Iran Updates

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provide these updates weekly on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

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Iran Update, July 15, 2024

The Axis of Resistance is continuing to try to coerce Gulf states into reducing their economic cooperation with Israel. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah warned Saudi Arabia on July 13 that it will “pay the price” for allowing Israel to conduct trade through Saudi territory.[i] Kataib Hezbollah accused Saudi Arabia of allowing Israel to use overland trade routes through Saudi territory “as an alternative to sea lanes.”[ii] Kataib Hezbollah was likely referring to the trade corridor that connects Israel to the Persian Gulf via the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.[iii] Israel has increasingly relied on this land route to mitigate the impact of Houthi attacks on international shipping around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.[iv] The Houthis conducted around 190 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea between November 2023 and mid-June 2024, causing trade activity at the Port of Eilat to decrease by approximately 85 percent.[v] Kataib Hezbollah previously vowed in April 2024 to sever the Israeli “land bridge” that passes through Jordan.[vi]

Kataib Hezbollah’s desire to disrupt the Israeli economic cooperation with the Gulf states is part of a larger Axis of Resistance effort to economically isolate Israel. Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly called on Muslim countries to impose an embargo on Israel.[vii] Iranian officials and media have also criticized Gulf states for allowing Israel to conduct trade through their territory and argued that the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf renders Houthi attacks in the Red Sea “ineffective.”[viii] An Iranian-backed Bahraini militia began conducting attacks targeting Israel in April 2024 as part of the Axis of Resistance effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.[ix] Iran and its allies appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said in recent months that part of their theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel.[x]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has not yet confirmed whether it killed Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif. The IDF conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone on July 13 targeting Deif and Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah.[xi] The IDF confirmed on July 14 that the strike killed Salamah.[xii] Hamas officials maintain that Deif is alive but have not provided evidence to back their assertion.[xiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The Axis of Resistance is continuing to try to coerce the Gulf states into reducing their economic cooperation with Israel. The Axis of Resistance has sought to isolate Israel economically throughout the Israel-Hamas war.
• Gaza Strip: Israel has not yet confirmed whether it killed Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif. Hamas has asserted that Deif is alive but has provided no evidence.
• Syria: Israel conducted several airstrikes into Syria, including one targeting a high-profile Syrian businessman involved in moving military material across the Levant.

Iran Update, July 14, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it killed Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah in the southern Gaza Strip on July 13.[i] The IDF conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone targeting Salamah and Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, on July 13.[ii] The IDF described Salamah as one of the “masterminds” of Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023.[iii] Salamah helped plan multiple other attacks against Israel throughout his career, including the kidnapping of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006.[iv] Salamah had commanded the Khan Younis Brigade after replacing senior Hamas military leader Mohammad Sinwar in 2016.[v] The IDF said that Salameh was responsible for all rockets attacks from the Khan Younis area into Israel. The IDF called Salamah’s killing “a significant blow” to Hamas’s military capabilities in the Gaza Strip.[vi] Sources from Hamas confirmed Salamah’s death.[vii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF confirmed that it killed the commander of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade in an airstrike targeting senior Hamas officials in the southern Gaza Strip. The IDF said that it is still assessing whether the airstrike killed Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif.
• West Bank: A Palestinian fighter conducted a car ramming and shooting attack in central Israel, injuring four Israeli soldiers.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed two drone and missile attacks targeting a commercial vessel.

Iran Update, July 13, 2024

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone targeting Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, on July 13.[i] The strike also targeted Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah. Israel is still assessing whether the strike killed Deif or Salamah. Israeli officials confirmed that they conducted the strike based on specific intelligence collected over the prior 24 hours.[ii] The IDF Air Force dropped eight 2,000-pound precision munitions targeting a building in which Deif and Salamah were assessed to be.[iii] Anonymous Israeli officials speaking to Western media said that the building was in a fenced off open separated from refugee tents.[iv] An Israeli military correspondent, citing IDF sources, reported that Israeli security officials are optimistic that the strike killed Deif.[v] Hamas denied that the IDF killed any senior commanders.[vi] The Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry claimed that strike killed 71 and injured 289.[vii] Anonymous Israeli officials speaking to Western media said that most individuals killed in the strike were Hamas fighters assigned to protect Deif and Salma.[viii]

Mohammed Deif was a notably senior official in Hamas, particularly its military wing. Deif played a leading role in building Hamas’ underground tunnel networks and planning Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023.[ix] The US State Department sanctioned Deif in 2015 and described him as the ”mastermind of Hamas’ offensive strategy.”[x] Anonymous Israeli officials speaking to Western media described Salamah similarly as one of the ”masterminds” of the October 2023 attack.[xi] Salamah oversaw a ”central combat center” in the southern Gaza Strip.[xii] Salamah reportedly helped plan multiple attacks on Israel throughout his career, including the kidnapping of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit from Sufa in 2006.[xiii] Salamah‘s uncle, Jawad Abu Shamala, is a member of Hamas’ political bureau and reportedly has a close relationship with leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar.[xiv]

Hamas called on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank to rise up in retaliation for Israel targeting Mohammad Deif. Hamas suggested that intensifying violence against Israeli settlers and soldiers in the West Bank could distract the IDF from operations in the Gaza Strip and thus exhaust the IDF.[xv] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant ordered a heightened security threat level “on all fronts.”[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

1. Gaza Strip: The IDF conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone targeting Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif. The strike also targeted Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah. Israel is still assessing whether the strike killed Deif or Salamah.
2. West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters six times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on July 12. PIJ fired small arms at the Israeli town Gan Ner in retaliation for Israel targeting Mohammed Deif.
3. Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 12.
4. Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed three Houthi drones in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on July 12.

Iran Update, July 12, 2024

Hamas continued to promote its postwar plan for a technocratic government to jointly rule the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hamas is content with this plan because it expects to maintain a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip thereby controlling the government or evading its rule. Hamas official Hossam Badran said on July 12 that Hamas proposes that a national, non-partisan group assumes administration of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank after the war.[i] Hamas has previously agreed to “technocratic” governments as part of a possible post-war Gaza Strip.[ii] Hamas approves of a ”technocratic government” because Hamas understands that it would be able to exert influence over such a government given that Hamas expects to maintain a military arm in the Gaza Strip after the war.

The ceasefire text currently under consideration does not contain a clause ensuring Hamas’ disarmament in the Gaza Strip, enabling Hamas to maintain control by force in the event of an Israeli withdrawal.[iii] Israel and Hamas do not currently have a framework to discuss Hamas’ disarmament under the current ceasefire proposals. Hamas official Hossam Badran called disbanding Hamas’ military wing a nonstarter.[iv] Hamas’ current demands regarding the phased ceasefire could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages or commit to disarmament. Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar would very likely fail to disarm in any event because to do so would result in Sinwar and Hamas losing a key element of their power in the Gaza Strip. Hamas forces throughout the Strip remain combat effective and are attempting to reconstitute, with some success. Sinwar has noted that he believes Hamas has Israel “right where [Hamas] wants [Israel].”[v]

Hamas would continue to shape, intimidate, and control a technocratic government if the group retains a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has previously undermined Israeli attempts to set up alternative governance structures in the Gaza Strip and will likely continue to suppress political alternatives. Hamas could use its functioning military and internal security wings to coerce technocratic government employees at every level, thus providing Hamas with significant influence over the Gazan government even if Hamas officials were not officially controlling it. Hamas has a long history of killing and suppressing dissidents and political alternatives, including members of local Gazan clans who Israel has approached to form a non-Hamas authority after the war.[vi] Hamas would almost certainly act quickly to constrain and co-opt the activities of a technocratic government in the Strip in order to prevent it from seriously challenging Hamas’ military or governance activities. The latest proposal for a 2,500-strong US-trained interim security force would be insufficient to provide order and challenge Hamas’ monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip.[vii]

Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian appointed former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as the chairman of his Steering Council to lead Pezeshkian’s transition into the presidency on July 12.[viii] This appointment is emblematic of Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue negotiations with the West. Zarif’s appointment follows reports that Pezeshkian may appoint former deputy foreign affairs minister for policy and deputy nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi as his foreign minister.[ix] The appointment of Zarif to lead Pezeshkian’s transition, combined with a possible appointment of Araghchi as foreign minister, illustrates Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue negotiations with the West.

