Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2023

November 11, 2023, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on November 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 11 that Russian forces launched 31 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, one Kh-31 missile, one P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile, and an S-300 missile against various targets in Ukraine, and specifically targeted Kyiv Oblast with either an Iskander-M or an S-400 missile.[1] Ukrainian air defenses downed 19 Shaheds (primarily targeting front line areas), one Kh-59 missile, and used a Patriot air defense system to destroy the ballistic missile targeting Kyiv Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were targeting an air defense system at the Boryspil Airport near Kyiv City.[3] The Kyiv City Administration stated that it has been 52 days since Russian forces last launched a missile strike against Kyiv Oblast.[4]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Crimea reported that sources in the GUR stated that the GUR orchestrated an explosion of railway tracks in Ryazan Oblast that caused 19 railroad cars of a freight train to derail on the morning of November 11.[5] The GUR source stated that the explosion will complicate Russian military logistics for the near future. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the train was carrying mineral fertilizer.[6] Moscow Railways stated that the situation did not affect passenger and commuter trains and that Russian Railways created a headquarters to coordinate any disruptions caused by the derailment.[7] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti stated that the derailment was due to an “intervention of unauthorized persons.”[8] The Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for Tambov Oblast also stated that a fire covering 300 square meters broke out in a gunpowder factory near Kotovsk on the night of November 11.[9] Eyewitnesses reportedly heard explosions before the fire ignited.[10] BBC Russia stated that this is the second such incident at this gunpowder factory after a fire there killed five people in June 2023.[11] GUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 11 that he cannot officially confirm or deny information about events in Russia, such as the explosion at the gunpowder plant near Tambov or the train derailment but that such strikes will continue.[12] Geolocated footage published on November 10 also shows smoke coming from a building in Kolomna, Moscow Oblast.[13] Russian sources claimed that locals heard explosions near the Machine-Building Design Bureau, a Rostec state corporation in Kolomna that specializes in missile systems.[14] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces downed one or more drones over the Machine-Building Design Bureau, and a Russian insider source claimed that a drone crashed into the building.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones over Smolensk and Moscow oblasts on the night of November 10, and a prominent Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted several air targets over Smolensk Oblast and Kolomna, Moscow Oblast in the night.[16] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the Kolomna strike as of the time of this publication. Ukrainian Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko notably stated in an interview published on November 11 that Ukraine would answer Russian strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the winter with reciprocal strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure.[17]

Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. One milblogger emphasized on November 11 that the Russian practice of conducting tactical assaults intended to storm Ukrainian fortified positions in forest areas of Donbas will not translate into a wider operational breakthrough anywhere on the front.[18] The milblogger noted that there is no way to train enough Russian personnel for the intensive frontal assaults required for significant advances in Ukraine.[19] Another milblogger claimed that the Russian military is about to experience a "real renaissance of infantry combat" because there are fewer tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and armored personnel carriers (APCs) close to the frontline.[20] A critical milblogger responded to the "infantry renaissance" comment and remarked that the comment is a negative reflection of Russian equipment losses and poor frontline coordination that has created a reliance on assault tactics.[21] A Russian Spetsnaz-affiliated Telegram channel additionally complained that the reliance on infantry-led frontal assaults is heavily attriting all Spetsnaz elements that have deployed to Ukraine because the Russian command has reportedly been using Spetsnaz forces for frontal assaults since the beginning of the war.[22] Spetsnaz forces are not meant to conduct such infantry-led assaults like standard Russian motorized rifle infantry, and some Russian sources are clearly frustrated with the ramifications of the misapplication of such Spetsnaz elements.

ISW has previously observed that Russian forces are increasingly relying on such infantry-led frontal assaults, likely to compensate for a lack of adequately trained personnel and due to widespread equipment losses.[23] The Russian General Staff appears to be relying heavily on frontal assaults as the predominant tactic in Ukraine as an important part of the Russian solution to the problems of "military parity" laid out by Zaluzhnyi's essay on the issue of "positional warfare."[24]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov. Ramzan Kadyrov quietly indicated on November 9 that he appointed Akhmat Deputy First Minister of the Chechen Republic for Physical Culture, Sports, and Youth Policy.[25] This appointment follows Akhmat’s 18th birthday on November 8, when Ramzan Kadyrov praised Akhmat for success in his “chosen business“ as head of the Chechen “Movement of the First“ youth movement.[26] Ramzan Kadyrov’s quiet acknowledgment of Akhmat’s new position stands in contrast to the recent praise and appointments of his other children, including his appointment of his younger son, Adam, to the Chechen security service position that Ramzan Kadyrov held prior to succeeding his own father.[27] The reason for Ramzan Kadyrov’s apparent snubbing of his eldest son is unclear. Akhmat Kadyrov notably met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in early March 2023 while rumors about Ramzan Kadyrov’s declining health circulated, fueling speculation that Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmat, and Putin may have been preparing for Akhmat to succeed his father.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11.
• Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• Russian authorities have reportedly launched another large-scale crypto-mobilization wave.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to fill out the workforce and artificially alter the demographics of occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 11 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction northeast of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), and in the Lyman direction near Nadiya (15km southwest of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), and the Serebryanske forest area.[29] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russia’s main goal in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction is to capture Kupyansk City.[30]

