Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2024

June 24, 2024, 10:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on June 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine, but that it will likely not arrive at a scale that will significantly impact the frontline situation until at least mid to late July 2024. Budanov stated in an interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer conducted on June 12 or 13 and published on June 23 that US and European weapons deliveries, including artillery ammunition, are arriving in Ukraine at a faster pace than several months ago but noted that Ukrainian forces need a high volume of weapons and "there is a question of volume."[1] Budanov stated that "no Armageddon will emerge [on the frontline]" but that the frontline situation will remain difficult for at least one month. Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk also recently stated on June 15 that Ukrainian forces are still waiting for most of the US military assistance announced in late April 2024 to arrive in Ukraine, but that limited amounts of US security assistance arrivals have reduced Russia's artillery shell advantage from seven-to-one to five-to-one.[2] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are attempting to make tactically and operationally significant gains before US military assistance arrives to Ukrainian forces at the frontline at scale, and that the initial arrival of Western-provided weaponry will take some time to have tactical to operational effect on the frontline.[3]

Budanov stated that a sufficient quantity of US-provided long-range ATACMS missiles could allow Ukrainian forces to strike the Russian-built Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and sever an important Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) between occupied Crimea and Russia.[4] Budanov stated that Ukraine could isolate occupied Crimea, which the Russian military uses as a rear staging area, by conducting long-range ATACMS missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge. The Russian military continues to use Crimea's GLOCs to transport military personnel, weapons, materiel, and fuel from Russia to the frontlines in Ukraine and reinforced its air defense umbrella to cover occupied southern Ukraine from Crimea.[5] Ukrainian officials have recently stated that Russian forces have reduced their military logistics transport across the Kerch Strait Bridge, presumably due to efforts to establish logistics lines connecting mainland Russia and occupied Crimea through occupied southern Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, but the Kerch Strait Bridge likely remains essential to maintaining Russia's occupation of Crimea.[6] Ukrainian long-range strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge would sever an important GLOC for Russian forces based in occupied Crimea and likely complicate their ability to maintain their occupation of and basing within the peninsula. The destruction of the bridge would force Russian military to rely on the long route along northern coast of the Sea of Azov and exacerbate vulnerabilities for Ukrainian forces to exploit along the Russian main GLOC.

Current US policy regarding Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons allows Ukraine to strike anywhere within Russian-occupied Ukraine, which presumably includes using long-range ATACMS to strike the portion of the Kerch Strait Bridge within Ukraine's internationally recognized land and maritime borders.[7] ISW assesses that 13 kilometers of the Kerch Strait Bridge — which Russian authorities built without Ukraine's approval following Russia's illegal occupation of the peninsula in 2014 — are within Ukraine's internationally recognized territorial waters. The US policy on the Ukrainian ATACMS use, therefore, technically should allow Ukrainian forces to strike at least a section of the bridge if not the entire bridge. Pentagon Spokesperson Major Charlie Dietz also notably stated on June 24 that “Ukraine makes its own targeting decisions and conducts its own military operations."[8] Then–US State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert stated on May 15, 2018, that the US condemns Russia's construction and partial opening of the Kerch Strait Bridge, that the bridge "serves as a reminder of Russia’s ongoing willingness to flout international law," and represents Russia's attempt to "solidify its unlawful seizure and its occupation of Crimea."[9]

Kremlin officials absurdly attempted to link the June 23 Ukrainian strikes on legitimate military targets in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and the likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attack in the Republic of Dagestan. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 24 that Russian President Vladimir Putin sympathizes with those who lost loved ones from both the Ukrainian missile strike on Sevastopol and the terrorist attack in Dagestan.[10] Peskov also stated that the Russian investigative bodies will determine whether the strike on Crimea and the terrorist attack in Dagestan were one series of incidents or separate incidents.[11] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky labeled both events as "terrorist attacks."[12] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that it is possible that the "customers" (or entities that ordered these attacks) of both the Crimea strikes and the Dagestan terrorist attack "will be the same."[13] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 24 that pro-Kremlin bots left over 1,400 comments on Russian social media platform VKontakte claiming that the US and Ukraine organized the terrorist attack in Dagestan — echoing the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) claim that the US was responsible for the Ukrainian strike on occupied Sevastopol.[14]

