Iran Updates

 

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                             

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, March 24, 2025

Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. [i] Top Trump Administration Envoy Steve Witkoff said that the proposal sought to put in place verification mechanisms and prevent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear material.[ii] Witkoff added that Iran did express interest in the proposal by reaching back out via multiple intermediaries, and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[iii]

Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic.[iv] An Iranian expert close to the regime and an Iranian media outlet close to a former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary both said that Iran would not negotiate over its missile program.[v] The Iranian expert also added that Iranian officials could not negotiate over its role in the Axis of Resistance because its proxy and partner militias “are not proxies.”[vi] This is a continuation of a long-running Iranian information operation that seeks to obfuscate Tehran’s role as the leader of the Axis of Resistance. These positions echo previous statements from senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei rejecting any measures to "set new expectations" for Iran's missile range.[vii]

Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran seeks to expel the United States from the region to exert itself as the regional hegemon and shape the region in its image. Its missile program forms one part of this effort. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to coerce its adversaries and provide new capabilities to its allies. Expelling the United States and emerging as a regional hegemon also requires like-minded partners and proxies that can actualize Iran’s vision in regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. An Iranian decision to curtail its proxy and partner network would be akin to an Iranian surrender and would require top Iranian leaders to give up on key ideological positions they have held for their entire adult lives.

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.[viii]  CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base and ammunition depots in al Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen on March 22 and a Houthi storage facility in western Sanaa suburbs on March 23.[ix] CENTCOM also struck Houthi ports and an airport in Hudaydah on March 22, reportedly injuring Houthi naval operations chief Mansour al Saadi, also known as Abu Sajjad.[x] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told CBS on March 23 that CENTCOM eliminated the Houthis’ missile unit chief.[xi] Local media also reported that US airstrikes killed three Houthi commanders in Majzar, Maarib Governorate, on March 22.[xii] The Houthis launched a retaliatory drone attack and a separate combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xiii]

The Houthis modified their military communication encryption codes and enhanced personal security measures for Houthi leadership in response to CENTCOM airstrikes targeting Houthi officials, according to a March 22 report in Yemeni media.[xiv] The Houthis have also reportedly increased security around military sites and imposed further censorship restrictions on the Yemeni population in Houthi-controlled territory, to prevent leaks showing Houthi military activities, sites, and leaders. Waltz also confirmed that CENTCOM will continue to target Houthi military infrastructure, weapons production sites, and communication lines, alongside Houthi leadership, to deter and weaken the Houthis’ capabilities to conduct attacks on Israel and international shipping.[xv]  Regional sources reported that CENTCOM struck the Houthis’ Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in the capital city Sanaa on March 19.[xvi]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed on March 22 that the United States ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail to the Red Sea because the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group failed to confront the Houthis.[xvii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Vinson to deploy to the Red Sea and extended Truman’s deployment by one month to maintain a continuous carrier presence in the region.[xviii]

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both Houthi missiles before they entered Israeli airspace.[xx] An Israeli war correspondent, citing an anonymous defense source, reported that the Houthis also launched a missile on March 22. The March 22 missile fell short of Israel and landed in an unidentified location in Saudi Arabia.[xxi]

The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.[xxii] The Central Bank added that this move will impact the Houthis’ economy. The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the Yemeni government attempted to remove the Houthi-controlled wing of the Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa from the SWIFT system in July 2024.[xxiii] The Saudis and Emiratis promptly and successfully pressured the Yemeni government to cease its plan to remove the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank from SWIFT.

The Houthis evacuated their headquarters in Baghdad and are considering closing their other two offices in Iraq after Iran warned the United States may strike Houthi targets, according to a Saudi news report on March 22.[xxiv] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned Iraqi militia leaders that US airstrikes against Houthi facilities could ”quickly backfire on Baghdad.” Ghaani called for ”avoiding any military activity during this sensitive period.”

Iran and the Iraqi federal government continue to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to “avoid all provocations” with Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxv] An unspecified source told Saudi media on March 21 that Ghaani, during his visit to Baghdad on March 19, told Iranian-backed militia and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to avoid provoking the United States or Israel.[xxvi] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein separately acknowledged in a recent interview that the federal government’s failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli attacks in Iraq.[xxvii] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[xxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some parties with Iranian-backed armed wings. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq, including via the transfer of weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night.[xxix]

The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxx] The Iraqi parliament first read through the draft law, titled the “Popular Mobilization Authority Law,” in a session on March 24 and Parliament will reportedly vote on the law on April 1.[xxxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians have debated the Popular Mobilization Authority Law’s components for weeks.[xxxii] Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the Iraqi federal government sought to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which has been debated in parliament several times in recent months, with a rewritten law--presumably the new Popular Mobilization Authority Law--that would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces.[xxxiii] This effort to restructure the PMF occurred as the United States pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxxiv]

Kurdish media reported on March 24 that the draft Popular Mobilization Authority law will replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law that formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxv] The current form of the PMF law clarifies the PMF’s structure and administrative functions, including the Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman’s authorities and the number of departments and directorates associated with the PMF.[xxxvi] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) is formally responsible for ensuring that the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[xxxvii] The draft law adds that the PMF will have a military academy like other Iraqi security institutions.[xxxviii] The draft law also prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties, as did the 2016 version.[xxxix]

The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties. Most Iraqi political leaders instead control their parties from outside government, unlike in most parliamentary systems. This means that Iranian-backed Iraqi figures like Qais al Khazali or Hadi al Ameri—leaders of Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization respectively—could easily continue to control both their military organizations and their political organizations without technically violating this law. The law also does not make any changes that would impede Iran’s ability to command and control the PMF, which does not listen to its official commander-in-chief, the Iraqi prime minister. Many elements of the PMF instead take their orders from Iran or Iranian-backed commanders.

Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[xl] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[xli] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[xlii] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[xliii] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[xliv] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[xlv] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[xlvi] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[xlvii]

The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran presented new evidence on March 14 that demonstrates ongoing and systematic human rights violations by the Iranian regime in response to the protests that sparked in September 2022.[xlviii] The report states that women are increasingly summoned to court for alleged non-compliance with mandatory Hijab laws. Penalties include fines, flogging, and bank account closure and are often based on photos or reports submitted by police or loyalist groups. The report states that Iranian authorities also rely heavily on advanced surveillance tools to monitor hijab violations. These include facial recognition systems, aerial drones, and mobile apps such as Nazer, which allows approved users to report women not wearing the hijab—even in private vehicles or ambulances. These developments reflect the Iranian regime’s broader effort to tighten control over the population by expanding surveillance and leveraging informal enforcement networks.

Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions. A large crowd gathered at Iranian poet Ferdowsi’s tomb near Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi on March 20 and chanted anti-regime slogans.[xlix] The governor of Mashhad confirmed that 15 individuals were arrested for what he described as “subversive slogans,” and stated they would face legal consequences.[l] Citizens in Fars Province gathered at Hafezieh in Shiraz on March 20, where many women appeared without the mandatory hijab, some participants danced in celebration and chanted pro-monarchy slogans.[li] Kurdistan Province Chief Prosecutor separately reported the arrest of seven individuals on March 23, accusing them of organizing anti-state activities under the guise of Nowruz events in the province.[lii] The Prosecutor claimed that the suspects had “organizational ties” and aimed to spread propaganda and insult religious sentiments. Independent human rights group Hengaw confirmed three of the arrests but noted the exact charges remain unclear.[liii] The arrests during Nowruz celebrations highlight the regime’s deepening fear of public gatherings that could evolve into anti-regime protests.

Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21.[liv] This marked the first rocket attack from Lebanon into Israel since early December 2024.[lv] The IDF intercepted three rockets, and the other three landed in Lebanese territory.[lvi] The IDF conducted counterbattery fire against the rocket launch site and later conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers across Lebanon on March 22 and 23.[lvii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) destroyed three rudimentary rocket launchers that consisted of simple wood and metal launch rails in two towns in Nabatieh District, southern Lebanon, on March 22.[lviii]

Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lix]  Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now. Hezbollah released a statement on March 18 condemning the renewed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has not said that it would resume attacks against Israel.[lx]

The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade.[lxi] Likely anti-government insurgents killed a Hayat Tahrir al Sham commander and two other pro-government fighters in separate areas of Idlib province on March 22 and March 24 respectively.[lxii] These attacks come after Coastal Shield Brigade commander Miqdad Fatiha stated on March 12 that the insurgency would begin to target interim government forces with improvised explosive devices and assassinations as part of the insurgency’s second phase.[lxiii] Insurgent leaders can use public statements as a way to signal intent to their followers.[lxiv] These attacks, combined with the discovery of two rudimentary IEDs on the Jableh-Latakia road on March 19 suggest that the insurgency may be adopting new tactics that are consistent with Fatiha’s second phase of operations.[lxv]

Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence. Interim government forces launched a search operation in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Province, on March 23 targeting former regime members who failed to register with the interim government and arrested individuals who refused to disarm.[lxvi] It is unclear if government forces cordoned off the area before conducting its search. Former Assad regime members previously ambushed interim government forces on February 19 along the Maarat al Numan-Khan Sheikhoun road.[lxvii] Government forces also arrested approximately 15 individuals in Jisr al Shughur, Idlib Province, on March 24 charged with collaboration under the former Assad regime.[lxviii] Pro-Assad insurgents killed approximately 25 individuals, primarily interim government forces, in Jisr al Shughur in the coordinated attack in early March.[lxix]

Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state.[lxx] The “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance,” or “Tamasuk,” identified itself as an alliance that transcends ”ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and even political and ideological” affiliations that seek to encourage a "civil, democratic, and pluralistic state” during its first press conference in Damascus on March 22.[lxxi] The Tamasuk alliance comprises at least 34 political and civil groups, including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other Kurdish, Christian, and Druze-affiliated groups.[lxxii] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing. A leader from the leftist ”People's Will Party” said that Tamasuk does not see itself as an “opposition” group but a group that is willing to engage ”all forces,” including the Shara government, in dialogue.[lxxiii] The alliances’ founding statement confirmed that it seeks to work towards a ”unified Syria” under a single state and single army and called for a “just, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.”[lxxiv] The coalition, while relatively small, is the first organized political alliance in Syria outside of the government itself since the fall of the regime.

The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government. Many of these parties and groups have previously criticized the Shara government for its exclusionary organization of the National Dialogue Conference.[lxxv] Many groups, like the SDC, have rejected Shara’s constitution for granting the executive branch “absolute powers.”[lxxvi] Tamasuk called for the writing of a new constitution that better defines the dispersion of decentralized powers in order to allow the people to exercise direct authority within their regions while centralizing affairs like foreign affairs, defense, and the economy under the central government.[lxxvii] The Shara government has so far ignored local calls from Syria’s various communities demanding decentralized powers.[lxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic. Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives.
• US Air Campaign against the Houthis: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.
• Houthi-Gulf Relations: The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties.
• Ethnic Tension in Iran: Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam. The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.
• Iranian Social Control: The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. Iran is using mobile applications, drones, and other tactics and technologies as part of this effort.
• Protests in Iran: Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions.
• Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire: Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21. Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lxxix] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade. Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence.
• Syrian Politics: Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state. The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government.

Iran Update, March 21, 2025

Senior Iranian officials are trying to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance by denying that Iran exerts direct control over groups like the Houthis, likely to avoid escalation with the United States. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a Nowruz speech to Iranian officials in Tehran on March 21 and claimed that the people of Yemen and resistance groups in the region "have their own motivation" and called Western claims that these groups act on Iran’s behalf “a big mistake.”[i] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami separately claimed on March 16 that the “Yemenis” are an “independent and free nation” and that Houthis make their own strategic and operational decisions that Iran does not direct.[ii] These statements ignore that the Houthis have repeatedly highlighted their coordination with the Axis of Resistance prior to conducting operations.[iii] Iran leads the Axis of Resistance and provides IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers to advise the Houthis, including senior IRGC Quds Force commander Abdul Reza Shahlai.[iv]

Khamenei and Salami’s remarks echo other Iranian statements that have come amid US threats to target Iran or key Iranian assets in the region.  In early 2024, for example, IRGC-QF Commander Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad to direct Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to stop attacks targeting US forces in Iraq. Senior Iranian officials simultaneously attempted to obfuscate Iran’s own involvement in the attacks and avoid a US response against Iran for the January 2024 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan.[v] US President Donald Trump warned on March 17 that the United States could respond to Houthi attacks as if those attacks came from Iran.[vi] Iran likely seeks to reduce the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States while maintaining its leadership of the Axis of Resistance—including the Houthis.

The United States deployed another US aircraft carrier to the Red Sea, according to an anonymous official talking to the Associated Press on March 21.[vii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail from the Sea of Japan to the Red Sea for a three-month deployment. The USS Carl Vinson group is set to arrive in April. Hegseth also extended the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group’s deployment to the Red Sea by a month. The decision to extend the Truman group’s deployment by one month will enable CENTCOM to maintain at least one carrier in the Red Sea without gaps in coverage.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 20.[viii] CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base in the al Fazah-al Tuhayta area, south of Hudaydah Port.[ix] CENTCOM also struck an unspecified location near Safraa in the Houthi stronghold of Saada City on March 20.[x] The Houthis did not launch retaliatory attacks targeting the Truman, as it has done previously.[xi]

The Houthis separately launched a ballistic missile targeting an unspecified Israeli military site south of Tel Aviv in central Israel on March 20.[xii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[xiii] This is the third attack the Houthis have launched targeting Israeli territory since the Houthis announced the resumption of their campaign against Israel, which they said is in response to Israel not sending aid into the Gaza Strip.[xiv]

The US Treasury is allowing energy imports to Yemen loaded before March 5, 2025, to proceed until April 4, 2025, despite US recent sanctions on the Houthis. After April 4 all energy imports will require specific US Treasury authorization.[xv] The Houthis have monopolized control of Yemeni oil imports by striking government-controlled port facilities, forcing those facilities to shut down and redirect traffic to Houthi-controlled Hudaydah port.[xvi] The Houthis do not control Yemen’s energy resources, meaning they cannot export Yemeni energy resources from Hudaydah.

Shipping companies are set to avoid the Red Sea transit route until a more comprehensive peace agreement is reached, according to the New York Times.[xvii] Approximately 200 cargo ships transited the Bab el Mandeb Strait in the southern Red Sea near Yemen in February 2025.[xviii] Two hundred cargo ships still represent an increase from the 144 ships that transited the Red Sea in February 2024, but it is still significantly fewer ships compared to before the Houthi attack campaign targeting maritime shipping, according to the New York Times.[xix] Global freight prices also remain significantly higher than before October 2023 though freight prices have decreased since December 2024, when the Houthis halted their attacks on international shipping.[xx] The Houthis have not targeted commercial vessels in the Red Sea since announcing their resumption of attacks on ”Israeli shipping” on March 11.[xxi]

Widespread reports about likely Sunni-perpetrated sectarian and revenge-based attacks targeting the Alawite community threaten to fuel the Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Alawite media has widely reported on instances of violence committed against the Alawite community by Sunnis and government forces.[xxii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify all of these reports at this time, but these reports will likely exacerbate Alawite distrust towards Sunni communities and Sunni-majority security forces. This distrust delegitimizes the interim government among the population and could enable insurgents to move in as security guarantors for the Alawite community.[xxiii] Insurgent groups seek to exploit insecurity and abuses to control the population and establish themselves as the primary security guarantor in a community.[xxiv]  Failure by the interim government to hold perpetrators of these abuses accountable and rebuild trust within the Alawite community will undermine any counterinsurgency campaigns.

