Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3

November 3, 9:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces are continuing to withdraw some elements from northwestern Kherson Oblast, but it is still unclear if Russian forces will fight for Kherson City. Kherson City occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov stated on November 3 that Russian forces “will most likely leave for the left (eastern) bank” of the Dnipro River urging civilians to evacuate from Kherson City “as quickly as possible.”[1] ISW has observed that Russian forces are continuing to prepare fallback positions on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River while continuing to set up defensive positions northwest of Kherson City and transporting additional mobilized forces there, despite Stremousov’s statement.[2] Some Russian elite units — such as airborne forces and naval infantry — are reportedly continuing to operate on the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River and their full withdrawal from northern Kherson Oblast would be a clearer indicator that Russian forces will not fight for Kherson City or settlements on the right bank.[3] Stremousov also hypothesized about the probability of fighting in Kherson City and northern Kherson Oblast in the next two weeks, which may suggest that he anticipates some battles for Kherson City despite his comments about withdrawal.[4] Stremousov is also an unreliable source who has consistently issued contradictory statements and made emotional responses to events, and his public statements may be clouded by personal fears of losing his position within the occupation government.

Ukrainian and Russian sources also extensively discussed the reported closure of some Russian checkpoints in the vicinity of Kherson City, the theft of city’s monuments, and the removal of a Russian flag from the Kherson Oblast Administration building as indicators of an ongoing Russian withdrawal from the city.[5] A Russian outlet claimed that Russian officials removed the flag because the occupation administration moved to Henichesk by the Crimean border.[6] While the relocation of the Kherson Oblast occupation government may suggest that Russian forces are preparing to abandon Kherson City, it may equally indicate that they are setting conditions for urban combat within the city. Similar reports may arise in coming days given the ongoing forced evacuation of civilians from both right and left banks of the Dnipro River but may not indicate an immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Kherson City. The disposition of Russian airborne forces remains the best indicator of Russian intentions.

Russian forces prematurely impaled an insufficient concentration of mobilized personnel on offensive pushes near Bakhmut and Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, wasting the fresh supply of mobilized personnel on marginal gains towards operationally insignificant settlements. Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov stated on November 3 that one or two Russian motorized rifle companies with artillery and tank support conducted ground attacks within the past week to seize Pavlivka in an effort to reach Vuhledar, but that Russian forces have suffered losses due to Ukrainian defenses.[7] Russian sources also acknowledged on November 3 that the rate of Russian advances near Vuhledar is slow due to Ukrainian resistance and mud.[8] Hromov stated that Russian forces continue ground attacks at the expense of mobilized personnel, private military company forces, and former prisoners, and that the Russians conducted over 40 ground attacks in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk Oblast areas in the past 24 hours, sustaining over 300 casualties (100 killed) in just one direction.[9] ISW has previously reported on the slow Russian rate of advance in Donetsk Oblast and injudicious allocation of resources on the front lines.[10] Russian forces would likely have had more success in such offensive operations if they had waited until enough mobilized personnel had arrived to amass a force large enough to overcome Ukrainian defenses despite poor weather conditions. Russian attacks continuing current patterns are unlikely to generate enough momentum to regain the battlefield initiative. ISW offers no hypothesis to explain Russian forces’ impatience or their continued allocation of limited military assets to gaining operationally insignificant ground in Donetsk Oblast rather than defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.

Russian outlets continued to publish confused reports regarding the dismissal and replacement of Colonel General Alexander Lapin from either his role as the commander of the Central Military District (CMD) or as the commander of the Russian “central” forces in Ukraine. The CMD press service told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Kommersant that the head of the organizational and mobilization department of the CMD, Major General Alexander Linkov, will temporarily replace Lapin as the CMD commander.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not officially announced Lapin’s dismissal or replacement, and the CMD did not specify if Linkov will also take charge of the “central” forces in Ukraine. Unnamed Russian MoD sources had previously told other Kremlin-affiliated outlets that Commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant-General Andrey Mordvichev would command “central” forces while Lapin is on a three-week medical leave.[12] Milbloggers with ties to the Russian state media also recently claimed that Mordvichev will also command the CMD.[13] Such incoherent announcements by Russian MoD officials about the possible replacement of the second most-senior Russian commander in Ukraine is highly unusual for a professional military during a critical period of a war.