The Kremlin information operation linking these two events is nonsensical if only because the civilian casualties in Crimea resulted from Russia's interception of an incoming ATACMS missile rather than a deliberate Ukrainian targeting decision. The Russian MoD acknowledged that a Russian air defense interceptor caused the Ukrainian missile to deviate from its flight path and detonate in Sevastopol.[15] An unspecified US official also told Reuters in a June 24 article that Russian forces were able to intercept the ATACMS missile targeting a Russian missile launcher causing the ATACMS missile to explode and rain down shrapnel on the Sevastopol beach.[16]  Russian officials have also offered no evidence for their claims of Ukrainian or American involvement in the Dagestan terrorist attack.

The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack. Peskov stated that Putin does not plan to make a special address concerning the strikes in Sevastopol or the attack in Dagestan — in contrast to Putin's March 25 lengthy speech following the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow.[17] Peskov responded to a journalist asking if the Kremlin fears the return of the situation of the early 2000s (presumably referencing a series of terrorist attacks in Russia, including the 2002 Nord-Ost siege, 2004 Moscow Metro bombing, and 2004 Beslan school siege), stating that the Kremlin does not fear a return to this situation as Russia is different now and Russian society is "absolutely consolidated" in its lack of support for terrorist attacks in Dagestan or Russia in general.[18] Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov stated that the terrorist attack against Dagestan's "brotherhood, multinational unity, and confessional indivisibility" is an attempt to divide Dagestan but "this [division] will not happen."[19] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the terrorists in Dagestan were attempting to create interreligious discord but that Russia will continue its fight against terrorism.[20] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov similarly claimed that the attack aimed to cause interreligious conflict but that other Russian regions, such as Chechnya, have already proven that Russia can effectively resist such conflicts.[21] The Kremlin has repeatedly promoted the idea that Russia is a harmonious multinational and multireligious state, despite increasing xenophobic rhetoric from Russia's vocal ultranationalist community and growing societal tensions.[22] This Kremlin facade of normalcy and stability also ignores the October 2023 antisemitic riots in Dagestan (including in Makhachkala, one of the locations of the June 23 attack), the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow, and the increasingly frequent counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus.[23]

The European Union (EU) adopted its 14th package of sanctions against Russia on June 24, including new restrictions against Russian funding to political parties and other "opinion-forming" organizations and Russian state media broadcasts within the EU. The new EU sanctions package prohibits EU actors that "form part of the public opinion forming process," including political parties, foundations, alliances, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and media service providers within the EU from accepting donations, financing, or other economic benefits or support "from Russia, either directly or indirectly."[24] The EU cites Russia's continued propaganda and disinformation campaigns to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, justify its war in Ukraine, and influence democratic processes within the EU as reasoning for this specific restriction. The EU sanctions regulation defines these Russian "direct and indirect" entities vaguely as "Russia and its proxies."[25] The EU also implemented a decision on June 24 that it adopted on May 17 to "suspend broadcasting activities of additional media outlets in the Union, or directed at the Union," explicitly including Kremlin news outlets and wires RIA Novosti, Izvestia, Rossiskaya Gazeta, and Voice of Europe, until "the Russian aggression in Ukraine is brought to an end" and until Russia "and its associated media outlets cease to conduct propaganda actions" in the EU.[26] The EU defines targeted outlets as "media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the [Russian] leadership" and whose propaganda actions are "supporting Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine" and "destabili[zing]" Ukraine's neighboring countries. The EU decision noted that these regulations only apply towards affected organizations' "broadcasting activities" and do not impede journalists' abilities to conduct interviews and research within EU member states. The EU has suspended the "broadcasting activities and licenses" of 18 Kremlin-backed disinformation outlets since 2022.[27] The EU does not define what constitutes "broadcasting activities" within the EU, but Western media has consistently reported that the EU has blocked access to websites of affected media outlets and that search engines and social media sites have also blocked access to sanctioned media organizations under the EU broadcasting bans.[28]

The new EU sanctions package also sanctions 116 new individuals and entities and introduces other sanctions enforcement measures.[29] The new sanctions package targets specific Russian naval vessels and forbids EU entities from providing reloading services of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) in EU territory for transshipment operations to third countries. The new sanctions package also introduces restrictions on exporting dual-use goods and requires EU parent companies to undertake "due diligence mechanisms" to assess and identify the risk of exported goods being re-exported to Russia and mitigating these risks.

