Africa File

The Africa File is an analysis and assessment of great power competition and the Salafi-jihadi movement in Africa and related security and political dynamics.     

In this update: Russia Continues Pivot to Libya and Mali; SAF Advances in Khartoum; M23 Marches On Goma; IS Somalia Down but Not Out; AES Joint Force

 

Key Takeaways:

RussiaRussia has continued to strengthen and expand its military presence in Libya and Mali as it withdraws assets from Syria. The Kremlin’s equipment buildup in Mali is likely unrelated to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and instead part of the Kremlin’s plans to continue to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps. The Kremlin’s decision to send armored vehicles to Mali, particularly T72 tanks, is significant in light of Russia’s significant vehicle losses in Ukraine.

SudanThe SAF continued to advance in northern Khartoum to relieve besieged SAF troops and dislodge the Rapid Support Forces from the capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) broke the siege on the SAF Headquarters in Khartoum on January 24 for the first time since the war began in April 2023. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports its grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan.

DRCRwandan-backed M23 rebels are advancing towards Goma, a provincial capital in eastern DRC, and say that they intend to capture the town, which is a major escalation in the group’s publicly stated aims and would exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC. M23’s advances increase the risk of clashes between M23 and allied Rwandan forces and UN and SADC forces that are supporting the FARDC. Such engagements would increase the diplomatic and military costs for M23 and Rwanda to capture Goma. M23 advances into South Kivu province are also setting conditions to significantly expand the conflict in eastern DRC. M23’s advances will strengthen the group’s control over critical mineral resources and supply lines to Rwanda. The timing of the Rwandan-backed M23 offensive indicates an effort to maximize its position in currently paused negotiations after peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed in December 2024.

Somalia. Somali security forces in Puntland, northern Somalia, have degraded the ISS with a counterinsurgency offensive but have not set conditions to weaken or defeat ISS permanently in the long term. The Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) will be able to reconstitute itself if the Puntland offensive does not significantly degrade the group’s revenue streams and set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones. ISS has sought to defend its support zones and deter security forces from interfering in its support zones without engaging in decisive battles that would draw additional pressure from security forces. These tactics support ISS’s long-term strategic goal of acting as an administrative node for the IS global network.

Sahel. The Alliance of Sahel States created a joint force of 5,000 troops that will deploy in the coming weeks. Increased ground operations will be necessary to degrade the very large and strong insurgent support zones along the borders of the Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

 

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Jan '25