Unspecified vigilantes also conducted two separate attacks targeting former Assad regime officials outside of the Syrian coastal area. These vigilante-style attacks may become more common as a result of a lack of government-led transitional justice.[xxv] Unidentified gunmen killed former Baath Party Secretary for Izra, Daraa Province, Mohammed Sharif al Zoubi.[xxvi] Unidentified gunmen also killed the former mayor of Khaldiya district, Aleppo City, Ibrahim Othman.[xxvii] Othman was accused of being an informant under the Assad regime.[xxviii]

Syrian government forces continued raids and arrests targeting elements of nascent insurgent networks elsewhere in Syria. Government forces arrested a Deir ez Zor City-based insurgent cell on March 20 that was planning an attack on a security headquarters.[xxix] The cell was affiliated with the US-sanctioned Qatirji Company.[xxx] The Qaterji Company facilitated Iranian oil sales to Syria and China under the former Assad regime, generating ”hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue” for the IRGC Quds Force and the Houthis.[xxxi] The Qaterji Company was a key revenue stream for the IRGC Quds Force and its affiliated proxies under the Assad Regime.[xxxii] These militiamen may form the core of a more broad-based insurgency outside of Alawite areas, given that they have lost economic power after the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran and the Axis of Resistance: Senior Iranian officials are trying to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance by denying that Iran exerts direct control over groups like the Houthis, likely to avoid escalation with the United States. Khamenei and Salami’s remarks echo Iranian statements in early 2024 that came amid US threats to target Iran or key Iranian assets in the region.
• Houthis in Yemen: The United States deployed another US aircraft carrier to the Red Sea, according to an anonymous official talking to the Associated Press on March 21. The US secretary of defense also extended the Truman group’s deployment by one month, which will enable CENTCOM to maintain at least one carrier in the Red Sea without gaps in coverage.
• Maritime Shipping in the Red Sea: Shipping companies are set to avoid the Red Sea transit route until a more comprehensive peace agreement is reached, according to the New York Times.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: Widespread reports about likely Sunni-perpetrated sectarian and revenge-based attacks targeting the Alawite community threaten to fuel the Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Alawite media has widely reported on instances of violence committed against the Alawite community by Sunnis and government forces.
• Other Insurgent Elements in Syria: Syrian government forces continued raids and arrests targeting elements of nascent insurgent networks elsewhere in Syria. Government forces arrested a Deir ez Zor City-based insurgent cell affiliated with the US-sanctioned Qaterji Company on March 20 that was planning an attack on a security headquarters.

Iran Update, March 20, 2025

A senior official from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2025.[i] The official suggested that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct “advanced and modern strikes” targeting US forces if US forces do not withdraw from Iraq by this date. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[ii] The Iraqi federal government has reportedly considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces in recent months due to the security threat it perceives that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria poses to Iraq, however.[iii] The removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria is a long-standing Iranian objective and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[iv] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba previously resisted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s order to halt attacks targeting US forces in early January 2024.[v] Ghaani recently met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on March 19 and may have discussed efforts to remove US forces from Iraq with these leaders.[vi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis are increasingly sharing military knowledge, which could increase both groups’ ability to threaten US and allied interests in the region. The Houthis have extensive experience in drone warfare and have shared this experience with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, as evidenced by the death of a Houthi drone expert in a US airstrike south of Baghdad in July 2024.[vii] The Houthis also reportedly operate three offices across Iraq and a training camp in a town controlled by Kataib Hezbollah in Diyala Province, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).[viii] RUSI reported on March 19 that Iranian-backed fighters in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have reportedly deployed to Yemen in recent months to train Houthi fighters in combat technology, including drones and improvised explosive devices.[ix] The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters in Yemen and Houthi members in Iraq highlights that knowledge transfers between the Houthis and Iraqi militias are reciprocal.

US President Donald Trump announced on March 19 that the United States will partner with regional allies “to dismantle Houthi operations and secure the Red Sea.”[x] These allies almost certainly include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) given that Saudi and Emirati-backed proxy forces in Yemen would be best suited to threaten Houthi control in Yemen. It is unclear what Trump means by ”dismantle.” Defeating the Houthis and ending their operations would probably require the US and its partners to support the Yemeni government to threaten Houthi control of Yemen.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[xi] CENTCOM targeted a cotton mill in Zabid, Hudaydah Governorate, which local media reported the Houthis had converted into a mines and explosive devices factory.[xii] The Houthis claimed that 16 Houthis fighters have died in the recent CENTCOM strikes.[xiii] The Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones targeting the USS Harry S. Truman and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 19 in response to the CENTCOM strikes.[xiv

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 19.[xv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[xvi] The Houthis previously targeted the IDF Nevatim Air Base in central Israel with two ballistic missiles on March 18.[xvii] The IDF intercepted both missiles.[xviii] The United States reportedly asked Israel not to respond to these attacks and to ”let [the United States] deal with it,” according to Israeli media.

Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghaleb Nasser al Rahwi separately met with former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi in Sanaa, Yemen, on March 20.[xix]  A Kurdish journalist suggested that Mahdi may have relayed a message from the United States urging the Houthis to stop their attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.[xx] Mahdi previously served as a member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which was founded by former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini.[xxi] Mahdi resigned as prime minister following the outbreak of large-scale protests in Iraq in October 2019.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei highlighted Iran's economic weaknesses and problems in his Nowruz speech on March 20.[xxii] Khamenei announced "Investment for Production” as Iran’s new year’s slogan, which is consistent with Khamenei’s economic-focused new year’s slogans in recent years. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized the issues of inflation and rising costs in his Nowruz speech on March 20.[xxiii] Khamenei's recent rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States, which would potentially provide Iran with sanctions relief, will likely contribute to worsening Iranian economic conditions. The Iranian regime will also likely not be able to meaningfully improve the Iranian economy if it does not address underlying issues, such as rampant corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement, that currently plague the economy.[xxiv] The value of the Iranian rial has depreciated around 103 percent over the past two years, highlighting how Iranian officials have either lacked the capability or willingness to meaningfully address Iran’s economic problems.[xxv]

Syrian government forces have conducted a series of raids and arrests targeting insurgent networks in Deir ez Zor Province, northeastern Syria, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19. Syrian government forces interdicted a weapons shipment on March 19 that was bound for insurgents in Deir ez Zor City.[xxvi] Syrian forces also arrested the former IRGC Sayyida Zainab Shrine militia commander in Mayadeen on March 20.[xxvii] Deir ez Zor City’s proximity to the Albu Kamal border crossing with Iraq and its location on a primary transportation route made it a key distribution point for weapons smuggling under the Assad regime. Various Assad- and Iranian-backed groups developed human networks and physical infrastructure in the area that emerging insurgent cells could exploit.

Insurgent cells in northeastern Syria may be driven by different underlying motivations than cells in western Syria. Insurgent cells based in Alawite-majority areas in western Syria appear motivated by an interest to restore Assad-era power structures to address economic grievances and security concerns. The insurgents in these areas very likely seek to improve their personal welfare and security rather than reinstate the Assad regime.[xxviii] Anti-interim government attacks in northeastern Syria have occurred in towns along the primary smuggling route from Iraq into Syria on the southern bank of the Euphrates River.[xxix] These towns were heavily dominated by Iranian and Iranian-backed armed factions and smugglers during Assad’s rule. Anti-smuggling crackdowns remove sources of revenue and rents, which in turn increases anti-government sentiment.

A Syrian journalist reported that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will withdraw from Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces and form an SDF-affiliated army division in Hasakah Province. The SDF met with a Syrian interim government delegation to discuss the terms of the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state at al Shaddadi base, Hasakah Province, on March 19.[xxx] An eastern Syria-focused journalist, citing unspecified sources and leaks from the meeting, claimed on March 20 that the integration agreement requires the SDF to “completely” withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces.[xxxi] The journalist added that the government will establish three divisions in northeastern Syria and an “SDF-affiliated” division in Hasakah Province.[xxxii]  CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, but it is unlikely that the SDF would agree to withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces and integrate into the Syrian army while under active attack from Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). An “SDF-affiliated” division would be consistent with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi’s demand that the SDF maintain some degree of autonomy by joining the Defense Ministry as a “military bloc,” however.[xxxiii] Syrian interim government officials have repeatedly rejected Abdi’s demand, but Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara’s recent decision to allow Suwaydawi-led security forces to oversee security in Suwayda Province suggests that Shara could be willing to allow the formation of an SDF-affiliated or SDF-led unit in northeastern Syria.[xxxiv]

The journalist also claimed that Hasakah Province will be “jointly administered.” It is unclear if a “joint administration” refers to the presence of an SDF-affiliated division in Hasakah Province or a decentralized system of governance that would afford the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) some local autonomy.[xxxv] Abdi reportedly requested that the integration process last three years, but the interim government reportedly insists that the SDF’s integration take place within one year.[xxxvi] Abdi likely seeks a longer integration timeline in order to assess the progress of the transition period and the trajectory of Shara’s government, given that the Syrian Democratic Council and the AANES recently publicly rejected the new government’s transitional constitution.[xxxvii] The transition period is scheduled to last around five years.[xxxviii]

Russia aims to increase cooperation with the Syrian interim government, likely to secure military basing rights in Syria. Russian President Vladmir Putin sent a letter to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on March 20 in which he expressed Russia’s willingness to develop “practical cooperation” with the Syrian interim government on “all issues on the agenda.”[xxxix] These issues almost certainly include economic cooperation. Russia has established some degree of economic cooperation with Syria since February 2025. Russia has delivered local Syrian currency and shipped crude oil to Syrian ports, for example.[xl] A tanker sanctioned for transporting Russian oil arrived at Baniyas Port on March 6.[xli] Another oil tanker carrying Russian crude oil reportedly reached Baniyas Port on March 20, and at least one more shipment of Russian oil is expected to arrive at Baniyas Port in early April 2025.[xlii]  Russia has not yet concluded a deal with the interim government to maintain its basing rights in Syria and will likely try to use these economic incentives as leverage to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• Threat to US Forces: A senior official from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2025. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026. The Iraqi federal government has reportedly considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces in recent months due to the security threat it perceives that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria poses to Iraq, however.
• Iraqi Militia-Houthi Cooperation: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis are increasingly sharing military knowledge, which could increase both groups’ ability to threaten US and allied interests in the region. The Royal United Services Institute reported on March 19 that Iranian-backed fighters in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have reportedly deployed to Yemen in recent months to train Houthi fighters in combat technology, including drones and improvised explosive devices.
• SDF Integration into the Syrian State: A Syrian journalist reported that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will withdraw from Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces and form an SDF-affiliated army division in Hasakah Province. it is unlikely that the SDF would agree to withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces and integrate into the Syrian army while under active attack from Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). An “SDF-affiliated” division would be consistent with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi’s demand that the SDF maintain some degree of autonomy by joining the Defense Ministry as a “military bloc,” however.
• Syrian Insurgency: Syrian government forces have conducted a series of raids and arrests targeting insurgent networks in Deir ez Zor Province, northeastern Syria, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19. Insurgent cells in northeastern Syria may be driven by different underlying motivations than cells in western Syria. Anti-interim government attacks in northeastern Syria have occurred in towns along the primary smuggling route from Iraq into Syria on the southern bank of the Euphrates River.
• Iranian Economy: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei highlighted Iran's economic weaknesses and problems in his Nowruz speech on March 20. Khamenei's recent rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States, which would potentially provide Iran with sanctions relief, will likely contribute to worsening Iranian economic conditions. The Iranian regime will also likely not be able to meaningfully improve the Iranian economy if it does not address underlying issues, such as rampant corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement, that currently plague the economy,

Iran Update, March 19, 2025

President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios report.[i] Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations. Trump’s May 2025 nuclear deal deadline would expire one month before the E3’s (Germany, France, and Italy) reported June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the reimposition of snapback sanctions.[ii] Prior negotiations, including the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), have taken much longer and fell well short of the current US goals in negotiations. The JCPOA took 20 months to negotiate.[iii] White House National Security Adviser Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Iran must ”hand over and give up” all elements of its nuclear program.[iv]  Khamenei has also repeatedly explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States given the US‘ current ”maximum pressure” campaign.[v] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[vi] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations even as his top military commanders and hardliner allies advocate against negotiations.[vii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein also said that Israel had threatened to strike Iraq during an interview on March 17.[viii] Multiple US officials, including the secretaries of state and defense, may have discussed these warnings during recent conversations with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[ix]  These warnings come amid renewed US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and new Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias initially began their October 2023 to February 2024 attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip. Three militia-affiliated Iraqi sources told Qatari media on March 19 that multiple militias recently transferred weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night, in coordination with the Iraqi federal government, "in anticipation” of Israeli strikes.[x]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis. A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may assume unspecified activities due to “recent developments.”[xi] These “recent developments” could include US airstrikes targeting the Houthis or resumed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. These militias have previously attacked US forces in retaliation for real and perceived Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere in the region.[xii] The Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, includes some parties with armed wings in the Islamic Resistance of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that consistently launched drone strikes that targeted Israel (from January to November 2024) and US forces (from October 2023 to January 2024).[xiii] The attacks targeting Israel sought to retaliate for Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip.[xiv] The attacks targeting US forces likely sought to pressure the US to force the Israelis to end the war in the Gaza Strip while simultaneously encouraging a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly told PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders that Iran would support any militia reaction to an Israeli strike in Iraq during a visit to Baghdad on March 19, which could include targeting US forces.[xv]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.[xvi] CENTCOM struck al Hebshi Iron Factory, north of Hudaydah Port, twice in two days.[xvii] Local and regional media reported that CENTCOM also conducted airstrikes on the Houthi’s Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in Sanaa City, as well as several sites in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate.[xviii] Yemeni journalists also reported that US airstrikes in Al Jawf Governorate, northern Yemen, on March 16 killed three Houthi officials, including Commander Zain al Abidin al Mahtouri in al Hazm City, al Jawf Governorate. Mahtouri reportedly trained in Iran in 2020.[xix]

The Houthis launched an unspecified number of drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 18.[xx] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated that this is the fourth time the Houthis have attacked the aircraft carrier in 72 hours. CENTCOM published footage on March 19 showing the USS Harry S. Truman intercepting a Houthi one-way attack drone over an unspecified location in the Red Sea.[xxi]

US President Donald Trump warned Iran against sending supplies to the Houthis on March 19.[xxii] Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer told Iranian media that ”Iran does not interfere in our [Houthis] decision-making" and refuted reports from March 18 that Iran requested the Houthis to de-escalate tensions with the United States and Israel in the Red Sea.[xxiii] The Houthis are aligned with Iran and Iran is almost certainly still supplying them with weapons, but the Houthis sometimes act without direct Iranian approval.[xxiv]

Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities. Security forces dismantled an IED discovered near the Latakia-Jableh highway on March 19.[xxv] The IED, which appears to be a pipe with two fragmentation grenades, is a rudimentary device that the insurgents likely built to resemble garbage and escape notice. Security forces also located and dismantled a similarly produced IED near the same road on March 13.[xxvi] Both IEDs are rudimentary devices that are not particularly difficult to produce, but it is notable that insurgent cells in the area have nascent IED production capabilities. These capabilities could improve if insurgents are able to acquire more expertise, equipment, and materials. Miqdad al Fatiha, leader of Assadist insurgent group the Coastal Shield Brigade, vowed in a March 13 video statement that his fighters would plant IEDs on roads in the next phase of fighting against government forces.[xxvii]

Syrian media reported that insurgents targeted several vehicles with Molotov cocktails in Jableh, Latakia Province, on March 19.[xxviii] The insurgents then attacked a gas station in the area before security forces arrived.[xxix] Insurgents’ targeting of possible civilian vehicles or civilian infrastructure may seek to generate fear in local communities and reduce a community’s faith in government forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations.
• Israel and Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.
• Insurgency in Syria: Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities.

