Iran Updates

 

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                          

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, February 20, 2025

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Several senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise” attack against Israel.[i] Iran named its previous two direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 “True Promise I” and “True Promise II,” respectively.[ii] Iranian military officials initially threatened to conduct a third direct attack on Israel after the IDF conducted strikes in Iran in late October 2024.[iii] These threats gradually subsided in the weeks following the IDF strikes, however. IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.

Hajji Zadeh highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”[iv] Hajji Zadeh was likely referring to the S-300 air defense systems that the IDF struck in October 2024. The October 2024 IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[v] Hajji Zadeh added that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “first follow-up" during meetings with Hajji Zadeh, Salami, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri is about the issue of “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems.[vi] Khamenei’s prioritization of this issue highlights his concern about a potential external attack on Iran. Hajji Zadeh claimed that Iran will install “anti-ballistic [missile] defense systems” in Tehran and other major Iranian cities in the next Persian calendar year, which begins in late March 2025.[vii]

The Syrian Preparatory Committee held “dialogue sessions” for Raqqa and Hasakah provinces in Damascus on February 20 in which some participants expressed anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) views. The Preparatory Committee’s “dialogue sessions,” which have thus far taken place in provincial capitals rather than in the national capital, are meant to help the interim government "develop an integrated action plan” for the National Dialogue Conference.[viii] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[ix]  Preparatory Committee member and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Muhammad Mastat stated that the Raqqa dialogue session took place in Damascus due to SDF “threats, repression and silence against the people of [Raqqa] province.”[x] Syrian state media quoted an anonymous participant from the SDF stronghold of Qamishli who demanded that the new Syrian state correct injustices that the Assad regime committed against Kurds, but did not otherwise discuss protections for the Kurdish population.[xi] SANA reported that attendees at the Raqqa dialogue session discussed SDF “crimes and violations” against locals, including wrongful imprisonment.[xii]  Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim emphasized that Hasakah, Deir ez Zor, and Raqqa must rejoin the Syrian state under “one army” and called for the dissolution of all military formations outside of the Syrian Defense Ministry.[xiii] The interim government has repeatedly called on the SDF to dissolve in recent weeks.[xiv]

The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. A minority Kurdish party, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants.[xv] The KNC is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). KDP President Masoud Barzani has called on the interim government to respect Kurdish rights and the SDF to cooperate with the KNC in negotiations with Damascus.[xvi] Preparatory Committee members have repeatedly stated that the SDF and its political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), will not be invited to the National Dialogue Conference.[xvii] A Kurdish activist posted a video on February 20 of the Syrian interim government purportedly ejecting a ”representative of the SDF (AANES) from the National Dialogue Committee Session.”[xviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the authenticity of this video. The Deir ez Zor Province dialogue session is scheduled to take place in Deir ez Zor City on February 21.[xix] It remains unclear if representatives from the SDF-controlled eastern bank of the Euphrates River, which constitutes about half of Deir ez Zor Province, will be allowed to attend the session. The potential exclusion of Kurdish groups from dialogue sessions would likely impact the trajectory of the National Dialogue Conference and subsequent drafting of the constitution.

These dialogue sessions are taking place about a week before the March 1, 2025, internal deadline that HTS set for itself to form a transitional government. Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani said on February 12 that Syria will “be launched [on] March 1” and “represent the Syrian people as much as possible.”[xx] The HTS ”Victory Conference” in late January 2025 resulted in the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as interim president. Shara is responsible for establishing a transitional legislature.[xxi]

Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20.[xxii] Azaz is located near the Syria-Turkey border. Security forces dismantled the VBIED.[xxiii] This is the eleventh car bomb or VBIED that has detonated or been dismantled in Syrian interim government and SNA-controlled territory in Aleppo Province since late December 2024, most recently on February 3.[xxiv] No actor or group has claimed responsibility for the recent car bomb and VBIED attacks, and it is unclear if the same actor has conducted every attack. Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media frequently claimed that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the SDF conduct these attacks, which the SDF has consistently denied.[xxv]

The PKK may have conducted some of these attacks, including the attempted car bomb attack in Azaz. Several of the attacks involved relatively advanced VBIEDs that caused high civilian casualties.[xxvi] A relatively organized cell is required to manufacture and transport such VBIEDs prior to their detonation. The PKK has historically operated in northwestern Syria, particularly in northern Aleppo Province, and some of its cells almost certainly remain in the area.[xxvii] ISIS also has some presence in northern Aleppo Province, but it has deprioritized this area in recent years and it very likely lacks the sort of well-developed safe zones required to build and deploy VBIEDs.

It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.[xxviii] Abdi, who is a relative moderate within the SDF, has also verbally agreed to eject foreign PKK fighters from Syria.[xxix] The expulsion of PKK fighters from Syria—many of whom answer to the PKK’s headquarters, not Abdi—which would both increase Abdi’s own power and help him secure a deal with Damascus.[xxx] A deliberate decision by Abdi to permit these attacks on civilians in northern Syria risks scuttling talks with Damascus and destroying the SDF project that Abdi has built since 2015.

Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned that the return of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr to Iraqi politics could threaten the seat shares of their individual parties in parliament and allow Sadr to control parliament.[xxxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose collection of Shia parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr won the most seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections and his movement nearly formed a government with Kurdish and Sunni backing before Sadr withdrew from politics in 2022.[xxxii] His withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain the majority of seats in parliament. An unspecified Sadrist source said on February 20 that Sadr will not participate in the upcoming elections regardless of whether Iraq uses an “electoral district or Saint Lague system.”[xxxiii] The Iraqi parliament has previously frequently modified the Iraqi electoral law before parliamentary elections.[xxxiv] The French Saint Lague system that Iraq used during elections between 2014 and 2020 allocated seats proportionally to Iraqi political parties in a way that often disadvantaged smaller parties.[xxxv] Iraq adopted a majoritarian system in 2020 that enabled smaller parties to win more seats in parliament.[xxxvi] Sadr’s movement won the largest number of seats in the October 2021 elections, largely due to internal competition within the Shia Coordination Framework.[xxxvii]

Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law in 2023 to return Iraq to the Saint Lague system, likely to favor larger Shia Coordination Framework parties in the October 2025 elections.[xxxviii]  State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki recently called on parliament to approve an amendment that would decrease the number of electoral districts in each province, which would further return Iraq to its pre-2020 electoral system.[xxxix] 

Maliki reportedly seeks to amend the electoral law because he is concerned that Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani will prioritize winning a second term as prime minister over ensuring that the Shia Coordination Framework retains its majority in parliament.[xl] Unidentified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani has allied politically with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors. Maliki may be concerned that Sudani’s political aspirations could lead him to further divide the Shia Coordination Framework’s support among Shia voters, which would weaken the Shia Coordination Framework against Sadr’s movement in the upcoming elections.

Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xli] Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be concerned that Sadr could call for protests if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xlii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xliii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xliv] Many of the pro-Iran factions that are part of the Shia Coordination Framework supported the Mahdi government. The fall of Mahdi‘s government led to the premiership of Mustafa al Kadhimi, whose government threatened some of the Shia Coordination Framework factions. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Rhetoric: Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Hajji Zadeh also highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”
• Syrian Constitution: The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. The Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants. This is notable given the KNC’s long-standing opposition to the SDF.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria: Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible PKK vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20. It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.
• Iraqi Elections: Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Iraqi Politics: Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Iran Update, February 19, 2025

The Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference.[i] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution, and therefore, the composition of its attendees will influence the trajectory of the post-Assad Syrian state. Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim told Turkish state media on February 19 that the Syrian interim government expects armed groups to disarm and integrate into the new Syrian army and for the political wings of these armed groups to dissolve.[ii] Daghim called out the SDF and PYD specifically, arguing that the PYD ”must be dissolved“ because the SDF “operates outside the authority of the Damascus government.”[iii] The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[iv] Daghim’s call for the PYD to ”dissolve” differs from recent reports that Turkey wants to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the PYD, to participate in the political system in Damascus.[v] Daghim confirmed that the Preparatory Committee “has not and will not communicate with the Syrian Democratic Forces or any other military group” but that the interim government is continuing to negotiate disarmament terms with the SDF.[vi] There appear to be several outstanding issues in the negotiations between the interim government and the SDF. An SDF commander stated that the SDF and AANES agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17, suggesting that figures formerly associated with the SDF could participate in the conference if the SDF dissolves before the conference.[vii]

The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions. The SDF fought Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)’s predecessor organizations and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) throughout the 2010s in Syria and had several political disagreements.[viii] The PYD, for example, did not join Syrian opposition organizations.[ix] Sunni Arab opposition groups have accused the SDF of cooperating with the Assad regime and have historically viewed the group with suspicion.[x] The Preparatory Committee is mostly comprised of pro-HTS figures who are loyal to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara. Daghim previously headed the SNA Moral Guidance Department and has previously criticized the SDF.[xi] Daghim stated on January 31 that the SDF is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[xii] Daghim nonetheless appears to be distinguishing the PYD, a dominant component of the SDF, from other Syrian components by calling for its dissolution. The SDF’s leaders, many of whom are Kurdish, are likely reluctant to integrate into an organization that includes groups that have repeatedly committed human rights abuses against Kurds. SDF leaders almost certainly recognize that ongoing Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks in northern Syria pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF and Kurds.[xiii] The SDF is therefore unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active attacks.

Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. The Shia Coordination Framework is a relatively loose alliance of several small and major Iraqi parties, some of whom could attempt to ally with Sadr prior to or after elections to improve their political positions. Iraqi media reported on February 18 that Sadr’s Shia National Movement registered to participate in the parliamentary elections.[xiv] Sadr called on his supporters to update their voter registration on February 19.[xv] Sadr’s movement withdrew from Parliament in 2022 amid political deadlock following the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[xvi] The movement’s withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to form the largest bloc in parliament. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could therefore threaten the Shia Coordination Framework’s majority in parliament, especially if he manages to co-opt smaller parties.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh al Fayyadh. The PMC is responsible for ensuring that militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) answer to the Iraqi federal government.[xvii] The Iraqi parliament is scheduled to vote on the PMF Law in its next session.[xviii] The PMF Law would force some PMF commanders and leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire due to their age. Some Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework members agreed on February 17 to add an amendment to the law that enables the Iraqi prime minister to extend the retirement age for PMF commanders and officials.[xix] This amendment would enable Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to postpone Fayyadh‘s retirement. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc reportedly seek to quickly pass the PMF Law, even if the passage of this law causes Fayyadh’s removal.[xx] Parliamentary sources told Iraqi media on February 19 that parliamentarians from the Badr Organization and Sudani oppose Fayyadh’s removal because they are concerned that a “hardline alternative” could replace Fayyadh.[xxi] It is not clear who the Badr Organization would consider a ”hardliner,” though it may be a reference to more extreme Iranian-backed groups like Kataib Hezbollah. The Shia Coordination Framework members who oppose Fayyadh also reportedly believe that the retirement of veteran PMF leaders could weaken the organization.

Fayyadh met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in Tehran on February 18, which may indicate that Fayyadh sought Iranian support to retain his position.[xxii] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s support for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely including those that operate within the PMF, during his meeting with Fayyadh.[xxiii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei similarly stated during a meeting with Sudani in Tehran in early January 2025 that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[xxiv]

Some elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel. A group calling itself the al Burhan Special Combat Force and claiming to be a part of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced its formation on February 14.[xxv] The group said that it would defend Iraqi territory and citizens from “occupation inside and outside of Iraq,” presumably a reference to the United States and Israel. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to cease attacks against US forces in January 2024. The Quds Force commander’s order caused some apparent frustration among more extreme Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, which did not ”initially agree” to the directive.[xxvi] Some Nujaba fighters may be frustrated by the failure of Iranian-backed groups to respond to reports that the Iraqi federal government may reconsider the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by the end of 2026.[xxvii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi groups similarly stopped attacks targeting Israel in November 2024 due to threats that Israel may strike Iraqi-backed groups in the country, and some fighters may be increasingly frustrated about the lack of attacks targeting Israel. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—of which Nujaba is a member—frequently said that its attacks targeted “our occupiers” in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, a clear reference to Israel.[xxviii]  Iran and its partners and proxies have claimed that Israeli intelligence organizations also operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxix] The al Burhan Special Combat Force’s reference to ”occupation” inside Iraq could refer to these organizations.

Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.[xxx] Bloomberg reported on February 18 that Iranian oil exports to China increased by 82 percent between January 1 and February 1, citing data from intelligence firm Kpler.[xxxi] Iranian oil exports to China previously peaked just before US President Donald Trump imposed “maximum pressure“ sanctions on Iran for the first time in 2018.[xxxii] Unspecified traders in the oil market told Bloomberg that Iran and China have increasingly used “ship-to-ship transfers” and “alternative receiving terminals” to confront logistical issues caused by US sanctions.[xxxiii] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on February 14 that the United States aims to reduce Iranian oil exports by more than 90 percent.[xxxiv]

Iran seeks to increase economic cooperation with Russia to mitigate the impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, but it is unclear whether this cooperation will meaningfully improve Iranian economic conditions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin met with Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on February 18 to discuss monetary and banking cooperation.[xxxv] The officials will discuss exchange rates and the implementation of the second and third phases of the Mir-Shetab banking system.[xxxvi] Iran and Russia implemented the first phase of the Mir-Shetab system in November 2024 to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[xxxvii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in Tehran on February 18 to discuss the implementation of the Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement.[xxxviii] Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh and Russian Transport Minister Roman Vladimirovich Starovoyt also signed the 2025 Roadmap for Transport and Transit Cooperation in Tehran on February 18.[xxxix] The agreement includes the completion of the Rasht-Astara Railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[xl] Iran and Russia have discussed the construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway for several years, and it is unclear whether this agreement will accelerate the construction of the railway.[xli]

The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19.[xlii] The sources denied Iraqi media reports that the Syrian interim government asked Iran to resume relations. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Constitution: The Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference. The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions.
• Shia Iraqi Politics: Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh al Fayyadh.
• Iraqi Militia Friction: Some elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel.
• Iranian Oil Exports: Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.
• Syrian Stabilization: The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.

Iran Update, February 18, 2025

NOTE: CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.   

A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17.[i] A commander within the Northern Democratic Brigade—a faction of the SDF—said that the SDF, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Council (SDF) agreed to merge SDF and AANES-affiliated security forces into the Syrian army after discussion on February 17 about negotiations with Damascus.[ii] The SDF reportedly agreed to several conditions, including to remove non-Syrian fighters from the SDF’s ranks.[iii] SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said in a February 18 interview with Kurdish media that the Syrian government also requested that the SDF transfer certain security issues to the Syrian state, including control over ISIS prisons.[iv] Abdi said that the SDF was ”open to cooperation” in these fields but did not explicitly specify whether the SDF had agreed to the conditions.[v] Non-Syrian fighters within the SDF likely primarily refer to foreign Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters operating within northern Syria. Abdi recently confirmed that these fighters had come to Syria to support the SDF’s fight against ISIS and reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from Syria if the SDF, Turkey, and Turkish-backed forces reached a ceasefire in northern Syria.[vi] Turkey, which has worked with the Syrian government to pressure the SDF to disarm, has long demanded that the SDF expel PKK members from its ranks, although it has often conflated the two and has also, in effect called for the SDF’s destruction.[vii]

There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively. Abdi said that there are still disagreements between Damascus and the SDF, though the two parties have continued to prepare suitable preconditions for negotiations.[viii] Abdi or the Syrian government have not yet publicly agreed on the specific mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Defense Ministry. Abdi’s demand that the SDF integrate as a ”bloc” was one of the main sticking points of negotiations in the past two months, and it is unclear if either side has relaxed their views on this issue.[ix]  Abdi’s public congratulations to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on assuming the presidency and invitation for Shara to visit northeastern Syria suggests that the SDF continues to be willing to engage positively with the Syrian government.[x]

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is under tremendous pressure from internal SDF rivals, external Kurdish rivals, longtime enemies, and his allies to integrate with the Damascus government. This pressure appears to be pushing the SDF to gradually moderate its demands. The reported SDF decision to merge itself into the Syrian army comes after weeks of SDF insistence that it would only integrate as a “bloc,” indicating that either Damascus, Abdi, or both parties moderated their demands.[xi] Senior Syrian officials have maintained that the state was considering the use of military action against the SDF if it continued to refuse to disarm.[xii] Turkey, which has continued to cultivate a significant strategic relationship with Damascus since the fall of Assad, has combined military threats with political persuasion through the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to compel Abdi to moderate his demands.[xiii] The KDP could calculate that cooperation with Abdi would provide an opportunity to re-establish the position of its Syrian wing, which has long had little influence due to the supremacy of the SDF and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), of which Abdi is a member. The United States—the SDF’s key supporter—also supports negotiations between the SDF and Damascus.[xiv]

Abdi probably sees an opportunity to avoid a major conflict with Damascus and solidify his own position, though he presumably recognizes that integration with the Syrian army is fraught with risk given the outstanding issues outlined above. Abdi’s rivals in the SDF, who include hardliners like Alder Khalil, oppose a deal with Damascus.[xv] Abdi could believe that by allying his wing of the SDF with other Kurdish elements and Damascus, he may be able to sideline the hardliners and force them from Syria. Alder Khalil, who is reportedly the leader of the PYD, would likely be one of the PKK members expelled from Syria under a deal.[xvi] It is unclear how Damascus or the SDF would actually expel the PKK, however, and whether the PKK would fight the decision without a call from PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm.

