Iran Updates

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provide these updates weekly on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

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Iran Update, November 3, 2024

The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Palestinian militias to fight Israel again.[i] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is looking for additional routes to destabilize Israel and incite terrorism, particularly utilizing the West Bank, due to the IDF's degradation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Iran and Hamas have observed the military degradation of Hamas’ units in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, is likely trying to reconstitute regardless of how badly the IDF defeated it as defeat is a temporary condition.[ii] It does not follow that Iran and Hamas will decide to rebuild Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the same way again. Iran and Hamas have almost certainly learned many lessons from the October 7 War, including the difficulty of rearming and rebuilding militias in an area that can be easily isolated, such as the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ severe degradation in the Gaza Strip and the difficulty in rebuilding Hamas’ military wing isolated there could cause Iran and Hamas to redouble their efforts to strengthen Hamas and Palestinian military organizations elsewhere, including in the West Bank. Iran has increased its efforts to smuggle weapons and other materiel into the West Bank in recent years.[iii] Iran’s efforts have so far had only limited success.

The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[iv] The IDF said on November 3 that the Egoz Unit captured Ali Suleiman al Asi in Saida, Daraa Province, in recent months.[v] The IDF said that al Asi collected intelligence on Israeli operations along the Syrian border with the Golan Heights for “future terror activity” on behalf of Iran.[vi] The IDF “closely monitor[ed]” al Asi before his capture.[vii] The IDF did not specify when the raids took place, but Israeli special operations forces (SOF) have conducted numerous covert raids into Lebanon to disrupt Hezbollah border infrastructure since October 2023.[viii] The IDF said that Aadi’s capture prevented a future attack and exposed Iranian attempts to gather intelligence on the Syria-Golan Heights border.[ix]

Iran’s intelligence collection about Israeli border movements on the Syrian-Golan Heights border is consistent with previous Iranian-backed efforts to gather intelligence to inform future ground attacks. Hamas undertook similar intelligence-gathering exercises ahead of the October 7 attacks.[x] Hezbollah observers on the Israel-Lebanon border likely monitored Israeli border patrols and movements in planning Hezbollah’s ground infiltration into Israel.[xi] The intelligence collection effort on the Syrian border could support future ground attacks or small-scale incursions, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims.[xii] Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[xiii] Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives. Netanyahu made these remarks during a visit to the Israel-Lebanon border on November 3 to meet with IDF commanders.[xiv] Israel has designed its current ground operations to dismantle border infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah from conducting direct fire and ground attacks into Israel.[xv] These operations do not seek to physically push Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River and have not done so. 

Israel is currently engaged in indirect negotiations with Hezbollah to obtain a ceasefire deal that may require Hezbollah military forces to withdraw north of the Litani.[xvi] The language of the deal from a recently leaked draft stipulates that Lebanese army “forces, infrastructure and weapons will be the only armed groups and assets deployed” south of the Litani River following the ceasefire.[xvii] It is unclear if Hezbollah will accept a deal that would call for its forces to move north. Hezbollah has not fulfilled its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1701, which required its forces to withdraw from areas south of the Litani River. The implementation of a large-scale Hezbollah withdrawal is extremely complicated, particularly given that many Hezbollah fighters were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[xviii] Unspecified Israeli sources stated that the IDF has identified more than thirty “legitimate targets” in Iraq should Israel decide to launch an attack against the militias. Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 31 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent strikes on Iran using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[xix] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[xx] CTP-ISW recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by approximately 106 percent between September and October 2024.[xxi]

 military officials told Elaph that Israel and the United States have been using satellites to monitor Iranian attempts to transfer ballistic missiles and other unspecified but related equipment from Iran to Iraqi territory.[xxii] Iran began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles, in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[xxiii]

The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States would not be able to restrain Israel’s response.[xxiv] An anonymous US official told Axios that the United States sent this message to Tehran through the Swiss diplomats, adding that the United States cannot confirm that Israel’s next attack will be as ”calibrated and targeted” as before. The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.[xxv] 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3.[xxvi] This is part of a larger US military effort to increase its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[xxvii]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.[xxviii] The IDF stated that the assessment focused on joint preparations against regional threats, especially against threats from Iran. Kurilla toured the US THAAD missile defense system battery during his trip to Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Hamas to fight Israel again.
• Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israeli prime minister stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims, which is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions. Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives
• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.
• US Diplomatic Efforts: The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States will not be able to restrain Israel’s response.
• US Posture in the Middle East: US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3. US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.
• Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed its second attack since announcing its existence.

Iran Update, November 2, 2024

The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond. Western officials believe that the regime is debating how and whether it should respond to the strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal.[i] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on November 2 that Iran will give a “tooth-breaking response” to Israel and the United States.[ii] This warning comes after Khamenei issued an order on October 29 to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is Iran’s highest defense and foreign policy body, instructing the SNSC to prepare a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[iii] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer and Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Esmail Kowsari claimed on November 2 that the SNSC agreed on a “military response” to Israel that will involve Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[iv] It is more likely that Kowsari would have insight into the SNSC’s decision-making due to his deep personal relationships with top IRGC commanders rather than due to his position in the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[v] Kowsari’s claim is consistent with Western media reports that Iran’s retaliation could include Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel.[vi] Unspecified Iranian sources speaking to Qatari-owned, London-based al Araby al Jadeed denied on November 2 that Iran will launch an attack from Iraq, instead insisting that Iran will respond from Iranian territory.[vii] These differing statements from Iranian officials likely reflect current debates within the regime about how the regime should respond to the Israeli strikes.

The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[viii] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the deployment of an unspecified number of additional ballistic missile defense destroyers, fighter squadron and tanker aircraft, and several U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers to the Middle East. AP reported, citing unspecified US officials, that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is scheduled to leave the Middle East in the middle of November and return to its home port in San Diego.[ix] The United States will still maintain the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Israel and the Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit in the eastern Mediterranean area despite the imminent departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln.[x] Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated that these new deployments demonstrate the “flexible nature of U.S. global defense posture” to deploy world-wide on short notice.[xi]

The IDF deployed an additional brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2.[xii] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade started clearing operations in Jabalia on November 2. The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade is the IDF’s largest infantry brigade, consisting of five battalions.[xiii] The 900th Infantry Brigade specializes in operations in urban environments against ”guerilla” cells in the West Bank.[xiv] This is notable because Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells. This makes the 900th Infantry Brigade well-suited to the task of destroying these cells, particularly within Jabalia City and Refugee Camp.

The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas. Israeli forces killed the commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector Mein Musa Az al Din and the commander of Hezbollah’s Coastal Sector Artillery forces Hassan Majed Diab around Tyre on November 1.[xv] Hezbollah previously claimed on November 1 that it blocked an Israeli reconnaissance force advancing through the Wadi Hamoul area, north of Alma al Shaab.[xvi] Commanders may choose to assign reconnaissance units to penetrate deeper into enemy territory due to ”a decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.”[xvii] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[xviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.
• US Posture in the Middle East: The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed the 900th Infantry Brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2. This brigade, which specializes in operations against “guerilla” cells in the West Bank’s urban environments, would be well-suited to operations in Jabalia’s urban environment, where Hamas has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas.
• Israeli Raids in Lebanon: Israeli naval special operations forces captured a senior member of Hezbollah’s naval forces in Batroun, central Lebanon, according to an unspecified Israeli official.

Iran Update, November 1, 2024

Western media reported that Iran will retaliate for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes around Iran, possibly by launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles from Iraq.[i] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian Supreme National Security Council on October 29 to plan a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[ii] Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[iii] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has repeatedly attacked Israel in recent months, primarily using the following weapons systems:

• Shahed-101 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-101 has a range of around 600 kilometers.[iv]
• Shahed-136 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-136 reportedly has a range of 2,500 kilometers.[v]
• KAS-04 drone. The KAS-04 is a variant of the Iranian-designed, long-range Samad drone.[vi]
• Al Arfad drone. The al Arfad is a variant of the KAS-04 drone.[vii]
• Arqab cruise missile. These are Iranian Paveh missiles with a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[viii]

Iran also began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles, in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[ix]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[x] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed nine drone attacks targeting unspecified locations across Israel on October 31 and November 1 alone.[xi] A source close to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq recently warned that the group plans to double its rate of attacks targeting Israel in November 2024.[xii] The recent Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attacks likely served, in part, as reconnaissance-in-force operations, which are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[xiii] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq could use these attacks to test and learn how to better bypass Israeli air defenses. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack against Israel, as opposed to a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory, would benefit Iran by allowing Tehran to preserve its dwindling long-range missile stockpile. Iran launched over 400 cruise and ballistic missiles at Israel in its April and October 2024 attacks.[xiv]

That Khamenei ordered a retaliation against Israel corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment that the recent IDF strikes on Iran inflicted significant damage to Iranian military and defense infrastructure. Three Iranian officials told the New York Times on November 1 that Khamenei ordered a retaliation after he reviewed a “detailed report. . . on the extent of the damage” of the IDF strikes.[xv] The sources added that Khamenei determined that the scope of the strikes was “too large to ignore” and that failing to retaliate “would mean admitting defeat.”[xvi] Senior US and Israeli officials recently confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[xvii] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.[xviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the damage to the air defenses has likely seriously degraded the Iranian ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.[xix] The IDF strikes also inflicted significant damage on facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs, which CTP-ISW previously assessed could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles for itself and its partners, such as Russia.[xx]

That Iran could direct an attack against Israel via its proxies in Iraq highlights the extent to which Iran has increased its military and political control over Federal Iraq. Iran has increasingly infiltrated Iraqi military and political institutions—such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iraqi Judiciary—in recent years.[xxi] The most recent example of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was the election of Shia Coordination Framework-backed politician Mahmoud al Mashhadani as Parliament Speaker on October 31.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Mashhadani received 181 votes, which is 16 votes more than the absolute majority required to become parliament speaker.[xxiii] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized after Mashhadani’s election that all Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, back Mashhadani.[xxiv]

Iran’s growing military and political control over Federal Iraq appears to be part of a broader Iranian strategy to turn Iraq into a base of operations from which Iran and its Axis of Resistance can conduct future operations and attacks against Israel. Iraq has increasingly become a focal point for cooperation and coordination among Axis of Resistance groups in recent months. A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants died in a US self-defense strike in Iraq in July 2024, highlighting increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups.[xxv] The Houthis and Hamas have separately opened political offices in Iraq in recent months, and Emirati media reported in June 2024 that Hamas was planning to relocate its political leadership to Baghdad.[xxvi] Growing Iranian influence in Iraq will threaten US and Israeli security and interests in the region, particularly as the United States is considering withdrawing its forces from Iraq.[xxvii]

Israeli forces engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southern Lebanon.[xxviii] Israeli forces began advancing toward Khiam on October 28. Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area on November 1.[xxix] Lebanese media reported small arms combat there as well.[xxx] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants a Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee panhandle. Despite the tactical significance of Khiam, Hezbollah does not appear to be mounting a particularly effective defense of the area. This behavior is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran will reportedly retaliate for the recent IDF strikes across Iran. Iran would be responding to the significant damage that the IDF inflicted upon Iranian air defenses and missile production facilities.
• Iraq: Iran may retaliate by ordering its Iraqi militias to fire a large volume of drones and missiles at Israel. That Iran is considering this option highlights the extent to which Iran has expanded its military and political influence in Iraq.
• Lebanon: The IDF engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon. The town is on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into Israel and observe the IDF and other targets in the area.

Iran Update, October 31, 2024

Israeli state-owned broadcaster Kan published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon.[i] The draft proposes that international mediators determine a date to begin the ceasefire and commence a 60-day “implementation period.” During this period, Lebanese Hezbollah would cease attacks against Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would cease offensive operations in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would gradually deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon before the implementation period ends. The LAF would be responsible for monitoring the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings. The LAF would also dismantle all non-state military infrastructure and confiscate arms.

The United States, Israel, and Lebanon, according to the proposal, would establish a "monitoring and enforcement mechanism” to address reported ceasefire violations. The United States will administer the mechanism, which would—in addition to Israel and Lebanon—include the United Nations and European and regional countries. The mechanism would develop measures to address ceasefire violations, such as sanctions packages. The mechanism would assess progress at the end of the implementation period and institute a permanent ceasefire. The IDF would at this point conduct a complete withdrawal from Lebanon within seven days. The United States and United Nations would separately facilitate Israel-Lebanon negotiations to achieve the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Hezbollah from operating south of the Litani River. Hezbollah has violated UNSCR 1701 repeatedly over many years.

US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials are currently discussing the ceasefire proposal. Senior US officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk met with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem on October 31 to that end.[ii] Hochstein previously spoke with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on October 30.[iii] Israeli Army Radio reported that there has been ”real progress” toward an agreement.[iv]

The success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation.[v] The proposal, in its current form, requires Hezbollah to cease attacks against Israel but does not explicitly require Hezbollah to disarm—only that the LAF must dismantle military infrastructure and confiscate weapons. The agreement could still be viable, however, so long as Hezbollah leaders accept the agreement and get their lower echelons to adhere to it. There is a risk that Hezbollah leaders cannot ensure that some of the rank-and-file militants stop attacks and surrender their weapons to the LAF, especially given the severe disruption to the Hezbollah command-and-control network. There may even be some exchanges of fire during the implementation period. This fighting would not necessarily mean that the ceasefire failed.

The LAF would need to disarm other non-state militias in southern Lebanon based on the text of the proposal. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain cells in Lebanon, particularly in the south, and Hezbollah commonly allows these and other Palestinian groups to launch attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory.[vi] The presence of these armed groups could complicate Hezbollah efforts to honor the ceasefire.

The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah forces to withdraw from south of the Litani River.[vii] The proposal instead stipulates that the LAF should be the only military force in the area.[viii] This language is remarkably similar to that of UNSCR 1701, which calls for southern Lebanon to be “free any armed personnel, assets, and weapons” other than those of the Lebanese state.[ix] UNSCR 1701 called in spirit for a Hezbollah withdrawal but fell short of providing for it explicitly.[x] Requiring Hezbollah to leave southern Lebanon would be extremely complicated given that many of Hezbollah militants were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails.[xi] The United States agreed to give Israel a “side letter” that would give assurances of US support if the LAF or UNIFIL fails to meet their respective obligations.[xii] Maintaining the option to operate in Lebanon is consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu saying on October 31 that the main Israeli priorities are to “enforce security, thwart attacks against [Israel], and act against the arming of our enemies despite all the pressures and constraints.”[xiii]  The side letter requests that Israel consult the United States before any Israeli strikes in Lebanon and that the strikes try to minimize harm to civilians.[xiv] The United States also requested that Israeli flights over Lebanon be used only for intelligence collection and refrain from breaking the sound barrier.[xv]

Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire. Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati said on October 30 that a deal could be announced “in the coming hours or days.”[xvi] Lebanese officials are reportedly avoiding criticizing any parts of the proposal publicly in order to provide space for continued negotiations.[xvii] The proposal published by Israeli media is dated October 26, but anonymous officials familiar with the negotiations have said that no major changes have been made since then.[xviii]

The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border.[xix] The division will include a quick reaction force to counter anti-Israel militancy in the Jordan Valley and to interdict weapons smuggling. The division will be subordinate to the IDF Central Command and cooperate with the Jordanian Army to secure the border region.[xx] The establishment of this new division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli media published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon. The success of the proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation. The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah to withdraw from south of the Litani River.
• Lebanon: Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails. Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire.
• Israel: The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border. The establishment of this division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.

Iran Update, October 30, 2024

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem reiterated normal Hezbollah themes and ideological points in his first speech as secretary general on October 30, suggesting his appointment will not spur drastic organizational change. Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Qassem on October 29 to replace Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed on September 27.[i] Qassem’s speech echoed similar topics to his speeches delivered after Nasrallah’s death but before Qassem’s appointment.[ii]

Qassem continued to attempt to obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon. Qassem bragged about Hezbollah's capabilities and fighting prowess, stating his intent to continue to “implement the war plan” against Israel that Nasrallah created.[iii] Qassem called on Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon to “reduce [Israeli] losses” and threatened that Israel would soon pay an “unprecedented price.”[iv]  Qassem continued to assert that Hezbollah fighters were successful on the battlefield and that “all the required capabilities are available to the resistance fighters on the front lines, and they are steadfast and capable.”[v] He also noted that Hezbollah fighters continue to launch attacks into northern Israel despite the widespread airstrikes targeting launch sites.[vi] He emphasized that Hezbollah is ”hurting” Israel, using the Binyamina base drone attack that killed four IDF personnel and injured 60 others as proof.[vii] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Northern Command said on October 21 that Hezbollah ”fails to carry out effective reinforcements and does not fight as a system” in southern Lebanon border villages where the IDF is operating, however.[viii] It is also notable that though Hezbollah is firing between 100 and 200 rockets into Israel every day, pre-war estimates indicated Hezbollah would be able to fire well over 1,000 rockets into Israel every day.[ix] This indicates that Hezbollah is either unwilling or unable to launch rockets into Israel at a higher rate.

Read more about Hezbollah’s efforts to disguise its military failure: Hezbollah’s Military Forces are Failing in Lebanon, by Brian Carter.

Qassem hinted at a possible shift in Hezbollah policy that would allow a Lebanon ceasefire to be separated from Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The new secretary general was less absolute regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip than Nasrallah had been before his death. Nasrallah had previously said that a ceasefire in Lebanon would have to be contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem appeared less resolute by saying that Hezbollah would accept ”appropriate” ceasefire conditions but insisted that "the basis for any negotiations is a ceasefire first."[x] Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[xi] Nasrallah had previously been very explicit that Hezbollah would not stop indirect fire attacks into Israel until the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip.[xii] Nasrallah held this unambiguous position before Israel began ground operations in southern Lebanon, however. The shift in Hezbollah’s position may be a result of both new Hezbollah leadership and the escalation of a war that has temporarily degraded Hezbollah's command, control, and logistical networks. Qassem said he believes that Hezbollah, not an international resolution, expelled Israel from Lebanon in 2006 and 2000, suggesting his reluctance to enter into a ceasefire agreement.[xiii]

Qassem expressed considerable skepticism that Israel would abide by a ceasefire agreement, citing what he sees as past Israeli violations of UNSCR 1701 and Israel’s vision for Lebanon. Qassem alleged that Israel regularly violated UNSCR 1701, but Hezbollah has violated the resolution since the end of the 2006 war by building massive military sites south of the Litani River that Israeli forces are now operating inside of Lebanon to destroy.[xiv] Qassem described Hezbollah's activities in southern Lebanon as a “proactive defense” against an Israeli intent to “eliminate” the resistance and “our people in the region.”[xv] A ”proactive” Hezbollah defense including ground forces designed to attack Israel is a violation of UNSC Resolution 1701. He claimed that Israel always intended to invade Lebanon and that Hezbollah ”harass[ment]” of northern Israeli towns with daily rocket and drone attacks did not cause Israel’s current operation.[xvi] This statement by Qassem is false. Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[xvii] Tens of thousands of Israeli civilians left northern Israel border villages and towns shortly after Hezbollah began attacking Israel with rockets, drones, and other systems on October 8, 2023.[xviii]

Qassem distanced himself and Hezbollah from Iran, stating that Hezbollah is not pursuing an Iranian project but is executing its plan to protect and liberate Lebanese land.[xix] He praised Iran for its “financial, media, and political support” and the “heavy price” that it pays for that support and its stance on Palestine.[xx] Emirati media cited an Iranian source that said that Qassem fled Lebanon on October 5 aboard the Iranian foreign minister’s plane.[xxi] CTP-ISW is unable to independently confirm this report. Qassem also thanked other Axis of Resistance groups for their support of Hezbollah and Palestine, singling out the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxii] Qassem’s praise for these groups is particularly notable given that several Houthi and Iraqi fighters have died in southern Lebanon since the Israeli campaign accelerated in late September 2024.[xxiii]

Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 significantly degraded Iran's integrated air defense system and made subsequent Israeli strikes on Iran easier and less risky. Senior US and Israeli officials confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[xxiv] The S-300 is the collective name for a number of individual platforms. Destroying the radars that the S-300 uses to engage targets, for example, would render the entirety of the S-300 system unable to engage air targets. The strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft in Iranian airspace.[xxv] It is not clear how well or how reliably these passive array detection radars can detect stealth aircraft in particular. Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the Lebanese Hezbollah attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 19.[xxvi] The damage to Iran's air defenses has likely seriously degraded Iran’s ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.

The IDF is signaling that it is preparing to end its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon. IDF officials told senior Israeli officials that it is an opportune time to obtain a diplomatic solution to end fighting with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and avoid a longer conflict in Lebanon during an Israeli cabinet meeting on October 29, according to unspecified Israeli officials.[xxvii] The Israeli officials said that the IDF is ”very close” to ending its initial phase of ground operations in Lebanese border villages.[xxviii] This reporting is consistent with recent reports that the IDF Northern Command expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks.[xxix] Israel and Lebanon are reportedly currently “in advanced stages” of ceasefire negotiations, which would involve a 60-day ceasefire followed by negotiations for a new mechanism to supervise southern Lebanon.[xxx] Senior US officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk will arrive in Israel on October 31 to meet with Israeli officials to discuss the most recent ceasefire proposal.[xxxi]

Israeli movement to secure a ceasefire suggests that the IDF believes it has achieved the military objectives dictated to it by Israeli political leadership, not that the ground operation has “failed.” Israeli ground and air operations have degraded Radwan special operations forces (SOF) assets to eliminate the threat of a Hezbollah ground infiltration into Israel. The IDF began its ground operations in southern Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities to conduct an October 7-style offensive and direct fire attacks into northern Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. The IDF said that the Radwan forces aimed to ”infiltrate Israeli territory and occupy [Israeli territory] near the northern border."[xxxii] Israeli operations along the Israel-Lebanon border have focused on removing Hezbollah Radwan SOF infrastructure that could have been used to launch ground attacks into Israel.[xxxiii] These raids have likely severely degraded if not destroyed Radwan infrastructure in border towns. The IDF recently announced that it “destroyed” Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a ground infiltration into Israel from Kfar Kila.[xxxiv] Israeli forces have destroyed at least seven major Radwan SOF sites during operations in southern Israel.[xxxv] 

The IDF Air Force also struck and killed Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF deputy commander Mustafa Ahmed Shahadi in the Nabatieh region of southern Lebanon on October 30.[xxxvi] The IDF said that Shahadi managed the Radwan Force’s combat plans in southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] Shahadi is the latest of at least ten Radwan SOF leaders that Israel has killed in Lebanon in 2024.[xxxviii] The IDF has also detained Radwan fighters during ground operations in southern Lebanon.[xxxix]

The IDF continues to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain along the Lebanese border to disrupt Hezbollah artillery observers’ ability to support indirect rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel.[xl] Israeli armor advanced towards Khiam on October 28, which is located on hilly terrain that would enable Hezbollah to direct these types of attacks with a view of northern Israel.[xli] Israeli forces are currently continuing clearing operations in Kfar Kila, Aitaroun, Dahyra, and Oum Touteh.[xlii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around 80 percent of Hezbollah’s pre-October 7 rocket capabilities.[xliii] Gallant said that Hezbollah is not currently organized in a way that would allow it to fire large barrages of rockets at northern Israel.[xliv] Pre-war IDF estimates from 2016 suggested that Hezbollah may launch up to 1,500 rockets and missiles daily into northern Israel in the event of an Israel-Hezbollah war.[xlv] Hezbollah's volume of rocket fire does not approach pre-war estimates of Hezbollah’s capabilities, although Israeli estimates have reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[xlvi] CTP-ISW estimates that Hezbollah has launched a daily average of 75 rockets into northern Israel between October 22 and October 29.[xlvii] This suggests that Israeli operations degraded Hezbollah’s rocket assets, which is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. An Israeli think tank estimated on October 28 that Hezbollah still likely retains up to 25,000 short-range rockets and up to 2,000 rockets and medium-range missiles.[xlviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah: Qassem continued to attempt to obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon. Qassem alleged that Israel regularly violated UNSCR 1701, but Hezbollah has violated the resolution since the end of the 2006 war by building massive military sites south of the Litani River that Israeli forces are now operating inside of Lebanon to destroy.
• Israeli Airstrikes Targeting Iran: Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 significantly degraded Iran's integrated air defense system and made subsequent Israeli strikes on Iran easier and less risky.
• Ceasefire in Lebanon: The IDF is signaling that it is preparing to end its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon. Israeli movement to secure a ceasefire suggests that the IDF believes it has achieved the military objectives dictated to it by Israeli political leadership, not that the ground operation has “failed.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain along the Lebanese border to disrupt Hezbollah artillery observers’ ability to support indirect rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel.

Iran Update, October 29, 2024

The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted precise and calculated strikes targeting Iranian military and defense industrial infrastructure to avoid collateral damage and casualties. The result of these precise strikes is that the damage to Iranian military infrastructure appears minimal. The Israeli strikes could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture advanced ballistic missiles and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.[i] Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 28 shows that the IDF likely struck a Ghadir radar site approximately 15 kilometers north of Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[ii] The Ghadir radar system, along with the Russian-made S-300, is an important component of the Iranian integrated air defense system.[iii] The Ghadir radar system can reportedly detect ballistic missiles from a distance of 1,100 kilometers and aircraft from a distance of 600 kilometers.[iv]

Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 29 separately shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, which is used to build solid-propellant ballistic missiles and launch Space Launch Vehicles (SLV) into orbit.[v] The IRGC previously launched the Soraya and Chamran-1 satellites into orbit from the Shahroud Missile Facility using the Ghaem-100 SLV in January and September 2024, respectively.[vi] A missile expert told AP News on October 29 that the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility is likely involved in “solid propellant mixing and casting operations.”[vii] The same missile expert reported on October 28 that the Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) factory that Israel struck on October 25 in Tehran has designed and developed “mixers for high-viscosity materials” since the early 1990s.[viii] The expert noted that the company could use this technology to produce solid-propellant mixers. The fact that Israel targeted mixing equipment used to make solid fuel highlights that Israel sought to degrade Iran’s ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly. Unspecified Israeli sources previously told Axios that Iran will likely need at least a year to acquire new mixing equipment.[ix]

An Israeli official stated on October 26 that the IDF hit approximately 20 targets in Iran.[x] Below are the confirmed locations in Iran that the IDF hit in its October 25 retaliatory strikes:

Tehran Province

• Parchin Military Complex, Tehran.[xi] Parchin is one of Iran’s most expansive and sensitive defense industrial sites. Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[xii] Iran has reportedly produced and tested chemical and nuclear weapons at the Parchin complex.[xiii] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found particles of man-made uranium at the Parchin site in 2015, indicating the presence of a larger quantity of uranium at one point, although Iran denied that the facility was tied to the nuclear program.[xiv] Former UN Weapons inspector David Albright said the buildings that the IDF hit at Parchin were used for mixing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[xv]
• Khojir Military Complex, Tehran.[xvi] Khojir is a missile production complex tied to the Parchin facility that is involved in the production of liquid- and solid-fuel missiles for the IRGC. Reuters reported satellite imagery revealed significant expansions at the site in July 2024.[xvii] The Khojir site is tied to various state-owned defense companies including Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG).[xviii] SHIG is one of Iran’s “primary entities responsible for ballistic missile development and production,” according to the US. SHIG has been sanctioned by the US, EU, and the UN for its role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[xix] Commercially available satellite imagery showed that the IDF destroyed two buildings in the Khojir complex.[xx]
• S-300 surface-to-air missile battery, Imam Khomeini International Airport, Tehran.[xxi] The Russian-made S-300 air defense system at the Imam Khomeini International Airport provides air defense cover for Tehran city.[xxii]
• S-300 surface-to-air missile battery, Hazrat Amir Brigade Air Defense Site, Elamshahr.[xxiii] The IDF struck an S-300 site near the Hazrat Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Amir ol Momenin Air Defense Brigade manages the S-300 equipment at the site.[xxiv] The brigade is part of the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military.
• Parand Military Site, Tehran.[xxv] Unspecified Iranian and Israeli officials told the New York Times that the IDF targeted the Parand military site with drones.[xxvi] Western media reported that the IDF hit this site, but there is no publicly available information on the purpose of this site at the time of writing.[xxvii]
• Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) Factory, Shams Abad.[xxviii] See above for details.

Khuzestan Province

• Abadan oil refinery, Khuzestan.[xxix] This is Iran’s largest oil refinery located near the Persian Gulf.[xxx] The United States Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Abadan Oil Refining Company, located at the Abadan oil refinery, in 2020 for facilitating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[xxxi]
• Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical Complex, Khuzestan.[xxxii] The IDF struck Iranian defense systems at the Petrochemical Complex.[xxxiii] This complex is Iran’s largest petrochemical compound and generates ”millions of tons of petroleum-based products” for exporting purposes annually.[xxxiv]
• Bandar Imam Khomeini Port, Khuzestan.[xxxv] The IDF struck the Port adjacent to the Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical Complex. This port serves as a major economic port on the Persian Gulf.
• Ghadir Early Detection Radar, Ahvaz.[xxxvi] See above for details.

Ilam Province

• Tang-eh Bijar Gas Field, Ilam.[xxxvii] The IDF struck air defense systems at the refinery for the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[xxxviii]

Semnan Province

• IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility / Shahroud Space Center, Semnan. See above for details.

Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[xxxix] Israeli media reported that the IDF strikes into Iran on October 25 were only in response to the large-scale Iranian ballistic missile attack against Israel on October 1 and that Israel is preparing a separate retaliation for the Hezbollah attack that targeted Netanyahu.[xl] The Israeli security cabinet reportedly convened for six and a half hours on October 27 to discuss, among other topics, the October 19 Hezbollah attack.[xli] An Israeli journalist emphasized that the Israeli response to the October 19 Hezbollah attack “is not expected to be similar” to the Israeli strikes in Iran on October 25.[xlii]

Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29.[xliii] Qassem replaces former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed on September 27.[xliv] Qassem is a founding member of Hezbollah and has been Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general since 1991.[xlv] Qassem focused on political issues while serving as deputy secretary general but he has assumed a more public-facing role since Nasrallah’s death.[xlvi] Emirati media cited an Iranian source that said that Qassem fled Lebanon on October 5 aboard the Iranian foreign minister’s plane.[xlvii] CTP-ISW is unable to independently confirm this report. The IDF killed Nasrallah’s presumed successor Hashem Safi ed Din on October 3, likely increasing the urgency for Hezbollah and Iran to move possible leaders out of Beirut.[xlviii] The IDF has killed the majority of Hezbollah’s senior leadership by airstrike in Beirut. Qassem is a less popular and charismatic figure than Nasrallah but will likely have success in consolidating internal support to effectively lead the movement due to his long history with the movement.

Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war.[xlix] Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”[l] He also dismissed Israeli claims that Hezbollah fighters are failing to defend against Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon.[li] Qassem indicated that Israel’s ground and air operations have not changed Hezbollah’s willingness to negotiate a political settlement or ceasefire.[lii] Qassem announced a new war “phase” designed to inflict high casualties on Israel. Hezbollah has likely implemented this phase, given that it conducted a record number of attacks for the war on October 25 and struck Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's home with a drone.[liii] Qassem’s statements suggest that Hezbollah will not temper its goals or military operations under his leadership.

Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam.[liv] This is the IDF’s deepest advance into Lebanon since ground operations began on October 1. Lebanese media reported that numerous IDF tanks entered Lebanon from near Metula on October 28 and advanced north to Tal al Hamamis and into Khiam’s southeastern outskirts.[lv] Geolocated footage also showed an IDF vehicle driving north on the southeastern outskirts of al Khiam on October 29.[lvi] Lebanese state media reported that Israeli tanks advanced at least six kilometers into Khiam’s outskirts, although CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.[lvii] Lebanese sources reported that IDF airstrikes, artillery shelling, and illumination rounds targeted the Khiam area during the IDF’s advance, which would have supported Israeli ground forces’ movements.[lviii] The IDF 98th and 91st divisions have operated south of Khiam in recent weeks.[lix]

Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Observers can directly view a large swath of territory in the Galilee panhandle, Shebaa Farms, and Golan Heights from Khiam, including several IDF Northern Command bases. Positions in Khiam and on nearby hills could enable Hezbollah artillery observers to direct rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The IDF has likely already seized terrain on Tal al Hamamis, located between Metula and Khiam, which would prevent Hezbollah from using the elevated terrain to conduct direct fire or support indirect fire attacks into the Upper Galilee from there.[lx] The IDF began ground operations to eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into northern Israel from positions in Lebanon. The IDF has previously seized hills in southern Lebanon that would enable Hezbollah to direct attacks targeting Israel to this end, including in Maroun al Ras, Mays al Jabal, and Odaisseh.[lxi]

Hezbollah and Lebanese media reported a high volume of engagements between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli armor advancing towards Khiam.[lxii] Hezbollah fighters reportedly fired anti-tank guided missiles, rockets, and mortars at Israeli forces advancing in numerous locations, including south, southeast, and southwest of Khiam.[lxiii] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces in Khiam’s southern neighborhoods.[lxiv]

Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement.[lxv] Senior Israeli officials speaking to Ynet said on October 29 that the deal would begin with a 60-day “acclimation period” ceasefire during which mediators would consider a “new mechanism” to supervise southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military infrastructure there.[lxvi] The IDF would withdraw most of its forces from southern Lebanon and only remain in certain areas where it still needs to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure.[lxvii] This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.[lxviii] To enforce UNSCR 1701 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy thousands of additional soldiers to southern Lebanon.[lxix] UNIFIL forces would be increased and bolstered by additional French, German, and British troops.[lxx] The plan proposes that Israel retains the right to take “prolonged action” in Lebanon to remove Hezbollah threats that Lebanese and international forces fail to address.[lxxi] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[lxxii] The agreement would finally include a ban on military imports to Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from rearming.[lxxiii]  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office has previously insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” near the Israel-Lebanon border and to maintain “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[lxxiv] Israeli media did not include Israeli access to Lebanese airspace in their most recent reporting about the proposal.[lxxv]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a security meeting with senior military officials on October 29 to discuss the possible ceasefire terms.[lxxvi]  Hezbollah has not commented on the negotiations and has not indicated if it would accept the deal. Hezbollah had previously made stopping its operations against Israeli forces contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[lxxvii] Hezbollah’s new Secretary General Naim Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[lxxviii] A successful implementation of the above ceasefire framework that pushes Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure north of the Litani River would reduce the threat of a Hezbollah October 7–7-style offensive into northern Israel. The terms would likely be insufficient to stop rocket fire into Israel due to the range of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal, however.[lxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strike on Iran: The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran and Hezbollah: Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Hezbollah’s New Leader: Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29. Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war. Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam. Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement. This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update, October 28, 2024

Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes "severely damaged” Iran’s air defense and missile production capabilities.[i] Unspecified sources within the Israeli defense establishment reported that Israel’s attack destroyed all of Iran’s long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and long-range detection radars, leaving Iran with only domestically produced short-range defense batteries.[ii] Western reporting has confirmed damage at a storage unit within the Abadan oil refinery in Khuzestan province and a TIECO oil and gas machinery factory in Tehran province, among others, following the IDF strikes.[iii] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called the strikes on Iran the most significant IDF Air Force operation since the Six-Day War in 1967, emphasizing that their impact represents "a change in the balance of power.”[iv] Gallant stated that the damage from the strikes puts Iran at a “huge disadvantage” when it comes to future Israeli attacks.[v]

Unspecified Iranian sources told Israeli media that Israel also targeted and breached Iranian radar systems in Syria before launching its attack on Iran.[vi] The sources noted that the radar screens in Iran’s defense systems “froze“ before the IDF strikes.[vii] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF likely targeted Iran’s early detection network in Syria and Iraq that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack.[viii]

Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. The Russian-made S-300 is the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.

