Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2025

April 18, 2025, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed on April 18 that discussing a general ceasefire in Ukraine is "unrealistic" and accused Ukraine of not observing the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure over the last month.[1] Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal during a phone call with US President Donald Trump on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then, attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and extract additional bilateral concessions from the United States.[2] ISW previously noted that any future general ceasefire agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's efforts to claim that Ukraine was violating the temporary strikes ceasefire without providing evidence, and that it is unclear if Russian officials will accept any meaningful monitoring mechanisms.[3]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.[4] Peskov responded to a question about whether Russia will resume strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities and claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not issued further instructions. Russian officials have not expressed any interest in extending the temporary strikes ceasefire and the actual terms of the ceasefire remain unclear due to the lack of formal, publicly available, joint ceasefire documents. Russian officials accused Ukraine of violating the temporary strikes ceasefire almost daily over the last month, but provided no evidence for most of these accusations.[5]

ISW previously assessed that Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine following the end of the strikes moratorium, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at an event for Ukrainian energy workers on April 17 that Russia may intensify strikes on Ukraine around Easter (April 20).[6] It remains unclear how the ending of the temporary strikes ceasefire may impact Russia's nightly strikes against Ukraine, as the specifics of Putin's previous order to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure also remain unclear. Putin claimed to have issued an order to the Russian military immediately following his March 18 phone call with President Trump to stop strikes on energy infrastructure facilities, but Russian officials have provided no further context about the duration or other specifics of this supposed order.[7]

Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions. Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded on April 18 to Bloomberg's report that the United States proposed freezing the war on the current frontlines, leaving occupied Ukraine "under Moscow's control," and taking Ukraine's NATO membership "off the table" as part of a plan to end the war and claimed that this plan is a "bad deal for Russia."[8] Simonyan claimed that Russia should reject this plan because the plan does not include terms for Ukraine's "denazification" or a formal recognition of occupied Ukraine as part of Russia, and additionally does not include assurances that Europe will not deploy a potential European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. Simonyan also attempted to delegitimize Ukraine and the United States as negotiating partners and claimed that "there can be no negotiating with the insane" in reference to the plan and the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev urged the United States to "wash its hands" of the war in Ukraine and let Russia "figure it out faster" in a social media post on April 18.[9]

Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly stated that they are unwilling to accept any agreement that does not concede to all of Russia's territorial and political demands for Ukraine.[10] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on April 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been "fixated" on territorial concessions during their bilateral meetings, indicating that Russian officials likely continue to reiterate their territorial and political demands about Ukraine both in public and in private.[11] Russian officials have noted that Putin remains committed to accomplishing all his goals in Ukraine, which Putin has explicitly defined in part as the "denazification" and demilitarization of Ukraine.[12] Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and to demand the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. ISW previously noted that Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression.[13] Putin has also called for Ukraine to concede unoccupied territory to Russia, and Russian officials appear to be considering these demands as the Kremlin's standing guidance on negotiations.[14]

Russian officials' continued insistence on these demands has also set conditions for Russian society to expect these demands to be fulfilled in any conclusion of the war in Ukraine, and Kremlin mouthpieces stating explicitly that these demands must be met even in a peace deal favorable to Russia is a reflection of this long-term rhetorical line. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, and Russian officials continue to indicate and explicitly state that they are unwilling to compromise on these goals.[15]

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated during an April 17 phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio the Kremlin's demand that any US-Russian efforts to end the war in Ukraine must "comprehensively" address the so-called "root causes" of the war.[16] Lavrov has previously defined these so-called "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[17] These so-called "root causes" are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.

Kremlin officials are likely engaging in bilateral discussions with US officials to maintain the appearance of being interested in good-faith peace negotiations, but Russian officials' commitment to their pre-war demands and other efforts to prolong negotiations continue to indicate otherwise.[18] Ukraine, however, continues to indicate it is willing to negotiate a lasting peace.[19] The US Department of State (DoS) reported on April 17 that Rubio told Lavrov that US President Donald Trump wants the war in Ukraine to end and that US negotiators presented and received an "encouraging" response to "outlines of a durable and lasting peace" at meetings between representatives of Ukraine and its Western partners in Paris on April 17.[20]

Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha to discuss implementing first an unconditional ceasefire and then the broader process of establishing a just and enduring peace in Ukraine – fully in line with US President Donald Trump's stated timeline of negotiations to end the war.[21] The Ukrainian delegation reiterated Ukraine's long-standing commitment to working with the United States, Europe, and other partners to establish peace in Ukraine. Rubio stated on April 18 that the US delegation proposed a "framework" for ending the war to the Ukrainian representatives and noted that if the United States determines "within a matter of days" that the war in Ukraine can be resolved, then the United States is prepared to facilitate, but if not, then President Trump is "probably at a point where he's going to say, well, we're done."[22] It remains unclear what Rubio means, however.