Iran Update, March 18, 2025

Recent tit-for-tat sectarian killings and local support for pro-Assad insurgent cells will likely hamper Syrian interim government efforts to promote security and community reconciliation in coastal Syria. Assadist insurgent cells attacked Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces in early March, which caused a spate of violence and extrajudicial killings across coastal Syria.[i] Revenge killings and kidnappings have continued to take place in coastal provinces over the past week even as coordinated insurgent attacks and extrajudicial sectarian killings by interim government forces have decreased.[ii] The kidnappings have targeted both interim government forces and civilians from Alawite, Sunni, and Ismaili communities.[iii] Tit-for-tat sectarian killings increase fear and feelings of insecurity among members of targeted communities. This fear makes it less likely that community members will disarm or turn in insurgent leaders because they do not have guarantees from the interim government that government forces will prevent future attacks on the community. Local notables in Tartous villages have gathered hundreds of weapons to surrender to the interim government but it is difficult to determine what percentage of village residents retain weapons.[iv] Local Alawite villages in the same area have refused to turn in around 40 insurgent leaders, which indicates that the residents of these villages support the insurgents or at least are willing to cooperate with them.[v] This support may be predominantly driven by fear that Sunni interim government forces could conduct extrajudicial killings if insurgents are not present to protect villagers rather than by ideological support for the deposed Assad regime.

Alawite insurgent leaders likely designed the early March 2025 attacks to trigger sectarian violence against their community in order to stoke fear and thereby increase support for the insurgency. Insurgencies attempt to control local populations by stoking fear and reducing a community’s faith in government forces.[vi] The coordinated and violent Assadist insurgent attacks in early March were likely intended to cause interim Defense Ministry deployments to the coast and trigger violent government reprisals.[vii] The Ismaili Shia-majority town of Qadmus and its surrounding Alawite villages in Tartous Province had established a positive working relationship with interim Interior Ministry units since mid-December 2024 but did not have the same positive relationship or trust in interim Defense Ministry units.[viii] Extrajudicial killings and violence committed by rogue interim Defense Ministry units in Tartous and Latakia provinces increased panic and fear in local communities and erased the goodwill and trust that interim Interior Ministry units had established with these communities.[ix] The majority of interim Defense Ministry forces have withdrawn from coastal Syria, but some forces continue to guard checkpoints and harass local Alawite communities.[x] The interim Defense Ministry forces’ continued presence in Alawite areas will likely increase local support for the insurgency in coastal areas. Increased local support will allow the insurgents to sustain their operations and will drive recruitment for insurgent groups beyond the group's initial power base and community.  Failure to hold perpetrators of extrajudicial killings during the recent clearing operations accountable will similarly exacerbate fears that government forces are targeting civilians and further drive support for insurgent cells.

Some Iraqi groups have continued to amplify sectarian rhetoric against Sunnis following the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria.  The United Council of Sheikhs and Notables of Basra and Iraq, which is a tribal committee that appears to be affiliated with the Basra Provincial Council, called on the Iraqi federal government to sever ties with the Syrian interim government on March 18.[xi]  The council called on the federal government to monitor Syrians in Iraq and hold individuals, such as Sunni Azm Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, accountable for ”inciting sectarian strife.”[xii] Khanjar expressed support for the Syrian interim government’s efforts to counter pro-Assad insurgents in coastal Syria on March 7.[xiii] The council added that Basrawi tribes are prepared to protect Iraqi holy sites--likely referring to the Shia shrines in Najaf and Karbala--and to confront anyone who attempts to ignite sectarian strife in Iraq.[xiv] Unspecified Shias in Basra separately announced a demonstration at the Turkish consulate in Basra on March 18 to protest the suppression of Shias in Syria by “takfiris.”[xv] The term “takfiri” refers to apostates and is commonly used by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures to refer to armed Sunni organizations.[xvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have described the fall of the Assad regime as a “Turkish conspiracy” and Iranian media has accused Turkey of condoning the killing of Alawites in Syria[xvii]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi political figures seek to prevent the Iraqi federal government from developing ties with the Syrian interim government because they view the interim government and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists.”[xviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, fought al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and presumably view Shara as an al Qaeda in Iraq ideologue. Iraqi media reported on March 17 that Shia Coordination Framework leaders refused to meet with Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani during his recent visit to Iraq.[xix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly called Shaibani’s visit “normalization with terrorism.”[xx]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force conducted over 30 airstrikes on March 17 targeting former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria that unspecified actors sought to repurpose.[xxi] Syrian media reported that the IDF struck the 132nd Brigade outside Daraa City, the 175th Regiment near Izraa, and al Thaala Airbase in western Suwayda Province.[xxii] The strikes killed at least two individuals and injured 19 others.[xxiii] The IDF said that it attacked military headquarters and SAA weapons and equipment that unspecified actors were attempting to use.[xxiv]  The IDF was likely referring to Syrian interim government forces’ attempts to repurpose former SAA positions in southern Syria as part of the interim government’s efforts to rebuild the Syrian army in the south. The Syrian interim government began recruiting soldiers in Daraa and Suwayda provinces on March 11 and have established several recruitment centers across Daraa Province to recruit soldiers into the 40th Division of the new Syrian army.[xxv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in late February 2025 that Israel would not allow "forces of the [Hayat Tahrir al Sham] or the new Syrian army to enter the territory south of Damascus" and called for a fully demilitarized southern Syria.[xxvi] Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani strongly condemned the Israeli strikes, describing them as part of a “campaign waged by Israel against the Syrian people and stability of the country.”[xxvii] Shaibani called on the United Nations to stop Israel’s actions and enforce the 1974 disengagement agreement.[xxviii]

An anti-Israel militia, the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria-the First of the Brave, acknowledged that the Israeli airstrikes targeted one of its positions in Daraa Province.[xxix] The group said that the strike killed one of its fighters and injured two others.[xxx]

The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel.[xxxi] The Houthis’ refusal to “dial down” tensions with the United States and Israel, despite Iran’s reported call for calm, demonstrates how the Houthis are aligned with Iran but do not answer directly to Iran.[xxxii] The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17.[xxxiii] The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel. The Houthis claimed that the attack was in response to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[xxxiv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[xxxv] Iranian officials may be trying to distance Iran from Houthi attacks against international shipping and Israel to try to prevent the United States from retaliating against Iran for Houthi attacks.[xxxvi]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in western Yemen on March 17.[xxxvii] US Joint Staff Operations Director Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich stated that the United States will continue to conduct airstrikes “in the coming days until we achieve [President Donald Trump’s] objectives.”[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Insurgency in Syria: Recent tit-for-tat sectarian killings and local support for pro-Assad insurgent cells will likely hamper Syrian interim government efforts to promote security and community reconciliation in coastal Syria. Revenge killings and kidnappings have continued to take place in coastal provinces over the past week even as coordinated insurgent attacks and extrajudicial sectarian killings by interim government forces have decreased. Tit-for-tat sectarian killings increase fear and feelings of insecurity among members of targeted communities. This fear makes it less likely that community members will disarm or turn in insurgent leaders because they do not have guarantees from the interim government that government forces will prevent future attacks on the community.
• IDF in Syria: The IDF Air Force conducted over 30 airstrikes on March 17 targeting former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria that unspecified actors sought to repurpose. The IDF was likely referring to Syrian interim government forces’ attempts to repurpose former SAA positions in southern Syria as part of the interim government’s efforts to rebuild the Syrian army in the south.
• Houthi Attacks: The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel. The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17. The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel.

Iran Update, March 17, 2025

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Houthi leaders and infrastructure in Yemen since March 15.[i] The strikes are in response to the Houthi attack campaign on international shipping, which the Houthis launched in October 2023 in support of Hamas.[ii] The Houthis have conducted 174 attacks targeting US military vessels and 145 attacks targeting commercial vessels since October 2023.[iii] CENTCOM reportedly conducted around 50 strikes across 9 Yemeni provinces, according to Yemeni journalists.[iv] The recent US strikes differ from previous US strikes against the Houthis under former President Joe Biden given that the recent strikes directly targeted Houthi leadership. US National Security Adviser Michael Waltz stated that the strikes killed “multiple” Houthi leaders.[v] The strikes killed senior Houthi leader Hassan Sharaf al Din and Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s bodyguard, according to Yemeni sources.[vi]

The strikes also targeted Houthi missile launchers, radars, air defense systems, and drone launch points.[vii] The Houthis use radars to target vessels.[viii] CENTCOM previously destroyed seven Houthi radars in June 2024 after the Houthis sunk a Greek-owned vessel.[ix]

The Houthis will likely respond by increasing their rate of attacks targeting US naval and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea stated on March 16 that the Houthis will respond “to escalation with escalation.”[x] The Houthis claimed on March 16 that they conducted two missile and drone attacks targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea in response to the US strikes.[xi] An unspecified US official told ABC News that “none of [the missiles and drones] came close” to hitting the USS Harry S. Truman.[xii] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times on March 15 that CENTCOM could continue to conduct strikes for several weeks and "intensify” the scope and scale of the strikes depending on the Houthis’ response.[xiii]

Senior Iranian military officials have tried to distance Iran from the Houthi attack campaign against international shipping in the aftermath of the US strikes. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on March 16 that Iran does not determine the “national or operational policies” of its proxies.[xiv] Iran has provided the Houthis with intelligence to identify Israeli-owned vessels in the Red Sea and has helped the Houthis develop their drone and missile stockpiles in recent years.[xv] US President Donald Trump stated on March 17 that the United States will hold Iran responsible for any future Houthi attacks.[xvi]

Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on March 8 that Western powers are trying to use nuclear negotiations to “set new expectations” for Iran’s missile range.[xvii] Khamenei emphasized that Iran "will not accept or comply" with such demands. Senior Advisor to the Armed Forces General Staff Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari echoed Khamenei's remarks and stated on March 15 that Iran "will definitely not accept" new “expectations” for the ranges of its missiles.[xviii] Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi previously stated in November 2024 that Iran may increase its missile range.[xix] Iran's explicit unwillingness to limit its missile program suggests that Iranian leadership perceives that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s primary deterrent against US and Israeli threats. This is particularly true after IDF airstrikes on Iran in October 2024 disrupted Iran‘s ability to produce solid-propellant ballistic missiles and neutralized Iran’s most advanced air defense assets.[xx] Iranian leaders likely recognize that Iran is increasingly vulnerable and may prioritize their missile program to establish deterrence against US and Israeli threats. Iran unveiled their latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad" in February 2025.[xxi] The missile has a range of 1,700 kilometers. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on March 16 on the “Etemad” missile, referring to it as the "Israeli ballistic missile” that can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[xxii] Iranian media is emphasizing that the “Etemad“ missile can hit Israeli cities likely to try to shape Israeli decision-making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Likely Hezbollah-linked Lebanese smugglers engaged Syrian forces on March 16 near Qusayr, on the Syria-Lebanon border. The smugglers kidnapped and killed three Syrian soldiers.[xxiii] Hezbollah ”categorically denied” any involvement in the clashes on the Syria-Lebanon border, but the smugglers in the Qusayr area almost certainly cooperate with Hezbollah given that the Qusayr area is part of a long-time supply corridor from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria.[xxiv] Likely Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers previously clashed with Syrian border security forces during a counter-smuggling operation near Qusayr in February 2025.[xxv] Iran almost certainly seeks to re-establish its overland smuggling network through Syria and rebuild its influence in the territory by promoting insurgent movements.

Pro-Assad insurgent elements are likely coordinating with the Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling network along the border. The Syrian Popular Resistance, a pro-Assad insurgent group operating in Syria, conducted attacks in January 2025 in western Homs Province near the Lebanon-Syria border related to smuggling networks.[xxvi] These attacks occurred during fighting between the Syrian government and Lebanese fighters. The Syrian Popular Resistance also announced its support on March 16 for what it said were “Lebanese tribes” engaged in clashes with Syrian forces.[xxvii] The overlapping activity in the border area suggests a degree of cooperation at a minimum between the Hezbollah-linked smugglers and the pro-Assad Alawite insurgent fighters.[xxviii] Interim government crackdowns on these smuggling networks could exacerbate grievances in coastal Syria by removing income sources for some community members. Successful counter-smuggling and counterinsurgent operations against smugglers and pro-Assad insurgents will remain critical to preventing Iran from expanding a foothold in Syria, however.

Prolonged clashes on the northeastern Lebanese border may inhibit the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) ability to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution in southern Lebanon. The LAF deployed to the Lebanese side of the border and “responded to sources of fire” after Syrian forces shelled Lebanese border villages on March 17.[xxix] The LAF could experience bandwidth constraints should it have to engage in multiple areas of Lebanon as Hezbollah is attempting to reconstitute its military capabilities in southern Lebanon.[xxx]

Diverse Syrian groups rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.  Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri condemned the new constitution on March 15, calling it “illogical.”[xxxi] Hijri has been at odds with other Druze leaders in recent weeks over the integration of Suwayda into the Syrian interim government.[xxxii] Suwaydawi lawyers also criticized the new constitution for its lack of safeguards against Shara’s pursuit of authoritarian policies.[xxxiii] CTP-ISW noted on March 13 that Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his personal power over the Syrian state.[xxxiv] Druze and Suwaydawi views of the constitution could impact ongoing governance and military integration agreements. Prominent Druze militias, including the Men of Dignity Movement, Mudafa al Karama, and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, agreed with the interim Syrian Interior Ministry on March 6 to establish locally led provincial security forces under interim Syrian government control.[xxxv] Kurdish groups similarly continued to condemn the new constitution after the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) rejected the constitution on March 13 and 14 for obstructing a democratic transition and prioritizing Arab identity.[xxxvi] Hardline Islamist and jihadist factions also denounced the new constitution and argued that key clauses were “un-Islamic.”[xxxvii] It is unclear at this time if these factions are part of Shara’s original support base. Some hardline jihadist factions have likely formed splinter groups in opposition to the interim government in response to Shara’s moderate policies.[xxxviii]

A new Iraqi group called the “Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces” announced on March 15 that it would protect Iraq and its religious beliefs.[xxxix] The group called on Iraqis and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) members to join.[xl] It claimed on March 17 that 40,000 people have submitted membership applications.[xli] Iraqi media reported that the group’s leader, Karar Fatah al Subihawi, has previously attended PMF events and was connected to the former leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Jaysh al Mukhtar, Wathiq al Battat.[xlii] Battat was a senior official in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah before he formed Jaysh al Mukhtar in 2013.[xliii] Subihawi reportedly remained in Damascus, Syria, after the collapse of the Assad regime to “liberate” the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine from the Syrian interim government.[xliv] Subihawi’s return to Iraq and the formation of the Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces may reflect concerns among some hardline pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians and militia figures about the Syrian interim government. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political figures see the Syrian interim government and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists.”[xlv] This new group could seek to directly stoke sectarian tensions in Iraq. The newly formed Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 11 that it has begun to pursue Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) members and supporters in Baghdad.[xlvi] CTP-ISW assessed on March 12 that the risk of sectarian violence from Syria spilling into Iraq is increasing due, in part, to the Ya Ali Popular Formations.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Houthi leaders and infrastructure in Yemen since March 15. The recent US strikes differ from previous US strikes against the Houthis under former President Joe Biden given that the recent strikes directly targeted Houthi leadership. The strikes reportedly killed at least one senior Houthi official and the head of security for Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.
• Iranian Negotiations: Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran.
• Syrian Insurgency and Smuggling: Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Pro-Assad insurgent elements are likely coordinating with the Hezbollah-affiliated smuggling network along the border.
• Syrian Constitution: Kurdish and Suwaydawi Syrian groups rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.
• Iraqi Militias: A new Iraqi group called the “Abbas Shield Martyrdom Forces” announced on March 15 that it would protect Iraq and its religious beliefs.

