Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2025

January 18, 2025, 8:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on January 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18.[i] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed seven drones over the region.[ii] Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil depot.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility.[iv] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing a fuel tank to catch on fire.[v] Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.[vi]

Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Nebo-SVU" long-range radar detection system in occupied Kherson Oblast; a Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Donetsk Oblast; and a 9C32M radiolocation station of a S-300 air defense system in occupied Donetsk Oblast on January 18.[vii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that they are conducting battle damage assessments (BDA) of the strikes.

The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appear to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 18 that the Russian military command have consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske.[viii] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne) and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved in combat operations in Ukraine.[ix]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian forces are not advancing immediately south of the town.[x] The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town.[xi] ISW previously observed indications that the Russian military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk.[xii] The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA) are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces.[xiii] The Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming weeks and months.  

The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 17 and 18 that elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) recently advanced south of Zelene Pole (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xiv] ISW observed reports as recent as January 18 that elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating in the Kurakhove direction, indicating that the Russian military command may have recently redeployed select elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the Pokrovsk direction if the milbloggers' claims are accurate.[xv] ISW previously observed claims that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to the Vozdyzhenka area (east of Pokrovsk) from Kurahkove.[xvi] Mashovets reported on January 18 that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 1195th and 1438th motorized rifle regiments (41st CAA) are attacking east of Pokrovsk from Vozdvyzhenka and Novotoretske-Tymofiivka (southwest of Vozdvyzhenka) towards Yelyzavetivka (west of Vozdvyzhenka).[xvii] Mashovets further reported that elements of the Russian 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), supported by elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are unsuccessfully attacking in the direction of Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad and Mykolaivka-Promin (all east of Pokrovsk). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are focusing their assaults east of Pokrovsk around Vodyane Druhe (northeast of Vozdvyzhenka), Zelene Pole, and Tarasivka (both north of Vozdvyzhenka), likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to form a wide salient that Russian forces can leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast in the future.[xviii] The Russian military command may be deprioritizing offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction and redeploying forces from Kurakhove to reinforce the Pokrovsk direction now that Russian forces have accomplished their objective of seizing Kurakhove, as elements of the 5th and 110th reportedly participated in the seizure of Kurahkove in late December 2024.[xix] It is unclear whether the Russian command reinforced or sufficiently reconstituted degraded Russian units that recently participated in battles to seize Kurakhove and its environs to the point they may effectively operate on the current frontline in Pokrovsk.

ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command would likely choose to recommit elements of the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the frontline, and the Russian military command appears to have chosen to redeploy these forces to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk.[xx] The Russian military command appears to be attempting to leverage units of the 41st and 51st CAAs to advance east of Pokrovsk and envelop the town and may intend to redeploy additional units of the 51st CAA to reinforce this effort in the future. Russian forces will likely continue to make gains as part of their intensified effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and southwest, particularly if Russian forces can identify and exploit tactical vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses along Pokrovsk's flanks. The rate of such advances will likely remain slow however, as Russian forces have yet to demonstrate the ability to conduct the type of rapid mechanized maneuver necessary to quickly penetrate Ukrainian defensive lines and surround Pokrovsk quickly enough to encircle a significant number of Ukrainian forces.

NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.[xxi] The Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 18 that the Commander of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) Colonel David Gagua met with NATO Joint Forces Training Center Commander Major General Bogdan Rycerski and discussed plans for the upcoming NATO-Georgia 2025 exercise. NATO reported on March 7, 2024, that the NATO-Georgia 2025 exercise is scheduled for March 2025 and that previous NATO-Georgia exercises focused on live and simulated training exercises and certification for NATO ally and partner countries’ military units.[xxii] Azerbaijani and Armenian sources reported on January 17 and 18 respectively that Azerbaijan will participate in the exercise and that Armenia will be an observer of the NATO-Georgia 2025 exercise.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.
• Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.
• The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.
• The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.
• NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting on January 18. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[xxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that frequent foggy weather conditions in Kursk Oblast are limiting both Russian and Ukrainian forces' ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance and drone strikes in Kursk Oblast.[xxv] Drone operators of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki (north of Sudzha); drone operators of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) "Prince Vandal Novgordosky" drones near Novoivanovka, Leonidovo, and Aleksandriya (all northwest of Sudzha); elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Nikolayevo-Darino (northwest of Sudzha); and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade and 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[xxvi]