Ssenior Iranian defense and political officials are downplaying the extent of the strike’s damage while simultaneously threatening a response.[xi] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed on October 28 that the Israeli attack caused only “minor” damage that Iran has since repaired.[xii]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in an attack on a police patrol unit in Taftan County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26.[xiii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces regional headquarters responsible for Sistan and Baluchistan Province “destroyed” the team responsible for the attack on October 27.[xiv] The IRGC Ground Forces regional headquarters reported that its forces killed four Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested four additional fighters. IRGC Ground Forces troops injured an unspecified number of fighters as they attempted to withdraw. This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since Decemb23.[xv]

Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[xvi] Israeli media reported that mediators attempted to combine a “small” Egyptian proposal with a comprehensive, multi-stage US-Qatar settlement.[xvii] CTP-ISW has not seen the details of this US-Qatar settlement. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi publicly proposed an initial two-day ceasefire in which four Israeli hostages would be exchanged with an unidentified number of Palestinian prisoners.[xviii] This would be followed by 10 days of further negotiations. Sisi’s proposed plan bears a resemblance to the proposal of Egyptian General Intelligence Service head Hassan Rashad on October 22 for a “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would facilitate negotiations for a more comprehensive ceasefire-hostage deal.[xix] A Palestinian source close to the negotiations told Reuters that Hamas would ”listen” to new offers but remains committed to achieving a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[xx] Hamas likely believes that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip by waiting out the Israelis, making it unclear why a smaller ceasefire-hostage deal would facilitate successful talks.[xxi]  

An Israeli source told Israeli media on October 27 that Netanyahu is willing to conclude the IDF operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in exchange for a diplomatic resolution that guarantees Israel’s war aims are achieved.[xxii] Israeli media reported that Israeli officials intend to host a follow-up summit soon to continue negotiations, with the involvement of Egyptian Intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, and potentially Hamas.[xxiii]

Hamas has attempted to coerce Palestinian civilians against leaving the northern Gaza Strip since IDF operations in Jabalia resumed on October 6, including by shooting civilians in the legs. The IDF said that civilian evacuations have taken longer than expected due to Hamas physically preventing Palestinians from leaving the north, including by shooting some civilians in the legs.[xxiv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson similarly said on October 23 that Hamas is physically assaulting Palestinian civilians evacuating Jabalia to discourage them from evacuating the area.[xxv] Israeli media reported on October 28 that 50,000 Palestinian civilians from the northern Gaza Strip have evacuated south since the IDF began clearing operations in Jabalia on October 6.[xxvi] The IDF has repeatedly warned civilians to travel to al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip and expanded the humanitarian zone eastward on October 26, likely to accommodate an increased flow of internally displaced Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip.[xxvii]

The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.[xxviii] Israel must approve an extension to allow Palestinian banks in the West Bank to maintain ties with Israeli banks by October 31. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and seven foreign counterparts wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25 and warned that Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s decision to not approve the extension may lead to the collapse of the Palestinian economy.[xxix] Smotrich has threatened to withhold his approval to extend a waiver that allows payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority for the import of food, water, electricity, and other services in the West Bank.[xxx] The restriction on the extension would cut Palestinian banks off from over $13 billion in trade with Israel, thus “damaging Israel’s economy and exacerbating an already dire economic situation in the West Bank,” according to the letter.[xxxi] Yellen and her counterparts also added that the collapse of the Palestinian economy would threaten Israeli security interests in the region.[xxxii] Smotrich has so far refused to renew the waiver but has until October 31 to do so.[xxxiii] US officials told Axios that the Biden administration recently told Israel that it had determined that Palestinian banks met Smotrich’s conditions for renewal.[xxxiv]

A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.[xxxv] A Yemeni journalist reported on October 26 that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah.[xxxvi] The Houthi fighters killed in southern Lebanon are from Saada Governorate in Yemen. Houthis from Saada Governorate are often given preferential treatment due to their close family ties and long-time service within the Houthi movement.[xxxvii] Fighters from Saada, given their loyalty, would be the most likely choices for important foreign missions like advising Hezbollah.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. Some Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s S-300s on October 25.
• Gaza Strip: Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.
• West Bank: The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.
• Yemen: A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.

Iran Update, October 27, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network during its strikes on Iran on October 25. The IDF struck and disabled air defense command-and-control sites and radars, including at some S-300 sites.[i] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF struck three or four S-300 sites, including one at the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran.[ii] Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times that the IDF strikes have caused major alarm among Iranian leaders.[iii]

Some of the air defense sites that the IDF struck were protecting critical energy infrastructure in western and southwestern Iran. Western media confirmed that IDF struck air defense sites around the Abadan oil refinery, Bandar Imam Khomeini energy complex and port, and the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[iv] Degrading the air defenses around these sites could leave them more vulnerable to future strikes.

CTP-ISW previously reported on how the IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and transfer them to partners abroad, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The IDF strikes—in addition to targeting air defense sites—hit drone and missile production facilities across Iran.[v] Commercially available satellite imagery revealed significant damage at the Parchin military complex, for example. The Parchin complex is one the most expansive and secretive Iranian missile production facilities. Some of the targets that the IDF targeted at the missile facilities were sophisticated mixing machines used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[vi] Iran will likely need months or possible a year or more to acquire new mixing equipment.[vii]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that, despite Israeli efforts to "magnify these actions for its own specific agenda”, it would be “misguided” for Iran to overlook the attacks during a speech in Tehran on October 27.[viii] Khamenei emphasized that Iranian officials will “assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done” to show Israel "who the Iranian people are.” The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called on October 26 for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council.[ix] UN Security Council President Pascale Christine Baeriswyl announced that the council will convene on October 28 to discuss the IDF strikes on Iran.[x]

Hamas has rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip. Mossad Director David Barnea proposed the deal in a recent meeting with Egyptian officials.[xi] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya rejected the proposal and reiterated Hamas’ intent to continue fighting for influence in the Gaza Strip.[xii] Hamas is exploiting the lack of a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip by lobbying for the establishment of a national unity government with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas likely calculates that it could slowly coopt and control any unity government with the PA and thereby retain a prominent role in post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas rejecting the deal that would protect its leaders supports CTP-ISW's assessment that the death of Yahya Sinwar is unlikely to prompt a shift in Hamas strategy in the war. Sinwar similarly rejected a deal with Israel that would grant him safety in September 2024.[xiii] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sinwar would almost certainly reject the deal due to his deep commitment to fighting and destroying Israel.[xiv] Hamas will likely continue to engage in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel in order to secure its maximalist demands, such as the IDF withdrawing completely from the Gaza Strip. Hamas officials and international negotiators are currently in Doha for further talks.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network in its strikes on October 25. This is in addition to the disruption that the IDF may have imposed on the Iranian ability to build missiles.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover from the war.

Iran Update, October 26, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three waves of strikes into Iran on October 25. The strikes were in response to the large-scale ballistic missile attack that Iran launched against Israel on October 1. The IDF targeted around 20 locations around Tehran and western Iran, including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs.[i]  The IDF in particular struck four S-300 air defense batteries, which are Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.[ii] That the IDF hit these batteries highlights the relative vulnerabilities of the S-300, especially against advanced platforms like the F-35 fighter jet. The IDF separately struck prominent defense industrial sites, such as the Parchin and Khojir complexes outside Tehran.[iii] These complexes are managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The regime uses these facilities to develop and manufacture advanced weapons systems, including solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran has used the Parchin complex previously for high explosives testing in support of its nuclear weapons program.[iv] International inspectors found traces of uranium there in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[v] Although there are no known nuclear activities currently at the Parchin and Khojir complexes, the IDF strikes could impede Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, given the role that these complexes could play in building a delivery system.

The IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that the IDF targeted sophisticated mixing equipment used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[vi] Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed that the IDF destroyed several buildings at the Parchin and Khojir complexes. The imagery shows no signs of secondary explosions, which is consistent with the IDF targeting industrial mixers rather than weapons storage facilities. The IDF strike on the Khojir complex comes after the regime began expanding the facilities there in August 2023 in order to increase the Iranian capacity to build missiles.[vii] The Israeli sources speaking to Axios said that Iran will need to buy new mixers from China.[viii] Doing so could take months or possibly a year or more, hampering the Iranian ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and those of its allies in the Axis of Resistance.

The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria immediately before launching strikes into Iran.[ix] The IDF was likely targeting early warning radars and sensors that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack. Iran has in recent years worked to build an early detection network across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in order to better defend against Israeli airstrikes.

Iranian officials and state media have downplayed the amount of damage that the IDF inflicted. The regime boasted that it prevented IDF aircraft from entering Iranian airspace and that the strikes caused only limited damage. The strikes did kill four Artesh officers, however, presumably at the air defense sites that the IDF struck.[x] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the IDF strikes saying that Iran has the ”right and duty to defend itself against foreign acts of aggression.”[xi]

A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence on October 25.[xii] The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it launched a drone attack targeting an unspecified ”vital site” in Israel. The naming of the group appears inspired by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has conducted regular drone and missile attacks on Israel in recent months. The IDF has not commented on the claimed drone attack at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF conducted three waves of strikes in Iran targeting air defenses and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. These strikes could disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
• Saudi Arabia: A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence. The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it fired a drone toward Israel.
• Lebanon: The IDF destroyed a large underground Lebanese Hezbollah complex in southeastern Lebanon. The location, size, sophistication, and structure of the complex suggested that it was meant for offensive operations against Israel.

Iran Update, October 25, 2024

Four unspecified Iranian officials outlined to Western media how Tehran could retaliate in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[i] These comments were likely an information operation meant to coerce Israel into limiting its strike on Iran. The Iranian officials, which included two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers, told the New York Times that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian armed forces to develop multiple retaliatory options.[ii] The officials claimed that, if Israel inflicts ”major harm,” such as by targeting energy and nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials, the retaliatory options would include firing as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles at Israel, increase Iranian-backed militia attacks across the Middle East, and disrupting commercial traffic in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[iii] The threat against global shipping comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to start an “energy war“ in the Middle East.[iv] The Iranian officials also claimed that Tehran could refrain from retaliating if Israel only strikes military targets—rather than energy or nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials.[v]

US Air Force F-16s from the 480th Fighter Squadron arrived in the Middle East on October 25.[vi]

Two unspecified Hamas officials claimed that Hamas will replace its leader, Yahya Sinwar, with a five-person committee based in Doha.[vii] The committee was reportedly formed after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. The committee was meant to facilitate decision-making when Sinwar was out of contact in the Gaza Strip, which happened regularly. The committee is led by Khalil al Hayya, who represents Hamas in the Gaza Strip on the committee. The committee also includes Zaher Jabarin, who represents the West Bank, Khaled Meshal, who represents the Palestinian diaspora, Mohammad Darwish, who is the Hamas Shura Council head, and the secretary of the Hamas Political Bureau, whose identity is unknown.

Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Israel on October 24, reflecting how Hamas strategy is unlikely to change significantly following the death of Sinwar.[viii] Hayya discussed the maximalist demands in a meeting with Egyptian intelligence director Hassan Mahmoud Rashad. The meeting comes as Egypt proposed a new “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would require Hamas to release a “small” number of Israeli hostages for a “few” days ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[ix]

Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks targeting international shipping, according to the Wall Street Journal.[x] The IRGC reportedly facilitated the transfer of the Russian intelligence to the Houthis at some unspecified point in 2024, helping the Houthis to target vessels that had deactivated their radio signals. The US Maritime Administration in March 2024 advised vessels to deactivate their radios when transiting near Yemen in order to protect themselves from Houthi attacks.[xi] Iran has separately tried to broker a deal between Russia and the Houthis that would transfer Russian anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis, further enabling attacks on international shipping.[xii] There is no evidence that Russia has sent missiles to the Houthis at this time, however, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xiii]

Lebanese Hezbollah have killed nine Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers in southern Lebanon since October 24.[xiv] The IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade (Res.) (146th Division) encountered Hezbollah militants during clearing operations in a forested area in southwestern Lebanon on October 24.[xv] The Hezbollah militants emerged from a tunnel shaft and threw grenades at Israeli forces.[xvi] Hezbollah killed four reservist soldiers in an exchange of fire and injured six others.[xvii] The IDF assessed that the Hezbollah militants were also killed in the exchange.[xviii] The IDF has continued to encounter and directly engage Hezbollah forces, typically in small groups of fighters, during clearing operations.[xix] Hezbollah also conducted an indirect fire attack and killed five reservists from the 8th Armored Brigade (91st Division).[xx] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets targeting an area near a building where 8th Armored Brigade soldiers were staying.[xxi] An IDF logistics convoy unit was also present in the building.[xxii] The attack injured 24 other IDF soldiers.[xxiii] Hezbollah has primarily targeted Israeli forces in southern Lebanon with indirect fire.[xxiv]

Iran Update, October 24, 2024

Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[i] Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk met with Deputy Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow on October 23 to request that Russia pressure PA President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Hamas over a national unity government.

Hamas is likely responding to the Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[ii] The plan would involve appointing a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister to administer the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas excluded from post-war governance. Negotiating a national unity government with the PA, on the other hand, would allow Hamas to retain a role in post-war governance. Hamas would likely exploit the establishment of a national unity government to gradually expand its control and influence in the Gaza Strip.

US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days.[iii] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamad bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced the plans on October 24. Al Thani added that Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.[iv] A Hamas delegation separately traveled to Egypt on October 24.[v] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position on October 18.[vi]

PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank in recent weeks in order to crack down on the Palestinian militias there.[vii] This PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank in response to Iranian efforts to empower the militias and undermine the PA. PA forces have arrested at least three Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in Tubas during this period.[viii] Residents have reported violent clashes between PA forces and militias there in recent weeks as well.[ix] Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have accused the PA of serving Israeli interests and called on militants to confront the PA forces in Tubas.[x] The PA operation into Tubas came as Israeli forces conducted their own campaign in August and September 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia across the West Bank in recent months.[xi]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake its assigned tasks, which includes enforcing UNSCR 1701.[xii] Berri reportedly made the assertion that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701 during a meeting with senior US official Amos Hochstein in Beirut on October 21.[xiii] Hochstein has reportedly suggested amending UNSCR 1701 by expanding the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon.

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati separately announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[xiv] The LAF currently has about 5,000 personnel in southern Lebanon.[xv] It is unclear whether the 8,000 number is the envisioned end strength for the LAF in southern Lebanon or would be in addition to the 5,000 soldiers already there. Increasing the LAF force size is unlikely to improve the enforcement of UNSCR 1701, however, so long as the Lebanese state and LAF are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah activity in the area.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the PA to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is responding to an Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, which would marginalize Hamas.
• Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days. Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.
• West Bank: PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank to crack down on Iranian-backed militias there. The PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon. Berri ignored the decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily there.

Iran Update, October 23, 2024

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[i] Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[ii] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[iii] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[iv]

It is within Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities—which now appear disrupted by Israeli action at a minimum—have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[v] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[vi]   The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s ”neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[vii] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.

Pezeshkian also met with PRC President Xi Jinping on October 23.[viii] This meeting’s details are not publicly available, but the officials probably discussed regional developments and growing Sino-Iranian strategic partnership, including Iranian oil exports to the PRC.[ix] Iranian Energy minister Abbas Aliabadi separately discussed trade and foreign capital investment with member countries of the Belt and Road Forum in Qingdao, China.[x]

Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.[xi] It is unlikely that Pezeshkian’s conversations with Putin and Xi Jinping will result in BRICS taking any tangible steps to undermine the US dollar in the near future. Russian and Iranian officials have used this de-dollarization rhetoric before, but this rhetoric has historically not resulted in any tangible movement against the dollar.[xii] Pezeshkian underlined the urgency in which BRICS countries need to create an integrated trade system with new mechanisms and technologies, which is a reference to an alternative to the SWIFT international messaging system, as proposals in his speech at the summit.[xiii] Pezeshkian explicitly stated that these would address sanctions and prevent future sanctions and even to counter the US dollar.[xiv]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3.[xv] Safi ed Din was leader of Hezbollah’s executive council and a member of Hezbollah’s political-military Shura Council.[xvi] Hezbollah confirmed his death on October 23, several hours after Israel released its statement.[xvii] Hezbollah similarly only confirmed the deaths of other senior Hezbollah leaders, like Hassan Nasrallah and Fuad Shukr, after Israel confirmed their deaths.[xviii] Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have alluded to Safi ed Din’s death over the past three weeks.[xix] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi accused Hezbollah of hiding the deaths of top commanders on October 18.[xx]

Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further effect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. Safi ed Din was dead for 20 days before both sides formally acknowledged his fate, meaning Hezbollah leadership has very likely recovered from the initial disorder caused by Safi ed Din’s death and adapted to his absence.[xxi]  Safi ed Din was very well positioned to take over control of Hezbollah from Nasrallah given the IDF reports that Safi ed Din “carried out [Nasrallah’s] duties” when Nasrallah was outside of the Lebanon or out of communication.[xxii] Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said on October 8 that Hezbollah would wait to appoint a new Secretary General but that there is not a leadership vacuum.[xxiii] Another Hezbollah leader said that the group had a “joint command in place.”[xxiv]

The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high-level Hezbollah commanders in the October 3 strike in Beirut. The IDF said that over 25 Hezbollah intelligence personnel were present in the underground bunker during the strike.[xxv]  Several senior Hezbollah intelligence officers died in the strike, including Hezbollah’s aerial intelligence collection leader and intelligence head in Syria.[xxvi] The overall chief of Hezbollah’s intelligence staff, Ali Hussein Hazima, also died in the strike.[xxvii] The deaths of Hezbollah’s top intelligence officers were more likely to have an immediate impact on Hezbollah’s operations in southern Lebanon and northern Israel than Safi ed Din’s death, though Hezbollah has presumably adapted to the loss of these leaders. Safi ed Din’s death will have ramifications for Hezbollah’s long-term trajectory, however.

The 146th Division continued to locate and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons during clearing operations in Marwahin, southwestern Lebanon on October 23.[xxviii] The 205th Armored Brigade (Res.) located a large cache of weapons inside a mosque. The IDF reported that the cache of weapons included long-range sniper equipment, night vision goggles, rocket-propelled grenades, various grenade launchers, shoulder-fired missiles, and Kornet missiles.

Hezbollah fighters, if they withdrew from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly withdrawing—instead fled their positions. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[xxix] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23. Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3. Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further effect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high level Hezbollah commanders in the October 4 strike in Beirut.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: An IDF armored brigade captured a large stock of high-end Hezbollah equipment, including night vision goggles and Kornet missiles, in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters, if they withdrew from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly executing an orderly delay—instead fled their positions
   

Iran Update, October 22, 2024

A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.[i] The source stated that Israeli operations targeting key Hezbollah leadership and the Israeli air campaign have significantly disrupted Hezbollah funding. The official stated that Iran used Syria as a conduit to provide Hezbollah with $50 million in cash each month prior to the start of the Israeli operations in Lebanon. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Iran transfers money to Hezbollah through the transfer of oil and money from Iran to Syria through Hezbollah’s Unit 4400.[ii] Hezbollah Unit 4400 is responsible for the transfer of funds and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.[iii] Israel killed the commander of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, and his subsequent replacement on October 1 and October 21.[iv] This report follows recent IDF airstrikes targeting branches of a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Beirut in recent days.[v]

Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers.[vi] The spokesperson noted in a press conference on October 22 that Hezbollah fighters had come “close” to seizing Israeli soldiers over the past several days but had not yet succeeded.[vii] Hezbollah has a long history of taking Israeli soldiers prisoner to exchange for Hezbollah fighters held by Israel.[viii] The spokesperson confirmed that Israel had detained Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations in southern Lebanon.[ix] The IDF said that it has detained many Radwan fighters and has published clips of their testimony, including statements from fighters that many Hezbollah fighters fled southern Lebanon after Hassan Nasrallah’s death.[x] The Hezbollah official said that ”after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations.[xi]

Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.[xii] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[xiii] Hezbollah’s Operations Room also noted on October 17 that Hezbollah would ”escalate” its attacks in the coming days.[xiv] Hezbollah has since expanded the scope and pace of operations into Israel, including by targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s home in Tel Aviv with an attack drone on October 19.[xv] Hezbollah has consistently claimed ground engagements in southern Lebanon at a higher rate since the first week of Israeli ground operations, although this may be a result of increased proximity between Israeli and Hezbollah forces as Israeli forces operate in additional areas of southern Lebanon.[xvi]  Hezbollah has conducted at least 39 attacks on Israeli forces, towns, and air assets over the past day.[xvii] Hezbollah officials have consistently argued that Hezbollah command, control, and logistical networks have returned to full operational capacity after being degraded by Israel’s air campaign in late September 2024.[xviii]

Hezbollah formally claimed responsibility for the October 19 drone attack on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel.[xix] Hezbollah took ”full and sole responsibility” for the attack.[xx]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[xxi] Blinken urged Netanyahu to “capitalize” on Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death to secure a ceasefire and hostage release deal in the Gaza Strip.[xxii] Blinken and Netanyahu also discussed ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon and enable civilians to return to their homes along the border.[xxiii] 

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Araghchi said that the Iranian military is monitoring all US troop movement in the ground and air regionally.[xxiv] Araghchi’s warning probably seeks to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces based in Arab countries to support Israeli retaliation against Iran and Israeli defense against Iranian attacks. This effort also supports Iran’s larger grand strategic objective of expelling US forces from the Middle East by subtly prodding these countries to constrain US efforts in the region. Araghchi also met with Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa and Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani in Manama, Bahrain, on October 21.[xxv] Araghchi met with Kuwaiti Prince Sheikh Sabah Khaled al Hammad al Dabah and Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali al Hiyaya in Kuwait City on October 22.[xxvi] Araghchi warned during a press conference in Kuwait that Israel knows what Iran can do in response if Israel attacks Iran’s critical infrastructure.[xxvii]

The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.[xxviii] The Shin Bet and Israeli Police stated in a joint statement that Iran directed the suspects to assassinate a senior Israeli nuclear scientist and the mayor of an undisclosed large city in central Israel.[xxix] Iran also instructed the individuals to photograph various undisclosed locations, vandalize sites in Jerusalem, and post graffiti calling for the release of the Hamas-held Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. This is likely part of an Iranian effort to sow division in Israeli society and increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The joint statement confirmed that Israeli security forces arrested the 23-year-old ”leader of the ring” who had recruited the six additional members.[xxx] A security official stated that the seven individuals worked as an “organized cell.“[xxxi] Six of the suspects are Israeli citizens, and the seventh suspect is an Israeli permanent resident.

This report comes one day after Israeli authorities arrested a separate Iranian spy network comprised of seven Israeli citizens who were given ”hundreds of tasks” including observing Israeli military facilities.[xxxii] Israeli police arrested an Israeli citizen in September accused of participating in an Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[xxxiii] Israeli media reported that this is the fifth public case of Iranian espionage attempts in Israel in the past month.[xxxiv]

Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.[xxxv]  The 460th Armored Brigade (162nd Division) engaged Palestinian fighters on October 14 who used the former UNRWA medical facility as a weapons storage and base of operations.[xxxvi] The IDF reported that it detained Palestinian fighters who were attempting to retreat south by hiding among civilians as they evacuated south.[xxxvii] The IDF reported that ”thousands” of civilians were evacuated from the area south to Gaza City.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Air Campaign: A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers. The Hezbollah official said that "after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations. Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.
• Blinken’s Regional Visit: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.
• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran.
• Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.
• Gaza Strip: Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.

Iran Update, October 21, 2024

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Axios reported that Israel insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.[i] Israel also demanded that the IDF Air Force enjoy “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[ii] US special envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Beirut on October 21 to discuss Israel’s conditions with senior Lebanese officials.[iii]

Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.[iv] Hezbollah is equally unlikely to accept these conditions, and Hezbollah leadership has previously indicated that it remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[v] This would rule out an agreement to return to UNSC Resolution 1701 without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[vi] An unspecified Israeli official said that Israel’s conditions resemble UN Resolution 1701 with “increased enforcement.”[vii]

UNIFIL has largely failed to undertake the tasks given to it under its mandate. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[viii] CTP-ISW has previously stated that Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are already in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701 and should have been enforced by UNIFIL.[ix] UNIFIL has failed to execute this mandate and prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing military infrastructure south of the Litani River. US officials, such as Amos Hochstein, have reportedly expressed interest in amending UN Resolution 1701 by expanding the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon.[x] Increasing the LAF’s force size is unlikely to enable the LAF to better enforce UN Resolution 1701, however, if Lebanese soldiers and their government (of which Hezbollah is a part) are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah fighters from operating in the area.

The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting at least nine branches of al Qard al Hassan in Beirut’s southern suburbs and across Lebanon on October 20.[xi] Al Qard al Hassan is one of Hezbollah’s main financial assets in Lebanon, providing financial services such as loans or ATM deposits and withdrawals to over 300,000 members of Lebanon‘s Shia population.[xii] Israeli Army Radio reported that al Qard al Hassan also manages Hezbollah’s banking system, including its payroll for Hezbollah fighters.[xiii] Al Qard al Hassan reportedly receives direct funding from Iran.[xiv] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF targeted al Qard al Hassan branches in Laylaki, Chiyah, and Burj al Barajneh in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in Nabatieh, Tyre, Shehabieh, Baalbek, Hermel, and Rayak, in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[xv] An unspecified senior Israeli official said that the objective of Israel’s ”broad wave of attacks” targeting al Qard al Hassan is to undermine Hezbollah’s economic stability and erode the trust that the Lebanese Shia community, including Hezbollah’s rank-and-file, holds in Hezbollah.[xvi] This will degrade Hezbollah’s ability to function during the war and ability to “rebuild and rearm on the day after,” according to the Israeli official.[xvii] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously expressed that Israel seeks to obtain a postwar agreement that would prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming and from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.[xviii]

The IDF’s effort to erode the Shia population’s trust in Hezbollah is consistent with previous Israeli efforts to do so. Netanyahu recently asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah, for example.[xix] It is unclear at this time if this strategy has successfully diminished public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.[xx] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the IDF targeted the head of Hezbollah’s financial arm responsible for “funneling cash from Iran to Hezbollah.”[xxi] Hagari did not state the specific individual’s name or position but stated that the individual had only been in the position for a “few weeks since his predecessor was killed.”  IDF has conducted various strikes targeting the Hezbollah financial system in Lebanon in recent days. Syrian state media stated that the airstrike killed at least two people.[xxii]

Military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30.[xxiii] The IDF Northern Command said that Hezbollah continues to fire from its ”residual rocket capabilities” but that this is not ”significant” fire.[xxiv] The IDF air campaign has concentrated its efforts on targeting Hezbollah rocket assets and weapons stockpiles. Degrading Hezbollah’s rocket assets is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah has continued to fire large barrages of daily rockets into northern and central Israel despite IDF operations targeting its rocket capabilities, however.[xxv] Hezbollah launched over 170 rockets on October 20, for example.[xxvi] An Israeli think tank reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[xxvii]

Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.[xxviii] Israeli forces have raided and seized terrain in border towns and areas over the past three weeks to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[xxix] While these raids have led to the likely severe degradation of Hezbollah capabilities in border towns, it is unclear how IDF strikes deeper into Lebanon have succeeded in degrading Hezbollah’s longer-range rocket and missile assets. These capabilities will continue to threaten residents of northern and central Israel.

The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on Jabal Kahil on October 20, north of Maroun el Ras, indicating that Israeli forces had seized and were operating on the hill.[xxx] The IDF has similarly seized hills in Mays al Jabal, Odaisseh, and Blida. A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces have conducted operations in some border villages that are only visible from Israeli territory and ”not seen” by Hezbollah forces.  These positions on hills and in towns overlooking northern Israel would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The correspondent claimed that Hezbollah fighters have conducted rocket attacks that have deterred Israeli forces from seizing the ”second line” of border towns.[xxxi] Israeli forces have entered one “second-line“ village but have not attempted to seize other ” second-line” towns.[xxxii] The fact that Israeli forces have entered one of these villages indicates that the IDF is not ”deterred.” It is highly unlikely that intermittent shelling would deter a combat-experienced force such as the IDF units operating in southern Lebanon.

Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. The Shin Bet and Israeli police arrested seven Israeli Jewish citizens of Azeri heritage in Haifa and northern Israel on charges of espionage for “hundreds of tasks” for Iranian intelligence agencies in a counterintelligence operation.[xxxiii] The suspects had been in contact with Iranian agents, and the Israeli State Attorney’s Office called this the most serious case they have investigated in recent years.[xxxiv] The suspects were reportedly recruited using financial inducements that were routed through Russian intermediaries who traveled to Israel.[xxxv]

The suspects reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones. Prosecutors stated that police and the Shin Bet accused the suspects of photographing and collecting information on Israeli energy and port infrastructure, IDF base and facilities, including the Kirya defense headquarters in Tel Aviv, Nevatim and Ramat David air bases, and Iron Dome battery sites, for Iran for around two years.[xxxvi] The suspects’ handlers also sent maps of certain sites to the suspects, including a map of the Golani Training Base, which Hezbollah struck with a drone on October 13.[xxxvii] The fact that the base’s dining facility was struck at dinner time with a Hezbollah drone suggests that some intelligence asset had observed patterns of life and understood the exact layout of the base and specific buildings within the base. Hezbollah has also targeted Iron Dome batteries with drone attacks, which this Iranian-led intelligence effort may have enabled.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 21 that the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in Israel is “in place.”[xxxviii] Austin declined to confirm if the anti-missile system was fully operational but said that it could be put into operation ”very quickly.” The US deployed the THAAD anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[xxxix]

The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened. White House spokesperson John Kirby claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom border crossing, which connects Israel and Rafah Governorate.[xl] The presence of armed gangs and criminal groups controlling the flow of aid could indicate decreasing Hamas internal control and governance capabilities, given that controlling the movement of humanitarian aid and distributing it to Hamas supporters is one way by which Hamas could maintain control in the Gaza Strip. Armed gangs and criminal groups could still cooperate with Hamas, however. Kirby noted that Israel had allowed 120 trucks of aid into the Gaza Strip over the last few days.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an increase in humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 250 trucks per day on October 19.[xli] Netanyahu’s decision followed a letter from the United States to senior Israeli officials on October 13 warning that the Biden administration would be forced to take unspecified steps, implying the withholding of military aid to Israel, if aid was not delivered to non-combatants in the Gaza Strip.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Goals in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.
• Israeli Air Campaign: The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.
• Israeli Military Assessments of Ground Operations: Israeli military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30. Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. Israel arrested seven suspects who reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel for Iranian handlers, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones.
• Gaza Strip: The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened.

Iran Update, October 20, 2024

Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters recently detonated a pre-planted improvised explosive device (IED), killing IDF 401st Armored Brigade Commander Colonel Ehsan Daqsa.[i] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Daqsa is the most senior IDF officer killed in the Gaza Strip since the October 7 war began.[ii] Daqsa, the 52nd Battalion commander (401st Armored Brigade), and two other officers activated a trip wire after they moved about 20 meters from their tanks towards an observation post in Jabalia. The trip wire detonated an IED that killed Daqsa.[iii] The 52nd Battalion commander was seriously injured and the other two officers sustained light to moderate injuries.[iv] The IDF appointed 162nd Division Deputy Commander Colonel Meir Biderman as the acting commander of the 401st Brigade.[v]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.[vi] Araghchi discussed recent ceasefire efforts in a meeting with Hamas’ Shura Council head Mohammad Ismail Darwish.[vii] Darwish thanked Araghchi for Iran’s continued support and stated that the Palestinian militias will continue their fight against Israel. Araghchi separately met with Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya and senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk.[viii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[ix] Araghchi stated in an interview with Turkish media following the meetings that Iran has already identified its targets in Israel for a potential retaliatory strike should Israel attack Iran.[x] Araghchi implied that Iran would only target military targets in Israel in such a retaliation. Araghchi traveled to Turkey to attend the 3+3 meeting with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials to discuss the south Caucasus in Istanbul on October 18.[xi]

The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.[xii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF intercepted a small quadcopter drone that crossed into Israel from Egypt.[xiii] The IDF reported that the drone was ferrying eight handguns and an unspecified amount of ammunition.[xiv]

Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.[xv]

The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[xvi]  The Israeli security cabinet met in the command bunker in the Kirya instead of in its normal meeting room inside the base.[xvii] The cabinet discussed several ”sensitive issues including the Iranian issue.”[xviii] Earlier reports stated that the security cabinet was expected to discuss increasing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and vote on whether to approve finding an armed contracting group to distribute humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.[xix] This meeting also comes as Israel continues preparations for a possible retaliation to Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack.[xx]

An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon.[xxi] The LAF announced on X that the airstrike targeted an LAF vehicle on a road between Ain Ebel and Hanine in Bint Jbeil District.[xxii] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF confirmed that it conducted the airstrike.[xxiii] The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck.[xxiv] The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”[xxv]

The IDF targeted and killed three senior Hezbollah officers in Tibnin, Bint Jbeil District, on October 20.[xxvi] The IDF killed a senior member of Hezbollah's southern front headquarters Hajj Abbas Salameh.[xxvii] Salameh conducted operations in the Bint Jbeil area and has held several positions previously on the southern front.[xxviii] The IDF also killed Hezbollah radio communications expert Reza Abbas Awada and Ahmad Ali Hussein, the head of Hezbollah’s strategic weapon production unit.[xxix] The IDF said that Hussein had completed "in-depth training" in Iran.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip.
• Iran and Hamas: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.
• Weapons Smuggling on the Egypt-Israel Border: The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.
• Ceasefire Talks: Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.
• Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Israeli Operations in Lebanon: An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon. The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck. The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”

Iran Update, October 19, 2024

Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Three drones crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 19.[i] The IDF said that one of the drones "hit a building“ in Caesarea with no casualties.[ii] Israeli residents reported hearing a large explosion following the drone’s impact.[iii] Neither Netanyahu nor his wife were at the residence at the time of the impact, according to the Prime Minister’s Office.[iv] Leaked images of the residence show damage to the side of a building.[v] Netanyahu warned in a statement that the Iranian-backed groups that tried to ”assassinate” him made a ”grave mistake.”[vi]

Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Drones pose substantial challenges for IDF air defenses, though the IDF is gradually improving its counter-drone capabilities. The IDF intercepted the other two drones that crossed from Lebanon and triggered warning alarms in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.[vii] CTP-ISW is unable to assess what the targets of these two drones may have been. Hezbollah most recently penetrated Israeli air defenses when a drone struck the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade’s training camp south of Haifa on October 13. Hezbollah combined short-range, imprecise rockets with drones and missiles during the October 13 attack. There have not been indications that Hezbollah also used imprecise indirect fires, such as rockets, in the October 19 attack targeting Netanyahu. Hezbollah has used single drones to penetrate Israeli air defenses in the past, however, by flying the drones at a low altitude and through challenging terrain to prevent radar detection.[viii]

Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders. These Israeli operations resulted in the deaths of Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah has not claimed or acknowledged the attack as of this writing, but Hezbollah’s operations did announce on October 18 that it would “transition to a new and escalating phase” in its attacks on Israel.[ix] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem also said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[x]

Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, according to an unspecified Israeli official. An unspecified Israeli intelligence official told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah drone attacks are increasing in frequency following a brief lull caused by the death of Hezbollah’s drone unit commander in an Israeli strike in Beirut on September 26.[xi] The Israeli intelligence official said that Unit 127—Hezbollah’s drone unit—is composed of a “few dozen” fighters and that the unit ”suffered” after Israel killed its commander.[xii] CTP-ISW observed a brief interval for six days after the commander’s death on September 26 in which Hezbollah fired no drones or a single drone into Israeli territory.

Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander. Hezbollah drone attacks have increased in recent days in both frequency and deadliness. Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah has launched about thirty drones into Israel in the past week.[xiii] A Hezbollah drone killed four IDF personnel and injured over 60 more in Binyamina on October 13, and another drone attack could have killed Netanyahu on October 19.[xiv] The IDF has continued targeting tactical-level Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon, which CTP-ISW has assessed may be diminishing the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units.[xv] The effects generated by the removal of Hezbollah commanders is a temporary effect, however. Hezbollah forces remain structured as a conventional fighting force. Military organizations are designed to absorb casualties and rapidly replace commanders to overcome temporary disruptions caused by the loss of leaders.[xvi]

Some recent Hezbollah attacks, such as the drone strike on the 1st Infantry Brigade’s base, indicate that Hezbollah has rebuilt at least some of its communications structure that the IDF campaign previously severely degraded. Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of rockets, missiles, and drones in the 1st Infantry Brigade attack, suggesting that Hezbollah had restored some communication between its rocket, missile, and drone units in order to coordinate the simultaneous launches.[xvii]

Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement.[xviii] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[xix] The Hamas officials said that Hamas will begin discussions to determine Yahya Sinwar’s successor “very soon.”[xx] 

A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.[xxi] Hayya and an accompanying Hamas delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on October 19 to discuss the October 9 meeting between Hamas and Fatah in Cairo addressing post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and recent "developments.”[xxii] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders.
• Hezbollah Drone Operations: Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, but Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander.
• Sinwar Succession: Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement. A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The 91st Division continued operations in Mhaibib, southern Lebanon, on October 19. The IDF 8th Armored Brigade and Yahalom combat engineers demolished a Radwan SOF tunnel north of Mhaibib. Part of the complex ran underneath a Lebanese school.