Iran Update, March 14, 2025

Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement on March 14 effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[i] The statement came from a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.[ii] The statement called on “relevant parties”—a reference to the United States—to “lift all illegal unilateral sanctions” on Iran. The statement described Iranian nuclear activities as “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” despite numerous indications that Tehran has restarted its nuclear weapons program.[iii] Iran currently has enough high-enriched uranium to build six nuclear weapons, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[iv] The statement also emphasized the parties’ commitment to strengthening their cooperation through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran wants to use these institutions to undermine US sanctions and build a parallel economic order to the US-led one.

The Iran-China-Russia statement underscores that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran. Western media reported that the Kremlin has offered to mediate in recent days.[v] CTP-ISW has assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests via such mediation, especially in negotiations focused on Iranian nuclear activities and the Axis of Resistance.[vi]

The Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.[vii] The SDC is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The AANES similarly stated on March 13 that the constitution was too like the Bashar al Assad regime’s constitution and noted that the focus on Arab identity is a “de-facto falsification of Syria’s national and societal identity.”[viii] The SDC claimed that the constitution “grants the executive authority absolute powers, while restricting political activity” and obstructs democratic transition.[ix] CTP-ISW noted on March 13 that Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his personal power over the Syrian state.[x] The SDC view of the constitution could impact the political and military integration efforts between AANES and Damascus that began on March 10, but it is unclear what exact effects it will have at this time.[xi] The SDC condemned the constitution drafting process when National Dialogue Conference sessions were not held in AANES territory before committing to integration efforts.[xii] Civilians in SDF-controlled Hasakah shared the SDC sentiment and demonstrated against the new constitution on March 14.[xiii]

Assadist insurgents ambushed an interim government patrol securing fuel trucks between Baniyas and Latakia on March 12.[xiv] The Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR) claimed the attack and stated that government forces did not detain the fighters responsible.[xv] Local media contrastingly reported that government forces did detain someone.[xvi] The SPR has little incentive to lie about the detention of its fighters, as the repeated publication of clearly false information risks discrediting the group among its target communities. Acquiring the intelligence necessary to consistently detain insurgents—rather than innocent bystanders—very often plagues counter-insurgency operations, moreover. Arresting the wrong person could spur additional grievances and mistrust of the interim government in these coastal communities. Attacks on fuel transports in this area could have wide-reaching effects if conducted at a larger scale, as the Baniyas port is critical for energy shipments into Syria. Continuing attacks targeting energy infrastructure could worsen the economy and living conditions outside of coastal Syria, where the Assadist insurgency is currently centered. Insurgent leaders may calculate that deteriorating economic conditions will weaken popular support for the interim government and generate momentum for the Assadist movement. Interim government forces collected small arms in negotiated settlements with locals around Baniyas on March 14, suggesting that wrongful arrests have not deterred some communities from collaboration with security officials.[xvii]

Interim government forces responded to several fires in insurgent attack zones in Latakia Province on March 13.[xviii] It is unclear at this time whether the fires near both Sunni and Alawite communities were intentionally set or by whom. Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah set forest fires that it claimed endangered Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on March 5 before major insurgent violence began in coastal Syria.[xix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements that warned it would attack Alawites for crimes committed under Assad and that the group would continue its attacks until the Alawites and Shia were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[xx] These forest fires exhaust limited government resources and could exacerbate disorder in an already tense environment.

Assadist insurgents likely exploited Latakia Province’s mountainous geography to delay the interim government’s response to major insurgent attacks on March 5-7. Insurgent cells attacked Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces, leading government forces to deploy to re-impose security over the coastal region in early March.[xxi] The interim government response resulted in sectarian violence and extrajudicial killings in some instances. Insurgents chose a choke point on an east to west highway from which interim government forces could access insurgent attack zones on the coast.[xxii] The fighters fired at vehicles passing the area, blocking the road with disabled cars and discouraging anyone from trying to pass.[xxiii] Insurgents will likely reuse this road-blocking tactic to isolate areas where they are conducting attacks. The terrain in these areas is such that any road-bound force will be canalized by the terrain and roadways and thus easily ambushed from the high ground surrounding the roads.[xxiv] This method highlights the tactical proficiency of this insurgency of former Assad regime officers and soldiers.[xxv]

Russia is using both diplomatic and economic incentives to gain favor with the interim Syrian government likely to retain its military basing rights in Syria. Russia and the interim government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria without conclusion.[xxvi] Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara told Reuters on March 11 that he aims to ”preserve. . . deep strategic relations” with Russia, suggesting that Russian officials still have room to influence Shara’s decision making, especially through incentives.[xxvii] Russia has avoided publicly condemning Damascus for its response to insurgent activity on Syria’s coasts, which led to mass extrajudicial killings, but reportedly strongly denounced the new Syrian administration in a closed-door UN briefing on March 10.[xxviii] Russian envoy Vassily Nebenzia compared the partially government-perpetrated sectarian violence to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[xxix] Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on March 13 that Moscow has faith “that the current authorities in Damascus recognize their responsibility to protect the legitimate rights of citizens in Syria, regardless of their religious affiliations.” Zakharova's statement is far from accusing Damascus of perpetrating a genocide, further suggesting that Moscow is tempering its public condemnation of the Shara government, which may be part of a larger effort to maintain good working relations with the interim government and to secure a deal for the bases.[xxx]

Russia has also established some economic cooperation with Syria since February. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[xxxi] A tanker sanctioned for transporting Russian oil also arrived at the Baniyas Port on March 6.[xxxii] Russian fuel could alleviate the energy shortages that the interim government is facing. Syria also sources fuel through other avenues, such as Qatar and the SDF, which present adequate alternatives to Russian fuel, possibly making Russian economic leverage less effective in this context.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran. The statement reaffirms that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran.
• Syria: The Kurdish-majority SDC rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara approved. It is unclear what effect this rejection will have on ongoing efforts to integrate the SDF into the interim Syrian government armed forces.
• Syria: Russia is using diplomatic and economic incentives to develop and maintain a working relationship with the interim Syrian government likely in order to maintain Russian military basing there.

Iran Update, March 13, 2025

The Houthis have sought to obtain hydrogen fuel cells from unspecified Chinese suppliers to increase the range and payloads of their drones, according to a November 2024 Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigation.[i] CAR reported that the Yemeni National Resistance Forces seized hydrogen cylinders bound for the Houthis in August 2024 that the Houthis intended to use for drone production.[ii] CAR reported that the range of hydrogen-powered drones is at least three times greater than other drones. The Houthis conducted frequent drone attacks against Israel during the October 7 War and could use hydrogen-powered drones to attack Israel, commercial shipping, and US interests in the region. The Houthis announced on March 11 the resumption of their attack campaign on international shipping.[iii]

Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara signed a draft constitution on March 13 that initiates a five-year transition period.[iv] The Constitutional Committee emphasized that the document ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.[v] The document is based on Islamic jurisprudence but protects religious freedoms.[vi] The constitution also grants Syrian women rights to education, employment, and political participation.[vii] The constitution enshrines the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press.[viii] The constitution reflects the topics that Syrians discussed at the National Dialogue Conference in late February 2025, including transitional justice, personal liberties, the role of civil society, and economic principles.[ix] The principles enshrined in the constitution are encouraging and may alleviate Western concerns that Shara’s Salafi-jihadi roots will negatively impact ethnic, gender, and religious protections.

Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state. Shara will appoint a third of the Syrian legislature, called the People’s Assembly. Shara could appoint individuals who are loyal to him and reluctant to hold him accountable.[x] Shara will also select the committee that will appoint the other two-thirds of the legislature, giving him further influence over the body’s composition.[xi] Shara will appoint all seven members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, which gives him influence over how the court interprets the law.[xii] The constitution grants Shara the right to declare a state of emergency with the approval of the National Security Council for a maximum period of three months.[xiii]  The newly-formed National Security Council is comprised of Shara loyalists, including Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, Interior Minister Ali Keddah, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Intelligence Director Anas Khattab.[xiv] It is unclear under what conditions Shara could declare a state of emergency and what special authorities he would assume during a state of emergency.

Key Takeaways:

• Houthi Military Capabilities: The Houthis have sought to obtain hydrogen fuel cells from unspecified Chinese suppliers to increase the range and payloads of their drones, according to a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigation. CAR reported that the range of hydrogen-powered drones is at least three times greater than other drones. The Houthis conducted frequent drone attacks against Israel during the October 7 War and could use hydrogen-powered drones to attack Israel, commercial shipping, and US interests in the region.
• Syrian Constitution: Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara signed a draft constitution on March 13 that initiates a five-year transition period. The Constitutional Committee emphasized that the document ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The constitution enshrines the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press. Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state, however.

Iran Update, March 12, 2025

The risk of sectarian violence from Syria spilling into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Shia group called the Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 11 that it has begun to pursue Jabhat al Nusra members and supporters around Baghdad.[i] The group is likely referring to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) members and supporters, given that Jabhat al Nusra was the predecessor group to HTS. The group then posted a video purportedly of masked individuals physically threatening Syrian nationals in a bakery in Baghdad.[ii] The group expressed hope that others would emulate these actions throughout Iraq.[iii] This comes after the group stated on March 9 that it would “pursue” and “expel” Syrians who support “[HTS] terrorism against the Alawite people and minorities.”[iv] Social media accounts claimed that the group is affiliated with either the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[v] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims at the time of this writing. It is not clear exactly what end state the Ya Ali Popular Formations seeks to generate based on its statements thus far. The group may, in fact, seek to stoke sectarian conflict directly.

The Ya Ali Popular Formations’ activity comes at a particularly tense moment in the Iraqi political scene. Sunni parties have tried to relitigate their position in the Iraqi political order in recent weeks, specifically calling for the implementation of long-held political demands. Prominent Shia leaders, including former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, have responded harshly, using sectarian rhetoric and conflating Sunni parties with extremist groups.[vi] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.[vii] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, similarly compared some Sunni actors to the Islamic State after these actors criticized the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court for blocking certain legislation.[viii] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 4.[ix] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[x] Several notable Sunnis, including former Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi protested the Federal Supreme Court’s initial decision.[xi]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda on March 11.[xii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xiii] The PMF Service and Retirement Law would reportedly require around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, to retire due to their age.[xiv] Sudani likely withdrew the law from the parliamentary agenda because he opposes Fayyadh’s removal and seeks to prevent political deadlock.[xv] Parliament has failed to convene in recent weeks because some Iranian-aligned parties have boycotted Parliament over the PMF Service and Retirement Law.[xvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s (AAH) Sadiqoun Bloc and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition announced in February 2025 that they would boycott Parliament until the law is included on the parliamentary agenda, for example.[xvii] AAH and Maliki both seek to remove Fayyadh.

Iraqi media reported that the Iraqi federal government seeks to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law with a law that would restructure the PMF.[xviii] It is unclear who or what group in the Iraqi federal government is leading the effort to restructure the PMF. Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the PMF restructuring law would “confirm” former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s 2019 decree that required the PMF to integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.[xix] The 2019 decree declared that “all Popular Mobilization Forces are to operate as an indivisible part of the armed forces and be subject to the same regulations.”[xx] The efforts to restructure the PMF come as the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxi] The Iraqi federal government may calculate that it could prevent US sanctions if it takes meaningful steps toward integrating the PMF into the Iraqi security establishment. These efforts have thus far proven fruitless, however, as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that control units in the PMF have “complete[ly] refused” to disarm and integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.[xxii]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri expressed support for the PMF restructuring law and allowing Sudani to extend Fayyadh’s term as PMC chairman during an interview on March 11.[xxiii] Ameri’s support for the PMF restructuring law and Fayyadh is notable given recent reports that Sudani may ally with Ameri, Fayyadh, and Iraqi Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmed al Asadi in the October 2025 parliamentary elections.[xxiv]

Unidentified actors conducted a drone strike targeting a Turkish base in Ninewa Province, Iraq, on March 12.[xxv] Iraqi media reported that Turkish forces intercepted the drone before it reached Zilkan base. This attack comes as Iran has appeared increasingly frustrated with Turkish influence in Syria and Turkish regional policy.[xxvi] Iranian state media circulated reports that Turkey interfered in Syrian affairs and condoned the killing of Alawites.[xxvii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically attacked Zilkan base and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[xxviii]

The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping.[xxix] This announcement highlights the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes. The Houthis announced that their forthcoming attacks will target Israeli vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli entities. The Houthis may attack US vessels as well, given the close relationship between the United States and Israel.

Houthi attacks on international shipping will continue to impose an economic toll on the United States and broader international community. Shipping costs around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden increased significantly after the Houthis began attacking vessels there in October 2023. These costs have yet to return to their pre-October 2023 levels, even though the Houthis have conducted no attacks since November 2024.[xxx] The resumption of Houthi attacks will likely raise shipping costs further, as transit around Yemen becomes riskier.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States on March 12, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.[xxxi] Khamenei accused the United States of trying to deceive and weaken Iran.[xxxii] Khamenei asserted that Iran cannot secure sanctions relief through talks in response to unspecified domestic calls for engagement with the United States. That Khamenei has reiterated this rejection of negotiations repeatedly in recent weeks may indicate that he is specifically responding to pro-negotiations elements in the regime. His comments come as senior UAE official Anwar Gargash delivered a message from US President Donald Trump to Iran on March 12.[xxxiii] The message called for negotiations, according to Trump.[xxxiv]

The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Victor Khrenin in Minsk on March 12.[xxxv] Nasir Zadeh lauded Tehran-Minsk cooperation against ”unilateralism” and signed a defense memorandum of understanding. This memorandum likely related to defense industrial cooperation, given that is one of the primary responsibilities of the Iranian defense ministry.[xxxvi] This visit follows other recent meetings between senior Iranian and Belarusian officials held multiple in late 2024.[xxxvii] These meetings come as Iran and Belarus signed a strategic cooperation agreement and Iran began working to build a military drone factory in Belarus in order to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The risk of sectarian violence spilling from Syria into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Iraqi Shia group called for attacks and harassment targeting HTS members and supporters.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda.
• Yemen: The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping, highlighting the threat that they pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.
• Iran: The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries.

Iran Update, March 11, 2025

The Syrian interim government has taken initial steps to prosecute individuals who committed crimes during recent insurgent activity in western Syria between March 6 and 10. Interim government forces arrested five individuals on March 11 for committing extrajudicial killings.[i] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara acknowledged accusations that interim government-affiliated forces committed extrajudicial killings and promised that the interim government would hold those who “exceeded the powers of the state” accountable during a speech on March 9.[ii] Interim government raids targeting former Assad regime members since December 2024 have fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[iii] The interim government will need to take concrete action and ensure a fair legal process, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, in order to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities. Prosecuting perpetrators of sectarian violence will enable the interim government to restore trust among Syrians, particularly Alawites, and could undercut any insurgent recruitment efforts.

 

Pro-Assad insurgent cells remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations. The commander of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade, Mikdad Fatiha, posted a video of himself traveling near Safita Dam, Tartus Province.[iv] Fatiha‘s ability to move relatively freely in Syrian coastal areas demonstrates that insurgents feel relatively safe moving around the countryside by road and do not fear government patrols or checkpoints. Checkpoints are commonly established on major roads and not on small roads and trails that local fighters may be aware of and can use to bypass checkpoints. Static checkpoints also do not destroy an insurgent force and usually fail to protect civilian populations.