Russian authorities may be setting conditions to imminently transfer the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Russian power grid following the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) November 3 statements affirming that Ukrainian authorities are not misusing nuclear materials.[14] The IAEA also stated on November 3 that shelling damaged external powerlines to the ZNPP in Ukrainian-held territory at points 50-60km away from the plant, completely cutting power to the ZNPP just one day after Ukrainian authorities transferred two reactors to a hot shutdown mode to generate heat for Enerhodar.[15] This timing suggests that Russian authorities seek to force the transfer of the ZNPP to the Russian power grid by painting Russian control as the only viable option to provide electricity to the ZNPP and heat to Enerhodar and the surrounding area. The IAEA stated that backup generators are powering the ZNPP and have enough fuel for 15 days; Russian occupation authorities may transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid within this 15-day timeline.[16] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed on November 3 that Russian authorities prevented a Ukrainian “terrorist attack” at the ZNPP, further suggesting that Russian authorities intend to paint themselves as the only safe operator of the ZNPP contrary to the IAEA’s findings of no indications of undeclared Ukrainian nuclear activities.[17]

Key Takeaways

• It is still unclear whether Russian forces will defend Kherson City despite the ongoing withdrawal of some Russian elements from northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces prematurely deployed newly mobilized personnel to offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in the pursuit of minimal and operationally insignificant territorial gains.
• Russian outlets continued to publish contradictory and confusing reports about the dismissal of Colonel General Alexander Lapin from the position of CMD commander or commander of the Russian “central” forces.
• Russian authorities may be setting conditions to imminently transfer the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to the Russian power grid.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
• The Russian military continues to face pronounced issues in the supply of critical military equipment.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense is likely continuing mobilization efforts covertly.
• Russian occupation officials continued forced evacuations in Kherson Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna on November 3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 3 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault northwest of Svatove in the direction of Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (14km northwest of Svatove).[18] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported on November 3 that Russian forces did strike Ukrainian positions in Novoselivske.[19] Russian sources claimed that Russian artillery units repelled Ukrainian formations that tried to advance towards Kreminna.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces preemptively struck Ukrainian forces preparing to launch an assault west of Kreminna from Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[21] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian assaults northwest of Kreminna in the directions of Makiivka (22km west of Kreminna), Ploshchanka (17km west of Kreminna), and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian assaults west of Kreminna intended to cut the Kreminna-Svatove highway and gain access to Kreminna through the south.[23] ISW cannot independently verify the Russian claims about Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.

Russian forces conducted assaults in eastern Kharkiv Oblast and western Luhansk Oblast to regain limited lost territory and to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces on November 3. Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces conducted three offensive operations in separate unspecified directions in the direction of Kharkiv.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted the assaults northwest of Kreminna to push Ukrainian forces away from the R-66 highway that connects Kreminna and Svatove.[26] Hromov also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in five unspecified directions in the Kramatorsk operational direction.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also struck a factory in Kharkiv city that they claim produces munitions for HIMARS MLRS, an absurd claim.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine.[29]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

See topline text regarding reports of Russian withdrawal from Kherson City.

Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to offer limited information regarding the situation on the frontlines in northwestern and northern Kherson Oblast on November 3. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck liberated settlements of Khreschenivka and Bilyavka in the Beryslav Raion with S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and Uragan MLRS rockets.[30] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov noted that Russian forces have increased their use of attack aviation in Kherson Oblast due to complications in logistics on the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River, likely as a result of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks on Mylove, Sukhanove, Bruskynske, and Ishchenka, all located between T2207 and T0403 highways in northern Kherson Oblast.[32] A Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces continued to shell along the entire line of contact, but specifically focused on the areas of Posad-Pokrovske and Luch approximately 35km northwest of Kherson City.[33] Ukrainian servicemen told bne IntelliNews that Russian forces last conducted a reconnaissance-in-force attack in the vicinity of Snihurivka (about 60km east of Mykolaiv City) about a month ago.[34]

Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast on November 3 by targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and logistics. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian alternative river crossing route in the area of the Antonivsky Bridge, and geolocated footage reportedly showed a series of explosions on barges underneath the Antonivsky Bridge from the right (western) Dnipro River bank.[35] Social media footage also showed the aftermath of reported Ukrainian strikes on a pier near the Antonivsky Bridge, that shows destroyed ships reportedly involved in Russian river-crossing efforts.[36] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also noted that Ukrainian forces struck an accumulation of Russian equipment in Chornobaivka (northwest of Kherson City) as Russian forces were transferring the equipment to another location.[37] Ukrainian forces reportedly eliminated 60 Russian servicemen in Pershotravneve, Mykolaiv Oblast in recent days, and destroyed four ammunition depots in Bashtanka and Beryslav Raions as well as six railway cars with fuel and lubricants.[38] Russian and local sources also reported Ukrainian strikes on the Kherson City shipyard.[39] Russian occupation officials accused Ukrainians forces of interfering with Russian evacuation processes by striking an administration building in Hola Prystan (about 13km southwest of Kherson City).[40] Ukrainian forces also reportedly launched strikes on Kakhovka Raion.[41]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled assaults on Bakhmut itself and near Verkhnokamianske (28km northeast of Bakhmut), Spirne (25km northeast of Bakhmut), and Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut).[42] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces launched airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Soledar and Bakhmut.[43] Hromov stated that Russian forces are attempting to block Bakhmut from the south and northeast and attempting reach Soledar to push towards Chasiv Yar.[44] A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing on the eastern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut to push Ukrainian forces to the right bank of the Bakhmutka River in the city.[45] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the administrative building of the Stirol chemical plant in Horlivka with HIMARS and posted images of the damage, but it is uncertain whether Ukrainian forces used HIMARS.[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions in Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast.[47] Russian forces continued routine shelling in the Bakhmut area.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Pervomaiske (12km west of Avdiivka).[49] Russian sources claimed that Russian and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces made unspecified advances near Avdiivka, Nevelske, Vodyane, and Marinka.[50] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces stormed Vodyane in the Donetsk City area in order to cut off a section of the M04 highway and conducted offensive actions in the direction of Pervomaiske to threaten Ukrainian forces in Krasnohorivka.[51] Hromov stated that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Vesele (roughly 5km north of Avdiivka) and Netaylove (roughly 14km west of Avdiivka).[52] Russian forces continued routine shelling in the Avdiivka area.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast at a slowed rate of advance on November 3 (see topline text). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults near Pavlivka, Vodyane (roughly 6km northeast of Vuhledar), Prechystivka (12km west of Vuhledar), and Novomykhailivka (roughly 10km south of Marinka).[54] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing in and on the northern outskirts of Pavlivka, near Prechystivka, and on the outskirts of Novomykhailivka.[55] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have advanced past Yehorivka (5km south of Pavlivka) to the southeastern outskirts of Pavlivka.[56] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks towards Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar) and Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW cannot verify the veracity of the Russian MoD’s claims.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continued shelling along the line of contact, including Vuhledar, Pavlivka, Prechystivka, and Vodyane.[58]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on November 3.[59] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces targeted critical infrastructure facilities with an Iskander missile and kamikaze drones in the Kryvyi Rih area.[60] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City, Dnipro City, and Nikopol with kamikaze drones.[61] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces also shelled Nikopol and Marhanets with MLRS and heavy artillery.[62] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City and other areas in Mykolaiv Oblast.[63]

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian military facility near Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3. Official Ukrainian sources reported unspecified explosions, likely from Ukrainian strikes, that destroyed the Refma factory building on the southeastern outskirts of Melitopol.[64] The Ukrainian sources stated that Russian military leadership used the site as a headquarters and that the strike destroyed 80 units of Russian military equipment.[65] Footage shows flying artillery rounds and audible explosions in the Melitopol area overnight.[66] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled Melitopol, but Zaporizhia occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted the rounds.[67]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military continues to face pronounced supply issues of critical military equipment. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 3 that the Russian military is struggling in Ukraine partially due to issues in sourcing artillery ammunition and armored vehicles.[68] The UK MoD reported that in mid-October Russian forces in Ukraine were losing more than 40 armored vehicles a day, which the UK MoD assessed was roughly equivalent to a battalion’s worth of equipment.[69] The UK MoD also reported that Russia has likely resorted to negotiating the supply of a 100 tanks and armored vehicles from Belarusian stocks in recent weeks.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 3 that Russian forces have started removing military equipment from storage that has not undergone appropriate maintenance.[71] Russia will likely continue to face protracted issues in supplying critical military equipment to Russian forces in Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is likely continuing mobilization efforts covertly under the guise of forming volunteer units as of November 3. Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported on November 3 that Russian officials are continuing covert mobilization despite the announced end of partial mobilization efforts.[72] Russian sources reported that Russian officials in the Republic of Karelia and the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria are still issuing mobilization summonses.[73] Hromov reported that Russian military recruitment centers received an order to continue recruiting volunteers for contract service.[74] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that volunteers can be men with expunged criminal records as well as men of any age and any health condition despite official disabled status.[75] Russian military officials will likely continue mobilization efforts covertly in the short term and pursue crypto-mobilization efforts like the formation of volunteer units in the long term. The continuation of mobilization efforts and the pursuit of crypto mobilization will likely reduce the efficacy of the fall 2022 conscription cycle in the Russian Federation.