The Iraqi Central Bank reportedly banned five local banks from US dollar transactions to combat money laundering and smuggling.[xvii] The Iraqi Central Bank may have banned these banks under US pressure. Unidentified sources told Reuters on February 16 that the bans followed a recent meeting between Central Bank officials and US Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, suggesting the Iraqi officials may be reacting to US pressure. The Iraqi Central Bank denied on February 16 that any Iraqi banks are subject to ”international sanctions.”[xviii] Iraqi banks have historically facilitated money transfers that support Axis of Resistance operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-Damascus Negotiations: A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17. There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively.
• SDF Negotiating Position: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is under tremendous pressure from internal SDF rivals, external Kurdish rivals, longtime enemies, and his allies to integrate with the Damascus government. This pressure appears to be pushing the SDF to gradually moderate its demands. Abdi probably sees an opportunity to avoid a major conflict with Damascus and solidify his own position, though he presumably recognizes that integration with the Syrian army is fraught with risk given the outstanding issues regarding integration.
• Iraqi Financial System and Iranian-backed Militias: The Iraqi Central Bank reportedly banned five local banks from US dollar transactions to combat money laundering and smuggling. The Iraqi Central Bank may have banned these banks under US pressure.

Iran Update, February 17, 2025

Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[i]  The sources said that Russia is “close” to a deal that would keep at least some staff and equipment in Syria.[ii] One of the sources said that Russia hopes to keep the same air and naval bases that it used prior to the fall of Bashar al Assad, likely referring to Hmeimim airbase and the naval base at Tartus.[iii] Russia also previously held several other airbases within central and northern Syria, including a helicopter base in Qamishli, though it is unclear whether the agreement will cover these sites. Russian forces have fully evacuated all their former positions in Syria except for Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.[iv] Other forces, such as the Syrian interim government or US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have taken many of these bases following Russian forces’ evacuation.[v]

The tone of engagement between Russia and the Syrian interim government has notably become more cooperative in recent weeks, which supports the sources’ claims that Russia may be nearing an agreement with Syria. Shara emphasized Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[vi] Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra recently suggested that Syria could allow Russia to retain air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[vii] It is not clear what “benefits“ Russia may be offering Syria in current negotiations. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 in a gesture that likely sought to foster goodwill with the Syrian government.[viii] This gesture followed Syrian officials’ demands that Russia pay its debts to the Syrian state and Putin’s offer to Shara to assist with Syria’s economy.[ix]

Unspecified sources also told Bloomberg that Russia could help with the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS efforts.[x] It is unclear based on this comment whether the Syrian interim government has discussed Russian forces re-deploying to Syria to fight against ISIS. The Syrian interim government is likely eager to obtain manpower to assist in counter-ISIS operations as the government contends with the political and material realities of forming and training the new Syrian army. Russian participation in the Assad regime campaign against ISIS failed to effectively degrade ISIS in Syria, however. Russian aircraft proved to be far more capable in targeting Syrian opposition groups on behalf of the regime than it was targeting ISIS.[xi] The scale of a future Russian deployment to Syria would impact the success of any Russian counter-ISIS operations, and it is unclear if a ”reduced” military presence would be any more effective against ISIS than Russian forces were at the height of Russian deployments to Syria. US CENTCOM recently announced in July 2024 that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute in Syria following several years of decreased capability.[xii] Russia would by no means provide a suitable replacement for the United States or SDF in counter-ISIS operations in the face of ISIS reconstitution efforts.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it will remain indefinitely in five strategically significant positions in southern Lebanon after withdrawing from all other positions on February 18.[xiii] Israeli Army Radio reported on February 17 that the IDF has built sites at these five positions and will remain there even as the IDF leaves most other areas of southern Lebanon in accordance with the ceasefire with Lebanon.[xiv] The United States approved Israel to hold these positions, which are:[xv]

1. Sulam Ridge, south of Labbouneh, Lebanon. Sulam Ridge overlooks the Israeli town of Shlomi.[xvi]
2. Jabal Blat, northwest of Ramyeh, Lebanon. Jabal Blat overlooks Shtula and Zarit.[xvii]
3. Shaked Ridge, south of Aitaroun, Lebanon. Shaked Ridge is north of Avivim and Malkia.[xviii]
4. Tzivoni Ridge, between Houla and Markaba, Lebanon. Tzivoni Ridge is west of Margaliot.[xix]
5. Tal al Hamamis, south of Khiam, Lebanon. Tal al Hamamis overlooks Khiam, Kfar Kila, and Metula.[xx]

Holding these positions would distribute the IDF across the border from east to west and enable the IDF to monitor territory that it previously cleared. This would in turn help prevent Lebanese Hezbollah fighters from approaching the border and reduces the threat of Hezbollah ground or short-range attacks into Israel.

The IDF stated that it is “preparing for a long stay” at these positions until Hezbollah is no longer south of the Litani River.[xxi] The IDF has repeatedly criticized the failure of the Lebanese Armed Forces to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons south of the Litani River and has emphasized that the IDF will continue to act against threats from Hezbollah.[xxii]  The IDF told Israeli Army Radio that Hezbollah infrastructure has been “completely destroyed” in areas about five to eight kilometers from the border where the IDF has operated.[xxiii] The area is also clear of a “high percentage” of weapons, according to the IDF.[xxiv]

The IDF is separately building defensive positions in front of border towns in northern Israel.[xxv] The IDF will triple the pre-war number of troops deployed along the border.[xxvi]

Hezbollah appears unwilling to confront the IDF militarily in the short-term, as Hezbollah prioritizes reconstituting. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem declared that the IDF must withdraw from Lebanon fully by the ceasefire expiration on February 18 and that the IDF had "no pretext" to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon.[xxvii] Qassem demanded that the Lebanese state take a “firm and decisive” position against the Israeli presence in Lebanon but notably did not threaten to resume attacks.[xxviii] Qassem likely aims to avoid engaging Israeli forces or attacking Israel for the moment, as Hezbollah helps rebuild and reconstitute its forces. Qassem would very likely become more willing to attack the IDF, as Hezbollah regains strength.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Bloomberg reported that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to retain a reduce military presence in Syria.
• Lebanon: The IDF announced plans to remain indefinitely at five locations in southern Lebanon, as the IDF withdraws from most other positions.

Iran Update, February 13, 2025

The newly-appointed Syrian Preparatory Committee provided some details about how it plans to select representatives to attend the National Dialogue Conference.  This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution, and therefore, the composition of its attendees will influence the trajectory of the post-Assad Syrian state.[i] The Preparatory Committee is mostly comprised of pro-Hayat Tahrir al Sham figures who are loyal to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara.[ii] Preparatory Committee member and spokesperson Hassan al Daghim said on February 13 that armed groups will not be allowed to participate in the conference.[iii] This condition most notably bars the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from participating in the conference but also bars southern Syrian armed groups, including the Southern Operations Room (SOR) and the Druze Men of Dignity militia, from participating. The Men of Dignity and SOR have not disarmed but have reportedly made progress toward doing so during negotiations with the interim government.[iv] The SDF is also negotiating with the interim Defense Ministry, but CTP-ISW assesses that the SDF is unlikely to give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active Turkish-backed attacks by disarming.[v] The SDF’s likely refusal to disarm does not preclude other Kurdish groups from participating in the conference, such as the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[vi]

It remains unclear how the Preparatory Committee will ensure the diversity of conference attendees. The committee is comprised of five males and two females and does not appear to include representatives of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Shia communities.[vii] The committee announced that “citizens” in each province will choose “national figures capable of representing the interests” of their province to participate in the National Dialogue Conference.[viii] This selection method could underrepresent minority groups in provinces with significant minority populations, including Aleppo, Homs, and Hama if the “citizens” who select “national figures” do not sufficiently represent minority ethnic and religious groups. The committee reiterated Shara’s opposition to quota systems that would ensure minority representation but promised that it would take “diversity into account.”[ix] The committee has not set a date for the National Dialogue Conference and noted that the interim government has delayed the conference several times.[x]  

Iran likely pressured members of the Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework to support the General Amnesty Law in order to prevent conflict between Shia and Sunni parties in Iraq. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Parliament passed the General Amnesty Law on January 21, after which some parliamentarians, including members of the Shia Coordination Framework, submitted lawsuits to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of the January 21 parliament session.[xi] The Federal Supreme Court rejected the lawsuits on February 11. The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis, who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[xii] Iran reportedly warned unspecified Iraqi officials not to “anger partners” in the country, possibly referring to Sunni parties.[xiii]  Most members of the Shia Coordination Framework agreed to support the approval of the General Amnesty Law to “unify ranks” and avoid “provoking the Sunnis” after the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, according to unspecified political sources speaking to Iraqi media on February 13.[xiv] Iraqi media previously reported that some Iraqi Shia political parties are concerned about potential Sunni discord in Iraq following the overthrow of Assad by primarily Sunni groups in Syria in December 2024.[xv]

Iranian-backed Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki has continued to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law despite Iranian pressure and the rest of the Shia Coordination Framework's consensus to implement the law. Maliki described the January 21 parliament session as “incorrect” and warned on February 10 that previous unspecified violations of the Iraqi constitution caused “deterioration and bloodshed” in Iraq.[xvi] Maliki recently made anti-Sunni sectarian statements on February 1. Maliki emphasized that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” in reference to the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law.[xvii] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian submitted a new lawsuit against the General Amnesty Law to the Federal Supreme Court on February 11.[xviii] Another Shia Coordination Framework-aligned parliamentarian said on February 11 that Federal Supreme Court President Jassem Mohammad Abboud disagreed with the majority decision to reject the recent lawsuits against the General Amnesty Law.[xix] Abboud is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization and Maliki.[xx] Abboud’s reported support for the lawsuits could suggest that Abboud is closer to Maliki than the Badr Organization, although it is unclear to what extent the Badr Organization has complied with Iranian requests to support the General Amnesty Law. The Higher Judicial Council in Iraq also ignored the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to place a pause on the law as it reviewed the law’s constitutionality, which suggests that Higher Judicial Council chief Faiq Zaidan remains beholden to pro-Iranian militias rather than Maliki.[xxi]

Israel and Hamas reportedly reached an agreement on February 13 to continue the implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement.  Egyptian and Qatari mediators said on February 12 that they succeeded in preventing a breakdown of the ceasefire agreement.[xxii] Hamas agreed to release three Israeli hostages on February 15 after mediators confirmed that Israel would allow the entry of tents and engineering equipment into the Gaza Strip.[xxiii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the ceasefire agreement requires Israel to permit the entry of these materials to enable the construction of makeshift housing for Gazans and the removal of rubble.[xxiv] Several trailers and trucks loaded with heavy machinery gathered near the Rafah border crossing on February 13.[xxv] Hamas announced on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, citing alleged Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement.[xxvi] Israel responded by threatening to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxvii]

Iran Update, February 12, 2025

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[i] The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives. Shara announced on January 30 that he would form a preparatory committee to facilitate “deliberations” and “consultations” about the National Dialogue Conference.[ii] The National Dialogue Conference will reportedly represent all segments of Syrian society and facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[iii] It is unclear what role the preparatory committee will play in organizing and overseeing the conference. Shara also stated on January 30 that the Syrian interim government would unveil a “Constitutional Declaration” after the formation of a preparatory committee.[iv] The preparatory committee is comprised of five males and two females and does not appear to include representatives of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Shia communities. The committee includes the following individuals:

• Yousef al Hajer: Hajer is from al Shuhail, Deir ez Zor Province, which was a Jabhat al Nusra stronghold until ISIS declared the formation of a caliphate in June 2014.[v] Hajar was injured in an April 2024 attack that targeted Abu Maria al Qahtani, one of the founders of Jabhat al Nusra.[vi] Hajer previously served as the head of the HTS Political Bureau and as a member of the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Shura Council in northwestern Syria.[vii]
• Hassan al Daghim: Daghim is Sunni and previously headed the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SNA) Moral Guidance Department.[viii] Daghim and other SNA members met with Shara in late December 2024 to discuss the integration of armed groups into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[ix] Daghim stated on January 31 that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[x] Daghim was previously a strong critic of Shara but reconciled with Shara in 2024.[xi]
• Hind Qabawat: Qabawat is a Christian who has spent years promoting interfaith tolerance, women’s rights, and conflict resolution in Syria.[xii] Qabawat serves as the director of interfaith peacebuilding at George Mason University’s Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. Qabawat is also a member of the High Negotiations Committee for Syria in Geneva. Qabawat founded the Syrian Center for Dialogue, Peace, and Reconciliation in Toronto.
• Maher Alloush: Alloush is Sunni and close to Ahrar al Sham, which is an Islamist opposition group that has been close to HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[xiii] Alloush previously mediated an internal dispute in Ahrar al Sham that resulted in the appointment of Abu Obeida as leader of Ahram al Sham in January 2019.[xiv] Alloush met with Shara in December 2024.[xv]
• Mustafa Musa: Musa is a member of HTS and served as the head of the SSG Shura Council from April 2020 until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xvi] Musa, who is a trained pharmacist, also previously headed the SSG Shura Council health committee.[xvii]
• Mohammad Mastat: Mastat previously served as the director of primary healthcare in the SSG Health Ministry.[xviii] Mastat is affiliated with Faylaq al Sham, which is a Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Islamist militia that has been a longtime HTS partner.[xix]
• Huda al Attasi: Attasi is a Turkish citizen and is the co-founder and director of International Humanitarian Relief.[xx] Attasi has spent years helping Syrian women, orphans, and displaced individuals. Attasi is a founding member of the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity, which advocates for the rights of displaced Syrians.[xxi]

The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with southern military commanders Naseem Abu Ara and Ali Bash in Damascus on February 12.[xxii] Ali Bash is the deputy of Ahmed al Awda, the current Southern Operations Room commander who previously led the Eighth Brigade, a group comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime and reorganized themselves as the ”Eighth Brigade.”[xxiii] Abu Ara is an Eighth Brigade commander.[xxiv] An unspecified source told southern Syria-based media that Abu Ara and Bash agreed to hold future meetings with Damascus to ”follow up” on steps to integrate Southern Operations Room fighters into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Qasra recently told the Wall Street Journal that Awda had resisted attempts to bring his units under the Defense Ministry.[xxv] Abu Ara denied Qasra’s allegations in a video statement on February 10 and argued that the people of the south were among the first to call for the Defense Ministry’s establishment.[xxvi] Qasra’s meeting with Abu Ara and Ali Bash suggests that southern leaders, such as Awda, will continue to discuss their integration into the Defense Ministry, although it does not appear that Awda or his subordinates have made any explicit commitments.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.[xxvii] The government forces deployed to “contain tensions” following the murder of a Syrian man in al Thaala.[xxviii] This is the Syrian government’s first official deployment in Suwayda Province.[xxix] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Men of Dignity Movement--a prominent Druze militia based in Suwayda--has thus far prevented the entry of HTS-led forces into Suwayda Province.[xxx] The head of the Men of Dignity Movement, Sheikh Abu Hassan Yahya al Hajjar, announced that the movement will cooperate with the Interior Ministry’s new police and security forces.[xxxi] It is unclear if Damascus and the Men of Dignity or another group coordinated the deployment of the Military Operations Department. The Syrian interim government likely seeks to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents by showing its abilities to ensure security in the region, however.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria. The Kremlin reported that Putin and Shara discussed recent negotiations over Russian basing rights in Syria between the Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[xxxii] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government.[xxxiii] It does not appear that Shara’s call with Putin led to any agreement on Russia's continued military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus. The direct communication between Shara and Putin, however, suggests that the Syrian interim government will continue to attempt to maintain a relationship with the Russian government and that negotiations over Russia’s presence in Syria have not concluded. Senior Syrian officials have adopted a more positive position towards Russia in recent days, even as Russian forces have continued to withdraw from Syrian territory.[xxxiv] Shara stressed Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during the phone call with Putin, according to an official Syrian government report, and Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu recently suggested that Syria is open to Russian air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[xxxv]  Syrian officials’ public posture towards Russia suggests that Syria will continue to engage with Russia, particularly as Syrian officials hope Western countries will lift sanctions imposed upon the Assad regime. Putin stressed the need to lift economic sanctions on Syria during the call, echoing a recent call from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and North Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on several unspecified countries to lift all unilateral sanctions imposed on Syria.[xxxvi] Syria could use its continued engagement with Russia as leverage with the West as Syria attempts to secure sanctions relief from the West.

Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[xxxvii] Unspecified Egyptian sources told Reuters that Qatar and Egypt discussed efforts to prevent the collapse of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire on February 12.[xxxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened on February 11 to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip after Hamas said it would postpone the planned release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would violate the ceasefire.[xxxix] A third IDF division entered the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, and the IDF recalled reservists as part of preparations for resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.[xl] Israeli officials have indicated that Israel will continue to meet its obligations under the first phase of the ceasefire if Hamas releases Israeli hostages on February 15, however.[xli]

Jordanian King Abdullah II agreed to accept 2,000 sick Gazan children but refused to host additional Palestinian refugees during a meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on January 11.[xlii] King Abdullah II stated that "everyone“ should prioritize rebuilding the Gaza Strip.[xliii] Egypt and Jordan are developing a plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip without relocating Gazans.[xliv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Transition: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara. The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives.
• Syrian Defense Ministry: The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.
• Syria-Russia Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.
• Gaza Strip: Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.

Iran Update, February 11, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15.[i] Netanyahu made this announcement after he convened a security cabinet meeting on February 11 to discuss the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[ii] Hamas stated on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[iii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 10 to prepare for any “possible scenario” in the Gaza Strip.[iv] The IDF deployed its 252nd Division to the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, bringing the total number of divisions there to three.[v] Hamas could use the remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again if the IDF resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on February 10 that Hamas’ decision to postpone the release of hostages is a “warning” to Israel.[vi] Hamdan claimed that Hamas will comply with its ceasefire obligations so long as Israel fulfills its obligations. This statement seeks to preemptively blame any breakdown in the ceasefire on an alleged Israeli failure to fulfill its ceasefire obligations. Hamas has, however, itself violated the ceasefire agreement by postponing the release of Israeli hostages.

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[vii] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, the Personal Status Law, and the Property Restitution Law on February 4 after several parliamentarians, including members of the Iranian-backed State of Law Coalition, submitted lawsuits to the Federal Supreme Court.[viii] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[ix] The Federal Supreme Court’s rejection of the lawsuits is notable given that the court has historically delivered rulings in favor of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[x]

Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” in reference to the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law.[xi] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri has also previously expressed strong opposition to the General Amnesty Law.[xii] These Iranian-backed militia leaders’ statements about the General Amnesty Law suggest that they will strongly challenge the Federal Supreme Court ruling.

The recent Federal Supreme Court ruling highlights existing fissures between the various judicial institutions in Iraq. The Supreme Judicial Council, which is constitutionally responsible for managing Iraqi courts, supervising judges, and forming policies to govern judicial operations, rejected on February 5 the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty, Personal Status, and Property Restitution laws.[xiii] The Court of Cassation, which legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, reportedly overturned the Federal Supreme Court’s February 4 decision on February 10.[xiv] The Supreme Judicial Council is led by Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zayden.[xv] Federal Supreme Court head Judge Jasem Mohammad Abbood is tied to the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization and Maliki.[xvi]

Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 8 that the United Ninewa Bloc attempted to remove Ninewa Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed al Hasoud.[xvii] The United Ninewa Bloc is an alliance of Sunni parties that includes the Azm Alliance (led by Muthanna al Samarrai), Sovereignty Alliance (led by Khamis al Khanjar), and Progress Party (led by Mohammad al Halbousi).[xviii] Hasoud is a member of the National Contract Bloc, which is led by Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[xix] The Ninewa Future Bloc, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, opposed the efforts to remove Hasoud.[xx] Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish groups have long vied for control in Ninewa Province. Sunni and Kurdish residents have long been resentful of Shia groups’ presence and influence in areas of the province. The Popular Mobilization Forces control some positions along the border between Syria and Ninewa Province.[xxi]

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar to discuss developments in Iraq and KRG-Iraqi federal government relations on February 8.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15. Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling.
• Iraq: Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq.

Iran Update, February 10, 2025

Hamas said on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[i] Hamas likely aims to retain its hostages as leverage in negotiations. Hamas’ military wing spokesperson claimed that Israel violated the ceasefire agreement by delaying the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, targeting them with gunfire, and restricting the flow of aid into the Gaza Strip.[ii] These claims are misleading. Israel delayed the movement of Gazans to the northern strip in January 2025 because Hamas did not release a female civilian hostage before releasing female soldier hostages, as required under the ceasefire agreement.[iii] Israeli forces have fired warning shots at Palestinians, but warning shots are a normal part of most escalation-of-force procedures in professional militaries.[iv] Israel has also provided at least an average of 555 aid trucks per day to Gazans, which is an increase from 70 trucks per day in early January 2025, before the ceasefire.[v] Israel has responded to Hamas’ threat to violate the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare for any “possible scenario” in the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas’ ceasefire violations.[vi]

Hamas likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to pressure Israel and the United States to move forward with the second phase of negotiations.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously indicated that Israel is willing to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip and added that Israel will “continue the war until Hamas no longer holds sway in Gaza.”[vii] Hamas may calculate that by retaining the hostages, it can increase domestic Israeli pressure on the Israeli government to continue negotiations and reach a permanent ceasefire. Hamas would be able to use these remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again in the future.

This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza. Hamas has repeatedly presented itself as the defender of the Palestinian people and as the government of Gaza. Hamas, were it negotiating as a government or as a defender of its people, would seek to exchange the hostages in return for a stop to the fighting and the release of humanitarian aid in order to help Palestinians. Hamas is using the hostages as leverage to secure its own survival, however. The UN reported that Israel has allowed “over” 10,000 aid trucks into the strip since January 19.[viii] This means that Israel provided an average of more than 555 aid trucks to enter the strip daily between January 19 and February 6, according to the United Nations.[ix] The ceasefire requires Israel to allow 600 trucks into the Strip a day, which would require Israel to send 10,800 trucks into the Strip between January 19 and February 6.[x] The daily average of 555 aid trucks is 55 trucks more than Israel allowed to enter the strip prior to October 7, 2023, and an increase of nearly 500 trucks daily compared to November 2024, however.[xi]

US President Donald Trump said on February 10 that the United States will “build a permanent place” for Gazans outside the Gaza Strip.[xii] Trump added that he will negotiate with Jordan and Egypt to accept Gazan refugees even though both countries have rejected the proposal.[xiii] The Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced on February 9 that Egypt will host an emergency Arab League summit on February 27 in Cairo to discuss “new and dangerous developments” following Trump’s statement on Gaza.[xiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also called for an emergency Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in separate phone calls with OIC Secretary General Hussein Ibrahim Taha, and the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Malaysian foreign ministers on February 9 and 10.[xv]

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on February 10 that restructured legislation that provided payments to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank who were arrested by Israeli forces or died while conducting an attack.[xvi] The restructured legislation will provide social welfare funding to Palestinians based on socio-economic status rather than allowances based on “prisoner or martyr” status.[xvii] This legislation formerly provided payment to Palestinian fighters arrested by Israeli security forces based on the length of their prison sentence.[xviii] Various Israeli and American administrations referred to this system as “pay-to-slay.“[xix] A Palestinian official told Axios that the decree transfers the cash assistance program, database, and allocations from the PA Ministry of Social Development to the Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment, an ”independent institution” focused on reducing poverty and addressing unemployment.[xx] Abbas founded the organization in 2019.

Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10.[xxi] These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.[xxii] President Masoud Pezeshkian, who similarly signaled his openness to negotiations with the West, also indicated his alignment with Khamenei‘s stance.[xxiii]  Senior political officials and Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders also condemned US President Donald Trump‘s “maximum pressure“ policy towards Iran and dismissed any potential US and Israeli ”threats” to Iran.[xxiv] The coalescence of top regime officials on the nuclear issue, including those previously supportive of negotiations, follows The Telegraph’s report on February 8, which stated that senior Iranian military leaders have been urging Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas said that it will postpone the release of Israeli hostages on February 10, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Hamas likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to pressure Israel and the United States to move forward with the second phase of negotiations. This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza.
• West Bank: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on February 10 that restructured legislation that provided payments to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank who were arrested by Israeli forces or died while conducting an attack.
• Iran: Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10. These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.

Iran Update, February 9, 2025

Senior Iranian military leaders have urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon, according to an unspecified Iranian official speaking to the Telegraph.[i] The article reported that the military leaders have previously supported Khamenei’s policy against nuclear weapons but now feel that they are faced with an “existential threat” since US President Donald Trump entered office. The unspecified Iranian official said that “we have never been this vulnerable, and it may be our last change to obtain [a nuclear weapon] before its too late.” The official added that the Khamenei’s decisions to forbid nuclear weapons and negotiations with the United States is “driving the regime toward collapse.”[ii] The official claimed that Iran has been “just a few button presses away from building a nuclear weapon for some time now.”[iii] This article follows the New York Times reporting that Iranian scientists are exploring how to build a crude nuclear weapon quickly.[iv] These reports are consistent with CTP-ISW assessment that Iran has restarted its nuclear weapons research but has not yet made a deliberate effort to build a weapon.

Khamenei's Foreign Affairs Advisor Kamal Kharrazi previously told the Financial Times in July 2024 that Iran was open to pursuing nuclear weaponization if faced with ”an existential threat.”[v] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Aragchi alluded to the ”heated debate” on whether to build a nuclear weapon on January 28, when Araghchi threatened pursuing one if the E3 triggered snapback sanctions before October 2025.[vi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) completed its withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor in the Gaza Strip on February 9 as part of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement with Hamas.[vii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF withdrew from the eastern sector of the Netzarim Corridor to the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[viii] The IDF began withdrawing from the corridor on January 27 to allow Gazans to return via established routes to the northern Gaza Strip.[ix] Hamas released three Israeli hostages on February 8 as part of its own ceasefire obligations.[x] 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military leaders have urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon, according to an unspecified Iranian official.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF completed its withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor in the Gaza Strip as part of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement with Hamas.
• Syria: An SNA commander claimed that his forces captured Tishreen Dam but withdrew in response to commands from higher headquarters.

Iran Update, February 6, 2025

Many of the most prominent Iraqi Sunni political parties have emphasized the need for political action to achieve long-standing Sunni political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. A member of the Progress Party, which is led by former Parliament Speaker and key Sunni politician Mohammad al Halbousi, warned on February 5 that the Progress Party could boycott parliament in response to the recent Iraqi Federal Supreme Court decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[i] The Federal Supreme Court, which is responsible for interpreting the constitution and determining the constitutionality of laws and regulations, temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 3. This law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law. The Progress Party holds 39 seats in parliament, which is far below the number of seats needed to block a quorum.[ii] A Progress Party-affiliated adviser to the Anbar Provincial Council similarly called on Sunni parliamentarians to boycott the political process and start “large” demonstrations in response to the Federal Supreme Court decision.[iii]

These statements come after the Sunni Azm Alliance called on February 5 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[iv]  Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly-formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition.[v] Halbousi is not a member of this new Sunni political coalition, and the United Sunni Leadership Coalition appears to be an alternative Sunni political party to Halbousi’s Progress Party.  It is therefore notable that both the Progress Party and parts of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition have called for political action to protest the Federal Supreme Court decision. Some Sunni politicians have accused State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki of pushing the Federal Supreme Court to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[vi] Maliki previously used the court to target political opposition, particularly Sunnis, during his term as prime minister between May 2006 and September 2014.[vii] Maliki’s rumored involvement in the Federal Supreme Court decision is consistent with recent sectarian, anti-Sunni statements he has made.[viii] Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” about the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed actors have claimed that the General Amnesty Law would release ”terrorists” and ”murderers” into society to try to prevent the approval and implementation of this law. [ix]

There are early indications of fissures between Iran-backed Shia political parties and figures ahead of the parliamentary elections in October 2025. Iraqi media reported on February 6 that the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework appears “divided” due to an ongoing dispute between Maliki and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[x] The dispute is reportedly over Maliki’s outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework and the removal of the Dhi Qar governor, who is a member of Hakim’s party. Iraqi media reported on January 30 that Hakim has boycotted several Shia Coordination Framework meetings because Maliki orchestrated the removal of the Dhi Qar governor.[xi] Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on February 6 that Shia Coordination Framework members discussed unifying Shia factions and resolving tensions with Hakim on February 5.[xii] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani reportedly convinced Hakim to resume his participation in Shia Coordination Framework meetings in return for the appointment of Hakim-backed figures to government positions.

Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. Interim government security forces deployed to Afrin and Jandairis, north of Aleppo, on February 6.[xiii] The SNA has controlled and administered these areas since 2018.[xiv]  Kurdish media claimed that the interim government would take control of SNA territory and dismantle barracks and other military infrastructure in the area.[xv]  Interim government-affiliated Public Security forces deployed to checkpoints near the entrances to Manbij, Aleppo Province, on February 5, demonstrating that the deployment of interim government forces extends across SNA-controlled territory.[xvi]

These interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. It is unclear how extensive the integration of armed groups across Syria will be or the pace at which this integration will occur. It is also unclear to what extent groups that integrate into the Defense Ministry will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures. Syrian media circulated reports on February 3 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed two SNA leaders as division commanders within the new Syrian armed forces.[xvii]  It is unclear if these commanders will recruit their divisions directly from their militias. The Syrian interim government said that it dissolved all former rebel and armed groups, including factions of the SNA, on January 29, but the fact that SNA groups continue to fight against the SDF along the Euphrates River suggests that the SNA groups have been dissolved in name only.[xviii] The interim government deployments come after Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[xix] Turkey closely coordinates with and provides air support to the SNA. Shara and Erdogan may have discussed the integration of SNA factions into the new Syrian armed forces.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.[xx] Katz said that the plan will include “special arrangements” for Gazans to relocate to “any country willing to receive them" via air, sea, or land. Katz discussed the plan with senior Israeli defense officials, including IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi.[xxi] Katz’s statement comes after US President Donald Trump suggested that Gazans should relocate to Egypt and Jordan.[xxii]

US President Donald Trump said on February 6 that the Gaza Strip should be “turned over” to the United States by Israel after the “conclusion of fighting.”[xxiii] Trump suggested that Gazans could relocate to other areas in the Middle East while the United States rebuilds the Gaza Strip. Trump said that no US troops would participate in this plan.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Politics: Many of the most prominent Iraqi Sunni political parties have emphasized the need for political action to achieve long-standing Sunni political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is attempting to block Sunni political action, which has caused some Sunni political parties to threaten additional political moves, including demonstrations.
• Control of Syria: Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. These interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. US President Donald Trump said on February 6 that the Gaza Strip should be “turned over” to the United States by Israel after the “conclusion of fighting.”