The Russian MoD claimed on November 11 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka and Zahoruykivka (15km east of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast and Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna) and Hrekivka (20km southwest of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued assaults near Bakhmut on November 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Ukrainian company commander fighting in the Bakhmut area stated that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to recapture positions near the railway near Klishchiivka, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces aim to capture dominant tactical heights near Klishchiivka.[33] The Ukrainian company commander stated that Russian forces are using different types of manpower, including mobilized, private military, and contract personnel, to attack near Bakhmut.[34] Russian sources claimed that the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are operating near Bakhmut.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault actions south of Bakhmut on November 11.[36]

Russian forces have recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and temporarily intensified offensive operations between November 10-11, likely to consolidate recent gains in the area. Geolocated footage posted on November 7 and 10 shows that Russian forces advanced into eastern Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), across the rail line southeast of Stepove, and into a tree line north of Stepove.[37] Russian sources largely claimed that Russian forces consolidated positions on the eastern outskirts of Stepove and advanced south of Avdiivka near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant.[38] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 10 that Russian forces entered Stepove, conducted reconnaissance-in-force, and then retreated, however.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka); near Stepove, Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka); and south of Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka).[40] The Ukrainian General Staff and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun indicated that Russian forces increased the number of ground attacks committed near Avdiivka in the past day, but the Ukrainian General Staff reported in its November 11 evening situation report that Russian forces only conducted 14 attacks during the day.[41] This tempo is more consistent with the number of Russian assaults reported in the Avdiivka direction in the past week, indicating that the increase in Russian attacks between November 10-11 was likely to consolidate gains near Stepove.[42]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Avdiivka on November 10. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Novokalynove towards Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka) and northeast of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) on November 10.[43] Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed counterattacks near Avdiivka on November 11.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City and in western Donetsk Oblast on November 11 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks with aviation support near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), Novomykhailivka (12km southwest of Donetsk City), and Vuhledar.[44]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west or southwest of Donetsk City or in western Donetsk Oblast on November 11. Geolocated footage posted on November 11 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a HIMARS strike against a Russian R-934 radio-electronic warfare station northeast of Puteprovod (17km northeast of Donetsk City).[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 11.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 11 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian assaults near Zolota Nyva (10km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Staromayorske and Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) but did not advance.[47]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked northwest of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne) and near Novopokrovka (13km northeast of Robotyne) and forced Russian troops to withdraw from tactical heights in Verbove and along the Novopokrovka-Polohy road.[48] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne).[49] ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian retreats from this area, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne.[51] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked west of Robotyne but did not advance.[52] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Verbove and captured Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in the area.[53]

Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Poyma (10km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Pishchanivka (13km southeast of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and had partial success in forest areas south of Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River), where fighting continues.[54] Several milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured a group of Ukrainian POWs near Krynky.[55] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that shortcomings in Russian electronic warfare (EW), air defense systems, and drone use are complicating Russia's ability to destroy the Ukrainian grouping on the east bank.[56]