Iran Update, October 18, 2024

The IDF Chief of Staff estimated that Israeli forces have killed at least 1,500 Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations against the group, which is consistent with CTP-ISW estimates.[i] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces in southern Lebanon that 1,500 is a conservative estimate.[ii] CTP-ISW has independently tallied about 1,450 Hezbollah fighter deaths since October 8, 2023.[iii]  IDF operations, including the widespread September pager and radio attacks, have almost certainly seriously injured thousands of other Hezbollah fighters and rendered them unable to fight.[iv] Halevi said that Israeli operations had struck Hezbollah’s entire senior leadership to ”wipe out” the chain of command.[v] The IDF has exclusively killed Hezbollah’s senior leadership through airstrikes.[vi] Halevi added that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon were decimating Hezbollah’s local leadership.[vii] This pattern of targeting means that Hezbollah very likely retains tactical-level commanders in its rear areas away from Israel’s current ground operations, particularly in the northern Bekaa Valley. The IDF Air Force frequently targets sites in the Bekaa Valley but the intensity of operations against Hezbollah’s northern units is significantly less than along the Israel-Lebanon border.[viii]

Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position during a speech mourning Yahya Sinwar on October 18.[ix] Hayya declared that Hamas would not release the Israeli hostages until the IDF completed a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and released Palestinian prisoners.[x] Hamas’ maximalist position has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s border with Egypt, which Hamas has used to develop its military capabilities over the past decades.[xi] Hamas has also insisted on a permanent ceasefire, the release of high-value Palestinian prisoners, the unimpeded return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, and full reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Israel and US officials confirmed on October 18 that mediators are not close to resuming talks in Doha or Egypt.[xii] Unspecified Israeli officials said that Israel would likely need to wait for Hamas to appoint a new leader before resuming negotiations.[xiii] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[xiv] Hayya was reportedly one of only a few exiled leaders whom Sinwar trusted, and he has played a key role in ceasefire negotiations.[xv] Hayya has a much stronger relationship with Hezbollah and Iran than other options for the top Hamas leadership role, like Khaled Meshaal.[xvi] Hayya also presumably took over many of Haniyeh’s duties—such as engaging with foreign partners—that Sinwar could not perform due to his physical position in the Gaza Strip.

Israeli officials are considering the impact of Yahya Sinwar’s death on hostage negotiations.[xvii] Israeli officials are reportedly concerned that Yahya Sinwar’s death will inspire Hamas to execute the Israeli hostages that it holds.[xviii] Israeli media reported that senior Israeli officials spoke with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about how to prevent Hamas from retaliating against Israeli hostages for Sinwar’s death.[xix] Hamas previously used its execution of Israeli six hostages to conduct a series of information operations designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.[xx]

Israeli military operations over the last year, particularly Israeli subterranean operations, deliberately created the conditions that led to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16. Sinwar had previously hid underground in Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Khan Younis until January 2024 and then in tunnels in Rafah until at least August 2024.[xxi] IDF clearing operations throughout the last year have attempted to destroy these tunnel networks throughout the Strip.[xxii] These operations enabled the IDF to force Sinwar from his tunnel complex in Khan Younis in January 2024 and then caused Sinwar to move above ground in Rafah after IDF operations there destroyed a number of tunnels.[xxiii] Forcing Hamas leaders like Sinwar above ground by destroying the tunnel networks was part of a deliberate IDF operational design. The discrete tactical engagement that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, but the broader Israeli campaign was intentionally designed to force Hamas rank-and-file and leaders above ground where they could be sought out and destroyed. Sinwar’s death was therefore not a matter of chance, but rather the outcome of a deliberate campaign designed to eventually eliminate all of Hamas’ senior leadership.

The IDF stated that Mohammed Sinwar assumed the duties of Hamas’ military wing after the IDF killed Mohammad Deif in July 2024.[xxiv] Read more CTP-ISW analysis of Yahya Sinwar’s succession here: Sinwar’s Death Will Not End Israeli Operations in the Gaza Strip by Brian Carter.

Two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members infiltrated Israeli territory near the Dead Sea and fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 18. The involvement of two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrates potential opportunities for Iran and the Axis of Resistance to recruit Jordanians to target Israel.[xxv] The Jordanian fighters infiltrated multiple meters beyond the Jordan-Israel border.[xxvi] Israeli forces killed the Jordanian fighters following an exchange of fire that injured two Israeli soldiers near Neot Hakikar, south of the Dead Sea.[xxvii] The Israeli Army Radio reported that the fighters carried a map, a compass, and an Arabic-Hebrew dictionary.[xxviii] The IDF blocked roads near the area and conducted aerial and ground scans to confirm that additional fighters did not also infiltrate Israeli territory.[xxix] The fighters reportedly wore Jordanian military uniforms but were not Jordanian soldiers.[xxx]  Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson Moaz al Khawaldeh claimed that the fighters were Muslim Brotherhood members who regularly participated in events in support of Gaza and the resistance.[xxxi] Multiple Palestinian militias have released statements praising the attack.[xxxii]

This attack, like the Jordanian truck driver attack that killed three Israeli citizens at the Allenby border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8, reflects anti-Israel sentiments in Jordan that can be manipulated by Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[xxxiii] Both Jordanian and Israeli police have thwarted several attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to conduct attacks within the kingdom or smuggle weapons into the West Bank.[xxxiv] Iranian efforts to manufacture weapons, arm Jordanian agents, and undermine the Jordanian state are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[xxxv] It is also notable that this attack occurred one day after the IDF announced it had killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, given Hamas’ historic and ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF Chief of Staff estimated that Israeli forces have killed at least 1,500 Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations against the group, which is consistent with CTP-ISW estimates.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position during a speech mourning Yahya Sinwar on October 18.
• The Death of Yahya Sinwar: Israeli military operations over the last year, particularly Israeli subterranean operations, deliberately created the conditions that led to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16. The discrete tactical engagement that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, but the broader Israeli campaign was intentionally designed to force Hamas rank-and-file and leaders above ground where they could be sought out and destroyed.
• Jordan: Two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members infiltrated Israeli territory near the Dead Sea and fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 18. The involvement of two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrates potential opportunities for Iran and the Axis of Resistance to recruit Jordanians to target Israel.

Iran Update, October 17, 2024

Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully. Israeli officials confirmed on October 17 that the IDF 828th Infantry Brigade killed Sinwar in Tal al Sultan, Rafah Governorate.[i] IDF soldiers located three fighters inside of a building, one of whom was later identified as Sinwar, and fired a tank round at the building. The IDF had previously assessed that Sinwar was likely using Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip as a “human shield” after Israeli forces found Sinwar’s DNA samples in a tunnel where six hostages were killed on August 31.[ii] The IDF did not report the presence of Israeli hostages with Sinwar at the time of his death, however.

Sinwar’s death is unlikely to meaningfully change Hamas’ negotiating position because Hamas aims to exploit the hostages it still holds to compel Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire that would enable Hamas to rebuild. Hamas executed six hostages who had been traveling with Sinwar in late August 2024 and publicized propaganda videos of the hostages.[iii] These videos were intended to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu in order to compel his government to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas. Khalil al Hayya, Sinwar’s deputy and chief negotiator, will probably take over Hamas’ political affairs in the interim period.[iv] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.

Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders.[v] Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Strip right now.[vi] Mohammad Sinwar’s military control of the group would at least in theory give him control over the hostages, though given the severely degraded state of Hamas’ command and control, it is far from clear that any single Hamas commander could be aware of the locations of hostages. Other commanders, like Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad, will also probably assume some of Yahya’s and former Hamas military wing commander Mohammad Deif’s responsibilities if they have not done so already.[vii] Mohammad Sinwar also has the requisite experience as a military commander that would enable him to rebuild Hamas, however, if allowed to do so. Mohammad Sinwar has served in many capacities for Hamas’ military wing, including as logistics and manpower chief and a brigade commander.[viii] He was also part of Yahya’s inner circle as a war planner and strategist.[ix] These skills will be extremely sought-after by Hamas’ leadership if it emerges from this war able to rebuild in the Gaza Strip.

The death of Yahya and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however. Israeli ground and air operations in the Gaza Strip have defeated or severely degraded Hamas units across the Gaza Strip.[x] This reality means that Mohammad Sinwar and others, like Izz al Din al Haddad, will be unable to immediately influence dynamics on the ground. Hamas fighters are currently fighting in small cells. The value of Mohammad Sinwar and Izz al Din al Haddad will come if they manage to survive this war and if the end of this war enables Hamas to reinvest in its military wing in the Gaza Strip to rebuild. Their military experience under those conditions would be invaluable to a rebuilding Hamas.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014.[xi] Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[xii] Araghchi and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi discussed the need to “intensify efforts towards ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.”[xiii] Araghchi separately called on regional countries to “redouble” their efforts to stop Israeli “aggression” in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Lebanon during a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty.[xiv] Egypt—along with Qatar and the United States—has mediated ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas in recent months. Araghchi’s visit to Egypt is noteworthy given that Iran and Egypt do not have formal diplomatic ties. Iran has increased its efforts to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt in recent years, however.[xv]

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi appointed Hassan Rashad as chief of the General Intelligence Service on October 16.[xvi] Rashad replaced Abbas Kamel, who had served as the Egyptian intelligence chief since 2018.[xvii] Kamel worked closely with the heads of the CIA and Mossad, as well as the Qatari prime minister, to try to secure a ceasefire and hostage deal between Israel and Hamas throughout the October 7 War.[xviii] Rashad has a long history of working in Egypt’s intelligence services and previously served as Kamel’s deputy.[xix]  Rashad has also overseen Egypt’s relationship with Iran and its proxies.”[xx]

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16 targeting Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.” [xxi]  CTP-ISW reported on October 15 that Houthi efforts to build an extensive tunnel network in the Houthi-controlled mountainous region between Sanaa and Sa’ada have intensified.[xxii] This was the first time that the US Air Force used B2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers against Houthi targets. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III called the CENTCOM strikes ”a unique demonstration of the United States’ ability to target facilities that our adversaries seek to keep out of reach.”[xxiii] Austin added that the US will continue to “degrade Houthis‘ capability to continue their destabilizing behavior“ attacking vessels in the Red Sea.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully.
• Sinwar’s Succession: Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders. Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Strip right now. The death of Yahya and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however, given the degraded state of Hamas’ military organization.
• Iranian Diplomatic Efforts: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014. Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.
• Yemen: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes using B2 Spirit stealth bombers in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16. The strikes targeted Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli media reported on October 17 that Hezbollah fighters killed five 1st Infantry Brigade soldiers during clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 16.

Iran Update, October 16, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Israeli forces have previously seized or partially secured terrain in Maroun al Ras, Yaroun, and Blida in southeastern Lebanon. Geolocated footage and commercial satellite imagery on October 16 show that Israeli forces have recently seized terrain along the western axis of advance in Mhaibib and along the eastern axis of advance in Ramyeh.[ii] A Lebanese social media user confirmed imagery and other reports that the IDF had “taken control” over the two villages.[iii] Israeli forces continued to operate in both areas on October 16.[iv] A force seizes terrain by killing or capturing all enemy forces and preventing the enemy from firing on the area. Israeli forces are likely currently conducting clearing operations in Mhaibib and Ramyeh, as indicated by engagements with Hezbollah fighters and the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli armor in Ramyeh, and Lebanese media reported heavy exchanges of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in the village on October 16.[vi] The IDF 91st Division destroyed an underground Radwan tunnel complex beneath Mhaibib on October 16 that Radwan forces used as a headquarters.[vii] Israeli forces are seizing and clearing terrain in border towns and areas to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.

Hezbollah fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in unsecured border areas. Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces exchanged small arms fire in Qouzah and Aita al Shaab, near Ramyeh, according to Hezbollah-affiliated sources.[viii] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting Israeli personnel between Markaba and Odaisseh.[ix] A Lebanese social media user noted that Hezbollah continues to control Odaisseh, which is in a small valley that runs east-to-west away from the Israeli border and is overlooked by two steep hills.[x] The IDF operated on the southern hill and engaged Hezbollah fighters there earlier in the war. IDF officers have consistently remarked that their forces are engaging Hezbollah fighters at longer ranges or that Hezbollah fighters have fled altogether, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem claimed on October 16 that this is an intentional strategy on Hezbollah’s part and that the group intends to rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces when they enter Lebanese territory rather than confront them as a regular standing army might.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm.[xii] Netanyahu told French President Emmanuel Macron that Israel would not accept a ceasefire agreement that would allow for Lebanon’s “security situation” to return to how it was before the IDF’s offensive.[xiii] [xiv] Netanyahu has previously declared that Israel seeks to return its citizens to the north by “defeat[ing] Hezbollah.”[xv] Israeli ground and air operations are presumably designed to defeat Hezbollah by rendering it unable or unwilling to continue the fight, thereby forcing Hezbollah to end its attacks and allowing Israeli citizens to return to the north. The Hezbollah that would emerge from such a war would be severely damaged and unable to execute the activities it traditionally has—at least for a time. Netanyahu’s demands for ceasefire stipulations to prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming would prevent Hezbollah from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.

Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. UN Resolution 1701 requires the disarmament of armed groups between the Litani River and the Israel-Lebanon border.[xvi] The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to ”take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[xvii] Hezbollah’s investment in military infrastructure in southern Lebanon was designed to be used in future wars against Israel. Several of these Hezbollah positions, including the tunnel complex the 91st Division destroyed in Mhaibib on October 16, were located within a few kilometers of UNIFIL outposts.[xviii]

Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16.[xix] The IDF presented a list of potential targets to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and began finalizing preparations including “sensitive coordination” with other regional countries. The report stated that Israel ”described its general attack plans” to the United States without providing an update on specific targets. An unspecified source stated that Israel could change its targeting decisions “at the 11th hour.”[xx] Unspecified American officials told CNN that they expect Israel will retaliate before the US presidential election on November 5.[xxi]

A senior Iranian defense official downplayed the US decision to send a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to Israel. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh dismissed this deployment as “psychological warfare” and claimed that the system does not present a “particular problem” for Iran.[xxii] An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated outlet similarly argued on October 13 that the THAAD system will not be effective against Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Fatah missile used in Iran’s October 1 attack.[xxiii] The American-made THAAD system is ”highly effective” and ”combat-proven” against short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, according to US manufacturer Lockheed Martin.[xxiv] The THAAD system successfully intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles targeting the United Arab Emirates in 2022.[xxv]

An unspecified “informed” source told Iraqi news outlet Baghdad Today that an American delegation arrived in Baghdad unannounced on October 16 to prepare for “indirect negotiations” with Iran.[xxvi] The source claimed that Washington has pressured Iraqi mediators to open negotiations with Iran amid concerns of potential regional escalation.[xxvii] The source also claimed that members of the US delegation are holding meetings with “elite” Iraqis on an ongoing basis to advance negotiations. These reports come as Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[xxviii] Senior Israeli officials guaranteed senior American officials that Israel will target Iranian military and defense sites instead of nuclear or oil facilities in its retaliatory strike on Iran.[xxix]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran.[xxx] Araghchi met with the Jordanian King Abdullah II and the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ayman Safadi separately in Amman on October 16 to discuss ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, humanitarian aid, and Israel‘s retaliation against Iran[xxxi] Safadi reiterated that Jordan will not allow Jordanian airspace to be violated.[xxxii] Iran’s two attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1 resulted in many Iranian projectiles violating Jordanian airspace.[xxxiii] Jordan is not to prevent Israel from launching an attack over Jordanian airspacKing Abdullah II also met with a US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee delegation led by Representative Mike Rogers in Amman on October 15.[xxxiv] This committee is responsible for designating funds for the US defense authorization bill, including financial assistance abroad.[xxxv] Jordan receives financial assistance money through the defense authorization bill. Araghchi will similarly meet Egyptian officials in Cairo on October 17.[xxxvi] Araghchi will attend the 3+3 Summit in Istanbul on October 18, where he will meet with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials.[xxxvii]

Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear .[xxxviii] Nakhaei Rad emphasized that “time and place” affects fatwas and “Shia jurisprudence is dynamic,” suggesting that current regional conditions could justify a shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine. Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons."[xxxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the letter was likely sent to the SNSC to encourage them to persuade Khamenei to reconsider his fatwa, as he has ultimate authority to revoke it.[xl]

US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. Axios reported on October 16 that the Israeli strategic affairs minister and Emirati foreign affairs minister met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to discuss a UAE-proposed plan for the Gaza Strip after the war.[xli] Blinken is now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel. The UAE plan, which was initially laid out in July 2024, would include the deployment of a temporary international mission to the Gaza Strip that would ”deliver humanitarian aid, establish law and order, and lay the groundwork for governance in the Strip.”[xlii] Part of the UAE’s plan involves appointing a reformed Palestinian Authority led by an independent prime minister to govern the post-war Gaza Strip.[xliii] The Palestinian Authority dismissed the UAE proposal because it is in conflict with the Chinese-mediated Hamas-Fatah deal that would establish a ”national unity government” including Hamas that would govern both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[xliv] The United States views UAE’s plan as a potential alternative that aims to lay out a possible path forward to the post-war governance structure for the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in unsecured border areas.
• Israeli Policy in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm. Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to ”take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran.
• Iranian Nuclear Policy: Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear . Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons."
• Postwar Plans in the Gaza Strip: US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. US officials are now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel.

Iran Update, October 14, 2024

Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah conducted a drone attack on October 13 targeting a training camp south of Haifa for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade that killed four IDF soldiers and injured 61 others.[i] Hezbollah said that the strike was targeting soldiers as they prepared for operations in Lebanon, and the IDF assessed that Hezbollah deliberately targeted an IDF dining facility during a period in which Hezbollah expected soldiers to be eating.[ii] This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon. The Israeli air campaign has severely disrupted Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures, and Israeli forces have observed Hezbollah fighters fleeing or only observing Israeli troops from a distance rather than decisively engaging IDF units.[iii] The IDF continues to seize terrain and towns, demonstrating that it can act with impunity in southern Lebanon.[iv] Hezbollah attacks into Israel allow it to claim that it is ”resisting” Israeli forces despite being unable or unwilling to defend southern Lebanon.[v]

This attack is part of a possible broader campaign that Hezbollah described on October 12. Hezbollah claimed on October 12 that its fighters continued to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[vi] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations, though it is unclear what military effect these attacks will have if any at all. Hezbollah’s decision to target a training camp for the 1st Infantry Brigade—a unit currently operating in southern Lebanon—likely falls within this framework.[vii] These attacks also could have an outsized effect in the Israeli domestic political space as well, and Hezbollah may calculate that continued attacks on rear IDF bases that kill even small numbers of IDF soldiers will cause Israeli public support for the ground campaign in Lebanon to decline. Hezbollah’s October 13 attack demonstrates that Hezbollah can precisely target IDF rear positions in northern Israel. The attack also demonstrates that Hezbollah‘s command-and-control network is sufficiently intact to order and execute these sorts of coordinated rocket and missile attacks (see below).

Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023. A preliminary IDF Air Force investigation indicated that Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of drones, rockets, and three precision missiles targeting Haifa at the same time it launched the drone targeting Binyamina.[viii] The IDF Navy and Iron Dome intercepted two of the drones near Nahariya and Acre but detection systems lost track of a third drone, a Shahed 107—which ultimately impacted in Binyamina.[ix] This tactic of using imprecise indirect fires to distract air defenses and then using precision weapons to strike targets has become common across Iran and its Axis of Resistance in recent years. Hezbollah has used this tactic to distract Israeli air defenses on numerous occasions to allow low-flying drones to enter northern Israel during its year-long campaign.[x] These drone attacks have previously proved difficult for Israeli air defenses to intercept. [xi]

Hezbollah likely attempted to replicate the successful October 13 attack by launching three surface-to-surface missiles targeting central Israel at the same time it launched dozens of rockets toward northern Israel on October 14.[xii] All three of these missiles were intercepted, but the missiles caused 182 red alerts across central Israel.[xiii]

The IDF vowed to respond by targeting Hezbollah’s drone unit and drone production infrastructure in response to the October 13 attack. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on October 13 that Israel would engage in a “forceful response” against Hezbollah.[xiv] Israeli Army Radio reported that IDF Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar instructed the IDF to prioritize airstrikes targeting Hezbollah's drone unit, which is responsible for drone production and operations.[xv] Bar said that the IDF Air Force set the goal to target every Hezbollah fighter, “from junior to senior,” in Hezbollah’s drone unit.[xvi] Israeli airstrikes have primarily targeted Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities but have occasionally targeted Hezbollah drone assets. The IDF recently struck drone warehouses in southern Lebanon on October 8 and 9, for example.[xvii]

Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.[xviii] Iran sent a high-resolution imaging ”Kowsar” satellite and a small ”Hodhod” communications satellite to Russia.[xix] Russia was originally scheduled to launch these satellites in December 2023 but was delayed.[xx] Russia previously launched two Iranian satellites in August 2022 and February 2024.[xxi] Russia will launch these satellites using the Soyuz space launch vehicle, which Russia also used in the February 2024 launch.[xxii]  Iran could use the ”Kowsar” satellite to collect imagery on US or allied troop positions and bases in the region. CTP-ISW has not observed acknowledgment of the satellite delivery in Russian media.

An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxiii] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim. The source claimed that Fallah Zadeh would help ”manage the current war” with Israel and secure logistical and communications support. The source reported that Fallah Zadeh will not advise Hezbollah in political matters or change the political structure of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has not announced its next Secretary General following airstrikes that killed Hassan Nasrallah and his presumed successor Hashem Safi el Din.[xxiv] Al Jarida has previously made unsubstantiated claims citing unspecified IRGC Quds Force officials that CTP-ISW also could not independently verify. No other reputable news organization independently reported similar claims corroborating al Jarida’s previous reports.

Iranian media published the full text of the “Development Plan for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology” on October 14.[xxv] A parliamentary presidium member recently announced the plan on October 6.[xxvi] The plan calls for the establishment of an “Atomic Energy Council” comprised of 19 members, including the Iranian president and the ministers of energy, foreign affairs, and defense.[xxvii] The plan also stipulates that the National Development Fund must invest at least $1 billion in Iranian nuclear power projects annually.

Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Baghdad on October 13 to discuss the “special and dangerous conditions” in the Middle East with senior Iraqi officials.[xxviii] Araghchi may have warned Iraqi officials against allowing Israel to use Iraqi airspace to attack Iran. Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein described “[Israel's] exploitation of Iraqi airspace” to attack Iran as “completely unacceptable” during a press conference with Araghchi.[xxix] Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid separately emphasized that Iraq “will never serve as a launching pad” for attacking Iran during a meeting with Araghchi.[xxx] Western media previously reported that Israel likely used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on April 18 in retaliation for the April 13 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[xxxi] Previous Iraqi governments have also warned Iran and the United States against using Iraq as a ”launching pad” for regional conflict, though these governments in practice are unable to prevent Iranian-backed groups in particular from using Iraqi territory to target US forces and Israel.[xxxii]

Araghchi separately met with senior Omani officials and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam in Muscat, Oman, on October 13.[xxxiii] Araghchi told reporters in Muscat that Iran has stopped indirect talks with the United States, likely referring to indirect talks that US and Iranian officials have held in Oman in recent months to try to avoid escalation in the region.[xxxiv] Oman and Iraq have historically served as intermediaries between Iran and the United States, and Araghchi may have called on the Omani and Iraqi governments to pressure the United States to restrain Israel’s response to the October 1 Iranian attack.[xxxv] Unspecified sources told CNN on October 12 that Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[xxxvi] The sources added that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike in Israel: Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Tactical Adaptation: Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023.
• Iran-Russia: Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.
• Iranian Support to Hezbollah: An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim.
• Iranian Preparations for Israeli Strike: Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran.

Iran Update, October 13, 2024

The United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel.[i] The THAAD system is a “ground-based interceptor designed to shoot down ballistic missiles.”[ii] Iran fired approximately 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in its April 13 attack and approximately 180 ballistic missiles in its October 1 attack.[iii] The Wall Street Journal reported on October 13 that less than 100 US military personnel will operate the THAAD system in Israel.[iv] The Pentagon stated that the deployment of the THAAD system underscores the United States’ “ironclad commitment” to defending Israel.[v] The United States previously deployed a THAAD system to the Middle East following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack into Israel.[vi] The United States also deployed a THAAD system to Israel in 2019 for “training and an integrated air defense exercise.”[vii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi responded to the deployment of the anti-missile system on October 13, warning that the United States is “putting [the] lives of its troops at risk by deploying them to...Israel.”[viii] Araghchi added that Iran has “no red lines” in defending its interests and people.[ix]  

US officials told NBC on October 12 that they believe Israel has “narrowed down” its targets for a retaliatory attack on Iran.[x] The officials stated that the targets include Iranian military and energy infrastructure and added that there is “no indication” that Israel will attack Iranian nuclear facilities or conduct targeting killings.[xi] The officials emphasized that Israel has not finalized “how and when to act,” however.[xii] An Israeli journalist separately reported on October 12 that Israel will delay its retaliatory attack until a US Army THAAD anti-missile battery arrives in Israel.[xiii] These reports come as Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[xiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and Oman on October 9, 10, and 13, respectively.[xv] Unspecified sources told CNN that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the Israeli retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[xvi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely trying to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike by threatening to start an “energy war.”[xvii]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with Iran over financial support for a larger-scale attack on Israel in 2021, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the October 7 attacks.[xviii] The Washington Post reported that Sinwar requested funding and military support from numerous senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, in order to ”destroy Israel completely in two years.”[xix] Iran reportedly agreed to allocate $10 million to the al Qassem Brigades, and several weeks later, Sinwar requested an additional $500 million to be allocated in monthly dividends over two years.[xx] Iran’s financial support of Hamas and the al Qassem Brigades has been well-established and Western officials have previously estimated that Iran provides Hamas with around $100 million in annual funding for Hamas’ military activities.[xxi] This funding was instrumental for Hamas to be able to marshal the capabilities required to carry out the October 7 attacks.[xxii] Sinwar's direct coordination and communication with senior Iranian officials, along with meetings between Hamas and Iranian officials in July 2023, underscore that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks.[xxiii] It remains unclear if Iran had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing.

An unspecified IDF division began a new ground operation near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 13.[xxiv] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported the IDF Air Force and artillery conducted a ”massive” bombardment before Israeli forces began ground maneuvers.[xxv] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with improvised explosive devices, small arms, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortars in Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh.[xxvi]

Israeli forces entered a UNIFIL position in Ramyeh, southern Lebanon, after sustaining injuries in a Hezbollah attack close to the UNIFIL position on October 13.[xxvii] The IDF reported that Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with “a massive anti-tank missile” during an operation in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon, injuring several soldiers.[xxviii] Israeli media reported that over 25 Israeli soldiers were injured in combat in southern Lebanon on October 13.[xxix] This casualty count is high for Israeli operations. The IDF reported that Israeli forces had to come within a few meters of a UNIFIL position to evacuate the wounded soldiers.[xxx] The IDF said that it was in constant contact with UNIFIL forces during the maneuver.[xxxi] UNIFIL stated two Israeli tanks destroyed ”the main gate and forcibly entered” the UNIFIL position in Ramyeh on October 13.[xxxii] UNIFIL also reported Israeli munition emissions caused skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions to 15 peacekeepers.[xxxiii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appealed to the UN Secretary General to remove UNIFIL forces from combat areas in southern Lebanon on October 13.[xxxiv] Netanyahu accused Hezbollah of using UNIFIL sites and personnel as “human shields” and ”hostages.”[xxxv]

Hezbollah conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF training camp in Binyamina, south of Haifa, and injured at least 67 Israelis on October 13.[xxxvi] Hezbollah said it launched multiple drones targeting a training camp for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade.[xxxvii] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched two or three drones in the attack and the IDF Navy intercepted one of the drones over Israeli territorial waters.[xxxviii] The drone that impacted in Binyamina reportedly did not trigger any warnings or register on Israeli detection systems.[xxxix] Israeli media reported that the drones were fired at the same time as a barrage of rockets from Lebanon.[xl] Hezbollah claimed a rocket attack targeting an IDF base in the Golan Heights shortly after the drone impacted Binyamin.[xli] The Home Front Command loosened restrictions over the targeted area prior to the attack.[xlii] Israeli medics said that the attack wounded over 67 people.[xliii] Hezbollah said it conducted the drone attack in response to two IDF airstrikes on Basta and al Nuwairi neighborhoods in central Beirut on October 10.[xliv] The IDF reportedly targeted senior Hezbollah official and Jihad Council member Wafiq Safa in one of the October 10 strikes.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: The United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. US officials told NBC on October 12 that they believe Israel has “narrowed down” its targets for a retaliatory attack on Iran.
• Hamas: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with Iran over financial support for a larger-scale attack on Israel in 2021, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the October 7 attacks.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: An unspecified IDF division began a new ground operation near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 13. Israeli forces entered a UNIFIL position in Ramyeh, southern Lebanon, after sustaining injuries in a Hezbollah attack close to the UNIFIL position on October 13. The IDF reported that Israeli forces had to come within a few meters of a UNIFIL position to evacuate the wounded soldiers.
• Hezbollah Attacks into Israel: Hezbollah conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF training camp in Binyamina, south of Haifa, and injured at least 67 Israelis on October 13.

Iran Update, October 12, 2024

Lebanese Hezbollah is falsely presenting Israeli ground operations as a failure in order to degrade Israeli will and underscore Hezbollah’s own resilience in the face of massive Hezbollah losses since mid-September.  Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces have failed to take control of any tactically significant hills or ridgelines in southern Lebanon.[i] Hezbollah asserted that Israeli forces have only advanced to the outskirts of Lebanese towns and are using propaganda images to misrepresent military successes. Geolocated footage and commercially available satellite imagery show Israeli forces are operating in the center of southern Lebanese towns, however.[ii] CTP-ISW observed on October 11 that Israeli forces Israeli forces also appear to have at least partially secured some villages in southern Lebanon given the presence of Israeli journalists and unarmored engineering vehicles.[iii] Securing a village would require Israeli forces to prevent Hezbollah from using direct or observed indirect fire weapons against the villages.[iv] An Israeli military correspondent further reported that Israeli forces seized territory along ridges and hills just inside of Lebanon within a few days of the ground operation starting on October 1.[v]

Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces are in contact in the areas surrounding UNIFIL position 1-31 south of Labbouneh, southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it has repelled repeated IDF attempts to advance from Ras Naqoura and Jal al Alam, northwest Israel, to Labbouneh, southwest Lebanon since October 7.[vi] Hezbollah said that its fighters engaged Israeli forces moving northwards from areas close to UNIFIL position 1-31 near Labbouneh. Commercially available satellite imagery and UNIFIL reports confirm that Israeli forces have advanced to UNIFIL position 1-31 as of October 11.[vii] The ongoing fighting close to UNIFIL position 1-31 is likely the cause of recent UNIFIL reports that multiple unspecified explosions have occurred close to the outposts and injured several peacekeepers.[viii] UNIFIL is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 which requires Hezbollah fighters to remain north of the Litani River and to ”take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities.[ix]

Hezbollah claimed that its fighters continue to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[x] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations. CTP-ISW has recorded Hezbollah attacks on IDF military targets along the Israel-Lebanon border but has not observed any effect on Israeli ground operations.

The New York Times reported that Hamas asked for Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah participation in the October 7 attacks in July 2023, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the operation.[xi] Hamas initially sought to attack in Fall 2022, according to minutes from Hamas meetings that the IDF captured in the central Gaza Strip in late January 2024. Hamas delayed the planned Fall 2022 attack to convince Iran and Hezbollah to participate. Hamas Political Bureau member and current Deputy Hamas leader Khalil al Hayya met with the head of the IRGC Quds Force Palestinian Affairs Office and a senior Hezbollah official in July 2023. Hayya specifically requested Hezbollah and Iran target sensitive Israeli sites as the Hamas attack began.  The IRGC Quds Force official reportedly told Hayya that Iran and Hezbollah supported the attack in principle but needed time to “prepare the environment.”

This meeting demonstrates that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks, but it remains unclear if Iran or Hezbollah had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing. Iran and Hezbollah’s hesitation may reflect the reality that Iran and Hezbollah would have needed to prepare their own operational plans to support Hamas’ plans successfully, which could take many months. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported the theory of ground attacks into Israel from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah had prepared to undertake such an attack if necessary.[xii]

Hamas’ decision to move forward with the attacks despite a lack of Iranian and Hezbollah full-scale involvement reflects differences in the relative prioritization of objectives within the Axis of Resistance. The New York Times reported that Hamas leaders felt pressure to attack Israel due to a variety of factors including Israel’s deployment of a new air defense system, ongoing Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization discussions, and Israeli actions in the West Bank and with the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[xiii] Israeli forces in Summer 2023 conducted a series of operations against Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas elements in the West Bank.[xiv] This divergence in prioritization of specific objectives further underscores the reality that the Axis of Resistance is not a monolithic system of Iranian proxies but rather an unconventional alliance network of like-minded actors across the Middle East led and dominated by Iran.

Hamas executed a sophisticated military deception campaign in support of the October 7 attacks, which contributed to the lack of Israeli preparedness for the attack. This deception effort was likely explicitly designed to exploit pre-existing Israeli biases toward believing Israel had deterred Hamas. The US military defines military deception as actions taken to deliberately mislead adversary decisionmakers to contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.[xv] The New York Times reported that Hamas deliberately avoided major engagements with Israel from 2021 to 2023 and conserved ammunition as a part of a deception campaign that would give the impression that Israeli military might had deterred Hamas.[xvi] Top Israeli officials, including the prime minister, believed that Israel had deterred Hamas.[xvii] Hamas’ decision to purposefully give the impression it was deterred would have reinforced these biases.   

Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made an unannounced visit to Beirut on October 11 as he traveled to Switzerland.[xviii] Ghalibaf told reporters in Beirut that he changed his travel plans to convey a message of support from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to the Lebanese people and government. Ghalibaf discussed Iranian efforts to secure a ceasefire that would end Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip during a meeting with Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[xix] Mikati emphasized the Lebanese government‘s commitment to implementing UN Resolution 1701 and strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces presence in southern Lebanon.[xx] This UN resolution, which ended the 2006 Lebanon war, requires Hezbollah forces to remain north of the Litani River.[xxi] Ghalibaf expressed further support for the Lebanese government and people in a joint press conference with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.[xxii] Ghalibaf is the second Iranian politician to visit Beirut since the start of Israeli ground operations in Lebanon following the October 4 visit of Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[xxiii]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s visit to Beirut also likely seeks to message Iranian commitment to its supporters and partners in Lebanon–including Lebanese Hezbollah–given that Iranian military operations have not deterred or disrupted Israeli operations in Lebanon. Ghalibaf visited areas recently targeted in Israeli airstrikes in central and southern Beirut and expressed sympathy to the families affected by the strikes.[xxiv] Ghalibaf stated that Iran will help rebuild central and southern Beirut.[xxv] Ghalibaf also met with unspecified ”heads of Palestinian parties” at the Iranian embassy in Beirut.[xxvi] Ghalibaf vowed to convey the ”message” of the Palestinian and Lebanese people as he left Beirut to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Geneva, Switzerland.[xxvii]

Senior Iranian officials are messaging Iran’s willingness to alter its nuclear doctrine, likely in an attempt to pressure the United States to discourage an Israeli strike targeting Iranian nuclear facilities while attempting to deter the Israelis. A senior political advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Brigadier General Rasoul Sanaei Rad, indicated in a recent interview on October 9 that Iran may reconsider its nuclear doctrine if Israel targets Iranian nuclear facilities.[xxviii] Certain factions within the Iranian regime have recently voiced support for changing Iran’s nuclear doctrine. These statements and actions in support of changing the doctrine are likely aimed both at the United States and Israel. The recent statements and actions in support of changing the doctrine, which include a call by 39 Iranian parliamentarians to revise Iranian defense doctrine to allow for an enhanced nuclear capacity, are the latest in a series of statements since May 2024 that suggest at least some elements within the regime are agitating against the current nuclear policy.[xxix] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set the current policy in 2003 when he issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons. Khamenei holds the ultimate authority over the nuclear issue and the fatwa will remain in effect unless he decides otherwise.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Information Operations: Lebanese Hezbollah is falsely presenting Israeli ground operations as a failure to degrade Israeli will and underscore Hezbollah’s resilience in the face of massive Hezbollah losses since mid-September.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces are in contact in the areas surrounding UNIFIL position 1-31 south of Labbouneh, southwestern Lebanon. The ongoing fighting close to UNIFIL position 1-31 is likely the cause of recent UNIFIL reports that multiple unspecified explosions have occurred close to the outposts and injured several peacekeepers.
• Hamas: The New York Times reported that Hamas asked for Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah participation in the October 7 attacks in July 2023, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the operation. This ask demonstrates that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks, but it remains unclear if Iran or Hezbollah had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing.
• Iran: Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made an unannounced visit to Beirut on October 11 as he traveled to Switzerland.
• Iranian Nuclear Doctrine: Senior Iranian officials are messaging Iran’s willingness to alter its nuclear doctrine, likely in an attempt to pressure the United States to discourage an Israeli strike targeting Iranian nuclear facilities while attempting to deter the Israelis.