Russian opposition media sources reported on January 18 that displaced residents of Kursk Oblast's border areas continued protests in Kursk City calling for Russian authorities to issue housing certificates and expressed frustrations over the general lack of financial assistance from the Russian government.[xxvii] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein promised to hold a meeting with the protestors the week of January 19 to 25 to discuss the group's grievances.[xxviii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 18. Geolocated footage published on January 18 shows that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in southern Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[xxix] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 17 and 18.[xxx] Elements of the Russian 11th Army Corps [AC] (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Hlyboke.[xxxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that Russian forces crossed the Russia-Ukraine international border and advanced north and south of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk), and that Russian forces also advanced in central Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), west of Petropavlivka, and seized Novomlysnk (north of Kupyansk and Dvorichna).[xxxii] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on January 17 and 18.[xxxiii] A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 18 that Russian forces have "run out of" armored vehicles in this direction and are resorting to conducting multi-wave infantry assaults after previously conducting company-sized mechanized assaults in the area.[xxxiv] The servicemember stated that Russian forces have not attempted to cross to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction due to the difficult terrain in the area and previous Ukrainian strikes against Russian boats and pontoon bridges.[xxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[xxxvi] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova, Pishchane, Zeleny Hai, and Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Pershotravneve, Kopanky, and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka and Tverdokhlibove on January 17 and 18.[xxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 18 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Terny, Novolyubivka, and Novosadove and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 17 and 18.[xxxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 18 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on January 17 and 18.[xxxix]  Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Russian forces are using “shed tanks” covered in protective equipment in the Siversk direction, and Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces are using motorized vehicles to transport assault groups in the direction of Bilohorivka.[xl]

Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 18. Geolocated footage published on January 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian armored vehicles, likely of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, near Dniprovska Street in central Chasiv Yar, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the settlement.[xli] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant.[xlii] ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) with support from the 299th and 331st VDV regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) and the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are trying to seize northern Chasiv Yar and that Russian forces seized a foothold in Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar).[xliii] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on January 17 and 18.[xliv] Drone operators of the Russian “Sever-V” Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[xlv] Tank operators of the Russian ”Nevsky” Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Soledar (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on January 18 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked within Toretsk, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 17 and 18.[xlvii] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on January 17 that Russian forces have seized a significant portion of the town's buildings, but noted that Ukrainian forces are holding positions in the town and are working to exhaust advancing Russian forces.[xlviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to consolidate positions in the contested "gray zones" in Toretsk, which reportedly constitute a significant portion of the town, and added that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of the town.[xlix] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Krymske on January 17 in order to bypass the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk from the west and noted that the seizure of Krymske would aid Russian forces in seizing the remainder of Toretsk. A press officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated on January 18 that Russian forces are attacking in larger platoon-sized infantry units in Toretsk and noted that Russian forces continue to employ small infantry tactics with the platoons, which are typically comprised of 20 personnel.[l] The Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 18 that Russian forces are using "kamikaze camel" tactics in the Toretsk direction and are forcing unarmed infantry ("camels") to advance close to Ukrainian positions to drop caches of ammunition, mines, or walkie-talkies for advancing Russian assault groups to use in the future.[li]  Mashovets stated on January 18 that elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are operating within and near Toretsk.[lii]

See topline text for reports of Russian offensive operations near Pokrovsk.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kurakhove on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have consolidated positions on the eastern outskirts of Dachne (west of Kurakhove) and advanced west towards Zelenivka from Yantarne (both southwest of Kurakhove).[liii] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove), although ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 5.[liv] Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division's (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 67th Rifle Regiment, and 6th Tank Regiment are slowly advancing northwest of Kurakhove along the Slovyanka-Petropavlivka line and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are attacking northwest of Kurakhove from Shevchenko towards Andriivka.[lv] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking from Kurakhove and Dalne (south of Kurakhove) towards Dachne, and that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are attacking near Yantarne and Zelenivka. Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka, Slovyanka and in the direction of Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne and towards Kostyatynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly and Yantarne.[lvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in southeastern Dachne.[lvii] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction and that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[lviii]