Ukrainian forces advanced on an island in the Dnipro River delta southwest of Kherson City on November 11. Geolocated footage posted on November 9 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian troops on the northeastern part of Bilohrudny Island, about 10km southwest of Kherson City.[57]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian rear areas in Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defense shot down two Storm Shadow missiles near Berdyansk.[58] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that residents of Melitopol and Berdyansk reported loud explosions, potentially from air defenses activating.[59]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities have reportedly launched another large-scale crypto-mobilization wave. Russian opposition group “Skrepach” claimed on November 10 that locals in St. Petersburg and Moscow reported receiving letters and military summonses from military registration and enlistment offices.[60] Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that the Russian authorities are also sending text messages and emails to conscripts asking them to come into military enlistment offices to “clarify” their personal information and including threats of punishment if conscripts do not appear at the offices.[61] Andryushchenko warned that Russian military officials will likely force conscripts to sign military service contracts if they show up at the offices.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Murmansk Oblast government reported on November 10 that Russia’s Northern Fleet formed a drone operator training center with the oblast’s support.[62] Russian drone operators will learn how to fly, assemble, and repair drones at the facility before deploying to the front in Ukraine. Murmansk Oblast Governor Andrei Chibis stated that his administration purchased over one thousand units of equipment for the facility and expressed hope that the facility with increase the effectiveness of Russian drone operators. Russian Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev also visited the training center.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to fill out the workforce and artificially alter the demographics of occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 11 that Russian authorities are bringing people from Russia and Central Asia to occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as part of the “Zaporizhia Virgin Lands” program in order to destroy Ukrainian identity and compensate for shortages in the workforce.[63] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti stated on October 20 that Zaporizhia occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky developed the “Zaporizhia Virgin Lands” program as part of a ten-year development plan and that the program will provide those who move to occupied Ukraine with Russian citizenship and government benefits.[64] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 10 that the Russian authorities are bringing Central Asia migrants en masse to occupied Donetsk Oblast to largely work in construction companies with inhuman working conditions.[65]

Russian officials and federal subjects continue to establish connections and patronage networks with occupied Ukraine. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin visited occupied Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, to inspect preparations for winter on November 10.[66] Kherson occupation senator Andrei Alekseenko claimed on November 11 that the Russian Republic of Mordovia is overseeing 27 social and educational infrastructure projects in occupied Kalanchak Raion, Kherson Oblast, and is investing almost 27 million rubles (about $292,900) in winter preparations.[67]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian opposition outlet Meduza discredited the Kremlin narrative that falsely accuses Ukrainian authorities of trafficking organs from military personnel on the black market.[68] Kremlin-affiliated actors, such as Adviser to the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Ovchinsky, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Anna Kuznetsova, have recently promoted this narrative.[69] Meduza explained that Russian narratives that Ukraine transports organs to NATO countries, such as Turkey, via ground transportation is improbable as the route from Odesa City to Istanbul alone is 17 hours – much longer than most organs can survive outside of the body.[70] Meduza also noted that Ukraine’s healthcare system lacks doctors who can perform mass organ removals and that Ukrainian law dictates that military personnel and civilians who die in hostilities cannot be organ donors.

The Kremlin continues to appease Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s promotion of Chechen nationalism. Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov met with Kadyrov on November 11 in Chechnya and presented him with updated textbooks for grade 10 that include revised language about how the Soviet government under Stalin forcibly relocated “innocent people loyal to the Soviet regime” who were “indiscriminately accused of treason.”[71] The textbooks previously stated that the government deported various groups during World War II “on the basis of facts of cooperation with the occupiers” – language which Chechen Duma Chairperson Magomed Daudov previously criticized as insulting.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iWTi1ojwHdSNY9Kiv1QqkGffmuFLxEY3UcsT52SayS8i1tQL8PpZ8uYdhD62Zh2Dl; https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/147 ; https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0aBeJfoKNZJqxMmywjwLfMKRA8DTr91D5tpaZeFVLUkr4JkVLuZr48ZBvQZ6TSaYTl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/11/u-nebi-nad-ukrayinoyu-znyshheno-19-shahediv-povitryani-syly/

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iWTi1ojwHdSNY9Kiv1QqkGffmuFLxEY3UcsT52SayS8i1tQL8PpZ8uYdhD62Zh2Dl; https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/147 ; https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0aBeJfoKNZJqxMmywjwLfMKRA8DTr91D5tpaZeFVLUkr4JkVLuZr48ZBvQZ6TSaYTl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/11/u-nebi-nad-ukrayinoyu-znyshheno-19-shahediv-povitryani-syly/ ; https://suspilne dot media/614719-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-nasams-vid-litvi-pid-avdiivkou-zsu-za-misac-znisili-ponad-100-tankiv-rf-626-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1699687725&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[3] https://t.me/milinfolive/110471 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4675

[4] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/3410

[5] https://suspilne dot media/614937-pustili-pid-ukis-19-vagoniv-poizda-gur-provelo-specoperaciu-u-razanskij-oblasti-rf/

