Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2023

February 9, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on February 9 that the Wagner Group has entirely stopped recruiting prisoners. In a response to a press comment, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner’s recruitment of prisoners has "completely stopped" and that "all obligations are being fulfilled" for those currently under Wagner’s employ.[i] Prigozhin also absurdly claimed that over 10 million Americans have applied to join Wagner.[ii] The Wagner Group will likely continue to recruit from prisons, albeit in a much more limited capacity. As ISW has previously noted, Wagner’s recruitment of prisoners has slowed over the last few months, an assessment confirmed by statistics by the Federal Penitentiary Service that show that decreases in the Russian prison population stabilized between November 2022 and January 2023.[iii] This phenomenon is consistent with the overall trend of conventional Russian troops slowly replacing the Wagner Group around Bakhmut, indicating that Russian military command may be shifting away from its reliance on Wagner and therefore on using prisoners as cannon fodder.

The Kremlin continues to pursue measures to gradually prepare Russia’s defense-industrial base for a protracted war in Ukraine while avoiding wider economic mobilization. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with the Supervisory Board of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives on February 9 and instructed the agency to support federal subjects in developing the production of unmanned aircraft systems.[iv] Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev previously stated that Russian military manufacturers intend to expand the supply of reconnaissance and attack drones to support operations in Ukraine, and Russian and Iranian officials are reportedly planning to build a factory in Russia to manufacture 6,000 drones "in the coming years."[v]

Medvedev visited a tank manufacturing plant in Omsk Oblast on February 9 and stated that Russia needs to increase the production of various armaments, including modern tanks, in response to Western military assistance to Ukraine.[vi] Dutch open-source group Oryx reported that Russian forces have lost 1,012 destroyed tanks in Ukraine with an additional 546 tanks captured by Ukrainian forces.[vii] Oryx reported that these combined losses represent roughly half the tanks that Russian forces committed to Ukraine at the start of the invasion.[viii] Fifteen hundred tanks are enough to equip more than 15 tank regiments or brigades or about 150 battalion tactical groups.[ix] The Russian military needs to quickly replenish these tank losses to maintain the ability to conduct large-scale mechanized maneuver warfare ahead of a likely increased pace of offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Medvedev likely framed his calls for increased production as a response to Western military assistance to obscure the fact that substantial military equipment losses are driving the need for increased production. The Kremlin’s efforts to gradually prepare Russia’s defense industrial base for a protracted war while avoiding a wider mobilization of the Russian economy continue to be incompatible with the scale of the war that the Russian military is fighting in Ukraine and the scale of Russian military equipment losses.

A prominent Wagner-linked Russian milblogger called for the dismissal of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu over a Russian military uniform procurement scandal. Many prominent Russian military bloggers harshly criticized Shoigu and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over news that the 22-year-old son of the Russian Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for State Property Management won a contract to supply the Russian military with new uniforms.[x] The milbloggers argued that the new uniforms are of inferior quality and overpriced (costing about 130,000-210,000 rubles or $1,780 - $2,875 per uniform) and are part of a petty corruption scheme to enrich the families of Russian defense officials. The Grey Zone Telegram channel—a prominent Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger – wrote an explicative-laden rant to its 426,000 subscribers that Shoigu has lost credibility in front of the Russian nation and that Russian President Vladimir Putin can amend the situation by firing Shoigu, Shoigu’s "entourage" in the Russian General Staff and banning Shoigu and his associates from all Russian military affairs.[xi] This is the latest episode in a string of events that has prompted Russian military blogger communities to attack the Russian MoD and senior Kremlin officials for petty corruption and ineptitude resulting in battlefield failures and worse quality of life for average Russian soldiers.[xii]

The Kremlin continues to show that it is unwilling to curb divisive rhetoric from ultranationalist pro-war figures. Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov publicly sparred with Duma Deputy General Viktor Sobolev following Sobolev’s criticism of Kadyrov’s statements on grooming standards in the Russian military being discriminatory against Muslims and calls for the Russian military to fight satanism in Poland.[xiii] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 9 that the Kremlin is "not participating in this controversy and would not like to give any assessments" about it.[xiv] The Kremlin will continue to tolerate divisive rhetoric from ultranationalist figures as it seeks to appeal to the wider pro-war community.