The EU approved a first tranche of up to 1.4 billion euros (about $1.5 billion) in military assistance for Ukraine from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets.[30] The EU reported that 90 percent of the first payment is dedicated to Ukraine's defense needs and that the remaining 10 percent is dedicated to the EU's support of the Ukraine Facility program, which supports rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction in Ukraine. The EU stated that it will begin distributing resources to Ukraine in July 2024 with biannual payments and will review this prioritization annually starting on January 1, 2025. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated that the EU approved this tranche of assistance from frozen Russian assets through a so-called "legal loophole" bypassing Hungary's veto because Hungary abstained from voting on an earlier agreement voting on setting aside the proceeds from Russia's frozen assets and therefore "should not be part of the decision to use this money."[31]

The Kremlin continued efforts to co-opt former Wagner Group personnel by introducing a new bill that would exempt much of the Wagner force from criminal responsibility for their participation in the Wagner armed rebellion on June 23 and 24, 2023. A source told Kremlin newswire TASS on the first anniversary of the Wagner armed rebellion on June 24 that the Russian Government’s Commission on Legislative Activities approved a bill that allows for exempting a participant of an armed rebellion from criminal liability if the participant “helped to prevent further damage” in Russian state interests.[32] The bill proposes changing a footnote to the “High Treason” article in the Russian Criminal Code to offer a possible exemption from criminal liability of armed rebellion if the participant voluntarily cooperated with Russian authorities and did not commit any other crimes. The bill’s explanatory note added that this exemption will motivate participants of armed rebellions to refuse to continue their "illegal actions," presumably referring to crimes in addition to armed rebellion. The bill also proposed to add a new “Armed Rebellion” article in the Russian Criminal Code, which will differentiate between the level of involvement and severity of the consequences for organizing, leading, or participating in a rebellion. The TASS source claimed that the Russian Government’s Commission on Legislative Activities simultaneously approved a bill on toughening criminal penalties up to life imprisonment for organizing or participating in an armed rebellion if the rebellion resulted in the death of a person or unspecified "other grave consequences."[33]