[6] https://t.me/rybar/54104

[7] https://t.me/mzd_rzd/870

[8] https://t.me/rian_ru/221171

[9] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/11/v-tambovskoy-oblasti-proizoshel-pozhar-na-porohovom-zavode-mestnye-zhiteli-soobschali-chto-pozharu-predshestvoval-vzryv ; https://68.mchs dot gov.ru/deyatelnost/press-centr/operativnaya-informaciya/5143831

[10] https://t.me/bazabazon/22865 ; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/21109

[11] https://t.me/bbcrussian/56029

[12] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/11/ukrayinski-morski-drony-vchergove-pokazaly-sebe-yak-nadzvychajno-efektyvna-zbroya-andrij-yusov/

[13] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1723095114254361078; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1723100214402097568

[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/28853 ; https://t.me/rybar/54106 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4676 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69222 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69222

[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4676 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56402 ; https://t.me/vrogov/12859 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/110459 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69222 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43656

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/32369 ; https://t.me/rybar/54101

[17] https://www.politico.com/news/2023/11/10/ukraine-energy-russia-00126592

[18] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103558

[19] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103558

[20] https://t.me/akela_zavtra/40

[21] https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2943

[22] https://t.me/ok_spn/27558; https://t.me/grey_zone/21710

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110123

[24] https://infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalContent/ZALUZHNYI_FULL_VERSION.pdf

[25] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4117; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4112

[26] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/starshiy-syn-kadyrova-na-18-letie-poluchil-dolzhnostj-v-praviteljstve-chechni/32679612.html

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023

[28] https://jamestown.org/program/is-chechen-leader-kadyrov-preparing-to-pass-governorship-to-son/; https://www.kavkazr dot com/a/zachem-kadyrov-otpravil-syna-k-putinu/32306385.html; https://www.rferl dot org/a/chechnya-kadryov-sons-spotlight/32603236.html

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl

[30] https://suspilne dot media/614719-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-nasams-vid-litvi-pid-avdiivkou-zsu-za-misac-znisili-ponad-100-tankiv-rf-626-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1699702049&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://youtu.be/R5vvrb1YsqU

[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/32384 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32386 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32387 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32382

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl

[33] https://suspilne dot media/614719-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-nasams-vid-litvi-pid-avdiivkou-zsu-za-misac-znisili-ponad-100-tankiv-rf-626-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1699693209&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38619; https://t.me/dva_majors/28853; https://t.me/rybar/54106

[34] https://suspilne dot media/614719-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-nasams-vid-litvi-pid-avdiivkou-zsu-za-misac-znisili-ponad-100-tankiv-rf-626-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1699693209&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[35] https://t.me/vdv_ZA_teplinsky/391 ; https://t.me/zvdvru/4264; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56398

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl

[37] https://t.me/BUAR110ombr/159 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7267; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1723094862520545731; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/122731 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7273; https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1723086281880617214; https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1723086257641619601;

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/28853; https://t.me/rybar/54106 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56400; https://t.me/dva_majors/28874; https://t.me/basurin_e/6844; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4683; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52017; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38619 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69221

[39] https://t.me/rybar/54095 ; https://t.me/rybar/54096

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid026mepwwEQzZBF7BG5sr3HNNA6D9YRYCoaZdRoCsLRoBpZBxw2qc4S87v5mFzCwz2al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid026mepwwEQzZBF7BG5sr3HNNA6D9YRYCoaZdRoCsLRoBpZBxw2qc4S87v5mFzCwz2al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid026mepwwEQzZBF7BG5sr3HNNA6D9YRYCoaZdRoCsLRoBpZBxw2qc4S87v5mFzCwz2al; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/11/na-avdiyivskomu-napryamku-znyshhena-duzhe-czinna-dlya-voroga-stancziya-reb-borysoglyebsk/; https://suspilne dot media/614719-ukraina-otrimala-zrk-nasams-vid-litvi-pid-avdiivkou-zsu-za-misac-znisili-ponad-100-tankiv-rf-626-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1699700297&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MkJvLikhQWntKFZvcPuJAU4EeGSB8Zp7MxJk9kGveauDbkTtEon3VeWkLEFSi7Vul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033TDuYNrFw7T8AzFdNeRSTJXsnmet8HafFmLWJKg1eFK4C6QHSB7bofToz8CCWH7Nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9P2SARxicvFjcizfQVbRcNEsTTnNUAGmzXzBtMLDUK6PA6g4y9ZdXoDzCyUW6Rhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2ec1xJoBFDWLHHiXvCH8NKZtFXTGTDdVoU1MUYjMoYqwyxsymS6XGzU45KcUrz6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VP9zk4vcGMFtAnZ8mbi6W6dnMdAZkQp53iYu4EzANVEhUc93i379MKTqH2GfYcetl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H7KkBqvVJzdSbPjNJR9wxPJ5aLTb286YeTRdgBpiprZUdgKYQFHSA8DgqEcwKJqFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zKw4M1RyUusb7Qc2sNQ5TUkxaQ69FA7KBMFyv9yiPupcmMTYfCLyQYhrx5x5CJtnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mvTSRqEjP9YoUFPJZ99MjoBBxY3i6eva2XhDHuF2yt6JRKBE3irhrMQD3eAVSsTYl