The Ukrainian delegation also met with representatives of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in the Coalition of the Willing framework to discuss the next steps for working towards peace in Ukraine.[23] The Ukrainian delegation reaffirmed its dedication to establishing an unconditional ceasefire. Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian delegations agreed that a "complete and unconditional ceasefire should be the first stage on the path to sustainable peace in Ukraine."[24]

Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 17 that Ukraine was ready to sign the memorandum of intent and proceed with the first steps towards the conclusion of a bilateral US-Ukrainian mineral deal.[25] Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko confirmed later on April 17 that Ukraine and the United States finalized and signed the memorandum of intent, and Ukraine's Ministry of Economy published the full text of the memorandum.[26]

Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks. Ukrainian officials reported on April 18 that Russian forces struck a residential area in Kharkiv City with three Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing at least one civilian, injuring at least 98, and damaging at least 21 apartment buildings, 40 houses, a civilian enterprise, two schools, and two children's centers.[27] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that the ballistic missiles were equipped with cluster munitions, which resulted in widespread damage.[28]

Russian forces have conducted several devastating strikes against Ukrainian cities since April 1. Russian ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads struck Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, causing at least 89 casualties on April 4, and Russian Shahed drones struck Kharkiv City and caused 39 casualties on the same day.[29] Russian ballistic missiles struck Sumy City on April 13 and caused at least 100 casualties.[30] A Russian ballistic missile strike on Dnipro City on April 17 caused at least 31 casualties.[31] Russian forces have been adjusting their strike tactics in recent weeks to increasingly hit civilian areas, likely intending to take advantage of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and Kremlin efforts to delay negotiations to intimidate Ukrainian civilians.[32]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.[33] Zelensky cited information from Ukrainian intelligence and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) indicating that the PRC has provided gunpowder and artillery to Russian forces and that PRC representatives are involved in weapons production within Russia. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian denied Zelensky's statement.[34]

ISW has recently observed indications that Russia and the PRC are deepening their cooperation, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine.[35] PRC military officials have reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare, and the PRC government may be disinterested in combating Russia's reported direct recruitment of PRC citizens to serve in the Russian military for this reason.[36] A Russian company also reportedly collaborated with entities in the PRC to develop and produce attack drones for use in Ukraine as of September 2024.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.
• Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions.
• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation.
• Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Kurakhove.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violations
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on April 18 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, and Voronezh oblasts over the past day.[38]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[39]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 18 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Gornal and near Oleshnya (west of Sudzha).[40]

Fighting continued near Gornal and Oleshnya on April 17 and 18.[41]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 17 that both Gornal and Oleshnya are contested "gray zones."[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Oleshnya.[43] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), including an unspecified 1st company of the brigade, are reportedly operating near Gornal.[44]

Fighting continued in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 18, but Russian forces did not advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast near the international border and are directing Russian glide bomb strikes near Demidovka and Popovka.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Sumy Oblast border area on April 18.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 18 but did not advance.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 17 and 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway southwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and to the eastern outskirts of Mala Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), respectively.[48]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk) and east of Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Kamyanka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 17 and 18.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks towards Borova, northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Novoserhiivka on April 17 and 18.[52]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on April 18 that it repelled a roughly reduced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of at least two armored vehicles, three buggies, and an unspecified number of civilian vehicles in an unspecified part of Kharkiv Oblast (likely referring to the Borova direction).[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Nove (northeast of Lyman).[54]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Nove.[55]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Nove, Ridkodub, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on April 17 and 18.[56]

Ukraine's Luhansk Oblast Military Administration stated on April 18 that Russian forces significantly increased their rate of artillery fire against the frontline in the Lyman direction.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the direction of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on April 18 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Bilohorivka toward Hryhorivka (both northeast of Siversk).[59]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bilohorivka and from positions near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) on April 17 and 18.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka.[61]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka, and west of Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Stupochky on April 17 and 18.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment and 661st Engineer-Sapper Battalion, are operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[63]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Toretsk, northwest of Toretsk, southeast of Dachne (northwest of Toretsk), and in southwestern Petrivka (west of Toretsk).[65]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk itself, northwest of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Druzhba and Krymske, and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Oleksandropil on April 17 and 18.[66]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 18 that Russian forces seized Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk), but ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement as of April 14.[67] Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the Toretsk direction reportedly complained that the Russian MoD is not providing adequate supplies or drones.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction, and elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Druzhba.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 600 meters from Kalynove toward Stara Mykolaivka (both east of Pokrovsk), near Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Malynivka, Myrne, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne on April 17 and 18.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lysivka, Udachne, and Zelene (south of Pokrovsk).[72]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction is unstable due to frequent Ukrainian counterattacks.[73]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 10th Tank Regiment and 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (both 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance and striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynove.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novoserhiivka, east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 17 and 18.[76]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[77]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove), reached the eastern outskirts of the settlement, and seized unspecified tactical heights in the area.[78]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Rozlyv on April 17 and 18.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces periodically counterattack near Bahatyr.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bahatyr, and elements of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Kostyantynopil.[81] Drone operators of the "Snegiri" Reconnaissance Group of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly remotely mining roads in the Bahatyr-Odradne area (southwest of Kurakhove to north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southeast of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[83]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Komar, Vesele, Fedorivka, and Shevchenko; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne on April 17 and 18.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Odradne, Vesele, and Shevchenko.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 200th Artillery Brigade, 140th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (both 29th CAA, EMD), 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, and 43rd Spetsnaz Company (both Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Odradne.[86] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Voskresenka (northwest of Shevchenko).[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on April 18.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 17 that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 18 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 17 and 18 that Russian forces advanced near Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), likely referring to the April 16 Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[89]

Russian forces continued ground assaults west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on April 17 and 18.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-37 "Sarmat" Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), and drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv.[91] Elements of the 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58 CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[92]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dnipro direction on April 18.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See updates about the Russian ballistic missile strike against Kharkiv City in the topline text.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 17 and 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea; five Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and Crimea; and 37 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Kursk City.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Iskander-K cruise missiles and 23 Shahed drones over Ukraine and that 10 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City and Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[94] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast; Voznesenskyi Raion, Mykolaiv Oblast; and Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[95]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.