The bill clearly demonstrates three Kremlin objectives: appeasing and possibly blackmailing remaining Wagner personnel into remaining loyal to the Kremlin; erecting a facade that the Kremlin is addressing societal backlash over casualties among defending Russian military personnel during the Wagner armed rebellion; and establishing safeguards to prevent future armed rebellions. A prominent Russian milblogger observed that this bill is clearly related to the anniversary of the Wagner armed rebellion and noted that Russian authorities did not charge any of the Wagner commanders or participants for their involvement in the rebellion.[34] The milblogger noted that this bill will lead to stricter legislation regarding armed rebellions and that the Kremlin had clearly learned a painful lesson from June 2023. The Kremlin notably dropped criminal charges against Wagner commanders and personnel on June 27, 2023, despite the fact that Wagner personnel shot down several Russian military aircraft during the rebellion, killing 13 Russian pilots.[35] Several Russian milbloggers marked the anniversary of the Wagner armed rebellion by celebrating the Wagner Group’s accomplishments and noting that the rebellion revealed serious problems in the Russian military — some of which the milbloggers claimed persist a year after the rebellion.[36]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol with Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov on June 24.[37] Zelensky did not offer a reason for Sodol’s dismissal. Hnatov served as deputy commander of the Ukrainian southern theatre since 2022, played an important role in liberating west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, and commanded the defense of Bakhmut in spring 2023.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine, but that it will likely not arrive at a scale that will significantly impact the frontline situation until at least mid to late July 2024.
• Budanov stated that a sufficient quantity of US-provided long-range ATACMS missiles could allow Ukrainian forces to strike the Russian-built Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and sever an important Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) between occupied Crimea and Russia.
• Current US policy regarding Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons allows Ukraine to strike anywhere within Russian-occupied Ukraine, which presumably includes using long-range ATACMS to strike the portion of the Kerch Strait Bridge within Ukraine's internationally recognized land and maritime borders.
• Kremlin officials absurdly attempted to link the June 23 Ukrainian strikes on legitimate military targets in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and the likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attack in the Republic of Dagestan.
• The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack.
• The European Union (EU) adopted its 14th package of sanctions against Russia on June 24, including new restrictions against Russian funding to political parties and other "opinion-forming" organizations and Russian state media broadcasts within the EU.
• The EU approved a first tranche of up to 1.4 billion euros (about $1.5 billion) in military assistance for Ukraine from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets.
• The Kremlin continued efforts to coopt former Wagner Group personnel by introducing a new bill that would exempt much of the Wagner force from criminal responsibility for their participation in the Wagner armed rebellion on June 23 and 24, 2023.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol with Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov on June 24. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Vovchansk and Starysta, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed depriving all Russian military districts of their status as joint headquarters.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces counterattacked and recently regained some tactical positions northeast of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage published on June 24 showed Ukrainian forces engaged in small arms fire with Russian forces in northeastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), indicating that Ukrainian forces regained limited positions along Khiloboroba Street.[39] Geolocated footage published on June 24 also indicates that Ukrainian forces regained positions in central Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City and southwest of Vovchansk).[40] Russian milbloggers, however, claimed Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and in the direction of Lyptsi; and in Vovchansk on June 23 and 24.[41] Russian forces reportedly continued to attack near and in Vovchansk, and positional engagements continued near Hlyboke.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified reconnaissance elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet are operating near Hyboke.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Kopanky; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Makiivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Torske; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 23 and 24.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 800 meters west of Novovodyane (northwest of Kreminna) and made additional tactical gains near Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk), south of Vilshana and near Novoselivka (both northeast of Kupyansk), and east of Stelmakhivka.[45] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) have sustained at least 251 casualties while fighting in the Borova (west of Svatove) direction between May 12 and June 17.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on June 24. Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows elements of the Russian 119th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) planting a Russian flag in southeastern Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[47] Fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka and Vyimka on June 24.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the area between Chasiv Yar and Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and towards the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal from Ivanivske (west of Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[49] Fighting continued near Chasiv Yar, in the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar), west of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and north of Chaisv Yar near Kalynivka.[50] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating in the Kanal Microraion.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on June 24. Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Pivnichne (east of Toretsk), Pivdenne (southeast of Toretsk), and Niu York (south of Toretsk) on June 24.[53]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Avdiivka on June 24 amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), up to 700 meters deep (northwest of Avdiivka) within central Sokil, and in an area up to 1.3 kilometers wide in eastern Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Sokil), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[54] The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Russian forces control most, but not all of Novooleksandrivka and that heavy fighting is ongoing within the settlement.[55] Several Russian milbloggers previously claimed on June 23 that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka.[56] Russian forces continued to attack northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Oleksandropil, Novoselivka Persha, Novoprokovske, and Ocheretyne and west of Avdiivka near Karlivka and Netaylove on June 23 and 24.[57]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 24, but there were no confirmed changes in the frontline. Ukrainian footage published on June 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a roughly reduced company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and 2.08 kilometers deep north along a 6.03-kilometers-wide front north of Volodymyrivka, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claim.[59] Fighting also continued southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka.[60]

Fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area on June 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Urozhaine and Staromayorske on June 23 and 24.[61] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) continued to operate in the direction of Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[62]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 24.[63] Russian sources claimed that positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne) but noted that the frontline situation had not changed in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces made unspecified advances near Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne).[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that reconnaissance elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) warned about effective Ukrainian mining efforts in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Lancet drone operators of the “Viking Detachment” (Otryad Vikinga) of the Russian 22nd Separate Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are operating in the direction of Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City).[67]

Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces launched a HIMARS strike against a Russian bus, car, and truck with Russian personnel in Burchak (approximately 78km south of Zaporizhzhia City).[68]