Iran Update, October 11, 2024

The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[1] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli forces seized territory along ridges and hills just inside of Lebanon within a few days of the ground operation starting on October 1.[2] The military correspondent reported on October 10 that Israeli forces were continuing to clear Hezbollah military infrastructure from rural areas. Hezbollah fighters have previously used rural territory along the Israeli border to fire direct-fire weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank guns, targeting Israeli forces and civilians.[3] Preventing Hezbollah from using these areas for its direct-fire weapons does not mean that Israel has achieved its objective of returning Israeli civilians to their homes in the north because Hezbollah can still fire longer-range indirect weapons, such as rockets and mortars.[4] These operations do, however, disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to use some of its weapons systems to target Israeli border towns.[5]

Israeli forces also appear to have at least partially secured some villages in southern Lebanon given the presence of Israeli journalists and unarmored engineering vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) guided Israeli journalists through towns in southern Lebanon on October 10 to report on the status of Israeli operations in the area.[6] Securing a village would require Israeli forces to prevent Hezbollah from using direct or observed indirect fire weapons against it.[7] A commander usually only secures an area for a time-limited period. The presence of these journalists and unarmored vehicles suggests some villages are at least partially secured given that the IDF would presumably employ armored engineering vehicles, as it has in the Gaza Strip, and would not allow civilian journalists access during major operations.[8] The IDF would need to meet these conditions prior to allowing Israeli civilians to visit Lebanese towns.

It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[9] Israeli forces have also observed that Hezbollah fighters have preferred to engage Israeli forces from a distance or have fled outright during the IDF’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon.[10] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[11] Even isolated tactical units should be capable of fighting effectively on their own for some time, however. Hezbollah could have made a deliberate choice to intentionally hold back its fighters, given that tactical elements would likely defend against Israeli forces absent direction from above.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. The Iranian foreign minister reportedly threatened senior Saudi officials that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets if Saudi Arabia were to support an Israeli attack on Iran.[12] Reuters reported on October 10 that Gulf countries are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[13] This reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.[14] Kataib Hezbollah spokesman Abu Ali al Askari released a statement on October 10, threatening to start an energy war with the aid of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthis in the Bab al Mandab.[15] Askari’s statement characterized Arab and Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, as “evil regimes” for their support of Israel.[16] Askari also threatened to target US forces in Iraq and the region if Iraq is attacked or if Iraqi airspace is used to attack Iran, likely to pressure the United States to deter Israel from attacking Iran.[17] These threats support Iran’s efforts to deter a more costly Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.[18] Pezeshkian expressed hope that Iran and Russia will sign the comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement during Pezeshkian’s upcoming trip to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, from October 22-24.[19] This is a 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia that will replace previous cooperation agreements, but the exact specifics of the agreement are not publicly available.[20] Putin and Pezeshkian both said that Russia and Iran frequently share positions and coordinate regarding international events.[21] Putin approved the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran on September 19.[22] Pezeshkian stated that he asked Putin to act ”more effectively” in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.[23] Putin said that he was satisfied with the volume of trade between Iran and Russia.[24] Russian media reported that Pezeshkian accepted Putin’s invitation for an official visit to Russia at an unspecified time in the future.[25]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow in Turkmenistan on October 11.[26] Pezeshkian expressed readiness to increase cooperation with Uzbekistan in scientific, industrial, and cultural fields.[27] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Turkmenistan made agreements in the industries of gas and electricity that will be finalized in an upcoming joint economic cooperation commission in Tehran.[28]

The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.[29] An unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media that the cabinet did not make any “big decisions.” An unspecified Israeli security official stated that the cabinet seeks to postpone the vote to decrease the length of time between approval and execution of the Israeli retaliation.[30] Three US and Israeli officials separately told Axios that US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “moved closer to an understanding” on the scope of Israel’s response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack during a phone call on October 9.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations.
• Iran and Iranian-backed Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. Current reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.
• Israeli Strike on Iran: The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.

Iran Update, October 10, 2024

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened senior Saudi officials, warning that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets and infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack on Iran, according to anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters.[i] Araghchi traveled to Riyadh on October 9 to discuss the October 7 War with senior Saudi officials.[ii] Araghchi said that Iran “sent a clear message” to Saudi Arabia that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or the Houthis could “respond” if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack.[iii] Reuters separately reported that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have told the United States that they will deny Israel use of their respective airspaces to attack Iran, citing three unspecified Gulf sources. The sources added that the Gulf states are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[iv] Araghchi traveled to Doha following his one-day visit to Riyadh and met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani on October 10, presumably to convey a similar warning.[v]

Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on October 10 that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[vi] Boroujerdi said that a withdrawal "could be necessary to defend [Iranian] interests." Boroujerdi suggested that Iran could then build a nuclear weapon in this scenario. Iran ratified the NPT, which prohibits nuclear weaponization, in 1970 and has repeatedly threatened to withdraw to impose pressure on the West.[vii]

Lebanese Hezbollah has likely lost under five percent of its original fighting force over the past year. Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[viii] Now-dead Hezbollah Secretary General Hassam Nasrallah claimed in 2021 that Hezbollah had 100,000 fighters, which was very likely an exaggeration.[ix] CTP-ISW has tallied over 600 Hezbollah fighter and commander death announcements over the past year.[x] The majority of these fighters died from the IDF air campaign to degrade Hezbollah capabilities in Lebanon. Hezbollah had issued timely mourning posts of its fighters throughout the conflict until Israel began its intensive air campaign against the force in late September 2024.[xi] Local sources have continued to announce fighter deaths even after Hezbollah stopped distributing notices.[xii] The IDF spokesperson separately said on October 5 that Israeli forces have killed 440 Hezbollah operatives since beginning ground operations in southern Lebanon, bringing the Hezbollah death toll to around 1,100.[xiii] The IDF has killed additional fighters since October 5, though the number is unclear.[xiv] IDF operations, including the widespread September pager and radio attacks, have almost certainly seriously injured thousands of Hezbollah fighters and rendered them unable to fight, moreover.[xv] While the IDF has significantly degraded Hezbollah leadership, Hezbollah still retains the bulk of its rank-and-file forces capable of conducting attacks into northern Israel and engaging Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Israeli journalists reported on October 10 that the IDF has taken control of some border areas in southeastern Lebanon.[xvi] Israeli journalists recently visited the IDF 91st Division in an unspecified village in southeastern Lebanon.[xvii] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli forces took control of Lebanese villages in the area “within a few days” and are now operating within the villages to clear them of Hezbollah military infrastructure.[xviii] Several journalists noted that the recent Israeli ground maneuvers have made travel on the Israel-Lebanon border easier and safer from Hezbollah attacks.[xix] Journalists posted photos of Israeli tanks, bulldozers, Humvees, and other machinery in southern Lebanese villages.[xx] Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be conducting significant resistance to Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[xxi] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah fighters at one point tried to reach a warehouse that had been seized by Israeli forces and were killed.[xxii] An Israeli commander previously noted some Hezbollah militants have withdrawn deeper into Lebanon while others have fled from Israeli forces.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened senior Saudi officials, warning that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets and infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack on Iran, according to anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters.
• Iran: Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on October 10 that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has likely lost under five percent of its original fighting force over the past year.
• Lebanon: Israeli journalists reported on October 10 that the IDF has taken control of some border areas in southeastern Lebanon.

Iran Update, October 8, 2024

Israeli political leaders indicated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4.[i] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a video statement on October 8 that Israel killed “Nasrallah himself, and Nasrallah’s replacement, and the replacement of his replacement,” which Israeli media has framed as confirmation of the killing of Safi ed Din.[ii] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant similarly said on October 8 that the IDF probably killed Safi ed Din.[iii] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, on the other hand, said that the IDF is still investigating the results of the airstrike targeting Safi ed Din.[iv] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem released a video statement on October 8 in which he said that Hezbollah would select a new leader based on its approving mechanisms, noting that the war made the succession to Nasrallah ”difficult and compromised.”[v] Qassem may be among the candidates considered to replace Nasrallah given that he has formal seniority in the organization and has appeared as the public face of the group in these difficult circumstances.

Netanyahu in his own video statement addressed the Lebanese people directly, saying that Hezbollah is “weaker today than it has been for many years.”[vi] Netanyahu asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah.[vii] Gallant similarly noted that Hezbollah is “without a leader” and that Israel should ”take advantage” of this situation in order to safely return displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel.[viii]

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Qassem separately in his video statement praised Hezbollah’s resilience and vowed to continue attacks into Israel.[ix] Qassem described the Israeli killing of Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders as a ”painful blow” but said that new leaders have capably filled these vacant positions.[x] Qassem also observed that numerous Israeli cities are within the range of many Hezbollah weapons systems and said that Hezbollah would ”expand the ranges” of its attacks.[xi] Qassem separately tried to build domestic Lebanese support for Hezbollah by asserting that Hezbollah began attacking Israel in October 2023 to support the Gaza Strip and to “defend Lebanon and its people.”[xii]   

Qassem also expressed Hezbollah supports for Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s efforts to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.[xiii] Qassem did not condition Hezbollah support for a ceasefire on first securing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, as Nasrallah consistently did.[xiv] Qassem refrained from elaborating on what a ceasefire in Lebanon would involve. Berri, who is a Hezbollah political ally, has met recently with Arab, Iranian, and Western officials to discuss a potential ceasefire in Lebanon.[xv] A ceasefire would require Hezbollah to at least cease its near constant attacks that Qassem vowed to continue and expand in northern Israel.

The IDF deployed a fourth division—the 146th Reservist Division—to southwestern Lebanon on October 8 for “focused and delimited" ground operations against Hezbollah.[xvi] The 2nd infantry, 205th armored, and 213th artillery brigades are currently operating under the 146th Division.[xvii] This division joins the 91st, 36th, and 98th divisions in southern Lebanon shortly after Israel announced that it would expand ground operations against Hezbollah and created a new closed military zone in Western Galilee.[xviii] An Israeli military corresponded estimated that there are likely over 15,000 Israeli soldiers deployed to fight in southern Lebanon.[xix]

The IDF destroyed a Hezbollah tunnel that crossed the Israel-Lebanon border on October 8.[xx] The IDF stated that the rudimentary tunnel crossed into Israel near Zarit but that Israeli forces blocked the tunnel exit into Israel several months ago and had maintained “full operational control” over the area.[xxi] Israeli forces seized weapons, including anti-tank missiles, inside the tunnel.[xxii] The IDF added that it has not found any other Hezbollah tunnels that cross into Israel.[xxiii]

US Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said on October 7 that Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in around a week.[xxiv] Burns also said that the United States has observed no evidence that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has ordered the regime to build a nuclear weapon. Burns added that the United States and its partners should be able to detect “relatively early on” if Iran begins building a nuclear weapon.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli political leaders indicated that the IDF killed Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem lauded the resilience of Hezbollah and vowed to continue and even expand attacks into northern Israel.
• Lebanon: The IDF deployed a fourth division—the 146^th Reservist Division—to southwestern Lebanon as part of its expansion of ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Iran: US CIA Director William Burns said that Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in around a week but does appear to have yet made the decision to do so.

Iran Update, October 7, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed a third division—the 91^st Division—to southern Lebanon on October 7 for “focused and delimited” ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.[i] The 91st Division joins the 36^th and 98^th divisions in southern Lebanon shortly after Israel announced that it would expand ground operations against Hezbollah.[ii] The IDF 3rd, 8th, and 288th reserve brigades are operating under the 91st Division.[iii] The division is ordinarily responsible for the entire Israel-Lebanon border and has conducted hundreds of attacks from Israel targeting Hezbollah.[iv] Hezbollah reported that it fired upon Israeli forces around the border near Yiftah.[v] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 7 similarly indicates troop movements in the area.

The IDF created a fourth closed military zone in Western Galilee on October 7.[vi] The new zone encompasses Rosh Hanikra, Hanita, Admit, Arab al Aramshe, and Shlomi, which is the western-most section of the Israel-Lebanon border.[vii] Most of the border is now a closed military zone. The IDF created closed military zones to the east over the Metula area on September 30, over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1, and over Manara and Yiftah on October 6.[viii]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 7.[ix] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[x] The spokesperson also ordered Lebanese civilians to keep off the sea and shoreline south of the Awali River.[xi] He said that the IDF Navy would soon operate off the coast against Hezbollah.[xii] Local Lebanese sources reported that Israeli naval ships fired artillery targeting Ras Naqoura in southwest Lebanon.[xiii] The IDF Navy has provided fire support to ground forces operating in the Gaza Strip over the past year.[xiv]

US Central Command Commander General Michael Erik Kurilla met with senior Israeli defense officials on October 5 and 6.[xv] Kurilla spoke with Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and other commanders about the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel and other threats facing Israel.[xvi] The IDF reported that Kurilla and Halevi discussed Israeli ground operations into southern Lebanon as well.[xvii]

Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is alive but have not yet provided evidence.[xviii] Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Ghaani in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4. IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi said on October 4 that Ghaani is “in good health.”[xix] The host of a Palestinian conference in Tehran similarly read a message that was purportedly written by Ghaani on October 7.[xx] Anonymous Israeli military sources told Israeli media that Ghaani was not the target of the IDF airstrike on Beirut and that the IDF was unaware of whether Ghaani was at the location of the airstrike.[xxi]

Hamas issued a statement commemorating the anniversary of its October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and celebrating the other Iranian-backed actors that have begun attacking Israel regularly over the past year.[xxii] This framing is consistent with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s reported desire to ignite a regional war against Israel in order to alleviate Israeli military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, in its statement, praised Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and West Bank fighters for their regular attacks on Israel.[xxiii] Hamas also boasted that a recent terror attack on the Israel-Jordan border has inspired ”an authentic Jordanian Arab front.”

Hamas separately claimed that it conducted its October 7 attack into Israel in order to preempt an Israeli attack.[xxiv] This appears to be the first time that Hamas has made this claim, raising the question of why it waited until now to make this assertion if it were true. Hamas also threatened to execute more Israeli hostages in its statement commemorating its indiscriminate killing, torture, and abduction of Israeli civilians.

The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is preparing legislation that would formalize parts of the Axis of Resistance as an alliance.[xxv] The proposed legislation would establish a "security defense agreement" or ”resistance pact” among Iran and its regional allies, likely Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The agreement would require alliance members to provide “comprehensive economic, military, and political support to each other” in the event of a US or Israeli attack. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council would be responsible for admitting members into the alliance. The legislation also proposes establishing a headquarters to “coordinate operations and military decisions” across the alliance. The legislation finally mentions holding combined military exercises and developing military infrastructure together. The committee will send the legislation to the Iranian Parliament for voting ”soon.” This notional alliance would formalize much of what Iran already tries to do with the Axis of Resistance. Iran views itself as a member and the leader of this informal alliance and coordinates military activities across the alliance through a network of headquarters dispersed across the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF deployed a third division for ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The IDF also created another closed military zone in Western Galilee.
• Iran: Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani is still alive but have not yet provided evidence.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas released a statement commemorating the anniversary of its October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and celebrated other Middle Eastern actors’ attacks on Israel.
• Iran: The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is preparing legislation that would formalize parts of the Axis of Resistance as an alliance.

Iran Update, October 6, 2024

Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani on October 4. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have been unable to contact Ghaani since Israel conducted an airstrike targeting Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in Beirut on October 4.[i] Ghaani was in Beirut at the time of the Israeli airstrike, according to the New York Times and Reuters. He was reportedly helping Hezbollah recover from recent Israeli attacks on the group.[ii] An Iranian security official told Reuters that Ghaani was not meeting with Safi ed Din when the Israeli airstrike targeted the latter. Ghaani was last seen publicly when he visited the Hezbollah representative office in Tehran on September 29.[iii] Ghaani has been notably absent from high-profile regime events since then. He was not seen at Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Friday prayer sermon on October 4 or when Khamenei met with Iranian military leadership on October 6.[v]

Some Iranian officials and state-affiliated media have called on the regime to confirm whether Ghaani is alive. An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on October 6 that Ghaani is “in perfect health” and called on the IRGC to address the rumors of his death or injury in Beirut.[vi] An outlet tied to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei similarly called on the regime to publish “news that our general is alive and well.”[vii] An IRGC member stationed in Beirut told the New York Times that the regime silence about Ghaani’s status has created “panic among rank-and-file members.”[viii]

Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said during a visit to the IDF Nevatim airbase that Israel will respond to Iran at an appropriate place and time and in a manner of its choosing.[ix] The Nevatim airbase was one of the sites that Iran targeted in its recent missile attack.[x] Several missiles hit the base, causing minor damages.[xi] Gallant added that the Iranian attack “didn’t even scratch” the capabilities of the IDF Air Force.[xii] Israeli President Isaac Herzog separately said that the Iranian attack “obviously deserves a response” in an interview with Saudi media.[xiii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant will reportedly travel to the Washington, DC, to meet with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III on October 9.[xiv] Gallant and Austin are expected to discuss US-Israel security cooperation vis-a-vis Iran.[xv]

Iran appears to be preparing for an Israeli retaliation amid reports that Israel may strike sensitive Iranian sites, such as energy and nuclear infrastructure.

• The Iranian State Civil Aviation Organization cancelled all civilian flights in Iran from 2100 local time on October 6 to 0600 local time on October 7.[xvi] These times equate to 1400-2300 ET on October 6.
• The Iranian National Tanker Company has vacated empty oil tankers from the main Iranian oil export terminal on Kharg Island.[xvii] Many vessels that had been docked at Bandar Abbas have left as well.[xviii]
• Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad met with IRGC Navy officers in Bushehr City to discuss the security of the South Pars gas field, which is the largest Iranian gas field.[xix] Paknejad also visited Kharg Island.[xx]

The IDF continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh in southern Lebanon. The IDF 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) engaged Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces (SOF), killing some and destroying military headquarters and warehouses south of Bint Jbeil .[xxi] The brigade commander said that the IDF is focusing on destroying Hezbollah surface and sub-surface infrastructure in order to prevent Hezbollah attacks into Israel.[xxii] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade (36th Division) destroyed tunnel shafts and ammunition depots near Maroun al Ras.[xxiii] The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade (98th Division) seized ”hundreds” of weapons and a vehicle used by Hezbollah Radwan SOF.[xxiv] An anti-aircraft gun was mounted atop the vehicle, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[xxv]

Israeli forces separately located a Hezbollah Radwan SOF warehouse and weapons storage facility in a tunnel complex beneath a civilian home in Odaisseh along the Israel-Lebanon border.[xxvi]

The IDF created a third closed military zone in the Upper Galilee on October 6.[xxvii] The new zone encompasses Malkia, Manara, and Yiftah, which is between the two existing closed zones. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1.[xxviii] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces tried to cross into Blida, which is adjacent to newly closed Yiftah on October 5.[xxix] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 6 indicates that Israeli forces operated near Blida. An Israeli military correspondent reported on October 4 that the IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[xxx]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 6.[xxxi] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[xxxii]

The IDF launched a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza City, on October 6 in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[xxxiii] The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024, during which the IDF encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.[xxxiv] Hamas has reportedly re-armed and re-organized itself in the four months since the IDF withdrew.[xxxv] An Israeli military correspondent said that the IDF assesses that there are thousands of original Hamas fighters and thousands of new but poorly trained Hamas recruits in the northern Gaza Strip.[xxxvi] The IDF stated that it would operate around Jabalia for as long as is required in order to thoroughly destroy Hamas infrastructure there.[xxxvii] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia sites around Jabalia as the IDF 401st and 460th armored brigades encircled the camp.[xxxviii] Israeli forces have engaged dozens of Palestinian fighters around Jabalia since entering the area.[xxxix] The 401st and 460th armored brigades are operating under the command of the 162nd Division, which had been leading operations in Rafah since May 2024.[xl] The IDF Gaza Division will now lead the Givati and Nahal brigades in clearing operations in Rafah.[xli]

Anonymous Iraqi officials claimed that the United States sent “strongly worded” messages to the Iraqi federal government following an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad.[xlii] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacked the US Diplomatic Support Complex near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[xliii] The Iraqi officials claimed that the United States threatened to attack Iranian-backed militias if they continued to attack US positions or escalated further against Israel.[xliv] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks targeting Israel since September 17.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani in an airstrike in Beirut. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have reportedly been unable to contact Ghaani since the airstrike.
• Iran: Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the recent Iranian ballistic missile attack. Iran appears to be preparing for an imminent Israeli strike, possibly targeting Iranian energy and nuclear infrastructure.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued clearing Lebanese Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh. The IDF also created a third military zone in the Upper Galiliee, amid Israeli reports that the IDF will expand its ground operations into Lebanon.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF launched a new clearing operation into the Jabalia refugee camp in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts. The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024 and encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.

Iran Update, October 5, 2024

An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is preparing to expand its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[i] The IDF plans to send more forces, according to the correspondent, which would build upon the two divisions already operating in southern Lebanon. These divisions have primarily operated around Lebanese villages immediately along the border with Israel.[ii] The expansion of Israeli operations would be meant to help achieve the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. The near daily Lebanese Hezbollah attacks in northern Israel have compelled thousands of civilians to evacuate.

The IDF continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon on October 5. The IDF 1st Golani Brigade (36th Division) raided Hezbollah positions and destroyed hundreds of weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles, grenades, and small arms.[iii] A Hezbollah-affiliated outlet described the activity as an ”intensive combing operation.”[iv] Hezbollah claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) and fired rocket-propelled grenades targeting Israeli forces around Maroun al Ras and Yaroun on October 4.[v]  The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade and 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) also engaged Hezbollah militants and raided Hezbollah infrastructure in mountainous and urban areas.[vi] These brigades and Israeli engineering elements destroyed underground infrastructure, including tunnels. One of the sites was a Hezbollah compound 300 meters from the Israel-Lebanon border.

Hezbollah appears to be trying to avoid decisive engagements with the IDF. Israeli sources reported that Hezbollah is trying to keep its forces at a distance and will withdraw shortly after making contact with the IDF.[vii] Hezbollah is fighting primarily through ambushes and the use of anti-tank missile fire and IEDs.[viii] Hezbollah has also kept the bulk of its forces deep inside Lebanon rather than deploying them to the front.[ix] This behavior indicates that Hezbollah retains effective command-and-control at least at the tactical level and possibly higher, despite the extensive Israeli killing of Hezbollah commanders. The IDF has observed some indications that the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah forces has been reduced, however.[x] The IDF announced on October 5 that it has killed about 440 Hezbollah militants since launching ground operations into Lebanon.[xi]

The IDF separately stated on October 5 that some Hezbollah militants have fled combat zones.[xii] Israeli media similarly reported that some Hezbollah militants have moved toward Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) positions in order to evade Israeli attacks.[xiii]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The IDF conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Beirut on October 4 and October 5, including infrastructure affiliated with the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus and weapons depots.[xiv] The IDF warned residents to evacuate from specific buildings before some of the strikes.[xv] The IDF also struck Hezbollah militants in a mosque adjacent to Salah Ghandour Hospital in Bint Jbeil.[xvi] The IDF said that the Hezbollah militants used the headquarters to plan attacks against Israeli forces and into Israel.[xvii] The IDF said that it called local authorities in Bint Jbeil to demand that Hezbollah activities within the hospital end immediately prior to the strike.[xviii]

The IDF also continued to target Palestinian militia networks in Lebanon.[xix] The IDF said that it killed Hamas official Muhammad Hussein Ali al Mahmoud in Saadnayel in the Bekaa Valley.[xx] The IDF said that Mahmoud was a senior official in Hamas’ wing in Lebanon and played a significant role in growing Hamas’ presence there, providing Hezbollah with weapons to attack Israel, and directing attacks in the West Bank.[xxi] The IDF also killed senior Hamas member Saeed Alaa Nayef Ali Mahmoud in a Palestinian refugee camp in Tripoli, Lebanon.[xxii] The IDF said that Ali led attacks against Israel and recruited Hamas fighters in Lebanon.[xxiii] Hamas mourned the two fighters.[xxiv] Hezbollah commonly allows Palestinian groups to launch attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon.[xxv] The IDF has targeted numerous members of Palestinian militias in Lebanon since beginning its intensified air campaign on September 21, including militants from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).[xxvi]

Hezbollah has continued its attack campaign targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 4.[xxvii] Hezbollah launched Fadi-1 missiles targeting the Ramat David airbase southeast of Haifa.[xxviii] Hezbollah separately launched rockets at the Maale Golani Barracks in the northern Golan Heights.[xxix] Hezbollah also claimed to launch rockets at civilian targets, including Sasa and Safed.[xxx] Hezbollah also continued to attack Israeli troops concentrated around the Israel-Lebanon border, including by firing large barrages of rockets at Dan and Katzrin. [xxxi] The IDF intercepted a suspicious aerial target that crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 5.[xxxii] The IDF conducted ”many interceptions” of Hezbollah rockets in the Karmiel area on October 5.[xxxiii] Some rockets fell in open areas.[xxxiv] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah rockets lightly injured three people in Deir al Asad near Karmiel.[xxxv] Hezbollah claimed to target the Elta Military Industries Company in Sakhnin near Karmiel.[xxxvi]

Iran Update, October 4, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on an underground bunker in Beirut on October 3. The airstrike targeted a meeting of senior Hezbollah officials, including the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah, Safi ed Din.[i] Neither the IDF nor Hezbollah have provided any information on the outcome of the strike. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said on October 1 that Hezbollah will choose a new leader as soon as possible and according to the approved mechanisms.[ii] The chief of Hezbollah intelligence may have also died in the airstrike.[iii] 

Iran Update, October 3, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued advancing into southern Lebanon on October 3. Geolocated imagery indicates Israeli troop movements around the western axis of advance, specifically around Aitaroun and Yaroun.[i] The IDF Golani Brigade (36th Division) coordinated with the IDF Air Force to strike Hezbollah militants in nearby buildings.[ii] Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces as they advanced.[iii] Hezbollah claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting the IDF around Maroun al Ras and that it detonated a “barrel bomb” targeting the IDF around Yaroun.[iv] A Hezbollah-affiliated reporter claimed that Hezbollah prepared ambushes beforehand.[v] The IDF previously announced on October 1 that it would soon operate in this general area to clear it of Hezbollah militants and infrastructure and asked civilians to evacuate.[vi] Hezbollah-affiliated sources separately reported that the IDF is operating around Kfar Kila around the eastern axis of advance.[vii] The IDF reportedly estimated that it has killed over 100 Hezbollah militants since launching ground operations into Lebanon on October 1.[viii] Hezbollah appears to have stopped posting obituaries for its militants in this time.[ix] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited the Israeli forces on the Israel-Lebanon border and vowed to continue efforts against Hezbollah.[x]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) said that an Israeli strike killed an LAF soldier in southern Lebanon on October 3.[xi] The LAF said that Lebanese soldiers returned fire after the strike.[xii] A Lebanese security source told Reuters that this incident marked the first time that the LAF has fired at Israeli forces in the war.[xiii]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns in southern Lebanon.[xiv] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River, which is 30 miles north of the Litani River.[xv] The 25 towns that the IDF identified are all north of the Litani River.[xvi] The IDF conducted several airstrikes in at least two of the specified towns on October 3.[xvii]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership across Lebanon on October 3.[xviii] The IDF Air Force struck over 200 Hezbollah targets, including Hezbollah militants and infrastructure, including observation posts and weapons depots.[xix] The IDF 210th Division directed an airstrike that targeted and killed the local Hezbollah commander for the Shebaa Farms and Mount Hermon area.[xx] The IDF said the commander was responsible for the Hezbollah attack that killed 12 children in the Golan Heights in July 2024.[xxi] The commander also oversaw hundreds of rocket and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting IDF positions on Mount Dov, Mount Hermon, and the northern Golan Heights.[xxii]

The IDF conducted numerous strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and intelligence networks in Beirut on October 3. The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson asked residents of the Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, and Hadath West neighborhoods to evacuate at least 500 meters from specific buildings that the IDF identified as “Hezbollah facilities.”[xxiii] Local sources reported that the IDF then conducted strikes targeting across several neighborhoods in southern Beirut.[xxiv] The IDF also conducted a strike that targeted an apartment complex in Bachoura, Beirut, marking the second time that the IDF has struck a target within Beirut city limits.[xxv] The IDF said that it struck several targets affiliated with Hezbollah's intelligence branch in Beirut, including intelligence unit members, collection instruments, and other infrastructure.[xxvi] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that nine people were killed and 14 injured in Israeli strikes on Beirut.[xxvii]

The IDF stated that Hezbollah has used a civilian border crossing near Damascus as its “main” route for receiving military equipment and weapons from Syria to deliver to southern Lebanon.[xxviii] The IDF stated that the transfer of weapons through Masnaa border crossing follows the IDF airstrikes on seven border crossings along the Syria-Lebanon border on September 26.[xxix] The IDF urged the Lebanese government to conduct strict inspections of trucks passing through civilian crossings and to turn weapons carrying trucks back to Syria.[xxx] The Lebanese Transport Minister Ali Hamieh said that the Lebanese government will monitor all border crossings following the accusations.[xxxi]

A senior aide to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei traveled to Beirut and met with Lebanese officials on October 3.[xxxii] Mohsen Ghomi, who is the international relations deputy in the Office of the Supreme Leader, met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, among others, to discuss the war against Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel.[xxxiii] Khamenei is expected to honor Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, both of whom died in the Israeli airstrike targeting the Hezbollah central military headquarters in Beirut on September 27. Khamenei will also commemorate the coming anniversary of Hamas’ brutal attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and typically reserves this right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic. The last time that Khamenei did so was shortly after the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[xxxiv] CTP-ISW will report on this event further in future updates.

The Axis of Resistance has continued to signal its solidarity with Hezbollah and readiness to escalate further against Israel. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source claimed that there is an Iranian-backed Iraqi “combat reserve” that is near Lebanon and ready to support Hezbollah once given approval to do so.[xxxv] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—separately fired an ”advanced” drone targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel on October 3[xxxvi] The IDF intercepted the drone.[xxxvii] Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed the Houthis fired multiple Jaffa drones targeting Tel Aviv on October 3.[xxxviii] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik separately vowed to continue attacks in retaliation for US and Israeli airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF continued advancing into southern Lebanon. The IDF reportedly estimates that it has killed over 100 Lebanese Hezbollah militants during its ground operation. The IDF also issued calls for further evacuations.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The IDF conducted several strikes in Beirut specifically targeting the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and reserves the right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic.

Iran Update, October 2, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has advanced into southern Lebanon along at least two axes. Geolocated imagery shows Israeli forces separately approaching Odaisseh and Maround al Ras.[1] The IDF 36^th and 98^th divisions participated in these advances and both have elements that fought in the Gaza Strip.[2] The Lebanese Armed Forces claimed that Israeli forces went around 1,300 feet into Lebanon around Odaisseh and Khirbet Yaroun and that the Israeli forces retrograded after a ”short period.”[3] This activity comes after the IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation into southern Lebanon on October 1. This effort—paired with the IDF air campaign—is meant to degrade Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities and destroy much of the military infrastructure that Hezbollah has built in southern Lebanon in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[4] These military effects are meant, in turn, to achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel.[5] Thousands of Israeli civilians have fled their homes, as Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023.[6]

Hezbollah engaged the IDF as it advanced into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces in Odaisseh and Maround al Ras in southern Lebanon.[7] Hezbollah also claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces near Kfar Kila and Yaroun.[8] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah fighters and destroyed military infrastructure in unspecified locations.[9] The IDF also reported that Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers in four separate engagements.[10]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 24 towns in southern Lebanon.[11] The spokesperson asked residents to travel north of Awali River, which is 30 miles north of Litani River. The spokesperson separately asked residents to avoid traveling by vehicle from north of Litani River to anywhere south of it.[12]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership.  The IDF struck Hezbollah militants as well as observation posts and weapons depots, among other military infrastructure sites, across Lebanon.[13] The IDF reported that it has struck Hezbollah munitions production sites around Beirut in recent days.[14] The IDF also reported that it has destroyed over 150 Hezbollah infrastructure sites in airstrikes over an unspecified period of time[15]

Hezbollah has continued its attack campaign targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Avivim for the second consecutive day on October 2.[16] The IDF reported that two rockets landed in an open area near Avivim.[17] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets at Haifa in response to Israeli advances into southern Lebanon.[18] Hezbollah has fired rockets at Haifa almost daily since September 21. Hezbollah separately attacked IDF personnel around the Israel-Lebanon border on October 2. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli troops near Adamit, Avdon, Misgav Am, Shtula, and Yaara.

The IDF released new information on Hezbollah planning to launch a ground attack into Israel in the days after Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023. Israel military correspondent reported that over 3,000 Iranian-backed fighters deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border after Hamas’ October 7 attack in preparation for their own possible ground attack into Israel.[21] This force included 2,400 militants from Hezbollah‘s Radwan special operations forces and 500 Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. The correspondent added that these forces were equipped with ”thousands of guns, anti-tank missiles, mines, [and] RPGs.”[22] The forces also had equipment, including aerial photographs, binoculars, night-vision goggles, and protective vests.[23] The correspondent lastly said that the force planned to use explosives to destroy the border walls between Israel and Lebanon and also use tunnels in order to enter Israel.

The Iranian missile attack into Israel on October 1 appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its strike packages against Western and Israeli air defenses. Though Israel intercepted most of the missiles that Iran launched on October 1, some of the missiles managed to impact. These missiles caused minor damage to dozens of homes north of Tel Aviv, a major road near the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, a school in central Israel, and the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev Desert.[24] In contrast, the United States, Israel, and their regional partners intercepted almost all of the drones and missiles that Iran launched in April 2024.[25]

Several factors could have led to the increased damage in the most recent Iranian attack. One factor could be that Iran meaningfully increased its volume of fire, launching 180-200 ballistic missiles compared to the 120 that it launched in April 2024.[26] Iran also refrained from launching slower moving cruise missiles and drones in the April 2024 attack.[27] Former Israeli Missile Defense Organization head Uzi Rubin said that the April 2024 attack was “easier to defend [against]” because the cruise missile and drones gave the IDF “plenty of warning.”[28] The ballistic missiles took about 15 minutes to fly from Iran to Israel.[29] Iran separately appeared to concentrate much of its fire around densely populated central Israel in the most recent attack, whereas Iran exclusively attacked remote areas in April 2024. Israeli air defenses are designed to avoid intercepting projectiles that will land in open areas. But the concentration of fire on central Israel, where there is a high risk of collateral damage, may have been designed to overwhelm Israeli air defenses by saturating the airspace with a large number of projectiles over relatively small and densely populated areas.

Outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reported that Iran used a combination of missiles to achieve different effects in the attack.[30] The outlet stated that the liquid-fueled Emad missiles were meant to engage Israeli interceptors, while the more advanced Fattah and Kheybar Shekan missiles were meant to strike precision targets.

Iranian military leaders threatened that they would launch larger attacks on Israel if Israel retaliated for the October 1 missile attack.[31] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri warned that Iran would repeat its October 1 attack with “greater intensity” and target “all [Israeli] infrastructure” if Israel attacks Iranian territory.[32] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi similarly warned that Iran would attack unspecified Israeli infrastructure if Israel retaliates against Iran for the October 1 attack.[33] Mousavi added that future Iranian attacks would be “stronger and multiple times [larger].”[34]

These Iranian threats come amid reports that Israel will conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days.[35] Anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that Israel may target Iranian air defense sites or energy infrastructure or conduct a targeted killing similar to the killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[36] The officials said that the Israeli retaliation will be “much more significant” than the Israeli response to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack.[37] Israel at the time conducted an airstrike targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan, Iran, in retaliation.[38] The Israeli officials added that Israel could attack Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran launched another attack.[39]

Adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, Ebrahim Jabari, claimed on October 2 that Iran conducted a cyber attack targeting Israeli air defense systems at the same as its ballistic missile attack on October 1.[40]

Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah, citing anonymous Iranian sources.[41] The report stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei offered to relocate Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to Iran in response to concerns of Israeli infiltration and the possibility that Israel would try to kill Nasrallah. Nasrallah declined the offer, according to the report, and Khamenei sent IRGC Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan to Beirut to persuade Nasrallah. Nilforoushan died in the Israeli airstrike that killed Nasrallah in Beirut. The airstrike follows several other Israeli operations killing high-profile officials in the Axis of Resistance, such as Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Fuad Shukr, and Ismail Haniyeh. Reuters reported that the killings—coupled with Israel detonating thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios—has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, including Khamenei. Iran, according to Reuters, launched investigating possible Israeli agents in the Iranian security apparatus, focusing on individuals traveling or with family abroad. Reuters also reported that Iran has arrested several individuals on suspicion that they helped Israel kill Nasrallah.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three drone attacks targeting three unspecified locations in northern Israel on October 2.[42]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened on October 1 to attack US forces in the Middle East if the United States attacks or helps Israel attack Iran in retaliation for the October 1 Iranian missile attack. Kataib Hezbollah threatened to attack US forces and interests in Iraq and across the region if the United States participates in “any hostile action” against Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.[43] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba similarly threatened to attack US forces if the United States or Israel attack Iran.[44] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately criticized Jordan for helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.[45]

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched three Quds-5 cruise missiles at unspecified locations in Israel on October 2.[46] Sarea claimed that the missiles hit their targets and added that the Houthis are ready to join any combined military operations against Israel. CTP-ISW cannot verify whether these attacks occurred.

Hamas claimed responsibility for the terror attack in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[47] Hamas claimed that two fighters managed to infiltrate into Israeli territory from the West Bank to conduct the attack. The two Hamas fighters reportedly stabbed and killed an Israeli security officer and seized his firearm.[48] The two attackers then shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa and wounded 16 others before Israeli forces killed both attackers.[49] The IDF identified the two Hamas fighters as residents of Hebron in the West Bank and identified their homes for demolition.[50] The IDF also detained and interrogated several “suspects,” who were likely assisted the two Hamas fighters in the attack. [51]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—has increased its rate of attacks targeting security forces in southeastern Iran in recent days. This uptick coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Bloody Friday,” when Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protests in Zahedan, Sistan and Balochistan Province.[52] Jaish al Adl has claimed the following attacks.

September 28

• An attack killing the deputy police chief of the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) in Sib and Suran.[53]
• An attack targeting two LEC officers at a police station in Zahedan.[54]

September 29

• A small arms and IED attack targeting two patrol vehicles in Rask.[55]
• An attack targeting an LEC officer in Khash.[56]
• An attack targeting an LEC base at Iranshahr.[57]

October 1

• An attack on the “Festival of Affections” ceremony at a school in Bent, killing a local IRGC commander and the head of the city council.[58]
• An attack targeting an IRGC Intelligence Organization vehicle, killing two agents in Rask.[59]
• An attack targeting a security patrol, killing two officers in Khash.[60]

This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[61] Jaish al Adl has conducted numerous attacks targeting Iranian security forces in this time, at times demonstrating unprecedented coordination and organization.[62] Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni ordered Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Police Affairs Brigadier General Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian and the Sistan and Baluchistan governor to conduct an investigation into the recent attacks.[63] Iranian leaders could interpret some of this activity through the lens of their fight against the United States and Israel, as they have long accused both countries of stoking anti-regime militancy in Iran.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has advanced into southern Lebanon along two axes. Hezbollah engaged the IDF as it advanced, killing at least eight Israeli soldiers. The IDF called on civilians across southern Lebanon to evacuate immediately and move northward.
• Iran: The recent Iranian missile attack on Israel appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its attacks against Western and Israeli defenses.
• Iran: Israel will reportedly conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days. Iranian military leaders threatened that they would respond by conducting an even greater attack on Israel.
• Iran: Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah. Israeli operations, including the killing of senior Axis of Resistance officials, has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to attack US forces if the United States supports an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Militia officials also criticized Jordan for purportedly helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.
• Iranian internal security: There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran in recent days. This coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Blood Friday,” when Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protesters in southeastern Iran.

Iran Update, October 1, 2024

Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1.[1] Iran claimed to launch this attack in response to Israel’s killing of senior Axis of Resistance leaders including Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[2] Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles, including Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles, from Iranian territory.[3] Iran claimed to launch its domestically produced hypersonic medium-range “Fattah-2” ballistic missile for the first time in the October 1 attack.[4] The IRGC claimed it launched Fattah missiles to destroy Israel's Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile interception systems.[5] The IRGC conducted the October 1 operation with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council and ”with the knowledge of” the Armed Forces General Staff.[6] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed that Iran targeted Israeli ”military, operational and intelligence” centers associated with the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, which occurred in Tehran, Iran in July 2023.[7] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media claimed that Iran targeted the following airbases.[8]

• The Nevatim Airbase, which houses Israeli F-35s, located outside of Beersheba, Israel.[9] Most of Israel’s F-35s were presumably airborne at the time of the attack, given that most of Israel’s aerial refuelers were airborne during the attack. This would have enabled Israel to keep most of its aircraft airborne during the strike both to prevent any damage to the aircraft and to intercept projectiles if needed and possible. Pro-Hezbollah media claimed this base was used in the Israeli killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[10] Geolocated footage showed impacts to the base from missiles.[11]
• The Hatzerim Airbase in the Negev Desert.[12]
• The Tel Nof Airbase 20 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.[13] Geolocated footage showed missiles impacting at or near the Tel Nof Airbase.[14]

Geolocated footage also showed Iranian ballistic missiles impacting in at least three other locations:

• An area south of Herzliya, Israel.[15] The geolocated footage depicts an area located near the IDF Glilot Intelligence Base, which houses IDF Unit 8200, which is the IDF’s signals collection unit, and the Mossaf Headquarters.[16] Israel evacuated the Glilot Intelligence base before the attack.[17]

• An area near the Ayalon Mall, Ramat Gan, Israel.[18] Ayalon Mall is immediately west of Yarkon Park, where Shin Bet is headquartered.[19]

• A school in Gedera, Israel, located near the Tel Nof Airbase.[20]

The Iranian attack killed one Palestinian near Jericho in the West Bank, and shrapnel lightly injured two Israelis in Tel Aviv.[21]

Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel. Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles targeting Israel on October 1, compared to the approximately 120 ballistic missiles it fired at Israel in April 2024.[22] The April attack focused on Israeli positions in northern and southern Israel, with several ballistic missiles striking Nevatim Airbase.[23] This attack focused on at least three possible targets between Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, and Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. Rehovot and Tel Aviv are 29km apart. Some portion of the strike package focused on Nevatim and Hatzerim Airbases in southern Israel, but a large number of missiles targeted a very small geographic area in densely populated central Israel. All missiles in this area would presumably need to be intercepted because the IDF will only intercept missiles that fall in populated areas. This is not the case in Nevatim and Hatzerim, which are surrounded by relatively unpopulated desert. The increase in ballistic missiles may have been designed to overwhelm the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense system by saturating it with large numbers of systems in relatively small and densely populated areas.  The large quantity of ballistic missiles also represents a significant Iranian investment that Iran is unlikely to willingly forfeit in an attack for show.

The IDF reported that Israel and its allies intercepted the “majority” of the Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel. IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the missiles impacted some areas in central and southern Israel, but that the IDF and the US-led defensive coalition intercepted the majority of projectiles.[24] United States National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan separately described the Iranian attack as “defeated and ineffective.”[25] An unspecified US defense official stated that US destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea helped intercept the Iranian ballistic missiles.[26]  The USS Arleigh Burke, USS Cole, and USS Bulkeley are currently deployed to the eastern Mediterranean region.[27] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) claimed that 90 percent of the missiles hit their intended targets without providing any evidence for these claims.[28]  

Israel vowed to retaliate against Iran for the October 1 attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated at the beginning of the Israeli cabinet meeting that Iran “made a big mistake and will pay.”[29] Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would attack anyone who attacks them. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Israel’s operational plans are ready and vowed that Israel will respond ”wherever, whenever, and however we choose.”[30] Israel previously conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[31] The IRGC warned on October 1 that it would conduct further attacks on Israel if Israel retaliates against Iran for its ballistic missile attack.[32]

The IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation in southern Lebanon. The IDF 98th Division began a “focused activity” on October 1 in what the IDF described would be a “targeted and delimited” operation in southern Lebanon.[33] The IDF said that a special operations brigade, a paratrooper brigade, and an armored brigade subordinate to the 98th Division have been preparing in recent weeks for the ground operation.[34] These units previously fought under the 98th Division for months in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli security cabinet approved the "targeted ground entry” on the evening of September 30.[35]

It is not immediately clear where the 98th Division began operations in southern Lebanon. The IDF did not specify where its forces began operations. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvi’on, and Malkia areas on October 1.[36] An unspecified UNIFIL source told Western media that the Israeli forces have staged ”sporadic raids” into Lebanon but have not ”remained on Lebanese soil.“ [37] Lebanese sources reported that Israeli artillery units continued to bombard border towns, particularly targeting Kafr Kila, Tal al Nahhas, and areas near Khiam.[38] Artillery units serve the primary role of providing indirect fire support to ground forces’ maneuvers.[39] Lebanese sources also reported that the IDF fired illumination rounds over Rmeish and Aita al Shaab.[40]

Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units in Lebanon as of the time of writing. Hezbollah may not engage Israeli forces while Israeli forces are only staging “sporadic raids” that do not remain in Lebanon. Unspecified security officials confirmed to Western media that Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units.[41] An unspecified soldier from the 98th Division told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah has not yet engaged Israeli forces but that one Israeli unit spotted Hezbollah observers and directed artillery units to push them back.[42] Hezbollah, however, claimed at least six attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated along the Israel-Lebanon border but inside Israel.[43] A correspondent from the Hezbollah-affiliated channel Al Manar reported that Hezbollah units attempted to confront Israeli attempts to penetrate the border by targeting gatherings of Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side of the border.[44]

Israeli officials maintained on October 1 that the IDF’s ground operation will remain “limited.”[45] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli Army Radio that the “limited ground operation” will remove threats near or along the Israel-Lebanon border.[46] Israeli forces are expected to operate about three miles deep into Lebanese territory, according to the Wall Street Journal.[47] Three miles would encompass many border villages, including those that the IDF fought in in 2006. The IDF Arabic spokesperson issued a call to residents of 27 southern Lebanese towns on October 1 and asked residents to “evacuate [their] homes immediately.”[48] The spokesperson asked residents to immediately travel north of the Awali River, which is 30 miles north of the Litani River the spokesperson told residents to leave.[49] An unspecified security official told Western media that there is currently no thought of operations moving up to Beirut, however.[50] Evacuating up to the Awali would, however, move these individuals out of areas targeted in IDF strikes designed to interdict Hezbollah reinforcements or resupplies. The IDF also mobilized four additional reserve brigades and unspecified other forces for “operational tasks” in Lebanon on October 1.[51]

The current IDF ground operation is a continuation of a year-long, previously undisclosed Israeli special operations campaign that sought to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[52] The IDF announced on October 1 that Israeli forces destroyed about 700 Hezbollah targets in cross-border raids since October 2023, including underground compounds, military targets, weapons warehouses, explosives, and headquarters. The IDF’s cross-border operations, often led by the Egoz Unit, sometimes lasted multiple days and focused on destroying infrastructure belonging to Radwan forces located close to Israel.[53] The Egoz Unit was originally established in the 1990s as a raiding force specifically trained for operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah.[54] Unspecified Israeli officials said that the IDF’s current ground incursion into southern Lebanon will be ”an extension of the previous” raids with more units deployed to destroy infrastructure that smaller special forces could not.[55]

Hezbollah began its cross-border firing campaign in support of Palestinians in Gaza in October 2023. Israeli Army Radio reported that over 3,000 of Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces deployed along the Israel-Lebanon border following the October 7 attacks to conduct a long-planned ground infiltration into northern Israel.[56] Hezbollah pioneered the idea of ground attacks into Israel, and it developed the Radwan Force to this end.[57]

The IDF Air Force continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's leadership and capabilities on October 1. The IDF continued to target Hezbollah weapons launchers, weapons storage facilities, and other military infrastructure across Lebanon.[58] The IDF’s air campaign concentrated airstrikes primarily on southern Lebanon but also continued to target sites in the Bekaa Valley. The IDF targeted and killed Hezbollah Unit 4400 commander Mohammad Jaafar Qasir in an airstrike in Beirut on October 1.[59] The IDF said that Unit 4400 is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and its proxies to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[60] Qasir was a senior Hezbollah member who had been in his position for 15 years and was one of the ”most dominant” figures behind Iran’s ground line of communication through Syria to Hezbollah.[61] The IDF also killed commander of the Syria-based Imam Hussein Division al Faqar Hinawi in Beirut on October 1.[62]  The IRGC formed the Imam Hussein Division in 2016.[63] The IDF said that the Imam Hussein Division had moved its headquarters to southern Lebanon since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war and operates closely with Hezbollah’s southern command units.[64]

The IDF Air Force likely struck multiple Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria on October 1, possibly to suppress SAA air defenses.[65] The IDF also struck multiple locations in eastern Daraa and western Suwayda on October 1.[66] Syrian sources reported that the IDF targeted and eliminated the radar systems of five Syrian Arab Army (SAA) battalions, including those located at the al Thaala and al Khalkhala military airports in western Suwaida.[67] A Syrian outlet noted that the number of systems targeted, and Israel’s use of drones differentiates these strikes from Israel’s previous attacks targeting radar systems in southern Syria.[68]

The IDF has previously conducted airstrikes targeting SAA sites in southern Syria in response to SAA's cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah.[69] The IDF has repeatedly targeted sites in Quneitra and Daraa provinces that Hezbollah fighters use as reconnaissance and observation points to observe the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[70] The IDF likely struck SAA sites in Suwayda and Daraa provinces on October 1 due to ongoing SAA-Hezbollah cooperation and possibly to continue to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive weapons from Syrian territory. Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the Lebanon-Syria border for this purpose.[71]

Hezbollah fired “Fadi-4” medium-range rockets targeting the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on October 1.[72] This is the second time that Hezbollah targeted Mossad Headquarters near Tel Aviv in the recent days.[73] Hezbollah also reported that it fired a Fadi-4 rocket targeting Unit 8200 headquarters near Tel Aviv for the first time on October 1.[74] Unit 8200 is an Israeli Intelligence Corps unit responsible for signals intelligence and similar activities.[75] Hezbollah separately claimed that it fired medium-range rockets targeting Sde Dov Airport, which closed in 2019, near Tel Aviv on October 1.[76] Hezbollah said that these attacks are part of “Operation Khaybar,” which is Hezbollah’s response to the Israeli airstrike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27.[77] The IDF has not commented on either attack at this time.

Hezbollah continued its attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military sites in Israel on October 1.  Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Metula.[78] The IDF said that it detected several projectiles over Metula and intercepted some of them.[79] Hezbollah also mortared Israeli forces in Avivim on October 1.[80] The IDF said that it also identified individual projectiles that fell in open areas in Avivim.[81] Hezbollah claimed on October 1 that the latest attack campaign against Israel is in response to Israel’s ”invasion” of Lebanese towns and villages.[82]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a rocket attack targeting a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[83] The US ambassador to Iraq announced that an attack took place at the Diplomatic Support Complex, which is a US State Department facility.[84] The attack occurred hours before the Iranian ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. Iraqi media reported that ”elements outside the law” launched three Katyusha rockets from al Amiriya in Baghdad toward the complex.[85] Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants recently attacked the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[86]

A security source separately told Al Jazeera on October 1 that unspecified militants conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.[87] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—denied responsibility for the attack.[88] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened in recent days to resume attacks targeting US forces if Israel launched a ground campaign into Lebanon.[89] Iranian state media claimed on October 1 that the United States has “officially entered” the war and that all US bases in the region are “legitimate targets” for the Axis of Resistance.[90] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, separately warned on October 1 that Iraqi militias will target “all US bases and interests” in the region if the United States attacks Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran in retaliation for the Iranian attack on Israel.[91]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three Arqab cruise missile attacks targeting unspecified locations in Israel on October 1.[92]

Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched one drone at Tel Aviv and four “Sammad 4” drones targeting unspecified sites in Eilat, Israel, on October 1, before Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel.[93] Israeli media did not acknowledge the attack. CTP-ISW cannot verify if these attacks took place.

Two unidentified individuals shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[94] The gunmen also wounded seven other civilians before Israeli security forces killed both gunmen.[95] Palestinian militias including the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement praised the attack, calling it a “natural response” to Israeli military operations in Gaza and the West Bank.[96] No Palestinian militias have taken responsibility for the shooting attack at the time of this writing, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack in Israel: Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1. Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units in Lebanon as of the time of writing. Hezbollah may not engage Israeli forces while Israeli forces are only staging “sporadic raids” that do not remain in Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Attacks Targeting Northern Israel: Hezbollah fired “Fadi-4” medium-range rockets targeting the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on October 1.
• Iraq: Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a rocket attack targeting a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.
• Houthis: Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched one drone at Tel Aviv and four “Sammad 4” drones targeting unspecified sites in Eilat, Israel, on October 1, before Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel.
• Terrorist Attack in Israel: Two unidentified individuals shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.

Iran Update, September 30, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it began a "targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon" on September 30.[i] The IDF said that ground forces will operate to target Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure in villages along the Israel-Lebanon border.[ii] The IDF said that Hezbollah infrastructure in these villages represents an “immediate and real” threat to Israeli communities in the north.[iii] Israeli military and political officials formally approved the ”next steps” of Israel’s operation in Lebanon on September 30.[iv] The IDF said it will act to achieve its stated war aim of returning the residents of the north to their homes.[v]

It is unclear where or if the IDF has entered southern Lebanon in force at the time of writing. Western media reported on September 30 that the IDF conducted several smaller incursions in the past week (for detailed coverage of these incursions, see below), but CTP-ISW has not yet observed large Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[vi] Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported on September 30 that Israeli units are concentrated at several positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[vii] This report is consistent with information reported by Western media.[viii] Hezbollah claimed cross-border attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated near the border on September 30.[ix] Hezbollah mortared Israeli forces gathered in the border town Shtula.”[x] Hezbollah also claimed that it attacked Israeli soldiers in groves near the Lebanese towns Kfar Kila and Addasiya.[xi] It is not clear if this attack took place in Israel or Lebanon. Saudi-owned outlets reported that Israeli tanks entered Ramish in southern Lebanon, but later deleted the reports.[xii] There has been no corroboration of these now-deleted reports.

The IDF said that Israeli ground forces will coordinate with the IDF Air Force and artillery units to attack military targets during this stage of the campaign. Local Lebanese sources and Arabic-language media reported that the IDF conducted several hours of artillery shelling and fired illumination rounds over several Lebanese border towns on September 30.[xiii] Arabic-language media also reported that the IDF called upon residents in Lebanese border towns to evacuate.[xiv] A Lebanese security source told CNN that the Lebanese army evacuated its observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border and moved into barracks in border villages.[xv]

The IDF conducted several preparatory measures to prepare for its ground incursion into Lebanon in recent days. The IDF Northern Command issued a closed military zone over the northern Israeli towns Metula, Misgav Am, and Kfar Giladi, along the Israel-Lebanon border.[xvi] The IDF prohibited civilian entry to the area.[xvii] The IDF has been preparing for the possibility of a ground incursion into Lebanon by calling up reservist units and deploying the 98th Division to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent weeks.[xviii] IDF commanders from the Northern Command and IDF 36th, 98th, and 91st divisions recently approved plans for the ”coming days” along the northern front.[xix] These formations have conducted several training exercises in recent days to prepare for the operation, including exercises that simulated a ground offensive into Lebanon.[xx] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited the 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) on the border on September 30 and said that the IDF will use all its capabilities, including ground forces, to return residents to the north.[xxi]

Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week, citing unspecified sources.[xxii] The raids reportedly included entering Hezbollah tunnels along the border.[xxiii] One such Israeli cross-border raid occurred near the Lebanese town of Alma al Shaab on an unspecified date last week.[xxiv] The IDF’s ground operation will take place as the IDF continues its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities with the objective of returning residents to the north.  

Unspecified US officials said that the objective of Israel’s “limited” ground operation is to clear Hezbollah infrastructure near the border that Hezbollah uses to threaten northern Israel.[xxv] US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that Israel had informed the US about “a series of limited ground operations” it was planning into Lebanon that would focus on Hezbollah infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.[xxvi]  The term ”limited” presumably refers only to the specific IDF operations to clear border infrastructure and is not necessarily applicable to the entirety of a potential Israeli ground campaign. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi recently told Israeli soldiers that the IDF is preparing for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.”[xxvii]

The IDF Air Force continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's weapons capabilities on September 30 ahead of a potential ground offensive. The IDF struck dozens of targets throughout Lebanon, including Hezbollah air defense systems.[xxviii] The IDF destroyed a warehouse of surface-to-air missile launchers near the Beirut International Airport.[xxix] Israel’s air campaign also continued to eliminate Hezbollah missile and rocket system commanders.[xxx] An IDF airstrike in Beirut killed the commander of Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket forces on September 28.[xxxi] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson also said on September 30 that the IDF had also killed the commander of Hezbollah’s precision missile unit in southern Lebanon, his deputy, and other commanders of the unit in southern Lebanon.[xxxii] The IDF’s degradation of Hezbollah’s weapons capabilities and the commanders with knowledge of these systems fit into Israeli war objectives for Lebanon, which would require the disruption or degradation of Hezbollah’s ability to fire rockets into northern Israel. Syrian sources also reported Israeli drones and explosions near Qudsaya, outside west Damascus, on September 30.[xxxiii]  Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the Lebanon-Syria border to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive weapons.[xxxiv]

The IDF Air Force also continued to target Palestinian militia members operating in southern Lebanon. The IDF struck and killed Hamas commander in Lebanon Fatah Abu al Amin in a refugee camp in Tyre on September 29.[xxxv] Amin coordinated Hamas’ activities in Lebanon and helped to recruit Hamas operatives in Lebanon and purchase weapons.[xxxvi] The IDF also struck and killed two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern Lebanon on September 29.[xxxvii] Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine acknowledged the death of their members in Lebanon on September 30.[xxxviii] Hezbollah commonly allows Palestinian groups to launch attacks on Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon.[xxxix] Previous IDF strikes in southern Lebanon throughout the war have killed fighters from multiple Palestinian militias, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Resistance Committees.[xl]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on September 29 to 2:00pm ET on September 30. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem re-emphasized Hezbollah’s organizational resilience and its ability to resist an Israeli assault ahead of a potential Israeli ground operation.[xli]  Israeli strikes have severely degraded Hezbollah leadership in recent weeks, killing Nasrallah and numerous strategic- and operational-level leaders.[xlii] Qassem said in his speech that Hezbollah is structured to enable it to continue operations against Israel despite the loss of leadership, and deputy commanders are prepared to step forward to take up their units’ command.[xliii] Qassem said that Hezbollah’s “resistance forces are ready” to engage an Israeli ground invasion and will not “budge an inch from [Hezbollah’s] positions] regardless of the destruction to Hezbollah’s leadership.[xliv] Qassem’s comments likely seek to assuage concerns among Hezbollah’s rank-and-file that Hezbollah leadership remains strong and able to survive ahead of potential ground engagements with Israel. Qassem lastly said that Hezbollah will choose a new secretary-general as soon as possible and according to the approved party mechanisms.[xlv] Hezbollah will likely rapidly promote lower-ranking commanders to take the place of those Israel has killed, but the loss of long-serving strategic- and operational-level commanders will create temporary disruption in Hezbollah’s command-and-control.

Hezbollah continued its attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military sites in Israel on September 30. Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah likely launched a drone targeting the Karish gas field in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[xlvi] The IDF Navy intercepted the drone before the drone came close to the gas field.[xlvii] Hezbollah has not claimed the attack as of the time of writing. Hezbollah fired at least 10 rockets targeting the Haifa area, as it has done repeatedly in recent days.[xlviii] The IDF intercepted some of the rockets targeting Haifa and others fell in open areas.[xlix] Hezbollah fired barrages of rockets targeting Israeli forces in Beit Saida for the first time since the beginning of the war.[l]

Iran will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of the conflict. The Iranian regime has thus far indicated that it does not seek to intervene directly in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[li] However, the regime could decide to intervene if it assesses that Israel’s objective in Lebanon is to significantly degrade, defeat, or destroy Hezbollah, one of its principal regional allies. The Israeli Security Cabinet altered an earlier directive on September 26 by changing the directive from avoiding a “broad campaign involving Iran” to “reducing the possibility...[of] an all-out war."[lii] The revision of this directive suggests that Israel has accepted the risk that Iran might directly intervene in the conflict. Iran has few military capabilities that could shape the outcome of the conflict, even if it were to intervene directly.

Iran could take other measures to harm Israeli and US interests in an effort to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah. These actions would likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current Israeli operations in Lebanon. Iran could take the following actions:

• Iran could conduct a large-scale drone and missile attack targeting Israel. The Iranian regime currently appears unwilling to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, and thus risk a large Israeli retaliatory attack on Iranian territory. Iran recently dismissed a request by Hezbollah to conduct a direct attack on Israel, stating that the “timing [wasn’t] right” for such an attack.[liii] The Biden administration recently warned Iran via an unspecified third country that it would likely not be able to “restrain” Israel if Iran conducts a direct attack on Israel, according to an unspecified Western official.[liv] The official added that the Biden administration warned Iran that Israel would conduct a “broader and greater” attack on Iran than it did in April 2024 if Iran directly attacks Israel.[lv] Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan Province, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[lvi] It is also not clear that a major drone and missile attack would impact Israeli calculations, given that the vast majority of Israelis support the war in Lebanon and the Israeli cabinet appears willing to retaliate heavily against Iran in an attempt to deter any hypothetical Iranian attack.
• Iran could increase assassination attempts targeting senior Israeli officials. The Shin Bet announced on September 30 that Iran has “significantly” increased its efforts to conduct assassinations in Israel.[lvii] The Shin Bet stated that it recently thwarted several Iranian assassination plots, including some that were in the “advanced stages” of planning.[lviii] The Shin Bet previously announced on September 19 that unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials.[lix] An assassination of a senior Israeli official would have no serious impact on military operations in Lebanon.
• Iran could order attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria to try to coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon. The Iranian regime has previously operated under the theory that it can coerce the United States to alter Israel’s behavior if Iran hurts US interests in response to Israeli actions.[lx] Israel acts independently of the United States, and therefore Iranian-backed attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East would likely fail to disrupt Israeli operations in Lebanon.
• Iran could further expand its nuclear program. An Iranian parliamentarian stated on September 29 that Iran should expand its nuclear program, including increasing production of 90% enriched uranium, in response to Israel killing Nasrallah.[lxi] An Iranian decision to significantly expand its nuclear program, or even pursue weaponization, risks an Israeli or US military or economic response but would likely not cause Israel to suspend its campaign in Lebanon. Expanding the nuclear program also runs contrary to recent Iranian efforts to pursue negotiations.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on Israel on September 30. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed the following:

• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Israel[lxii]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa[lxiii]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” at the port of Haifa[lxiv]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in central Israel[lxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it began a "targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon" on September 30. It is unclear where or if the IDF has entered southern Lebanon in force at the time of writing. Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week, citing unspecified sources.
• Iranian Response to Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Iran will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of the conflict. Iran could take other measures to harm Israeli and US interests in an effort to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah. These actions would likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current Israeli operations in Lebanon.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on Israel on September 30.

Iran Update, September 29, 2024

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is trying to help Lebanese Hezbollah recover from the severe disruption that Israel has imposed upon it. Two anonymous IRGC officials told the New York Times that Tehran is trying to help Hezbollah establish a secure communications network, name a new secretary general, and rebuild its command structure.[i] The sources also said that a senior IRGC Quds Force officer will travel to Beirut to support this recovery.[ii] This report comes after CTP-ISW assessed that Israeli military operations have generated internal disarray in Hezbollah and severely disrupted its strategic- and operational-level military leadership. IRGC Quds Force Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with the Hezbollah representative to Iran, Abdullah Safi ed Din, in Tehran on September 29, which is consistent with the New York Times article.[iii] Abdullah Safi ed Din is the brother of Hashem Safi ed Din, who is speculated to be one of the top contenders to succeed Hassan Nasrallah as Hezbollah secretary general.[iv] Iranian state media widely circulated Ghaani’s meeting likely to reaffirm the close coordination between Iran and Hezbollah.[v]

The Iranian security establishment is likely preoccupied managing the crises that it faces over planning an immediate retaliatory strike to avenge Nasrallah. On one hand, Israeli operations have severely degraded and in some cases defeated Hamas units in the Gaza Strip.[vi] On the other hand, Hezbollah appears to be suffering from temporary organizational paralysis.[vii] Iranian military leadership needs to urgently address the mounting questions about in what form Hezbollah will emerge from the war. Some Iranian officials who are not engaged in managing these military emergencies, such as Masoud Pezeshkian and Saeed Jalili, have meanwhile focused on debate over how to respond to the killing of Nasrallah, according to the New York Times.[viii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its decapitation campaign against Hezbollah. The IDF has sustained airstrikes targeting and killing senior and mid-tier Hezbollah commanders, such as Nasrallah, in recent days.[ix] The IDF confirmed that over 20 Hezbollah officers died in the airstrike that killed Nasrallah.[x] These officers included Ali Karaki, who was a member of the Hezbollah Jihad Council and commanded the southern axis against Israel. These officers also included senior advisers to Nasrallah and the head of his personal security detail.[xi] The IDF more recently killed Nabil Qaouq, who was the deputy chairman of the Hezbollah Executive Council and possibly a member of the Hezbollah Jihad Council, in an airstrike on September 28.[xii] Israeli Army Radio reported that Qaouk was expected to participate in Hezbollah leadership the “day after Nasrallah.”[xiii] Israeli media lastly reported that the IDF conducted a strike targeting Abu Ali Reda, the commander of the Hezbollah Badr unit, in Beirut on September 29.[xiv] Hezbollah denied the reports that Reda had been killed.[xv]

The IDF continued efforts to degrade Hezbollah capabilities and prevent weapons transfers from Syria into Lebanon. The IDF struck over 120 Hezbollah targets, including rocket launchers, weapons caches, and other military infrastructure, across southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[xvi] The IDF also struck targets tied to weapons smuggling in al Qusayr, Syria.[xvii] Local Syrian sources separately reported that Israel conducted an airstrike on an unspecified target near Yafou, a few kilometers away from the Lebanese border in southwestern Syria.

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on September 28 to 2:00pm ET on September 29. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah continued attacking civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah fired several rocket barrages targeting IDF positions, including “Camp Ofek,” marking the first time that Hezbollah has attacked this location in the war.[xviii] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked the IDF position in response to the “Israeli violation” of civilians in Lebanon.[xix] The IDF also detected a rocket that was launched from Lebanon and fell near al Binyamin, north of Ramallah, in the West Bank.[xx] No actor has claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Hezbollah previously fired long-range rockets targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.[xxi] Hezbollah also fired drones targeting Israeli forces at Eliakim camp.[xxii] Israeli air defenses intercepted two drones over Israeli territorial waters.[xxiii]

These consistent but relatively low-level attacks suggest that Hezbollah may be unable to wage a sophisticated strike campaign into Israel at this time. CTP-ISW has observed that Hezbollah appears to be suffering from temporary organizational paralysis, as it has not responded to Israel in any meaningful way and has failed to stop Israel from targeting its key leadership or take necessary steps to protect that leadership.[xxiv] The disruption caused by the Israeli air campaign is a temporary effect, however. Any organized military will reconstitute its leadership and communications if given time and space to do so. CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess the combat effectiveness of Hezbollah’s tactical-level units, although they are likely degraded to various degrees due to Israeli airstrikes.

The Jordanian Army reported that a Grad rocket launched from southern Lebanon fell in an “uninhabited desert area” southeast of Amman, Jordan, on September 29.[xxv] The rocket fell in al Muwaqqar, which is around 160 kilometers from the Lebanese border.[xxvi] Al Muwaqqar is also around 22 kilometers from the Marka civil airport, which is used by US forces in Jordan.[xxvii] No actor has claimed responsibility for firing the rocket at the time of this writing. Hezbollah may have misfired a rocket aimed at Israel or the West Bank. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, have signaled in recent days their intention to conduct attacks into Jordan, although there is no evidence at this time to suggest that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fired the rocket into Jordan.[xxviii]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Houthi sites in al Hudaydah and Ras Issa, Yemen, on September 29 in order to retaliate for previous Houthi attacks and to restore deterrence vis-a-vis te Houthis.[xxix] The Houthis most recently claimed a Palestine-2 ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion International Airport on September 28.[xxx] The IDF stated that it targeted infrastructure used by the Houthis to import oil and smuggle Iranian weapons into Yemen. The IDF noted that the Houthis have cooperated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the past year in order to attack Israel.[xxxi] CTP-ISW previously reported on increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups, including the Houthis sending a drone expert to Iraq to train Iraqi militia members.[xxxii] The IDF Air Force previously struck Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah in July 2024 following a Houthi drone attack targeting Tel Aviv.[xxxiii]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed seven attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 28. The claims included the following:

• Three drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in Eilat[xxxiv]
• Two drone attacks targeting unspecified locations in Israel[xxxv]
• Two al Arqab cruise missile attacks targeting unspecified locations in Israel[xxxvi]

The IDF intercepted a drone that was headed toward Israeli territory over the Red Sea on September 29.[xxxvii]

Unspecified sources in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on September 29 that it will target US and Israeli interests to avenge Hassan Nasrallah.[xxxviii] The sources added that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq will fire missiles at Tel Aviv to “be able to kill [Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu.[xxxix] Al Akhbar also reported that the Islamic Resistance of Iraq has ordered a “general mobilization” to prepare for a “comprehensive war” with Israel, although the outlet did not provide sources for this claim.[xl] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously vowed to send fighters to help defend Hezbollah if Israel launches a ground operation into Lebanon.[xli]

Syrian opposition media reported that an unspecified actor conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militia positions and infrastructure in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on September 28.[xlii] The airstrikes targeted bridges, militia positions, and a recently installed radar system around Albu Kamal and Deir ez Zor City.[xliii] Several militia members were killed or injured in the airstrikes, according to opposition reports.[xliv]

This map illustrates individual airstrikes based on local Syrian reporting. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of the strikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IRGC is trying to help Lebanese Hezbollah recover from the severe disruption that Israel has imposed upon it. Iranian military leadership is likely preoccupied managing crises over planning an immediate retaliatory strike to avenge Hassan Nasrallah.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued its campaign to degrade Hezbollah capabilities, kill Hezbollah leaders, and prevent weapons transfers to Lebanon. Hezbollah continued attacking civilian and military sites in Israel.
• Yemen: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Houthi sites in Yemen in retaliation for Houthi attacks on Israel and in order to restore deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed seven drone and missile attacks targeting Israel. The IDF intercepted a drone that was headed toward Israel over the Red Sea.
• Syria: Syrian opposition media reported that an unidentified actor conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militia positions and infrastructure in eastern Syria.

Iran Update, September 28, 2024

Lebanese Hezbollah confirmed that Israel killed its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Israel was aware of Nasrallah’s whereabouts for months and conducted the airstrike to exploit a brief window of opportunity.[2] Unspecified Israeli officials said that Israel dropped over 80 explosive munitions on Hezbollah’s main military headquarters where Nasrallah was located.[3] The IDF confirmed that the commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front, Ali Karaki, also died in the airstrike.[4] Iranian media confirmed that IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan died as well.[5] Unspecified Israeli officials suggested that the chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, Hashem Saffiedine, is expected to succeed Nasrallah.[6]

The Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah. Continued Israeli airstrikes have killed numerous senior and mid-tier Hezbollah commanders, including Nasrallah, in recent days. These strikes almost certainly worsened the internal disarray that Hezbollah was already facing after Israel detonated thousands of pagers and personal radios belonging to Hezbollah members. Hezbollah appears to be suffering from temporary organizational paralysis, as it has not responded to Israel in any meaningful way and has failed to stop Israel from targeting its key leadership or take necessary steps to protect that leadership. Hezbollah has built a professionalized military force that should be able to overcome this disruption, however, if given the time and space to do so. All the commanders that Israel has killed have deputies who should in principle be able to fill those roles and help the force recover, although they will have taken over under extremely difficult circumstances and under intense pressure.

The damage to Hezbollah’s operational-level military leadership will impede its ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term. Commanders at this echelon, such as the heads of Hezbollah’s regional units, would be responsible for planning and overseeing campaigns and major operations, including a defense against an Israeli ground offensive into Lebanon.[7] Subordinate units would struggle to coordinate effectively without coherent higher headquarters. Operational-level commanders would also be responsible for coordinating across sectors and managing the intelligent allocation of resources, which would be particularly critical for sustaining campaigns. Tactical-level commanders will likely lack the means to execute an independent military effort that would generate a serious effect without support from operational-level leadership.

The damage Israel has done to Hezbollah's operational-level leadership will likely severely degrade Hezbollah's ability to plan and conduct a large-scale effective drone-missile campaign against Israel in the short term, since such a campaign requires both extensive and detailed planning and a degree of coordination that Israel's disruption of Hezbollah communications likely makes extremely difficult. The disruption caused by Israel's air campaign is a temporary effect, however. Any organized military will reconstitute its leadership and communications abilities if given time and space to do so. The continued and increasing pressure the IDF has applied to Hezbollah has likely prevented the group from reconstituting thus far and may continue to do so if the pressure is sustained.

CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess the combat effectiveness of Hezbollah’s tactical-level units, although they are likely degraded to various degrees. The IDF has conducted airstrikes aimed at these units in southern Lebanon for months in order to “prepare the area for the possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[8] But CTP-ISW has not observed enough data to assess what effects these airstrikes have had at this point. Even isolated tactical units that have survived could likely fight effectively on their own at least for some time against an Israeli ground offensive. The IDF campaign against Hezbollah tactical units has almost certainly degraded at least some of them, however.

Hezbollah has continued its attacks targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah fired long-range rockets targeting Tel Aviv and the northern West Bank.[9] The IDF detected five projectiles over the West Bank and intercepted most of them.[10] This incident marks the second time that Hezbollah has tried to fire into the West Bank in recent days. Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting nine civilian locations in northern Israel, including Karmiel, marking the first time that Hezbollah has attacked this location.[11] Hezbollah separately fired rockets targeting Safed in the Upper Galilee.[12] The IDF detected 30 projectiles in the area and intercepted some, while the others fell in open areas around Safed.[13]

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have not yet responded in any coherent or clearly coordinated fashion to the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is the seniormost defense and foreign policy body in Iran, held an emergency meeting at the residence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on September 27 to discuss the Israeli strike targeted Hassan Nasrallah.[14] Khamenei typically SNSC meetings only during serious crises, such as immediately following Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024 and the United States killing Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[15] The Axis of Resistance has otherwise sustained its regular operations vis-a-vis Israel, which is discussed in further detail below. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed five drone attacks targeting Israel, for instance, which is largely consistent with its usual activity. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias separately issued generic threats toward the United States and Israel in response to the Israeli killing of Nasrallah.

Some Axis of Resistance leaders have increased their personal security measures, which may impede coordination across the alliance. Khamenei moved to a “secure location” in Iran after Israel killed Nasrallah, according to Reuters, citing two unspecified sources in the Middle East.[16] Saudi-owned outlet al Arabiya reported on September 28 that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has “ceased his movements” and changed his ”security circle” in response to the killing of Nasrallah.[17] These security measures and others that senior Axis of Resistance officials may be taking will not preclude the Axis of Resistance from coordinating a response to Israel, however. It is furthermore unclear whether the Axis of Resistance yet fully understands the extent to which Israel has disrupted Hezbollah leadership.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed five attacks targeting Israeli targets since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 27.[18] The claims include the following:

• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel[19]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in northern Israel[20]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Golan Heights[21]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Tel Aviv[22]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel[23]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah blamed “Zionist-American aggression” for Nasrallah’s death in a statement on September 28.[24] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds, formerly known as Ashab al Kahf, separately warned on September 28 that “everyone who participated, supported and backed” the IDF airstrike targeting Nasrallah is part of its “upcoming target bank.”[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah confirmed that Israel killed its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, in an airstrike in Beirut. The airstrike also killed several other senior Hezbollah officials and an IRGC brigadier general.
• Lebanon: The Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership of Hezbollah. This disruption was likely worsened by the internal disarray that Hezbollah already faced after the Israeli pager and radio attack.
• Lebanon: The damage that Israel has done to Hezbollah’s operational-level leadership will likely severely degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a large-scale drone-missile campaign against Israel in the short term.
• Iran: Iran and its Axis of Resistance have not yet responded in any coherent or clearly coordinated fashion to the Israeli air campaign. Axis of Resistance leaders have increased their personal security measures, which may impede coordination.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed five attacks targeting Israel. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also issued generic threats toward the United States and Israel in response to Israel killing Hassan Nasrallah.

Iran Update, September 27, 2024

The IDF is still investigating whether Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah survived the IDF strike that targeted his headquarters in Dahieh, Beirut, on September 27.[1]  The IDF reported on September 27 that the IDF targeted Nasrallah in Hezbollah’s underground central command headquarters.[2] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel  Hagari reported that the IDF is still investigating whether Nasrallah survived the airstrike.[3] Israeli officials told the New York Times that Israeli leadership decided to conduct the strike after receiving real-time intelligence indicating that Nasrallah was present for a meeting.[4]  Israeli media speculated after reviewing imagery and video that the IDF used multiple large bunker-buster bombs to penetrate and destroy Hezbollah‘s underground command center.[5] An unspecified source close to Hezbollah cited by Agence France-Presse (AFP) claimed that Nasrallah is ”fine.”[6]

The IDF is conducting a decapitation campaign targeting senior Hezbollah leadership as part of its air campaign across Lebanon. This campaign could impact Hezbollah’s ability to effectively organize and direct its forces. The IDF reported that its September 24 airstrike which killed Hezbollah’s Rocket and Missile Unit Commander Ibrahim Muhammad Qabisi also killed Qabisi’s deputy Abbas Sharafeddine and a senior commander from Hezbollah’s missile division, Hussein Ezzeddine.[7] Ezzeddine was reportedly close to the former top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, who Israel killed in late July.[8] The IDF has conducted several major airstrikes in recent days targeting senior Hezbollah commanders and their communication networks.[9] CTP-ISW noted that Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios disrupted the group’s internal communications and may have prompted the group to begin using less secure methods of communication that Israel could then intercept and exploit.[10]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon and destroy Hamas in Gaza, and the achievement of these objectives would fundamentally change the security landscape in the Middle East.[11] Defeating both groups would also either achieve or create conditions to achieve all of Israel’s war aims. These war aims are destroying Hamas as a governing and military force, preventing terrorist attacks in Israel, returning the hostages, protecting Israel’s borders, and returning citizens to the north.[12] Iran has historically relied on Hezbollah to implement its Middle Eastern strategy. Hezbollah trainers have trained Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi fighters to support Iran’s regional goals.[13] Hezbollah also supported Iran by deploying forces into Syria to support the Bashar al Assad regime.[14] Both Hamas and Hezbollah have used their large, well-developed non-state military forces to threaten Israel from the north and south in support of Iranian objectives.[15] The defeat or severe degradation of these two groups would significantly alter the current security architecture in the Middle East that has prevailed since at least the mid-2000s.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel has “destroyed nearly all of Hamas battalions” and is now focused on eliminating Hamas’ remaining fighting capabilities, which is generally consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment of Hamas’ current strength.[16] CTP-ISW assesses that Israeli operations have defeated or severely degraded Hamas units across the Gaza Strip.[17] Defeat occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight and is forced to yield to the friendly commander’s will. Hamas’ units do not appear to be fighting as cohesive military formations.[18] Defeating Hamas militarily is a prerequisite to destroying the group militarily and politically. Destroying Hamas as a military organization requires the IDF to damage Hamas’ military forces to such a degree that they cannot function without being entirely rebuilt.[19] Destroying Hamas as a political organization would require additional political measures, including the creation of a transitional governing authority to rule the Strip. Defeating or destroying Hamas would prevent future terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip and remove one entity that Iran can use to attack Israel.

Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to “defeat Hezbollah,” which would return Israeli citizens to the north.[20] The ongoing Israeli air campaign has severely damaged Hezbollah’s command-and-control network. Hezbollah has so far failed to cease rocket fire into northern Israel, and Israel’s top military commanders are signaling that a ground operation may be necessary to accomplish Israel’s war aims. These operations are presumably designed to defeat Hezbollah’s will or ability to continue the fight, thereby forcing Hezbollah to end its attacks and allowing Israeli citizens to return to the north. The Hezbollah that would emerge from such a war would be severely damaged and unable to execute the activities it traditionally has—at least for a time—thus leading to profound changes in regional security architecture. These changes would likely require Iran to make a series of choices related to how it would manage its Axis of Resistance in the future.

Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar reported on September 26 that the IDF Air Force is preparing to provide air support for a potential ground operation into Lebanon.[21] Bar stated that the Air Force would work with Israeli ground forces to provide air cover and destroy targets above and below ground. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces on September 25 that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon is “prepar[ing] the area for the possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[22] Halevi said that the IDF is preparing for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah fighters and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.” Hezbollah operates dozens of so-called “military areas“ close to civilian, UNIFIL, and Lebanese Army infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[23] Israeli Security Cabinet approved new war aims on September 16 as part of the October 7 War to return Israeli citizens to their homes in northern Israel.[24] The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone cannot stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is very effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[25]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on September 26 to 2:00pm ET on September 27. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel on September 26 and 27. Hezbollah targeted two Israeli towns, including Tiberias and Ilaniya, for the first time.[26] Hezbollah launched two waves of rocket attacks targeting Tiberias.[27] Israeli media reported that all five Hezbollah rockets launched as part of the first barrage fell into the Sea of Galilee.[28] Hezbollah launched medium-range “Fadi 1” rockets at several Israeli civilian centers in Kiryat Ata, Haifa District, for the second day in a row.[29] Hezbollah launched rockets and artillery shells in two separate attacks targeting IDF military sites in northern Israel on September 26 and 27.[30]

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 26 that Hezbollah is facing internal disagreements about how to respond to the recent Israeli air campaign.[31] The Wall Street Journal, citing people familiar with Hezbollah discussions, reported that some Hezbollah members believe the group is acting too cautiously and should instead retaliate quickly against Israel. The sources further revealed that some Hezbollah members expressed frustration with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) for failing to step in to support the group in recent days. The Wall Street Journal reported that Hezbollah leadership seeks to avoid a regional war which it views as a ”trap” set by Israel.[32]

Iran’s Axis of Resistance is conducting a multi-front attack campaign targeting Israeli territory which may be intended to draw Israeli resources and attention away from its campaign in Lebanon. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—launched a one-way attack drone at an unspecified Israeli target in the Golan Heights on September 27.[33] Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree announced on September 27 that the Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Tel Aviv and a drone attack targeting Ashkelon.[34] The IDF reported that it shot down a Houthi ballistic missile with the Arrow air defense system outside Israeli borders and that the IDF was not aware of a drone reaching Israel on the night of September 26-27.[35] Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have intervened in Israel’s war with Hezbollah, in part, by intensifying attacks on Israel.[36] These groups could calculate that these attacks would strain Israeli air defenses by forcing the air defense systems to track multiple targets from multiple directions simultaneously.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strike Targeting Nasrallah: The IDF is still investigating whether Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah survived the IDF strike that targeted his headquarters in Dahieh, Beirut, on September 27. Israeli officials told the New York Times that Israeli leadership decided to conduct the strike after receiving real-time intelligence indicating that Nasrallah was present for a meeting.
• Israeli War Aims: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon and destroy Hamas in Gaza, and the achievement of these objectives would fundamentally change the security landscape in the Middle East. Defeating both groups would also either achieve or create conditions to achieve all of Israel’s war aims.
• Lebanon: Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar reported on September 26 that the IDF Air Force is preparing to provide air support for a potential ground operation into Lebanon. The Wall Street Journal reported on September 26 that Hezbollah is facing internal disagreements about how to respond to the recent Israeli air campaign.
• Hezbollah’s Attack Campaign in Northern Israel: Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel on September 26 and 27.
• Iran’s Axis of Resistance in the October 7 War: Iran’s Axis of Resistance is conducting a multi-front attack campaign targeting Israeli territory which may be intended to draw Israeli resources and attention away from its campaign in Lebanon.

Iran Update, September 26, 2024

Israeli sources provided additional details on some military effects that Israel is trying to achieve in Lebanon. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on September 26 that the IDF is currently working to degrade Hezbollah military capabilities, deny Hezbollah the ability to receive external weapons transfers, and kill senior Hezbollah officials.[1] The IDF Air Force has conducted a large-scale air campaign into Lebanon in recent days to this end.[2] The IDF Air Force most recently struck around seven border crossings between Lebanon and Syria on September 26 as part of Israeli efforts to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah.[3] An Israeli journalist separately reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks ultimately to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani river in southern Lebanon.[4] This objective is consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which requires Hezbollah forces to remain north of the Litani river. Israeli officials have repeatedly said since at least December 2023 that they are pursuing diplomatic efforts and will use military force if necessary to get Hezbollah to comply with the UN Security Council resolution. Israeli military operations in Lebanon are meant to achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel. Hezbollah has conducted almost daily drone, missile, and rocket attacks into Israel since October 2023, which has compelled Israeli civilians to evacuate their homes.

Hezbollah continued to fire rockets targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel on September 26. Hezbollah launched rockets targeting Rafael Advanced Defense Systems near Haifa for the third time in recent days.[5] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting four civilian centers in northern Israel, including Ahihud and Kiryat Ata, for the first time.[6] Targeting the relatively mobile and well-hidden Hezbollah drone, missile, and rocket array is a difficult undertaking, even for an air force as tactically proficient as the IDF Air Force. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone cannot stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[7]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah outlined on September 25 how it will purportedly support Lebanese Hezbollah against Israel. Kataib Hezbollah called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to increase the “level and size” of attacks targeting Israel.[8] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has increased its rate of attacks targeting Israel in recent days. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed six attacks targeting Israel on September 22 and three attacks targeting Israel on September 24, for example.[9] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on September 25 that the IDF is aware of the threat posed by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to Israel and “will do whatever is necessary to deal with this matter.”[10] Kataib Hezbollah separately claimed that it has observed “intense” US and Israeli activity in Iraqi airspace, possibly setting informational conditions to resume attacks targeting US forces.[11] Kataib Hezbollah warned that it will confront “all aspects of the American presence.”[12] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, similarly threatened in June 2024 to target US interests in Iraq and across the Middle East if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.[13]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—published a video on September 26 threatening to attack Israeli military sites.[14] The video showed satellite imagery of the Israeli Defense Ministry building and an intelligence site in Tel Aviv as well as the town of Yodfat in northern Israel.[15] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds claimed that Israel assembles nuclear weapons at an underground facility in Yodfat.[16] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds has published several videos highlighting potential targets in Israel in recent weeks, including videos in August and September 2024 showing satellite imagery of the Israeli Soreq Nuclear Research Center, an Israeli military industrial site near Tel Aviv, and the Israeli Biological Research Institute.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli sources provided additional details on some military effects that Israel is trying to achieve in Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah continued to fire rockets targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah called on other Iraqi militias to increase the “level and size” of their attacks on Israel. Iraqi militias have conducted regular drone and missile attacks targeting Israel in recent months.

Iran Update, September 25, 2024

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) leadership is signaling to its forces that it will conduct a major ground operation into Lebanon imminently. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces on September 25 that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon is “prepar[ing] the area for the possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[1] Halevi said that the IDF is preparing in particular for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.” Halevi made these remarks to the IDF 7th Armored Brigade during a training exercise on the Israel-Lebanon border.[2] The 7th Armored Brigade is one of several IDF units that have deployed to the northern border in recent weeks.[3] Major General Ori Gordin—the commander of the IDF Northern Command—similarly remarked that the Israeli forces must be “strongly prepared” for a ground offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while observing the 7th Armored Brigade simulate a ground operation in Lebanon on September 24.[4] Gordin said that the IDF campaign into Lebanon began with degrading Hezbollah rocket capabilities and command-and-control. The IDF has now entered a new phase of this campaign, according to Gordin.[5]  

Halevi and Gordin made these remarks directly to Israeli service members, as the IDF called up reservist units to deploy to the northern border.[6] The IDF announced on September 25 that it activated two reservist brigades—the 6th Infantry Brigade (36th Division) and 228th Infantry Brigade (146th Division)—so that the units would “allow the continuation of the fighting effort” against Hezbollah.[7] These two reservist brigades join several other IDF units, including the 98th Division, that have been called up or deployed from other areas of responsibility to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent days.[8] The commander of the 7th Brigade recently published a letter in which he said his unit is prepared to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[9]

Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance appear to be preparing for an Israeli ground operation into Lebanon. The IDF has observed around 40,000 Iranian-backed Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi militants concentrate around the Syrian border with the Golan Heights, according to Israeli media.[10] It is unclear why and when the Axis of Resistance deployed these militants or whether they were already in the area. It is also unclear whether Hezbollah is able or willing to integrate these foreign fighters into its already well-organized and trained force structure. Syrian opposition media separately reported on September 24 that IRGC officers and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders recently met in Deir ez Zor Province and discussed how to “ease pressure” on Hezbollah.[11] The meeting participants reportedly considered attacking international coalition targets in eastern Syria.[12] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is trying to balance its support for the Axis of Resistance while trying to avoid an all-out war against Israel.[13]

The IDF Air Force continued to strike Hezbollah targets across Lebanon on September 25. The IDF announced that it struck over 280 targets across Lebanon, including rocket launchers and military infrastructure, such as weapons depots.[14] Numerous sites struck by the IDF produced secondary explosions, indicating the presence of explosive munitions.[15] The IDF also stated that it struck 60 targets connected to the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus, including collection sites and headquarters.[16]

Some of the IDF airstrikes targeted weapons depot and other military infrastructure in Nabatieh, which is one of the largest population centers in southern Lebanon.[17] Geolocated footage and local reports indicate that IDF struck targets within relatively densely populated areas near Nabatieh city center.[18] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF airstrikes in the city are ”relatively unusual.”[19]

Iran Update, September 24, 2024

The intensifying operations between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah are part of the broader war that Israel has fought since October 7, 2023.  Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into Israel since the war began in order to compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and thus preserve Hamas.[i] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defined returning northern Israelis to their homes as an additional war aim, adding it to the objectives he set after October 7: returning Israeli hostages and destroying Hamas’ military and governance capabilities in the Gaza Strip.[ii] Nasrallah has similarly directly connected Hezbollah’s war effort to the Gaza Strip in this broader conflict by tying an end to Hezbollah attacks to a ceasefire deal in the Gaza Strip.[iii] Israel’s intensified air campaign in Lebanon is part of a broader Israeli strategy to defeat multiple Iranian-backed military campaigns executed by Iran and its Axis of Resistance as part of the October 7 War.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The intensifying operations between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah are part of the broader war that Israel has fought since October 7, 2023. Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into Israel since the war began in order to compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and thus preserve Hamas. Agreeing to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to stop Hezbollah fire into northern Israel would not satisfy Israel’s war objectives, nor would it discourage similar Hezbollah operations in the future.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign into Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah capabilities on September 23 and 24. The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck around 1,600 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley over the past day.
• Iranian Response to Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Iran declined a request by Lebanese Hezbollah in recent days to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, according to two unspecified Israeli officials and an unspecified Western diplomat speaking to Axios on September 24.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign against Israel by targeting several new Israeli civilian and military sites on September 23 and 24.

Iran Update, September 23, 2024

Israel set new war objectives for Lebanon on September 16. The accomplishment of these objectives would require the IDF to undertake a second major military campaign in Lebanon as part of the October 7 War. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on September 16 that returning Israeli citizens to their homes in northern Israel would be a new Israeli war aim as part of the October 7 War.[1] Netanyahu’s new war aims are a response to the 11-month-long Lebanese Hezbollah military campaign that has sought to accomplish Hezbollah’s own military and political objectives vis-a-vis Israel and in support of Hamas.[2]  

Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon is part of an Israeli effort to prevent Hezbollah from accomplishing its own war aim, which is to enable Hamas’ survival and ability to rebuild itself in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has repeatedly tied an end to rocket fire into northern Israel to an Israeli ceasefire in the Gaza strip on terms dictated by Hamas.[3] Hamas’ proposed ceasefire agreement, however, is tantamount to an Israeli defeat because it would enable Hamas to rebuild over time.[4] Agreeing to Hamas’ terms would also fail to ensure Israeli security over the long term because it would demonstrate to Nasrallah that Israel could be cowed and defeated by relatively inexpensive indirect fire targeting civilians in Israel. This would encourage Nasrallah to undertake similar campaigns again in the future.  

Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[5] Continuing to fire rockets into Israel increases the risk of war, given the stated Israeli aim to return its civilians to their homes in northern Israel. This Israeli aim is not possible unless Hezbollah rocket fire ceases.  Nasrallah is unlikely to abandon his Axis of Resistance partners in the end because to do so would severely diminish Hezbollah’s regional position as a leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah trainers, for example, routinely work with Iranian-backed militias in Syria to sustain ground lines of communication between Iran and Hezbollah. Losing influence with these groups could have detrimental impacts for Hezbollah’s long-term strength in the region and in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah will therefore probably continue its indirect fire into northern Israel despite the ongoing Israeli air campaign. This will increase the risk of a ground campaign, given that the Israeli war aims of returning Israeli residents to northern Israel will require the IDF to physically prevent Hezbollah from firing into Israel. Israel is conducting a major air campaign in Lebanon, primarily targeting rocket launch sites to degrade Hezbollah capabilities and destroy threats to Israel.[6] The IDF reported that it struck approximately 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon the morning of September 23.[7] Targeting the relatively mobile and extremely well-hidden Hezbollah rocket, missile, and drone array is a very difficult undertaking, even for an air force as tactically proficient as the IDF Air Force. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone do not have the ability to stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is very effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[8]

The IDF conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front Ali Karaki in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, according to sources in the IDF.[9] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Karaki became the most senior Hezbollah military commander after the IDF killed Ibrahim Aqil on September 20.[10] Karaki is the Southern Front commander, and controls Hezbollah’s Badr, Nasser, and Aziz Units.[11] Hezbollah rejected reports that Karaki was killed in the Israeli airstrike and claimed that he was moved to a safe location.[12] The IDF has not commented on the airstrike at the time of this writing.

The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck over 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and is preparing to strike targets in the Bekaa Valley.[13] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF was primarily targeting rocket launchers aimed towards Israel to preempt threats.[14] The IDF stated that Hezbollah stores its weapons in populated areas and civilian structures and warned civilians to avoid those areas.[15]

Lebanese Hezbollah expanded the depth of its attack campaign against Israeli civilians by targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.^[16] Hezbollah fired an unspecified number of long-range rockets that struck at least five Israeli settlements in the West Bank.^[17] These settlements are located approximately 100 kilometers south of the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF stated that the rockets fell in open areas.^[18] A Palestinian journalist reported that Hezbollah rockets injured two Palestinians in Deir Istiya, which is about 15km southwest of Nablus and in Salafit Governorate.^[19] Hezbollah may intend for these rocket attacks deep into the West Bank attempting to strain Israeli air defenses by forcing Israeli air defense systems to intercept rockets over the West Bank, where Israel very infrequently intercepts rocket fire. Most of the rocket fire that Israel has historically intercepted close to the West Bank has come from the Gaza Strip to the west, rather than from the north. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks into West Bank demonstrates its capabilities to strike new targets deeper into Israel, and poses an imminent threat to major Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv is also located approximately 100 kilometers south of Israel-Lebanon border. This is the first time that Lebanese Hezbollah has struck targets in the West Bank since launching its indirect fire campaign targeting northern Israel on October 8, 2023.^[20]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on September 23 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration is willing to resume nuclear negotiations.[21] Araghchi made this statement on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City. Araghchi and President Pezeshkian traveled to New York on September 20 and 22, respectively, to attend the UNGA.[22] Araghchi stated that Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations in New York City if “the other parties are ready.”[23] Araghchi added that he will remain in New York longer than Pezeshkian to meet with various unspecified foreign diplomats. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi accompanied Araghchi and Pezeshkian to New York.[24] Ravanchi and Zarif were both part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[25] Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2018 to 2021, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[26]

Araghchi also met with several foreign counterparts in New York on September 22 and 23. Araghchi met with the foreign affairs ministers of Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan.[27] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s support for Lebanese Hezbollah during his meeting with Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bouhabib.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel set new war objectives for Lebanon on September 16. The accomplishment of these objectives would require the IDF to undertake a second major military campaign in Lebanon as part of the October 7 War. Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon is part of an Israeli effort to prevent Hezbollah from accomplishing its own war aim, which is to enable Hamas’ survival and ability to rebuild itself in the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck over 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and is preparing to strike targets in the Bekaa Valley. The IDF conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front Ali Karaki in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, according to sources in the IDF.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah expanded the depth of its attack campaign against Israeli civilians by targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.
• Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on September 23 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration is willing to resume nuclear negotiations.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas has published and attributed several messages to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in recent weeks. Israeli intelligence officials assess that Sinwar did not write the messages himself.
• Iraq: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia member told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on September 23 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ “scope of [Israeli] targets” has expanded due to recent Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.

Iran Update, September 22, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a large-scale airstrike campaign across Lebanon on September 21 and 22.[i] The IDF announced on September 21 that it targeted over 400 rocket launchers, thousands of rocket barrels, and other military infrastructure in at least two waves of airstrikes across southern Lebanon.[ii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the strikes targeted short- and medium- range rocket launchers within firing range of Haifa and other northern Israeli towns.[iii] The IDF stated that it was responding to indications that Hezbollah was preparing to launch rockets into northern Israel.[iv] The IDF announced new security protocols for some of the northern communities around the same time in response to the indications of an imminent Hezbollah attack.[v]

The IDF announced on September 22 that it conducted another wave of airstrikes targeting dozens of Hezbollah rocket launchers and military infrastructure across Lebanon.[vi] The IDF framed the most recent wave of strikes as meant to degrade Hezbollah forces rather than to preempt an imminent Hezbollah attack, as was the case for the previous day’s airstrikes.[vii] The framing that the IDF offered for the most recent wave of strikes matches generally how the IDF has discussed most of its airstrikes into Lebanon since October 2023.

This activity marks the third consecutive day of heavy Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon.[viii] This activity also comes immediately after Israel detonated thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios on September 18 and 19, respectively. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that Israel will continue to target Hezbollah with ”blow after blow” until Israel achieves its stated war aim of allowing displaced citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel.[ix]

Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel on September 21 and 22. These attacks are consistent with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declaring recently that the group would continue its cross-border attacks in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[x] Hezbollah launched three barrages of medium-range rockets targeting IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel on September 21.[xi] The airbase is the northernmost one in Israel. Hezbollah stated that the attack was in response to “repeated Israeli attacks” on Lebanon.[xii] The IDF intercepted about 24 rockets.[xiii] This attack may have been the one that the IDF preempted earlier that day.

Hezbollah fired around another 85 short- and medium-range rockets targeting Rafael Advanced Defense Systems near Haifa on September 22.[xiv] The Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli defense company that develops weapons and military technology, including the Iron Dome air defense system, for the IDF.[xv] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted the company’s site in retaliation for Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios.[xvi] Several rockets impacted areas just outside Haifa and injured three people.[xvii]

It is notable that these latest Hezbollah attacks are slightly smaller in scale than previous retaliatory attacks the group has conducted. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24 in retaliation to Israel killing top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr.[xviii]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed five attacks into Israel on September 22. The claims included the following:

• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified location in northern Israel[xix]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Israel[xx]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel[xxi]
• An Arfad drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley[xxii]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley[xxiii]

The IDF intercepted two cruise missiles that were headed toward the southern Golan Heights from Iraq.[xxiv] The IDF intercepted the missiles before they entered Israeli airspace. The IDF also intercepted a drone that was heading toward southern Israel from Iraq.[xxv] The IDF intercepted the drone before it entered Israeli airspace, but air sirens still activated near Eilat. The IDF lastly intercepted a drone that flew over the southern Golan Heights from the east.[xxvi]

The commander of the IDF 7th Armored Brigade, Colonel Elad Zuri, published a letter on September 20 in which he said that the brigade is prepared to be the first unit to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[xxvii] Zuri said that the 7th Brigade is deployed on the northern border and prepared to fight in order to return displaced northern residents to their homes.[xxviii] The IDF separately deployed the 98th Division, including the 35th Paratroopers and 89th Commando brigades, to northern Israel on September 18.[xxix] The 7th Brigade most recently fought in the Gaza Strip on August 30 under the command of the 98th Division.[xxx] It is unclear whether the 7th Brigade deployed north as part of the 98th Division or whether it will be subordinate to the 36th Division in Israel’s Northern Command.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF conducted a large-scale air campaign into Lebanon. This activity marks three consecutive days of heavy Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel, which is consistent with Hezbollah’s stated intent to continue cross-border attacks.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed five attacks into Israel. The IDF intercepted several drones and cruise missiles headed toward Israel from Iraq.

Iran Update, September 21, 2024

Israel has issued new security protocols for some of its northern communities in anticipation of intensifying conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari announced the new measures for residents on September 21 in response to indications that Hezbollah is preparing to launch rocket attacks into Israel.[1] Hagari said that residents should limit gatherings outside to 30 individuals and inside to 300 individuals. Educational and workplace activities should occur near protected areas, such as shelters, according to Hagari. The new measures apply specifically to residents in Galilee and the Jordan Valley. IDF Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar separately reported that the Air Force is maintaining a high level of readiness.[2] Israel has closed its airspace north of Hadera, northern Israel, to civilian flights in order to avoid accidental engagement with Israeli air defenses.[3]

An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF exploited an “operational opportunity” in conducting its airstrike that killed 12 Hezbollah Radwan commanders in Beirut on September 20.[4] The correspondent said that the planning and execution of the airstrike occurred within a “few hours.”[5] The IDF received intelligence that the Radwan commanders were gathering in an underground operations center in southern Beirut and quickly developed plans to attack. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi was visiting forces in northern Israel when the IDF received this intelligence and presented the plan to political leaders for approval. This reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that the IDF appears to be exploiting disarray in Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group.[6] Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios disrupted the group’s internal communications and may have prompted the group to begin using less secure methods of communication that Israel could then intercept and exploit.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to threaten intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war. The militias likely seek to deter a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon by threatening to expand the war. These militias could follow through with these threats in the event of intensifying conflict. Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—announced on September 20 that it is prepared to send “hundreds or even thousands” of militants to Lebanon to support Hezbollah against Israel.[7]  Kataib Sarkhat al Quds also threatened to strike the Institute for Biological Research south of Tel Aviv.[8] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and has tried repeatedly to conduct drone and missile attacks into Israel since January 2024.[9]

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi Red Crescent Society sent two plans of aid to Beirut on September 21.[10] The delivery includes medical supplies. The PMF stated that the supplies will be delivered to Lebanese hospitals to treat individuals wounded by Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel has issued new security protocols for some of its northern communities in anticipation of intensifying conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. The new measures are in response to indications that Hezbollah was preparing to launch rockets into areas.
• Lebanon: The IDF reportedly exploited an “operational opportunity” in conducting its airstrike targeting the Hezbollah Radwan commanders in southern Beirut. CTP-ISW has previously observed that Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage on the group.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to threaten to intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war. The militias likely seek to deter a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon but could still follow through on their threats in the event of intensifying conflict.

Iran Update, September 20, 2024

Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut on September 20, killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces unit.[1] The targeted individuals included Ibrahim Aqil, who was the overall Radwan commander. He was also a member of the Hezbollah Jihad Council, which oversees the group’s military operations. That Israel detected and was able to target such a sensitive meeting suggests that Hezbollah is suffering from lapses in operational security—possibly caused by Israel detonating the pagers and personal radios used by Hezbollah members.[2] These detonations compromised Hezbollah’s primary and secondary means of communication. CTP-ISW previously observed that Hezbollah could revert to less secure methods of communication, such as phones and radio relays, in order to rapidly restore communications.[3] Doing so would leave Hezbollah vulnerable, given that Israel could intercept these signals.

Hezbollah remains a capable fighting force that will overcome the disruption to its command-and-control and communications systems. Hezbollah has organized its forces in a conventional military structure that is designed to withstand and resolve these kinds of disruptions. The detonation of pagers and personal radios and the killing of senior Radwan commanders will thus generate only temporary effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness. Hezbollah will recover given sufficient time to do so. Hezbollah also has Iranian-backed allied militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that have not suffered any disruption to their own command-and-control and communications systems.

In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF is now more battle-tested and experienced from its time fighting Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has had time to practice complex maneuver operations against a deeply entrenched enemy force. The IDF 98th Division, for instance, has fought extensively in the Gaza Strip and is now deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border.[4] On the other hand, Hezbollah has a significantly more competent force than it did in 2006.[5] Hezbollah forces are more experienced given their participation in protracted campaigns fighting for Bashar al Assad in Syria. The Axis of Resistance is furthermore positioned to attack Israel from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in a way that they were not in 2006.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. Kataib Hezbollah pledged on September 17 to send fighters and materiel to support Hezbollah against Israel.[6] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—separately announced on September 19 that it will soon launch a “new phase” of operations against Israel.[7] Abu Ala al Walai—the secretary general of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada—lastly sent a message to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 20, in which he suggested that Iranian-backed Iraqi forces could deploy to Lebanon and fight alongside Hezbollah.[8] This public messaging is likely meant to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon, as CTP-ISW previously assessed, but could reflect the militias’ willingness to intervene as well.[9]  The IDF conducted an airstrike south of Damascus on September 20, killing a senior Kataib Hezbollah official, underscoring the military presence that the militia has near the Israel-Syria border.[10]

The United States does not expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months, according to the Wall Street Journal.[11] Anonymous US officials told the outlet that Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands. This behavior has led international negotiators to doubt that Hamas seriously wants a deal. Senior US officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have similarly questioned whether Hamas is sincerely looking to reach a deal.[12] The officials also cited disagreement between Israel and Hamas about hostage-prisoner swaps as an obstacle in negotiations. The officials added that Israel detonating pagers and personal radios owned by Lebanese Hezbollah members has further complicated diplomatic engagement with Hamas. An anonymous Arab official similarly said that there was “no chance” a ceasefire-hostage agreement after the Israel detonated the pagers and personal radios.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon Israel. The IDF conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF unit.
• Lebanon: In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF and Hezbollah have both gained used combat experience since then.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. These militias are active near in Syria near the Israeli border.
• Gaza Strip: The United States does not reportedly expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months. Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands.