Iran Update, February 5, 2025

Iran is downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that the maximum pressure policy is a “failed experiment” in response to US President Donald Trump announcing on February 4 his intent to re-enforce extensive sanctions on Iran.[i] Senior Iranian officials separately expressed willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations, emphasizing the Iranian policy against building and using nuclear weapons. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami similarly said that Iran has no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[ii] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on February 5 that Iran is ready to give the United States a chance to resolve disputes.[iii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran negotiates with the West or tries to build a nuclear weapon, however. Trump said on February 5 that he would like to pursue a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Iran “immediately.”[iv]                

Reuters reported on February 5 that Trump ordered his administration to work with allies to "complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran,” likely referring to discussions with the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran.[v] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[vi] The E3 previously stated that it is prepared to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[vii] The E3 has until October 2025 to do so.[viii]

The US Defense Department is preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria.[ix] No order has been given to proceed with the withdrawal at the time of this writing, however. A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami said on February 5 that ISIS is waiting for a US withdrawal to reactivate and restore its physical so-called ”caliphate.”[x] Shami confirmed that the SDF had received no warning from the United States about plans to withdraw.[xi]

A US withdrawal from Syria would very likely create opportunities for ISIS to rebuild itself in northeastern Syria in particular. The United States provides critical functions that enable the SDF to secure detention facilities in northeastern Syria that hold 10,000 ISIS fighters, whom US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla has called “an ISIS army-in-waiting.”[xii] A US withdrawal from Syria would significantly increase the likelihood that the SDF would be unable to secure these ISIS fighters due to pressure from Turkey and Turkish-backed forces. The distraction and chaos caused by a US withdrawal from northeastern Syria would provide ISIS an opening to launch a major attack against some of these detention facilities. ISIS attacked al Sinaa Prison—a detention facility in southern Hasakah City—in January 2022 and freed up to 300 ISIS fighters.[xiii] Some of these fighters infiltrated back to regime-held areas in the central Syrian desert, which likely spurred an increase in attacks in the central Syrian desert in early 2023.[xiv] 

Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party leader Mohamed al Halbousi called for “massive demonstrations” on February 4 to protest the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[xv] The Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law and two other laws that the Iraqi Parliament passed on January 21 in order to determine the constitutionality of the laws.[xvi] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[xvii] The Anbar, Salah al Din, and Ninewa provincial governors and Kirkuk Provincial Council chairman suspended work in protest of the court decision.[xviii] Multiple independent Iraqi parliamentarians urged Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to ask Parliament to remove the provincial governors due to their “rebellion.”[xix] The Sunni Azm Alliance party separately called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution on February 5.[xx] The Azm Alliance added that a referendum on unspecified amendments should occur on the same day as the parliamentary elections. The Iraqi constitution stipulates two alternate mechanisms for adding constitutional amendments that both require a vote in Parliament and a public referendum.[xxi] Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition that called for the Sudani administration to implement nine longstanding Sunni demands on January 18.[xxii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia officials are continuing to use inflammatory and sectarian rhetoric in response to these Sunni demands. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, compared the people “attacking” the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to those who “brought down a third of Iraq,” likely referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[xxiii] Walai’s rhetoric mirrors Iranian-backed Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s anti-Sunni sectarian statements on February 1.[xxiv] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government. The Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework has expressed support for the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[xxv]

US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC on February 4 in order to discuss Iran, Israeli-Saudi normalization, and the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xxvi] Trump later said in a joint press conference that the United States would “take over” and “own” the Gaza Strip and rebuild it.[xxvii] Trump added that the United States will clear destroyed infrastructure and remove unexploded ordinance. Trump also suggested that Egypt and Jordan could accept Palestinian refugees, despite the two countries previously rejecting the possibility.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian officials are downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Syria: The United States is drafting plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, which ISIS would exploit to resurge in Syria.
• Iraq: Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Gaza Strip: US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC in order to discuss Iran, the Gaza Strip, and Israeli-Saudi normalization.

Iran Update, February 4, 2025

Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. The New York Times reported on February 3 that a "secret team" of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is "exploring" a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a "matter of months.”[i] The engineers and scientists could be from the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), which, under a different name, played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003. The new approach would decrease the time Iran needs to turn weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 90 percent) into a nuclear weapon. This approach would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have to detect Iranian weaponization activity. It would also reduce the time that the United States or Israel would have to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran currently possesses near weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 60 percent), but Western estimates indicate that Iran could further enrich this material to weapons-grade levels within days. Unspecified US officials said that Iran could build an "older-style nuclear weapon" using the new approach, but that such a weapon would not fit on a ballistic missile and would likely be less reliable than a modern weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.

Iran’s nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran’s deterrence since October 2024. The IDF has defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip and degraded Hezbollah.[ii] The IDF also disabled Iranian air defenses and disrupted Iranian missile production capabilities in its airstrikes on Iran in October 2024.[iii] The New York Times reported that Iran is exploring “new options” to deter US or Israeli strikes, citing unspecified intelligence.[iv] Some Iranian hardliners have publicly called for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence vis-a-vis Israel.[v] CTP-ISW has previously observed that some Iranian hardliners are trying to pressure the Supreme Leader to revoke his 2003 fatwa that bans the production and use of nuclear weapons.

US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Trump signed an executive order that targets Iranian oil sales to other countries.[vi] Trump previously withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran during his first term as president. Trump told reporters that he is open to a deal with Iran and would be willing to meet with Iranian officials.

“Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy. The Iranian budget relies heavily on oil export revenues. Iran previously exported around 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in April 2018—one month before Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[vii] Iranian oil exports fell dramatically in the following years, but oil exports began to slowly increase beginning in 2020, though Iran still only exported 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.[viii] Iran will likely try to continue to export oil illicitly but will likely not be able to maintain current oil export levels.[ix] Oil exports are also insufficient to resolve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues will remain regardless of the imposition of sanctions. These economic issues include widespread corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and parastatal foundations, known as bonyads, in the economy.[x]

Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appointed Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters on February 4.[xi] Sabahi Fard will continue to serve as the Artesh Air Defense Force commander as well. Sabahi Fard replaced Brigadier General Ghader Rahim Zadeh, who had commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters since April 2021.[xii] Khamenei appointed Rahim Zadeh as an adviser to Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[xiii] Iran established the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters in 2008. Khamenei restructured the Iranian air defense structure in 2019, delegating air defense operations to the Artesh Air Defense Force and elevating the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters to a higher echelon of command. The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and IRGC. Sabahi Fard previously commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters from May 2018 to May 2019 before Khamenei restructured it.[xiv]

These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.[xv] The Artesh Air Defense Force most recently conducted an exercise in southwestern Iran on February 4.[xvi] The Artesh Air Defense Force tested Iranian-made radar systems, an expanded surveillance network, and the ”Majid” and “Joshan” missile systems, which Iranian media claims can intercept a large-scale drone attack.[xvii] These exercises reflect Iran’s efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities and concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.

An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.[xviii] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced that the delegation would travel to Doha after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, DC on February 4. The ceasefire agreement required Israel and Hamas to begin negotiations for the second phase on February 3.[xix] Reuters reported on January 19 that the second phase of the ceasefire "is to include the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, a complete Israel Defense Forces withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a permanent ceasefire.[xx]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[xxi] Shara announced that Syria is forming a “joint strategy” with Turkey to confront regional security threats and ensure lasting stability in the two countries.[xxii] Neither Shara nor Erdogan provided details about this strategy. Several unspecified officials and security sources told Reuters on February 4 that Shara and Erdogan would likely discuss the creation of a joint defense pact that would allow Turkey to use airbases in the central Syrian desert and take a “lead role” in training the new Syrian army.[xxiii]  Shara and Erdogan did not announce a defense pact during their joint press conference.

A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would be consistent with current Syrian objectives. Syrian leaders have said that they will pursue “strategic relations” with Turkey and have frequently included Turkish-backed factions and commanders in meetings about the establishment of the new Syrian government and military.[xxiv] The presence of Turkish forces at Syrian airbases in the central Syrian desert would in theory enable Turkey to defend Syrian airspace in the event of a future attack, according to several officials, including one Syrian security official.[xxv] The Assad regime previously acquired and used Russian and Iranian air defense systems, such as the Russian Pantsir missile system.[xxvi] Israeli airstrikes before and after the fall of the regime likely destroyed the majority of these systems.[xxvii] The Syrian government is likely eager to obtain temporary Turkish protection from potential threats in the absence of a functional military and active air defense systems. The new Syrian army also needs military equipment and training, both of which Russia and Iran previously provided to Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[xxviii] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra noted during a recent interview that the Defense Ministry needs critical ”infrastructure” to repair or replace aircraft, tanks, and radars.[xxix] The new Syrian army units, which the interim government is forming from various armed factions, will require training to become organized and disciplined units.

A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would similarly enable Turkey to pursue its strategic objectives in Syria by increasing its influence in Syria. Turkish officials have repeatedly stated that Turkey seeks to “eliminate” the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[xxx] An unspecified regional intelligence official stated that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Palmyra military airport and the Tiyas airbase to send a “message” to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.[xxxi]

Formalized Turkish military involvement in Syria would also likely be part of Turkey and HTS’s efforts to coerce the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Shara and Erdogan likely discussed recent developments in HTS’s ongoing negotiations with the SDF. Shara recently told Western media that he is not very optimistic about the possibility of an agreement with the SDF but that negotiations continue.[xxxii] Imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is expected to make an imminent ”historic call” for the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) to disarm. Turkish officials expect that such a call would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government.[xxxiii] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to conduct a military offensive into northern Syria in order to “eliminate” the SDF but has refrained from doing so while HTS negotiates with the SDF. HTS and Turkey may calculate that a formal Turkey-Syria defense agreement and an increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF to concede to HTS and Turkish demands. The SDF is unlikely to disarm, however, as it actively engages Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Syria.  

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contact on "all issues," including Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[xxxiv] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[xxxv] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[xxxvi] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[xxxvii] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya, though Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025, as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[xxxviii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[xxxix] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria—a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet.”[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time. Iran’s nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran’s deterrence since October 2024.
• Maximum Pressure: US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. “Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.
• Syria-Turkey Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4. A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would be consistent with current Syrian objectives, and it would similarly enable Turkey to pursue its strategic objectives in Syria by increasing its influence in Syria.
• Russia in Syria: A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.

Iran Update, February 3, 2025

An Iraqi Sunni parliamentarian criticized State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki on February 3 for promoting sectarianism.[i] Maliki gave a speech on February 1 in which he made anti-Sunni sectarian statements and implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.[ii] Progress Party member Shaalan al Karim described Maliki’s speech as “charged with sectarianism” and criticized the Shia Coordination Framework--a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi parties--for not denouncing Maliki’s statements.[iii] Karim added that the Iraqi parliament approved the General Amnesty Law amendment on January 21 with “broad political agreement.” Karim likely made this statement in response to Maliki’s claim that the amendment will release “murderers and criminals” from prison.[iv] The General Amnesty Law amendment will grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[v] The approval of the amendment was a long-standing Sunni demand and has long been opposed by Iraqi Shia parties. CTP-ISW has observed no other prominent Iraqi Sunni politician respond to Maliki’s speech at the time of this writing.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will visit Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[vi] The director of media for Turkish President Erdogan said that Shara will discuss the latest developments in Syria and Syrian-Turkish economic and security cooperation during meetings at the Presidential Complex.[vii]

Unknown actors detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) along the M4 highway outside of Manbij and killed at least 19 people on February 3.[viii] Syrian media reported that unknown actors parked the VBIED near the Hassin station, outside of Manbij City, on February 2 and then detonated it the next day. At least 15 of the casualties were agricultural workers in the vehicle next to the VBIED.[ix] Unknown actors have recently detonated at least seven VBIEDS in the Manbij area since December 2024, including an attack on February 1.[x] This most recent attack is the highest casualty incident yet in the series of attacks. The perpetrators and intended target(s) of the attack are unknown at this time. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s Office said in a statement that the Syrian state would pursue and impose “severe punishments” on the perpetrators of the attack.[xi]

Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media accused the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of conducting the February 3 VBIED attack.[xii] Previous VBIED attacks have similarly inspired accusations against the SDF. SDF officials condemned the attack and blamed Turkish-backed factions for conducting the attack and inspiring fear among the population.[xiii] The SDF volunteered the help the Syrian interim government find the perpetrators.[xiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: An Iraqi Sunni parliamentarian criticized Nouri al Maliki for stoking sectarian tensions. This comes after Maliki gave an inflammatory speech accusing Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.
• Syria: Interim President Ahmed al Shara will pay an official visit to Ankara to discuss bilateral cooperation and events in Syria.
• Syria: An unknown actor detonated a VBIED near Manbij in northern Syria, marking the seventh VBIED detonation in the area in recent months.

Iran Update, February 2, 2025

The Iraqi parliament voted to approve an amendment to the Iraqi budget law to provide salaries for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employees and resume oil exports from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on February 2.[i] The Iraqi government will pay $16 per barrel to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), an increase from the previous compensation of $6 per barrel. An international consulting firm will determine the actual cost of oil extraction in the Kurdistan Region, according to the amended budget law. An Iraqi parliament’s finance committee member said that the cost of oil extraction is not fixed and may reach $22 per barrel, depending on the consulting firm’s inspection.[ii] The KRG spokesperson confirmed that the Iraqi parliament also resolved the issue of KRG employees' outstanding salaries.[iii] Iraqi and Kurdish officials are discussing sending the salaries in the “coming few days.”

Several Iraqi security and political officials have sought to delay the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq due to the situation in Syria. The Associated Press reported on January 31 that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria informed Iraqi officials’ assessment to delay the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[iv] Iraqi security and political officials warned that the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq would create a vacuum for ISIS to reconstitute. A US defense official said that unspecified Iraqi government officials have asked “informally at the highest of levels” to delay the withdrawal of US forces citing the same reason. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[v]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Parliament: The Iraqi parliament voted to approve an amendment to the Iraqi budget law to provide salaries for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employees and resume oil exports from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on February 2.
• US Presence in Iraq: Several Iraqi security and political officials have sought to delay the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq due to the situation in Syria.
• Turkey: Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated Turkish threats against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in a press conference with his Qatari counterpart on February 2.

Iran Update, January 30, 2025

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released three Israeli hostages during the third hostage release on January 30.[i] Hamas released a female soldier hostage in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas transferred her to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the eastern Jabalia refugee camp.[ii] PIJ released two Israeli civilian hostages in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip.[iii] Hamas also released five Thai hostages on January 30.[iv] Israel released 110 Palestinian prisoners in exchange.[v] The ceasefire agreement requires Hamas to release an additional three Israeli hostages on February 1.[vi]

Hamas attempted to signal that it retains the ability to coordinate and communicate with other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip. Several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, the Palestinian Resistance Committee, and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement accompanied PIJ as it released two Israeli hostages in Khan Younis on January 30.[vii] Hamas claimed that the presence of these militias “confirms the unity” among these groups.[viii] The release of the two hostages comes after PIJ failed to release an Israeli hostage on January 25. CTP-ISW assessed on January 27 that PIJ’s failure to release the hostage on January 25 is unlikely to be the result of a rift between Hamas and PIJ.[ix] The militias could face challenges due to weakened institutional coordination mechanisms between the militias after months of IDF operations.

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cutoff on January 29.

