISW is unable to independently verify the details of the strike at this time.

Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022 and that Ukraine has repatriated 1,189 children with support from humanitarian organizations and Qatar, South Africa, and the Vatican.[7] Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have killed Ukrainian parents, kidnapped their children, and transported the children to "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea. Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have also separated children from their families in illegal filtration camps. Ukraine's Regional Human Rights Center identified 13 such "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea alone. Russian authorities reportedly use the camps in occupied Crimea to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children before further deporting them to Russia for adoption. Herasymchuk warned that Russian authorities are increasingly attempting to mobilize Ukrainian teenage boys into the Russian military - a violation of the Geneva Convention.[8] ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[9] The United Nation's Genocide Convention Article 2 defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine.
• Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2025

Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia's favor.[1] Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian government.[2] ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's future negotiating positions.[3] TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.

Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.[4] Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations.[5] This position suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called "root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning [of] a number of provisions on which NATO's existence and functioning are based."[6] Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss the possibility of "reducing the level of [NATO's] military presence," presumably along Russia's borders, but noted that this is unlikely to happen.

Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders.[7] Putin issued a series of demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things.[8] The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations.[9] Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.

Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more broadly.[10] Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness" and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even including elements of [a] bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.[11]

People's Republic of China (PRC)–based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine. RFE/RL, citing its own Ukrainian bureau's investigative unit Schemes, reported on January 30 that at least two dozen PRC-based firms "untouched" by Western sanctions are directly supplying Russia with gallium, germanium, and antimony — key elements used in Russian drones and missiles.[12] Schemes found that PRC-based firms send these materials to Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies including Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, which supplies nearly 80 percent of the Kremlin's weaponry used in Ukraine. At least a third of these suppliers are reportedly linked to the PRC government, which has repeatedly denied aiding Russia's war. Schemes also noted that the Russian subsidiary of a Japanese company imported antimony from the PRC and supplied silicon wafers to Russian military microelectronics manufacturers. ISW has previously noted that PRC companies are directly and indirectly supplying Russia with drones, machine tools, and microelectronic products that Russia uses to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions used in Ukraine.[13]

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.[14] The resolution called for unwavering European support to Ukraine and noted that sustainable peace negotiations can only be achieved from a position of Ukrainian strength. The resolution stated that negotiations regarding an end to the war in Ukraine can only be conducted with direct Ukrainian involvement and if Russia abandons its “imperial ambitions.” The resolution also condemned Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and commended Ukraine's progress towards European Union (EU) membership. Zelensky has previously highlighted that sustainable and just peace in Ukraine should be achieved through enhanced military support to Ukraine, especially given Russia's reluctance to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued maximalist and imperialist ambitions.[15]

The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine. A US defense official told CNN and three sources with knowledge of the transfer told US outlet Axios on January 28 that the US military transferred roughly 90 decommissioned Patriot missiles from storage facilities in Israel to Poland.[16] The Patriot missiles are expected to be transferred to Ukraine on an unspecified date.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.
• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.
• People's Republic of China (PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.
• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty."[i] Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance.[ii] Putin is correct, however, that additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance.[iii] Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer 2022.[iv] Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for the almost three years of war.

Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[v] ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in funding US military assistance to Ukraine.[vi]

Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin. Putin claimed that any peace agreement that Russia and Ukraine conclude before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rescinds his 2022 decree will be invalid.[vii] Putin further claimed that that Zelensky is no longer able to legally rescind the decree because he is no longer the "legitimate" president of Ukraine and that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada could rescind the decree but does not seem interested in doing so. The Ukrainian constitution does not empower the Verkhovna Rada to unilaterally rescind presidential decrees, however, and a decision to do so could itself violate the Ukrainian constitution.[viii] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberately false interpretations of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is the illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to its law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[ix] Putin would likely seize on any unconstitutional act by the Verkhovna Rada — even one he is now calling for — to declare the act and Verkhovna Rada "illegitimate" and stand up another strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in serious negotiations that recognize Ukraine as an independent state. Putin has previously claimed that the Verkhovna Rada is the only "legitimate" government branch in Ukraine and thus the only Ukrainian government entity with which Russia could negotiate.[x] Putin may intend to declare the Verkhovna Rada "illegitimate" in the future in order to justify his demands for complete regime change in Kyiv and his unwillingness to negotiate with Ukrainian authorities.

Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreement with Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly claimed that every Ukrainian government since the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine has been illegitimate.[xi] Putin has nevertheless engaged in negotiations and reached agreements with Ukrainian officials, including regarding the resolution of armed conflict with the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015.[xii] Putin has also consistently violated these agreements and used similar claims about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government to justify these violations.[xiii] Even if Zelensky or other parts of the Ukrainian government agreed to lift the decree banning negotiations with Putin, Putin would likely violate any peace or other agreement that he reaches with Ukraine under the false justification that such agreements are "invalid" as long as he believes that he can achieve his maximalist war aims through military operations. Putin likely also intends to leverage false claims about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the limitations that the decree places on the possibility of peace negotiations to falsely portray Ukraine — rather than Russia — as the party prolonging the war and unwilling or unable to engage in meaningful negotiations to his domestic and international audiences.

Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiation framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government. Putin's January 28 statements are part of a continued effort to position himself as Trump's equal and reinforce his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.[xiv] Putin's statements also set conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreements with Ukraine that Trump may hope to mediate and are yet another indication that Putin is not interested in compromising on his demands of complete regime change and the crippling of Ukraine's military as conditions for peace.[xv] Putin's efforts to strongarm Trump are also part of a concerted Russian effort to force the West to acknowledge and endorse Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government and an enduring Ukrainian state. ISW previously noted that Western acquiescence to all of Russia's demands in Ukraine would require the West to acknowledge and agree that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and that a Ukrainian identity and state independent from Russia either does not currently exist and/or does not deserve to exist in the future.[xvi]  

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire.[xvii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17 million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military.[xviii] Geolocated footage posted on January 28 and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery.[xix] Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started a fire in an industrial area.[xx]  Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building and three other buildings.[xxi] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September 2024.[xxii]

The Russian MoD confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces. Sanchik briefed Russian Defense Minister Belousov on Ukrainian activity along the front line in the Southern Grouping of Force's area of responsibility (AoR) and the Russian MoD posted footage showing Sanchik speaking with Belousov.[xxiii] Sanchik previously served as commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD), and ISW first observed claims that Russian authorities appointed Sanchik commander of the Southern Grouping of Forces and Southern Military District [SMD] in November 2024.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression.
• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin.
• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreements with Ukraine.
• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.
• Volunteer recruitment rates in in Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[1] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[2] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[3] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[4] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[5] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[6]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[7] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.[8] Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[9]

The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.^[10] Ukrainian volunteer drone initiative Victory Drones initially amplified in April 2024 preliminary information that the Russian military command was finalizing the establishment of the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment as part of the Central Military District (CMD).^[11] Victory Drones noted that the regiment had 1,342 servicemembers and that the regiment was staffed at 94 percent as of April 2024. Victory Drones noted that the regiment trained at the base of the Russian 473rd District Training Center (CMD) and consists of command elements, an unmanned systems strike battalion, three unmanned systems reconnaissance and strike battalions, and logistics support units such as signal, medical, and repair elements. Victory Drones reported that the Russian military command planned to form 102 subordinate component units within the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment, of which 41 are strike units and 61 are reconnaissance units. Several Russian volunteer groups began crowdfunding for the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment starting in July 2024 and implied that the regiment was operating in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.^[12]

Russian milbloggers observed throughout Fall 2024 that the Russian MoD began reorganizing informal drone detachments and other specialists, such as signalmen, medics, and engineers, into "joint technical battalions."[13] The Russian MoD also announced that it formed an unspecified number of unmanned systems detachments by October 2024 via the "Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies and announced the formation of five additional unmanned systems.[14] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov subsequently announced that the Russian MoD would complete the formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military in the third quarter of 2025.[15] Defense Analyst Konrad Muzyka assessed that the recent organizational changes within the Russian military and the formation of drone units suggest that similar regiments may emerge in other Russian military districts in the future.[16] Russian forces will likely gain augmented drone support capabilities should the Russian MoD successfully form these new unmanned systems regiments and centralize its procurement efforts under the Unmanned Systems Forces, although the success of this effort will depend on the Russian military's commitment to executing the necessary reforms and the availability of resources.[17]

A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger.[18] Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian sabotage acts.[19] The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.[20] The Kremlin's sabotage and destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast.[2] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at the end of December 2024.[3]

The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.[4] The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.[5] The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most."[6] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March or early April 2025.[7] Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and compliance of the contract with national and international law.[8] Transnistrian authorities have previously rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid.[9] ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.[11] Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[12] Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2025

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.[1] Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement.[2] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[4] A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat of encircling the brigade's elements.[5] ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV) drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area.[6] The brigade stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25 and 26.[7]

The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions.[8] The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure.[9] The Russian MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements.[11] The Russian MoD has not recently been announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January 26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area.[12] Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers, will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.