 

Qardaha and its surrounding neighborhoods may be support zones for the pro-Assad insurgency. Interim government forces evacuated residents from Salata, Latakia Province, on March 11 following intense fighting between pro-Assad fighters and interim government forces in the area.[v] Salata is around two kilometers west of Qardaha, which is Bashar al Assad’s hometown and a former Assad regime stronghold.[vi] Former Assad regime members have conducted periodic attacks targeting interim government forces since at least January 2025.[vii] Qardaha residents demonstrated against interim government forces operating in Qardaha and called for their removal prior to the recent outbreak of violence between March 6 and 10, which suggests that the population may be sympathetic to pro-Assad insurgent cells and support their activity.[viii] Insurgents in Qardaha fled to nearby hills on March 7 after interim government forces began clearing operations in the area.[ix] Insurgents may draw away resources from the town and intimidate locals to prevent them from cooperating with security forces.

Iran likely seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government. Iranian media has accused the Syrian interim government of committing acts of sectarian violence. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed that the interim government has targeted innocent Alawite civilians with "no political affiliation," for example.[x] An outlet linked to the Islamic Propaganda Organization separately argued on March 8 that Kurdish, Druze, and Christian groups in Syria must coordinate to ensure the success of the "Alawite uprising." This statement may seek to encourage minority groups in Syria to band together to resist the interim government.[xi] The same outlet also claimed that the possibility of "disintegration and civil war in Syria is very high."[xii]  These reports focus on Syrian interim government crimes against Alawites but do not acknowledge that the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria has also included sectarian killings and other extrajudicial killings perpetrated by Alawite, Assadist insurgents.[xiii] Former Assad regime members initiated the violence on March 6 by attacking interim government forces in Latakia Province.[xiv]

 

Iran appears to be growing increasingly frustrated with Turkey’s influence in Syria and Turkish regional policy. Iranian media circulated reports that claimed that Turkey interfered in Syrian affairs and condoned the killing of Alawites. An outlet linked to the Islamic Propaganda Organization claimed that the Syrian interim government is a Turkish proxy.[xv] Iran views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic regional objectives. Iran and Turkey's opposing interests and policies in Syria and other parts of the region could increase fissures in the Iran-Turkey relationship.

 

The Syrian interim government began integrating militia members from Daraa Province into the interim Defense Ministry on March 11.[xvi] A Defense Ministry-affiliated committee registered Syrians from multiple towns in western Daraa and assigned the new soldiers military identification numbers.  The soldiers will join the 40th Division, which the government initially called the Southern Division. Colonel Banyan al Hariri will command the division.[xvii] Hariri defected from the Syrian Arab Army in 2011 as a warrant officer and later helped create Ahrar al Sham in Daraa Province before moving north in 2018 instead of reconciling with the regime.[xviii] The Syrian Defense Ministry promoted Hariri to the rank of colonel in December 2024 and recently assigned him to command a task force overseeing Daraa Province in southern Syria.[xix]

 

Details about the formation of this division suggest that the new Syrian Army may employ independent brigade combat teams rather than use a division-centric structure. A General Security member told local leaders on February 21 that the new division will consist of four brigades located in Izraa, Nawa, and Daraa City, Daraa Province, and Suwayda City, Suwayda Province.[xx] Each brigade will be “independent” with organic infantry, armor, administration, medical, reconnaissance, and “technical,” capabilities.[xxi] “Independent” presumably means that the brigades will be able to—in theory—operate independent of division-level headquarters and division-level assets. These independent brigades will be better suited to conduct small-scale tasks associated with counterinsurgent or low-intensity operations—either against ISIS, former regime supporters, or well-equipped smugglers—compared to large divisions.

Iranian-backed Shia political parties are hampering the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to prevent US sanctions on Iraq. Iraqi media reported on March 11 that there are “deep rivalries” in the Shia Coordination Framework over resistance by the Iranian-backed factions to the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to avoid US sanctions.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraqi media has reported in recent weeks that the United States plans to sanction Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors.[xxiii]  The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm and integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi military establishment.[xxiv] Some of these militias have refused to disarm and dissolve despite warnings from the Iraqi federal government about Israeli and US economic and military consequences if the militias fail to do so.[xxv] The economic consequences likely refer to sanctions Iranian-backed political parties’ unwillingness to work with the Iraqi federal government to avoid US sanctions highlights the control that Iranian-backed groups hold in Iraq.

Key Takeaways:

• Pro-Assad Insurgency: The Syrian interim government has taken initial steps to prosecute individuals who committed crimes during recent insurgent activity in western Syria between March 6 and 10. The interim government will need to take concrete action, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, in order to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities. Pro-Assad insurgent cells remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations.
• Iranian Response to Syrian Insurgency: Iran likely seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government. Iranian media has accused the Syrian interim government of committing acts of sectarian violence. These reports focus on Syrian interim government crimes against Alawites but do not acknowledge that the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria has also included sectarian killings and other extrajudicial killings perpetrated by Alawite, Assadist insurgents.
• Integration of Syrian Armed Groups: The Syrian interim government began integrating militia members from Daraa Province into the interim Defense Ministry on March 11. The militia members will join the 40th Division, which the government initially called the Southern Division. Details about the formation of this division suggest that the new Syrian Army may employ independent brigade combat teams rather than use a division-centric structure.
• Iraqi Political Fissures: Iranian-backed Shia political parties are hampering the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to prevent US sanctions on Iraq. The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm and integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi military establishment. Some of these militias have refused to disarm and dissolve despite warnings from the Iraqi federal government about Israeli and US economic and military consequences if the militias fail to do so.

Iran Update, March 10, 2025

Current Syrian interim government counterinsurgency operations are insufficient to defeat pro-Assad insurgent cells across Syria. Interim government forces launched major counterinsurgent operations in former regime strongholds between March 7 and 10.[i] These operations have coincided with a decrease in insurgent activity but insurgent cells have continued attacks on interim government forces while expanding attacks across Tartous Province.[ii] The decrease in rate of insurgent attacks during major counterinsurgent operations is more likely due to insurgents withdrawing from an area for the duration of the operation rather than a reflection of the operation’s success in destroying cells. There have been few engagements between insurgents and Syrian government forces during these large-scale counterinsurgent operations, suggesting that the insurgents are lying low and avoiding contact. Counterinsurgency operations require that security forces maintain their presence in an area to control it and prevent insurgents from reestablishing their connections with their support base.[iii] The interim government announced Syrian forces began to withdraw from western Syria after successfully pushing insurgents out of city centers.[iv] Interim government forces established approximately 150 checkpoints to prevent the movement of fighters. Checkpoints alone will not defeat the insurgency, because checkpoints are commonly placed on major thoroughfares and not the sorts of small roads and trails that are known to local fighters and can easily bypass checkpoints. Static checkpoints also do not destroy the insurgent force and usually fail to protect the population.[v]

The interim Syrian government has not addressed outstanding grievances within the Alawite community. Damascus will need to address these grievances to build the stability and confidence in government institutions necessary to defeat the insurgency. A unit within the interim government forces was removed from counterinsurgency operations over the weekend after committing extrajudicial killings but was not appropriately detained and reportedly proceeded to commit additional acts of violence against the civilian population.[vi] Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara gave a speech on March 9 in which he briefly acknowledged accusations of extrajudicial killings by HTS-led forces and promised that those who “exceeded the powers of the state” will be held accountable.[vii] Shara also appointed two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to a committee to investigate the crimes committed by government troops, which is a notable step towards ameliorating sectarian concerns.[viii] Government forces have arrested some of those responsible for extrajudicial killings.[ix] Interim government raids targeting former Assad regime members since December 2024 have fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[x] Failure to hold perpetrators of extrajudicial killings during the recent clearing operations accountable will exacerbate fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians.

The violence in coastal Syria has prompted calls for sectarian violence in Iraq. A new group called the Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 9 that it will “pursue” and “expel” Syrians in Iraq who support “al Jolani’s terrorism against the Alawite people and minorities.”[xi] The group accused the Iraqi federal government of supporting “crimes against humanity” and warned that it will “escalate” attacks if the Iraqi federal government does not confront the Syrian interim government. The Ya Ali Popular Formations has not claimed an attack at the time of this writing.

Iraqi security forces separately arrested two Syrian nationals in Baghdad on March 8 and 9 for promoting sectarianism. Security forces arrested a Syrian man in Um al Kuber wa al Gazlan neighborhood in northeastern Baghdad on March 8 for "promoting extremist content” online.[xii] An unspecified source told Iraqi media on March 10 that Iraqi authorities have “intensified efforts to monitor and dismantle” online networks that promote terrorism.[xiii] Security forces also arrested a Syrian man in Zafaraniya neighborhood in southeastern Baghdad on March 9 for “glorifying ISIS and inciting sectarianism” on social media.[xiv]

Some Iraqi Shia officials have accused the Syrian interim government and interim government-affiliated forces of fomenting violence and committing acts of sectarian cleansing against Alawites in Syria. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali accused groups “disguised as security forces” of executing members of the Alawite community.[xv] Khazali called on the international community and “active and inactive countries in the Syrian area” to intervene in the conflict and protect Alawite civilians. Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr separately accused the Syrian interim government of targeting Alawites ”with violent methods that may amount to sectarian cleansing.”[xvi] Sadr called on the Syrian interim government to preserve unity in Syria in order to prevent Israel from exploiting the situation to ”invade” Syria.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his rejection of negotiations with the United States. Khamenei rejected negotiations with Western powers during a speech to senior Iranian officials in Tehran on March 8.[xvii] Khamenei dismissed talks as a ”tool for imposing new restrictions” on Iran’s defense capabilities, missile range, and international partnerships. Khamenei framed Western insistence on negotiations as a ”pressure tactic” and emphasized that ”Iran will not accept any new demands.” Khamenei’s remarks come after US President Donald Trump sent a letter on March 5 proposing nuclear talks.[xviii] Khamenei’s remarks reinforced his speech on February 7, where he categorically rejected nuclear talks and called negotiations with the United States, “unwise, unintelligent, and dishonorable.”[xix] Senior Iranian military officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, have echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations since his speech on March 8.[xx]

Khamenei also addressed Iran’s economic challenges during his speech and tried to downplay the impact of sanctions.[xxi] Khamenei demanded currency system reforms, increased investment in domestic industries, and stronger action against smuggling to stabilize the economy. It is unlikely that any of these policies would outweigh the effects of US sanctions on the Iranian economy or solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues include corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the IRGC and parastatal organizations in the economy. Khamenei warned that Western powers aim to weaken Iran by targeting public livelihoods and claimed that Iran’s adversaries want to make Iran’s economy fail. Khamenei framed economic reforms as essential to resist Western pressure. Khamenei remarks reflected the regime’s concern over economic instability, rising inflation, national currency devaluation, and the impact of renewed US ”maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran.[xxii]

The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity as part of the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran.[xxiii] The removal of the waiver will likely threaten political stability in Iraq and damage Iran’s economy further. The waiver suspension bars Iraq from directly importing Iranian electricity, but Iraq can still import Iranian gas. The Iraqi state-owned gas company head told Reuters on March 10 that Iraq will sign a new gas import deal with Qatar and Oman at the end of March 2025 to mitigate the effects of a potential US decision to bar Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[xxiv] It is unclear whether Qatari and Omani gas exports to Iraq would be sufficient to compensate for the potential cessation of gas imports from Iran. Iranian electricity exports to Iraq comprised around four percent of Iraq’s total electricity consumption in 2023, whereas Iranian gas exports accounted for over 30 percent of Iraq’s total gas consumption.[xxv]  

An energy shortage could threaten Iraqi political stability by triggering power outages amid summer heat waves, which could trigger major anti-government protests ahead of Iraq’s October 2025 parliamentary elections. Summer power cuts have caused major anti-government demonstrations in Iraq in the past.[xxvi] Temperatures in Baghdad can reach as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer. Public frustration about electricity outages could influence the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025 because Iraqi citizens could blame incumbent politicians for the energy shortage, which could advantage independents or help Moqtada al Sadr‘s Sadrist Movement. The Sadrist Movement is currently not active in national-level parliamentary politics. US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz assured Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani on March 9 that the United States will collaborate closely with Iraq to minimize any effects the waiver has on Iraqi stability, while stressing that this strategy is designed to isolate Iran.[xxvii] The United States has historically issued sanctions waivers for Iranian electricity exports to Iraq.

The suspension of the waiver will likely further damage the Iranian economy. Iraq has been Iran’s second-largest destination for non-oil exports, which have amounted to 11.2 billion USD since last March, according to recent Iranian media reports.[xxviii] The top three non-oil Iranian exports are three different forms of gas. The suspension of the electricity waiver is another measure the United States has taken in its “maximum pressure” campaign, which aims to reduce Iran’s energy exports to zero in an effort to force Iran into negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear program.[xxix] The United States has already considered implementing an accord that would allow the United States to ask other nations to inspect Iranian oil tankers, in addition to sanctioning individuals, entities, and vessels facilitating Iranian oil trade.[xxx]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian interim government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10.[xxxi] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed a seven-point document outlining principles of understanding between the two leaders.[xxxii] The ceasefire is notable given that the SDF and factions affiliated with the interim government have ostensibly fought each other in northern Syria since December 2024.[xxxiii] The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which was brought under the command of the interim defense ministry in January 2025, has launched daily attacks targeting the SDF along the Euphrates River with Turkish air support.[xxxiv] The interim government has not deployed its official miliary formations to lines of contact with the SDF, but Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra warned in January that the Syrian interim government was “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces.[xxxv]

The March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF’s military and civil organizations will integrate into the Syrian state, but it is unclear how the integration will occur in practice. The agreement’s text provides few details on the method of integration beyond that it will bring “all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state.”[xxxvi] Damascus had requested in January 2025 that the SDF disintegrate its forces and have its fighters join the Interim Defense Ministry as individuals, not as a military bloc under previous SDF command structures.[xxxvii] SDF commander Abdi refused this demand when it was first presented.[xxxviii] Abdi also refused pressure to integrate into the Interim Defense Ministry after Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call to disarm in late February 2025.[xxxix] Ocalan’s call could have influenced Abdi’s decision to sign this agreement, though Abdi had previously said he would not sign an agreement on integration without a ceasefire.

The emerging insurgency in coastal Syria likely influenced the terms that Shara and the SDF were willing to compromise on, leading to a deal. It remains unclear at this time which party conceded their previously held position regarding terms of military integration. Unrest in Latakia and Tartous provinces has drastically decreased the interim government’s bandwidth, however. An interim government deployment to the contact lines with the SDF would require a large number of combat-experienced, well-disciplined forces, which are the exact sort of forces required to conduct counterinsurgency operations against Assadists in western Syria. The SDF agreed to support Damascus in “its fight against the remnants of Assad” and other threats to Syrian security on March 10, suggesting that SDF forces could help alleviate bandwidth concerns by countering former Assadists in Sunni Arab areas along the Euphrates River.[xl]

The insurgency and harsh counter-insurgent reprisals from interim government forces likely strengthened SDF leaders’ conviction that the organization must retain some force capable of defending the Kurdish population from ethno-sectarian violence, however.[xli] The Syrian interim government had not previously provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The Abdi-Shara agreement recognized Kurdish rights to Syrian citizenship and ensured the return and protection of all displaced Syrians to their villages, likely in an effort to assuage these Kurdish concerns.[xlii]

Damascus will take over key physical sites currently controlled by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria under the agreement.  The SDF gave the interim government control over all border crossings, airports, and petroleum resources in northeastern Syria.[xliii] Regional media reported that the interim government would also take over the administration of currently SDF-controlled detention facilities holding 10,000 ISIS fighters and displaced persons camps holding around 46,000 ISIS supporters and refugees in northeastern Syria.[xliv] Neither the SDF nor Damascus have confirmed this report.   The interim government’s control over the camps will not solve the repatriation and deradicalization issues, however. Damascus will probably have similar—if not more—difficulty repatriating the fighters and camp residents because it has less leverage than the United States and many countries around the world have little incentive to repatriate their nationals who joined or supported ISIS.

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on March 9 that Lebanese government efforts to establish a state monopoly on violence do not apply to Hezbollah.[xlv] Qassem stated that he did not believe Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s recent statements that called on the government to establish a state monopoly over weapons are directed at Hezbollah.[xlvi] Qassem argued that Hezbollah serves as a ”necessary” deterrent against Israeli attacks into Lebanon, which is a long-running Hezbollah claim to justify its existence as a non-state militia in Lebanon.[xlvii] Qassem said that the Lebanese government should pursue reconstruction efforts in southern Lebanon without the conditions that ”some are talking about.” Qassem is likely referring to Lebanese parliamentarians who recently emphasized that international reconstruction aid is contingent on Hezbollah demilitarization.[xlviii] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah will allow the Lebanese state to pursue diplomatic solutions with Israel as long as it does not “make us lose Lebanon.” This position on diplomatic solutions with Israel is likely deliberately vague to enable Hezbollah to justify military action against Israel if Hezbollah feels military action is necessary, with or without the acquiescence of the Lebanese state. Qassem admitted that the Israel-Lebanon war weakened Hezbollah.

 

 

Key Takeaways:

• Pro-Assad Insurgency: Current Syrian interim government counterinsurgency operations are insufficient to defeat pro-Assad insurgent cells across Syria. The decrease in rate of insurgent attacks during major counterinsurgent operations is more likely due to insurgents withdrawing from an area for the duration of the operation rather than a reflection of the operation’s success in destroying cells.
• Syrian Government Response to Insurgency: The interim Syrian government has not addressed outstanding grievances within the Alawite community. Damascus will need to address these grievances to build the stability and confidence in government institutions necessary to defeat the insurgency. The government did appoint two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to investigate crimes in the coastal areas. It has also arrested some of those responsible for extrajudicial killings.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his rejection of negotiations with the United States. Khamenei also addressed Iran’s economic challenges during his speech and tried to downplay the impact of sanctions. It is unlikely that new Iranian policies would outweigh the effects of US sanctions on the Iranian economy or solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy.
• Energy Waivers in Iraq: The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity as part of the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran. The removal of the waiver will likely threaten political stability in Iraq and damage Iran’s economy further.
• Damascus-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Agreement: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian interim government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10. The March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF’s military and civil organizations will integrate into the Syrian state, but it is unclear how the integration will occur in practice.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on March 9 that Lebanese government efforts to establish a state monopoly on violence do not apply to Hezbollah. Qassem argued that Hezbollah serves as a ”necessary” deterrent against Israeli attacks into Lebanon, which is a long-running Hezbollah claim to justify its own existence as a non-state militia in Lebanon.

Iran Update, March 7, 2025

Insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region.[i] Syrian government reinforcements deployed across to Tartous and Latakia on March 6 in response to coordinated attacks by Assadist insurgents on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Latakia Province.[ii] Clashes between Syrian government forces and insurgents spread overnight to other parts of Latakia and Tartous provinces.[iii] The Syrian government deployed armored units, helicopters, and drone units to locate and target insurgents in the area.[iv] Insurgents attempted to take control of hospitals across the coastal region and continued to attack security personnel as government forces advanced into coastal cities.[v] The Syrian government deployed armor, helicopters, and drone units to locate and target insurgents in the area.[vi] Syrian government forces have killed or captured over 150 pro-Assad insurgents captured since March 6.[vii]     

The heaviest bouts of fighting between insurgent cells and government forces took place in Jableh, south of Latakia City, where insurgent cells launched coordinated attacks on March 6.[viii] Insurgents attacked security forces as government forces advanced north on the coastal highway towards Jableh and targeted security forces with mortars and small arms within the city.[ix] Security forces prevented pro-Assad insurgents from besieging a hospital on the Jableh outskirts and re-secured the Naval College in Jableh after several hours of clashes.[x]  It does not appear that government forces have fully re-secured the city, however. Likely insurgents continued to conduct attacks in the city, including an attack that sabotaged a high voltage line that caused a power outage in Latakia Province.[xi]

Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. Syrian government forces have secured most of the region’s larger towns but still have not fully eliminated insurgent cells in Tartous and Latakia’s Alawite-majority mountainous countryside.[xii]  Insurgents also do not wear uniforms and can quickly blend back into the population when they come under pressure from security forces, making them very difficult to defeat in one clearing operation.[xiii] Security forces advanced into some towns in the Latakia countryside and engaged insurgents, including Qardaha—Assad’s hometown—in order to free dozens of security personnel that insurgents had taken hostage.[xiv] Security personnel expanded the campaign to pursue insurgents into the southern Hama countryside, suggesting that these insurgent cells have a presence outside of coastal heartland or that insurgents have fled the area.[xv]

Government control over most populated areas will not necessarily prevent insurgents from returning, however. That cells of pro-Assad fighters were able to organize amongst themselves and respond quickly to the initial clashes in Jableh suggests that anti-government sentiment is relatively strong. Hardcore Assadists have been able to successfully exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. A Syrian near Beit Ana in Latakia said that many young men volunteered to shoot at government personnel after an unknown individual provided them with rifles.[xvi] Insurgencies against the interim government will likely continue to emerge in these areas until the government addresses the root causes of the Alawite community’s feelings of disenfranchisement and secures the population against abuses from incompetent government security forces.

It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells, however. Syrian government forces captured several well-known Assad-era commanders, including Assad’s former head of Air Force Intelligence Ibrahim Huwaija, but there is no clear evidence that they were involved in the inception or planning of coordinated attacks.[xvii] Several organized insurgent groups have also been tied to the current clashes, including Assadist groups like the Syrian Popular Resistance, ex-Republican Guard commander Muqdad Fataha’s Shield of the Coast Brigade, and ex-Fourth Division member Ghiath Dalah’s recently-announced Military Council for the Liberation of Syria.[xviii] Dalah called for restraint from his followers in a statement on March 7, condemning instances of sectarian-motivated violence and stating that he seeks to negotiate with the government.[xix] It does not appear that Dalah or any other former regime elements fully control the coastal insurgents, despite his call to his followers. Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids and searches for former Assad regime members in former regime strongholds since coming to power in December 2024. It is unlikely that a single large, organized, unified insurgent organization has been able to form and coordinate the majority of the targeted attacks against government forces on March 6.  

The Syrian Popular Resistance, a pro-Assad group, claimed numerous attacks targeting government forces in the coastal region.[xx] The Syrian Popular Resistance claimed it engaged government forces in several towns and villages along the coast, including along the M4 highway north of Latakia.[xxi] Footage posted on social media on March 7 confirmed heavy fighting between unknown insurgents and the government forces along the highway.[xxii]  The exact reach or strength of the Syrian Popular Resistance is unclear, but it does appear to be in communication with insurgents operating on the ground. The group claimed on March 7 that it had taken control of numerous villages in Jabal al Alawiyin and expanded the scope of its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside.[xxiii]

Military reinforcements, including newly formed Syrian army units, deployed to the coastal region from across Syria to support counterinsurgency efforts.[xxiv] Government reinforcements from Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs, Damascus, Deir ez Zor, and some southern provinces travelled to the coastal region on March 6.[xxv] These reinforcements included units from several new Syrian army divisions that deployed from their respective areas of responsibility, including forces from the 62nd Division based in Hama, 118th Division based in Palmyra, and unspecified forces from Deir ez Zor.[xxvi] The government has formed these divisions within the last two months.[xxvii] The counterinsurgency campaign along the coast is likely the first large-scale operation for many of these units. This is also the first time that multiple divisions are coordinating division-level operations, but it remains unclear how formalized these division structures are and if they are structured like conventional military forces.

The tensions on the coast also appear to have drawn in armed groups that may or may not have fully integrated into Syrian army units. Syrian media posted footage that showed a large convoy from the Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade travelling to the coast.[xxviii] The Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade is part of the Syrian National Army’s First Corps and has been involved in fighting against the SDF along Manbij frontlines in recent weeks.[xxix]  

Emerging reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities perpetrated by interim government forces increase the likelihood that insurgent cells will expand in size, geographic distribution, and Alawite support. Widely circulated videos show that likely interim government forces massacred about 30 individuals in Mukhtariya, Latakia Province.[xxx] Pro-Assad forces reportedly ambushed interim forces near the town on March 6, leading the interim government to deploy there and fight throughout the night.[xxxi] This incident and others occurring at a smaller scale across coastal Syria appear to be poorly executed counter-insurgency operations that transform into extrajudicial executions by HTS-affiliated forces in Alawite towns.[xxxii] These heavy-handed operations will further alienate and inspire fear in the coastal minority populations. The insurgents probably hope to trigger violent government reprisals to generate support for their insurgency. Alawite activists have reportedly warned that the attacks on interim government forces in Latakia Province on March 6 aimed to elicit a harsh response from the Syrian government.[xxxiii]  There is a climate of distrust between Alawites in the coastal regions and the government, with pro-government sources blaming Alawites for the executions, and Alawites considering the initial attacks on interim government forces to be ”false flag attacks.”[xxxiv]

Thousands of Syrians not associated with organized military structures have expressed their intent to fight against regime remnants in coastal areas.[xxxv] Sources in the Interior Ministry blamed violence and disorder on ”unorganized popular crowds [that] headed to the coast” and called attacks ”individual violations" that the government forces were working to stop.[xxxvi] These statements suggest that the Syrian government lacks command-and-control over some formations along the coast. A heavy-handed approach that fails to clearly distinguish between insurgents and civilians can be a feature of poor command and control within a military organization. Some Assad remnants have shed their fatigues and are reportedly mixing with the civilian population, which creates additional problems for the government forces as they attempt to identify and kill combatants.[xxxvii]  

Harsh counter-insurgency operations undermine government efforts to reestablish control over an area by exacerbating fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians or specific confessional or ethnic groups in particular. This fear can in turn drive popular support and recruitment for insurgent groups even beyond the group‘s initial power base and community.[xxxviii]  Such a dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked.

Syrians across most provinces demonstrated in support of the interim government’s operation against Assadist insurgents on March 7. Over 25 municipalities in nine provinces held demonstrations.[xxxix] Assadist insurgents reportedly opened fire on demonstrators in Homs on March 6.[xl] This substantial showing across Syria suggests that HTS retains popularity across broad swathes of the country.

US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.[xli]  Trump told reporters in Washington, DC, on March 7 that he would prefer to pursue a nuclear deal, but that ”the other option will solve the problem.”[xlii] Trump is presumably referring to a military strike targeting Iran‘s nuclear facilities.[xliii] Trump warned that ”something is going to happen very soon” regarding Iran.

Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump’s letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Western media on March 7 that Iran will not resume negotiations with the United States while the United States continues to impose its ”maximum pressure” policy.[xliv] Several Friday prayer leaders across Iran rejected negotiations with the United States in sermons on March 7.[xlv] Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader, which indicates that their comments are a coordinated messaging campaign.  Khamenei previously categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech on February 7.[xlvi] Khamenei may choose to negotiate with the United States indirectly through European, Russian, or Qatari intermediaries, for example. Khamenei is scheduled to meet with senior military officials and civil servants for Ramadan on March 8 where they will likely discuss the letter.[xlvii]

Iran’s refusal to negotiate with the United States will further deteriorate Iran’s economic situation, which could trigger internal unrest. Iran is facing dire economic conditions, with inflation reaching approximately 35 percent in February 2025 and the Iranian rial regularly reaching record-low exchange rates.[xlviii] Trump re-instituted ”maximum pressure“ sanctions, which target Iranian oil exports to discourage Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, on February 4.[xlix] The United States is also considering a plan under which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, which will help impose the “maximum pressure“ policy at sea.[l] Iranian officials are insisting that Iran should increase its ideologization efforts, such as countering alleged US-instituted soft war and psychological operations, rather than addressing economic concerns.[li] Increased maximum pressure sanctions, combined with ideologization efforts, could stoke unrest and lead to protests in Iran.

Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon.[lii] Iranian officials continue to suggest that Iran could change its nuclear strategy to address growing external security threats as Iran continues to increase its enriched uranium stockpile.[liii] It is unclear at this time whether the Supreme Leader has made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon or a nuclear deal. Khamenei’s decision will likely depend on whether Iran calculates that the greatest threat to regime survival is internal or external.

Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk."[liv] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi said on March 3 that Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[lv] Western media reported on March 4 that Russia offered to mediate talks between the United States and Iran.[lvi] Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.[lvii]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened on March 7 to resume attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea on March 7 if Israel does not restart aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip by March 11.[lviii] These attacks are aimed at disrupting trade to Israel in support of Hamas after October 7, 2023.[lix] The Houthis paused their attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in November 2024.[lx] The Houthis continued launching drone and missile attacks on US military vessels and Israeli territory until Israel and Hamas implemented the ceasefire on January 19, 2025.[lxi] The Houthis have regularly threatened to restart their campaign against Israel in the event the Houthis felt that Israel was not adhering to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire terms.[lxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Insurgency in Syria: Insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region. Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells.
• Sectarianism in Syria: Emerging reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities perpetrated by interim government forces increase the likelihood that insurgent cells will expand in size, geographic distribution, and Alawite support.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump’s letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead.
• Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program: Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk." Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.
• Houthis and the Red Sea: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened on March 7 to resume attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea on March 7 if Israel does not restart aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip by March 11.

Iran Update, March 6, 2025

Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members conducted coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province on March 6.[i] Interim government forces deployed to the area and cordoned off the area, presumably ahead of a clearing effort.[ii] Interim government forces suppressed fighters in Beit Ana and Daliyah but continue to engage former Assad regime members in the Latakia countryside at the time of this writing.[iii] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor this developing situation. Former Assad regime members have killed at least 13 Syrian soldiers on March 6.[iv] Former Assad regime loyalists have announced their intent to restore Assad’s rule in Syria. It is unlikely that all of the individuals who participated in the attacks on interim government forces joined in the fighting to topple the government and restore Assad, however.[v]

Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. Former Assad regime members already have the preexisting networks that they can leverage to rapidly organize insurgent cells. These networks are military, intelligence, and political networks and criminal syndicates who were regime supporters and lost significant economic and political influence in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. These networks could enable former Assad regime members to coordinate attacks across wider areas. This is particularly true in former regime stronghold areas in coastal Syria.

These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. Insurgent groups often attract supporters who hold a range of social, economic, and political grievances.[vi] Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids in former regime strongholds targeting former Assad regime members since coming to power in December 2024.[vii] These raids, while resulting in the arrest of many mid- to high-level Assad regime officials, have also fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[viii] Members of the Alawite community have expressed their belief that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised by Sunnis as part of a broader effort to marginalize the Alawite community.[ix] This is not true; all of Syria is economically devastated, but Alawites believe they are ”uniquely” experiencing economic issues nonetheless.[x] Former Assad regime members have reportedly used Alawite fears of attacks on the community to mobilize young men to take up arms.[xi] Interim government forces have also launched a campaign to interdict drug smuggling in western Syria, cutting off a once-steady revenue stream for some criminal syndicates and their beneficiaries.[xii] Insurgent groups can leverage these grievances against the interim government to increase their supporter base, and have already begun to do so.