The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) will likely not reduce the threat that these militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and their political wings have reportedly considered a negotiated settlement in which the militias would integrate into the PMF in return for political appointments.[x] These militias, which reportedly include Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, seek key positions in the Iraqi federal government, including the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC).[xi] The PMC is responsible for ensuring that militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi Federal government.[xii] Some members of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework seek to remove current PMC Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, in part due to disputes between Fayyadh and PMF Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi.[xiii] The replacement of Fayyadh with another Iranian-backed figure would not make the PMF any less beholden to Iran than it currently is, nor would it result in the PMC fulfilling its duty to ensure the PMF answers to the Iraqi government. Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada all control brigades in the PMF that answer to the militias and Iran rather than the Iraqi prime minister. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would therefore fail to reduce the threat that these militias pose to the United States and its partners.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted an unarmed reconnaissance drone in Lebanon as it flew toward Israel on January 30.[xiv] Lebanese Hezbollah has not mentioned the drone or claimed it as a Hezbollah drone at the time of this writing. The drone may have moved south to monitor Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah last launched a drone towards Israel on November 26, before the ceasefire went into effect.[xv] This incident comes after the United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon extended the ceasefire until February 18, when Israel will presumably withdraw from Lebanon.[xvi]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara said that Syrian sovereignty “under one authority and on one land” is a priority of the HTS-led interim government on January 30.[xvii] Shara officially became the Syrian interim president on January 29.[xviii] Shara said that he consulted with “legal experts” before he assumed the role of president and will work to form a transitional government that represents “the diversity of Syria.”[xix] Shara also stated that he would build state institutions and an economy free of corruption, prosecute former regime elements accused of crimes against the Syrian people, and impose Syrian “sovereignty under one authority and on one land.”[xx] Shara and other former HTS interim government officials have maintained that they will not allow any “federal” entities in Syria.[xxi] This demand has complicated negotiations with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has so far rejected every HTS proposal that limits its political and security autonomy.[xxii] Shara notably did not invite SDF representatives to the “Victory Conference” on January 29.[xxiii]

Shara promised to appoint an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and announced the formation of a preparatory committee for the National Dialogue Conference, which will reportedly represent “different points of view.”[xxiv] Shara said that, once these steps are complete, the government will release a “Constitutional Declaration” that will serve as the legal basis for the transitional period.[xxv] Shara did not specify who or which groups will write the “declaration” and if the National Dialogue Conference will impact the contents of the declaration.

Iran Update, January 29, 2025

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government held a “victory conference” on January 29, during which it formalized much of its consolidation of power since the fall of Bashar al Assad.[i] The conference announced the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as the transitional president, though has informally been the de-factor of the interim government for months. Shara is now responsible for forming an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and approved, according to the conference.[ii] Shara, at the conference, identified his priorities as ”filling the power vacuum, preserving civil peace, building state institutions, working to build a developmental economic infrastructure, and restoring Syria's international and regional standing” in his speech.[iii] Shara has previously described the interim government overseeing a three-to-four transition period, during which he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.[iv]

The victory conference separately announced the disbanding of all Assad regime institutions and its constitution.[v] The interim government has proposed previously holding a representative Syrian national dialogue to write a new Syrian constitution, though it is unclear whether a date or any participants have yet been identified.[vi]

The victory conference also announced the planned dissolution of all former opposition parties in Syria. The conference specifically stated that “all military factions, political, and civil revolutionary bodies will be dissolved and integrated into state institutions.”[vii] This decree follows months of talks between HTS and armed groups.[viii] The interim Defense Ministry announced on January 19 that over 60 military factions agreed to join the new Syrian armed forces.[ix]

Military factions allied with HTS that participated in the overthrow the Assad regime attended the conference, including Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) leaders, who are sanctioned by the United States for abuses against Kurds.[x] An anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) source reported that the SDF was not invited to the conference.[xi] It remains unclear if the interim government’s decree dissolving all military factions will apply to the SDF or if the SDF has agreed to such terms. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said January 14 that he wants the SDF to integrate into the Defense Ministry as a “bloc,“ which the interim defense minister reportedly rejected.[xii]

Russia and the HTS-led interim Syrian government failed to reach an agreement on January 28 on Russian basing in Syria. A Russian delegation that included Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Special Presidential Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev traveled to Syria on January 28 to discuss Russian access to its military bases at Latakia and Tartus.[xiii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Russia and HTS only agreed to continue discussions.[xiv] An unspecified Russian source similarly told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[xv] The stalled negotiations come as Russia continues to evacuate military assets from its bases at Latakia and Tartus.[xvi]

Iran Update, January 28, 2025

Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. Turkey and Ocalan have reportedly reached an agreement in which Ocalan will publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. Unspecified Turkish officials told regional media on January 27 that Ocalan's announcement would "easily" pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[i] This belief reflects misplaced Turkish thinking that the entire SDF will be responsive to PKK demands, which is unlikely. The SDF is composed of Syrian Kurds, some of whom were members of the PKK. The SDF’s leadership presumably recognizes that Turkish-backed attacks pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF and Kurds, given that many Turkish-backed forces have previously committed human rights abuses against Kurdish people in northwestern Syria. The SDF is unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active military attacks, regardless of Ocalan’s position.

The Turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria. The SDF has articulated clear and specific demands since it began talks with the HTS-led government in late December 2024. These demands include joining the new Syrian army as an integrated unit, remaining deployed in northeastern Syria, and maintaining some regional autonomy in a ”decentralized” system.[ii] It is unlikely that the SDF would ”easily” give up these demands if the PKK disarms.

An unspecified source told Middle East Eye that Turkey seeks to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to participate in the political system in Damascus.[iii] The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[iv] The SDF and PYD almost certainly hope to be involved in the political system in Damascus, but that is not mutually exclusive with SDF demands for regional autonomy. The SDF’s stated demands suggest that it would not be satisfied with mere political representation in Damascus and that it seeks firmer guarantees of political and security autonomy.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.[v] Araghchi stated that Iran would ”have to look for an alternative” if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[vi] The E3 has until October 2025 to trigger snapback sanctions if it decides to do so. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[vii] The IAEA Board of Governors is next set to meet in March 2025.[viii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions.[ix] Araghchi added that there is a "heated debate" in Iran about what an "alternative" to diplomacy would be.[x] Araghchi is likely referring to the debate among Iranian officials about whether Iran should revise its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear weapon.[xi] That Araghchi interviewed with British outlet Sky News in English suggests that his statements were directed at the E3.

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[xii] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[xiii] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[xiv] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[xv] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[xvi] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[xvii]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[xviii] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta. [xix]Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships - likely the Sparta and Sparta II - had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[xx]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut-off on January 27.

Key Takeaways:

• Kurds in Syria: Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the PKK to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. The Turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.
• Russia in Syria: The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.

Iran Update, January 27, 2025

Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement.[i] Hamas agreed to release a female civilian hostage held by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.[ii] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) announced that Hamas would release the hostage and two additional Israeli hostages on January 30.[iii] This is in addition to the three hostages Hamas will release on February 1.[iv] Hamas also provided Israel with a list that confirmed 18 of the 26 remaining hostages scheduled for release during the first phase of the ceasefire are alive.[v] The list did not specify which specific individuals were and were not alive, however.

 

PIJ’s failure to release the hostage is unlikely to be a result of friction between PIJ and Hamas. PIJ has previously released hostages as part of the November 2023 ceasefire agreement and it has not engaged Israeli forces in the strip during the ceasefire, which indicates that PIJ continues to cooperate with Hamas.[vi] Hamas released four female Israeli soldiers as part of the second hostage release on January 25 before PIJ agreed to release the fifth hostage.[vii] Hamas leads a 12-member coalition of Palestinian militias that allows Hamas to coordinate operations between various Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[viii] The breakdown surrounding the release of the fifth hostage on January 25 could be the result of a breakdown in the coordination mechanisms within this coalition, rather than a disagreement between the two factions. IDF operations have probably weakened the institutional coordination mechanisms between the two factions on the ground in the strip.  

 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor on January 27 to allow Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip via established routes.[ix] The IDF withdrew from the corridor two days later than mandated under the ceasefire because Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by failing to release a hostage.[x] Gazans began returning to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road, which is the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[xi] US and Egyptian private security contractors started operating a checkpoint on the Netzarim Corridor along the Salah al Din Road where they will inspect Palestinian vehicles returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[xii] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued instructions to Gazans as they returned to the northern strip and prohibited returnees from carrying weapons.[xiii] The spokesperson reiterated the IDF’s warnings that asked Gazans to avoid Israeli forces. Social media footage showed a large number of Palestinians moving to the northern Gaza Strip uninspected as several Hamas fighters greeted them along al Rashid Road.[xiv]

 

The return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire if Israel and Hamas fail to agree on a second-phase ceasefire.[xv] Relatively few Gazans remained in the northern Gaza Strip after months of intense Israeli combat operations.[xvi] The lack of civilians enabled Israeli forces to operate more freely with a decreased risk that Israeli troops would encounter civilians. The return of approximately 650,000 Gazans will significantly increase the number of civilians in the northern strip, which will complicate the execution and planning of IDF operations.[xvii] New major Israeli combat operations would necessitate the evacuation of Gazan civilians, for example.

 

Individual Hamas fighters disguised as civilians who move north on foot could also be able to bring small numbers of weapons and small amounts of ammunition to Hamas forces in the north. Such an effort to move supplies by foot is likely insufficient to resupply Hamas forces to a point that would seriously challenge Israeli forces if the IDF resumes operations.

The United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days.[xviii] The ceasefire will now be in effect until February 18.  Axios reported that the Trump administration negotiated the extension with Israel and Lebanon over the past few days.[xix] The ceasefire will presumably require the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon by February 18. The LAF is also expected to backfill the IDF by this date. Israel has withdrawn from about three positions in southern Lebanon thus far and remains active in at least 12 border towns, according to local Lebanese media.[xx] An IDF spokesperson announced on January 27 that the IDF had recently ”re-deployed” to several unspecified locations in southern Lebanon in order to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure.[xxi] The IDF spokesperson said that the implementation of the ceasefire ”is postponed” in some areas of Lebanon as the IDF needs more time to ensure that Hezbollah cannot use those areas to rebuild itself.[xxii]

 

Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next three weeks. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected the ceasefire’s extension in a January 27 speech and called on Israel to withdraw immediately.[xxiii] Hezbollah had previously threatened to resume attacks on Israel if Israel stayed in Lebanon past the January 26 deadline.[xxiv] Qassem said that Hezbollah ”has the right to act as it sees fit” against Israel and that any ”repercussions” from the IDF’s delayed withdrawal are the responsibility of Israel and the monitors of the ceasefire, which includes the US, France, and the UN.[xxv] Qassem did not directly promise to resume attacks against Israeli troops operating in Lebanon, however. Qassem's restrained response to the ceasefire extension is likely a result of the severe degradation that Israeli operations had inflicted on Hezbollah prior to the ceasefire. Hezbollah likely aims to avoid engaging Israeli forces or attacking Israel as it helps rebuild Lebanon and reconstitute its forces. It is doubtful that Hezbollah has been able to reconstitute a significant portion of its military capabilities during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The SDF reportedly rejected a concessionary proposal from the HTS-led Syrian government that would require it to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry. Unspecified sources close to the new administration told Al Jazeera on January 26 that the SDF rejected a recent proposal from the Syrian government that would allow for a “decentralized” management system that provides local councils with “broad” unspecified powers, recognition of Kurdish rights and inclusion in the new Syrian constitution, and a pathway for Kurdish fighters to join Syrian military and security institutions.[xxvi] The SDF reportedly insisted that it join the new Syrian army as an integrated unit, remain deployed in northeastern Syria, and receive portions of future oil revenue.[xxvii] The SDF has not strayed far from its position since it began negotiations with the HTS-led government on December 30.[xxviii] It is notable that the government’s offer does not provide any meaningful, irreversible protection for Syrian Kurds. HTS and its predecessor organizations have a long history of co-opting groups and then steadily eroding their power. The SDF is also extremely unlikely to willingly disarm while its units are actively repelling SNA attacks along the Euphrates River and Peace Spring frontlines.

 

Turkey’s encouragement of Turkish-backed factions to join the Syrian army is likely part of a Turkish effort to coerce the SDF to concede to the Syrian government in negotiations. Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 27 that Ankara has told Turkish-backed Syrian armed factions to integrate into the Syrian army.[xxix] Fidan said there are over 80,000 members of factions ”loyal” to Turkey in northern Syria.[xxx] Fidan also encouraged armed groups in southern Syria to do the same.[xxxi] The integration of Turkish-backed groups, including groups currently operating within the Syrian National Army (SNA), would enable Turkey to wield significant influence within Syria’s armed forces. Turkey’s direct influence on Turkish-backed Syrian factions varies by group and some factions would be more responsive to Turkish direction than others. The HTS-led Defense Ministry has already promoted several fighters from these groups to high ranks within the Defense Ministry, however.[xxxii] Turkey is likely encouraging these factions to join the Syrian army because it believes it will retain some influence over these groups.  Turkey could then use their integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry and the Turkish influence that the integration would generate for Turkey to demonstrate to the SDF that it can encourage both the SNA and HTS-aligned forces to unite against SDF interests. The SDF has so far been unwilling to compromise on its demands as it contends with attacks from the SNA and Turkey. HTS, for its part, has been reticent to threaten the SDF with military force, though this reticence could change as the SDF maintains its position.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas and PIJ fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement. PIJ’s failure to release the hostage is unlikely to be a result of friction between PIJ and Hamas. PIJ has previously released hostages as part of the November 2023 ceasefire agreement and it has not engaged Israeli forces in the strip during the ceasefire, which indicates that PIJ continues to cooperate with Hamas.
• Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire: The United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days. Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next three weeks.
• Syrian Army Formation: The SDF reportedly rejected a concessionary proposal from the HTS-led Syrian government that would require it to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry. Turkey’s encouragement of Turkish-backed factions to join the Syrian army is likely part of a Turkish effort to coerce the SDF to concede to the Syrian government in negotiations.

Iran Update, January 26, 2025

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.[i]PIJ confirmed that hostage, Arbel Yehud, is “alive and in good health” and stated it will release Yehud after reaching an agreement with the mediators.[ii] Israel accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by releasing female soldiers before female civilians.[iii] In response, the IDF maintained its position in the Netzarim Corridor along al Rashid Road—the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—preventing Gazans from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[iv] The IDF reiterated on January 26 that it will only fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern part of the strip once PIJ releases Yehud.[v] The Palestinian Resistance Committee (PRC) and PIJ jointly took Yehud hostage on October 7, 2023.[vi]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 25.

The IDF fired at individuals in southern Lebanon on January 26 in order to eliminate “imminent threats” to Israeli forces. The 60-day Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire period ended on January 26.[vii] The ceasefire agreement stipulates a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26.[viii] Israel announced on January 24 that the IDF will refrain from withdrawing from southern Lebanon by January 26 because the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) purportedly failed to destroy Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure south of the Litani River, which it is required to do, according to the ceasefire agreement.[ix] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson re-issued warnings to residents against returning to 62 towns in southern Lebanon on January 25.[x] Lebanese media claimed that returning residents entered 22 towns in southeastern Lebanon and 13 towns in southwestern Lebanon on January 26.[xi] The LAF “accompanied" some residents as they returned to several towns.[xii]  The IDF stated that it used ”dispersal fire” to eliminate threats posed to Israeli forces, including at ”rioters” and at a vehicle flagged with a Hezbollah flag that approached Israeli forces.[xiii]  Lebanese media claimed that the IDF fired artillery and small arms at Lebanese residents and LAF soldiers in several towns in southeastern Lebanon.[xiv] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that Israeli operations killed at least 23 people, including an LAF soldier, and injured 124 additional people in southern Lebanon.[xv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson accused Hezbollah of exploiting residents to cover up the repercussions of its “irresponsible decisions.”[xvi]

The Iraqi Progress Party, which is a Sunni political party headed by former Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, signaled its openness to forming an alliance with the Sadrist Movement ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Progress Party spokesperson Yahya al Mohammadi stated on January 26 that the Sadrist Movement’s withdrawal from politics after the October 2021 parliamentary elections created a “defect” in the Iraqi political system.[xvii] Mohammadi stated that “political balances” and “future visions for the formation of the next government” will determine whether the Progress Party allies with the Sadrist Movement. Mohammadi’s statements come after the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition has aligned with Sadr on several issues in recent weeks.[xviii] Prominent Sunni politician Khamis al Khanjar, who helped establish the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, recently called on Iraqi political parties to adopt Sadr’s position of “non-interference” in Syria, for example.[xix]

The United States will deliver a shipment of 1,800 MK-84 general purpose aircraft munitions to Israel in the “coming days.”[xx]  US President Donald Trump said that the United States has been holding these bombs in storage since May 2024.[xxi]

Syrian border forces thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq on January 25.[xxii] The General Directorate of Border Security announced that it seized a shipment of rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq, before the shipment reached Lebanon.[xxiii] The General Directorate specified that the weapons were intended for Hezbollah.[xxiv] Syrian government forces recently interdicted a drone shipment in Tartus likely intended to resupply Hezbollah.[xxv] The General Directorate did not specify the identities of the smugglers but noted that the shipment traveled through existing smuggling routes. It is unlikely that these networks fully collapsed when the Assad regime fell, despite the flight of numerous Iranian-backed elements from Syria.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: PIJ agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: The IDF fired at individuals in southern Lebanon on January 26 in order to eliminate “imminent threats” to Israeli forces.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Progress Party signaled its openness to forming an alliance with the Sadrist Movement ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Syria: Syrian border forces thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq.