Zarif’s appointment in the transition team illustrates how previously marginalized, moderate political elements are seeking to capitalize on Pezeshkian’s victory to re-enter the political conversations. Zarif—a moderate who served under moderate President Hassan Rouhani—had previously been sidelined in Iranian politics under the Raisi Administration after the collapse of the JCPOA.[x]  Zarif will likely remain influential during the transition period by informing Pezeshkian’s decision-making regarding the composition of his cabinet.

Zarif denied, however, that he is seeking a permanent position in Pezeshkian’s government. Zarif separately tweeted on July 12 that the Pezeshkian transition team has ”just begun” to make decisions about the appointment of government ministers.[xi]  Zarif urged Iranians to ignore the rumors circulating that Pezeshkian has already decided who will be nominated for cabinet positions.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas continued to promote its postwar plan for a technocratic government to jointly rule the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hamas is content with this plan because it expects to maintain a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip thereby controlling the government or evading its rule. Hamas would continue to shape, intimidate, and control a technocratic government if the group retains a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian appointed former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as the chairman of his Steering Council to lead Pezeshkian’s transition into the presidency on July 12. This appointment is emblematic of Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue negotiations with the West. Zarif’s appointment in the transition team illustrates how previously marginalized, moderate political elements are seeking to capitalize on Pezeshkian’s victory to re-enter the political conversations.
• Iran in Russia: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf conducted bilateral meetings with his counterparts from Russia, Ethiopia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan on the sidelines of the BRICS parliamentary forum in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 11 and July 12.
• Lebanon: A senior Hezbollah leader said in a speech on July 12 that Hezbollah must use military force, rather than diplomatic talks, to force Israel to end the war in the Gaza Strip.

Iran Update, July 11, 2024

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in recent days to meet with unspecified Axis of Resistance leaders, according to Iraqi media.[i] An anonymous Iranian source told Baghdad Today that Ghaani met with Iranian-backed officials from Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Yemen during his travel. The source reported that Ghaani met with militia leaders in Iraq on July 9, which is the same day that Iranian-backed Iraqi and Palestinian militias met in Baghdad to discuss military and political coordination.[ii] Ghaani may have attended this meeting given his role in coordinating and planning Axis of Resistance activity. This flurry of activity across the Axis of Resistance could in part reflect preparations for a possible major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon.

Some senior IRGC commanders have emphasized in recent days the need for the Iranian political establishment, particularly hardliners, to accept and support Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian in order to preserve political stability. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei said on July 10 that Pezeshkian should be considered part of “the revolution front,” which is a reference to parts of the hardline camp.[iii] Rezaei further stated that those who support the regime and Islamic Revolution must also support Pezeshkian. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh similarly on July 11 called on supporters of runner-up presidential candidate Saeed Jalili to respect Pezeshkian’s victory and avoid criticizing the electoral process.[iv] Hajji Zadeh described Pezeshkian as “the president of the entire nation and of every Iranian.” Hajji Zadeh also noted that former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death could have triggered a “major crisis” but that the regime averted such a crisis and conducted two rounds of voting within a week “without the smallest problem.” Rezaei’s and Hajji Zadeh’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prioritized regime legitimacy and stability over installing his preferred candidate in the election.[v]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in recent days to meet with unspecified Axis of Resistance leaders, according to Iraqi media
• Some senior IRGC commanders have emphasized in recent days the need for the Iranian political establishment, particularly hardliners, to accept and support Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian in order to preserve political stability.
• Gaza Strip: International mediators are reportedly considering using 2,500 US-trained PA supporters from the Gaza Strip as an interim governing force in the Gaza Strip.
• Russia: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the BRICS parliamentary forum in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Iran Update, July 10, 2024

Palestinian militias, including Hamas, are continuing to coordinate militarily and politically with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar met with the leaders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq, the Badr Organization, and the Jihad and Construction Movement in Baghdad on July 8 and 9.[i] The Jihad and Construction Movement is affiliated with the Badr Organization and controls the Popular Mobilization Forces 17^th Brigade.[ii] Mazhar called for increasing coordination between Palestinian and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during his meetings with the militia leaders. Mazhar praised the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—for "exhausting” the United States and Israel through its repeated attacks targeting US bases and Israeli targets since October 2023.[iii] Mazhar separately discussed Palestinian militia activities in the West Bank. Unspecified Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials attended Mazhar’s meeting with Hadi al Ameri, who is head of the Badr Organization.[iv]

The PFLP, Hamas, and PIJ delegations’ visit to Baghdad comes amid reports that Hamas plans to relocate its political leadership to Iraq. Emirati media reported in late June 2024 that Hamas plans to move its political leadership to Iraq due to growing pressure from the United States and Qatar on Hamas to show greater flexibility in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[v] Iran will reportedly be responsible for protecting Hamas personnel and offices in Iraq. The Emirati report followed the opening of a Hamas political office in Baghdad in early June 2024.[vi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued new evacuation orders for all of Gaza City on July 10.[vii] The IDF dropped leaflets over Gaza City urging civilians to evacuate southward for Deir al Balah and al Zuwayda in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF stated that Gaza City will remain a "dangerous combat zone.” The announcement appears to be an expansion of an earlier Israeli evacuation order issued for parts of Gaza City on July 8.[viii] The IDF 98th and 99th divisions are currently in Gaza City. The 99th Division launched a raid into Tal al Halwa, Gaza City, on July 8 in order to find and destroy Palestinian militia infrastructure.[ix] Some of that infrastructure was inside a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) headquarters.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah tried to project strength and highlight Israeli weakness during a speech on July 10. [x] Nasrallah claimed that the IDF cannot likely launch a major offensive into Lebanon because of bandwidth constraints. He also boasted that Hezbollah attacks into Israel have exhausted Israeli forces. Nasrallah claimed that the extension of Israeli reservists’ service is imposing economic and social costs on Israel. Nasrallah likely made these remarks to portray confidence to Hezbollah members and the Lebanese public while messaging his readiness and willingness to fight Israeli leaders.

Lebanese Hezbollah is adapting to evade Israeli detection and surveillance ahead of a possible major Israeli offensive into Lebanon. Reuters reported on July 10, citing six anonymous sources familiar with Hezbollah operations, that Hezbollah is adapting in response to Israeli airstrikes and surveillance.[xi] These adaptations include banning its members from using cellphones in the battlefield and instead requiring them to use couriers and pagers to communicate. Hezbollah is also using an Iranian-financed, private telecommunications network that involves fiber optic cables running from Beirut to southern Lebanon and the Bekka Valley. The sources furthermore told Reuters that Hezbollah frequently changes its code words to reference meeting sites and weapons. The Reuters report is consistent with Nasrallah warning in February 2024 that Israel is surveilling Lebanese phone calls.[xii] Israel has conducted extensive airstrikes targeting Hezbollah throughout the Israel-Hamas war. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated on July 7 that the IDF has killed three division-level Hezbollah commanders and 15 brigade-level Hezbollah commanders.[xiii]

Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is apparently considering nominating Abbas Araghchi as his foreign affairs minister, underscoring Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. IRGC-affiliated media reported on July 10 that Pezeshkian’s advisers "have almost reached the final conclusion” to nominate Araghchi, citing an unspecified source.[xiv] The source claimed that Araghchi has advised Pezeshkian on his conversations with unspecified Axis of Resistance and regional officials in recent days. Araghchi played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration and served as Rouhani's deputy foreign affairs minister for policy between 2017 and 2021.[xv] It is unclear whether the Iranian Parliament, which is currently dominated by hardliners, would approve Araghchi as foreign affairs minister. It is furthermore unclear whether Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would permit Araghchi to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West in a manner meaningful different from the Ebrahim Raisi administration if the Iranian Parliament does approve him as foreign affairs minister. Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25.[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Palestinian militias, including Hamas, are continuing to coordinate militarily and politically with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. PFLP, Hamas, and PIJ delegations recently met with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued new evacuation orders for all of Gaza City on July 10.
• Southern Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is adapting to evade Israeli detection and surveillance ahead of a possible major Israeli offensive into Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah separately tried to project strength and highlight Israeli weakness during a speech on July 10.
• Iran: Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is apparently considering nominating Abbas Araghchi as his foreign affairs minister, underscoring Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West.

Iran Update, July 9, 2024

Hamas is threatening to end ceasefire negotiations with Israel in response to Israeli raids targeting Hamas fighters in Gaza City. This effort may seek to trigger increased international pressure on Israel to stop the raids. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on July 8 that continued Israeli raids in Gaza City and Rafah would end the current Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations.[i] Israel launched a raid in Tal al Hawa in southwest Gaza City on July 8 to target Hamas fighters, dismantle militia infrastructure, and destroy weapons caches.[ii] Israel is conducting raids on a UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have used to detain individuals, shelter fighters, and store weapons.[iii] Israeli forces also sought to locate and destroy militia safehouses and other sheltered positions during the raids.[iv] Haniyeh’s statement suggests Hamas is concerned that the Israeli raids could severely disrupt Hamas’ capabilities in the area. Haniyeh and Hamas may assess that threatening to end negotiations over Israeli action will cause the mediators to increase pressure on Israel to slow or cease operations to save the deal. Hamas will likely survive an Israeli operation in Tal al Hawa because it is able to relocate fighters and resources to other areas of the Gaza Strip and infiltrate areas after Israeli forces have completed clearing operations. Israeli operations do damage Hamas, however, and this statement suggests that Hamas seeks to decrease Israel’s ability to conduct these raids at will.

Hamas has begun transporting unspecified equipment to Baghdad International Airport in preparation for relocating its political leadership to Iraq, according to an unspecified senior Shia Coordination Framework member.[v] The politician claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Leader Qais al Khazali and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri met on July 8 to discuss Hamas’ potential relocation to Baghdad. The politician noted that unspecified Shia factions are divided over whether the Iraqi federal government should allow Hamas to move to Iraq. Emirati media reported on June 24 that Hamas plans to relocate its political leadership to Iraq due to growing pressure from the United States and Qatar on Hamas to show greater flexibility in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[vi] Emirati media noted that Iran would be responsible for protecting Hamas personnel and offices in Iraq. The Emirati report followed the opening of a Hamas political office in Baghdad in early June 2024.[vii]

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas: Hamas is threatening to end ceasefire negotiations with Israel in response to Israeli raids targeting Hamas fighters in Gaza City. This effort may seek to trigger increased international pressure on Israel to stop the raids.
• Hamas in Iraq: Hamas has begun transporting unspecified equipment to Baghdad International Airport in preparation for relocating its political leadership to Iraq, according to an unspecified senior Shia Coordination Framework member.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah released drone footage on July 9 reportedly showing various Israeli military sites in the Golan Heights.

Iran Update, July 8, 2024

Iran is expanding its domestic drone and missile production capacities, which would enable further Iranian military support to Russia and the Axis of Resistance. Reuters, citing commercially available satellite imagery, reported on July 7 that Iran has expanded two defense industrial sites outside Tehran City in recent months[i] The satellite imagery indicated that Iran has built over 30 new buildings at the two sites, which are meant to support the manufacturing of ballistic missiles and drones. A Western analyst that Reuters cited assessed that the expansion began at one site—the Khojir missile production complex—in August 2023 and at the other site—the Shahid Modarres base—in October 2023.[iii] The buildings are apparently still under construction. Anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters claimed that Iran would transfer the drones and missiles produced at these facilities to Russia, the Houthis, and Lebanese Hezbollah. The satellite imagery of the Iranian sites also showed dirt berms surrounding many of the new structures, indicating the nearby presence of highly combustible materials.[iv] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) oversees both sites undergoing construction.

The expansion of the Iranian defense industrial sites come amid discussions between Iran and Russia to expand their military cooperation. Politico, citing anonymous sources, reported in April 2023 that Iran was negotiating a deal with Russia and China to send missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[v] Western officials and media moreover indicated in January 2024 that Iran and Russia were continuing negotiations to supply Iranian missiles to Russian forces.[vi] Reuters reported in February 2024, citing anonymous Iranian sources, that Tehran had sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[vii]

Iranian short-range ballistic missiles could improve the Russian ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Rybar claimed in February 2024 that the acquisition of Iranian missiles would enable Russian forces to hit “remote Ukrainian targets.”[viii] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson similarly said in February 2024 that Russia acquiring such missiles would pose a ”serious threat to Ukraine.”[ix] This Russo-Iranian military exchange is part of the strategic partnership that has developed between Moscow and Tehran since 2022, which CTP-ISW has covered extensively.[x]

Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be associating himself with members of the moderate Hassan Rouhani administration, which was in power from 2013-21. Pezeshkian identified former Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as one of his close advisers and supports while running for the presidency.[xi] Zarif served in the Rouhani administration and played a prominent role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[xii] Rouhani’s Information and Communications Technology Minister Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi has separately been advising Pezeshkian throughout his campaign.[xiii] Pezeshkian has since winning the presidential elections met other members of the Rouhani administration, such as Rouhani himself and former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ali Taib Nia.[xiv] The connection between Pezeshkian and the Rouhani administration could indicate that Pezeshkian will draw from this network to build his cabinet. That Pezeshkian may be rallying support from Rouhani’s circles would be unsurprising given that Pezeshkian has not historically appeared to have a prominent support base independently. Pezeshkian will remain considerably constrained in his capacity as president, regardless of support from Rouhani and his network.

Masoud Pezeshkian held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8, marking one of his first known call with a foreign official as president-elect.[xv] Pezeshkian advocated for the continued expansion of Russo-Iranian ties on the call.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia cooperation: Iran is expanding its domestic drone and missile production capacities, which would enable further Iranian military support to Russia and the Axis of Resistance.
• Iran Domestic Politics: Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be associating himself with members of the moderate Hassan Rouhani administration, which was in power from 2013-21.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and international mediators are weighing options for interdicting Hamas weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor.

Iran Update, July 7, 2024

Hamas is continuing to resist Israeli and US efforts to create a phased ceasefire deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages, end the war, and begin major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The remaining gap in ceasefire negotiations is significant because agreeing to the most recent Hamas language would effectively commit Israel to the permanent ceasefire Hamas has been demanding before Hamas had released all remaining hostages. Hamas’ current demands could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages. Hamas remains unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands, including a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. The May 31 ceasefire proposal announced by US President Joe Biden continues to serve as the basis for negotiations.[i] The phases of the May 31 proposal were:[ii]

1. Phase one involves a six-week ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would release an unspecified number of hostages, including Americans, women, and elderly and sick individuals, in exchange for “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners in this phase. Displaced Palestinian civilians would return to their homes, including those in the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid would “surge with 600 trucks [entering the Gaza Strip] per day,” which is a notable increase from the 500 trucks in an earlier Israeli proposal. Negotiations for a permanent ceasefire would continue during this phase.
2. Phase two involves Hamas and other Palestinian militias releasing all remaining living hostages, and the IDF withdrawing from the Gaza Strip completely. Biden said that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would facilitate continued negotiations during this phase.
3. Phase three involves major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. It also involves Hamas and the other militias returning the bodies of all hostages to Israel.

Hamas attempted in early June to undermine the phasing of the May 31 proposal by demanding the beginning of reconstruction in phase one and a complete halt to the war regardless of whether negotiations to transition to the second phase succeeded.[iii] The May 31 proposal notably did not guarantee a transition from the first to the second phase of the ceasefire. This would enable Israel to resume military operations if Hamas proved unwilling to compromise on the specifics for a permanent ceasefire beginning after phase two and three. Undermining the phasing would have enabled Hamas to continue to extract concessions from Israel indefinitely without transitioning to phase two, because Israel could not impose military pressure on Hamas to encourage Hamas to compromise to release hostages without breaking the agreement. Hamas’ attempt to undermine the phasing of the proposal also did not make clear how Israel would secure the release of the remaining hostages that would have been released under phase two of the May 31 proposal.

Hamas’ most recent ceasefire position demonstrates that the group has not meaningfully shifted its position since negotiations last stalled in June and that it still seeks to undermine the agreement’s phasing. Axios reported on July 6 that the outstanding gaps between Israel and Hamas center on the language regarding and time-delimitation of negotiations to transition from the first phase of the ceasefire deal to the second phase.[iv] The current proposal says that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar will “make every effort” to ensure negotiations during the first phase end in a transition to the second phase and a sustainable calm. Hamas is attempting to remove “make every effort,” replacing it with “ensure“ and dropping the original six-week time limit for the first phase.[v] This change would make the initial ceasefire effectively permanent from the start and would commit the United States, Qatar, and Egypt to securing a ceasefire and enable Hamas to draw out negotiations for the transition to the second phase indefinitely, if needed.[vi] The language and removal of the time-delimited first phase makes it more difficult for Israel to resume operations to pressure Hamas and extract concessions without breaking the agreement entirely or appearing to scuttle negotiations over the transition to phase two. This could allow Hamas to secure a complete ceasefire without adhering to commitments under phases two and three, which include the release of Israeli hostages. The categories of hostages in phase two and three include Israeli soldiers, whom Hamas is reticent to release.

Hamas and its leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, feel that they can manipulate ceasefire negotiations in this manner because they remain confident that they are winning in the Gaza Strip. Hamas forces throughout the Strip remain combat effective and are attempting to reconstitute, with some success. Sinwar has noted that he believes Hamas has Israel “right where [Hamas] wants [Israel].”[vii]  

Post-election statements by both President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and the supreme leader indicate that the Pezeshkian administration will not change the regime’s trajectory. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated his desire for Pezeshkian to continue the policies of former president Ebrahim Raisi in a message on July 6 following the presidential election.[viii] Pezeshkian issued a statement to the people of Iran on July 6 following the election thanking Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for opening the field for “participation and competition.”[ix] Pezeshkian has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to enforcing Khamenei’s policies throughout his campaign. Pezeshkian also prayed at the tomb of first Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on July 6 after the election to “renew his allegiance to Khomeini’s ideals.”[x] Masoud Pezeshkian will be sworn in as the ninth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran on August 4 or 5, according to a member of Iran’s parliament presiding board.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas is continuing to resist Israeli and US efforts to create a phased ceasefire deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages, end the war, and begin major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The remaining gap in ceasefire negotiations is significant because agreeing to the most recent Hamas language would effectively commit Israel to the permanent ceasefire Hamas has been demanding before Hamas had released all remaining hostages. Hamas’ current demands could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida claimed on July 7 that Hamas has regenerated materiel and personnel across the Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Post-election statements by both President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and the supreme leader indicate that the Pezeshkian administration will not change the regime’s trajectory.
• Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah also launched a heavy barrage of rockets targeting IDF air defense assets and surveillance equipment in response to the Israeli strike that killed Attar. Hezbollah aims to degrade Israel's integrated air defense system by targeting Mount Meron, which hosts air surveillance and battle management functions.

Iran Update, July 6, 2024

Moderate politician Masoud Pezeshkian won the Iranian presidential runoff election on July 5.[i] Iranian media reported that Pezeshkian received over 16 million votes, while his opponent, ultraconservative hardliner Saeed Jalili, received approximately 13.5 million votes.[ii] Pezeshkian and Jalili won approximately 10.4 million and 9.5 million votes respectively in the first round of voting on June 28.[iii] The Iranian Election Headquarters announced that voter turnout in the runoff presidential election was 49.8 percent, marking an approximately 10 percent increase from the first round of elections on June 28.[iv] Pezeshkian will be inaugurated on an unspecified date between July 22 to August 5.[v]Pezeshkian’s presidency will mark a departure from hardline President Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency.  Pezeshkian has repeatedly criticized Raisi’s presidency in recent weeks.[vi]

Pezeshkian previously served as a senior health official in the reformist Mohammad Khatami administration from 2000-2005 and as a parliamentarian from 2008 to 2024.[vii] Pezeshkian hails from Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province, and is fluent in Azeri and Kurdish.[viii] Pezeshkian is trained as a physician and served as a medic during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988.[ix] He later served in the reformist Khatami administration as health and medical education minister.[x] Pezeshkian is currently a parliamentarian representing East Azerbaijan Province and has held this role for 16 years.[xi]  He served as a deputy parliament speaker in 2016.[xii] Pezeshkian was disqualified from running in the 2021 presidential election, making his recent qualification and subsequent presidential win noteworthy.[xiii]

Pezeshkian will likely attempt to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, although it is unclear to what extent Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will permit him to do so. Pezeshkian called for increasing international engagement with Western actors and endorsed a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) throughout his campaign.[xiv] Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign affairs minister under reformist president Hassan Rouhani who helped negotiate the JCPOA in 2015, has played a prominent role in Pezeshkian’s campaign, suggesting that Pezeshkian is committed to resuming negotiations.[xv]  Pezeshkian separately supported resolving issues with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).[xvi] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.[xvii] The Supreme Leader has previously expressed foreign policy and nuclear views that promote domestic production over economic engagement with the West, making it unclear to what extent Khamenei will permit Pezeshkian to engage with Western actors.[xviii] Khamenei has also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign and has called on him to “continue [former hardline president Ebrahim] Raisi’s path” in his presidency.[xix]

Pezeshkian’s presidency is unlikely to generate meaningful changes within the regime. Pezeshkian supports regime policies like mandatory veiling. Pezeshkian has previously critiqued the Noor Plan—a 2024 Iranian law enforcement plan that often violently enforces veiling—but continues to support mandatory veiling within Iran and has argued that the regime must reform the way it educates girls so that they do not question the need to veil.[xx] Pezeshkian has also boasted about his role in enforcing mandatory veiling in hospitals and universities shortly after the Islamic Revolution.[xxi] Pezeshkian has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to enforcing Khamenei’s policies throughout his campaign. The president also lacks the authority to pursue policies different from the supreme leader’s edicts, even if the president aims to pursue policies separate from the supreme leader.[xxii] 

Pezeshkian’s presidency suggests that Khamenei prioritized the regime’s legitimacy over his individual legacy in this instance. Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies and espoused Jalili’s nuclear and foreign policy views in a speech on June 25, which suggested that Khamenei preferred Jalili over Pezeshkian.[xxiii] Khamenei previously paved the way for his preferred candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, to win the August 2021 presidential election.[xxiv] The fact that Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win the election suggests that Khamenei prioritized preserving the Islamic Republic’s veneer as a “religious democracy” over installing a president who more closely aligns with his hardline stances on domestic and foreign issues.

It is particularly noteworthy that Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win given that the next Iranian president may oversee Khamenei’s succession. Khamenei is currently 85 years old and has almost certainly begun to consider who will succeed him. That Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win suggests that he believes Pezeshkian could maintain order in the regime and Iranian society during a potential succession crisis. It also suggests that Khamenei prioritizes regime survival over having a president in power whose views and policies directly align with his own.

Khamenei may have calculated that manipulating the July 5 election results could stoke widespread unrest. The regime previously engineered the election results between reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, which galvanized a months-long anti-regime protest wave.[xxv] The regime might be particularly wary of public unrest given that it recently suppressed the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement and that much of the Iranian population still holds sociocultural, political, and economic grievances against the regime.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Moderate politician Masoud Pezeshkian won the Iranian presidential runoff election on July 5. Pezeshkian’s presidency is unlikely to generate meaningful changes within the regime. It is noteworthy, however, that Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win given that the next Iranian president may oversee Khamenei’s succession.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Anonymous Israeli officials said that the main sticking point in ceasefire negotiations centers around Article 14, which states that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar will “make every effort” to ensure negotiations end in an agreement and that a ceasefire is held as negotiations continue. Hamas seeks to remove the phrase “make every effort,” leaving only “ensure.”
• Gaza Strip: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reported on July 6 that the 98th Division located a weapons warehouse in Shujaiya containing long-range rockets and explosive charges.

Iran Update, July 5, 2024

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent a delegation led by Mossad Director David Barnea to Doha, Qatar on July 5 to continue ceasefire talks.[i] Barnea met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani on July 5 to build discussions on the ceasefire proposal Hamas submitted to Israel on July 2.[ii] An anonymous Israeli official told The New York Times that the Israeli delegation is engaging in preliminary talks before advancing to more “substantive” talks.[iii] US and Israeli officials described this new round of ceasefire talks as a breakthrough after weeks of stalled negotiations but the officials warned that these talks do not guarantee a ceasefire deal.[iv] Netanyahu told the Israeli negotiation team prior to its departure to Doha that the war in the Gaza Strip will end “only after achieving all of [the war] goals.”[v] An anonymous US official cautioned that “[t]here’s still work to do” on the ceasefire.[vi]

Israel’s post-war plan for the Gaza Strip remains unclear as negotiations resume in Doha. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said that Saudi Arabia supports an international force under the auspices of the United Nations to support the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip following the end of the war.[vii] Hamas has promised to prevent the deployment of foreign forces in the Gaza Strip.[viii]

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and security developments in the Gaza Strip with a senior Hamas delegation in Beirut on July 5.[ix] Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya led the Hamas delegation. Nasrallah and the delegation discussed Hamas’ political efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement with Israel. The Hamas delegation expressed appreciation for Hezbollah’s support to Palestinian fighters in the Gaza Strip.

The Hamas delegation separately held meetings with a senior Houthi delegation and a delegation from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, without providing additional details.[x]

Iran held its second round of its presidential election between ultraconservative hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili and moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on July 5.[xi] The Iranian Election Headquarters extended the voting deadline from 1800 to 0000 local time, likely to try to increase voter turnout.[xii] This action is not unprecedented; the regime has previously extended voting hours during both presidential and parliamentary elections, including during the June 28 first round presidential election.[xiii] The Interior Ministry will likely announce the final election results in the morning local time of July 6. CTP-ISW will publish analysis of the results on July 6.

Iran is continuing to promote greater financial and monetary cooperation with Russia to try to undermine Western sanctions. Central Bank of Iran Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 3 to attend a financial conference.[xiv] Farzin called on BRICS members to form a financial institution similar to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).[xv] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.[xvi] Farzin also called on Russia, China, and Iran to use their national currencies—rather than the US dollar—in economic transactions.[xvii] Farzin invited Russia to join the Asian Clearing Union, which is a payment arrangement in which the central banks of member states "settle payments for intra-regional transactions...on a net multilateral basis.”[xviii] Iran, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka currently comprise the Asian Clearing Union. Belarus applied to join the Asian Clearing Union in May 2023.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran held its second round of its presidential election between ultraconservative hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili and moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on July 5.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu sent a delegation led by Mossad Director David Barnea to Doha, Qatar on July 5 to continue ceasefire talks.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas tactics and Shujaiya’s dense, urban terrain are presenting challenges for the IDF, in some cases requiring that Israeli infantry clear building multiple times.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and security developments in the Gaza Strip with a senior Hamas delegation in Beirut on July 5.

Iran Update, July 4, 2024

Recent Iranian polls show that moderate Masoud Pezeshkian is leading over ultraconservative hardliner Saeed Jalili in the Iranian presidential race.[i] The runoff election will occur on July 5. The Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) published a poll on July 4 showing that Pezeshkian has a 5.6 percent lead over Jalili.[ii] ISPA notably predicted accurately that Pezeshkian and Jalili would win the highest and second highest number of votes, respectively, in the first round of voting on June 28.[iii] ISPA also correctly predicted that pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf would receive significantly less votes than Pezeshkian and Jalili.[iv] The July 4 ISPA poll is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation on July 1 that Pezeshkian appears to be gaining momentum ahead of the July 5 runoff election.[v]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must decide whether he will permit Pezeshkian to win the election if Pezeshkian wins the most votes. Khamenei recently expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with Jalili’s views, suggesting that Khamenei endorses Jalili.[vi] Khamenei furthermore indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies on the same date.[vii] Khamenei’s opposition to some of Pezeshkian’s policies could lead him to directly intervene in the upcoming election and install Jalili as president.

Israel and Hamas have resumed negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Qatar sent Hamas on June 25 a revised ceasefire proposal that was based on an earlier US-backed proposal.[viii] The new proposal includes several unspecified amendments to the original text.[ix] Hamas has reviewed the new proposal and sent its response to Israel. Israeli leaders plan to discuss the Hamas response and send a delegation for further discussions.[x] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call with US President Joe Biden on July 4 to discuss the new proposal.[xi]

Hamas appears to have changed part of its maximalist negotiating position in its response to the new proposal. An anonymous Israeli official said that Hamas is no longer demanding the full withdrawal of Israeli forces during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire.[xii] This phase includes a six-week ceasefire and the release of some Hamas-held hostages. The phasing of the original US-backed proposal has been a point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas.[xiii]

Significant obstacles remain to securing a ceasefire agreement, however. Lebanese media reported that some of the changes in the new proposal do not “affect the essential issues” but are meant to preserve negotiations.[xiv] An Israeli official similarly told Axios that ”serious challenges” remain and that it could take several weeks to reach a deal.[xv]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation meant to prevent Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon. An anonymous commander from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq told Western media that there would be an “escalation for escalation” if the IDF goes into Lebanon..[xvi] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The commander also told Western media that the coalition has sent military advisers and experts to Lebanon to help Lebanese Hezbollah prepare for a greater conflict against the IDF. These remarks come after two unspecified Iraqi officials told Associated Press that some advisers are already in Lebanon to support Hezbollah.[xvii] Iranian-backed Iraqi and Lebanese officials separately told the Associated Press that thousands of Iranian-backed fighters from across the Middle East would join the war between Israel and Hezbollah.[xviii] That the Axis of Resistance is speaking to Western media reflects its intent to message to Western audiences.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Recent Iranian polls show that moderate Masoud Pezeshkian is leading over ultraconservative Saeed Jalili in the Iranian presidential race.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas have resumed negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Significant obstacles remain to securing a ceasefire agreement.
• Lebanon: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation meant to prevent Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.

Iran Update, July 3, 2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran held its final debate before the upcoming presidential runoff election. Ultraconservative Saeed Jalili continued to downplay the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West. Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian tried to garner support from hardliners.
• Lebanon: Israeli forces killed the commander responsible for Lebanese Hezbollah operations in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah has sustained almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023, despite the IDF killing Hezbollah commanders throughout the war.
• Gaza Strip: Qatar sent Hamas a revised ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas has reviewed the proposal and sent its response to Israel. This comes after Hamas essentially rejected the most recent US-backed ceasefire proposal.
• Syria: Iranian-backed militias have moved advanced weapons into Syria and established a drone assembly site in eastern Syria, according to Syrian opposition media.

Iran Update, July 2, 2024

Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be gaining momentum ahead of the runoff presidential elections on July 2. Several recent polls demonstrate that Pezeshkian is maintaining his lead over hardline candidate Saeed Jalili.[i] Pezeshkian received 10.4 million votes and Jalili received around 9.5 million during the first round of elections on June 28.[ii]  Former presidential candidate and pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s campaign head Sami Nazari Tarkarani also endorsed Pezeshkian on July 2.[iii] This endorsement may divert some of 3.4 million votes Ghalibaf received during the first round of elections to Pezeshkian, thus advantaging Pezeshkian.[iv] Pezeshkian also performed strongly in a July 1 economic debate against Jalili. Members of Jalili’s own faction criticized Jalili’s poor performance, in contrast.[v] Details on this debate are included in the following paragraphs.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must determine if he will permit Pezeshkian to win the election if Pezeshkian maintains his lead over Jalili. Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, suggesting that Khamenei endorses Jalili.[vi] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies on the same date.[vii] This suggests that Khamenei may decide to prevent Pezeshkian from becoming president. Raisi’s 2021 election suggests that Khamenei is comfortable engineering elections to advantage his preferred candidate.[viii] The Guardian Council denied the candidacies of several prominent politicians in the 2021 elections and Raisi therefore faced no significant competition in the race.[ix]

It is unclear, however, how and if Khamenei will advantage Jalili if Pezeshkian is able to generate increased support and win the election this week. The regime engineered the election results between reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, galvanizing a months-long anti-regime protest wave.[x] Khamenei would risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy and possibly kickstarting unrest if Pezeshkian garners increased support in the coming days and Khamenei decides to undermine Pezeshkian’s ability to win the election.

The two remaining presidential candidates, reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Saeed Jalili, discussed the economy in the first debate of the election’s second round on July 1.[xi] Both candidates reiterated previous economic talking points on their agenda from the first round.[xii]

• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of increased public participation in the economy, including by women and minority groups. Pezeshkian also emphasized the importance of high voter turnout rates for the final election on July 5. He probably calculates that a greater voter turnout will improve his chances at election.[xiii] Pezeshkian said that international sanctions cause Iran’s economic issues in part, but that the government’s failure to fully implement economic policy also contributes to Iran’s economic woes.[xiv] Pezeshkian said that improving the economy also requires pragmatism in diplomatic relations with the world, noting that Iran will ”never...cancel all sanctions” and that loosening sanctions depends on ”what we give [diplomatically] and what we get [diplomatically]“ and whether Iran wants to ”solve [its] problem with the world or not.”[xv] Pezeshkian also noted the value of strong management within government.
• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili focused on how the next government can create more employment opportunities.[xvi] Jalili agreed with Pezeshkian that greater participation in the economy is better.[xvii] Jalili proposed finding alternative trade partners to alleviate sanctions’ impact on the Iranian economy.[xviii] This suggestion presumably means that China, Russia, and other US adversaries. Jalili did not suggest returning to nuclear negotiations as a way to improve the Iranian economy or relations with foreign countries.[xix] Jalili criticized Pezeshkian for placing too much of the blame on the Iranian government for the failure of JCPOA and not enough on the other parties involved.[xx]

A senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is attempting to publicly discourage US support for a major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairperson and Supreme Leader Foreign Affairs Advisor Kamal Kharrazi stressed Iran's support for Hezbollah in the event of an Israeli military operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon during an interview with the Financial Times on July 2.[xxi] The fact that Kharrazi gave this interview to this outlet suggests his primary audience is the West, including the United States. Kharrazi said that Iran was “not interested” in participating in a regional war and stressed the need for the United States to discourage Israel from launching an operation against Hezbollah. Kharrazi noted that Iran and the Axis of Resistance would have “no choice” but to use “all means” to support Hezbollah in the event of an Israeli military offensive into southern Lebanon. Kharrazi’s comments follow statements from several Iranian officials boasting about Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s ability to destroy Israel in recent days. IRGC Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh warned that Iran is ”awaiting an opportunity for the True Promise II Operation” during a speech on July 1.[xxii] The first True Promise Operation was the Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel on April 13.[xxiii] Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani separately told Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in a phone call on July 1 that Hezbollah is ”fully prepared” to resist any Israeli threats into Lebanon.”[xxiv]

Kharrazi separately reiterated in his interview with the Financial Times that Iran was open to pursuing nuclear weaponization if it faced ”an existential threat.” [xxv] Kharrazi made similar statements suggesting that Iran could pursue a nuclear weapon in May 2024.[xxvi] Kharrazi’s statements also coincide with normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons among Iranian officials and evidence that Iran has expanded its nuclear program in recent weeks, suggesting a broader policy shift in Tehran.[xxvii]

Several current and former Israeli security officials told the New York Times that top Israeli generals disagree with political establishment’s war goals in the Gaza Strip.[xxviii] Unspecified Israeli generals reportedly think a ceasefire is the best way to ensure the release of living Israeli hostages from Hamas custody.[xxix] Former Israeli National Security Advisor Eyal Hulata corroborated this account, adding that high-level military officials believe a ceasefire would allow for the release of hostages and that the IDF could fight Hamas at some point in the future.[xxx] Hulata was the national security advisor until early 2023. Hamas has rejected ceasefire proposals that do not ensure a permanent ceasefire partly due to the possibility of the IDF fighting Hamas again after Hamas releases the hostages.[xxxi] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari implied on June 19 that the IDF thinks the Israeli prime minister’s goal of destroying Hamas is not an achievable goal and that those advocated the goal are ”misleading the Israeli people.”[xxxii] IDF clearing operations have successfully degraded Hamas battalions throughout Gaza Strip, but Hamas has reconstituted its forces in several areas after Israeli withdrawals, partly from newly recruited fighters.[xxxiii] The IDF explicitly responded to the New York Times report, reiterating that the IDF agrees with the Israeli political leaders' goal to “destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas” and return Israeli hostages.[xxxiv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his stance that the war will end once Israel “achieves all of its objectives, including the destruction of Hamas and the release of all” the hostages.[xxxv] The reported disagreement between the Israeli civil-military establishment comes as the IDF is expected to shift from full division-sided clearing operations like it is currently pursuing in Rafah to a reduced but lasting force presence along the Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors.[xxxvi]  Prime Minister Netanyahu said on July 1 that the IDF was advancing to the ”end of the stage of eliminating Hamas” militarily.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be gaining momentum ahead of the runoff presidential elections on July 2. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must determine if he will permit Pezeshkian to win the election if Pezeshkian maintains his lead over Jalili. Khamenei would risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy and possibly kickstarting unrest if Pezeshkian garners increased support in the coming days and Khamenei decides to undermine Pezeshkian’s ability to win the election.
• Lebanon: A senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is attempting to publicly discourage US support for a major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon.
• Gaza Strip: Several current and former Israeli security officials told the New York Times that top Israeli generals disagree with political establishment’s war goals in the Gaza Strip. IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari implied on June 19 that the IDF thinks the Israeli prime minister’s goal of destroying Hamas is not an achievable goal and that those advocated the goal are ”misleading the Israeli people.”
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on July 1 that it conducted four ballistic and cruise missile attacks targeting four commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. CTP-ISW cannot verify that these attacks occurred.

Iran Update, July 1, 2024

Hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili will likely win the Iranian presidential election in the runoff race on July 5. No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28 and Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5.[i] Pezeshkian received 10.4 million votes while Jalili received around 9.5 million. The second most prominent hardline candidate—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—received around 3.4 million votes in the first round of elections on June 28, which was not enough to compete in the runoff election.[ii] At least some Ghalibaf voters will presumably back Jalili in the runoff election, however, giving Jalili a significant advantage over Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian has also struggled to consolidate support among Iranian youth, a key voter demographic for the reformist faction.[iii] Pezeshkian is unlikely to garner enough support to win against Jalili, especially since social media users have circulated statements in recent days of Pezeshkian boasting about his role in enforcing unpopular policies such as mandatory veiling.[iv]

The Iranian regime is attempting to frame the July 5 presidential runoff elections as a fair and competitive race, despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indicating a preference for hardline candidate Saeed Jalili.  Khamenei has repeatedly expressed concern about low voter turnout rates in recent years and views participation in Iran’s presidential elections as a demonstration of Iran’s democratic legitimacy.[v] Iranian regime officials during this election cycle have attempted to reinforce the regime’s democratic legitimacy by boasting that Pezeshkian’s candidacy illustrated the legitimacy of Iran’s electoral process.[vi] Some Iranian university students confronted  Pezeshkian in a meeting on June 16, framing his candidacy as an effort on the part of the regime to contribute to an “illusion of democracy” and an attempt by the regime to legitimize the elections.“[vii] The June 28 voter turnout rate was nevertheless unprecedently low at 40 percent, with the lowest recorded rates in Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Tehran provinces.[viii] It is noteworthy that a significant percentage of anti-regime protests during the Mahsa Amini movement occurred in Kurdistan and Tehran provinces, suggesting continued disillusionment with the Iranian regime in these regions.[ix]

Khamenei and segments of Iran’s clerical establishment have indirectly demonstrated a preference Jalili in recent days, making a Pezeshkian win unlikely regardless of how many votes he receives. Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, suggesting that Khamenei endorses Jalili.[x] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies on the same date, making it unlikely that Khamenei will permit him to become president. Segments of the Iranian clerical establishment may also back Jalili. Reformist-affiliated Entekhab News posted a screenshot on July 1 that it claimed showed coordination among Iranian clerics to campaign for Jalili in villages and cities across Iran.[xi] Entekhab also circulated reports on July 1 that the influential Qom Seminary in Iran will close this week for its students and teachers to help improve voter turnout. Entekhab suggested that the Qom Seminary closures corroborated reports of clerics campaigning for Jalili.[xii] It is likely, if the Qom Seminary closures are indeed connected with reports of clerics campaigning, that students and teachers will disperse to their hometowns—specifically rural areas—to generate support for Jalili. Rural and sparsely populated areas have historically served as a bastion of support for the regime and its hardline policies.[xiii] Roughly 35 percent of the Iranian population lives in rural areas and political engagement in these areas could furthermore improve voter turnout rates while benefiting Jalili.[xiv]

The Supreme Leader will risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy in the unlikely event that Pezeshkian garners enough votes to win the election. Khamenei has criticized Pezeshkian’s policies and echoed Jalili’s nuclear and foreign policies, indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili over Pezeshkian. It is therefore unlikely that Khamenei will permit Pezeshkian to win, regardless of whether Pezeshkian receives the majority of votes. Raisi’s 2021 election suggests that Khamenei is comfortable engineering elections to advantage his preferred candidate.[xv] The Guardian Council denied the candidacies of several prominent politicians in the 2021 elections and Raisi therefore faced no significant competition in the race. It is unclear, however, how Khamenei will advantage his preferred candidate if Pezeshkian is able to generate increased support and win the election this week. The regime engineered the election results between reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, galvanizing a months-long anti-regime protest wave.[xvi] Khamenei will risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy and possibly kickstarting unrest in the unlikely event that Pezeshkian garners significant support in the coming days.

Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank appear to be strengthening at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian militia fighters, Israeli military officials, and Palestinian Authority officials told the New York Times that Palestinian militia organizations control refugee camps in the West Bank by refusing to allow Palestinian Authority security forces to enter.[xvii] Palestinian fighters have prevented Palestinian Authority officials from entering refugee camps since before October 7, according to Palestinian media.[xviii] Fighters in Nur al Shams, east of Tulkarm, fired small arms at Palestinian Authority forces in June 2023 when the Palestinian Authority attempted to remove barriers that Palestinian militia fighters had placed at the entrances of the camp to prevent Israeli forces from entering.[xix] Palestinian militia control of refugee camps in the West Bank provides a relatively safe area for Palestinian militias to build new capabilities and plan operations against both the IDF and the Palestinian Authority.

The Palestinian Authority’s inability to exert effective control over refugee camps in the West Bank has significant implications for the post-war situation in the Gaza Strip, if these statements to the New York Times are accurate. The Palestinian Authority remains extremely unpopular, and Hamas will be able to easily justify continued resistance to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip if the authority assumes control with Israeli backing. A surviving Hamas in the Gaza Strip will attempt to rapidly resume its control over the Gaza Strip and continue its efforts to undermine the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hamas sees control over the Gaza Strip as an interim step to creating an Islamist Palestinian state controlling all of Israel and the Palestinian territories.[xx]

The Iranian-guided effort to establish combined battalions in the West Bank since at least 2022 is almost certainly contributing to the gradual strengthening of Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank. Palestinian militias—under Iranian direction—have created a series of combined battalions in the West Bank since at least 2022, modeled on the Lion’s Den militia in Nablus.[xxi] The New York Times interviewed a former Fatah militia member who had defected to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and now leads one of these combined battalions in Tulkarm.[xxii] This battalion includes all Palestinian factions in the area, including PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.[xxiii] Palestinian militias in combined units are able to unify planning and logistics by combining their resources, thus improving the militias’ capabilities and efficiency in aggregate.

Israeli security measures will likely constrain the groups’ ability to quickly expand their capabilities, however. Israeli counter-smuggling efforts and IDF control over access to the West Bank make it challenging for Palestinian militia groups to successfully access enough materiel to build advanced explosive devices or weapon systems at scale. Israeli security forces have successfully interdicted relatively large smuggling operations throughout and prior to this war.[xxiv] Major Israeli raids also disrupt the activity of nascent militia cells before these cells have time to build large stockpiles of weapons and explosives.[xxv] CTP-ISW has not observed a major and consistent change in militia capabilities during the war.

Iran is likely continuing its efforts to arm West Bank militias by smuggling arms through Jordan into the West Bank. The IDF thwarted an attempt to smuggle handguns and rifle parts into the West Bank from Jordan on July 1.[xxvi] Three smugglers attempted to cross the border from Jordan into the northern West Bank.[xxvii] Israeli border police and the IDF searched the area and discovered three bags containing over 75 handguns and dozens of M16 rifle components, including upper receivers, bolts, and charging handles.[xxviii] Israeli security forces have not apprehended the three suspects at the time of writing.[xxix] The July 1 smuggling attempt is consistent with other Iranian-backed smuggling attempts.

Iran is supplying Palestinian militias with weapons to improve their capabilities and to foment unrest against Israel.[xxx]  Both Israeli and Jordanian police have thwarted numerous attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to transport small arms, explosives, mines, and rockets across the Jordan-West Bank border.[xxxi] Iranian-backed smugglers often use established multinational narcotics-smuggling networks and routes to smuggle arms from Syria into Jordan.[xxxii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division continued clearing operations to degrade a reconstituted Hamas battalion and to demolish underground military infrastructure in Shujaiya, Gaza City, on July 1.[xxxiii] The IDF re-entered Shujaiya on June 27.[xxxiv] Hamas fighters in Shujaiya have targeted Israeli forces with sophisticated weapons, such as explosively formed penetrators, supporting the IDF assessment that the Hamas Shujaiya Battalion has at least partially reconstituted since the IDF last operated in the area in April 2024.[xxxv] The IDF killed Hamas‘ Shujaiya Battalion commander and his deputy in December 2023, which led them to conclude the battalion was ”significantly damaged.”[xxxvi] The IDF assesses that Hamas has partially rebuilt its battalion from new recruits and Hamas fighters from other degraded battalions.[xxxvii] One element of reconstitution is reorganization, in which a commander redistributes the resources at their disposal to restore attrited units to a minimal level of effectiveness.[xxxviii] Building composite units by combining several degraded or combat ineffective battalions is one common way to reorganize a force to be minimally combat effective. Israeli forces operating in Shujaiya have also destroyed weapons productions sites during the past several days of operations, indicating that Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion is also pursuing small-scale weapons production to replenish its stockpiles and aid in regeneration tasks.[xxxix] CTP-ISW previously observed that Hamas cells have probably established a rear area in Jabalia or northern Shujaiya, from which they can mount attacks on IDF units along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[xl]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Khan Younis on July 1.[xli] An IDF evacuation order typically means that Israeli forces will enter the area within 24 hours to begin clearing operations.[xlii] PIJ launched 20 rockets from Khan Younis into southern Israel roughly 10 hours before the IDF issued the order on July 1.[xliii] The IDF Air Force struck the launch site shortly after PIJ fired the barrage.[xliv]  An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 23 that Hamas is reconstituting its military and governance structures in Khan Younis in the absence of Israeli force presence.[xlv] The IDF withdrew its forces from Khan Younis on April 7.[xlvi] Hamas is also working to reassert local control in Khan Younis by deploying fighters on the streets, managing local policing, and taking over humanitarian aid shipments.[xlvii] Hamas is restoring its governing organizations as well, which has prompted the IDF to target Hamas officials involved in these activities.[xlviii] Hamas’ reconstitution in Khan Younis is likely driving the IDF to conduct a short-term raid into Khan Younis. An IDF operation into Khan Younis may also target Hamas political and military leadership. CTP-ISW previously noted that the IDF’s decision to withdraw its forces from Khan Younis enabled Hamas militants and political leadership to flee to Khan Younis.[xlix] Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is likely hiding in a “vast” tunnel system beneath Khan Younis, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the New York Times.[l] Hamas fighters’ option to move northward contributed to their decision to not become decisively engaged in Rafah.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the Middle East in the event of an Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, met on June 30 and threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the region and increase the “pace and type” of its operations if Israel launches a major military offensive into Lebanon.[li] Iranian-backed militias initially paused attacks against US forces in the region in February 2024 after IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad and ordered a pause on the attack campaign after a Kataib Hezbollah drone attack killed three US soldiers in Jordan in January 2024.[lii] The militias’ announced strategy is partially inconsistent with a Saudi report that alleged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would intervene in Lebanon by sending fighters and weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah if Israel launches a major military offensive into Lebanon. Both the IRGC and Hezbollah reportedly had reservations against such plans, which is consistent with the long-standing Iranian desire to avoid an overt regional war against the United States and Israel.  The militia’s newly articulated strategy is more consistent with the militia’s attacks and involvement in the Israel-Hamas war thus far.[liii]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee most recently threatened to resume its attack campaign on US forces and interests in the Middle East on June 19, citing the Iraqi government’s failure to establish a timeline for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq.[liv] The June 30 Coordination Committee statement citing a possible Israeli offensive into Lebanon as a trigger for new attacks comes after individual attempts by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups to resume attacks on US forces.[lv] Emirati state media reported that other Islamic Resistance in Iraq militia leaders have disagreed with Kataib Hezbollah’s calls to resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq since April 2024. Kataib Hezbollah has reportedly begun to ”reconsider” its decision to pause attacks.[lvi] Qais Khazali, who is the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, similarly threatened on June 24 to attack US interests if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.[lvii] Such calls appear to encourage action that would disobey the orders from the IRGC Quds Force commander in January to stop attacks.

The June 30 Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee statement also identified targeting the under-construction Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline connecting Basra, Iraq to Aqaba port south of Jordan, as a “starting point” for new attacks.[lviii] The Coordination Committee claimed that Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline is a ”malicious project aimed at draining Iraqi resources and paving a path toward normalization with Israel”. The pipeline project is strategically important for Iraq as it will offer a key alternative port to Iraq’s currently existing exports terminal, eventually diversifying its export routes and linking Iraq’s economy with those of its Arab neighbors.[lix] The Coordination Committee and Iran may assess that this declared strategy of attacking Jordanian targets is less likely to elicit a US response and is therefore less risky than targeting US forces in the region. This lower-risk strategy would also be consistent with the long-standing Iranian desire to keep its militia activity at a level that does not cause the United States to seriously threaten Iranian assets.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili will likely win the Iranian presidential election in the runoff race on July 5.
• West Bank: Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank appear to be strengthening at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority’s inability to exert effective control over refugee camps in the West Bank has significant implications for the post-war situation in the Gaza Strip, if statements to Western Media about strengthening militia groups in the West Bank are accurate.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued operations aimed at degrading a reconstituting Hamas Battalion in Shujaiya. Hamas commanders in Shujaiya may have formed a composite unit there by combining multiple degraded or combat ineffective units to form one combat effective unit. Forming a composite unit is one method through which reconstitution takes place.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Khan Younis on July 1. These evacuation orders typically precede Israeli operations.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the Middle East in the event of an Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. The groups identified the under-construction Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline between Basra, Iraq, and Aqaba, Jordan, as a starting point for a new attack campaign.
• Yemen: Houthi media published footage on June 30 of a Houthi attack targeting a bulk cargo carrier with a new model of unmanned surface vessel.

Previous Iran Updates

• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023
• September 2023
• August 2023
• July 2023
• June 2023
• May 2023
• April 2023
• March 2023
• February 2023
• January 2023
• December 2022
• November 2022
  
• October 2022
• September 2022