Russian forces recently advanced into eastern Velyka Novosilka and will likely seize the settlement in the coming weeks, provided Russian forces maintain their current rate of advance in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced westward to a cemetery in eastern Velyka Novosilka.[lix] Recent Russian advances east of Velyka Novosilka and the recent Russian seizure of Vremivka (south of Velyka Novosilka) indicate that Ukrainian forces likely no longer hold positions in the fields south of Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently physically interdicted all of Ukraine's ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Velyka Novosilka as part of ongoing Russian efforts to complicate Ukrainian logistics into the settlement and force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the settlement in the near future. Russian forces will likely seize Velyka Novosilka in the coming weeks or months, although Russian advances will likely remain at a slow pace. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper Russian movement.  Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings, and tactical terrain features, such as rivers and the steppe that provide little cover or concealment will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velkya Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.[lx]

Russian forces also reportedly advanced in other areas of the Velyka Novosilka direction amid ongoing offensive operations in the area on January 18. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces advanced to Andriya Sheptytskoho Street in western Velyka Novosilka after crossing a partially destroyed bridge connecting Velyka Novosilka and Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka); along Horishnia Street in eastern Velyka Novosilka;  and in the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[lxi] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces will likely not be able to transport equipment across the bridge connecting Velyka Novosilka and Vremivka.[lxii] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations in Velyka Novosilka on January 17 and 18.[lxiii] The Russian MoD claimed on January 18 that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the seizure of Vremivka and are currently operating in Velyka Novosilka and that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are operating near Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[lxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on January 18 but did not advance.[lxv] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including drone operators of the “Penguin” group of the "Gepard" Battalion, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[lxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 17 and 18 but did not advance.[lxvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 18 that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 39 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Bryansk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[lxviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two ballistic missiles over Kyiv Oblast and that debris from downed ballistic missiles damaged infrastructure in Kyiv City; that Ukrainian forces downed 24 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts; that 14 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Russian ballistic missiles struck an enterprise and damaged houses in Zaporizhizhia City. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak reported on January 18 that a Russian Shahed drone damaged an industrial enterprise in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxix] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials reported on January 18 that a Russian ballistic missile strike against Shevchenkivskyi Raion, Kyiv City damaged a non-residential building and the Lukyanivska metro station and killed three civilians.[lxx]

The Romanian Ministry of Defense MoD) reported on January 18 that a Russian Shahed drone may have crashed near Plauru, Romania during a Russian drone strike against Ukraine on the morning of January 17.[lxxi]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20056

[ii] https://t.me/tass_agency/296571; https://t.me/tass_agency/296588

[iii] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31437; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54118 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54119 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54120 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54121 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54122; https://t.me/shot_shot/76387; https://t.me/Shapsha_VV/13330; https://t.me/russianocontext/5857

[iv] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08KT6dkFzAQCf6coFBL6fdB5asThjVJtq1qzeV5znDwgsekUXiQjrUS2j4w2yjfBDl

[v] https://t.me/tass_agency/296590 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/296601 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/296602

[vi] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1880406005751976252; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1880342385735180512; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54125 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54127 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54130; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54128 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54129; https://t.me/ukrbavovna/19039

[vii]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08KT6dkFzAQCf6coFBL6fdB5asThjVJtq1qzeV5znDwgsekUXiQjrUS2j4w2yjfBDl  

[viii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2501

[ix] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025

[x] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/927907-zahodu-protivnika-tocno-ne-bulo-z-nasogo-boku-voin-68-brigadi-rozpoviv-situaciu-dovkola-pokrovska/

[xi] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84672 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61504 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20622 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20621 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84650 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22568

[xii] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324

[xiii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2502

[xiv] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30569 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20623

[xv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2503     

[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025

[xvii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2501  ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0xFcTFpuZpsMJWMWPpkTGgtfxDY76YTYC5dBoF9S9GZHXSRhgks6HiiDnLntLYEPHl