Iran Update, January 23, 2025

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 22.

Israel and Hamas appear to have agreed to allow Gazans to return from the southern to the northern Gaza Strip. This agreement may prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from moving large quantities of weapons and fighters to the northern Gaza Strip. A multinational consortium led by US and Egyptian contractors will oversee the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios on January 23 that Israel and Hamas agreed to establish a multinational consortium to oversee vehicle movement through the Netzarim Corridor.[i] The consortium will include two United States-based private security firms and an Egyptian company. The consortium will establish a vehicle checkpoint on Salah al Din Road at the corridor once the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraws from the area. Hamas will likely try to move materiel and resources to the northern Gaza Strip via Salah al Din Road, which the vehicle checkpoint should prevent. Hamas announced that Gazans can return to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road--the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—after the IDF withdraws from there.[ii] The ceasefire agreement requires the IDF to withdraw from al Rashid Road by January 25.[iii]  Hamas will likely try to move fighters and weapons via al Rashid Road to the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters who transit al Rashid Road on foot will not be able to carry large weaponry or large amounts of ammunition, however.  

Lebanese Hezbollah called on the Lebanese government to pressure the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon if the IDF remains past January 26, which is the date by which the IDF is required by the ceasefire with Hezbollah to withdraw.[iv] Hezbollah emphasized that the IDF must withdraw from Lebanon by January 26 but refrained from explicitly threatening to attack if the IDF does not withdraw. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Hezbollah will resume attacks targeting Israel at this time. Israeli media reported on January 23, citing an informed source familiar, that Israel submitted a request to the United States to postpone its withdrawal from Lebanon by 30 days. Israeli media reported that members of the ceasefire monitoring committee, including the United States, France, Lebanon, and Israel, discussed the request. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met with the chair of the ceasefire monitoring committee, US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers, on January 23, likely to discuss the request.[v] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer stated on January 23 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL have made “positive movements. . . but not fast enough.”[vi]

The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region. The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Iraqi security establishment who answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister would increase Iranian influence and facilitate Iranian capture of the Iraqi security establishment. The Iraqi federal government’s failure to punish militias who conduct attacks without the permission of the state would encourage the militias to conduct further attacks, given that they have no incentive to stop their attacks. The Iraqi federal government has notably previously failed to deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly offered to protect Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from foreign attacks and allow them to keep their weapons in return for the militias integrating into the Iraqi security establishment.[vii] These concessions do not guarantee that the militias will answer to the Iraqi prime minister instead of Iran. These concessions also do not guarantee that the militias will not conduct attacks targeting US or allied interests. Granting these concessions and failing to impose other requirements on the militias to join the Iraqi security establishment could therefore harm US security interests in the region.

Over 130 unspecified Iraqi parliamentarians signed a petition to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, possibly because he recently helped establish a new Sunni political alliance and pass the General Amnesty Law. Parliament passed three “controversial” laws—including the General Amnesty Law—on January 21.[viii] The General Amnesty Law will grant amnesty to a large number of Iraqis who were previously wrongfully imprisoned. The law is a long-standing demand for Sunni political parties in Iraq. The State of Law Coalition, which is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, and some independent parliamentarians have challenged the constitutionality of the January 21 parliament session in the Iraqi Federal Court.[ix] A petition to remove the parliament speaker requires 109 signatures. An absolute majority vote of 165 parliamentarians is subsequently required to remove the parliament speaker.[x] Mashhadani’s deputy, Shia Coordination Framework member Mohsen al Mandalawi, would become the temporary parliament speaker if Mashhadani was removed.[xi] Mandalawi previously served as interim parliament speaker between November 2023 and October 2024, while Parliament struggled to elect a new speaker.[xii] The petition to remove Mashhadani comes after he helped form the United Sunni Leadership Coalition in early January 2024. The coalition called on the Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands--including passing the General Amnesty Law--on January 18.[xiii]

Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli have recently held talks with Ocalan.[xiv] Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15, according to the director of the Washington DC-based Middle East Institute’s Turkey Program.[xv] The Turkish government will reportedly release Ocalan from prison and draft a new constitution that includes Kurdish rights and other unspecified changes in return.[xvi] "PKK-linked groups" will reportedly share power with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and integrate some forces into the new Syrian armed forces as part of the agreement.[xvii] It is unclear whether ”PKK-linked groups” includes the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses ”PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. PKK groups in Qandil, northern Iraq, have reportedly agreed to the terms of the agreement.[xviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report. The demand for “PKK-linked groups” to share authority with the KNC is consistent with Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani’s efforts to pressure the SDF to work with minority Kurdish parties and avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey.[xix] It remains unclear whether the PKK would heed calls from Ocalan to disarm. The disarmament of the PKK would also likely not satisfy Turkey’s demand to ”eliminate” the SDF.[xx]

Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra warned that the Syrian interim government is “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces.[xxi] Qasra told reporters on January 22 that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.”[xxii] Qasra's comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF. The SDF has so far refused to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry and has instead called for a “decentralized” system that would allow the SDF to join the new Syrian armed forces as a “bloc” and remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[xxiii] The interim government is currently pursuing a two-pronged strategy to coerce the SDF to disarm: it is actively negotiating with the SDF while simultaneously coordinating with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey and the SNA are both actively fighting the SDF in northern Syria. A Syrian government decision to deploy forces to SDF frontlines would mark a significant departure from the government’s current strategy. Syrian government leadership, such as Shara and Qasra, may calculate that HTS military involvement would sufficiently coerce the SDF to disarm, which it has so far been unwilling to do through negotiations with HTS alone.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. Geolocated footage shows a Department of Military Operations convoy arriving in Zamla, a town around 12 kilometers south of Rusafa, on January 23.[xxiv] Syrian media reported that HTS-led forces took control of several oil fields near Zamla and several towns in the desert west of Zamla.[xxv] The commander of the SDF-affiliated Northern Democratic Brigade said on January 23 that the SDF recently warned the international coalition about the threat of ISIS in the “significant security vacuum” between SDF-held territory and Syrian interim government-held territory.[xxvi] Assad regime forces and Iranian-backed militias formerly controlled Zamla and its oil fields, and the withdrawal of regime-affiliated forces could allow ISIS to resurge in those areas.[xxvii] The commander said that the SDF, Department of Military Operations, and international coalition recently held a meeting near Rusafa and that Department of Military Operations forces subsequently deployed to the area.[xxviii] This meeting and subsequent deployment is consistent with likely HTS objectives to consolidate control over areas of the Syrian Badia, particularly in areas where ISIS could grow and resurge.

The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad. The deployment of these forces comes after Qasra warned that the Syrian government is ready for a potential military operation against the SDF. The interim government's deployment of forces to Rusafa may set conditions for a potential operation. The current HTS position in the Rusafa desert is located at the crossroads of government-held territory to the west and SDF-held territory to the north. Such a position would allow HTS-led forces to advance north and potentially cut off the SDF’s southern salient along the southwestern bank of Lake Assad from the rear, disrupting an SDF defense of Raqqa. The Rusafa position is furthermore located south of Ain Issa, where SNA forces are currently deployed. The HTS-led forces and SNA could possibly coordinate to envelope Raqqa City from the north and south. CTP-ISW has not observed any indicators that HTS is planning a military operation targeting the SDF at the time of this writing, however.

Anti-SDF media reported that the Department of Military Operations reportedly clashed with SDF-affiliated gunmen in the village of Amala, west of Zamla, and captured several men.[xxix] The SDF denied that its forces clashed with Syrian government forces in the area and blamed ”Turkish-run media” for spreading false narratives.[xxx]

The HTS-led interim government appears to be forming a police force that is centered on Islamic principles.[xxxi] Members of the HTS police force in Idlib have traveled to Damascus to recruit police officers. The HTS police has asked applicants a series of questions about their beliefs and training for new recruits is focused on Sharia Law. Unspecified Syrian officers cited by Reuters stated that the Islamic teaching is intended to instill morality in the new Syrian police force. Reuters cited Syrian civilians who expressed apprehension toward a police force based on religious doctrine. Minority Syrian communities have expressed distrust toward the Sunni majority HTS-led interim government following reports of sectarian motivated attacks by HTS-affiliated fighters.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways: 

• Turkey and Syria: Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. 
• SDF Negotiations: The Syrian Interim Defense Minister said that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.” His comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF. 
• HTS Deployment: The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad. 
• Iraq: The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. 

Iran Update, January 22, 2025

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.[i] The PIJ statement claimed the joint operations rooms would coordinate and develop ”field work” and ”joint action.” The joint operations rooms will be comprised of fighters from PIJ’s al Quds Brigades, Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch.[ii] The ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch, which is one of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades many branches based in various locations throughout the West Bank, was active in Tulkarm in summer 2024.[iii] It is unclear at this time where the joint operations rooms will be based, or which subgroup or groups of the ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch will be involved. Hamas, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and PIJ previously established a combined operations room known as ”the Hornets’ Nest” that was based in Jenin and active from 2022-2024. The Hornets’ Nest also included the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others.[iv] PIJ, Hamas, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed to fire small arms and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a combined operation targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[v]

Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. A senior Iraqi diplomat claimed on January 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will only integrate into the Iraqi army after US forces completely withdraw from Iraq.[vi]  The outgoing Biden administration reportedly pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraq militias.[vii] The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups. Many of these groups have committed acts of sectarian cleansing dating back to the 2000s, which would destroy the national character of the Iraqi army if the government reflagged entire militia units as Iraqi army units.[viii] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization, swear allegiance to the Iranian supreme leader, not the Iraqi state.[ix] The state-recognized wings of these groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) already answer to militia chains of command—not the Iraqi prime minister—and there is no reason to believe that these groups would adhere to an Iraqi army chain of command if reflagged as Iraqi army units. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[x] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani told Saudi outlet al Elaph in January 2025 that the Iraqi government is actively trying to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within Iraq’s legal and institutional framework.[xi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal date or makes “sudden moves.”[xii] Kaabi added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain al Asad airbase.[xiii] It is notable that US-led international coalition forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq until the end of 2026.[xiv]

Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks.[xv] The officials expect the vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [xvi]

Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[xvii] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12 mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran’s ability to produce missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of Iran’s supply of ammonium perchlorate.

Iran has previously used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[xviii] The US Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to make explosives.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.
• Iraq: Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups.
• Iran: Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks. Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however.

Iran Update, January 21, 2025

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of ceasefire violations in the Gaza Strip since the last data cut off on January 20.

Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. The Associated Press reported that Hamas has patrolled aid convoy routes, coordinated the distribution of humanitarian aid, and monitored the return of Gazans to Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip after the ceasefire went into effect.[i] Some Gazans began to return from IDF-designated humanitarian zones to the northern Gaza Strip on January 19, and the IDF announced on January 21 that it would soon allow Gazans to return from the southern Gaza Strip to the northern Gaza Strip.[ii]

These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7. Hamas does appear to function as a proto-government that can provide and distribute basic services and goods while controlling the population, which would be consistent with an insurgent organization that seeks to re-exert control over the Gaza Strip. It is notable in this context that Hamas is the sole actor in the Gaza Strip capable and willing to undertake this relatively broad spectrum of tasks. Hamas therefore appears to be prepared to reemerge as the sole authority in the Gaza Strip, even though the IDF destroyed its government structure. Hamas will likely begin to use its small, insurgent-like cells of fighters to reimpose its control over the population and other armed groups, including criminal elements.

Hamas announced that it will release four female Israeli hostages on January 25.[iii] Hamas previously announced that it would release the next group of hostages on January 26.[iv] The ceasefire agreement requires Hamas to release three hostages every Saturday during the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal and 14 hostages on the last day of the first phase.[v] Hamas released three Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[vi]

The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.[vii] Halevi will officially leave as chief of staff on March 6, four days after the first phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement ends.[viii] Halevi stated that the IDF has not fully destroyed Hamas’ governance and military capabilities or returned Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip.[ix] Halevi called for an external committee to investigate the IDF’s failure on October 7.[x] IDF Southern Command Commander Major General Yaron Finkelman also resigned on January 21. Finkelman cited his failure to protect Israel on October 7.[xi] The IDF Southern Command is responsible for areas of southern Israel, including the area along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[xii]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish offensive. The SDF is currently engaged against the SNA on the western bank of the Euphrates River and Arab tribal forces under the command of Sheikh Ibrahim al Hifl in Deir ez Zor.[xiii] The SNA has deployed to the lines of control at Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr, which CTP-ISW assessed may be in preparation for a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xiv] The SNA and Turkey have continued to attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication to interdict supplies and reinforcements from the east, which would isolate SDF forces along the river.[xv]

The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive. The SDF deployed reinforcements from Hasakah to Deir ez Zor on January 21, which could leave SDF defenses in Tal Tamr, Hasakah Province, vulnerable to a Turkish or SNA attack if the SDF weakened any reserve or frontline positions near Tal Tamr.[xvi] The SDF’s decision to withdraw forces from Hasakah leaves this front relatively more vulnerable to Turkish or SNA capture, depending on the strength of the forces that the SDF has redeployed. CTP-ISW cannot ascertain from where in Hasakah Province the SDF redeployed forces. The requirement on the SDF to deploy forces to Deir ez Zor nonetheless further strains SDF bandwidth. A Deir ez Zor-based journalist reported that the SDF deployed forces to Dhiban, Tayyana, Kasra, and Hajin in Deir ez Zor Province.[xvii] The SDF has fought Arab tribal forces that are likely under the guidance of Sheikh Ibrahim al Hifl in Deir ez Zor since December 20.[xviii] The SNA has deployed forces toward Tal Tamr in recent weeks, possibly in preparation for a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.[xix]

Turkey and the SNA have concentrated air and artillery strikes on SDF positions around the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 20.[xx] The SNA has deployed forces to the lines of control at Ain Issa and Kobani. CTP-ISW assessed that these forces could launch two lines of advance to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.[xxi] Turkish and SNA strikes on SDF positions could set conditions for an SNA assault. The SNA and Turkey have conducted strikes on SDF positions along a key ground line of communication in northern Syria that would isolate the SDF at Qara Qozak Bridge.[xxii]

The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament.[xxiii]  Sistani is the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Bureau head Ali al Asadi likely made this comment in response to Iraqi federal government efforts to convince Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to either surrender their weapons or join the official Iraqi security apparatus.[xxiv]  Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.[xxv] Sistani said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[xxvi] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[xxvii] It is unclear if other Iranian-backed militias besides Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba would agree to disarm if Sistani directly requested that they disarm. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is also implicitly bypassing and rejecting the authority of the Iraqi federal government by the invocation of Sistani’s authority. Sistani does not hold an official position in the Iraqi government.

