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November 21, 2024
Understanding Israel’s Campaign to Defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) campaign into Lebanon is degrading Hezbollah and destroying its military capabilities and infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The IDF campaign is a response to Hezbollah’s rocket and drone attacks into Israel since October 2023, which forced thousands of civilians to evacuate their homes in northern Israel. The stated objective of the IDF campaign in Lebanon is to stop these attacks and allow displaced civilians to return safely to their homes.[i] Israel’s air and ground operations have achieved critical tactical- and operational-level successes in support of this objective, including the seizure of key terrain north of the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah has maintained a steady rate of rocket and drone attacks into Israel, however, even as the IDF ground campaign has continued. The IDF campaign appears to be intended to leverage its air and ground operations to render Hezbollah unwilling to continue firing into northern Israel rather than trying to destroy Hezbollah’s capabilities to conduct such attacks completely.
Israel launched air and clandestine operations in mid-September 2024 to disrupt Hezbollah command-and-control. These operations began with the detonation of thousands of pagers and personal radios belonging to Hezbollah members across Lebanon. The detonations disrupted Hezbollah internal communications and temporarily paralyzed the group’s command and control.[ii] The IDF then launched an ongoing series of airstrikes into Lebanon, targeting key Hezbollah leaders and sites. These operations disrupted Hezbollah command-and-control in order to set conditions for IDF ground operations into Lebanon. Disruption efforts may temporarily knock enemy forces out of a battle, but disruption is never an end itself; it is a means to an end.[iii]
The IDF has exploited its disruption of Hezbollah forces to destroy much of Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities and infrastructure along the Israel-Lebanon border.[iv] The IDF launched its ground campaign into southern Lebanon on October 1 to capture key terrain north of the border that Hezbollah used for conducting observed and unobserved fire into northern Israel and to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure that could enable an October 7-like ground terrorist attack into Israel. Hezbollah has been unable to mount an effective or organized defense against Israeli operations, likely due to the disruption caused by Israeli air and clandestine operations.[v] IDF efforts appear to have thus degraded Hezbollah and its ability to conduct large or coordinated indirect fire attacks into Israel, although the group has retained the ability to conduct limited and sporadic attacks.[vi] Senior Israeli officials have expressed the intent to push Hezbollah north of the Litani river, but IDF ground operations have thus far been more limited in scope and depth of penetration.[vii]
Hezbollah has maintained a steady rate of attacks into Israel, however, indicating that the current Israeli operations on their own are probably insufficient to achieve the stated Israeli war aims. Israeli ground operations have cleared approximately one percent of Lebanese territory at the time of this writing, and Hezbollah maintains advanced weapons systems and infrastructure across most of the country.[viii] The IDF Air Force has struck Hezbollah assets deep in Lebanon, but airstrikes alone will not destroy Hezbollah‘s drone, missile, and rocket stockpiles across the country.
Israel aims to address the enduring threat of Hezbollah attacks by compelling Hezbollah to seek an end to the war while maintaining Israeli freedom to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. Some rumored ceasefire plans would create a much stronger UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces presence in southern Lebanon while allowing future Israeli operations in Lebanon.[ix] A ceasefire along these lines would enable the IDF to prevent future October 7-style attacks. Israel appears to calculate that sufficient military pressure on Hezbollah will compel the group to accept such arrangement--at least for a time. Israeli operations in Lebanon will therefore likely continue and possibly expand until Hezbollah agrees to end the war that it started with Israel over a year ago.
[i] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-17-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-18-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024
[ii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-12-2024
[iii] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-90.pdf
[iv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-12-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-
[v] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-20-2024
[vi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024
[vii] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14417
[viii] https://israel-alma.org/2024/01/18/the-mapping-of-hezbollahs-military-areas-in-south-lebanon-2/
[ix] https://x.com/IsraelRadar_com/status/1851143584398876739
[JM1]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFJtm5