Iran Updates

 

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                                               

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, April 10, 2025

A Senior Iranian official threatened to reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if external threats against Iran continue. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 10 that Iran could expel IAEA inspectors, halt cooperation with the agency, or move enriched uranium to “safe and unknown locations” if external threats and military pressure continue.[i] Iran has already restricted IAEA oversight, including withdrawing the designation of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[ii] Shamkhani’s remarks may possibly aim to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities and may also seek to instill urgency among Western officials for renewed negotiations.

China increased its Iranian oil imports by at least 80 percent in March compared to February.[iii] This undermines the US "maximum pressure" campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, and illustrates cooperation between two major US adversaries. Reuters reported on April 10 that China's imports of Iranian oil increased significantly in March amid concerns that new US sanctions could further restrict the Iranian oil supply, citing unspecified traders and analysts.[iv] Estimates show that Iran shipped between 1.3 to 1.8 million barrels per day to China in March. Most of these exports are transferred off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore and reflagged as Malaysian. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, buying 90 percent of Iran's total oil exports. China's Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions. Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement in mid-March condemning the US "maximum pressure" strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[v] Chinese officials have echoed this statement since.[vi]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 9 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 9.[vii] CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots in Mount Nuqum, which is on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City, for the second consecutive day.[viii] CENTCOM conducted at least five airstrikes targeting two other Houthi weapons depots around Sanaa City.[ix]  CENTCOM targeted Houthi barracks and weapons depots on Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate, for the eighth time since the start of CENTCOM’s airstrike campaign on March 15.[x]

One airstrike may have killed a relatively more high-value Houthi leader in central Sanaa City on April 9. A Yemeni journalist reported that a CENTCOM airstrike on April 9 targeted a car at the roundabout between al Saleh Mosque and the gate of the Presidential Palace in al Sabeen District, central Sanaa City, and killed three likely Houthi fighters.[xi] Armed Houthi fighters surrounded the destroyed vehicle, preventing Sanaa residents from identifying the dead or approaching the vehicle until April 10. Airstrikes targeting vehicles, especially in sensitive areas like the middle of a major population center, usually intend to eliminate senior enemy commanders rather than ordinary foot soldiers or low-level commanders.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 9 that he discussed “eliminating the threat of the Houthis,” in addition to developments in the Gaza Strip and Syria, with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Washington, DC.[xii] Farhan also met with US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz on April 9.[xiii] US Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin separately discussed the role the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) can play “in restoring peace and prosperity to Yemen,“ as well as “US efforts to end the Houthi threat to freedom of maritime navigation,” with PLC Vice President Tareq Saleh.[xiv] These meetings follow CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla’s most recent regional Middle East tour between April 1 and 5. [xv] Kurilla met with the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sagheer Ahmed Aziz, and the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, General Fayyad bin Hamed al Ruwayli, in Riyadh between April 3 and 5.[xvi]

CENTCOM announced the arrival of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility on April 10.[xvii] CENTCOM published footage of the Vinson working alongside the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group in the Red Sea. CENTCOM has been launching airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in Yemen from the Truman since March 15.[xviii]

Syrian Kurds and Druze communities and political factions have signaled concern over the trajectory of the transitional government. Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (AANES) official Badran Jia Kurd told Reuters on April 10 that Kurdish political parties have agreed on a “common political vision” for northeastern Syrian that would include "local legislative councils within the region, executive bodies to manage the region's affairs, and internal security forces affiliated with them.”[xix] These ”political parties” include the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), and these unified demands have emerged from recent talks between the two parties.[xx] Both parties are longtime rivals, making their unity against the transitional government notable. Jia Kurd said that the Syrian state must preserve each region’s “specificities” by enshrining these "federal" mechanisms in the Syrian constitution.”[xxi] KNC leader Suleiman Oso said that the joint parties’ ”vision” is expected to be announced by the end of April.[xxii] The Druze community, which is predominantly located in southwestern Syria and remains fractured into several distinct armed factions in political groups, holds similar reservations about joining the transitional government. Major Druze leaders, including Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri and the spokesperson for the Men of Dignity Movement, have expressed that there is ”no consensus” with Damascus while adding that they have significant reservations about the transitional government. Both the Kurds and the Druze community have inked some agreements with the transitional government. But the demands by the Kurds and the statements from the Druze community reflect deeply held fears over the trajectory of the transitional government, especially after Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara‘s loyalists retained control over all key Syrian ministries in the transitional cabinet formed on March 29.[xxiii] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected any decentralization or federalization of the country.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran Nuclear Talks: A Senior Iranian official threatened to reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if external threats against Iran continue, which may seek to instill urgency in the nuclear negotiations while deterring a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
• Maximum Pressure: China increased its Iranian oil imports by at least 80 percent in March compared to February. This undermines the US "maximum pressure" campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, and illustrates cooperation between two major US adversaries.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: CENTCOM has conducted nine airstrikes in Yemen since April 9. One strike may have killed Houthi commanders. The USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group also arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
• US Diplomacy in the Middle East: The US secretary of state discussed Yemen and “eliminating the Houthi threat,” among other issues, with the Saudi foreign minister. CNN previously reported that regional diplomatic efforts were under way for a Yemeni government ground offensive in Yemen.
• Syrian Centralization: Syrian Kurds and Druze communities and political factions have signaled concern over the trajectory of the transitional government. Both the Kurds and the Druze community have inked some agreements with the transitional government, but recent demands by the Kurds and statements from the Druze community reflect deeply held fears over the trajectory of the transitional government.

Iran Update, April 9, 2025

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand.[i] A senior Hezbollah official told Reuters on April 9 that Hezbollah is willing to discuss disarmament with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[ii] Iranian media separately argued on April 9 that the United States must negotiate with Axis of Resistance groups directly because these groups operate "independently.”[iii] These reports follow similar reports in recent days that claimed that Iran is reducing its support for the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iv] This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iranian support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions.

 

Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.[v] Iran has financially supported the military reconstitution of Lebanese Hezbollah since the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire went into effect in November 2024.[vi] UK-based outlet The Times reported on April 9 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force sent advanced missiles to unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in early April 2025.[vii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sources separately told Emirati media on April 9 that the militias disagree about whether to disarm.[viii] This report refutes earlier statements made by members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to Western media on April 7 that the militias had agreed to disarm.[ix] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to abandon its support for the Axis of Resistance as it serves as a key component of Iran’s long-standing regional strategy and deterrence against the United States and Israel.

 

Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. Some senior US and Israeli officials have recently called for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program.[x] IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs."[xi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[xii] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 9 that Iran's network of nuclear facilities and technology is "stabilized, irreversible, and indestructible."[xiii] An unspecified Iranian official similarly told Western media that the Iranian nuclear program "cannot be dismantled."[xiv]

 

Israeli media reported on April 9 that the United States set a 60-day deadline, starting on April 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[xv] Iran and the United States are expected to hold nuclear talks in Oman on April 12. Negotiations for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took around 20 months.[xvi]  Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal. Iran has explicitly rejected some of these demands, including the full dismantlement of its nuclear program.[xvii] Trump previously warned in late March 2025 that "there will be a bombing" if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xviii] Senior Iranian officials have threatened to attack US bases and forces in the Middle East in response to a potential strike on Iran.[xix]

 

Iran reportedly recently delivered advanced missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, possibly in order to diversify its strike options in response to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. The Times reported on April 8 that Iran delivered an unspecified number of Arqab cruise missiles and Jamal 69 ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xx] Arqab cruise missiles, also known as Paveh missiles, have a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[xxi] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, frequently used Arqab missiles to attack Israel between May and November 2024.[xxii] Iran has reportedly supplied Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with Jamal 69 ballistic missiles, or Iranian Zolfaghar missiles, since 2018.[xxiii]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent days. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai implied on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[xxiv] The Popular Campain to Expel the American Occupation threatened to target the US Embassy in Baghdad if Iran is attacked.[xxv] These threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq.

 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City.[xxvi] The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.[xxvii] Mashat largely serves as a figurehead in the Houthi regime, while the head of the presidential office, Ahmed Hamed, exerts control and influences decision-making behind the scenes.[xxviii] Hamed has close ties to Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi and fought alongside Abdulmalik in the early 2000s.[xxix] Abdulmalik appointed Hamed as head of the presidential office in January 2018.[xxx]

 

CENTCOM has conducted at least 20 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 8.[xxxi] The military base that CENTCOM struck on Mount Nuqum reportedly contains underground weapons depots and tunnel networks.[xxxii] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting communications sites. These sites likely support Houthi operations in Houthi territory as well as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel.[xxxiii] CENTCOM targeted likely Houthi barracks in Amin Muqbil on the outskirts of Hudaydah City.[xxxiv] Airstrikes targeting communications sites and strategic points near Houthi-controlled ports will likely impede the Houthis’ logistics, including the Houthis’ ability to move military supplies and coordinate operations.[xxxv]

 

Internationally recognized Yemeni government officials argued on April 8 and 9 that a ground offensive, in addition to airstrikes, against the Houthis is the only way to eliminate the Houthi threat to international shipping.[xxxvi] These officials called for international support for a ground offensive. CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla separately met with several US defense partners and allies in the Middle East between April 1 and 5 to discuss regional developments.[xxxvii] Kurilla held separate meetings with the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sagheer Ahmed Aziz, and the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, General Fayyad bin Hamed al Ruwayli, in Riyadh between April 3 and 5.[xxxviii] The officials likely discussed the CENTCOM airstrike campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and may have discussed cooperation with the Yemeni Armed Forces and Saudi Arabian Armed Forces to address the Houthi threat.

 

A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025.[xxxix] Mohammed Jabar acknowledged in an interview with a UAE-based outlet that he coordinated the March 6 attacks against transitional government forces.[xl] Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad.[xli]  Tartous security forces previously said that Assadist insurgents received salaries from abroad and used foreign communications equipment.[xlii] Jabar’s admission supports the assessment that Iran and Iranian-backed militias did not fund or oversee the Assadist insurgency in March.

Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.  Jabar echoed a sectarian justification for the Alawite insurgency, claiming that his forces rose up without preparation in self-defense after transitional government forces targeted Alawites across coastal Syria.[xliii] Jabar also expressed personal grievances against the Shara government for seizing his property in Latakia.[xliv] The tactical proficiency of the insurgents’ actions, such as blocking the transitional government’s route to the Syrian coast, suggest that insurgents planned and coordinated the attacks in advance, contrary to Jabar’s claims.[xlv]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Information Operation: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand. Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs." Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal.
• CENTCOM Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City. The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.
• Syrian Insurgency: A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025. Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad. Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.

Iran Update, April 8, 2025

Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands.[i] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations.[ii] US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that the US and Iran will hold “direct” talks on April 12, while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected direct negotiations multiple times in recent months.[iii] Araghchi published an English-language op-ed in Western media on April 8 that emphasized that talks will be “indirect” and compared the proposed format to the indirect Russia-Ukraine talks mediated by the United States and the indirect US-Iran nuclear talks mediated by the European Union in 2021.[iv] Some reported US demands include significant limits to Iran’s uranium enrichment, a decrease in support to Iran’s proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, and limits to Iran’s drone and missile program.[v] Some senior US officials also indicated that the United States seeks a deal that would fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, something that Iranian officials have stated is unacceptable.[vi] To accept these demands would require Iran to abandon key components of its regional strategy and severely limit Iran’s deterrence against the United States and Israel. Iran has long anchored its regional strategy on the development of proxies and partners, and it has only abandoned key partners like Bashar al Assad in the face of military defeat.

Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations. Iranian officials have recently told Western media outlets that Iran is distancing itself from various proxies in the Axis of Resistance, namely the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[vii] Iranian officials could calculate that launching this information campaign will enable them to successfully argue that Iran is stepping back its support for its proxies. This campaign is a continuation of a long-running Iranian campaign in which Iran denies its support for many of its proxies. Iran, for example, denies that it violates the UN arms embargo to Yemen despite clear evidence that Iran ships weapons to the Houthis.[viii] Iran similarly obfuscates its role in the Axis of Resistance despite its clear leadership role--including its ability to direct some groups to do Tehran’s bidding. Iran and its partners and proxies have continued to state publicly in Arabic and Farsi that they will support one another while simultaneously denying their close relationships in English to Western outlets.[ix]

Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, further illustrating the interaction between major US adversaries. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Chinese and Russian counterparts in Moscow on April 8 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue and lifting sanctions.[x] Iran, China, and Russia issued similar statements following the meeting, emphasizing the importance of ongoing cooperation on these issues.[xi] Iran, China, and Russia previously issued a joint statement in mid-March condemning the US "maximum pressure" strategy vis-a-vis Iran following a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.[xii] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia or China plan to support Tehran amid growing US pressure. Russia and China, both UN Security Council members, may help block the passage of resolutions against Iran. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil. China’s Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions.[xiii]

Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials.[xiv] Another unspecified source "familiar with Turkish-Israeli tensions” told Middle East Eye on April 7 that the talks between Turkey and Israel began after Israel struck Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province.[xv] Israel has struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21, March 24, and April 2.[xvi] Israeli officials called the strikes a “warning” to Turkey.[xvii] Reuters reported on April 7 that Turkey has evaluated establishing airbases at Tiyas and at least two other Syrian bases.[xviii] The unspecified Western officials said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told his Turkish counterparts that Israel had a “limited window” to strike Tiyas before Turkey positioned assets there, which would make the base “off-limits” to Israeli strikes.[xix] The Turkish Defense Ministry denied that it held talks with Israel on April 8.[xx] An open line of communication between Turkey and Israel could possibly prevent a potential stand-off between the two parties, particularly one that may be triggered if Israel continues to strike Syrian bases and Turkey continues to develop plans to base its forces in Syria. One of the unspecified sources said that Netanyahu maintained that Israel insists on a fully demilitarized southern Syria, which would preclude Turkey from forming a presence there.[xxi] The Turkish government is unlikely to halt plans to establish Turkish presence at Syrian bases like Tiyas or Palmyra. Turkish officials have maintained that doing so is critical to Turkey’s counter-ISIS efforts.[xxii]

 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah Governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks. CENTCOM conducted an airstrike on April 2 targeting al Fazah, Hudaydah Governorate, southwest of Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen near the Red Sea, reportedly killing at least 70 Houthi fighters.[xxiii] Several mid-ranking Houthi military and intelligence officials reportedly died in the airstrike, including the al Tuhayta Axis Commander Najib Kashri.[xxiv] The Tuhayta area is south of Hudaydah and close to the frontline between Houthi and pro-Yemeni government forces. CENTCOM strikes eliminating mid-level commanders along this frontline could create opportunities for pro-government forces to exploit if the CENTCOM strikes were to be coordinated with pro-government forces. These strikes and their possible impacts on the frontline are notable in the context of CNN reporting on April 6 that the Yemeni Government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis, citing unspecified regional diplomatic sources.[xxv] These mid-level commanders will be quickly replaced, however. The Tuhayta area is also probably important for Houthi smuggling efforts and drone and missile operations.[xxvi] CENTCOM reportedly targeted the Houthis’ Red Sea Coastal Region Commander Abu Taleb in this airstrike as well.[xxvii] Abu Taleb’s status remains unknown.

CENTCOM also reportedly conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting 13 Houthi military officials meeting at Sheikh Saleh al Suhaili’s house in the eastern suburbs of Sanaa City, according to local sources.[xxviii] Houthi media reported that the airstrikes killed at least four people and injured 25, but did not name the casualties.[xxix] Suhaili’s brother is close to the founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein al Houthi, and is himself reportedly affiliated with the Houthis internal security apparatus and the Houthis’ smuggling operations.[xxx] Suhaili has also previously hosted former Iranian Ambassador to the Houthis and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force member Hassan Irloo in the same house when Irloo was ambassador between 2019 and 2021.[xxxi]

A Saudi news outlet reported that the Houthis arrested Houthi Security and Intelligence Services Deputy chief Major General Abdulqader al Shami for leaking Houthi military sites’ locations, citing unspecified sources.[xxxii] Shami previously served in intelligence roles under President Ali Abdullah Saleh and continued to work under the Houthis after the Houthis took over Sanaa in 2014.[xxxiii] Shami’s superior, Abdulhakim al Khaywani, does not trust Shami because of Shami’s connections to the pre-Houthi government, according to local media reports from 2022.[xxxiv] Shami presents an easy scapegoat for intelligence failures. Shami could have motivations for leaking information if he has been increasingly marginalized, though CTP-ISW has not observed reports suggesting that Shami leaked any possible military locations.

 

US Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin met with PLC President Rashad al Alimi on April 8 in Riyadh to discuss US efforts to end the Houthi blockade and restore freedom of navigation.[xxxv] This meeting is notable after unspecified regional diplomatic sources told CNN on April 6 that the Yemeni government is preparing a ground offensive against the Houthis with US and Saudi naval support to retake Hudaydah Port, though as US ambassador, Fagin regularly meets with Alimi.[xxxvi]

 

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan arrived in the United States on April 8 for an official visit and is set to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 9.[xxxvii] Faisal will reportedly discuss developments with the Houthis and in the Gaza Strip, according to unspecified US government officials.[xxxviii]  Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman separately held a phone call on April 7 with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to discuss defense cooperation and CENTCOM’s airstrike campaign targeting the Houthis.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations. Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations.
• Iran, Russia, and China Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, further illustrating the interaction between major US adversaries.
• Turkey and Israel in Syria: Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks.

Iran Update, April 7, 2025

Regional diplomatic sources told CNN on April 6 that the Yemeni government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis. The offensive would reportedly consist of advances from the south and east and along the western Yemeni coast to take Hudaydah.[i] The Yemeni government is led by the Presidential Leadership Council, which is an eight-person council consisting of all major anti-Houthi factions in Yemen and led by President Rashad al Alimi.[ii] An operation of this scale would require significant political coordination between multiple anti-Houthi factions with disparate political goals. Yemeni President Rashad al Alimi and Information Minister Muammar al Eryani both called for unity on April 7 and April 5, respectively.[iii]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 26 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 4.[iv] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes, reportedly targeting a Houthi command and control site on 50th Street in Hudaydah City, Hudaydah Governorate.[v] CENTCOM conducted at least two airstrikes targeting a Houthi military base in Kahlan, east of Sadaa City, Sadaa Governorate, on April 4 and at least three airstrikes targeting the Houthi underground facilities at al Sabaha military complex on Jabal Awsad, north of Sanaa City, Sanaa Governorate, on April 6.[vi] CENTCOM has previously targeted both Houthi military bases on March 27, April 2, and April 3.[vii] CENTCOM also conducted at least nine airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting likely Houthi naval sites on Kamran Island, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 5 and 6.[viii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely running an information operation to dissuade the United States from striking militia targets in Iraq as part of a broader Iranian information campaign targeting the West. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commanders from Kataib Hezbollah, Harkat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada told Reuters on April 7 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are prepared to disarm to “make whatever decisions necessary” to avoid conflict with the United States and Israel.[ix] The militia commanders said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supports this decision. These statements are very similar to other articles quoting Iranian officials in recent days that seek to alter US decision-making ahead of a possible strike on Iran‘s nuclear facilities. Iranian officials on April 3 told Western media that Iran is “abandoning“ the Houthis without providing any evidence.

Iranian officials and Iranian partners are not making any claims about disarmament or decreases in Iranian support in Persian or Arabic language media, suggesting that these reports are part of a concerted information effort targeting a Western audience. Kataib Hezbollah, for example, denied that it is prepared to disarm in an April 7 statement in Arabic.[x] Iranian officials similarly gave statements in Persian highlighting Iranian support to the Houthis on April 3, the same day unspecified Iranian officials told Western media that Iran is “abandoning the Houthis.”[xi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to abandon their decade-long objective to expel the US from Iraq and the region unless they suffer serious political setbacks in Iraq due to their military activities. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024 in pursuit of the removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria.[xii] The militias have previously conducted these attacks to both encourage a US withdrawal and to fulfill other strategic objectives. CTP-ISW assessed on April 4 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria recently, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure that US forces withdraw from Iraq and Syria.[xiii] Such threats are directly at odds with an effort by the militias to ”disarm.”

Iran continued to push for indirect negotiations with the United States while rejecting direct negotiations prior to US President Donald Trump’s April 7 announcement that Iran and the United States would hold direct talks on April 12.[xiv] Reuters reported on April 6 that Iran is pushing back on US demands to engage in direct nuclear talks, citing an unspecified senior Iranian official.[xv] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri similarly stated on April 7 that indirect talks with the United States are "acceptable," but “there will be no direct negotiations.”[xvi] This is the first time a senior Iranian military official has echoed Iran’s official line on nuclear negotiations by expressing openness to indirect negotiations, though rejecting direct talks.[xvii] Iran reportedly seeks a "secret" two-step process that starts with indirect talks and "potentially moves” to direct talks.[xviii] The senior Iranian official told Reuters that indirect talks give Iran a chance to "evaluate Washington's seriousness."[xix] Iran may use reported US demands for Iran to curtail its missile program and its role in leading the Axis of Resistance to claim that the United States is not ”serious.”[xx] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly and explicitly rejected any concessions on issues its nuclear program.[xxi] Iranian officials also stated on April 7 that Iran wants Oman to mediate talks between the United States and Iran.[xxii] CTP-ISW has not observed any official Iranian responses to Trump’s announcement. CTP-ISW will provide more details and analysis in the April 8 Iran Update.

Iran continued to threaten to attack US allies or any country that may support a US strike on Iran, likely to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Western media reported in recent days that Iran has warned Persian Gulf countries hosting US military bases, including Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Bahrain, not to support any potential strike on Iran.[xxiii] An unspecified Iranian official told The Times that Iran would view such support as an ”act of hostility.”[xxiv] Reuters reported on April 6 that neighboring countries with US bases "may be in the firing line," according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[xxv] An unspecified senior Iranian military official previously told the Telegraph in late March that Iran would attack any base "used by Americans" to attack Iran.[xxvi] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has held several calls with his counterparts in the region in recent days, likely to encourage these states to dissuade the United States from attacking Iran.[xxvii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran previously employed this strategy in October 2024 to dissuade states in the Middle East from providing Israel with assistance to launch an attack on Iran.[xxviii]

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited Iran's Southern Air Defense Zone based in Bushehr Province on April 6 to conduct an operational assessment of military units and defense capabilities in the zone.[xxix] The visit follows a similar inspection at the Southeastern Air Defense Zone based in Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4.[xxx] These ongoing inspections likely reflect Iranian efforts to ensure air defense readiness and prepare for a possible strike on its nuclear facilities. An unspecified senior Israeli official told Axios on April 4 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump planned to discuss a potential strike on nuclear facilities—if diplomatic efforts fail—during their meeting on April 7.[xxxi]  US President Donald Trump has previously warned on March 30 that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Air Campaign in Yemen: Regional diplomatic sources told CNN on April 6 that the Yemeni government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis. The offensive would reportedly consist of advances from the south and east and along the western Yemeni coast to take Hudaydah. US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 26 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 4.
• Iranian Information Operations: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely running an information operation to dissuade the United States from striking militia targets in Iraq as part of a broader Iranian information campaign targeting the West. Iranian officials and Iranian partners are not making any claims about disarmament or decreases in Iranian support in Persian or Arabic language media, suggesting that these reports are part of a concerted information effort targeting a Western audience.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to push for indirect negotiations with the United States while rejecting direct negotiations prior to US President Donald Trump’s April 7 announcement that Iran and the United States would hold direct talks on April 12. Iran continued to threaten to attack US allies or any country that may support a US strike on Iran, likely to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran Update, April 4, 2025

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. US President Donald Trump ordered the US military to restore the freedom of navigation and prevent attacks on US shipping in the Red Sea.[i] Western media reported on April 4 that Pentagon officials have told Congress and US allies that the US air campaign in Yemen has had only limited success in destroying Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen.[ii] There are likely multiple different operational concepts that would successfully render the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue attacks targeting international shipping. A focus solely on missiles, drones, and launchers would be very unlikely to make the Houthis unwilling or unable to target international shipping because it would be very difficult to destroy all Houthi weapons stockpiles and missile launchers. Such an operation would not seriously threaten Houthi control in Yemen. The Houthis’ top priority remains maintaining control over Houthi-controlled territory and ultimately defeating the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

CENTCOM can render the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue attacks without destroying all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. Yemeni media and officials and US officials have reported that CENTCOM has targeted Houthi communications, training centers, underground facilities, leaders, and other assets.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot currently assess the overall impact of these strikes on Houthi decision-making. These strikes could degrade the Houthi ability to target shipping by disrupting targeting cycles and command networks, however. Leadership strikes, particularly against mid-level leaders responsible for imposing local Houthi control, could disrupt Houthi internal security over time.[iv] US officials currently assess that the initial US strikes targeting Houthi assets have disrupted the Houthi command-and-control network and limited the Houthi ability to target international shipping. This would suggest that the air campaign has achieved some temporary military effects, though these effects are temporary without continued pressure on the Houthis.  

A US airstrike killed a Houthi Hudaydah Governorate Police supervisor on April 4.[v] Continued US airstrikes targeting Houthi supervisors could destabilize Houthi internal security over time. The Houthi regime uses a ”supervisory” system to maintain control over its governance structures. Supervisors fill a similar role to political commissars in the Soviet Union by ensuring that non-Houthi government leaders remain loyal to the Houthi movement.[vi] A sustained air campaign against these individuals could seriously disrupt Houthi internal security in certain areas.

CENTCOM has conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 3.[vii] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate, northern Yemen, including likely command and control sites in Saada City and eastern Saada Governorate.[viii] The Houthis conducted a combined cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on April 4.[ix] CENTCOM did not confirm the attack.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq. Newly-formed militia Harakat al Ashtar said on April 3 that its fighters are “preparing major surprises” for US forces and swore to burn US vehicles.[x] The Popular Campaign to Expel the American Occupation, another likely pro-Iranian Iraqi militia formed in early February 2025, posted a video on April 3 threatening US forces and said that the United States has no choice but to withdraw ”humiliated, defeated, and broken.”[xi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, a larger Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw by the end of 2025.[xii] Other militias have implied that they would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[xiii] These militia threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously conducted attacks targeting US forces to both encourage a US withdrawal and to fulfill other strategic objectives.  The militias have continued to threaten to attack US forces since January 2024 but have claimed few attacks since that date.[xiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xv] The removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria is a long-standing Iranian objective, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xvi]

Najaf-based Iraqi Shia cleric Sadr al Din al Qabanji separately threatened that US bases in Iraq are within the striking range of Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during a sermon on April 4.[xvii] Qabanji urged US President Donald Trump not to start or threaten war, referring to Trump’s threat to bomb Iran if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xviii] Qabanji is a member of an Iranian-aligned Iraqi Shia political party and has ties to Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xix]

Senior Iranian officials appear increasingly concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and IRGC Aerospace Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone based in Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 to conduct an operational assessment of military units and defense capabilities at the zone.[xx] The visit comes as Iran continues to pursue efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid growing concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[xxi]

The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that will fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.[xxii] US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 3 that direct talks "go faster."[xxiii] Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected direct negotiations with the United States.[xxiv] An Iranian expert close to the regime told the Atlantic on April 3 that Iran seeks a ”secret,” two-step process that starts with indirect talks and “potentially” moves to direct negotiations.[xxv] US officials have previously warned that the United States will pursue military options if the Iranian regime does not engage in direct negotiations.[xxvi] Indirect talks likely allow Iran to buy time, avoid public pressure, and preserve its image while quietly weighing US demands it may eventually have to accept in some form.

Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government.[xxvii] Velayati stated on April 4 that the Syrian government has ”no legitimacy” and has targeted ”innocent civilians“ in Latakia, likely referring to a period of violence in coastal Syria in early March.[xxviii] Velayati also criticized the government’s inaction against Israeli operations in Syria.[xxix]

Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.[xxx] Anti-government actors, including Alawite social media accounts and Alawite insurgents, are driving sectarian narratives in the Syrian information space that support insurgent objectives.[xxxi] Both Iran and the insurgents likely calculate that highlighting the Syrian government’s sectarian tendencies will make it more difficult for the government to secure foreign aid and make it more likely that the government becomes increasingly unstable. This would provide an opportunity for Iran to reinsert itself into Syria, as it has expressed interest in doing.

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. The current air campaign could render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks in the Red Sea by disrupting Houthi targeting cycles and command-and-control networks.
• Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that fully dismantles Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.
• Iran and Syria’s Insurgency: Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government. Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.

Iran Update, April 3, 2025

Iran is continuing to try to bolster its air defenses in preparation for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Iran has built a new Ghadir phased-array radar in West Azerbaijan Province in northwestern Iran in recent months, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[i] An open-source analyst reported on April 2 that Iran also recently built two Ghadir radars in southern Iran near the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The October 2024 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran damaged two Ghadir radars in southwestern Iran.[ii] The operational status of these radars is unclear. Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent months, particularly around Iranian nuclear facilities.[iii] The construction of new radars and recent exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid the Iranian regime’s concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.

Russia remains an unviable mediator between the United States and Iran given Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activity in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on April 1 that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program.[iv] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, met with Ryabkov in Moscow on April 2 to discuss Iranian nuclear negotiations.[v] Ravanchi and Ryabkov emphasized the importance of "resolving misunderstandings about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities." A senior Russian official similarly downplayed the threat of the Iranian nuclear program in early March 2025, claiming that Iran's production of 60 percent enriched uranium has "no weapons risk."[vi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[vii] Senior Russian officials have also previously criticized the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran and called US threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities "unacceptable.”[viii]

Russia has also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel and the United States. Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting data to support Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea, according to Western media.[ix] The Telegraph reported on April 3 that there is currently a Russian military expert in Yemen who is advising the Houthis on how to conduct attacks.”[x] Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activities in the region make it extremely unlikely that Russia would be able to help the United States secure its interests in the Middle East.

A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph on April 3 that Iran is “abandoning” the Houthis.[xi] This statement is very likely part of an Iranian information operation to try to obfuscate Iran’s leading role in the Axis of Resistance and absolve Iran of responsibility for proxy attacks against the United States and Israel. The official told The Telegraph that the Iranian regime has pivoted its focus to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian territory.[xii] Iran is almost certainly concerned about a potential strike, but that concern has not precluded continued Iranian support for the Houthis. Iranian officials have continued to express support for the Houthis in Persian- and Arabic-language media, including in Houthi media, in recent days.[xiii] The official also claimed that the Iranian regime ordered Iranian military personnel to leave Yemen because Iran is concerned that the death of an Iranian military official in a US airstrike in Yemen could lead to a “direct confrontation” with the United States.[xiv] The deaths of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force personnel in other Axis of Resistance theaters, such as Iraq and Syria, has not previously caused Iran to leave those theaters.[xv]  It is therefore unlikely that Iran would leave Yemen and abandon its decades-old strategy of building up proxies across the region to confront the United States and Israel out of concern that a US airstrike could kill Iranian personnel.

The official also claimed that Iran is abandoning the Houthis because it believes that the Houthis are “living their final months.”[xvi] This statement contradicts Iran’s approach to other Iranian proxies that have been severely degraded since October 2023.[xvii] The IDF severely degraded Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but Iran continues to support both groups.[xviii] Iran has attempted in recent months to transfer funds to Hezbollah to aid Hezbollah’s reconstitution in Lebanon, for example.[xix] Iran is also attempting to stoke sectarian tensions and rebuild Iranian networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xx] The Houthis’ ability to disrupt international trade and attack Israel makes them a strategic and valuable partner for Iran, which Iran is unlikely to abandon.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 28 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 2.[xxi] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi sites near Taiz Airport for the first time since the start of the US air campaign on March 15.[xxii] CENTCOM also targeted a Yemeni-Omani telecommunications site in Jablah District, Ibb Governorate, that reportedly contained Houthi radars and air defense systems.[xxiii] CENTCOM conducted an airstrike targeting a vehicle south of Sanaa. The strike reportedly killed the personal assistant of Houthi Interior Minister Abdulkarim al Houthi, who is Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s uncle.[xxiv] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. CENTCOM also likely targeted Houthi fighters in a separate airstrike targeting a vehicle northwest of Saada.[xxv]

The IDF engaged armed Syrians during an Israeli incursion 13 kilometers into Syrian territory near Nawa, Daraa Province, on April 2. Syrian media reported that an Israeli convoy of tanks and vehicles entered a forest near al Jabaliya Dam, approximately 13 kilometers from the disengagement zone.[xxvi] The IDF said that several “terrorists” fired at IDF 210th Division forces while they were confiscating weapons and destroying infrastructure in the area.[xxvii] The IDF killed several of the gunmen from the ground and air.[xxviii] Syrian media reported that unspecified Syrian gunmen fired heavy machine guns at Israeli aircraft and that Israeli forces shelled numerous targets near Tal al Jamou.[xxix] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that its fighters engaged the IDF with "appropriate weapons” near Nawa and Tasil.[xxx] The fighting killed nine Syrian men and reportedly injured over 20 others.[xxxi] The Syrian Interim Foreign Ministry accused Israel of deliberately attempting to “destabilize Syria.”[xxxii] This incident marks the second time that Syrians have attacked Israeli forces advancing into southern Syrian territory since the IDF killed at least four armed Syrians in Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25.[xxxiii]

This incident may present anti-Israel and anti-interim government armed groups with an opportunity to gain support and recruit new fighters. The leader of the prominent Suwayda-based Druze militia Mudafa al Karama, Leith al Balous, praised the Syrians who “defended” southern Syria from Israel as martyrs who fought against Israel in a “battle of existence and dignity.”[xxxiv] Over a thousand Syrians participated in a funeral in Nawa on April 3 for the men who died during the fighting.[xxxv] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which claimed that its fighters engaged Israeli forces, amplified calls to attend the funeral.[xxxvi] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria uses iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors and has referred to the current government as an “internal enemy,” suggesting that the group is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[xxxvii] The growth of anti-Israel, anti-government activity may provide an opportunity for external actors, such as Iranian-backed actors, to exploit anti-Israel grievances in southern Syria.

The IDF has continued to strike military assets in Syria, including a site where Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase. The IDF struck Hama Military Airport in Hama Province, Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert, and the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh, Damascus, on April 2.[xxxviii] The Syrian interim government said that the strikes injured several Syrians and “destroyed” Hama Military Airport.[xxxix] Several local Syrian sources reported that the strikes destroyed the airport’s aircraft, hangars, arms depots, and runway.[xl] The new Syrian Air Force has used aircraft at the Hama Airport in recent days, according to local media.[xli] Local media reported that the strike on the airport killed a Syrian Jaysh al Izza soldier.[xlii] The new Syrian 74th Division, which is reportedly comprised of mostly Jaysh al Izza soldiers, is based in Hama Province.[xliii] Syrian media also reported that the IDF struck former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions near Damascus on April 3.[xliv] Local sources reported that the IDF targeted a former SAA air defense battalion.[xlv]

Israel previously attacked Hama Military Airport and former SAA positions near Damascus in December 2024 to destroy equipment and weapons left over from the Assad regime.[xlvi] Israel recently struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21 and March 24.[xlvii] Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase at Tiyas as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.[xlviii] Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on April 2 that the IDF conducted the strikes to send a message to Turkey that Israel will not allow Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.[xlix] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz called the strikes “a warning for the future.”[l]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Air Defenses: Iran is continuing to try to bolster its air defenses in preparation for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Iran has built a new Ghadir phased-array radar in West Azerbaijan Province in northwestern Iran in recent months, according to commercially available satellite imagery. Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent months, particularly around Iranian nuclear facilities. The construction of new radars and recent exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid the Iranian regime’s concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia remains an unviable mediator between the United States and Iran given Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activity in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on April 1 that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, met with Ryabkov in Moscow on April 2 to discuss Iranian nuclear negotiations. Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activities in the region make it extremely unlikely that Russia would be able to help the United States secure its interests in the Middle East.
• Iranian Support for the Houthis: A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph on April 3 that Iran is “abandoning” the Houthis. This statement is very likely part of an Iranian information operation to try to obfuscate Iran’s leading role in the Axis of Resistance and absolve Iran of responsibility for proxy attacks against the United States and Israel. The Houthis’ ability to disrupt international trade and attack Israel makes them a strategic and valuable partner for Iran, which Iran is unlikely to abandon.
• Israeli Activity in Syria: The IDF engaged armed Syrians during an Israeli incursion 13 kilometers into Syrian territory near Nawa, Daraa Province, on April 2. This incident marks the second time that Syrians have attacked Israeli forces advancing into southern Syrian territory since the IDF killed at least four armed Syrians in Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25. This incident may present anti-Israel and anti-interim government armed groups with an opportunity to gain support and recruit new fighters.
• Israeli Activity in Syria: The IDF has continued to strike military assets in Syria, including a site where Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase. The IDF struck Hama Military Airport in Hama Province, Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert, and the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh, Damascus, on April 2. Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on April 2 that the IDF conducted the strikes to send a message to Turkey that Israel will not allow Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.

Iran Update, April 2, 2025

Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on April 2 claiming that Iran "certainly has sufficient weapons" to attack Diego Garcia Island.[i] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island.[ii] The piece stated that US Air Force and Navy "strategic assets" and "4000 US soldiers" at Diego Garcia would be "at risk of complete destruction" if the United States attacked Iran.[iii] There are normally roughly 400 US military personnel and 2,000 civilian contractors at Diego Garcia.[iv] The article outlined the following options for an Iranian attack on US assets at Diego Garcia.

• Missile and drone attack: Defa Press stated that Iran could conduct a drone attack "using advanced Shahed 136 drones."[v] Iran unveiled the Shahed-136B drone in September 2024 and claimed it has a range of 4000 kilometers (km).[vi] The original Shahed-136 drone has a maximum speed of 185 km per hour, which means it would take about 20 hours to reach Diego Garcia from the southernmost city in Iran. Iran previously launched about 170 drones in their April 2024 attack on Israel, none of which entered Israeli airspace, in part because the drone’s slow speed enabled allied aircraft to intercept and destroy the drones.[vii] The drones launched from Iran would have taken roughly nine hours to reach Israel, though Israel had the benefit of a plethora of Israeli and allied land-based aircraft available to intercept drones.[viii] Defa Press also stated that Iran could use ballistic and cruise missiles, including Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, at "close range" to Diego Garcia.[ix] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles and ability to manufacture some advanced ballistic missiles have been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, but Iran would presumably expend a large proportion of its remaining stockpile in the event of a strike on its nuclear facilities.[x] Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of its drones and missiles or otherwise alter the weight of the drones and missiles themselves to launch a land-based attack with sufficient range to hit Diego Garcia.
• Naval drone and missile attack launched from surface vessels: Defa Press also threatened that Iran could hit targets in the Indian Ocean using surface vessels, presumably its drone carriers and others, to launch cruise missiles and drones.[xi] This would—in theory—allow Iranian ships to get closer to Diego Garcia. Such vessels lack the necessary countermeasures to seriously defend themselves against US naval action, however.

Iran still retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike other US bases in the Middle East, however. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent weeks to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries.[xii] An unspecified Iranian official told the Wall Street Journal that "each American soldier will be an individual target" if the United States attacks Iran.[xiii] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh similarly stated that the United States has "at least 10 bases and over 50,000 troops" near Iran that Iran could target.[xiv] Iran has previously attacked US bases in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, and the Houthis have previously targeted al Dhafra Airbase in Abu Dhabi, which hosts US and French personnel.[xv]

Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah.[xvi] Hezbollah has probably long used its international networks to procure some weapons and drone components, though it could decide to prioritize these efforts after the collapse of Assad and the setbacks caused by Israel.[xvii]

These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.[xviii] Spanish media reported that the three individuals arrested on April 1 resided on the same street as another group of Hezbollah-affiliated individuals that Spanish police detained in 2024 for producing over 1,000 drones for Hezbollah.[xix] Spanish media noted that the investigation that led to the arrest of the three individuals on April 1 has also led to the arrests of an unspecified number of individuals in France and the United Kingdom.[xx]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.[xxi] The SDF agreed to withdraw from two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 1.[xxii] An interim government official said that the withdrawal agreement is the first step toward the comprehensive agreement between the SDF and interim government.[xxiii] Local sources subsequently reported that the SDF withdrew from the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge on April 2, where they have fought the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) since December 2024.[xxiv] An anti-SDF source also claimed that the SDF would withdraw from Deir Hafer, Nasiriyah, and Maskanah south of the dam along Highway 4 after leaving Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[xxv] Syrian sources, including those close to the interim government, claimed that the SDF’s withdrawal was the result of “a preliminary agreement” to create a demilitarized zone around frequent engagement sites.[xxvi]  A “special administration,” possibly consisting of dam employees, will be in control of the Tishreen Dam area.[xxvii] Dam employees were allowed to remain in the area to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions during the last ceasefire agreement between the SDF and the SNA in December 2024.[xxviii]  Syrian Kurdish sources have refuted the reports that the SDF withdrew from its positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[xxix] Official SDF and interim government sources have not commented on the rumored SDF withdrawal or agreement at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian media said that Iran could attack Diego Garcia using very long-range one-way attack drones or by using a naval surface combatant to launch drones and cruise missiles.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah. These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.
• SDF-Syrian Interim Government Agreement: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.

Iran Update, April 1, 2025

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad.[i]  The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1.[ii] A Lebanese security source told Reuters that Badir was a mid-ranking commander whose responsibilities included the "Palestinian file."[iii] Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.”[iv]

It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack. Hezbollah and Iran may have planned the attack to impose a heavy cost on Israel to try to increase pressure on the IDF to withdraw from the five remaining IDF positions in southern Lebanon.[v]  It is also possible that hardline Hezbollah elements who disagree with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s position of inaction vis-a-vis Israel independently planned this attack.[vi] Qassem has repeatedly stated that the Lebanese state, rather than Hezbollah, is responsible for responding to Israeli operations in Lebanon.[vii] It is unclear if Hezbollah central leadership approved the attack plan. It is further possible that Hezbollah and Iran calculated, after suffering significant losses throughout the past year, that they must change their strategy and conduct external terror attacks. The Israeli National Security Council warned on April 1 ahead of the Jewish Passover holiday that Iran, either directly or through its proxies, may try to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad against the backdrop of renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip.[viii]  

Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security."[ix] Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[x] Hardline Iranian Parliamentarian Ahmad Naderi separately stated on March 31 that the United States "wouldn't dare threaten to bomb" Iran if Iran "had an atomic bomb."[xi] Naderi previously made similar statements in November and December 2024.[xii] Larijani and Naderi's comments echo recent calls from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials for the Supreme Leader to allow the development of a nuclear weapon.[xiii] The recent Iranian threats come after US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xiv]

Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site.[xv] This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.[xvi] Middle East Eye reported that negotiations for the defense pact have "quietly” continued since December 2024.[xvii] One of the sources said that Turkey plans to deploy Hisar air defense systems and surveillance and attack drones to provide air cover for the base while construction is underway. The Hisar-A and Hisar-O systems are Turkish short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, respectively.[xviii] A second unspecified source claimed that the presence of Turkish drones and air defense systems at the base would “likely deter Israel” from conducting strikes in the area.[xix] The IDF recently struck “strategic military infrastructure” at Tiyas Airbase on March 21 and 25.[xx] The strikes destroyed at least one Su-24 fighter jet and rendered the airstrip unusable.[xxi] An unspecified Israeli defense official told Israeli media that the IDF conducted these strikes to send a message to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara that Israel will not tolerate any reduction of its “freedom of action” in Syrian airspace.[xxii] An unspecified Israeli security official stated on March 31 that a Turkish airbase in Syria would undermine Israel’s freedom to operate in Syria and that Israel would view such a base as a “potential threat.”[xxiii] The location of Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert would allow Turkey to establish “aerial control” over the area and support Turkish counter-ISIS efforts, according to one of the sources speaking to Middle East Eye.[xxiv]

Turkey and the Syrian interim government have begun construction efforts at the Menagh Airbase, near the Syria-Turkey border in Aleppo Province, in recent weeks.[xxv] Turkey may deploy air defense systems and fighter jets to the Menagh Airbase once renovations are complete, according to Syrian media.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Thwarted Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian Attack: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad. The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1. Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.” It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack.
• Iranian Weaponization Threats: Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security." Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.
• Turkish Military Bases in Syria: Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site. This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.

Iran Update, March 31, 2025

Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal.[i] Trump added that he would impose secondary tariffs on Iran if Iran makes no progress towards a deal.[ii] Secondary tariffs would impose sanctions on countries that trade with Iran. US officials have previously threatened military action against Iran if there were no direct negotiations.[iii] Iranian officials have said they are open to indirect negotiations, though they reject direct negotiations with the United States.[iv] Senior Iranian officials have also repeatedly threatened to strike US interests in the region since at least January 2025, likely to shape US decision-making and discourage a US or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program.[v] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told the Telegraph on March 29 that Iran would attack any base "used by Americans" to attack Iran.[vi] Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation.

Iranian officials have recently threatened the following responses to a US-Israeli strike on Iran. These courses of action are not mutually exclusive.

• Attack US bases and forces: Iranian officials have repeatedly explicitly threatened to attack US bases and forces in the region in recent months.[vii] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told Western media on March 29 that Iran would target Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean if the United States attacked Iran.[viii] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[ix] An anonymous official also told Tehran Times that Iran's missile launchers at its underground bases are loaded with missiles and "ready for launch."[x] Iran's reported current maximum missile range is 2000 kilometers (km), and its reported maximum drone range is around 2500km.[xi] Diego Garcia Island is located about 3700km from Iran's southernmost city, Pasabandar. Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of the warhead on its medium-range missiles or otherwise decrease missile weight to launch a successful attack on Diego Garcia. Iran could target other US facilities in the region if it chose to do so. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh threatened on March 31 that US bases in the region are ”sitting in a glass house" near Iran.[xii]
• Disrupt international trade: IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri suggested on March 29 that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[xiii] Tangsiri also threatened to seize ships if Iranian ships were seized.
• Conduct a direct attack on Israel: Senior Iranian military commanders have recently resurfaced threats to conduct another missile attack on Israel.[xiv] Iran unveiled its latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[xv] Iranian media referred to the missile as the “Israeli ballistic missile” because it can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[xvi] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles, or missiles that can reach Israel, has been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, however.

Iranian officials have publicly stated that they are unwilling to make concessions to reach a new nuclear deal with the United States under President Trump's desired timeline or terms. Iranian sources stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance.[xvii] A senior Iranian military official stated on March 29 that Iran will "never negotiate” on its missiles or the “capabilities” of the Axis of Resistance.[xviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to expel the United States from the region and establish itself as the regional hegemon. An unspecified senior Iranian source separately told a UK-based, Gulf-linked outlet that Trump's letter refers to the "zero enrichment" approach.[xix] It remains unclear if Iran is willing to reverse significant progress on its nuclear program to meet the terms. Western media also reported in mid-March that Trump's letter set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal.[xx] Prior negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), took 20 months to negotiate.

Iran is likely rebuilding its solid-fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.[xxi] The sanctioned Iranian cargo vessel Jairan, which is carrying sodium perchlorate, a chemical used to make solid missile fuel, arrived near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, around March 29.[xxii] Marine Traffic and Maritime Executive confirmed that the Jairan, one of two Iranian Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessels sanctioned for transporting missile materials, is waiting near the Gheshm and Hormoz islands. Western officials told The Financial Times in January 2025 that Golbon and Jairan would deliver over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran.[xxiii] The IRGC’s Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which partially oversees Iran’s missile research and development, received most of the shipment offloaded by Golbon on February 13.[xxiv] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[xxv] The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to one of these locations would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.

Iran continues to coordinate with Russia and China on nuclear issues. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov in Tehran on March 31 to discuss nuclear talks and sanctions relief.[xxvi] Gharibabadi said Iran, Russia, and China will continue trilateral meetings and that Russia invited him to a UN Charter group meeting in Moscow in mid-April. The meeting follows a March 14 joint statement from Russia, China, and Iran that condemned US sanctions and described Iran’s nuclear activities as “peaceful.”[xxvii] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia and China plan to support Tehran under growing US pressure. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests through mediation, particularly in talks on Iran’s nuclear program and support of the Axis of Resistance.[xxviii]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara announced the appointments of 23 transitional ministers to his cabinet during a press conference on March 29.[xxix] These ministers are expected to remain in power until the transitional government cedes power to a new, elected government after a five-year interim period.[xxx] Shara replaced the majority of former interim ministers with new appointments and appointed one woman, one Christian, one Alawite, one Druze, and two Kurds to lead ministries within his government.[xxxi] Shara also appointed nine ”independent” ministers, including various professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[xxxii] He also dismissed the former interim justice minister, who was an ex-Jabhat al Nusra official.[xxxiii] These are undoubtedly positive steps towards a representative transitional government, but Shara still prioritized maintaining his control over key ministries such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice by appointing Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated officials or former HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) officials to these posts.[xxxiv] He also appointed former HTS and SSG officials to the less important ministries of energy, local administration and environment, public works and housing, youth and sports, and administrative development.[xxxv] The decision to expand his transitional cabinet to include minorities and “newcomers” follows widespread concern that Shara is personalizing power and appointing loyalists while blocking opportunities to represent Syria’s various minority communities in the transitional government.[xxxvi] Shara previously appointed a cabinet nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based SSG.[xxxvii]

Shara’s appointments of long-time loyalists to key positions suggests Shara hopes to continue to maintain his own and HTS’s influence within the transitional government. Shara has appointed or reappointed close advisers and allies from HTS to oversee portfolios directly concerning internal security and state stability. Shara has retained two of his most trusted advisors, Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Asaad al Shaibani, as ministers of defense and foreign affairs, respectively.[xxxviii] Former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Khattab has transitioned from intelligence chief to Interior Minister, where he will oversee the state’s General Security Services, border control, and intelligence services.[xxxix] The United States and the UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[xl] It is not clear if or who Shara will appoint to directly oversee Syrian intelligence services, given the expansion of Khattab’s role. Shara also appointed “key HTS ideologue” and Sunni scholar Mazhar al Wais as his Justice Minister.[xli] Arab media has reported that Wais has served as a ”senior legal figure” in HTS and has accompanied Shara to numerous high-level meetings without having been appointed to an official role.[xlii] Shara’s decision to position these loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the trajectory of the Syrian government and its security services, which could allow him to maintain his rule well into the future. Qasra, Shaibani, Khattab, and Wais’s appointments suggest that Shara intends to maintain significant control over ministries that directly concern internal security and state stability, and it could enable him to sideline rivals as he did during his rule of Idlib.

Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[xliii] These ministries—particularly education—can be used to remake the next generation of a country by altering textbooks. The Assad regime and other Middle Eastern autocratic regimes—like the Houthis in Yemen and ISIS—have created educational materials to brainwash the next generation. Shara probably recognized that placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have earned him significant international blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions. Shara could still employ a ”supervisory” system in which deputy ministers make the decisions and hold the real power while the minister serves as a figurehead.

Shara’s new transitional government is unlikely to assuage fears from minority communities about the future of minority representation in the transitional government and the trajectory of Shara’s rule. Shara’s clear preference for Sunni Arabs, the very few minorities, and the lack of appointees from other strong Syrian parties like the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) or Kurdish National Council (KNC) has already led several minority-dominated groups to condemn his “one-party government.”[xliv] The Alawite community, for its part, remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. The SDC decried the new government as “largely homogenous.”[xlv] A KNC official told Kurdish media that the KNC ”will not participate in a government that does not recognize the rights of the Kurdish people.”[xlvi] The official warned that the Kurds have been ignored for the ”third time,” likely referring to widespread Kurdish criticism over exclusion from the National Dialogue Conference, the drafting of the constitutional declaration, and the recent appointments.[xlvii] Fear among key Kurdish powerbrokers that Shara will continue to exclude their parties from a voice in his government’s formation risks disrupting the Syrian interim government’s efforts to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state.

The separatist Druze-majority Suwayda Military Council (SMC) also rejected Shara’s “one-color" government during a press conference on March 30.[xlviii] The group called on Shara to form a government that ”represents all Syrian components.”[xlix] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[l] A Western analyst recently reported that it is ”well known” within the Druze community that the SMC has connections to Israel through members of the Israeli Druze community.[li] It does not appear that the SMC represents a majority of the Syrian Druze population. That multiple camps across Syria continue to reject Shara’s transitional government will not help grow the government’s legitimacy, however.

Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28.[lii] Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.[liii] The Supreme Council of Fatwa will rule on decisions by majority vote, and Shara will vote as a tiebreaker if needed.[liv] HTS established a Supreme Fatwa Council in Idlib in 2019 that Shara effectively controlled and used to sideline his hardline Islamist rivals.[lv] Shara’s ability to use the council against his rivals will depend on his level of influence over a majority of its council members. Several notable HTS-affiliated scholars, including Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atun, former HTS-backed Supreme Fatwa Council member Anas Ayrut, and new Minister of Justice Mazhar al Wais, sit on the new council.[lvi]

Shara appointed Sheikh Osama al Rifai as the council’s chairman.[lvii] The Syrian Islamic Council, which was a body of Sunni Islamic scholars that opposed the Assad regime, appointed Rifai as the Grand Mufti in Syria in 2021 after the regime abolished the office.[lviii] Rifai has connections to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood.[lix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies enabling a strike, may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel.
• Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities. The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to product long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.
• Syrian Transitional Government: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.
• Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council: Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28. Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.

Iran Update, March 28, 2025

Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[i] Iran signaled openness to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions.  Senior Iranian officials expressing support for indirect negotiations likely aim to reassure the Iranian public that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief amid Iran's deteriorating economic situation. Senior Iranian officials have, however, heavily caveated that Iran should remain cautious in negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on March 28 that Iran's response to Trump's letter is “restrained” and emphasized Iran's readiness to "confront" threats.[ii] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized US attempts to "impose [its] demands" on Iran.[iii] Iranian officials have also explicitly rejected any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[iv] These statements likely aim to appease hardline elements within the regime that oppose negotiations with the West.

Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[v] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments."[vi] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi asked the E3 to "reconsider its approach" towards Iran during a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on March 28.[vii] A Wall Street Journal reporter also reported on March 28 that Iran and the E3 held "technical talks" in Geneva this week.[viii] Iranian efforts to signal openness to indirect negotiations and discussions with the E3 likely aim to deter the E3 from triggering the “snapback” mechanism.

Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has engaged in a concerted effort since at least January 2025 to shape US-Israeli decision-making and deter a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. A senior Iranian military commander warned in February 2024 that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist" an Israeli attack on Iran, likely referring to US bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries.[ix] Ghalibaf separately stated on March 28 that US allies and bases in the region "will be as vulnerable as a powder keg" if the United States and Israel threaten Iran.[x] Iran has recently unveiled new missile bases and conducted air defense exercises around nuclear sites, likely to highlight its missile capabilities and prepare for a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[xi] Iran may be signaling a willingness to engage in indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States to further shape US-Israeli decision-making and avoid a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official stated on March 25 that Trump's letter said "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[xii] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.

The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. [xiii] The government-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Aden announced on March 16 that eight Sanaa-based banks will move to Aden to avoid being subject to sanctions after the United States designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2025.[xiv] Remaining in Houthi-controlled areas would risk these banks coming under US sanctions.[xv] The Houthis have already arrested five employees at checkpoints as of March 27, according to anonymous sources talking to a Saudi news outlet.[xvi] The relocation of banks will likely further damage the Houthis' already unstable economy, which could lead to unrest and weaken the Houthis’ control over these areas in Yemen.

A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[xvii] The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE in July 2024 if the two states did not pressure the Yemeni government to stop efforts to remove the Houthi-controlled Central Bank from the SWIFT international banking network.[xviii]  The Houthis' threats worked, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE convinced the Yemeni government to drop their campaign. The Houthis recognize that Saudi Arabia and the UAE fear a resumption of Houthi attacks targeting key Saudi and Emirati commercial centers.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[xix] CENTCOM conducted at least eight airstrikes on a Houthi military base and Houthi underground facilities and communication infrastructure in the Jabal al Aswad area, Amran Governorate.[xx]  CENTCOM also targeted the Houthis‘ military command headquarters in Sanaa City.[xxi] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi denied that CENTCOM’s airstrikes have impacted their capabilities in his Quds Day speech on March 27.[xxii] A published list of dead Houthi fighters released on March 26 indicated that CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 41 Houthi fighters.[xxiii] The Houthis are unlikely to report the real number of casualties in the CENTCOM airstrikes among their fighters or release the names of Houthi senior officials killed in action. An anonymous US defense official confirmed that CENTCOM has killed several Houthi leaders since the start of their airstrike campaign, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxiv] The Wall Street Journal also reported that Abdulmalik has ordered Houthi leadership to not carry cellphones to avoid being tracked.[xxv]

Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes. A senior Houthi political official condemned the UAE for their cooperation with the United States, threatening to attack Abu Dhabi and Dubai in a post on X on March 27.[xxvi]

A Houthi delegation met with Egyptian intelligence officials in Cairo on March 26, at the Houthis’ request, to discuss deescalating regional tensions, according to anonymous sources speaking to a Saudi news outlet.[xxvii] These Egyptian officials reportedly passed on a message from the United States requesting the Houthis to not pursue an offensive campaign targeting international shipping. The source added that it was unclear if the message mentioned anything about the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have consistently linked their attacks on international shipping and Israel to their support for the Palestinian people.[xxviii] The Houthis halted their attacks when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was initially implemented in January 2025.[xxix]

Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[xxx] Sadr called on his followers to completely boycott the elections. Sadr urged Sadrists to update their voter registration on February 19 but had refused to announce whether his movement would participate in the elections.[xxxi] Sadr’s boycott of the elections is noteworthy given that his movement, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections to exclude Iranian-backed Shia political parties from government formation.[xxxii] The Sadrist political bloc’s withdrawal from Parliament in 2022 enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in Parliament.[xxxiii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could have threatened the Shia Coordination Framework’s strength in Parliament.

Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Multiple parliamentarians, including from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, the KDP, and a Turkmen bloc, called on Sadr to reverse his decision on March 28.[xxxiv] These calls follow other recent calls for Sadr to participate in the elections from senior Iraqi politicians, including Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai.[xxxv] Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xxxvi]  Iraqi political leaders across the political spectrum are likely concerned that Sadr could call for protests against governmental corruption if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xxxvii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xxxviii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xxxix]

Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Unknown actors in Lebanon launched two rockets at Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel, on March 28, which is the second rocket attack targeting Israel in the past week.[xl] The March 28 attack did not strike Kiryat Shmona.[xli] Both Hezbollah and the Lebanese president said that Hezbollah was not responsible.[xlii] Hezbollah’s central leadership is unlikely to approve any attacks targeting Israel, which would risk major Israeli reprisals. Hezbollah faces serious threats to its control, including substantial reconstruction costs that it is having trouble meeting. Israeli airstrikes would only further imperil Hezbollah. The IDF conducted an airstrike that destroyed a Hezbollah drone storage facility in Beirut, Lebanon, in response to the rocket attack.[xliii] The Israeli campaign in Lebanon badly weakened Hezbollah’s military wing in southern Lebanon, destroying approximately 80% of its 40-kilometer range rocket stockpiles and killing many senior commanders.[xliv]

Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there. Hezbollah has historically maintained de facto security control over southern Lebanon and smaller armed factions operating there, and it would be able to prevent these attacks if it were not badly damaged. It has also historically maintained good command and control over its forces, as demonstrated by the carefully calibrated attack campaign into northern Israel between October 2023 and October 2024. That Hezbollah cannot control its fighters or prevent them from conducting these attacks—which risk drawing a devastating Israeli response contrary to Hezbollah’s interests—suggests that Hezbollah lacks strong commanders who can discipline their forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Houthi Economy: The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27. Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes.
• Iraqi Politics: Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.
• Rocket Attacks in Lebanon: Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there.

Iran Update, March 27, 2025

Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[i] Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Trump sent a letter to Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, and Iran responded to the letter via Oman on March 26.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States, though it rejects direct negotiations under the current US “maximum pressure” campaign and US-Israeli threat of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated on March 25 that Trump's letter to Iran proposed "direct talks" and emphasized that "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[iii] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to grant sanctions relief or avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.

This likely suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approved indirect negotiations with the United States. Araghchi said that Iran conducted such indirect talks under former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Kamal Kharazi, have also recently expressed willingness to engage in indirect negotiations with the United States.[iv] That Kharazi spoke to state media may suggest that Iranian officials are concerned about internal unrest over Iran’s economic situation and want to signal to the Iranian population that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief.[v]

 

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors (see graphic below). A media official from the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria told Lebanese media on March 27 that the group does not receive “internal or external” support from Iran or Iranian-backed actors in the region.[vi] The official described the group as an “integrated organization” with political, social, military, and legal offices.[vii] There is no evidence that the group has any affiliations with external actors, but it is unclear why an independent local actor would decide to use iconography that many Syrians and people in the region and the world widely associate with Iran and its proxies and partners.[viii] The group initially established itself on January 8 as the ”Southern Liberation Front” and used red, green, and black text over a grey map of Syria as its logo until January 12, when it changed to the current logo.[ix]

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria said it communicated with the Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, but broke off communications after the Coastal Shield Brigades launched its military offensive in early March.[x] The media official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria opposed the killing of any Syrians, indicating that the group is attempting to present itself as cross-sectarian. The official also referred to the current government as an ”internal enemy,” suggesting that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[xi] The official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria cannot conduct many operations due to the interim government’s ”movements.” Fourteen members of the group have been killed in operations against the Israelis, however.[xii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations. Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely approved indirect negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations.
• Anti-Government Militias in Syria: The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors. This group also referred to the interim government as an “internal enemy” and communicated with other anti-government insurgents in western Syria before early March.

Iran Update, March 26, 2025

The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters.[i] Unspecified US and Syrian sources told Reuters on March 25 that US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi gave a list of US conditions for partial sanctions relief to Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[ii] The conditions reportedly include counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing structure.”[iii] The United States is considering extending an existing sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions exemption if the Syrian interim government fulfills these conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[iv] The United States would also reportedly issue a statement expressing support for Syria’s territorial integrity.[v]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. “Foreign fighters” likely refers to non-Syrian fighters whom Shara has promoted within the ranks of the Defense Ministry since coming to power. These fighters include Abdul Rahman al Khatib, a Jordanian, and Omar Mohammad Ciftci, a Turk.[vi] Khatib and Ciftci are HTS fighters who are loyal to Shara and have fought alongside Shara for over a decade.[vii] Shara recently appointed Khatib and Ciftci to command the Republican Guard and Damascus Division of the new Syrian army, respectively.[viii] These positions are key to maintaining security in Damascus and protecting Shara and the interim government, underscoring Shara’s trust in both men to protect his nascent rule over the country. Shara will likely oppose dismissing Khatib and Ciftci from their posts and appointing other, potentially less trusted, commanders to their posts. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.

Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. These militias include elements that operate outside of the PMF.[ix] “Informed political sources” told Iraqi media on March 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework has reached a “preliminary agreement,” with Iranian approval, to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF.[x] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq.[xi] The agreement also stipulates that PMF brigades and units can only carry out orders that the Iraqi prime minister gives them. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.[xii] The integration of militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[xiii]

This agreement comes amid US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reported plans to sanction PMF leaders.[xiv] This agreement also comes as the Iraqi parliament is debating the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which is meant to replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law and clarify the PMF’s structure and administrative functions.[xv]

Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25.[xvi] This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.[xvii] The facility contains both solid- and liquid-fuel ballistic missiles, including Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, Sejjil, Emad, and Haj Qassem missiles. Iran used Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, and Emad ballistic missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[xviii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri claimed on March 25 that the new facility includes enough missiles for Iran to conduct an attack “dozens of times” greater than its October 2024 attack on Israel.[xix]

Open-source reports suggest that the United States recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.[xx] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that B-2 Stealth Bombers, KC-135 refueling tankers, and a C-17 cargo plane recently arrived at Diego Garcia Island.[xxi] The United States has not confirmed the arrival of these aircraft at the time of this writing. The military buildup comes amid the US air campaign targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Yemen.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Integration into the PMF: Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.
• Iranian Deterrence Efforts: Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25. This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.

Iran Update, March 25, 2025

Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime.[i] It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin ”any diplomatic initiative,” but the supreme leader would almost certainly make such a decision. Araghchi has historically taken a softer line on nuclear negotiations with the United States compared to the regime’s hardline elements. Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[ii] Former President Hassan Rouhani and former leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team Mohammad Javad Zarif were previously given "full authority" to advance nuclear talks during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations.[iii]

An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch. Shara announced on March 25 that the interim government will comprise 22 ministerial portfolios led by a majority of “newcomers,” suggesting that he will replace the 22 existing ministers.[iv] This likely includes dissolving the office of Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir.[v] Emirati media reported in late February that Shara’s ministerial changes are imminent and are supposed to reflect that Shara understands the concerns about his consolidation of power.[vi] This follows widespread concern over Shara’s concentration of executive authority and the lack of checks and balances on the Presidency outlined in the recently announced constitutional declaration.[vii]

Shara’s current roster of transitional ministers is nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based, HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[viii] At least 18 of the 22 ministers that Shara appointed shortly after coming to power in December 2024 have close ties to or deep experience working with Shara, either through the SSG or through direct participation in HTS.[ix] The SSG was nominally independent of HTS but, in practice, subordinate to HTS. Men who have been deeply loyal to Shara and have worked with him since his Jabhat al Nusra days currently hold the largest and highest priority ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs and intelligence.[x]

Shara’s appointments in the coming days will be a strong indicator of the sort of government and state Shara intends to lead. A bias towards non-SSG, non-Sunni, non-Islamist, and non-HTS backgrounds would indicate Shara’s willingness to form a representative government that represents all of Syria. An opposite bias towards Sunni Arabs, Sunni Islamists, or former HTS and SSG members would indicate that Shara is not willing to form a representative or inclusive government at this time and instead seeks to cement his own control. This would also likely increase the distrust of the Shara government among minority communities, including the Alawites, Kurds, and Druze communities.

The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.[xi] Local media reported on March 24 that Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis at the Sarfait border crossing with Oman in southeastern Yemen.[xii] The Houthis have previously procured dual-use items on the international market for drone and missile components.[xiii] The Houthis smuggle these shipments through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and through land borders, particularly from the Omani-Yemeni border via Yemeni government-controlled Mahra and Hadramawt governorates in eastern Yemen.[xiv]  The United States sanctioned China-based electronics companies for selling dual-use components to the Houthis in October 2024.[xv] The Houthis also imported hydrogen fuel cylinders from unspecified Chinese suppliers in August 2024, which were aimed to increase the range and payloads of the Houthis’ drones.[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime. It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin ”any diplomatic initiative,” but such a decision would almost certainly be made by the supreme leader.
• Syrian Transitional Government Formation: An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch.
• Houthi Arms Smuggling: The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.

Iran Update, March 24, 2025

Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. [i] Top Trump Administration Envoy Steve Witkoff said that the proposal sought to put in place verification mechanisms and prevent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear material.[ii] Witkoff added that Iran did express interest in the proposal by reaching back out via multiple intermediaries, and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[iii]

Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic.[iv] An Iranian expert close to the regime and an Iranian media outlet close to a former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary both said that Iran would not negotiate over its missile program.[v] The Iranian expert also added that Iranian officials could not negotiate over its role in the Axis of Resistance because its proxy and partner militias “are not proxies.”[vi] This is a continuation of a long-running Iranian information operation that seeks to obfuscate Tehran’s role as the leader of the Axis of Resistance. These positions echo previous statements from senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei rejecting any measures to "set new expectations" for Iran's missile range.[vii]

Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran seeks to expel the United States from the region to exert itself as the regional hegemon and shape the region in its image. Its missile program forms one part of this effort. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to coerce its adversaries and provide new capabilities to its allies. Expelling the United States and emerging as a regional hegemon also requires like-minded partners and proxies that can actualize Iran’s vision in regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. An Iranian decision to curtail its proxy and partner network would be akin to an Iranian surrender and would require top Iranian leaders to give up on key ideological positions they have held for their entire adult lives.

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.[viii]  CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base and ammunition depots in al Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen on March 22 and a Houthi storage facility in western Sanaa suburbs on March 23.[ix] CENTCOM also struck Houthi ports and an airport in Hudaydah on March 22, reportedly injuring Houthi naval operations chief Mansour al Saadi, also known as Abu Sajjad.[x] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told CBS on March 23 that CENTCOM eliminated the Houthis’ missile unit chief.[xi] Local media also reported that US airstrikes killed three Houthi commanders in Majzar, Maarib Governorate, on March 22.[xii] The Houthis launched a retaliatory drone attack and a separate combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xiii]

The Houthis modified their military communication encryption codes and enhanced personal security measures for Houthi leadership in response to CENTCOM airstrikes targeting Houthi officials, according to a March 22 report in Yemeni media.[xiv] The Houthis have also reportedly increased security around military sites and imposed further censorship restrictions on the Yemeni population in Houthi-controlled territory, to prevent leaks showing Houthi military activities, sites, and leaders. Waltz also confirmed that CENTCOM will continue to target Houthi military infrastructure, weapons production sites, and communication lines, alongside Houthi leadership, to deter and weaken the Houthis’ capabilities to conduct attacks on Israel and international shipping.[xv]  Regional sources reported that CENTCOM struck the Houthis’ Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in the capital city Sanaa on March 19.[xvi]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed on March 22 that the United States ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail to the Red Sea because the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group failed to confront the Houthis.[xvii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Vinson to deploy to the Red Sea and extended Truman’s deployment by one month to maintain a continuous carrier presence in the region.[xviii]

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both Houthi missiles before they entered Israeli airspace.[xx] An Israeli war correspondent, citing an anonymous defense source, reported that the Houthis also launched a missile on March 22. The March 22 missile fell short of Israel and landed in an unidentified location in Saudi Arabia.[xxi]

The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.[xxii] The Central Bank added that this move will impact the Houthis’ economy. The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the Yemeni government attempted to remove the Houthi-controlled wing of the Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa from the SWIFT system in July 2024.[xxiii] The Saudis and Emiratis promptly and successfully pressured the Yemeni government to cease its plan to remove the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank from SWIFT.

The Houthis evacuated their headquarters in Baghdad and are considering closing their other two offices in Iraq after Iran warned the United States may strike Houthi targets, according to a Saudi news report on March 22.[xxiv] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned Iraqi militia leaders that US airstrikes against Houthi facilities could ”quickly backfire on Baghdad.” Ghaani called for ”avoiding any military activity during this sensitive period.”

Iran and the Iraqi federal government continue to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to “avoid all provocations” with Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxv] An unspecified source told Saudi media on March 21 that Ghaani, during his visit to Baghdad on March 19, told Iranian-backed militia and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to avoid provoking the United States or Israel.[xxvi] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein separately acknowledged in a recent interview that the federal government’s failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli attacks in Iraq.[xxvii] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[xxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some parties with Iranian-backed armed wings. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq, including via the transfer of weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night.[xxix]

The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxx] The Iraqi parliament first read through the draft law, titled the “Popular Mobilization Authority Law,” in a session on March 24 and Parliament will reportedly vote on the law on April 1.[xxxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians have debated the Popular Mobilization Authority Law’s components for weeks.[xxxii] Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the Iraqi federal government sought to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which has been debated in parliament several times in recent months, with a rewritten law--presumably the new Popular Mobilization Authority Law--that would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces.[xxxiii] This effort to restructure the PMF occurred as the United States pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxxiv]

Kurdish media reported on March 24 that the draft Popular Mobilization Authority law will replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law that formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxv] The current form of the PMF law clarifies the PMF’s structure and administrative functions, including the Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman’s authorities and the number of departments and directorates associated with the PMF.[xxxvi] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) is formally responsible for ensuring that the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[xxxvii] The draft law adds that the PMF will have a military academy like other Iraqi security institutions.[xxxviii] The draft law also prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties, as did the 2016 version.[xxxix]

The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties. Most Iraqi political leaders instead control their parties from outside government, unlike in most parliamentary systems. This means that Iranian-backed Iraqi figures like Qais al Khazali or Hadi al Ameri—leaders of Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization respectively—could easily continue to control both their military organizations and their political organizations without technically violating this law. The law also does not make any changes that would impede Iran’s ability to command and control the PMF, which does not listen to its official commander-in-chief, the Iraqi prime minister. Many elements of the PMF instead take their orders from Iran or Iranian-backed commanders.

Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[xl] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[xli] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[xlii] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[xliii] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[xliv] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[xlv] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[xlvi] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[xlvii]

The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran presented new evidence on March 14 that demonstrates ongoing and systematic human rights violations by the Iranian regime in response to the protests that sparked in September 2022.[xlviii] The report states that women are increasingly summoned to court for alleged non-compliance with mandatory Hijab laws. Penalties include fines, flogging, and bank account closure and are often based on photos or reports submitted by police or loyalist groups. The report states that Iranian authorities also rely heavily on advanced surveillance tools to monitor hijab violations. These include facial recognition systems, aerial drones, and mobile apps such as Nazer, which allows approved users to report women not wearing the hijab—even in private vehicles or ambulances. These developments reflect the Iranian regime’s broader effort to tighten control over the population by expanding surveillance and leveraging informal enforcement networks.

Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions. A large crowd gathered at Iranian poet Ferdowsi’s tomb near Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi on March 20 and chanted anti-regime slogans.[xlix] The governor of Mashhad confirmed that 15 individuals were arrested for what he described as “subversive slogans,” and stated they would face legal consequences.[l] Citizens in Fars Province gathered at Hafezieh in Shiraz on March 20, where many women appeared without the mandatory hijab, some participants danced in celebration and chanted pro-monarchy slogans.[li] Kurdistan Province Chief Prosecutor separately reported the arrest of seven individuals on March 23, accusing them of organizing anti-state activities under the guise of Nowruz events in the province.[lii] The Prosecutor claimed that the suspects had “organizational ties” and aimed to spread propaganda and insult religious sentiments. Independent human rights group Hengaw confirmed three of the arrests but noted the exact charges remain unclear.[liii] The arrests during Nowruz celebrations highlight the regime’s deepening fear of public gatherings that could evolve into anti-regime protests.

Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21.[liv] This marked the first rocket attack from Lebanon into Israel since early December 2024.[lv] The IDF intercepted three rockets, and the other three landed in Lebanese territory.[lvi] The IDF conducted counterbattery fire against the rocket launch site and later conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers across Lebanon on March 22 and 23.[lvii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) destroyed three rudimentary rocket launchers that consisted of simple wood and metal launch rails in two towns in Nabatieh District, southern Lebanon, on March 22.[lviii]

Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lix]  Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now. Hezbollah released a statement on March 18 condemning the renewed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has not said that it would resume attacks against Israel.[lx]

The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade.[lxi] Likely anti-government insurgents killed a Hayat Tahrir al Sham commander and two other pro-government fighters in separate areas of Idlib province on March 22 and March 24 respectively.[lxii] These attacks come after Coastal Shield Brigade commander Miqdad Fatiha stated on March 12 that the insurgency would begin to target interim government forces with improvised explosive devices and assassinations as part of the insurgency’s second phase.[lxiii] Insurgent leaders can use public statements as a way to signal intent to their followers.[lxiv] These attacks, combined with the discovery of two rudimentary IEDs on the Jableh-Latakia road on March 19 suggest that the insurgency may be adopting new tactics that are consistent with Fatiha’s second phase of operations.[lxv]

Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence. Interim government forces launched a search operation in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Province, on March 23 targeting former regime members who failed to register with the interim government and arrested individuals who refused to disarm.[lxvi] It is unclear if government forces cordoned off the area before conducting its search. Former Assad regime members previously ambushed interim government forces on February 19 along the Maarat al Numan-Khan Sheikhoun road.[lxvii] Government forces also arrested approximately 15 individuals in Jisr al Shughur, Idlib Province, on March 24 charged with collaboration under the former Assad regime.[lxviii] Pro-Assad insurgents killed approximately 25 individuals, primarily interim government forces, in Jisr al Shughur in the coordinated attack in early March.[lxix]

Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state.[lxx] The “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance,” or “Tamasuk,” identified itself as an alliance that transcends ”ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and even political and ideological” affiliations that seek to encourage a "civil, democratic, and pluralistic state” during its first press conference in Damascus on March 22.[lxxi] The Tamasuk alliance comprises at least 34 political and civil groups, including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other Kurdish, Christian, and Druze-affiliated groups.[lxxii] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing. A leader from the leftist ”People's Will Party” said that Tamasuk does not see itself as an “opposition” group but a group that is willing to engage ”all forces,” including the Shara government, in dialogue.[lxxiii] The alliances’ founding statement confirmed that it seeks to work towards a ”unified Syria” under a single state and single army and called for a “just, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.”[lxxiv] The coalition, while relatively small, is the first organized political alliance in Syria outside of the government itself since the fall of the regime.

The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government. Many of these parties and groups have previously criticized the Shara government for its exclusionary organization of the National Dialogue Conference.[lxxv] Many groups, like the SDC, have rejected Shara’s constitution for granting the executive branch “absolute powers.”[lxxvi] Tamasuk called for the writing of a new constitution that better defines the dispersion of decentralized powers in order to allow the people to exercise direct authority within their regions while centralizing affairs like foreign affairs, defense, and the economy under the central government.[lxxvii] The Shara government has so far ignored local calls from Syria’s various communities demanding decentralized powers.[lxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic. Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives.
• US Air Campaign against the Houthis: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.
• Houthi-Gulf Relations: The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties.
• Ethnic Tension in Iran: Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam. The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.
• Iranian Social Control: The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. Iran is using mobile applications, drones, and other tactics and technologies as part of this effort.
• Protests in Iran: Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions.
• Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire: Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21. Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lxxix] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade. Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence.
• Syrian Politics: Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state. The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government.

Previous Iran Updates

• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
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