Victory Coalition spokesperson Salam al Zubaidi separately claimed on January 21 that the Iraqi federal government will be able to force Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to surrender their weapons and integrate “rehabilitated elements” into the Iraqi military establishment or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxviii] The Victory Coalition is a Shia political party that is led by former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi. It is part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, but Abadi attempted to form a political party with Ammar al Hakim in 2020 that would have supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[xxix] Zubaidi claimed that a “large portion” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could surrender their weapons and integrate into the Iraqi military establishment and the PMF “in the coming days.”[xxx]

The Iraqi parliament passed three controversial laws on January 21. Some parliamentarians have claimed that parliament lacked a legal quorum when it passed the laws.[xxxi] Parliament passed the Personal Status Law, General Amnesty Law, and Property Restitution Law on January 21. The Personal Status Law, which gives Islamic courts increased authority over matters like marriage, is mainly supported by Shia political parties.[xxxii] Iraqi law previously set the minimum age for marriage at 18, but the Personal Status Law allows Shia and Sunni clerics to permit marriages at younger ages based on different interpretations of Islamic law.[xxxiii] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis whom Iraqi courts wrongfully convicted. Sunni political parties have long demanded the implementation of this law.[xxxiv] Some parliamentarians claimed that parliament passed these laws without a quorum. They also accused Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani and his deputies of adding amendments to the laws without discussion and leading a vote on all three laws as a package.[xxxv] Independent parliamentarian Zuhair Fatlawi told Iraqi media that over 180 parliamentarians left parliament before the vote. Over 50 parliamentarians started a petition to remove Mashhadani.[xxxvi]

The Iraqi parliament did not vote on an amendment that would benefit Kurdish political parties during its session on January 21, despite the amendment appearing on the parliamentary agenda.[xxxvii] This amendment would increase the Iraqi federal government’s compensation for oil production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) from $6 to $16 and in return, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would resume oil exports.[xxxviii] Some Shia political parties walked out of parliament on January 19 in protest against the amendment.[xxxix] A Shia Coordination Framework-aligned parliamentarian told Iraqi media on January 21 that parliament delayed the vote on the amendment due to the addition of a new amendment to the budget.[xl]

An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.[xli] The Iraqi government established the Accountability and Justice Commission in 2008 to rid Iraq of Baathist ideology, but it was weaponized by Shia politicians to target Sunnis and secular Iraqis to prevent Sunnis and secular Iraqis from winning elections.[xlii] Any government body created to replace the commission and scrutinize political candidates is liable to abuse. It remains unclear what responsibilities the proposed judicial body would have. This report comes after the United Sunni Leadership Coalition called for the dissolution of the Accountability and Justice Commission, among other demands, on January 18.[xliii]

Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website shows that the Russian cargo ship Sparta II entered the port of Tartus on January 21. The Sparta II is likely transferring Russian military equipment to Libya, given that the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia intended to use the Sparta II to transport equipment from Syria to Libya.[xliv] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that columns of Russian military equipment and cargo have remained lined up for evacuation at the port since at least December 17.  Sparta II’s entry into the port suggests that Russia and the HTS-led interim government recently reached an agreement that allows Russian vessels to enter the port. The GUR reported as recently as January 12 that the HTS-led government had not granted permission for Russian ships to enter the port.[xlv] The GUR also reported that Russian Rear Admiral Valery Varfolomeyev failed to negotiate Russian entry to the port on January 9.[xlvi]  At least three other Russian vessels, including two landing ships and a cargo ship, have remained off the coast of Tartus since January 6.[xlvii]

The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus. The Tartus customs director told Syrian media on January 20 that the interim government suspended a previous agreement that allowed an unspecified Russian company to invest in the port of Tartus.[xlviii] The director claimed that the interim government would receive all the revenue that the Russian company accrued.[xlix] The Assad regime leased control of the port of Tartous to the Russian oil and gas company Stroytransgaz in 2019 for 49 years.[l] It is unclear if Russia and the HTS-led interim government have reached a definitive agreement on the future of Russian basing rights in Syria. HTS’s decision to end Russian financial involvement in Tartus suggests that HTS intends to reassert Syrian control over the port, which makes it unlikely that Russia will maintain a military presence there.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7, however.
• IDF Resignations: The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed SDF faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate and possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish. The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.
• Iraqi Militia Disarmament: The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.
• Iraqi Politics: An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.
• Russia in Syria: Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus.

Iran Update, January 20, 2025

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 19.

Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.[i] Hamas released three female Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[ii] Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank in exchange.[iii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) facilitated the entry of 630 humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip on January 19.[iv] Israel is required to support the entry of 600 aid trucks into the Gaza Strip daily during the first phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.[v]

The IDF fired warning shots at approaching Gazans in the Gaza Strip on January 20.[vi] Palestinian medical officials reported that IDF injured eight Gazans in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[vii] A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF also injured two individuals in the central Gaza Strip.[viii] The IDF warned Gazans on January 19 to avoid approaching Israeli forces in designated areas.[ix]

 Iran Update, January 16, 2025

The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue.[i] Both sides resolved the issue. Hamas reportedly renegotiated the names of the Palestinian prisoners it expects Israel to release as part of the agreement.[ii] An Israeli official confirmed that both sides resolved the issue, and the Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17. The ceasefire will take effect on January 19, if approved.[iii]

A senior Israeli official confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will remain in the Philadelphi Corridor during the first 42-day phase of the ceasefire.[iv] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, was a major point of contention between Israel and Hamas during the ceasefire talks.[v] The official stated that Israel will stay in the Philadelphi Corridor beyond the first phase of the ceasefire until Israel achieves its war aims.[vi] These aims include the release of all hostages. The IDF will gradually withdraw from the remaining parts of the Gaza Strip to a 700-meter-deep buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries, however.[vii]  Israel will also temporarily halt air reconnaissance over the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[viii]   Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. Reconstitution is a very time- and resource-intensive task even under ideal conditions when the reconstituting force is out of contact with the opposing force. It includes restoring degraded units to combat effectiveness and increase their survivability.[ix] IDF operations have destroyed Hamas‘ military organization in the Gaza Strip by damaging the organization so badly that it cannot be made usable without being completely rebuilt. Israel has also depleted Hamas’ weapons stockpile. Hamas can execute limited reorganization tasks, perhaps even including efforts to organize isolated cells under some semblance of a military hierarchy. The regenerative tasks that would create true, cohesive military units within a fighting organization would take months free of Israeli interference to complete. Regenerating the weapons stockpile is similarly impossible in the 42-day window.[x]

Regeneration of Hamas’ military force is not possible in this 42-day window. Regeneration requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.[xi] The replacement of personnel to a capable level requires training, which is not possible without sanctuary and a period longer than 42 days. Hamas may be able to undertake some minimal training, but these newly trained fighters will be unable to seriously impede Israeli forces if the IDF chooses to resume combat operations. Recent reports indicate that Hamas has intensified recruitment efforts, but these recruits are inexperienced and untrained.[xii]

The IDF will be able to rapidly re-seize areas it withdraws from if the ceasefire deal collapses after the first phase. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). A representative of KDP leader Masoud Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, on January 13.[xiii] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media that Barzani likely seeks to pressure the SDF to conclude an agreement with Turkey and the SNA to “prevent the destruction” of Kurdish areas in Syria. Turkey and the SNA continue to threaten the SDF positions in northeastern Syria.[xiv] The KDP has steadily improved its relationship with Turkey in recent years, primarily due to the KDP’s hostility to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[xv] Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses ”PKK” as a euphemism for the entire SDF.[xvi]

The KDP is also pressuring the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the HTS-led interim government. Masoud Barzani met with Abdi in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 16.[xvii] A senior KDP member told Western media that Barzani and Abdi focused on unifying Kurdish political efforts in Syria.[xviii] The KDP has historically aligned itself with the Kurdish National Council, a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties.[xix] The SDF’s political body is led by the Kurdish National Council’s political rival.[xx] Barzani’s representative also met with Kurdish National Council officials on January 13 to attempt to dissolve tensions between the Syrian Kurdish political parties.[xxi]

Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.[xxii] A PKK official separately told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria.[xxiii] Abdi similarly said that the PKK would withdraw from Syria if Turkey agreed to a ceasefire.[xxiv] The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view. Turkey has also explicitly called for the destruction of the YPG/PKK and views the SDF and YPG and PKK as undistinguishable.[xxv]

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara addressed Israeli military activity in southern Syria on January 16 during a meeting with the Qatari foreign minister.[xxvi] Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power.[xxvii] He emphasized that Israeli forces must return to the 1974 disengagement line in the Golan Heights and that UN forces should deploy to the buffer zone.[xxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the fall of the Syrian regime.[xxix] Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.”[xxx]

Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons.[xxxi] The Israeli strike also killed the mayor of Ghadir al Bustan.[xxxii] The January 15 strike appears to be the first IDF strike that has directly targeted HTS-led government forces.[xxxiii] It remains unclear at this time how much effort Shara will devote to the restoration of the 1974 disengagement line with Israel and whether this statement is predominantly due to public pressure after the January 15 attack.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire Deal: The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue. Both sides resolved the issue.
• Military Implications for Ceasefire: Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.
• Kurdish Coordination: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the SDF: A PKK official told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria. The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire in northern Syria difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view.
• Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Israel: Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power. Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.” Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons.

 Iran Update, January 15, 2025

Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 15.[i] Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on January 19.[ii] Hamas confirmed that it agreed to the final draft agreement on January 15.[iii] The agreement outlines three phases, as proposed by US President Joe Biden in May 2024.[iv] During the first phase, which will last for 42 days beginning on January 19, Hamas must release 33 hostages.[v] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will gradually withdraw from the central Gaza Strip to an 800-meter-deep buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries during the first phase.[vi] Reuters reported that ”Israel will release 30 Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli civilian and 50 Palestinian prisoners for every female Israeli soldier that Hamas releases.”[vii] Israel will also allow displaced Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip during this phase.[viii] Israel and Hamas will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a permanent ceasefire.[ix] This presumably means that if negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire fail, the fighting would resume. The third phase of the ceasefire reportedly includes provisions for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip supervised by Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations.[x]

Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.[xi] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Corridor was a major point of contention between Israel and Hamas during the ceasefire talks.[xii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced on January 15 that Hamas "backed down" on its demand for an IDF withdrawal from the corridor "at the last minute."[xiii]

A large number of Iraqi political parties boycotted parliament on January 15, likely to demonstrate their ability to rally sufficient support to block parliament.[xiv] Iraqi media reported that “the majority of [political] blocs” boycotted parliament because Parliament Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani and the two deputy speakers did not place the General Amnesty Law on Parliament’s agenda.[xv] The Iraqi Parliament Speaker and the two deputies are responsible for ”jointly” determining the agenda.[xvi] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[xvii] This law has been a long-standing demand of Sunni political parties in Iraq and was part of the “political agreement paper” that enabled the formation of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s administration in 2022.[xviii] Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party announced on January 13 that it would boycott parliament until the speaker places the General Amnesty Law on Parliament’s agenda.[xix] The newly-formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition separately discussed the implementation of the General Amnesty Law in a meeting on January 11 suggesting that this coalition may have boycotted parliament on January 15 as well.[xx] This coalition includes Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai, and Mashhadani, among others.[xxi]

Mashhadani and his allies, including the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, may also have deliberately blocked the General Amnesty Law in order to block the passage of the Intelligence Service Law, which was also on the agenda.[xxii] The Intelligence Service Law was also on the December 5, 2024, agenda but Parliament again failed to reach quorum.[xxiii] There are no other laws on both the December 5 and January 15, 2025, agendas.[xxiv] A member of the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee told Iraqi media that the Intelligence Service Law expanded the ”legal cover” for the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which is now led by an Iranian-backed Badr Organization-linked director.[xxv] The Parliamentary boycott comes after several notable Sunni politicians, including Mashhadani, called in December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[xxvi] The boycott also comes after Khanjar warned in December 2024 that Sunnis would turn to “other parties” that oppose dialogue and negotiation if the Iraqi federal government fails to defend them, suggesting that Sunni Iraqis remain frustrated by the federal government’s treatment of the Sunni community.[xxvii]

Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara on January 15, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm. Syrian interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and interim Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxviii] The Syrian officials also met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin.[xxix] A meeting between key defense and security stakeholders suggests that the parties likely discussed military coordination in northern Syria, where the Turkish aircraft and drones are supporting the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) against the SDF. CTP-ISW previously assessed that HTS and Turkey are coordinating to disarm and integrate the SDF into the HTS-led defense apparatus.[xxx] Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the SDF in a military operation if it does not disarm. Turkey has directly supported SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River since at least late December 2024.[xxxi] Turkish support efforts could also be a precursor to a Turkish operation into Syria. Shaibani said during a press conference in Ankara that the HTS-led government will not allow Syrian territory to be used as a ”launchpad” for actors to threaten Turkey, signaling HTS support for Turkey’s effort to destroy the SDF.[xxxii]

The SDF has continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF. Fidan suggested on January 10 that Turkey would give the Syrian interim government an opportunity to disarm and dissolve the SDF before Turkey takes military action.[xxxiii] HTS and the SDF have not yet made tangible progress toward an agreement. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said on January 14 that he and HTS leader Ahmed al Shara have not agreed on the terms of the SDF and Kurdish-controlled government’s integration into the new Syrian military and political establishment but are in the process of forming a committee to discuss such issues.[xxxiv] Shaibani confirmed during a press conference in Ankara that Syrian officials are engaged in “dialogue and negotiation” with the SDF.[xxxv] Abdi maintained that he seeks a “decentralized” administration and wants the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” rather than on an “individual” level.”[xxxvi] Abdi likely calculates that maintaining some degree of Kurdish political and security autonomy would provide Kurds in northeastern Syria with better security guarantees than if the Kurdish-controlled government and SDF fully subordinated themselves to a centralized government. The ongoing Turkish and SNA attacks on the SDF have likely heightened Abdi’s concerns about the need to retain political and security autonomy. HTS officials have maintained that they will not allow any “federal” entities in Syria, however, and are unlikely to capitulate on this demand.[xxxvii] Shaibani declared in Ankara that the HTS-led interim government cannot ”accept” the SDF in its current form outside the central government.[xxxviii] Abdi also mentioned that the SDF would allow HTS to take control of the oil fields in SDF-held territory, provided that the profits of the oil fields are distributed “fairly.”[xxxix]

 Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 15. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on January 19. Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Politics: A large number of Iraqi political parties boycotted parliament on January 15, likely to demonstrate their ability to rally sufficient support to block parliament. The Iraqi Parliament Speaker and his allies, including the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, may also have deliberately blocked the General Amnesty Law in order to block the passage of the Intelligence Service Law, which was also on the agenda.
• Syria-Turkey Meeting: Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara on January 15, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF. The SDF has continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry.

 Iran Update, January 14, 2025

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is confronting small pockets of locally organized fighter cells in areas under its control. Some of these groups are led by known Assad regime officials who have military experience and control pre-existing militias.[i] HTS-led forces have successfully confronted and suppressed these isolated incidents of resistance in a way that mirrors the Assad regime’s counter-revolutionary approach at the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011-2012.[ii] The HTS-led forces have deployed tanks and used attack helicopters and drones to target pro-regime forces in coastal Syria.[iii] These deployments have enabled HTS-led forces to swiftly confront small groups of regime remnants.[iv] The organization, coordination, size, and spread of these opposition groups do not currently appear to strain HTS-led forces‘ bandwidth. An increase in pro-Assad activity coupled with an ISIS resurgence in HTS-held areas would very likely present HTS with a bandwidth problem, however, and thus impede future efforts to suppress dissent.[v]

A pro-Assad group is attempting to coordinate and expand attacks targeting HTS-led forces but has yet to demonstrate any ability to do so. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” announced in late December 2024 the launch of armed resistance against the HTS-led interim government.[vi] The group has since claimed on multiple occasions that its fighters have attacked and killed interim government forces. It remains unclear whether the group has had any real involvement in these attacks, however.[vii] The “Syrian Popular Resistance” claimed on January 13 that it killed over 35 HTS-led forces in western Homs near the Lebanon-Syria border in coordination with fighters from Hermel, Lebanon.[viii] Some security analysts attributed the clashes to Lebanese Hezbollah or smugglers, omitting mention of the ”Syrian Popular Resistance.”[ix] The interim government gave no comment on the clashes, which would be surprising if opposition fighters had indeed killed 35 HTS-led fighters. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” also claimed to be affiliated with a former Syrian regime officer who led an attack taking interim government forces hostage in Latakia on January 14.[x] The militia leader did not mention the ”Syrian Popular Resistance” in a video he posted shortly after the attack.[xi] That the perpetrators of these attacks do not independently acknowledge any affiliation with the "Syrian Popular Resistance” suggests that this coordinating body is largely aspirational at this time. The formation of an opposition group that operates under the Syrian Popular Resistance would likely strain the interim government’s bandwidth and make them less effective in responding to anti-HTS resistance.