Iran Update, September 19, 2024

Israeli sources reported on September 19 that Israeli officials are deciding whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will conduct an offensive into Lebanon.[1] Hezbollah will almost certainly not cease rocket fire into northern Israel, which will necessitate an Israeli operation if Israel hopes to achieve its stated objectives in northern Israel. The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war objective on September 16.[2] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 12 that a political settlement alone will not return displaced citizens to northern Israel and that Israel is "preparing for a broad campaign” to accomplish Israeli objectives.[3]Netanyahu chaired a security meeting with military and political leaders at the HaKirya in Tel Aviv on September 19 to discuss the IDF’s possible courses of action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Israeli Army Radio.[4] The meeting follows Israel's multi-stage attack that detonated explosives in Hezbollah communications devices that killed 32 Hezbollah fighters and injured over 3,000 on September 17 and 18.[5] Israel also conducted pre-emptive strikes targeting over 150 Hezbollah rocket launchers ready to fire at Israel on September 19.[6] Israel has deployed additional IDF units to the northern sector since September 18.[7] Israeli media reported that the IDF does not have “imminent” plans to undertake a new major operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however, and that the Israeli security cabinet instructed the IDF to wait to see Hezbollah’s chosen course of action.[8]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declared in a September 19 speech that Hezbollah would continue to conduct attacks targeting Israel. Nasrallah said that Hezbollah would not stop its cross-border attacks in support of Gaza and that Israel would face a “severe reckoning” in response to the explosive device attacks.[9] Nasrallah did not specify when Hezbollah would conduct this retaliatory attack, however. Nasrallah has frequently delivered direct threats against Israel but seldom follows through upon these threats. There have been a few occasions on which Hezbollah has carried out Nasrallah’s threats by conducting attacks that Nasrallah deemed to be appropriate, however.[10] Nasrallah did retaliate as promised after Israel killed top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, for example. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24, a month after Israel killed Shukr.[11] Nasrallah is currently facing competing priorities that highlight Hezbollah’s constraints and impact his decision-making as he calculates Hezbollah’s response to Israel’s actions.

Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance. Continuing to fire rockets into Israel increases the risk of war, given the stated Israeli aim to return its civilians to their homes in northern Israel. This aim is not possible unless Hezbollah rocket fire ceases. This objective is in tension with other Hezbollah priorities, which include avoiding a major war with Israel to prevent jeopardizing Hezbollah’s preeminent political position in Lebanon. Nasrallah ex post facto recognized that his decision initiating the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War by kidnapping three Israeli soldiers was a strategic mistake, likely due in part to the negative impact the war had on Hezbollah’s political position in Lebanon.[12] Nasrallah is unlikely to abandon his Axis of Resistance partners in the end, however, because to do so would severely diminish Hezbollah’s regional position as a leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah trainers, for example, routinely work with Iranian-backed militias in Syria to sustain ground lines of communication between Iran and Hezbollah. Losing influence with these groups could have detrimental impacts for Hezbollah’s long-term strength in the region and in Lebanon. It could also undermine Hezbollah's unity, as Nasrallah's relative caution is likely not reflective of the attitudes of all Hezbollah rank-and-file. Hezbollah’s rank-and-file is presumably more in favor of continuing operations against Israel, given the recent Israeli communications attacks and ongoing Israeli airstrikes targeting mid-level Hezbollah commanders.

Iranian officials stated that there will be a response to the Israeli operation that detonated pagers belonging to Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon on September 17. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami vowed a “crushing response” from the Axis of Resistance in a message to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 19.[13] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated his condemnation for the attack in Lebanon and stated on X (Twitter) that “God...takes revenge and [Israel] will definitely be punished justly” on September 19.[14] Salami separately visited Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani, who had been injured in the attack, after Amani had been transferred to a hospital in Tehran on September 19.[15] The Iranian Ambassador to the UN Saeed Iravani said in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres on September 18 that Iran will follow up the attack and Iran has the right to respond to Israel’s attack in Lebanon.[16]

Unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials. The Israeli Shin Bet assessed that the plot was likely part of an effort to retaliate against Israel for the operation that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. It is not clear which specific Iranian officials had knowledge of or approved this plan. It is also unclear whether multiple government agencies were aware of the plan. The Shin Bet and Israel Police announced that Iran allegedly recruited an Israeli civilian in a failed plot to assassinate a senior Israeli political or defense official including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[17] The Shin Bet assessed that Iranian officials viewed the assassination plans as "revenge” for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[18] The Israeli civilian traveled to Iran and Turkey several times and met with an Iranian businessman there who presented himself as a member of the Iranian intelligence apparatus.[19] The Israeli civilian met with the ”businessman” and his associates abroad on numerous occasions beginning in April 2024.[20] The fact that Iran cultivated this asset in April 2024 suggests that Iranian intelligence did not initially recruit this asset for an assassination operation directly related to the Haniyeh killing, given that Israel killed Haniyeh in July 2024.  The Shin Bet did not provide indications as to whether the Israeli civilian made significant progress in carrying out any these assassination plots.[21] Israel Police arrested the civilian in August 2024.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli sources reported on September 19 that Israeli officials are deciding whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will conduct an offensive into Lebanon. Hezbollah will almost certainly not cease rocket fire into northern Israel, which will necessitate an Israeli operation if Israel hopes to achieve its stated objectives in northern Israel. Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance.
• Iran and Israel: Unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials. The Israeli Shin Bet assessed that the plot was likely part of an effort to retaliate against Israel for the operation that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Senior Hamas official Hossam Badran said on September 19 that the group is not optimistic that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Cairo will produce a ceasefire agreement.
• Iraq: An Iraqi politician said that the IRGC Quds Force Commander met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad and ordered the militias to “calm the political and military situation in Iraq” due to current regional developments, which is consistent with prior CTP-ISW assessments.

Iran Update, September 17, 2024

Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers used by Lebanese Hezbollah members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17.[1] Lebanese officials reported that around 2,800 individuals were injured, though some reports suggest that the number is closer to 4,000, most of whom are Hezbollah members.[2] The attack also injured the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani.[3] Hezbollah mourned the death of 12 fighters after the attack but did not explicitly acknowledge how they died.[4] Israel reportedly executed the attack by planting one-to-two ounces of explosive material and remote triggers inside a batch of Taiwanese-made pagers en route to Lebanon.[5] Hezbollah had ordered the pagers to communicate across its ranks, as Hezbollah Secretary General ordered group members to limit cellphone usage in order to avoid Israeli detection.[6] Hezbollah responded to the attack by blaming Israel and vowing to retaliate.[7] 

The attack has likely had several negative effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness at least temporarily. The attack likely disrupted some internal communications across Hezbollah, especially given the extent to which Hezbollah has been relying on pagers in recent months. The nature and scale of the attack also likely stoked confusion and shock among some Hezbollah members. These effects could drive general paranoia within Hezbollah as well, given that Israel has demonstrated repeatedly in recent months how deeply it has infiltrated Iranian and Iranian-backed networks.

Israel announced on September 16 that it thwarted a Lebanese Hezbollah attempt to assassinate a former senior Israeli security official.[8] The Shin Bet located at an unspecified location an anti-personnel mine that a Hezbollah cell was planning to use for the assassination in the ”coming days.”[9] The mine was connected to a camera and a remote-controlled detonator. The Shin Bet reported that the mine was “nearly identical” to ones previously used by Hezbollah.[10]

The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war objective on September 16.[11] The Israeli security cabinet’s approving this addition marks the first time that northern Israel is officially included in Israel’s stated war objectives.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 12 that a political settlement alone will not return displaced citizens to northern Israel and that Israel is "preparing for a broad campaign” to this end.[13]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is in the process of defeating Hamas militarily in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has very likely degraded severely the two Hamas brigades in the southern Gaza Strip.[14] Hamas attacks decreased dramatically since August 2024, reflecting this degradation.[15] Israeli operations have destroyed the bulk of Hamas’ rocket supply as well, leading to a significant decline in Hamas rocket attacks.[16] Hamas is likely no longer operating as an effective and well-organized fighting force. Hamas is instead fighting in a disorganized manner through small, de-centralized cells of fighters across the Gaza Strip.[17]

Israel is meanwhile continuing to pursue its stated war aim of destroying Hamas as a military force and governing authority in the Gaza Strip.[18] Destroying Hamas militarily is a greater undertaking than defeating it and requires Israel—per US military doctrine—to physically render Hamas forces combat ineffective unless reconstituted.[19] Destroying Hamas as a governing authority requires Israel to replace Hamas with a new entity or force that can provide the civil services and security that the Hamas government has provided to Gazans.

Hamas is projecting public confidence that it will survive in the Gaza Strip as part of an information operation to erode Israeli will to sustain the war. Hamas cannot defeat Israel militarily in this war and is instead trying to compel Israel to accept defeat. Senior Hamas official Khaled Mashal said in an interview that Hamas will play a “dominant role” in the post-war Gaza Strip.[20] Hamas has also exploited Israeli hostages to increase Israeli domestic pressure on the government to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would allow Hamas to survive. Hamas has, for example, published propaganda videos of hostages to reinforce the perception that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[21] Mashal admitted in his interview that Hamas is in no rush to conclude ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel and will remain committed to its maximalist demands, which include a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[22]

Hamas has articulated its own post-war vision for the Gaza Strip to further cement its enduring influence there. Hamas has repeatedly advocated for a Palestinian unity government to take control of the strip after the war and even signed an agreement with Fatah in July 2024 to that end.[23] CTP-ISW previously argued that Hamas could use its functioning military and internal security wings to coerce technocratic government employees at every level, thus providing Hamas with significant influence over the Gazan government even if Hamas officials were not officially controlling it.[24] Remnants of Hamas’ military and internal security organizations could still coerce government officials in any future Gazan Authority, though those efforts may initially lack overarching guidance from higher echelons of command.[25] A lack of central control of such efforts would initially impede Hamas’ efforts to exert influence over a future Gazan governing authority, but Hamas would almost certainly rebuild the control necessary to overcome this deficiency. Israeli efforts that focus on disrupting remaining elements of Hamas’ civil rule, such as its role in the distribution of humanitarian aid, would make it more even more difficult for Hamas to do so.[26]

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17 following recent visits to Syria and North Korea and amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military support from allies. Shoigu met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[27] The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Ahmadian and Shoigu discussed upcoming bilateral agreements.[28] Pezeshkian told Shoigu that Iran will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions.[29] Shoigu previously met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria, on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional and international security issues.[30] Shoigu also recently visited Pyongyang on September 13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[31] Shoigu's international visits are coming over the backdrop of the recent Iranian delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[32] Russia’s deepening engagement with China, Iran, and North Korea is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states that could bolster Russia's defense industrial base and secure economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[33]

A Washington-based think tank reported that Iran has in recent months increased its operation at two nuclear sites that were previously used for high explosive testing.[34] The report noted that this increased activity—paired with the growing Iranian stockpile of highly enriched uranium—could shorten the Iranian breakout timeline for producing a nuclear weapon to about one week.[35] The Institute for Science and International Security, citing unspecified Western intelligence sources, reported specifically that Iran has ”reactivated and accelerated” activities at the Sanjarian and Golab Dareh nuclear sites in Tehran Province in recent months.[36] The institute also observed through satellite imagery an increase in human traffic, landscaping, and physical security at the Sanjarian site.[37] The Sanjarian and Golab Dareh sites were both involved in Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, according to documents retrieved by Israel in a clandestine operation in Iran in 2018.[38]

This report comes as Iran has taken several other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has increased its stockpile of weapons-grade uranium, installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges, and conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[39] Russia has separately begun giving Iran unspecified nuclear assistance in exchange for Iran sending ballistic missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel-Hezbollah conflict: Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers used by Lebanese Hezbollah across Lebanon and Syria. The attack has likely had several negative effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness at least temporarily.
• Israel-Hezbollah conflict: The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war aim. Israeli leaders seek to push Hezbollah away from the Israel-Lebanon border to allow displaced citizens to return to northern Israel.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF is in the process of defeating Hamas militarily in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is projecting confidence outwardly that it will survive in the Gaza Strip as part of an information operation to erode Israeli will to sustain the war.
• Iran-Russia cooperation: Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran on an unannounced visit following recent visits to North Korea and Syria and amid ongoing Kremlin efforts to secure military support from allies.
• Iranian nuclear program: A Washington-based think tank reported that Iran has in recent months increased its operations at two nuclear sites that were previously used for high explosive testing. This activity could shorten the Iranian nuclear breakout timeline to a week.

Iran Update, September 16, 2024

Israel is refocusing its operations in the Gaza Strip to prioritize “destroying the pillars of Hamas’ civil rule. . . especially the distribution of humanitarian aid,” according to an anonymous Israeli official.[i] The official told Israeli media that controlling aid distribution enables Hamas to project the image that it still controls the Gazan population.[ii] Hamas inserts itself into the aid distribution process by forcing humanitarian organizations to coordinate with Hamas affiliates and seizing aid shipments as they enter the strip.[iii] Hamas has also aggressively opposed other Gazan factions from adopting a role in aid distribution given that it would jeopardize Hamas’ near monopoly of aid.[iv]

Israeli officials have recently considered alternative methods to distribute aid without Hamas, especially as the IDF faces less resistance from Hamas’ military across the Gaza Strip.[v] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 2 that Israel needs to find an alternative distribution mechanism in order to deprive Hamas of its ability to rule.[vi] Netanyahu has reportedly ordered the IDF to examine the administrative and logistics requirements involved in the IDF assuming responsibility for aid distribution from international organizations.[vii] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi has reportedly opposed the IDF assuming such responsibility due to the risk it would pose to Israeli service members and because international organizations are already prepared to do so.[viii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel is refocusing its operations in the Gaza Strip to prioritize “destroying the pillars of Hamas’ civil rule. . . especially the distribution of humanitarian aid.” An Israeli official said that controlling aid distribution allows Hamas to project the image that it still controls the Gazan population.
• Iranian nuclear program: Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Russia has increased nuclear cooperation with Iran in line with Iranian “ambitions to obtain atomic weapons,” according to Western media.
• Iranian economy: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed parts of his agenda to strengthen Iran’s economic relationships abroad during his first press conference. Pezeshkian advocated for Iran complying with international money laundering and financial transparency standards, which Iranian hardliners have historically opposed.

Iran Update, September 15, 2024

Israeli air defenses “partially intercepted” a Houthi ballistic missile that entered Israeli airspace on September 14.i This is the third time that a Houthi missile or drone has entered Israeli airspace from Yemen since October 7.ii The Houthis claimed that the attack targeted an unspecified military target in the Tel Aviv area with a “new hypersonic missile” on September 14.iii The IDF denied that the Houthis used a hypersonic missile.iv The IDF launched several interceptors at the missile but only partially struck it, causing the missile to disintegrate over central Israel.v The missile and interceptor fragments damaged and set fire to several areas but did not strike populated or military targets.vi The Houthis said the missile flew for 11 minutes and 30 seconds over 2,040 kilometers.vii  The Houthis did not say that the strike was in response to a specific event, but the attack coincided with the Prophet Mohammad's birthday.viii Hezbollah similarly chose a religious occasion—Arbaeen—to conduct its August 25 rocket and drone attack on northern and central Israel.ix The Houthi Defense Minister and Chief of Staff foreshadowed the attack on September 14, declaring to Israel that ”the coming days will bring you surprises that you will not expect” that would be ”more severe and harsher than what you have witnessed in the past.”xThe Houthis said in their attack claim that they would continue to target Israel as the anniversary of Hamas’ October 7 attack draws closer.xi 

Palestinian and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias praised the Houthi missile attack targeting Israel.xii Hamas claimed that the attack was a “natural response” to Israeli “aggression” against Palestinians, Arabs, and the Yemeni people.xiii Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai claimed that the attack “surprised” Israeli air defenses and is part of the “new phase of operations” against Israel.xiv Walai recently announced on September 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would soon begin their fourth phase of operations against Israel.xv Walai claimed that this phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and other Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. 

Iran, the Houthis, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance could learn lessons from the Houthi attack in order to increase the effectiveness of future attacks on Israel. The Houthi attack was likely in part a reconnaissance-in-force operation. The US Army defines reconnaissance-in-force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”xvi The Houthis could use their attack on Israel to better understand the capabilities and disposition of Israeli air defenses. Iran could similarly study the failure of Israeli air defense to intercept the missile prior to it entering Israeli airspace to better understand how to penetrate Israeli defenses in the future. 

Key Takeaways:  

• Yemen: Israeli air defenses “partially intercepted” a Houthi ballistic missile that entered Israeli airspace on September 14. Iran, the Houthis, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance could learn lessons from the Houthi attack in order to increase the effectiveness of future attacks on Israel. 

• Gaza Strip: Hamas conducted a relatively simple but multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Rafah City on September 15. Even severely weakened military organizations like Hamas’ Rafah Brigade can continue to conduct simple opportunistic attacks targeting Israeli forces. This attack, while somewhat tactically notable in that the Palestinian fighters conducted the attack in two deliberate stages, does not indicate that the Rafah Brigade is operating at a high level of combat effectiveness given that it appears to have been executed by one cell using one type of direct fire weapon system. 

• West Bank: Israeli forces thwarted an infiltration attempt by a group of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel on September 14. 

• Lebanon: An IDF brigade commander in northern Israel independently issued evacuation orders for areas of southern Lebanon without coordinating with Israeli political leadership or higher IDF headquarters on September 15.  

• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified target in Haifa, Israel, on September 15. 

Iran Update, September 14, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division killed over 100 Hamas fighters and located Hamas infrastructure in Tel al Sultan over the past week.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 13.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 15 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 13.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi drones and one Houthi “support vehicle” in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on September 13.

Iran Update, September 13, 2024

The US Embassy in Baghdad assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted the attack a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[i] CTP-ISW also assessed on September 11 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the September 10 attack. The US Embassy in Baghdad said on September 11 that an attack targeted the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound, a US diplomatic facility.[ii] An unspecified military official told AFP on September 11 that militants fired two Katyusha-type rockets in the attack. One rocket struck the wall of an Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service building and the other rocked landed inside an international coalition base, presumably a reference to the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound.[iii] CTP–ISW previously noted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants seem to have conducted the attack against the wishes of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iv] The US Embassy called on the Iraqi government to protect US and coalition personnel and facilities.[v] The US government has often emphasized to the Iraqi government, especially Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani, the importance of ensuring the safety of US forces following Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria.[vi]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sent a letter to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah vowing to continue Hamas’ fight against Israel, according to Hezbollah-affiliated media.[vii] Sinwar reportedly wrote the letter at an unspecified date after former Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh’s death on July 31.[viii] Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported that Sinwar wrote that Hamas will “remain steadfast” until Israel is defeated and an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital is established.[ix] Sinwar also thanked Nasrallah for Iranian-backed groups' efforts to support Hamas since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[x] Hezbollah began its cross-border attacks in northern Israel in October 2023 in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah also harbors Hamas elements in Lebanon and permits them to conduct attacks into Israel.[xi] The al Qassem Brigades recently an attack targeting an IDF site in northern Israel with rockets fired from Lebanon, for example.[xii]

The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—claimed on September 11 that its fighters continue to engage Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip.[xiii] Hamas has not claimed many individual attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, however. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on September 9 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip, suggesting that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military.[xiv] 

The IDF said on September 13 that it discovered a small tunnel during a multi-day operation in Tulkarm.[xv] The IDF said that the tunnel was near a hospital in the Tulkarm refugee camp.[xvi] The IDF added that the tunnel had only one entrance, which could indicate the tunnel was still under construction, according to an Israeli journalist.[xvii] Multiple entrances and exits to a tunnel network improve its resilience. Israeli media reported in March 2024 that the IDF has established a team to locate tunnels in the West Bank.[xviii] The IDF reportedly established the unit after residents near Tulkarm heard digging noises near their homes. An unspecified security official said that the unit is aware that “terrorist organizations [in the West Bank] are trying to mimic some of the combat methods in Gaza” and that these organizations use underground facilities for weapons storage. The IDF previously discovered one tunnel dozens of meters long in Jenin refugee camp in July 2023.

The Pentagon announced on September 12 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and is en route to the Indo-Pacific area of command.[xix] The USS Roosevelt arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility on July 12 to deter or defend against an Iranian retaliatory strike targeting Israel.[xx] The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group will remain in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian concluded his official three-day trip to Iraq on September 13.[xxi] Pezeshkian met with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders in Sulaymania, Iraqi Kurdistan, on September 12.[xxii]  Pezeshkian emphasized Iraqi Kurdistan’s importance to Iran during the meeting. Pezeshkian said that he hoped to increase economic relations between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. PUK President Bafel Talabani stated that Iraqi Kurdistan will ”fully and accurately implement what is mentioned in the security agreement.” This is likely in reference to the March 2023 security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran. This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[xxiii] Talabani reiterated his commitment to securing the border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxiv] This marked the first time an Iranian President travelled to Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxv]

Pezeshkian also visited religious sites in Karbala and Najaf on September 12.[xxvi] Pezeshkian emphasized the need for unity amongst Muslims in a meeting with Iraqi elites, academics, and nomads in Basra on September 13.[xxvii] Pezeshkian reiterated his support for concepts that would enable the free movement of people between Muslim countries in a fashion similar to the European Union.[xxviii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi accompanied Pezeshkian on the trip.[xxix] Pezeshkian returned to Tehran from Basra on September 13.[xxx]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai claimed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will soon begin their fourth phase of operations against Israel.[xxxi] Walai explained in an interview to Iranian state-owned media this phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and another Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. Walai outlined the previous three operational phases. Walai said that in the first phase, Iraqi groups attacked US bases before attacking Israel in the second phase. In the third phase, Iranian-backed Iraqi groups conducted joint operations with the Houthis.[xxxii] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, conducted over 170 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023-January 2024.[xxxiii] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted occasional attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since January 2024, but the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted Israel in most of its attacks after January 2024.[xxxiv]  CTP-ISW has also reported extensively on how the military relationship between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias has deepened in recent months.[xxxv] The Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq first claimed to conduct a joint drone attack targeting Israel on June 6. The last joint attack occurred on June 15.[xxxvi] A US self-defense strike on July 30 targeting a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility killed a Houthi drone expert who had traveled to Iraq to train other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in drone tactics, indicating the deepening relationship between Iraqi groups and the Houthis.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The US Embassy in Baghdad assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted the attack a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10. CTP-ISW also assessed on September 11 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the September 10 attack.
• Gaza Strip: The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—claimed on September 11 that its fighters continue to engage Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not claimed many individual attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, however.
• West Bank: The IDF said on September 13 that it discovered a small tunnel during a multi-day operation in Tulkarm. The IDF said that the tunnel was near a hospital in the Tulkarm refugee camp. The IDF added that the tunnel had only one entrance, which could indicate the tunnel was still under construction, according to an Israeli journalist. Multiple entrances and exits to a tunnel network improve its resilience.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Pentagon announced on September 12 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and is en route to the Indo-Pacific area of command.
• Iran: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian concluded his official three-day trip to Iraq on September 13.

[i] https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1834487174286262565

[ii] https://www.barrons.com/news/us-embassy-says-baghdad-airport-blast-was-attack-on-diplomatic-compound-444dbded

[iii] https://www.barrons.com/news/us-embassy-says-baghdad-airport-blast-was-attack-on-diplomatic-compound-444dbded

[iv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-12-2024

[v] https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1834487174286262565

[vi] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-al-sudani-2/ ; https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-sudani-3/

[vii] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا ; www dot almanar.com.lb/12467193

[viii] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا  

[ix] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا

[x] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/مكتب-السنوار-للسيد-نصر-الله--نشكر-تضامنكم-الذي-عبرت-عنه-أفعا

[xi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-9-2024

[xii] www dot alqassam.ps/arabic/تقارير-القسام/20035/اليوم-ال-341-القسام-يقصف-موقعا-شمال-فلسطين-المحتلة

[xiii] www dot alqassam.ps/arabic/تقارير-القسام/20035/اليوم-ال-341-القسام-يقصف-موقعا-شمال-فلسطين-المحتلة  

[xiv] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/gallant-hamas-as-military-formation-in-gaza-is-gone-now-only-guerrilla-warfare/

[xv] www dot idf.il/230293; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1834590659988140260

[xvi] www dot idf.il/230293

[xvii] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1834590659988140260

[xviii] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hkpbcoira

[xix] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3904376/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

[xx] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/igphoto/2003502192/

[xxi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/23/3157701

[xxii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157587

[xxiii] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=299491; https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/deep-dive-iran-inks-security-accord-with-iraq-as-regional-diplomacy-revved-up

[xxiv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157587

[xxv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157587

[xxvi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/22/3157585

[xxvii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/690459

[xxviii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/690459 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-11-2024

[xxix] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1834603170472902689

[xxx] https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1834585552319824151

[xxxi] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/09/13/733175/%E2%80%98Several-resistance-fronts-ready-to-execute-operations-against-Israel%2C-allies%E2%80%99

[xxxii] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/09/13/733175/%E2%80%98Several-resistance-fronts-ready-to-execute-operations-against-Israel%2C-allies%E2%80%99

[xxxiii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024 ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-us-strikes-militias-e2d31a579001f62a12b55b4cbf16ab48

[xxxiv] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis

[xxxv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2024

[xxxvi] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1173 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1220

[xxxvii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

Iran Update, September 12, 2024

• Syria: Israeli special operations forces conducted a highly unusual raid into Syria to destroy a major Iranian-backed precision missile factory and recover intelligence from it. The raid is part of a concerted Israeli effort to disrupt Iranian-backed weapons supply networks in the Levant.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: A Hamas delegation met with Egyptian and Qatari mediators to discuss the number of Palestinian prisoners freed in a potential agreement. Egyptian and Qatari mediators pressed Hamas to lessen its demands.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162^nd Division commander announced that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade is “dismantled” and that the IDF has secured control of the urban Rafah area. Recent Hamas attacks in Rafah indicate that the brigade is severely degraded.
• Iraq: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued his official visit to Iraq. Pezeshkian met with Iranian-backed politicians and militia leaders in Baghdad. Pezeshkian has traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet with local officials there.
• Caucasus: Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project that would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. Neither Iran nor Russia likely seek to antagonize the other, especially as they pursue bilateral arms deals.

Iran Update, September 11, 2024

The IDF Southern Command’s fire control commander said that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.[1] Destruction is doctrinally defined as physically rendering an enemy force unable to fight until reconstituted.[2] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent interviewed the outgoing Southern Command fire control commander on September 11.[3] The commander said that all of Hamas brigades are “damaged to the point of disbandment” and that Hamas fighters almost exclusively conduct guerilla-style attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.[4] He said that within a year he expects that the IDF would have "complete freedom of action” in the Gaza Strip.[5] The commander also said he believes it is possible to degrade Hamas to an extent it can never recover from. The commander’s assessment aligns with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s assertion on September 9 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[6] The fire control commander and Gallant’s comments suggest that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military under structured command hierarchies.

Hamas information captured by the IDF and released by Israel supports the assertion that the IDF has severely degraded Hamas’ military capabilities. Gallant released a captured Hamas letter on September 11 authored by Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah in which Salamah told Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar informing him of the damage sustained by the Khan Younis Brigade.[7] Salamah wrote the letter at an unspecified point before his death in July 2024.[8] The IDF withdrew from Khan Younis in April 2024 and has conducted intermittent raids since then that have encountered scattered resistance.[9] Salamah told Sinwar that his brigade had lost 50% of its fighters and that another 25% of the remaining fighters were mentally or physically unfit to fight.[10] Salamah also said that the brigade had depleted or lost control over 60% of its small arms and at least 65-70% of its anti-tank weapons.[11] The degradation of Hamas‘ military structure and capabilities is not limited to Khan Younis—Israeli military sources said in late August 2024 that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade, for example.[12] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, indicating a lack of unit cohesion or adherence to a command structure.[13] CTP-ISW continues to observe Hamas attacking Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip although at a significantly diminished rate in recent months.[14] Hamas likely continues to operate in small, de-centralized cells of fighters throughout the Gaza Strip.

Degradation is a temporary military effect and must be sustained by further military action or policy options to, at minimum, disrupt or prevent reconstitution. Reconstitution requires space and time for a degraded force to disengage, rest its forces, and train new personnel. IDF operations, including airstrikes, deny Hamas this space and time. Interdiction of Hamas resupply efforts under the Philadelphi Corridor is equally important to preventing reconstitution, given that new personal weapons and anti-tank systems would presumably enter the Strip from under the Philadelphi Corridor.

Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants attacked a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[15] The militants appear to have conducted the attack without approval from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The US Embassy in Baghdad announced that an attack took place at the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound, which is a US diplomatic facility.[16] The attack notably took place hours before Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Baghdad.[17] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.[18] It is more likely, however, that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—rather than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conducted the attack. An unspecified military official told AFP that the fighters launched two Katyusha rockets targeting the facility.[19] The official stated that one of the rockets fell on the wall of an Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service compound while the other rocket landed inside an international coalition base. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have frequently used Katyusha rockets to target US forces in Iraq.[20] ISIS does not frequently directly target US forces in Iraq, opting instead to target Iraqi Security Forces, which are a comparably “softer“ target. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah claimed on September 11 that “suspicious hands” conducted the attack with the aim of “disrupting” Pezeshkian’s visit to Baghdad, indicating that Kataib Hezbollah--and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq more broadly--did not order or sanction the attack.[21] Unspecified fighters previously conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces stationed at Baghdad International Airport in October 2023.[22]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Baghdad on September 11, marking his first visit abroad since becoming president in July 2024.[23] Iranian and Iraqi officials signed 14 cooperation agreements covering a variety of topics, including free trade zones, media, commerce, and transportation.[24] Iran, Iraq, and Syria have increasingly discussed establishing a free trade zone since former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Syria in May 2023.[25] CTP-ISW previously assessed that a free trade zone through Iran, Iraq, and Syria would allow Iran to move materials across borders with less oversight.[26]

Pezeshkian met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan on September 11.[27] Pezeshkian called for implementing existing security agreements between Iran and Iraq during a joint press conference with Sudani, likely in reference to the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad.[28] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[29] Iranian media recently reported on September 8 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan evacuated its headquarters in Iraq near the Iranian border as part of this agreement.[30] Sudani emphasized that Iraq will not allow “any group to commit transnational aggression against Iran.”[31] Pezeshkian separately called for “removing the borders of Islamic countries...similar to the experience of the European Union” during a meeting with Rashid.[32] This statement may reflect Iran’s desire to facilitate greater economic cooperation and integration with its regional partners, particularly Iraq and Syria.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNCS) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for a BRICS security commission and “Joint economic mechanisms” to address a number of security issues during a BRICS security meeting on September 11.[33] The meeting, hosted in St. Petersburg, Russia, gathered high-ranking security officials from BRICS countries. Ahmadian proposed forming a “BRICS Security Commission” and “joint economic mechanisms,” to address issues related to terrorism, border security, maritime security, and cyber security.[34] Ahmadian emphasized that BRICS members have the potential to be “the founders of a new [global] security system.”[35] Ahmadian expressed his support for a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine and referenced peace initiatives proposed by China and Brazil.[36] High-ranking security officials from Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia attended the summit.[37] Ahmadian will hold further meetings with some of his counterparts on the summit's sidelines on September 11 and 12.[38]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will almost certainly reject a deal for his safety in exchange for Hamas surrender. Israeli hostage coordinator Gal Hirsch told Bloomberg News that he extended an offer to Hamas on September 8 that would give Sinwar free passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the return of the hostages, demilitarization, de-radicalization and a new political system in the Gaza Strip.[39] These stipulations would achieve all Israeli war aims in the Gaza Strip, thus resulting in a Hamas surrender. There have been no indications that Sinwar would moderate his stance to protect his own life or benefit himself, either in this war or during previous negotiations with Israel. Sinwar has maintained his hardline stance in negotiations and has repeatedly resisted pressure to moderate Hamas’ ceasefire position from both his former superiors and his military subordinates in the Gaza Strip during this war.[40] Sinwar has previously rejected conciliation or cooperation with Israel, and he is willing to absorb significant personal sacrifice to advance his objectives.[41] Sinwar opposed the 2011 prisoner deal in which Israel released Sinwar and other top Hamas leaders in exchange for Hamas-held IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, for example.[42] Sinwar was reportedly insistent on freeing Hamas fighters serving multiple life sentences and was willing to remain in prison and “pay a heavy price for principle,” according to a former Israeli prison official.[43] Sinwar also appears to be deeply committed to his belief that he and Hamas can destroy the Israeli state, suggesting he would not trade his personal safety for the collapse of the movement.

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas’ Military Effectiveness: An IDF officer said that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. Hamas information captured by the IDF and released by Israel supports the assertion that the IDF has severely degraded Hamas’ military capabilities. Degradation is a temporary military effect and must be sustained by further military action or policy options to, at minimum, disrupt or prevent reconstitution.
• Iraq: Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants attacked a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. It is more likely, however, that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—rather than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conducted the attack. An unspecified military official told AFP that the fighters launched two Katyusha rockets targeting the facility.
• Iran and BRICS: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNCS) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for a BRICS security commission and “Joint economic mechanisms” to address a number of security issues during a BRICS security meeting on September 11.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will almost certainly reject a deal for his safety in exchange for Hamas surrender. There have been no indications that Sinwar would moderate his stance to protect his own life or benefit himself, either in this war or during previous negotiations with Israel. Sinwar has maintained his hardline stance in negotiations throughout the war and he previously opposed the prisoner-hostage exchange deal in 2011 that freed him. Sinwar opposed the 2011 deal on the grounds that other Hamas fighters serving multiple life sentences were not freed alongside him.

Iran Update, September 10, 2024

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[i] Blinken confirmed that Russia has received an unspecified number of SRBM shipments and warned that Russian forces will likely use them on the battlefield "within weeks." Iranian officials continue to deny that Tehran has sent weapons to Moscow. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy affirmed on September 10 that the United States and United Kingdom are "completely aligned" on the need to tackle Iranian influence both in Ukraine and the Middle East.[ii] France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly condemned Iran's SRBM deliveries and emphasized that they are taking steps to cancel bilateral air services with Iran (including by sanctioning Iranian national airline Iran Air), designate individuals and organizations involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and in the transfer of SRBMs to Russia, and sanction Russian cargo ships.[iii] UK outlet the Times, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported that Iran had delivered over 200 Fateh-360 SRBMs to Russia via a Caspian Sea port on September 4. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia will use Iranian-supplied SRBMs to target Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the coming months, thus alleviating the strain on Russia's domestic missile production capacity.[iv]

The United States and several European countries imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia on September 10 following Iran’s shipment of ballistic missiles to Russia. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned ten individuals and six entities based in Iran and Russia for enabling Iran’s delivery of weapons components and systems to Russia and thus supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.[v] OFAC sanctioned the following Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry officials:

• Rouhollah Katebi. Katebi is the Russian point of contact for the Iranian defense ministry. Katebi participated in Russian preparations to receive the Iranian Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles.
• Ebrahim Bahrami. Bahrami has been a point of contact in Iran for the Russian government and the training of Russian military personnel in Iran. Bahrami is an employee of Shahid Kharrazi Industries, which the United States previously sanctioned in January 2018.
• Ali Jafar Abadi. Jafar Abadi is the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force’s Salam Farsi Space Command and has overseen satellite launches in Iran. Russia has previously helped Iran launch satellites into orbit, including in August 2022 and February 2024.[vi]

OFAC also sanctioned the following entities:

• Iran Air. Iran Air has shipped electronics and aircraft parts to Russia. OFAC previously sanctioned Iran Air in November 2018 and identified 67 of its aircraft as blocked property.[vii] The US State Department separately designated Iran Air on September 10 for ”materially contributing to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.”[viii]
• Iran-based Azadegan Transportation Company. The Azadegan Transportation Company is an IRGC-affiliated company that is “critical to the logistics operations of the IRGC.”
• Iran-based Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau. The Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau has provided Russian weapons makers with samples of its engines in support of Russian cruise missile development. Farzanegan manufactures numerous types of engines, including turbojet engines, and previously claimed that it produced Iran’s first ramjet engine, according to the US Treasury Department.