Poorly executed counter-insurgency operations risk fueling a cycle of violence and increased local support for insurgent groups if not conducted carefully. Insurgent groups seek to exploit insecurity and abuses to establish themselves as the primary security guarantor in a community.[xiii] Insurgent groups conduct attacks on government security forces to elicit a strong response, which insurgent groups can then frame as government attacks on civilians.[xiv] Alawite activists have reportedly warned that the attacks on interim government forces in Latakia Province on March 6 aimed to elicit a harsh response from the Syrian government and thereby instigate an insurgency.[xv] Former Assad regime members attacked an ambulance that was attempting to evacuate Syrian soldiers from Jableh with the expectation that the interim government would respond to the attack with a large operation.[xvi] A heavy-handed approach that fails to clearly distinguish between insurgents and civilians undermines government efforts to reestablish control over an area by exacerbating fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians. This fear can in turn drive popular support for insurgent groups.[xvii]

Former senior Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Fourth Division officer Brigadier General Gaith Dalah announced the formation of a “military council to liberate Syria” on March 6.[xviii] Dalah announced that the group’s objectives include the “liberation” of Syrian territory from the “terrorist, jihadist organizations” that control it, in reference to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham-led Syrian interim government.[xix] The group also seeks to dismantle the Syrian interim government’s “deeply rooted sectarian structures.” Dalah is a former Fourth Division general.[xx] The United States designated Dalah as a specially designated national (SDN) in 2020 for his efforts to prevent a ceasefire in Syria.[xxi] It is unclear if Dalah actually established this military council or if the group is claiming him as their leader due to his reputation in the Assad regime. It is notable and likely not a coincidence that the group announced its formation on the same day that regime-affiliated clashes broke out in coastal Syria.

The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6.[xxii] Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf. The plan is part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal.[xxiii] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized on March 6 that the United States seeks to “shut down” Iran’s oil sector and drone manufacturing capabilities.[xxiv] Iran has developed several ways to evade US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers in Malaysia to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil shipments to China.[xxv] Under the plan that Reuters reported on March 6, the United States would ask allies to inspect Iranian tankers transiting chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait off the coast of Malaysia, to prevent illicit Iranian oil exports.[xxvi]  Iran has previously seized commercial tankers in response to Western seizures of Iranian tankers. Iran seized a tanker carrying Chevron oil in the Strait of Hormuz in April 2023 in response to the United States confiscating Iranian oil shipments, for example.[xxvii] This incident resulted in a steep increase in crude oil prices.[xxviii]

Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. A US-sanctioned, Barbados-flagged tanker arrived at the coast of Baniyas, Tartous Province, Syria, on March 6.[xxix] The United States sanctioned the vessel in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[xxx] Reuters reported that the vessel departed from the Russian port of Primorsk for Syria on February 8 carrying 37,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulphur diesel.[xxxi]  It is unclear whether the vessel has offloaded the diesel fuel at the time of this writing. The Syrian interim government has sought to obtain oil since Iran halted oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian government recently reached a deal with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in February 2025 to transport oil from SDF-controlled oil wells to government territory for refinement and use.[xxxii] Russian oil exports to Syria would suggest that Russia seeks to reestablish its economic relationship with Syria, possibly to gain favor with the interim government and try to secure military basing rights in Syria.

Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[xxxiii] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 5 that Syrian officials have sought to renegotiate the terms of several contracts that the Assad regime signed with Russia. These contracts cover Russian investments in phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert, a fertilizer plant in Homs, and the port of Tartous.[xxxiv] A security force would be needed to protect Russian assets at mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert given that ISIS regularly attacks facilities in this area. It is unclear whether the Syrian interim government would commit to protecting Russian assets or allow some Russian security presence at these sites. Russo-Syrian economic cooperation can take place without an agreement between the interim government and Russia about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia could try to use its economic support for Syria as leverage to secure a "reduced” military presence in Syria, however.

The US and Israeli air forces conducted a joint exercise on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and prepare for "a range of scenarios.”[xxxv] The drill involved Israeli F-15Is, F-35Is, and a US B-52 bomber.[xxxvi] The exercise comes after senior Iranian military commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel. These threats likely aim to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[xxxvii]

Prominent Druze militias and the Syrian government agreed to establish Suwaydawi-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province. The Men of Dignity Movement announced on March 6 that it and other prominent Druze groups, including Mudafa al Karama and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, reached an agreement with the interim Syrian Interior Ministry.[xxxviii] The Men of Dignity said that Suwaydawi-led security forces will oversee security and fight criminal activity and drug trafficking in Suwayda with logistical support from the Interior Ministry.[xxxix] The Interior Ministry sent eight police vehicles to Suwayda for the new security force to use and pledged to provide further support in the coming days.[xl]

The Druze militias and interim government agreed that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although it is unclear if Suwaydawis will have a majority presence in the units or if the units will only be comprised of Suwaydawis.[xli] The Syrian government has not reached a similar security arrangement with any other minority group in Syria. The Men of Dignity have called for a decentralized system of government from Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.[xlii] Shara has, for the most part, rejected minority groups’ calls for any type of federalist system. His acquiescence to the presumably Druze demand that security forces in Suwayda Province be comprised of Suwaydawis—likely Druze militia members—suggests that Shara is willing to relax his position under certain conditions. Shara could seek to make a similar agreement with the Kurds in northeastern Syria, who have similarly called for a decentralized governance system.

The Men of Dignity Movement’s agreement with the Syrian government is a departure from its previous position, in which the group prevented the entry of government forces into Suwayda Province. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations briefly deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12 to contain tensions surrounding the murder of a local man, but it is unclear if government forces remained in the area or if they coordinated their operations with Druze militias.[xliii] The Syrian government has not forcibly deployed security forces to areas in Suwayda Province and has prioritized negotiations with local Druze authorities, likely to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents and the Druze community. A delegation of Druze officials, including Ahrar al Arab Gathering leader Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi and former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous, met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation in southern Syria.[xliv] Rising tensions in Suwayda over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s demand to ”demilitarize” southern Syria may have contributed to the Men of Dignity’s willingness to cooperate with the Syrian government.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Emerging Syrian Insurgency: Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad.
• Iranian Sanctions Evasion: The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6. Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf.
• Russia in Syria: Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks.
• US-Israeli Exercises: The US and Israeli air forces conducted a joint exercise on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and prepare for "a range of scenarios.”
• Druze in Syria: Prominent Druze militias and the Syrian government agreed to establish Suwaydawi-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province. The Druze militias and interim government agreed that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although it is unclear if Suwaydawis will have a majority presence in the units or if the units will only be comprised of Suwaydawis.

Iran Update, March 5, 2025

US sanctions on Houthi officials for coordinating with Russia demonstrate how Russia facilitates Iranian-backed groups’ terrorism in the Middle East. The United States designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization and sanctioned eight Houthi officials for facilitating attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.[i] Houthi officials threatened unspecified military actions in response to US sanctions.[ii] Russia has both provided intelligence for attacks on international shipping and attempted to recruit Yemenis to fight in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to Western reporting.[iii] The US Treasury stated that Russia and China colluded with the Houthis to ensure that the Houthis would not attack Russian and Chinese-flagged vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[iv] The Kremlin reportedly provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on US and international vessels. This activity, which includes the provision of intelligence to the Houthis that can improve the Houthis’ ability to damage US or international vessels and kill US Navy sailors or third country merchant mariners, demonstrates how Russia seeks to undermine US interests in the Middle East. Russia, given its role supporting Iranian-backed Houthi campaigns in the Middle East, would not help secure US interests in the Middle East as a mediator between the United States and Iran.[v]

Interim government forces engaged a militia consisting of former pro-Assad fighters on February 5 in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa.[vi] Anti-Assad media said that a militia led by Mohsen al Haymed killed two interim government security personnel in al Sanamayn, which caused the interim government to deploy forces to al Sanamayn in response[vii] Haymed’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[viii] HTS-led forces previously deployed to al Sanamayn on January 4 in response to fighting between Mohsen al Haymed’s armed faction and other local factions.[ix] Haymed’s group turned over heavy weapons to the HTS-led forces but was allowed to retain personal small arms.[x]

Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah set forest fires that it claimed targeted Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province.[xi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements that warned it would target Alawites for crimes committed under Assad and that the group would continue its attacks until the Alawites and Shia were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[xii] It is not clear whether the group is conducting these attacks itself or if it is falsely claiming security incidents.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is also active in other areas of Syria. Unknown fighters detonated an explosive that damaged the Nasser Ibrahim Asaad Shrine in Tel Abdul Aziz, Hama Province.[xiii] This is the third sectarian-motivated attack close to Tel Abdul Aziz in the last month. Unspecified gunmen reportedly executed five Syrians in al Anz, 11km northwest of Tel Abdul Aziz, on January 27, and Saraya Ansar al Sunnah executed four Syrians in Tel Dhihab, 5km south of al Anz, on February 2.[xiv] The gunmen in al Anz targeted a local mayor responsible for reconciliation in the area with the Assad Regime.

The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced announced on March 5 that Iraq will not repatriate Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp in northeastern Syria for four to six months.[xv] Ministry Spokesperson Ali Abbas said that Iraq will resume repatriating Iraqi citizens once Iraq rehabilitates 3,500 Iraqi citizens in al Jada camp, Ninewa Province. The Iraqi federal government last repatriated Iraqi citizens from al Hol in early February 2025.[xvi] Abbas told Kurdish media on February 15 that the Iraqi government may suspend repatriation from al Hol due to a lack of US funding as a result of the USAID funding freeze.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Sanctions for Houthi-Russian Collusion: US sanctions on Houthi officials for coordinating with Russia demonstrate how Russia facilitates Iranian-backed groups’ terrorism in the Middle East. The United States designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization and sanctioned eight Houthi officials for facilitating attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.
• Pro-Assad Militias: Interim government forces engaged a militia consisting of former pro-Assad fighters on February 5 in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa.
• Sectarian Sunni Militias in Syria: Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed that it set forest fires targeting Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is also active in other areas of Syria, particularly in Hama Province.
• Iraqi Repatriation: The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced announced on March 5 that Iraq will not repatriate Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp in northeastern Syria for four to six months. Abbas told Kurdish media on February 15 that the Iraqi government may suspend repatriation from al Hol due to a lack of US funding as a result of the USAID funding freeze.

Iran Update, March 4, 2025

Russia offered to mediate talks between the United States and Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to Bloomberg.[i] Russian mediation would reportedly cover Iranian nuclear activities and support for the Axis of Resistance. It is far from clear that Russia would help secure US interests through this mediation, however, especially regarding Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance. Russia has cooperated extensively with the Axis of Resistance over the past decade. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East. Russian and Iranian-backed forces conducted a combined attack on US forces in Syria in 2018, for example.[ii] Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel throughout the October 7 War. The Kremlin provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[iii] Moscow and Tehran signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, underscoring further their close collaboration and their alignment in working to erode US global influence.[iv]

Russia’s support for the Axis of Resistance does not necessarily mean that Russia has leverage over its behavior. Russia has historically been the dominant partner in the Russo-Iranian relationship, but this relationship has become more balanced in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia relies heavily on Iranian military support, such as drones, to sustain its war against Ukraine.[v] These shifting dynamics have made Iran a more equal partner in its strategic partnership with Russia. Moscow trying to coerce Tehran into curbing its regional activities would risk damaging their partnership, which is critical to sustaining Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024 likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. Reuters reported on March 4 that seven senior Russian weapons experts, including one with a background in advanced weapons development and one with a background in missile testing, traveled to Iran in April and September 2024.[vi] A senior Iranian defense ministry official stated that unspecified Russian missile experts conducted multiple visits to Iranian missile production sites, including at least two underground missile facilities, in 2024. The September 2024 visit notably occurred days after Iran began sending short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[vii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles in October 2024, which could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia in the near future.[viii]  

The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel. The visit occurred five days after the IDF struck the tombstone engagement radar of a Russian-made S-300 air defense system in Iran. The strike rendered the S-300 inoperable by destroying its ability to track and engage targets.[ix]

Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly supports the participation of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Shia National Movement in the October 2025 parliamentary elections in order to diminish Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s political influence.[x] Iraqi media reported on March 4 that the Shia Coordination Framework expects Sudani’s Euphrates Movement to win between 40-55 seats in the upcoming election.[xi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Unidentified Shia sources previously told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani has allied with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors.[xii] Maliki reportedly believes that the participation of Sadr’s Shia Nationalist Movement in the elections would decrease the number of seats that Sudani’s party wins.[xiii] Sudani notably left Maliki’s State of Law Coalition in 2019.[xiv]

Iraqi media suggested on March 4 that Sudani could ally with political figures who oppose Maliki, including former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[xv] Abadi attempted to form a political party with Hakim in 2020 that supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[xvi] Hakim has recently fought with Maliki over his outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework and involvement in the removal of the Dhi Qar governor, who is a member of Hakim’s party.[xvii] A National Wisdom Movement official said on March 4 that the party remains close to Sudani.[xviii] A potential Sudani-Hakim-Abadi alliance could hurt the Shia Coordination Framework’s performance in the upcoming elections.

Maliki remains concerned that Sadr’s lack of participation in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Maliki said that Sadr’s participation is “crucial” for Iraqi political stability in an interview on March 2.[xix] CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to mitigate the risk of Sadr calling for protests, as he did after the 2021 elections.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to Bloomberg. Russian mediation would reportedly cover Iranian nuclear activities and support for the Axis of Resistance. It is far from clear that Russia would help secure US interests through this mediation, however, especially regarding Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024 likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly supports the participation of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Shia National Movement in the October 2025 parliamentary elections in order to diminish Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s political influence.\

Iran Update, March 3, 2025

Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024. Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, who commands the Artesh Air Defense Force and Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters, said on March 1 that the armed forces plan to change their air defense “tactics” in response to “current threats.”[i] Sabahi Fard was likely referring to the possibility of a conventional strike on Iran. Iranian officials have conducted a flurry of activities in recent months that further reflect their concern about a potential strike on Iran. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters in early February 2025.[ii] This headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Sabahi Fard’s appointment highlights the regime focus on strengthening Iran’s air defense capabilities and improving air defense coordination between the Artesh and IRGC. The Artesh Air Defense Force and IRGC Aerospace Force have also conducted a series of exercises, particularly around Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in recent weeks.[iii] These exercises have tested indigenous Iranian air defense systems, such as the Bavar 373.[iv] Iran may recognize that Russia’s constrained manufacturing capacity and demand for ground-based air defense systems will likely prevent Iran from acquiring new S-300s in the near future, and Iran may therefore prioritize the development of its indigenous systems. Sabahi Fard announced on March 2 that Iran will soon unveil a new version of the Bavar 373.[v]

 

Iranian leaders are responding to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes into Iran in its April and October 2024 that neutralized the S-300s.[vi] These Russian-sourced S-300s were the most advanced Iranian air defense capability to this point. The loss of the S-300s has forced Tehran to develop new ways to counter aerial threats, though it is far from clear that it will develop any seriously viable solutions.