A likely Islamist HTS splinter group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government on January 11. The group, which calls itself the “Sayf al Bahr Battalion,” reportedly formed on January 3 after defecting from HTS.[xii] The group’s spokesperson, Abu Khaled al Shami, accused HTS leader Ahmed al Shara of stripping HTS of its “Islamic character and working to dissolve it in the name of the secular civil state.”[xiii] Shami announced the “start of the fighting” against HTS-led forces in a statement on January 11.[xiv] Shami called on Syrians to prevent their sons from joining the new Syrian army and to reject nationalism and secularism.[xv] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion claimed to fire on HTS military vehicles at an unspecified town in Rif Dimashq on January 11.[xvi] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that this attack took place or verify the exact nature and origin of the group. CTP-ISW has observed the formation of nascent opposition against HTS, particularly along the Syrian coast.[xvii] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion appears to be the first organized opposition faction that has defected from HTS. Armed opposition from this group could encourage more extreme jihadist elements in HTS’s coalition to revolt against its rule.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians in Baghdad on January 13, which is consistent with previous indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the October 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[xviii] Barzani held separate meetings with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, and Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai. Barzani emphasized the role of Parliament in “strengthening national dialogue” in his meeting with Mashhadani.[xix] Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians recently called in mid-December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[xx] It is unclear where Barzani was referring to these politicians’ call when he mentioned ”national dialogue.”

Barzani also discussed the 2025 Iraqi budget with Iraqi political officials on January 13. Barzani called on the Iraqi judiciary to “guarantee the [KRG’s] financial rights” during a meeting with Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan. Barzani and former interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi reportedly agreed to amend the 2025 budget to guarantee the salaries of [KRG] employees.”[xxi] The KRG recently threatened on January 8 to withdraw from the Iraqi government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[xxii]

A source close to nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr separately claimed on January 13 that Sadr opposes the return of his political bloc—the Shia National Movement—to politics. The Sadrist political bloc withdrew from Parliament in 2022, enabling the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in parliament. Sadr’s reported opposition to his political bloc reentering politics is noteworthy given that some Sunni politicians have recently aligned with Sadr on some issues. CTP-ISW previously noted that the alignment of Sadr’s and Sunni positions could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Israel and Hamas have reportedly made progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement but have yet to solve a key outstanding issue.[xxiii] An unspecified Palestinian official told the BBC on January 14 that the final draft of the ceasefire agreement allows Israel to maintain an 800-meter-long buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries.[xxiv] Israel’s ability to establish such a buffer zone was reportedly a significant point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas.[xxv] Israel and Hamas have yet to solve another key outstanding issue--the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors--however.[xxvi]

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 14 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, has “agreed in principle” to the terms of the final ceasefire draft.[xxvii] Sinwar may be making autonomous decisions about the ceasefire agreement without consulting Hamas central leadership.[xxviii] The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13 that Sinwar has begun operating autonomously and ignoring the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. It is unclear how Sinwar would implement the terms of a ceasefire agreement given that he lacks sufficient command-and-control across the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip.[xxix]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Israel on January 14 that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new militants as it has lost.”[xxx] Blinken stated that Hamas’ new recruitment effort is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.” The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on January 13 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[xxxi] These new recruits are not capable of successfully operating in organized military units given that Hamas has lost adequate safe areas to train new recruits.[xxxii] Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas the sanctuary to conduct training programs, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them safe areas there by conducting repeated raids.[xxxiii] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train new recruits in a way that would make them competent and capable of fighting against the IDF.

The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization.[xxxiv] Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[xxxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Small pockets of locally organized, armed resistance against HTS have emerged in Syria. The expansion of such resistance would strain the bandwidth of HTS-led forces and impede any efforts to suppress this resistance.
• Iraq: KRG President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Sunni politicians in Baghdad, which is consistent with early indications that Kurdish and Sunni parties are trying to build a political coalition ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas made significant progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement. They appear to have yet to resolve disagreement over whether the IDF would withdraw from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, however.

 Iran Update, January 13, 2025

Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a "breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Israel and Hamas have yet to solve at least two outstanding issues, however.[i] Two Israeli officials told Axios that mediators from Qatar, the US, and Egypt presented Hamas with a “final draft” of the agreement.[ii] The draft stipulates that Hamas must release 33 hostages during a 42-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israel will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining hostages in exchange for "high-profile" Hamas members, according to details shared by an Israeli military correspondent.[iii]

Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.[iv] Israeli officials told an Israeli military correspondent that the IDF will maintain its presence in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, which are two operationally significant IDF-held areas, between the first and second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[v] Another presumably separate Israeli official told Axios that the IDF will “gradually withdraw” to a buffer zone along the border and that the IDF will withdraw from the corridors.[vi] The official did not make clear when the IDF would withdraw from the corridors. A Hamas official told CNN that negotiations regarding the buffer zone and a permanent ceasefire are ongoing and remain “sticking points.”[vii] Hamas demands the buffer zone return to its pre-war width of 300-500 meters, while Israel insists on a two-kilometer-wide zone along Gaza’s eastern and northern boundaries.[viii] The IDF intends to use this buffer zone to protect Israeli communities in southern Israel. Israel will not completely withdraw from the Gaza Strip until its war objectives are achieved, among them the return of all the hostages, according to Israeli officials speaking to an Israeli military correspondent.[ix]

Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council.[x] Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[xi] Hamas has obtained some of these resources by hijacking aid convoys. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Hamas is using unexploded ordinance to build new improvised explosive devices.[xii] New recruits are not capable of successfully disassembling and reassembling unexploded ordinance to build improvised explosive devices. Such efforts require relatively experienced explosives experts. The loss of those experts due to Israeli military action would likely have outsized effects on the nascent reconstructed Hamas military organization, which will already need substantial time and space to reconstitute itself.

Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization. Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. Military units have institutionalized command, recruitment, and replenishment functions that make them resilient in the face of casualties and degradation. Individual cells of fighters lack this institutionalization and are relatively easy to destroy. A decentralized, guerrilla force like the one Hamas employs can “wait out” the Israelis and prepare to rebuild, however. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them sanctuary there by repeatedly raiding areas where Hamas is strong.[xiii] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train their new recruits to make them competent and capable against the IDF.[xiv]

Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[xv] The successful IDF effort to isolate the northern Gaza Strip both above and below ground means that it is highly unlikely that Sinwar is capable of communicating with forces in the north by runner or other physical means. Sinwar or someone close to him could presumably communicate electronically, but the use of electronic communications would be extremely risky and therefore unlikely to enable Sinwar to exert day-to-day control over Hamas’ military organization in the northern Strip. Sinwar likely retains significant control over Hamas forces in the central Gaza Strip and in Khan Younis, however.[xvi] The IDF raids these areas only rarely and it is not permanently present close to many of the major Gazan towns and cities in the Central Camps or Khan Younis areas.

The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[xvii] It is also far from clear that Sinwar would decide to rebuild Hamas in the same way Hamas built itself from the 1990s to 2023, given the obvious failure of Hamas’ military operations in the Gaza Strip and the inability of those operations to achieve any of Hamas’ war aims. These war aims include the destruction of the Israeli state by triggering a regional war or the destruction of the Abraham Accords.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey and the SNA continued shelling SDF positions along both the line of control and deeper into SDF-held territory on January 13.[xviii] The SNA has also reportedly deployed forces to the line of control near Tal Tamr since at least January 8.[xix] These deployments and the shelling around Tal Tamr will almost certainly force the SDF to deploy forces to the area to protect against any possible Turkish-SNA offensive, thus fixing significant SDF forces far from the main fighting near the Euphrates. Turkey and the SNA can therefore force the SDF to stretch its bandwidth by allocating forces to Tal Tamr without an attack from Tal Tamr. Stretching the SDF’s bandwidth would likely make Turkish or SNA operations near Kobani or the Euphrates River much easier.

Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River. Turkey and the SNA are attempting to isolate the SDF forces in their bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates by striking along supply lines and key nodes behind the front while pressuring the SDF bridgeheads with ground attacks. Local, anti-SDF media reported that Turkey struck an SDF barracks and two guard posts in Sarrin, east of the Qara Qozak bridge.[xx]  The SDF operates from a base in Sarrin that Russian forces evacuated after the fall of the regime, meaning that Turkey is striking an SDF rear base that could be used to sustain the bridgeheads.[xxi] Turkey also reportedly conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions west of the Tishreen Dam.[xxii]

The SNA has followed up these airstrikes by pressuring the SDF bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates. Geolocated footage posted on January 13 showed SNA-affiliated fighters firing small arms at an unseen target in a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxiii] The SDF posted footage on January 12 of an SDF drone strike that targeted an SNA personnel carrier.[xxiv] Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains as of this writing, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to its rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.[xxv] The enemy force—if it discovers a withdrawal is underway—will typically attempt to turn the withdrawal into a rout to destroy the withdrawing force.[xxvi]

Geolocated footage posted by the commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—on January 13 showed SNA armored vehicles traveling through a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxvii] Abu Amsha claimed that the video showed SNA reinforcements arriving at the frontlines.[xxviii] The SNA may seek to move more forces to the frontline in order to continue pressuring the SDF positions or prepare for a large-scale assault to collapse the bridgehead.

 

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a "breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.
• Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Leadership: The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad.
• Turkish and Syrian National Army (SNA) Operations: Turkey and the SNA may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River.
• SDF Bridgeheads on the Euphrates: Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains around the bridgeheads, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to their rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.

 Iran Update, January 12, 2025

Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as Tehran has continued to expand its nuclear program. The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—conducted the latest air defense exercise across northern and western Iran on January 12.[i] This exercise notably covered the Iranian nuclear facilities around Arak and Fordow.[ii] Though Iran typically conducts air defense exercises around this time of year, this activity nonetheless probably reflects Iranian leaders’ assumption that they will face airstrikes against their nuclear program in the near term. This assumption has no bearing on the likelihood that the United States or Israel would actually conduct such a strike, however.

 

The Artesh exercises tested the manned and unmanned aircrafts as well as the following air defense systems, according to Iranian state media:[iii]

• Rad missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, anti-tank missile designed for T-72 tanks, fired from a 125 millimeters (mm) caliber barrel, and with a target distance of four kilometers (km).[iv]
• Majid An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired, electro-optical-guided missile with a maximum target range of 15 km.[v]
• Talash missile. An Iranian-made, long-range, mobile surface-to-air air defense missile system, capable of hitting all altitude targets with at a maximum range of 200km.[vi]
• Misagh-3 missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired system with a laser fuse and maximum range of five km and flight altitude of 3,500 meters (m).[vii]
• Khordad-15 system. An Iranian-made, long-range air defense system with a detection range of 85 km and target range of 45 km.[viii]
• Shahid Jalilvand radar system. An Iranian-made, medium-range, phased array radar system able to detect small flying targets with low cross-sections in three dimensions and a 24-hour operational continuity.[ix]
• Samavat radar-controlled artillery system. A short-range Iranian version of the Swiss low-altitude Skyguard radar system with a range of 4 km and uses an anti-aircraft 35mm Oerlikon caliber barrel gun.[x]
• Seraj radar-controlled air defense artillery system. Iranian-made artillery system with a 35mm caliber barrel gun, radar, and new optical system.[xi]

This activity comes after the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted an air defense exercise around the other major Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz on January 7.[xii] This flurry of air defense activity is part of the larger military exercise that the Iranian armed forces are holding across Iran until March 2025.[xiii] This exercise includes the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is unlikely that Iran could repel a US or Israeli airstrike given the inferiority of the Iranian systems that have been used in these exercises relative to the modern US and Israeli capabilities. This is especially the case given that Israel neutralized Iran’s S-300s—its most advanced air defense platform—in October 2024.

Iran could use part of its exercises to prepare for an attack on US or Israeli targets, though CTP-ISW assesses that this possibility is relatively unlikely at this time. Iran previously conducted exercises ahead of its Operation True Promise and Operation True Promise II attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 respectively.[xiv] And Iranian officials have yet to fulfill their vow to conduct a third missile attack on Israel.

Fatah released a statement on January 11 affirming that the PA will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict in the West Bank.[xv] Fatah stated that Hamas is responsible for the destruction of the Gaza Strip because Hamas ”gambled with the interests and resources of the Palestinian people for Iran’s benefit.” PA forces have been operating in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank, since early December 2024 to degrade Palestinian militias networks there.

 Iran Update, January 11, 2025 

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus. The Syrian Interior Ministry announced on January 11 the arrest of ISIS members who were planning a suicide bombing attack at the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[i] The ministry stated that the General Intelligence Directorate and General Security Administration coordinated to thwart the attack.[ii] ISIS has previously attacked Shia shrines in Syria, including in July 2023, when ISIS detonated a bomb near the Sayyidah Zeinab Shrine, killing six individuals and wounding 20 others.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the interim government claim about the most recent attempted ISIS attack. If true, it would indicate that ISIS seeks to attack Shia targets to stoke sectarian tensions and delegitimize HTS as the primary ruling power in Syria. HTS announced recently that it has accepted responsibility for securing the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[iv]

HTS-led Syrian interim government officials met with a senior Lebanese delegation in Damascus to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration on January 11.[v] HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with a Lebanese delegation headed by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[vi] Shara said that they agreed to securing the border to prevent illegal smuggling as a top priority.[vii] Such efforts could impede Lebanese Hezbollah efforts to reconstitute militarily. Hezbollah has long relied on Syria as a conduit to receive funds and materiel from Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah had lost its ground access to Iran via Syria and signaled his willingness to restore this connection with the support of the new interim government in Syria in December 2024.[viii] The border policies that the HTS-led interim government and Lebanon enact in the coming months will determine how easily Iran can revive its ground access to Hezbollah.

The Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) launched an operation targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Hamrin Mountains, Diyala Province. The Iraqi Air Force conducted an airstrike on January 10 that killed four ISIS members.[ix] Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah visited the site of the airstrike on January 11.[x] The PMF announced on January 11 that the Iraqi Army and PMF Diyala Operations Command launched a security operation under the direction of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to “clear and search” the Hamrin Mountains.[xi] The Diyala Operations Commander, Talib al Musawi, is affiliated with the Badr Organization and the Badr-controlled PMF 1st, 4th, 23rd, and 24th brigades all operate in Diyala.[xii]

The security operation in Diyala Province comes after Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) special operations forces conducted military exercises in neighboring Kermanshah Province, Iran, between January 4 and 9.[xiii] The Gilan Province-based Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Saberin Special Forces Brigade participated in the exercises.[xiv] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour stated on the sidelines of the exercise that Diyala Province was previously a “cradle of terrorist and Takfiri groups.”[xv] The exercises and Pakpour’s statement highlight heightened concerns among Iranian officials over external threats, particularly the possibility of ISIS infiltrations into Iran.

• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted ISIS attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus.
• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government hosted a senior Lebanese delegation to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Army and PMF launched an operation targeting ISIS in the Hamrin Mountains in eastern Iraq.

 Iran Update, January 10, 2025

There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the Iranian-backed Shia parties in these elections. A prominent Sunni politician, Khamis al Khanjar, met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masoud Barzani on January 9 to discuss the upcoming parliamentary elections and “the formation of alliances that can guarantee the rights of their people and regions.”[i] This meeting comes as Khanjar helped form a political coalition—the United Sunni Leadership Coalition—with other prominent Sunni leaders on January 7.<a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-10-2025#_edn3d735d366ff89b1e0ba0e820657f73f7c0e29edecfef5daab01186bb2d1cbf892" name="_edn3d735d366ff89b1e0ba0e820657f73f7c0e29edecfef5daab01186bb2