The United Kingdom’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), France’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Germany’s Federal Foreign Office announced, as the E3, that they will cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran and sanctioned three individuals and four entities.[ix] Cancelling bilateral air services will restrict Iran Air’s ability to fly to the United Kingdom and Europe.[x]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly plans to appoint Kazem Gharib Abadi as the lead Iranian nuclear negotiator with the West.[xi] This appointment would further signal the willingness of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations given Gharib Abadi’s experience. Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2018-21, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[xii] Gharib Abadi claimed that the United States and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have failed to uphold their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[xiii] Abadi currently serves as deputy judiciary chief for international affairs and secretary of the Iranian Supreme Human Rights Council.[xiv]

The appointment of Gharib Abadi as lead nuclear negotiator would come as Araghchi has selected other experienced diplomats for key positions. Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for policy on September 9.[xv] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani.[xvi] Araghchi also appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as his personal adviser.[xvii] Bagheri Kani was appointed as lead nuclear negotiator in 2021 under former President Ebrahim Raisi.[xviii] Bagheri Kani reiterated Tehran’s willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West in July 2024.[xix]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone targeting three senior Hamas commanders on September 9.[xx] The IDF stated that it targeted Hamas commanders in a command-and-control compound within the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in Khan Younis.[xxi] The IDF killed the head of Hamas’ aerial system in the Gaza Strip, Samer Ismail Hader Abu Daqa, the head of targeting and surveillance in Hamas’ military intelligence, Osama Tabash, and senior Hamas fighter Ayman Mabhouh.[xxii] The IDF stated that the three commanders were directly involved in the October 7 attack and continued to conduct attacks against Israeli forces and Israel itself.[xxiii] The IDF stated that it collected ”extensive” intelligence and conducted aerial observation in the hours prior to the attack to verify the commanders’ presence in the area.[xxiv] A security source told Israeli Army Radio that there is a ”high level” of intelligence indicating that the three Hamas commanders were present at the site of the attack.[xxv] IDF clearing operations in recent months have forced senior Hamas officials to leave underground tunnels and hide among civilians in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[xxvi]

Palestinian sources, including the Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry, reported that the IDF killed at least 19 and wounded over 60 people in the strike.[xxvii] The Hamas-run Government Media Office claimed that the strike killed 40 Palestinians.[xxviii] US White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby called the reports of high civilian casualties in the strike “deeply concerning” and added that the United States would not be "bashful" about pressing Israel for more information about the attack.[xxix] The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres condemned the airstrike.[xxx] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce civilian harm from the strike, including through the use of specific munitions and aerial surveillance.[xxxi] The IDF added that the Hamas-run Government Media Office’s figures on Palestinian casualties are inconsistent with the IDF’s information.[xxxii] The IDF stated that Hamas continues to concentrate its operatives and infrastructure in the humanitarian zone, despite IDF measures to keep Gazans out of combat zones.[xxxiii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[xxxiv] Gallant told reporters on September 9 that Hamas’ “military formation no longer exists.”[xxxv] Gallant’s comments suggest that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military. Prior to October 2023, Hamas structured its al Qassem Brigades to survive Israeli military action by building a resilient military organization with doctrinally correct unit echelons and command hierarchies.[xxxvi] This organization was meant to facilitate recovery in the face of the loss of militia leaders or the destruction of elements of units. The al Qassem Brigades organized themselves into echelons from the squad all the way to the brigade level just as conventional militaries do.[xxxvii] IDF operations in the Gaza Strip have significantly reduced Hamas’ ability to operate under these structured command hierarchies, however. Israeli military sources said in late August 2024 that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade, for example.[xxxviii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, indicating a lack of moral cohesion or adherence to a command structure.[xxxix] Furthermore, the lack of clear tactical or operational objectives in recent Hamas attacks in Rafah are inconsistent with those of an effective military unit. Israeli tactics responding to Hamas rocket fire have resulted in a significant decrease in rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel as well.[xl]

Hamas continues to operate in the Gaza Strip from the remnants of its former structure. Gallant said that the IDF continues to engage Hamas fighters and pursue Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip.[xli] CTP-ISW continues to observe Hamas attacking Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip although at a significantly diminished rate in recent months.[xlii] Hamas likely continues to operate in small, de-centralized cells of fighters throughout the Gaza Strip.

Gallant said that the IDF is “wrapping up [its] missions in the south” and will shift its focus from the Gaza Strip toward the Israel-Lebanon border.[xliii] Gallant visited Israel’s northern border on September 10 and spoke to Israeli forces simulating a military exercise in northern Israel.[xliv] Gallant told Israeli forces that they must be ready to execute the IDF’s mission along the northern front “when the time comes.”[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia cooperation: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that Iran sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. The United States and European countries imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia in response.
• Iranian Nuclear negotiations: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Kazem Gharib Abadi, further signaling the willingness of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is instead operating from the remnants of its conventional military structure.

Iran Update, September 9, 2024

Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[1] An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4.[2] Iran has previously transferred weapons from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.[3] Iran and Russia previously signed an agreement in December 2023 for Iran to send Fateh-360 missiles and Ababil close-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[4] European intelligence sources told Reuters in August 2024 that Russian military personnel are training in Iran to operate Fateh-360 missiles.[5] Fateh-360 missiles have a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[6] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure in the coming months.[7]

The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Iranian charge d’affaires in Ukraine, Shahriar Amouzegar, on September 9 following recent reports that Iran delivered hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry harshly warned Amouzegar about the “devastating and irreparable consequences” for Ukrainian-Iranian relations if recent reports about Iran sending ballistic missiles to Russia prove true.[9] Ukraine previously “downgraded” its diplomatic ties with Iran in September 2022 after Iran began supplying Russia with drones for its invasion of Ukraine.[10]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.[11] IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi highlighted an ongoing increase in Iran's 20% and 60% enriched uranium reserves, citing the IAEA’s May 2024 report on Iran’s nuclear program.[12] His statements are consistent with an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report which reportedly noted that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium has increased by 22.6 kilograms (15.90 percent) since the IAEA's last report in May 2024.[13] Grossi added that Iran has taken no steps in the last 15 months to implement an agreement to cooperate with the IAEA and allow the IAEA to "implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities" on a voluntary basis.[14] Grossi said that "there has been no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues" with Iran and that the IAEA has limited awareness of the current locations of Iran's nuclear material and equipment.[15] Grossi stated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian agreed to a bilateral meeting to resume "dialogue and cooperation between the [IAEA] and Iran." Grossi previously indicated that the meeting would be in the “near future.”[16]

Iran continues to deny that its nuclear program is violating any agreements.[17] Iran’s representation in the United Nations Office in Vienna called the IAEA’s report on Iran’s undeclared nuclear materials "fake and invalid."  The note said the IAEA "did not provide Iran with credible documents" to back its claims and that Iran has no obligation to answer the IAEA's questions.[18]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.[19] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said that Israel is "shaken" by the "nightmare of Iran's decisive action" and that "Israelis will taste the bitter taste of revenge."[20]  Salami’s comments are notable because he is a senior operational commander in the IRGC chain of command, meaning he and his subordinates would be responsible for the planning and execution of an attack on Israel. Salami’s comments reiterated recent claims from the Iranian military establishment that emphasize that the Iranian delay is intentional for its psychological effect on the Israeli population.[21] Salami also noted that the attack would "definitely be different," which is consistent with statements from other Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force officers.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[23]

The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. The Jordanian truck driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[24] The Jordanian Foreign Affairs and Expatriates spokesperson said that initial investigations confirmed the attack “was an individual act.”[25] The attacker was a former Jordanian Armed Forces soldier and a member of a powerful tribe aligned with the Jordanian monarchy. Both of these links suggest that he was not linked to Hamas or Shia militia groups.[26] The attacker’s tribe also released a statement stating that he had no party or political affiliations.[27]

It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[28] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[29] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that supports the idea that the ”Islamic Resistance in Jordan” exists and operates in Jordan. CTP-ISW assessed in April that Moanes’ declaration was likely aspirational and did not accurately represent Kataib Hezbollah‘s reach in Jordan.[30] Other Axis of Resistance groups and anti-Israel factions in Jordan also attempted to capitalize on the Allenby Bridge border crossing attack. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad both called the attack a confirmation of the Arab world’s rejection of Israeli ”crimes” and ”massacres.”[31] A Jordanian civil society group that organized protests in spring 2024 held a demonstration attended by thousands of Jordanians in Amman celebrating the attack.[32] The civil society group also released a statement in response to the attack that called on the Jordanian monarchy to end normalization with Israel and withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.[33]

The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Unspecified US officials said Hamas’ execution of six hostages and demands to release 100 more Palestinian prisoners led to “significant pessimism” within the White House over the feasibility of Hamas and Israel agreeing to a new proposal.[34] US officials said that President Biden does not want to “reward” Hamas with concessions after it killed the hostages and pushed for more demands.[35] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media that the US is re-considering whether its negotiators will introduce another bridging proposal at all.[36] Four unspecified senior Israeli officials said that the US and Israel recently attempted to organize another round of negotiations in Cairo but Egypt did not allow talks to move forward after expressing displeasure with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Netanyahu said that Egypt enabled weapons smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor.[37] The Biden administration’s focus has reportedly shifted to encouraging the Egyptian and Qatari mediators to pressure Sinwar to concede some of Hamas’ demands.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah. The IDF likely conducted several airstrikes into Syria on September 8, including one targeting a Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) site in Masyaf, Hama Governorate, used to produce advanced weapons including precision guided munitions.[39] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent called the strike “exceptional“ and large, adding that the strike hit an underground weapons facility at the SSRC site. FIRMS data showed significant fires in southern Masyaf and in a valley southwest of Masyaf that holds an underground facility and tunnel network.[40] The airstrikes killed 16 people and injured 43 others.[41] Iran reportedly uses the SSRC site in Masyaf to develop weapons for the members of the Axis of Resistance, including the Lebanese Hezbollah.[42] The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the airstrikes but denied the presence of any Iran-operated military site in the area.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence. An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4. Iran has previously transferred weapons to Russia from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.
• Jordan: The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal.
• Syria: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Lebanon: A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.

Iran Update, September 8, 2024

A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.[1] The driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[2] Israeli forces at the border crossing killed the shooter.[3] The gunman killed three Israeli civilians working at the border crossing.[4] The Israel Airports Authority—the Israeli government entity responsible for airports and land-to-land border crossings—closed Allenby Bridge, the Rabin crossing, and Jordan River crossing with Jordan until further notice following the shooting attack.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Jordan on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[6] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said on April 1 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[7] Moanes said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to equip Jordanian fighters, so that Iraq and Jordan can jointly attack Israel to ”defend” the Palestinian cause. Jordanian Interior Minister Mazin Abdullah Hillal al Farrayeh said that the driver acted alone.[8] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify Kataib Hezbollah’s September 8 claim.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi claimed on September 7 that Iran will “certainly” conduct a “second True Promise Operation,” in reference to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[9] Naghdi claimed that Iran will retaliate “at the right time” to ensure that its retaliation generates “more effects.”[10] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran fired toward Israel in April 2024, and the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage on Israel than Tehran intended.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[12]

Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Richard Moore stated on September 7 that he still expects Iran to retaliate against Israel the killing of Haniyeh.[13] Moore stated that “we won’t be able to let our guard down for the type of activity that the Iranians might try and prosecute in that direction.”

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.
• Iranian Retaliation: Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck and killed Hamas’ eastern Khan Younis Battalion rocket commander on September 3. The IDF said on September 8 that the commander launched rockets at towns near the Gaza Strip and central Israel throughout the war.

Iran Update, September 7, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted three airstrikes targeting Hamas command and control centers in Gaza City and Deir al Balah since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on September 6. One airstrike in Deir al Balah killed PIJ’s eastern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Hatem Abu al Jedian and PIJ’s southern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Abdullah Khattab.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: CIA Director Bill Burns said on September 7 that whether Israel and Hamas accept a new ceasefire proposal will be determined by political will.
• Northern Israel: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 6.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed one Houthi drone and one Houthi “support vehicle” in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on September 6.

Iran Update, September 6, 2024

The rate of Palestinian militia rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks. Israeli media reported that this decrease is due to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) beginning to immediately evacuate Gazan residents in areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.[16] This approach often includes Israeli airstrikes targeting rocket launch sites.[17] The IDF has reportedly pursued this approach regardless of the volume of rockets fired or where the rockets landed.[18] CTP-ISW has observed rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory decrease significantly since June 2024, which is consistent with the reporting of this new Israeli approach. The decrease is also likely due to the Hamas stockpile of rockets dwindling.[19] Gazan residents have reportedly pressured Hamas to refrain from firing rockets from certain neighborhoods in response to this new Israeli approach.[20] Clashes have erupted between Hamas members and local residents in some cases, according to Israeli military officials. An IDF source said that, in one incident, a Gazan clan attacked Palestinian fighters with clubs as the fighters tried to fire a rocket.[21]

Hamas has begun exploring new ways to pressure the Israeli public as firing rockets has become harder. Hamas has relied on its rockets for years to impose such pressure. But the loss of its stockpile and new Israeli approach have made this option decreasingly viable. Hamas has thus begun calling for suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians in Israel.[22] Hamas claimed responsibility for an attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in August 2024, marking the first time that Hamas has made such a claim since 2008.[23]

Hamas continued to conduct an information operation to decrease Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas. Hamas released two propaganda videos on September 5 and 6 depicting two recently killed hostages calling for a ceasefire.[24] These videos are meant to drive the Israeli public to pressure the Israeli government to accept an immediate ceasefire-hostage deal with Hamas. Hamas has separately issued new demands in recent days by increasing the number of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel must release in a ceasefire-hostage deal, according to anonymous US officials.[25] The return of these Palestinian prisoners would support Hamas’ efforts to rebuild its military wing. The issuance of new demands has made the United States doubt whether Hamas sincerely wants a ceasefire-hostage deal.[26]

Israeli officials are reportedly pessimistic about the prospects of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with his national security team on September 5 to discuss how to respond to Hamas recently executing six hostages.[27] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli officials left the meeting feeling ”pessimistic” and added that ”the chances of a deal are slim.”[28]

Iranian officials have continued expressing their opposition to Azerbaijan’s efforts to connect its mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave by going through Armenia.[29] These comments are in response to Russia changing policy to support this connection, which is known as the Zangezur Corridor.[30] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei said that Russian support for the Zangezur Corridor is unacceptable and contradicts the Iran-Russia strategic partnership.”[31] Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani similarly told reporters on September 6 that “dreams about the Zangezur [Corridor] will not come true.”[32] IRGC-affiliated media separately published an article stating that Russia has “adopted a wrong position regarding that Zangezur Corridor that is incompatible with Iran’s interests and red lines.”[33] Tehran has long opposed the development of the corridor because it would sever Iranian land access to Europe and Russia via Armenia.[34]

Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration on September 4. Yahya Rahim Safavi, who is a senior military adviser to Khamenei, met Pezeshkian’s foreign minister, health minister, interior minister, and science minister.[35] Safavi stressed the importance of ”constructive interaction” between the Iranian armed forces and Pezeshkian administration. Ali Akbar Velayati, who is a senior foreign policy adviser to Khamenei, separately met with some senior policy officials in the Pezeshkian administration.[36] Iranian opposition outlets have described these meetings as ”unprecedented,” which is consistent with CTP-ISW's tracking. The meetings between Khamenei’s advisers and the Pezeshkian administration reflect the close coordination between them.[37] Pezeshkian has repeatedly emphasized his subordination to Khamenei and appears to be coordinating his agenda and policies with Khamenei’s inner circle directly.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia will likely use the missiles to attack Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure over the coming months.
• Gaza Strip: The rate of Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks partly due to the IDF beginning to immediately evacuate areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to conduct an information operation to erode Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal on terms favorable to Hamas.
• Caucasus: Iranian officials have continued expressing opposition to Azerbaijani efforts to link Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave going through Armenia. Tehran is responding to Russia changing its policy to support this connection.
• Iran: Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration. These meetings reflect the close coordination between Khamenei’s and Pezeshkian’s circles.

Iran Update, September 5, 2024

The Biden administration is reportedly reevaluating its approach to ceasefire-hostage negotiations after Hamas killed six hostages, according to an unspecified US officials cited by Axios on September 5.[i] US officials reported that the Biden administration is considering applying pressure and implementing unspecified accountability measures against Hamas instead of pushing Israel to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would give the group additional concessions. Hamas’ decision to increase the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released in a ceasefire-hostage deal has lowered the administration’s confidence that Hamas is willing to reach a deal. Officials are concerned that if the United States pressures Israel to withdraw its forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, as Hamas has demanded, that Hamas will reject a different part of the proposal.

Hamas is using its execution of the six hostages to conduct a series of information operations that are designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.[ii] Hamas released a fourth video September 4 depicting two of the six recently killed hostages.[iii] This video—like the others—featured scripted statements calling for a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[iv] The two hostages in the September 4 video, who were under duress, accused the Israeli government of failing to rescue the hostages from the Gaza Strip and failing to reach a ceasefire-hostage proposal that would bring hostages home alive.[v] Both hostages called on Israeli civilians to protest in favor of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Hamas is intentionally releasing these videos at this time to capitalize on Israeli outrage towards Netanyahu and to coerce the Israeli state into softening its demands. The softening of the current Israeli demands—which include a presence on the Philadelphi Corridor and the exile of many Palestinian prisoners released under any deal—would threaten to cause an Israeli defeat by enabling Hamas to rebuild itself. Hamas would very likely reconstruct smuggling tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor if it regained control over that area. Those tunnels would enable Hamas to rebuild its military wing with new weapons and supplies, including concrete to repair tunnels. Returning Palestinian prisoners—if they are allowed to return to the Palestinian territories—could serve as key commanders, replacing commanders Israel has killed in the ongoing war. Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations.[vi]

Israel, Hamas, and international mediators have not resolved opposing demands relating to the hostage-prisoner release and the presence of Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor. An anonymous White House official cited by the Washington Post reported that negotiations still have not determined who will be released in a hostage-prisoner release or when.[vii] Hostage-prisoner release negotiations have become more ”complicated” since Hamas killed six hostages, ”some” of whom were reportedly listed to be released in the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal.[viii]  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also stated that Israel will maintain at least a reduced presence along the Philadelphi Corridor, which is a demand that is in direct opposition to Hamas’ demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip.[ix] Netanyahu has argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005 enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[x] Netanyahu said that he would only consider a full withdrawal in the second stage of ceasefire-hostage negotiations if another entity demonstrated that it could interdict Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[xi]

Unspecified US and regional officials cited by The New York Times claimed that international mediators are “finalizing” a new ceasefire-hostage proposal to “narrow” remaining gaps between Israel and Hamas.[xii] Two Israeli officials and a senior official from an unspecified mediating country reported that the United States, Qatar, and Egypt are reviewing a series of Egyptian- and Qatari-drafted proposals.[xiii] Netanyahu stated during a TV segment on September 5 that ”there is not a deal in the making.”[xiv]

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Inspection Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi claimed that Iran must inflict “the largest blow” on Israel for Haniyeh’s death in an interview with Iranian armed forces-run media on September 5.[xv] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xvi] Several senior Iranian military officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Operations Deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Chizari, have made similar statements to Iranian armed forces-run media in recent days.[xvii] The coordination deputy of the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, Brigadier General Saeed Farjian Zadeh, separately warned on September 3 that Iran will respond to Israel “in a precise and calculated manner at the right time and under the right conditions.”[xviii]

The Iranian foreign minister called regional stability a pillar of Iranian national security on September 5, stressing that any attempts to redraw borders will be a “red line” for Iran. Araghchi’s comments were in reference to an earlier statement by the Russian foreign minister that supported the Turkish-Azerbaijani Zangezur Corridor project.[xix] Araghchi’s warning follows a meeting between Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou and Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2 in which Demirchi Lou expressed the need respecting internationally recognized borders.[xx] Both the meeting and Araghchi’s comments were likely triggered by a statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in which Lavrov stated his support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[xxi] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued messaging that they will retaliate for Israel killing Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly reevaluating its approach to ceasefire-hostage negotiations after Hamas killed six hostages, according to an unspecified US officials cited by Axios on September 5. Hamas is using its execution of the six hostages to conduct a series of information operations that are designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.
• Caucasus: Iranian and Russian officials met to discuss the Caucasus amid growing differences between Moscow and Tehran.

Iran Update, September 4, 2024

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Armed Forces General Staff Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi claimed on September 4 that Israel “must bury [its] dream that Iran will not respond” to Haniyeh's death.[1] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Operations Deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Chizari separately warned that Iran will “definitely” give a “crushing response” to Israel in an interview with Iranian armed forces-run media on September 4.[2] Chizari stated that Iran seeks to “surprise” Israel, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran is likely trying to generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise ahead of its expected attack.[3] Chizari also discussed Lebanese Hezbollah’s recent drone and rocket attack targeting Israel and claimed that Iran’s response to Israel will be “different.”[4] It is unclear whether Chizari meant that Iran’s retaliation will be different from Hezbollah’s recent attack or from Iran’s April 2024 drone and missile attack targeting Israel. Chizari is a senior Quds Force official who previously supported efforts to preserve the Bashar al Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[5] The United States sanctioned Chizari in 2012 for committing human rights abuses against Syrians.[6] Senior Quds Force commanders in particular may desire a direct strike on Israel given that Israel killed Haniyeh at an IRGC Quds Force facility in northern Tehran.[7] The Quds Force’s participation in an Iranian strike on Israel could mean that Iran would use more than just drones and missiles—as it did in its April 2024 attack—to attack Israel. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its attack model—possibly by including militia attacks on US positions in Syria—to try to inflict greater damage on Israel than it did in April 2024.[8]

Chizari separately praised Palestinian militias’ response to recent Israeli operations in the West Bank, claiming that Israel will not be able to prevent the “formation and strengthening of resistance” in the West Bank.[9] Israeli forces have conducted a large-scale counterterrorism operation in the West Bank since August 27 in order to degrade Palestinian militia networks there.[10] The operation is partly a response to Palestinian militias in the West Bank building the capability and setting conditions to conduct suicide bombing attacks in Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his plan for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor during an English-language press conference on September 4.[11] This is Netanyahu’s second press conference about the corridor this week amid domestic pressure to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement following Hamas’ execution of six Israeli hostages.[12] Netanyahu used the English-language press conference to explain to an international audience why he demands that Israel retain control of the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.[13] Netanyahu argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005 enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[14] Netanyahu warned that international pressure would make it difficult for Israel to return militarily to the corridor if it withdrew as part of the first stage of a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[15] Netanyahu said that he would only consider a full withdrawal in the second stage of ceasefire-hostage negotiations if another entity demonstrated that it can interdict Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[16] Netanyahu's close aide, Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, separately criticized Egyptian President Abdel Fatteh al Sisi on September 4 for failing to stop Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[17]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou met with the Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2.[18] The meeting followed Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov‘s statement in support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[19] Demirchi Lou underlined the need to respect internationally recognized borders, regional stability, and mutual interests of the Caucasus states, especially ahead of the upcoming 3+3 meeting with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Russia, as well as a meeting between the Iranian, Russian, and Azerbaijani foreign ministers.[20] Lavrov expressed support for the Zangezur corridor in an interview with Russian media during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, on August 19.[21] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued messaging that they will retaliate for Israel killing Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
• Caucasus: Iranian and Russian officials met to discuss the Caucasus amid growing differences between Moscow and Tehran.

Iran Update, September 3, 2024

Hamas has continued to exploit Israeli hostages in an information operation likely in order to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Hamas likely calculates that this effort could create more favorable terms for Hamas in such an agreement while weakening the Israeli state. Hamas continued to insist on September 3 that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations. Hamas released a propaganda video for the third time since recently killing six Israeli hostages. The most recent video—like the others—featured a recently executed Israeli hostage who called for a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[1] Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida separately blamed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly for Hamas killing the six Israeli hostages.[2] Abu Obeida added that Hamas had issued new unspecified instructions for what its fighters who are guarding hostages should do if Israeli forces approach them.[3] Hamas released the hostage propaganda videos and Obeida’s comments in Arabic, English, and Hebrew, indicating that the messages are meant for Israeli, Palestinian, and Western audiences, among others.[4] These messages are meant to undermine domestic and international support for Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and increase support for a ceasefire-hostage deal that meets Hamas’ demands. Senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi told al Jazeera on September 3 that the release of Israeli hostages in Gaza will only occur through a prisoner exchange deal, which will only be achieved by a total Israeli withdrawal from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors.[5] The end of Israeli operations and a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has been one of Hamas’ principal demands since the beginning of negotiations and has since become the greatest hurdle to the talks.[6]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended and reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor during a press conference on September 3.[7] The press conference comes amid domestic pressure to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement following Hamas’ execution of six Israeli hostages.[8] Netanyahu said that control of the Philadelphi Corridor is central to Israeli war aims.[9] Netanyahu argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[10] Netanyahu added that “the axis of evil needs the Philadelphi Corridor and, for the same reason, we must control it.”[11] Netanyahu lastly warned that international pressure would make it difficult for Israel to return militarily to the corridor if it withdrew.[12]

US White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby said on September 3 that Israel previously agreed to a US-outlined ceasefire-hostage proposal in May 2024 that required the IDF to withdraw from “all densely populated areas,” including around or adjacent to the Philadelphi Corridor.[13] Kirby said that this “essential element” had not changed in subsequent ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[14] Kirby’s comments are not necessarily inconsistent with Netanyahu’s promise to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor. Netanyahu has reportedly agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from a one- to two-kilometer section of the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire-hostage deal.[15]

An outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) published on September 2 an analytical report examining the possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[16] The report assessed that the most likely course of action in the coming months is a continuation of limited fighting around the Israel-Lebanon border. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into southern Lebanon due to:

• Israeli forces being already stretched by militia activity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
• The threat of an Iranian attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh;
• Internal divisions within the Israeli government; and
• The United States opposing an all-out war ahead of its presidential election.

The report ignored the repeated statements from senior Israeli officials vowing to drive Hezbollah forces out of southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006.[17]

It is unclear to what extent this report reflects Iranian leaders’ thinking about attacking Israel while deterring Israel from launching an offensive into Lebanon. The report nevertheless suggests that at least some in the Iranian security establishment are considering how the threat of an attack on Israel could shape Israeli decision-making vis-a-vis Hezbollah. Iran has repeatedly signaled its opposition to an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] Iran relies on Hezbollah to establish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and to project force and influence throughout the Levant. Hezbollah has also adopted an increasingly prominent role in helping Iran manage the Axis of Resistance in recent years.

Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood, according to a report by the Associated Press.[19] The report cited experts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The report found that some of the Emad medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran used had a circular error probable of around 1.2 kilometers.[20] The circular error probable is a measurement of the median error radius of a weapon system. Tehran previously advertised that the Emad missile has a circular error probable of 50 meters, while international observers estimated that it was closer to 500 meters.[21] Both measurements suggest a much greater degree of accuracy than demonstrated in the Iranian April 2024 attack on Israel. Analysts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessed that Iran tried to strike Israeli F-35I fighter jet hangars at the Nevatim airbase with the Emad missiles.[22]

Iran using Emad missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States. The inaccuracy of these missiles would risk causing severe collateral damage, including civilian casualties, even if Iran does not intentionally target civilian areas in Israel.[23] Iranian military commanders have reportedly considered attacking military targets around Haifa and Tel Aviv, where the risk of harming civilians would be particularly high given the population density.[24]

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to exploit Israeli hostages in an information operation to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Hamas likely calculates that this effort could create more favorable terms for Hamas in such an agreement.
2. Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended and reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor that separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu said that controlling the corridor is central to Israeli war aims and that withdrawing from the corridor would make it hard for Israel to ever return.
3. Lebanon: An IRGC-affiliated outlet published an analytical report examining possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into Lebanon for several reasons, including the imminent threat of an Iranian attack on Israel.
4. Iran: Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood. Iran using such missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States.

Iran Update, September 2, 2024

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs.[i] Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1.[ii] The P5+1 is composed of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.[iii] Ravanchi also served as the Iranian ambassador to the UN between April 2019 and August 2022.[iv] Pezeshkian’s appointment of Araghchi—who himself played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations under Rouhani—as Iranian foreign affairs minister and Araghchi’s appointment of Ravanchi as his political deputy underscores the Pezeshkian administration’s serious intent to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi separately stated that Pezeshkian has indicated to him “a potential for renewed dialogue aimed at ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya on September 2.[v] Grossi previously indicated on August 30 that Pezeshkian had agreed to a bilateral meeting in the “near future.”[vi] It is unclear to what extent Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will permit the Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, although Khamenei has expressed support in recent weeks for engaging in negotiations in order to remove international sanctions on Iran.[vii]

Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[viii] An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia "within a matter of days.”[ix] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[x] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran on how to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving Russia's own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[xi]

Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.”[xii] Moghaddam claimed that Iran will have a “wise reaction” to Ismail Haniyeh’s death. Moghaddam’s statements are consistent with those from senior Iranian officials discussing Iran’s “psychological war” against Israel.[xiii] Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing ”psychological warfare” against Israel.[xiv]  

Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state. Hamas released propaganda videos featuring six recently executed Israeli hostages on September 2 calling for a ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[xv] Hamas also released a graphic in Hebrew stating that Israel will only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations not military operations.[xvi] Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations.[xvii] These videos are part of an information operation that aims to undermine Israeli public support for the ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Hamas leaders likely seek to exacerbate the tensions in the Israeli domestic sphere and cause further psychological distress by airing this propaganda. Hamas leaders may believe that that the Israeli public and officials will increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to drop demands from ceasefire negotiations that Hamas dislikes, such as a continued control over the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.[xviii]

Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israeli’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[xix] Gallant reportedly argued in a private cabinet meeting that prioritizing IDF control over the Philadelphi Corridor for six weeks over securing the release of dozens of living hostages is the wrong decision and should be reversed.[xx] Gallant said that the IDF could retake the corridor in eight hours if it withdrew.[xxi] Netanyahu argued that repealing the security cabinet’s decision would send the wrong message to Hamas and incentivize the militias to kill more Israeli hostages.[xxii] Netanyahu added that the Philadelphi Corridor is Hamas’ ”oxygen pipe” and a withdrawal from the corridor would restore Hamas’ rule and military capabilities.[xxiii] Several other members of the cabinet disagreed with Gallant’s public suggestion to reverse the August 29 cabinet decision.[xxiv]

Israel's national workers union announced a general strike on September 2 in support of an immediate ceasefire deal and hostage-release.[xxv] Israeli media reported that hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated in support of a ceasefire in major Israeli cities.[xxvi] The recovery of six Israeli hostages who had been executed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on September 1 spurred the strike and protests.[xxvii] Ben Gurion International Airport and some schools shut down during the strike.[xxviii] The Israeli labor court ruled on September 2 that the strike was political and therefore illegal.[xxix] The national workers union agreed to end the strike prematurely due to the court ruling.[xxx] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly condemned the protests and said that the demonstrations supported Hamas.[xxxi]  

The Biden administration is considering submitting a new “final” ceasefire-hostage deal proposal to Israel and Hamas in the coming days, according to Axios.[xxxii]  National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk told hostage family members on September 1 that the United States may present a new bridging proposal after mediators made significant progress on the specifics of the hostage-prisoner exchange component of the ceasefire deal over the last week of talks.[xxxiii] The United States last submitted a “bridging proposal“ to Israel and Hamas on August 16.[xxxiv] The new text is expected to include a US proposal about Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor. The Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor is currently a major hurdle in talks.[xxxv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added a stipulation in July that Israeli forces would maintain control over the corridor for the first phase of the ceasefire deal, which would be six weeks long.[xxxvi]

Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.[xxxvii] Hayya clearly stated that Hamas would not agree to a ceasefire and hostage exchange without a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor.[xxxviii] Hayya told al Jazeera that the past two weeks of ceasefire talks in Doha and Cairo have achieved nothing and are ”like grinding water.””[xxxix] Hayya criticized US officials for simultaneously expressing false optimism and not pressuring Israeli leaders to allow greater concessions in negotiations.[xl]  US President Joe Biden indicated on September 2 that he thought Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not doing enough to reach a deal.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs. Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal.
• Russo-Iranian Relations: Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Iranian Retaliation: Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.” Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing ”psychological warfare” against Israel.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state.
• Israeli Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.

Iran Update, September 1, 2024

A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander reiterated Iran’s support for Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands on September 1.[i] IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi expressed support for Hamas’ maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[ii] Masjedi stated that Hamas will continue to fight Israel unless Israel accepts its demands. Accepting Hamas’ maximalist demands would prevent Israel from being able to achieve its stated war aim of destroying Hamas as a military organization and governing authority. Israel’s acceptance of Hamas’ demand for a complete Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, for example, would mean that the IDF could no longer operate along the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.[iii]

IRGC-affiliated media indicated on August 31 that some elements of the Iranian regime are likely continuing to try to delay a retaliatory strike on Israel until the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations conclude. Basirat claimed that Iran’s response to Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh will be “strong, decisive, and deterrent,” but noted that Iran does not seek to derail the ongoing ceasefire talks.[iv] International mediators, including Qatar, have kept Iranian officials apprised of negotiation progress since the latest round of negotiations started in Doha in mid-August 2024.[v] Unspecified Iranian officials previously told Western media on August 13 that Iran will "delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[vi]

Lebanese Hezbollah Representative to Iran Abdallah Safi al Din met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Iran on September 1.[vii] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that Safi al Din and Araghchi discussed the “latest situation of the anti-Israel front in Lebanon.”[viii] Safi al Din and Araghchi likely discussed the Hezbollah drone and rocket attack targeting Israel in some capacity, though neither official would be responsible for planning or executing military operations against Israel. The United States sanctioned Safi al Din in May 2018 for acting as a conduit between Iran and Hezbollah and serving as an interlocutor between Iran and Hezbollah on financial issues.[ix]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages from a tunnel in Rafah on September 1.[x] Israeli security sources said that Hamas executed the hostages two to three days before the hostages were found and recovered.[xi] An IDF spokesperson said that the hostages were executed by Hamas guards "shortly before IDF forces reached them.”[xii] The Israeli forces did not encounter Palestinian fighters inside or near the tunnels while discovering and recovering the hostages.[xiii]  The IDF located the hostages one kilometer away from where they rescued living hostage Farhan al Qadi on August 27.[xiv]  IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, IDF Southern Command commander Major General Yaron Finkelman, and hostage talks negotiator Major General (res.) Nitzan Alon visited the recovery site in Rafah on September 1.[xv]

Hamas blamed Israel for the hostage’s death and recovery, claiming that Israel is ultimately responsible for the deaths by failing to agree to a ceasefire.[xvi] Hamas did not deny killing the hostages but attempted to shift overall blame to Netanyahu and the United States.[xvii] Netanyahu's statement blamed Hamas for continuing to “firmly refuse any [ceasefire-hostage deal] offer” and said that the execution of the hostages demonstrates Hamas does not want a deal.[xviii] Israeli security sources speaking to state-funded, IDF-supported Israeli Army Radio, said that the three of the hostages were supposed to be released in the first stage of a ceasefire-hostage deal.[xix] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israeli’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain and IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor—a major hurdle in a ceasefire-hostage deal—in response to the execution of the six hostages.[xx] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the hostages were likely executed around the time the security cabinet approved retaining an IDF presence on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border on August 29.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Talks: A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander reiterated Iran’s support for Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands on September 1. IRGC-affiliated media indicated on August 31 that some elements of the Iranian regime are likely continuing to try to delay a retaliatory strike on Israel until the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations conclude.
• Hostage Recovery: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages from a tunnel in Rafah on September 1. Hamas blamed Israel for the hostage’s death and recovery, claiming that Israel is ultimately responsible for the deaths by failing to agree to a ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A humanitarian pause began September 1 in the central Gaza Strip to enable humanitarian aid groups to start a mass polio vaccination campaign.
• West Bank: The IDF continued raids in Jenin for the sixth consecutive day as part of the IDF effort to degrade Palestinian militia networks in the West Bank.

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