Key Takeaways

• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that the Wagner Group has entirely stopped recruiting prisoners.
• The Kremlin continues to pursue measures to gradually prepare Russia’s defense industrial base for a protracted war in Ukraine.
• A prominent Wagner-linked Russian milblogger called for the dismissal of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu over a Russian military uniform procurement scandal.
• The Kremlin continues to illustrate that it is unwilling to curb divisive rhetoric from ultranationalist pro-war figures.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and continued offensive operations around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that the Russian military integrated a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) volunteer formation into the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities detained a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempting to assassinate Russian occupation officials.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

ISW continues to assess that Russia's most likely course of action (MLCOA) is an imminent offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast and is therefore adjusting the structure of the daily campaign assessments. We will no longer include the Eastern Kharkiv and Western Luhansk Oblast area as part of Ukrainian counteroffensives and will assess this area as a subordinate part of the Russian main effort in Eastern Ukraine. The assessment of Luhansk Oblast as part of the Russian main effort does not preclude the possibility of continued Ukrainian counteroffensive actions here or anywhere else in theater in the future. ISW will report on Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts as they occur.

Russian forces continued offensive actions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack near Stelmakhivka, 15km west of Svatove.[xv] Russian milbloggers circulated footage reportedly of elements of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) correcting artillery strikes in an unidentified sector of the Svatove-Kreminna line.[xvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that  Central Military District elements are operating in the Lyman direction (the area west of Kreminna) and using TOS-1 thermobaric multiple rocket launch systems.[xvii] The commitment of a military district-level asset such as the TOS-1 to the Kreminna area suggests that the Russian MoD is prioritizing this axis. Widely circulated social media footage posted on February 9 additionally shows a Ukrainian strike on a Russian BMPT Terminator armored fighting vehicle about 8km south of Kreminna, indicating that the Russian command is committing new equipment to this area of the front.[xviii] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack near Bilohorivka.[xix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops are conducting offensive operations north of Bilohorivka and attacked along the Shepilove-Dibrova line, about 5km south of Kreminna.[xx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Vyimka (22km northeast) and Fedorivka (15km northeast); north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora (4km north) and Paraskoviivka (5km north); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanviske (5km west) and Chasiv Yar (10km west).[xxi] A Russian milblogger remarked that Russian troops have recently changed their tactics in the Bakhmut area and are focusing less on frontal assaults on small settlements and more on interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk and T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highways.[xxii] This observation is consistent with the Ukrainian General Staff report of Russian attacks towards Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske, both critical settlements along the T0504. Other Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Wagner Group forces are pushing towards Ivanivske and attacking along the E40 near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) and Dubovo-Vasylivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut).[xxiii] Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group forces are additionally attacking toward Krasna Hora from three sides and that Ukrainian troops are close to withdrawing from the settlement.[xxiv]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on February 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka, north of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Vesele, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka.[xxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City resumed offensives near Krasnohorivka, advanced near Vodyane and Opytne, failed to break through near Pervomaiske, and continued attacks in western Marinka.[xxvi] Social media footage published on February 9 purportedly shows elements of the 5th Brigade of the 1st Army Corps (forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic) attacking Ukrainian positions near Marinka.[xxvii]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on February 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bohoyavlenka (25km southwest of Donetsk City) and Prechystivka (38km southwest of Donetsk City).[xxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed assault operations on the outskirts of Vuhledar.[xxix] A Ukrainian reserve officer also reported that the majority ethnic Tatar volunteer battalion "Alga" of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps) fought near Vuhledar on February 6.[xxx] The reserve officer suggested that the use of volunteer battalions in this area indicates that the 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades, which were previously active in the area, sustained insurmountable losses and are being replaced by other formations.[xxxi] Recently posted footage from the Vuhledar area shows a defeated Russian mechanized formation of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade that lost 13 main battle tanks and 12 BMP infantry fighting vehicles in a single engagement - about half a Russian tank battalion.[xxxii] The footage shows the Russian formation driving in a column displaying poor tactics and a lack of learning from previous Russian tactical failures.[xxxiii] Separate drone footage published on February 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces approaching Vuhledar.[xxxiv] Geolocated footage published February 7 also shows reported elements of the 36^th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) striking Ukrainian positions on the eastern outskirts of Vuhledar.[xxxv]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in Zaporizhia Oblast on February 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Novoandriivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[xxxvi] Russian forces additionally continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson oblasts on February 9.[xxxvii] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City and Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xxxviii]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian sources claimed that the Russian military integrated a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) volunteer formation into the Russian Armed Forces. A Russian milblogger claimed that the former DNR Vostok volunteer battalion is now formally the 11th Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces.[xxxix] The DNR Vostok volunteer battalion commander, a notable Russian milblogger, has not addressed the reported integration. The Russian milblogger did not specify what higher formation the 11th regiment is subordinated to, but it is possible that it is subordinated to the Southern Military District which formally controls the DNR 1st Army Corps. This regiment may be assigned to a new unspecified Russian maneuver division. ISW previously assessed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be rushing to integrate irregular conventional forces into more traditional structures and will likely struggle to correct these formations‘ poor effectiveness during integration efforts.[xl]