Positional battles continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on June 24.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized control over unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta after waging “bloody battles,” but claimed that small Ukrainian infantry groups are counterattacking and have the advantage in drone operations in the Kherson direction.[70]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian Center for Long-Range Space Communications — an important military asset of the Russian space communications and satellite navigation system — near occupied Yevpatoria, western Crimea with ATACMS on June 23.[71] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind, citing satellite imagery, reported a large-scale fire on the territory of the Russian-occupied Center for Long-Range Space Communications, which is also known as the Russian 40th Command and Measuring Complex in Vityne near Yevpatoria.[72] Crimean Wind also amplified footage of a large fire, which was later geolocated to the center.[73] Crimean Wind reported that the Russian “Krasukha” electronic warfare (EW) complex (which was intended for the defense of command posts and other unspecified important objects) was possibly present on the center’s complex. The center has been part of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014.[74] Ukrainian military expert Anatoloy Khrapchynskyi told Radio Svoboda’s investigative branch Schemy on June 24 that the Russian “Liana” electronic intelligence satellite surveillance and collection system, which includes “Lotus” and “Pion-NKS” satellites, are located on the territory of the center.[75] Khrapchynskyi added that “Pion-NKS,” in particular, uses radars for maritime reconnaissance and information gathering. Khrapchynsky added that the Russian military may have been using the center to control groups of the “GLONASS” satellites, which is a Russian analogue to the American GPS system operated by the Russian state space corporation Roscosmos.[76] Ukrainian forces previously reportedly struck this center on December 20, 2023.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) 

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes against Ukraine on June 24. Donetsk Oblast Head Vadym Filashkin stated on June 24 that Russian forces struck Pokrovsk with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, destroying and damaging residential houses.[78] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two cruise missiles, likely Iskander-K missiles, against Odesa Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down one of the missiles.[79] Russian forces reportedly struck civil infrastructure and a warehouse in Odesa City.[80]

Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike on Kharkiv City on the afternoon of June 24 and struck an educational institution.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed depriving all Russian military districts of their status as joint headquarters. The Russian MoD proposed in a draft decree published on June 24 to remove each military district's status as an "interservice strategic territorial association" — joint headquarters in Western militaries — and reorganize the joint strategic commands into a department subordinate to each military district to "optimize" the Russian command structure.[82] The Russian MoD stated that this measure aligns with other reorganization measures, including reorganizing the Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD), subordinating the Caspian Flotilla to the Russian Navy, and subordinating the formations of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces to the Aerospace Forces (VKS).[83] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees depriving the Northern Fleet of its interservice strategic territorial association status and establishing the MMD and LMD on February 26.[84]

Russian milbloggers continued to accuse Russian battlefield commanders of poor treatment of personnel and unprofessionalism. A Russian milblogger who has allegedly fought in occupied Donetsk Oblast published footage on June 23 allegedly showing Russian soldiers detained in an unsanitary basement for up to three months.[85] The milblogger complained that Russian media hides the true reality of the war in Ukraine and that Russian commanders are forming "maimed" regiments of soldiers, including mobilized personnel, contract personnel, and wounded personnel, whom they treat "like cattle." The milblogger complained that Russia does not have enough soldiers and reiterated calls for another wave of mobilization, which another milblogger echoed.[86] Another prominent milblogger amplified a letter allegedly from a Russian mobilized soldier who claimed that he has been fighting on the frontlines with different units for a long time and accused the Russian military command of unfairly issuing medals and bonuses to Russian servicemen. The mobilized serviceman stated that the Russian military command does not adequately recognize Russian servicemen for their battlefield achievements with awards or properly care for wounded personnel.[87] Another milblogger responded to this letter claiming that many commanders value loyalty most from their soldiers so that each commander creates the perception that their leadership roles are stable.[88] An alleged Russian soldier warned in a different letter that milbloggers should be careful when amplifying complaints about the Russian military command. An alleged Russian serviceman downplayed some previous complaints from a Russian military unit by claiming that the battlefield situation is always harsh and observing that there are fewer complaints overall now than in previous months.[89]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to portray itself as an institution that is effectively providing medical care and other social support measures to Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva announced on June 24 that the MoD is opening a military-social center in Moscow to monitor and assist Russian soldiers with social support and that the center will also have offices in each military district.[90] Tsivileva also stated that Russia needs to provide a comprehensive approach to treatment and rehabilitation for Russian personnel injured in Ukraine, including providing prostheses, specialized vehicles, and resocialization for these veterans.[91]