[43] https://t.me/rybar/54095 ; https://t.me/rybar/54096; https://t.me/readovkanews/69221

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid026mepwwEQzZBF7BG5sr3HNNA6D9YRYCoaZdRoCsLRoBpZBxw2qc4S87v5mFzCwz2al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl

[45] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/21038; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1723298652553179200; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1723373141903217142; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1723365059387134112

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/16371

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/16371

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/28853; https://t.me/rybar/54106; https://t.me/wargonzo/16371; https://t.me/readovkanews/69221; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38619

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031Qx2qMkYBoEk3JRB3pGAnMC28EPUoRYMWtzCup2ELNF8do3pgWbzrQzu4HKZtpTkl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023nzWAkdq5WV96vWqaYAawHtKzkEZSNkduUuxv8MfXtjz3HA7B2FH5yPwZ5Aoijw2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Uz7eBU8jAewSWSNouv5JMvWUZMf5fUjG9Tu8fhJsFSH3MYMP8FHocAmo3eBmwmKJl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid026mepwwEQzZBF7BG5sr3HNNA6D9YRYCoaZdRoCsLRoBpZBxw2qc4S87v5mFzCwz2al

[52] . https://t.me/wargonzo/16371

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4671

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/16371; https://t.me/rybar/54096; https://t.me/dva_majors/28853 ; https://t.me/rybar/54106; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/15820 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/30791 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/13474 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4678; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38619

[55] https://t.me/rybar/54096; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56411

[56] https://t.me/rybar/54096

[57] https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1722719420173209769; https://t.me/dva_majors/28794

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/28868 ; https://t.me/vrogov/12861

[59] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3750; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3749

[60] https://t.me/CKREPACH/389

[61] https://t.me/andriyshTime/15022

[62] https://t.me/opershtab_murmansk/6521 ; https://murmansk-news dot net/society/2023/11/10/157465.html ; https://murman dot tv/news-n-16471--na-severnom-flote-otkryli-centr-po-podgotovke-operatorov-dronov-dlya-svo

[63] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3747

[64] https://ria dot ru/20231020/spetsialisty-1904240314.html

[65] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/na-tot-zrostaye-kilkist-migrantiv-z-tsentralnoyi-aziyi/

[66] https://t.me/readovkanews/69219

[67] https://t.me/aakherson/1002

[68] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/11/11/vozmozhno-vy-ne-v-kurse-no-rossiyskaya-propaganda-postoyanno-obvinyaet-ukrainu-v-torgovle-organami-ih-yakoby-izymayut-u-voennyh-a-potom-vezut-na-zapad

[69] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/11/11/vozmozhno-vy-ne-v-kurse-no-rossiyskaya-propaganda-postoyanno-obvinyaet-ukrainu-v-torgovle-organami-ih-yakoby-izymayut-u-voennyh-a-potom-vezut-na-zapad ; https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2023/01/02/ekspert-ocenil-soobshheniya-o-chernykh-transplantologakh-na-ukraine.html ; https://rg dot ru/2023/08/06/potroshiteli.html ; https://pressria dot ru/20231005/955529147.html ; https://t.me/breakingmash/46584

[70] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/11/11/vozmozhno-vy-ne-v-kurse-no-rossiyskaya-propaganda-postoyanno-obvinyaet-ukrainu-v-torgovle-organami-ih-yakoby-izymayut-u-voennyh-a-potom-vezut-na-zapad

[71] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19257499 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4123

[72] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/09/23/iz-shkol-chechni-iz-yali-vse-novye-uchebniki-istorii-dlya-10-klassov-ob-etom-zayavil-spiker-parlamenta-chechni-a-zatem-otkazalsya-ot-svoih-slov