The Russian military continued to face issues in accommodating newly mobilized personnel as of November 3. Russian sources reported that mobilized personnel continue to not receive training, equipment, and supplies.[76] A Russian source reported on November 2 that mobilized personnel in Pskov are sick, starving, and sleeping on the streets.[77] The Russian military also continues to face issues with disorderly conduct among mobilized personnel. A Russian source reported that Russian military police appealed to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for help in restoring order after more than 350 drunk and disorderly mobilized personnel arrived at a train station in Belgorod Oblast.[78] The Russian military will likely continue to face issues in accommodating and incorporating newly mobilized personnel, especially as it continues to focus on replenishing depleted frontline units with newly mobilized personnel instead of adequately training them.

The Russian Military is unlikely to improve the quality of the training of its personnel despite proposals to do so. Crimean State Duma Deputy Mikhail Sheremet proposed on November 3 to increase the terms of service in the army to two years, which would allow for more time to train personnel.[79] The Russian military is unlikely to increase the time of training even if it increases the terms of service. Hromov reported on November 2 that the Russian MoD sped up courses for current cadets and moved their graduation from June 2023 to December 2022.[80] The Russian military is likely going to apply similar time constraints to its training of new conscripts regardless of an extension of their terms of service. The Russian military currently prioritizes getting personnel to frontline positions in Ukraine quickly and appears to view the quality of their training as an afterthought.

Russia continues to face social backlash due to the conduct of partial mobilization. Russian sources reported that mobilized personnel continued protests in Ulyanovsk over the lack of promised payments and are currently conducting a strike as of November 2.[81] Further social backlash is likely as Russian officials will likely fail to meet promises made to the public during partial mobilization.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued to forcibly evacuate residents in Kherson Oblast on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials continued forced evacuations of settlements on the east bank of the Dnipro River from Velyka Znamyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast to Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, more than 100km apart.[82] Kherson occupation deputy head Kirill Stremousov called upon all residents who have not left the west bank of the Dnipro River to evacuate immediately.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 3 that Russian occupation officials forcibly relocated Russian citizens associated with the Kherson occupation administration from Beryslav and Kozache to Henichesk.[84] The Resistance Center reported that some ordinary citizens remain near front-line positions in Beryslav and Kozache and that Russian occupation officials have forcibly relocated others through filtration centers to the Russian Federation.[85] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 3 that Russian occupation authorities are relocating children from boarding schools and prisoners in Kherson City to Russian-occupied Crimea under current evacuation measures.[86] Russian occupation officials are likely to continue to increase forced evacuation measures as the Ukrainian southern counteroffensive progresses.

Russian forces and occupation officials continued to employ coercive measures against residents and endanger civilian populations in Russian-occupied territories on November 3. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) spokesperson Oleksandr Motyzyanyk reported on November 3 that Russian forces and occupation officials have used provisions under the martial law decree to increase filtration measures, force civilians to build fortifications, and steal Ukrainian property and historical items.[87] The GUR reported that Russian occupation officials are planning on confiscating all boats left in the Dnipro River and plan to seize solar energy equipment left by Ukrainian firms, and that Russian forces are currently seizing forcibly evacuated residents’ cars.[88] A geolocated imaged posted on November 3 shows Russian forces also pillaging the Kherson Art Museum.[89] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian occupation officials are increasing filtration measures in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast and in Mylove and Novopskov in Luhansk Oblast.[90] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 3 that Russian forces use the civilian population in Svatove, Luhansk Oblast as “human shields” by placing Russian personnel in businesses and schools and requiring that residents show up to work and that children attend classes.[91] Russian occupation officials and forces are likely to continue to engage in measures that are coercive and that endanger residents living in Russian-occupied territories.

Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that Ukrainian and Russian officials completed a prisoner exchange on November 3. Russian sources announced on November 3 that Ukrainian and Russian officials released 107 prisoners of war in a one-for-one prisoner exchange.[92] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War confirmed that Russian forces released six Ukrainian officers, and 101 privates and sergeants.[93] The Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin announced that 65 of the 107 released Russian prisoners are DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) personnel.[94]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.