A Russian military court reportedly ruled that Russian commanders can legally refuse to release servicemembers from service at the end of their contracts. A Russian media outlet reported on February 8 that a Perm Oblast military garrison court ruled in favor of Russian commanders in a lawsuit filed by a serviceman who claimed that the commanders refused to release him from service when his contract ended in September 2022.[xli] The court reportedly argued that the partial mobilization decree established an exhaustive list of grounds for release that did not include the expiration of a contract, and therefore, concluded that there were no grounds for recognizing the actions of the commanders as illegal.[xlii] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will not formally rescind the partial mobilization decree to legally justify the continued service of mobilized personnel indefinitely.

A volunteer battalion affiliated with a Russian occupation official reportedly deployed to frontline positions in Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on February 9 that elements of Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky’s Sudaplatov volunteer battalion have deployed to frontline positions in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[xliii] Russian sources have previously claimed that Turkish, Swedish, and Serbian volunteers are serving in the volunteer battalion.[xliv] ISW continues to assess that this volunteer battalion will likely face significant command and control challenges if these claims are true.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Kremlin continues to prioritize the development of occupied territories in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Supervisory Board of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives on February 9 and instructed the agency to focus on the development and implementation of socio-economic development plans for occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[xlv] Putin stated that Russia needs to develop the occupied territories within the current decade to foster social commitment to Russia.[xlvi] Donetsk People’s Republic head Denis Pushilin met with Russian Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov on February 9 to discuss a new fuel and energy complex in Donetsk Oblast.[xlvii] The Kremlin and Russian occupation officials likely believe that rapid economic development will promote widespread pro-Russian sentiments in occupied territories.

Russian officials continue to pursue the deportation of residents and children from occupied territories through various schemes. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on February 9 that Russian medical services are taking women and newborns with diseases that cannot be treated in Zaporizhia Oblast to Russia for perinatal care.[xlviii] Balitsky also stated that Russian doctors and the Russian Ministry of Health are providing obstetric services in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[xlix] Both these obstetric measures are likely meant to support ongoing Russian efforts to deport children and residents from occupied territories under the guise of medical relocation schemes.[l] Russian Agency for Strategic Initiatives member Svetlana Chupsheva stated in a meeting with Putin that the agency helped relocate dozens of residents from occupied territories to Russia under the medical relocation scheme.[li] Chupsheva also stated that the Agency for Strategic Initiatives plans to accept 5,000 children from Donetsk Oblast into a programming course that may set conditions for the relocation of these children to Russia.[lii] ISW continues to assess that these schemes are likely part of a wider ethnic cleansing effort.

Russian sources claimed on February 9 that Russian authorities detained members of a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempting to assassinate the Berdyansk deputy occupation head, the Berdyansk occupation traffic police deputy head, and the Berdyansk occupation commandant.[liii] Russian sources also claimed that the Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group was preparing an attack on a "We are Together with Russia" Center near Berdyansk.[liv] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin likely founded, coordinates, and promotes the "We Are Together with Russia" organization to create a facade of public support for the annexation and integration of occupied Ukrainian oblasts into Russia.[lv]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified elements of the Belarusian 6^th Separate Guards Mechanized brigade conducted tactical live-fire exercises at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus, on February 9.[lvi] A tank battalion of the Belarusian 11th Separate Mechanized Brigade conducted live fire training with T-72 tanks at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground in Brest, Belarus, on February 9.[lvii]

Belarus reportedly began a month-long training for reserve recruits on February 9. The Grey Zone Telegram channel reported on February 9 that Belarus’ reserve recruits began a one-month-long training period.[lviii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.