[xviii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61498 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20623

[xix] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024

[xx] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025

[xxi] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.ge/videos/1561392468586128

[xxii] https://www.nato dot int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm

[xxiii] https://caliber dot az/en/post/azerbaijan-joins-forces-for-nato-georgia-2025-military-drills; https://www.1lurer dot am/en/2025/01/18/Armenia-will-participate-in-Georgia-NATO-2025-exercises-as-an-observer/1251459

[xxiv] https://x.com/Noobieshunta_/status/1880563643462598870 ; https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1880542757707784561

[xxv] https://t.me/rusich_army/20180 

[xxvi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22545; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22544 ;  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84711 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84649 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22554

[xxvii] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/18/bezhentsy-iz-prigranichnyh-rayonov-vyshli-na-miting-v-kurske-oni-potrebovali-podderzhki-vlastey ; https://t.me/astrapress/72701 ; https://t.me/istories_media/8788 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29233

[xxviii] https://t.me/severrealii/29233

[xxix] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1880587396762534000; https://t.me/brussinf/8992 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84647

[xxx]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4164 ; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/videos/3860786744160145/

[xxxi] https://t.me/mod_russia/48000 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/5544 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62634

[xxxii] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30592; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30598; https://t.me/z_arhiv/3059

[xxxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[xxxiv] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmn2K7jNGco; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/18/vorog-vykorystovuye-myasni-shturmy-shturmuye-pihotoyu-poky-ta-ne-zitretsya-u-77-j-oaembr-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[xxxv] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmn2K7jNGco; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/18/vorog-vykorystovuye-myasni-shturmy-shturmuye-pihotoyu-poky-ta-ne-zitretsya-u-77-j-oaembr-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[xxxvi] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30589

[xxxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[xxxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[xxxix] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl 

[xl] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/928033-rf-zastosovue-bmp-ak-taksi-na-fronti-ta-zavilis-tanki-rukavicki-situacia-v-zoni-vidpovidalnosti-otu-lugansk/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4164

[xli] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1880565760546021676; https://x.com/CinC_AFU/status/1880550661491998845; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8153; https://t.me/osirskiy/1037

[xlii] https://t.me/tass_agency/296605; https://t.me/yurasumy/20625   

[xliii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2504

[xliv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[xlv]  https://t.me/Sever_Z/9258     

[xlvi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22563 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/296665

[xlvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20624    

[xlviii] https://youtu.be/pG-mt68VSI8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/927747-porahuvati-skilki-kontrolue-kozna-storona-vazko-osuv-hortica-pro-situaciu-u-torecku/

[xlix] https://t.me/yurasumy/20624    

[l] https://youtu.be/tmn2K7jNGco; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/18/zavalyuyut-pihotoyu-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vorog-zbilshyv-kilkist-shturmovykiv/

[li] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4177

[lii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2504    

[liii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22550 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20620 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31431

[liv] https://t.me/mod_russia/48001 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2025

[lv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2503

[lvi] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61504 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61498 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24331 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[lvii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61498

[lviii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84668 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13276 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84674 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13275 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62640 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62643

[lix] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24742

[lx] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31

[lxi]https://t.me/motopatriot78/31427%20 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31432 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31439 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31446 ; https://t.me/rybar/67248 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20619 ;

[lxii] https://t.me/rybar/67248

[lxiii]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062 ;   https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[lxiv] https://t.me/mod_russia/48002 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31453 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31427 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31432 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2504 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31447

[lxv]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl

[lxvi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22544 ; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/1953; https://t.me/dva_majors/62637

[lxvii]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20062 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06y39nEMobNcmweyUmbhZEt8gMQektvjWyJ4zF8k9wQWdNv5xUVJSq661vweWmt7pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ShLhLZaBcqmeGb4RU5n3MQXg4xSy4Gxuq7fjnSmVF7csQioM3seDxQ8zLCLSVwbLl

[lxviii] https://t.me/kpszsu/27112

[lxix] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/18850

[lxx] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4031 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4032 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4033; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/748 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/750; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13017  

[lxxi] https://english dot mapn.ro/cpresa/6430_press-release