Russian President Vladimir Putin updated regulations on June 24 that will allow the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to participate in the selection of conscripts.[92] Putin signed a law in December 2023 which allowed conscripts to serve in the FSB.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation reported on June 24 that Russia is conducting a disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Ukraine's development of nuclear energy.[93] The Center for Countering Disinformation stated that pro-Kremlin foreign and domestic media are promoting narratives claiming that the use of American fuel in Russian-designed and built nuclear power plants in Ukraine will lead to nuclear disaster and that the construction of the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant will lead to a Chernobyl-like disaster and will be expensive and endless.

Russia continues to charge former Ukrainian officials in absentia as part of efforts to discredit the post-2014 Ukrainian government and justify Russia's full-scale invasion as necessary to protect civilians in Ukraine. Russian authorities placed Pavlo Petrenko, who served as Ukraine's Minister of Justice from 2014 to 2019, and Yuryi Stets, who served as Ukraine's Minister of Information Policy from 2014 to 2019, on Russia's wanted list under the article of the Russian Criminal Code prohibiting the cruel treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) or civilians, the deportation of civilians, or the use of means and methods of warfare that Russia-signed international treaties prohibit.[94] A Moscow court sentenced Petrenko and Stets in absentia to two months of detention from the moment of their arrest or extradition to Russia.[95]

Russian milbloggers and Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan politicians continue to promote narratives targeting the Moldovan government and Moldova's relationship with the West, likely in response to the recent announcement about the start of European Union (EU) accession agreements with Moldova.[96] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 24 that Western organizations are holding a "Youth Forum" in Moldova to promote pro-EU sentiments and recruit young "agents of Western influence."[97] Another Russian milblogger also claimed that Western organizations are trying to "infiltrate" and "recruit" local political power blocs in Moldova.[98] Kremlin newswire TASS amplified claims by Kremlin-affiliated Governor of the Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia Yevgenia Gutsul about how Moldovan authorities revoked the license of Moldovan gas company NordGaz, which planned to supply Gagauzia with heavily discounted gas, out of fears that the entire Moldovan population would have rebelled against Moldovan authorities' inability to secure lower gas prices for the entire country.[99] The Moldovan National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE) suspended Nordgaz's gas supply license in December 2023 for three months due to unauthorized Nordgaz supplies to its consumers, but a Moldovan court ruled in February 2024 that the ANRE had no grounds to revoke the license.[100] Gutsul  has since turned to Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom to reach an agreement to supply gas to Gagauzia at preferential prices.[101]

Prominent Russian milbloggers purposefully mischaracterized the recent closure of an Estonian border checkpoint out of safety concerns as a deliberate provocation against Russia. Russian milbloggers claimed that Estonian authorities are planning to conduct a provocation near the checkpoint in Narva, Estonia on June 24 by allowing a large number of people to cross the Russian border and "artificially" create lines at the Ivangorod checkpoint in Russia.[102] The Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) closed the pedestrian border crossing in Narva from June 20 until June 24 due to safety concerns after slowdowns at the Ivangorod checkpoint caused long lines to form in Narva.[103] The Kremlin has artificially created migrant crises in NATO states previously, however.[104]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Belarusian Foreign Minister Sergei Aleynik signed a joint statement in Minsk, Belarus on June 24 outlining the Union State's foreign policy priorities.[105] The joint statement claimed that Russian-Belarusian relations have reached an "unprecedented" level of interaction and trust and that Russia and Belarus continue to coordinate measures against external security threats. The joint statement also supported increasing the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in regional security efforts and Belarusian involvement in BRICS. Lavrov and Aleynik also signed a joint appeal to the heads of "friendly Eurasian associations" including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), SCO, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to work with Russia and Belarus to form a "Greater Eurasian Partnership" on Eurasian security issues, likely as part of Russia's new effort to create a "Eurasian security architecture" as an alternative to NATO.[106]

Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin acknowledged on June 24 that Wagner Group trainers continue to train Belarusian military personnel in Belarus.[107] Khrenin stated in an interview with Belarusian state-owned television channel STV that Wagner trainers "have shared and even now continue to share" their combat experience with the Belarusian military.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.