The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the area in Fall 2024.[13] Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October 2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months.[14] The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka. This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025.[15] The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.

Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.[16] Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations southwest of Toretsk for this purpose.[17] Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024.[18] A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.

Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City.[19] Geolocated footage shows a fire at a tank at the refinery.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.[21] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage.[22] Ukrainian official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships.[23] Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to 24.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military officers.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2025

Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time.[1] Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024.[2] Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."[3]

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine.[4] Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy.[5] ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.[6]

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[8] Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2025

The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1] Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011.[2] The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however.[3] ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.[4] These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the All-Russian Cossack Society, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5] The training will include drone piloting training and tactical, medical, and fire training. A separate portion of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack societies, following the March 2024 law enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve, are likely an effort to expand the number of well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.[6]

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7] The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia.[9] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month.[10] North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024.[11] This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors.[12] A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement.[13] Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner.[14] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.[15]

Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the Russian government, via a Russian military official based in Turkey, recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22, and these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of military equipment from the port. The milblogger claimed that the Russian and HTS-led governments continue to negotiate about the future of Russia's presence at the Tartus and Khmeimim military bases and noted that it is unclear if any other third-party might be interested in using the port of Tartus in the future.[17] Other Russian milbloggers expressed confusion over the situation in Syria and accused unspecified actors of spreading rumors about Russia's supposed agreement with the HTS-led government.[18] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated on January 22 that Russian and Syrian officials have not reached a final solution in the negotiations about future Russian military bases in Syria.[19]

A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing its own sources, reported on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline, using the Cyprus-based company Obzor Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant, citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform (RBP) for natural gas transmission, reported that Obzor Enterprises booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February 1 to March 1, volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs. Kommersant reported that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the gas. Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching Transnistria. Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to Transnistria through the European spot market, but Moldovan President Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.[21] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on the night of January 15 to 16.[1] The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire.[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the second strike started another fire at the facility.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast.[4] Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant.[5] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment.[6] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that falling drone debris caused fires.[7] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC) (CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic cooperation.[14] Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin readout of the call did not mention these topics.[15] Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.[16]

Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Khinshtein to this post on December 5, 2024, following intense backlash for failing to communicate with or support Kursk Oblast residents displaced by the Ukrainian incursion - scapegoating then-Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to respond.[17] Russian opposition media and local Kursk Oblast news outlets reported that residents of Sudzhansky, Korenevsky, Bolshesoldatsky, and Glushkovsky raions – all on the frontline in Kursk Oblast – protested in front of the Kursk Oblast Administration building on January 18 and 21, demanding to meet with Khinshtein.[18] The protestors recorded an appeal to Khinshtein on January 21 asking him to address insufficient permanent housing for residents, issues with temporary accommodation centers, and his lack of dialogue with Kursk Oblast residents – the latter of which was one of Khinshtein's stated priorities following his appointment.[19] Local Kursk Oblast media reported that Khinshtein's advisor, Viktoria Penkova, met with the protestors, and the Kursk Oblast Administration Press Service stated that authorities informed the protestors of "necessary explanations and consultations" during the meeting.[20] Putin likely appointed Khinshtein to appear dedicated to solving social issues in Kursk Oblast and to quell local protests, and Khinshtein's failure to thus far fulfill this role in his tenure as acting governor undermines this intended effect.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation.
• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military failures.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.[1] Syrskyi stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024.[2] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall-Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump.[4] Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine.[5] Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government.[6] Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[7]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 20 that unspecified drones struck Russian military facilities in Kazan.[8] Russian opposition outlet Astra posted footage of a fire at the Gorbunov Aircraft Plant in Kazan, and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram account geolocated a picture of the aftermath of the strike to the fuel tanks of the Gorbunov plant.[9] The Gorbunov Aircraft Plant is a subsidiary of the Russia Tupolev United Aircraft Company, which produces and repairs Tu-160 strategic bombers.[10] Tatarstan authorities claimed on January 20 that Russian forces shot down all the drones and that the strike caused no damage or casualties.[11] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 20 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise on the outskirts of Kaluga City.[12] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 20 that sources within the Kaluga Oblast emergency services stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against Lyudinovo on January 17 damaged three diesel fuel tanks and one gas fuel tank.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast on the night of January 17 to 18, causing a fire at the facility.[14]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on January 20 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia's military facilities, including oil refineries and those that produce ammunition, missile components, and dual-use products, have significantly disrupted Russian forces' combat capabilities and ability to maintain a high intensity of combat operations.[15] Syrskyi noted that Russian forces are using half as many artillery shells per day than they were an unspecified period of time ago. Syrskyi emphasized that Ukrainian forces target Russia's ammunition, missile component, and dual-use production enterprises as well as oil refining facilities that support Russia's war efforts. ISW has observed reports from Ukrainian personnel in the field noting decreases in Russia's artillery usage and of Russia's overall artillery advantage in some areas.[16]

Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas. Russian and Transnistrian authorities were reportedly recently discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025, but Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted on January 16 that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria.[17] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky stated on January 20 that Transnistria will allow Moldovagaz to supply Transnistria with gas, presumably from Europe, despite initially refusing offers in early January 2025 from Moldovagaz to help Transnistria obtain gas from European platforms.[18] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistria can guarantee payment – possibly referring to Moscow's recent reported proposal to use Russian budget funds to buy European gas for Transnistria's domestic consumption.[19] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz sent a letter to Moldovagaz on January 18 requesting that Moldovagaz outline the procedure for supplying gas to Transnistria.[20] Moldovan President Maia Sandu responded on January 20 that Krasnoselsky's proposal does not appear to be about Transnistria's purchase of gas through Moldovagaz but that Krasnoselsky rather is proposing that "someone else" buys the gas and delivers it to Moldovan territory, after which Moldovagaz transports it through Moldova to Transnistria.[21] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities are currently determining which companies would be involved in this process, since Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion.[2] Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery.[3] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.[4] Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.[5]

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast.[6] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations.[7] North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future.[8] South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast.[9] North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.[10] The agreement outlines the UK's commitment to Ukraine's possible future NATO membership as a means to guarantee Ukraine's security and calls for strengthening bilateral defense and security ties, building consensus on Ukraine's NATO membership prospects, enhancing maritime security, expanding economic and trade cooperation, and boosting collaboration  in the energy, climate, and justice spheres. Starmer highlighted during a press conference on January 16 that the UK intends to provide military aid to Ukraine annually and will provide Ukraine with a loan backed by funds from frozen Russian assets.[11] Starmer highlighted that the UK will also expand its training program for Ukrainian military personnel and provide Ukraine with 150 artillery barrels and a new Danish-funded mobile air defense system.[12]

Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that unspecified sources stated that Russia and Transnistria are discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025.[13] Kommersant stated that Moscow tentatively proposed using Russian budget funds to buy up to three million cubic meters per day of gas that would cover Transnistria's domestic consumption but would not support producing Transnistria's electricity exports to Moldova. Kommersant estimated that this volume of gas would likely cost Russia $164 million from January to April 2025. Natural Gaz DC co-owner Arkady Vikol stated on January 15 that the company had signed a contract with Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz to supply two-to-three million cubic meters of European gas per day to Transnistria.[14] Transnistria President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia would provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery method.[15] Russia is likely seeking alternative routes to supply Transnistria with gas as the Trans-Balkan pipeline transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Ukraine stopped transiting Russian gas through its territory on January 1, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on January 15 that Ukraine was in discussions to help Transnistria but that the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is "generally unacceptable."[16] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have recently noted how Russia is trying to use its artificially created gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections, and Russia may cease gas supplies to Transnistria again in April 2025.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and other energy infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast.[3] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes.[4] Ukrenergo has since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy consumption following the strikes.[5] Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.[6]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on January 15 that Ukraine received 25 Ukrainians who suffer from serious injuries and illnesses and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[7] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that Ukraine received a civilian previously captured by Russian forces during the exchange.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia received 25 Russian POWs.[9] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced on January 6 that Ukraine and Russia had reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025 and that Ukraine will prioritize returning seriously ill and wounded Ukrainians.[10]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Russian forces are unable to field tanks and armored vehicles in frontline areas where Ukraine has deployed at least two Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) strike drone companies and two Ukrainian reconnaissance drone companies operate because Ukrainian drone operators strike most or all Russian armored vehicles three to six kilometers from the frontline.[11] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are also unable to field tanks in frontline areas where Ukrainian forces have a sufficient number of shells due to the high accuracy of Ukrainian artillery strikes. The milblogger complained that Russian drones are less effective than the Ukrainian drones and that the Russian military command only supplies Russian FPV operators advanced FPV models operating on non-standard frequences and fiber-optic drones — both of which are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) — to priority sectors of the frontline. The milblogger further claimed that an insufficient amount of Russian artillery coupled with insufficient Russian drone capabilities in select sectors of the frontline allow Ukrainian forces to field tanks more easily for indirect and direct fire. Effective Ukrainian drone and artillery operations in select areas of the frontline may be straining Russia's ability to field tanks amid reports that Russian forces continue to accrue vehicles losses that are likely unstable in the medium term.[12] Ukraine's ability to damage and destroy Russian armored vehicles and tanks with FPV drones and artillery will likely strain Russia's ability to replace such losses as current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that these losses will be prohibitive over the longer term.

Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.[13] Krasnoselsky visited Moscow from January 10 to 14 and negotiated possible gas deliveries to Transnistria with the Russian Energy Ministry.[14] Krasnoselsky added that Russia will provide Transnistria with enough gas for thermal power engineering, industrial enterprises, and civilian use, noting that Russia will not be supplying the rest of Moldova with gas.[15]

Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia. The US State Department reported on January 14 that Armenia and the US launched the US–Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission, signaling a significant step in their bilateral relations.[16] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan formalized the agreement aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation in economic, security, defense, and governance sectors. Blinken emphasized US support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov criticized the partnership agreement, accusing the US of destabilizing the South Caucasus.[17] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed dissatisfaction with Armenian government’s January 9 approval of a European Union (EU) accession bill. Overchuk and Lavrov argued that Armenia's potential future EU membership is incompatible with Armenia's membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and framing Armenia’s EU accession bill as a potential withdrawal from the EAEU.[18] Overchuk and Lavrov also claimed that such decisions are Armenia’s sovereign right yet highlighted potential consequences, reinforcing Kremlin’s longstanding pattern of threatening and pressuring neighboring countries through indirect and direct means. The Kremlin reactions to Armenia’s deepening ties with the West demonstrate a broader Russian strategy of undermining the sovereignty of neighboring and previously colonized countries through initial ultimatums and veiled coercion, often escalating to direct action and military violence when Russia’s influence is challenged, as is the case in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.
• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.
• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000 Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kvitkova Street and reached the northwestern administrative boundary of Toretsk.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Pyrohova Street in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 90 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has only observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces occupy approximately 71 percent of the settlement as of January 7.[3] Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024, likely to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the area and deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas in the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, both of which were Russian main efforts at the time.[4] Russian forces originally committed limited combat power, including elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), Territorial Troops, and some elements of the Central Military District [CMD], to intensified operations near Toretsk in June 2024.[5] Russian forces have made creeping and grinding gains within Toretsk and the nearby settlements since June 2024 but have intensified offensive operations in recent weeks and made tactical gains within northern and northwestern Toretsk.[6]

Russian forces appear to be shifting assault tactics in Toretsk in order to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and facilitate tactical gains within the settlement. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in fireteams of roughly five personnel.[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that Russian forces had made recent gains in Toretsk by attacking in multiple areas at once instead of focusing attacks in one location.[8] Russian forces are likely leveraging their superior manpower quantities to intensify offensive operations and advance within Toretsk.

Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces may intend to consolidate their positions in northwestern Toretsk and central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) to advance along the T-05-16 highway towards Kostyantynivka through Nelipivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillia and the fields around these settlements in an effort to threaten the southern tip of Ukraine's Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk fortress belt, which forms the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defense. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage further advances northwest of Toretsk and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in this area and level the frontline west and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Such advances would complicate Ukraine's ability to counterattack into Russia's near rear southeast of Chasiv Yar, including towards Klishchiivka, and would allow Russian forces to deploy additional artillery systems within range of Kostyantynivka and operate first-person-view (FPV) drones within range of the town. Russian forces may also attempt to advance west and northwest of Niu York and Leonidivka towards the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway to pressure Kostyantynivka further from the south and create a more stable southern flank for a push on Kostyantynivka. Russian forces will likely be able to accomplish more rapid advances in the fields and small settlements north and west of Toretsk than they have been able to make in their grinding advances in urban Toretsk. Russian units in this area may attempt to replicate the short, tactically significant mechanized assaults that Russian forces conducted in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 if they have adequate armored vehicle reserves for this sector.[9]

Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk. Russian forces may attempt to leverage gains within Toretsk and in the Toretsk-Shcherbynivka-Niu York area with recent Russian gains east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket between Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Toretsk. Russian advances east of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk may be part of an ongoing effort to make opportunistic gains that seize any territory, regardless of that territory’s relative insignificance.

Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months. Russian forces achieved their most rapid rates of advance while operating in the fields and small settlements in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 but have struggled to make rapid advances in urban areas including Toretsk.[10] Russian forces have spent the last six months advancing roughly 12 kilometers through Toretsk and have been fighting through Chasiv Yar since April 2024.[11] Russian forces have, in contrast, advanced roughly 18 kilometers west of Selydove since Russian forces seized the settlement in late October 2024 and roughly 20 kilometers north and northwest of Vuhledar since Russian forces seized the settlement in early October 2024.[12] Russian positions in northwestern Toretsk are currently 12 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and Russian forces would likely attempt to advance directly along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Russian forces could possibly be able to threaten significant Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka within the coming two or three months but only if they are able to achieve a rate of advance in the open areas northwest of Toretsk similar to the rate at which they have advanced in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions. The Russian force grouping in Toretsk is likely smaller than the groupings in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions, however, likely does not have prioritized access to Russian reserves, and may not be capable of committing enough troops and materiel to the frontline to accomplish these rates of advance.

Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), including its 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, have been the main forces conducting offensive operations in Toretsk.[13] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in mid-December 2024 that elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are also operating in Toretsk, but ISW has not observed Russian reporting of this brigade operating in the area.[14] The Russian military command may decide to continue offensive operations in the Toretsk direction with the 51st CAA forces that are currently deployed in the area, which would likely result in slower, gradual advances as these limited forces are likely degraded after six months of urban combat.

The Russian military command could choose to redeploy forces from other sectors of the front to the Toretsk direction. The Russian military command could redeploy forces from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions to the Toretsk direction in the future. The Russian military command has been prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions recently and would likely not redeploy forces from these areas to the Toretsk direction until Russian forces had achieved their objectives in these areas. Russian forces' priority objective in the Pokrovsk direction remains unclear at this time, however, as Russian forces appear to be advancing east and southwest of Pokrovsk in order to envelop the town while also advancing westward from the area south of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[15] Russian forces in the Kurakhove direction are currently focused on eliminating the Ukrainian pocket near the Sukhi Yaly River but may also prioritize continued advances westward towards the border area in the future.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that the Russian military command recently withdrew elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) from combat operations near Kurakhove in order to rest and reconstitute and will redeploy these forces to an unspecified frontline area at a future date.[17] The Russian military command will likely choose to recommit the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the front, which could be Toretsk if the command chooses to make that a priority.

The Russian military command may continue to prioritize the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction but deprioritize offensive operations in another sector of the front, such as the Kupyansk or Borova directions, in order to redeploy forces to the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations at varying intensities along the entire front as part of efforts to pin down Ukrainian forces and maintain the strategic initiative.[18] The Russian military command may prefer to maintain this continuous pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline over redeploying forces to the Toretsk direction, although the Russian offensive operations towards Kostyantynivka from the Toretsk area may offer Russian forces the opportunity to make the most operationally significant advances along the frontline. ISW is not prepared to offer a forecast of how the Russians will weigh the effort near Toretsk at this time.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report if the strike killed or wounded Russian personnel. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a strike, reportedly with HIMARS, against a different 810th Naval Infantry Brigade command post near Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 25, killing the brigade’s deputy commander and other staff officers.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area.
• Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months.
• Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas.
• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2025

 Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast. The tempo of Russian offensive operations has remained low east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, along the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) line, and further east near Novooleksandrivka and Arkhanhelske since September 2024 when Russian military command reprioritized offensive operations aimed at seizing Selydove (southwest of Pokrovsk), Kurakhove, and Vuhledar over efforts to seize Pokrovsk.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Russian forces began intensifying offensive operations east of Pokrovsk, and geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[20] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces have likely also seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (both east of Pokrovsk) in recent days and advanced into southeastern Yelyzavetivka (south of Pokrovsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units consolidated positions north of Tymofiivka and along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that Russian forces advanced north of Vozdvyzhenka toward Baranivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Zelene Pole.[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 5 that Russian forces recently resumed attacks in the Mykolaivka-Promin and Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad areas (both east of Pokrovsk) and reinforced the Russian grouping in this area with elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 137 Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 41st CAA, CMD).[23]

The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on December 27.[24] Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest in the near future.[26] The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the fields and small settlements along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.

Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic, aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia's long-term objective of advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[28] The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.

Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30] The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between at least two sectors of the frontline.[31] ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA's AoR within the past month. The Russian military's decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade as a tactical penetration force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.
• Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.
• Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.
• Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.
• The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.
• Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
• Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assesment, January 4, 2025

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[i] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[ii]

Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[iii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[iv] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[v] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[vi] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[vii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[viii] The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses.[ix] Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[x]

Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows damage to the Novatek gas terminal in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[xi] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that its sources stated that Russian forces shot down most of the drones over the port terminal of Novatek subsidiary Novatrans LLC, causing minor damage to a building at the port.[xii] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces downed three drones near Luga Bay but that there was no damage.[xiii] Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces destroyed a total of four drones over Leningrad Oblast.[xiv] The Ust-Luga sea trade port is the second largest in Russia after Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against the Novatek gas terminal at the port in January 2024.[xv]

Astra reported that its sources in the Russian emergency services stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City with at least five drones on the night of January 3 to 4 and that Russian forces shot down all the drones.[xvi] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed at least five drones over Voronezh City overnight and that several drones fell on residential buildings.[xvii] Astra also reported on January 4 that its sources in the Kursk Oblast emergency services stated that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast on January 2 killed seven Russian servicemembers.[xviii] Ukrainian and Russian sources previously stated that the strike targeted a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]).[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.
• Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.
• Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assesment, January 3, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace." Zelensky stated on January 2 that achieving a "just peace" in future negotiations – a concept Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Year’s address – requires a strong Ukrainian military, security guarantees from Western allies, and Ukraine's future membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) in order to deter Russia from renewed aggression against Ukraine.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine cannot achieve a just peace with a small military, such as "40,000 or 50,000 soldiers" – a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial demand during the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and only maintain a force of roughly 50,000 personnel.[2] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded conditions for ending the war that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation, including the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government and Ukraine's demilitarization.[3] These demands have not changed since 2021.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal. Zelensky stated on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine's "arguments for a just peace."[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and "drone-missiles" and at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) will also increase production capacity to about $30 billion worth of goods and attract $1 billion in foreign investment in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is working to mass produce the "Trembita" cruise missile, which has a 90-mile range, a 40-pound payload, and costs $10,000 per missile to produce.[6]

Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities will be able to consider lifting martial law when the "hot phase" of the war comes to an end and when Ukraine is in a "strong position" with a "strong army, a strong package of weapons, [and] security guarantees." Ukraine's law, "On the legal regime of martial law," originally passed in 2000, states that Ukrainian authorities can end martial law "provided that the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity has been eliminated."[8] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberate misreadings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[9] The Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya. The GUR reported on January 3 that the Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship, the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, and the Sparta cargo ship are scheduled to arrive at Tartus on January 5 while the Sparta II cargo ship and the Ivan Skobelev tanker are scheduled to arrive on January 8 to transfer Russian military assets to an unspecified location in Libya.[10] The GUR previously reported in mid-December 2024 that Russia had deployed the Ivan Gren, Alexander Otrakovsky, Sparta, and Sparta II from northern Russia to Syria.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace."
• Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal.
• Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2025

 Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Russian and Ukrainian authorities confirmed that Russian gas ceased flowing through Ukrainian territory as of the morning of January 1, and Russian officials and media largely projected confidence that the cessation of gas supplies through Ukraine will harm Europe but not Russia.[1] The loss of gas revenue will likely negatively affect Russian state energy operator Gazprom, which has been struggling with decreasing gas revenue from Europe since 2022.[2] Bloomberg estimated on January 2 that Gazprom will likely lose $6 billion in gas revenues per year due to the cessation of gas transports through Ukraine.[3] The BBC Russian Service noted on January 1 that Gazprom's main source of income in 2021 came from Russia's 45 percent share of the European gas market at the time but that Russia now has only one remaining route to export gas to Europe — the TurkStream pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Black Sea to Turkey — and that Russian gas currently only accounts for five percent of the European market.[4] The BBC noted that Slovakia and Austria — the final destinations of the blocked Russian gas through Ukraine — have both fully met their energy needs through alternative sources. The Kremlin's efforts to project confidence about the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine mirrors its efforts to coerce Europe into authorizing Russian gas transit to Europe through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Winter 2021–2022, and the Kremlin's renewed posturing in Winter 2024–2025 likely aim to extract economic or diplomatic concessions from Europe, undermine unity within the European Union (EU), and drive a wedge between the US and EU.[5]

Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova. Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Transnistria via Ukraine on January 1, claiming that Moldova failed to pay a debt worth $709 million.[6] An audit by British and Norwegian audit firms, however, found in 2022 that Moldova owed Gazprom only $8.6 million.[7] Moldova recently held talks with Gazprom about transporting gas to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey, but Gazprom refused and did not make the arrangements to do so by the deadline on December 16.[8] Free Gazprom gas has long powered Transnistria's Cuciurgan power station, which exported a significant amount of electricity to Moldova and used the profits from these sales to support Transnistria's budget.[9] The Cuciurgan power station switched to coal reserves on January 1, which reportedly can last about 50 days.[10] Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz stopped gas supplies to most consumers in Transnistria and shut off most of the hot water and heat on January 1.[11] Moldova increased its electricity imports from Romania to make up for lost supplies from Transnistria.[12] Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom offered on January 1 to provide Tiraspoltransgaz technical and commercial assistance to obtain gas from European markets after successful tests on December 31, 2024 to supply Moldova with gas through Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.[13]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations. Zelensky stated in his New Years Eve address on December 31, 2024, that Ukraine seeks to accomplish a "just peace" in the war and announced that Ukraine is once again building its own missiles and produced over one million drones in 2024.[14] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is producing large quantities of "Palyanytsya," "Peklo," "Ruta," "Neptune," and "Sapsan" missiles, some of which Ukrainian forces have yet to use. Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) produced 30 percent of all military equipment that Ukrainian forces used on the frontlines in 2024. Zelensky described Ukrainian missiles and drones as Ukrainian "arguments for a just peace" and noted that Ukraine can only accomplish such a peace if it is strong.

Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies. ZNPP occupation director Yuriy Chernichuk announced on January 1 that Russian occupation officials intend to obtain licenses from Moscow to operate all six of the ZNPP's nuclear reactors by 2028, obtaining a license for the operation of the first reactor by the end of 2025.[15] Ukrainian licenses for the first ZNPP reactor will expire in December 2025, and the Kremlin claimed in 2022 that all licenses would be valid until their expiration or until the ZNPP received Russian licenses.[16] Chernichuk also announced on January 2 that occupation officials plan to replace the ZNPP's foreign-sourced equipment with Russian-made equipment, that Russia will use the ZNPP reactors to supply energy to all of occupied Ukraine, and that Russia will also use the ZNPP to generate power for Russian regions west of the Ural mountains.[17] Chernichuk's stated goal of acquiring licenses for Russia to operate ZNPP's nuclear reactors signals Moscow's long-term territorial intentions and aligns with Russia's broader efforts to de facto legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and further steal Ukraine's critical energy supply.

Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post. Geolocated footage published on January 2 showed a damaged building and Russian military vehicles after a Ukrainian missile strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike, possibly with HIMARS, against the command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the settlement, while Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that the strike damaged the House of Culture in the area.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was holding an award ceremony at the House of Culture.[20]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea. The GUR reported on January 2 that a Ukrainian Magura V5 naval drone used missiles to destroy two Russian Mi-8 helicopters and damage one in the Black Sea on December 31.[21] The GUR previously reported that the naval drone strike only destroyed one helicopter and damaged another.[22] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk doubted Russian reports that there were eight crewmembers aboard the helicopters but noted that the loss of highly trained helicopter crews is significant.[23] Pletenchuk also noted that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea have deprived Russian forces of sustainable logistics in the area, including by damaging the railway on the Kerch Strait Bridge and ferries that transported railway cars and fuel tankers.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military vessels are trying to hide from Ukrainian naval strikes in bays and ports and that Russian forces will only be able to repel Ukrainian naval drones equipped with missiles with jet and fighter aircraft.[25] ISW assesses that increased Ukrainian offensive capabilities in the Black Sea will most likely threaten Russian control over occupied Crimea.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary.
• Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations.
• Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel.

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