 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz directed the IDF on March 3 to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in response to fighting in Jaramana, Rif Dimashq.[vii] It is unclear what political end state the Israeli government seeks to achieve with these plans. The Israeli government has yet to release further details or articulate a clear vision of what a victory would encompass. Netanyahu said on February 23 that the Israeli government will “not tolerate any threat to the Druze community” and called for southern Syria to fully demilitarize.[viii] Protests erupted across Syria, particularly in majority Druze areas, on February 25 and 26, rejecting Israeli intervention.[ix] The Druze community is highly diverse and loyalty to a particular leader within the community varies across Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[x] Prominent Lebanese Druze politician Walid Jumblatt claimed on March 2 that Israel was attempting to stoke sectarian divisions within Syria.[xi]

 

Growing tensions in southern Syria risk destabilizing the interim Syrian government, which would create opportunities for ISIS and the IRGC to expand their presences in Syria, contrary to Israeli objectives. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on February 25 that Israel would attack the interim Syrian government or “terrorist organizations” if they try to establish themselves in southern Syria.[xii] Such fighting could distract the interim government and create opportunities for the IRGC and ISIS to make inroads in other places in Syria.[xiii]

 

The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria. Druze Jaramana Shield Brigade fighters attacked HTS-led forces at a checkpoint to Jaramana, Rif Dimashq, on March 1, killing one fighter and kidnapping another.[xiv] A delegation of Druze officials led by former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous negotiated the release of the hostage and permitted HTS-led forces to enter Jaramana to arrest the wanted fighters.[xv] Balous accompanied a delegation of Druze officials to Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation within Suwayda Province and southern Syria.[xvi] Jaramana is a former Assad regime stronghold with several regime-aligned Druze militias.[xvii] HTS-led forces have faced resistance from former Assad regime members, as they attempt to consolidate territorial control over Syria.

 

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced an immediate ceasefire with Turkey on March 1.[xviii] The PKK Executive Committee stated that it would disarm in line with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call to dissolve on February 27.[xix] The PKK’s People’s Defense Center Command Headquarters ordered a ceasefire that is ”valid for all our forces,” including ”all autonomous units.”[xx] It remains unclear at this time the extent that sub-national PKK affiliate groups will observe the ceasefire. The PKK command headquarters ordered forces to redeploy exclusively on a ”defensive basis.”[xxi] The PKK demanded that Ocalan oversee the ceasefire and be allowed personal freedoms.[xxii] Turkey has imprisoned Ocalan since 1999 and allowed him little contact with the outside world. Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[xxiii]

 

The PKK ceasefire does not appear to include the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently fighting Turkish and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria, although fighting has stalled in recent days. Kinetic engagements between the SDF and Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have declined since the PKK announced the ceasefire on March 1. Fighting has completely halted around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo, where the forces have fought for about three months.[xxiv] The rate of Turkish airstrikes has decreased as well. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as “PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[xxv] AKP spokesperson Omer Celik said that the AKP expects the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria to dissolve on February 28.[xxvi] The YPG is the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF. Turkey often conflates the SDF and YPG with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected the idea that Ocalan’s call for disarmament applies to the SDF in Syria on February 27.[xxvii]

 

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven Syrians to draft a non-permanent
“constitutional declaration” that Shara himself will approve.[xxviii] Shara announced on March 2 that the members of the committee will draft the document that will “regulate“ Syria‘s transitional phase.[xxix]  The newly appointed committee told Syrian state media on March 3 that the constitutional declaration will set ”general foundations” for a system of government and will define the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.[xxx] The committee said that the document will eventually be supplanted by a permanent constitution.[xxxi] Shara himself has estimated that writing the permanent constitution could take up to three years.[xxxii] The constitutional declaration is therefore expected to provide a legal framework for the Syrian state over the next few years. The systems of governance and values enshrined in the document will likely significantly influence the trajectory of the future permanent Syrian state. Committee member Ismail al Khalfan said that the declaration will be announced within a few days.[xxxiii] The committee will then submit their draft to Shara, who will approve the final declaration.[xxxiv]

 

The committee includes the following individuals:

• Abdul Hamid al Awak. Awak is from Hasakah Province and is a faculty member at Mardin Artuklul University in Turkey.[xxxv] Awak holds degrees in constitutional law, administrative law, and public law.[xxxvi] Awak previously participated in several regional legal forums addressing constitutional governance and democratic transition and advised a Turkish-based non-profit organization that promoted social services and political reform in northern Syria.[xxxvii]
• Yasser al Huwaish. Huwaish is from Deir ez Zor Province and is a dean at Damascus University’s College of Law.[xxxviii] Huwaish specializes in international economic law.[xxxix]
• Ismail al Khalfan. Khalfan is a dean at the University of Aleppo’s College of Law.[xl] Khalfan previously taught at universities in Gaziantep, Turkey, and in the Aleppo countryside.[xli] Khalfan specializes in international law.[xlii]
• Rian Kuhaylan. Kuhaylan is from Barzeh, Damascus.[xliii] Kuhaylan is the head of the public law department at Damascus University.[xliv] She specializes in constitutional and criminal law.[xlv]
• Mohammad Reda Jalakhi. Jalakhi is a dean in the political science department at Damascus University.[xlvi] Jalakhi previously worked in the administration of Idlib University. Jalakhi was appointed as a board member of the Syrian Development Organization after the fall of the regime.[xlvii]
• Ahmed Qarbi. Qarbi is the director of the Shared Identity and Consensus Unit at the Syrian Dialogue Center.[xlviii] This organization aimed to promote a “culture of dialogue” among segments of Syrian society in order to encourage political and societal cooperation.[xlix] Qarbi specializes in public law and previously lectured at Aleppo University.[l]
• Bahia Mardini. Mardini is a journalist and lawyer who previously worked as a media representative for the Syrian National Coalition.[li] Mardini is reportedly Kurdish.[lii] Kurdish media reported that it was unable to verify Mardini’s involvement with any Kurdish political parties active in Syria.[liii] Mardini advocated for Syria to hold free and fair multi-party elections in Syria in 2018.[liv]

 

The extent to which this committee will incorporate the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference remains unclear. The National Dialogue Conference published a list of recommendations calling on the constitutional committee to draft a new Syrian constitution that ensures a balance of power and enshrines justice, freedom, and equality as Syrian values.[lv] The committee said on March 3 that it is “keen” to draw ideas from discussions at the National Dialogue Conference and will not contradict the conferences’ final recommendations.[lvi] The committee is not legally required to consider these recommendations, however. The constitutional committee also does not appear to represent Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity.

 

Unspecified sources told al Jazeera on March 3 that Shara will soon appoint 100 members to a transitional legislative body to serve two-year terms.[lvii] The sources said that Shara will appoint members of the “People’s Assembly” within two months after the constitutional declaration is adopted.[lviii] Shara will reportedly appoint these members from “fair representation of components and competence.”[lix] The sources said that constitutional declaration will allow national parties to be formed later on in the transition.[lx]

 

Shara’s direct control and supervision of these interim governing structures could allow him to co-opt them to solidify his personal power during Syria’s years-long transition. Shara’s direct hand in the formation of these structures may be necessary in order to centralize Syria’s transitional government during an unstable period in its formation and set in motion interim frameworks to govern the country. Shara's control over the creation of the constitutional declaration leaves Syrian citizens few instruments through which they can influence the direction of the Syrian transitional government beyond the committee’s promises that it will consider the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference. Shara’s reported appointment-by-decree of People’s Assembly members also demonstrates that he could appoint HTS loyalists or other allies, thereby consolidating his own power over the interim legislature.[lxi] It remains unclear how much power the People’s Assembly will have during the transition period though, and this will presumably be defined within the constitutional declaration. Shara’s oversight and control over those who comprise the constitutional committee and People’s Assembly could allow him to prevent internal checks against his power or keep political rivals out of positions of influence in the government in the long-term. It remains unclear if Shara would seek to pursue such actions in the short-term while dependent on the support of minority groups and the West in order to keep Syria stable.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel has neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024.
• Syria: Israeli leaders ordered the IDF to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in southern Syria. It is unclear what political end state they seek to achieve.
• Syria: The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria.
• Syria: The PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkey. It remains unclear how this ceasefire will affect the SDF.
• Syria: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven individuals to draft a non-permanent “constitutional declaration” for him to approve.

Iran Update, February 28, 2025

Iran and China continue to cooperate to circumvent US sanctions. At least eight tankers have participated in ship-to-ship transfers to move Iranian oil to China in recent weeks.[i] These transfers reflect the “dark fleet” of vessels that Iran uses to move oil through Malaysian waters to China.[ii] Iran was reportedly holding around 16.82 million barrels of oil in floating storage facilities in December 2024, with two-thirds of these barrels based off the eastern Malaysian coast.[iii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with the Malaysian foreign minister in Tehran on February 25.[iv] Iran depends heavily on revenues from energy sales to support its economy. China continues to import Iranian oil because of its cheap cost, despite China signaling that it is adhering to US sanctions by banning sanctioned tankers from Shandong Province ports.[v] China wants low energy costs to maintain competitiveness in its manufacturing industry.

Lebanese airport authorities seized 2.5 million US dollars in cash on February 28 that a man attempted to smuggle from Turkey to Lebanon for Hezbollah, likely on Iran’s behalf.[vi] This incident follows an uptick in Iranian money smuggling efforts to Hezbollah via air routes in recent months. Israel reported in January 2025 that Turkish citizens have been involved in efforts to smuggle cash from Istanbul to Beirut for Hezbollah.[vii] Lebanon reportedly indefinitely suspended landing rights for Iranian airlines flying to Beirut on February 13.[viii] Commercially available flight tracking data revealed only two instances of Iranian flights landing in Beirut since February 11. The suspension of Iranian landing rights to Lebanon could explain why Iran may now rely on money smuggling routes from Turkey.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran and China continue to cooperate to circumvent US sanctions. At least eight tankers have participated in ship-to-ship transfers to move Iranian oil to China in recent weeks.
• Lebanon: Lebanese airport authorities seized 2.5 million US dollars in cash that a man tried to smuggle from Turkey to Lebanon for Hezbollah likely on Iran’s behalf.

Iran Update, February 27, 2025

US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected a call from Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm and dissolve. Ocalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey, said that “all groups must lay [down] their arms” and called on PKK leaders to hold a conference to dissolve the PKK.[i] Abdi replied that Ocalan’s statement “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.” Abdi stated that peace between the PKK and Turkey would strip Turkey of any justification for continuing attacks against Kurdish groups in Syria, however.[ii] The chairperson of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF, separately stated that “if the reasons for carrying weapons disappear, we will lay them down,” implying that the SDF will not disarm until Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) cease attacks on the SDF in northeastern Syria.[iii]

Turkish officials previously signaled that they believed a call to the PKK from Ocalan to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into agreeing to disarm and integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[iv] This belief reflects misplaced Turkish thinking that the entire SDF would be responsive to PKK direction. Abdi’s response to Ocalan’s call furthermore suggests that Abdi views himself as a Syrian Kurdish leader, not a transnational Kurdish separatist leader, and that he prioritizes protecting the SDF and Syrian Kurds from human rights abuses and political marginalization over pursuing larger Kurdish separatist goals. Abdi has consistently rejected the idea of SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria seceding from the Syrian state but has advocated for a federalist system.[v]

Abdi likely rejected Ocalan’s call in part because the Syrian interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government.  The interim government has insisted that the SDF completely disarm and join the new Syrian army as individuals. Abdi has emphasized that he would want the SDF to join the new Syrian army as a “military bloc,” however.[vi] The integration of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense as individuals would involve dismantling current SDF formations and building new formations in the Syrian Army that include relatively small numbers of SDF fighters sprinkled among multi-ethnic, theoretically apolitical units loyal to the national army. This process would inevitably force the SDF to halt its operations against Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northeastern Syria in order to deconstruct its own forces. The interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would prevent Turkey or the SNA from advancing into SDF-held territory or committing crimes against Kurds in northeastern Syria while the SDF integrates into the Defense Ministry.  Some of the SNA factions that are fighting the SDF are sanctioned for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurds during the Turkish-backed operation to seize Afrin, northwestern Syria, in 2019.[vii]

The interim government appears to have double standards for the integration of the SNA and SDF into the Defense Ministry. The SNA has begun integrating its forces into the Defense Ministry in recent weeks.[viii] The rate of SNA attacks and activity against the SDF in northeastern Syria has not decreased, however, indicating that either the interim government has not yet integrated the SNA factions as individuals or alternatively has allowed SNA factions to integrate into the Defense Ministry as blocs.[ix] The SNA would have to stop fighting, deconstruct its forces, and then rebuild its forces as new, multi-ethnic, theoretically apolitical units loyal to the Defense Ministry chain of command to integrate as individuals and fully dissolve themselves.

The SDF could agree to disarm and integrate into the interim government if the interim government provides security guarantees and additional assurances on decentralization to the SDF and Syrian Kurds. The SDF could become more willing to disarm and dissolve if all armed factions, including the SNA, enter the Syrian Defense Ministry as individuals. The integration of individual SNA fighters into new Syrian army units that are not associated with the SNA could reduce the risk that the SDF currently perceives from the SNA. The interim government has announced the integration of former armed groups into the interim government, but these groups appear to have integrated in name only.[x] The interim government will likely need to make identical demands for all armed factions and secure some sort of political agreement and ceasefire with the SDF if it wants the SDF to integrate into the interim government.

Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media on February 27 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian interim government due to Iranian opposition.[xi] Turkey maintains close ties to the Syrian interim government and has closely coordinated its pressure campaign on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria with the interim government.[xii] Iran views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. The fall of Assad marked the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer resources to reconstitute Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[xiii] Iran previously relied on ground lines of communication in Syria to transfer funds and materiel to Hezbollah. The fall of Assad disrupted these routes. Iranian officials have also expressed concern in recent weeks that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[xiv] Iranian officials have also previously expressed concern about Turkey’s alleged pan-Turkic aspirations and the spread of Turkish and NATO influence in the region.[xv]

Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests. Iraqi media reported on February 27 that State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri view the fall of the Assad regime in Syria as a “Turkish conspiracy.”[xvi] This report comes after Iraqi Sunni political parties have increasingly vocalized long-standing political demands in recent weeks, including by calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[xvii] Maliki and Ameri may be concerned that Turkey could work with these Sunni parties to challenge Shia power in Iraq, just as Maliki and Ameri believe Turkey worked with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) to overthrow Assad. Turkey has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its own influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense..[xviii] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, also view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists“ and a threat to stability..[xix] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, fought al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and presumably view Shara as an al Qaeda in Iraq ideologue.

Key Takeaways:

• PKK and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): US-backed SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected a call from PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm and dissolve. Turkish officials previously signaled that they believed a call to the PKK from Ocalan to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into agreeing to disarm and integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.
• SDF-Damascus Negotiations: The SDF commander likely rejected Ocalan’s call in part because the Syrian interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The SDF could agree to disarm and integrate into the interim government if the interim government provides security guarantees and additional assurances on decentralization to the SDF and Syrian Kurds.
• Iran and Iraqi Views on Syria: Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests.

Iran Update, February 26, 2025

CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did after Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.

Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 92.5 kilograms (kg), or 2.2 significant quantities, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[i] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[ii] The Associated Press reported on February 26 that Iran possesses 274.8 kilograms (kg) of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 6.6 significant quantities, as of February 8, citing an unreleased IAEA report. This amount marks a 92.5 kg increase in Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium and a 2.2 increase in significant quantities since the IAEA published its last report in November 2024.[iii] The IAEA report stated that Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium is at 8,294.4 kgs, marking a 1,690 kg increase since November 2024.[iv] The IAEA report also noted that Iranian officials continued to prevent four additional experienced IAEA inspectors from monitoring the Iranian nuclear program.

The significant expansion in Iran's enriched uranium stockpile coupled with Iran’s categorical rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States makes it very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States ahead of June 2025. The E3 reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[v] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[vi]

Iran is continuing its preparations for a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran will hold nuclear defense exercises at nuclear facilities in Iran on February 26 and 27.[vii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force and the Artesh previously conducted air defense exercises around Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Arak in January 2025.[viii] Two unspecified senior Iranian officials recently stated that Iran is bolstering its air defenses ahead of a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[ix]

Senior Iranian military commanders continued to threaten on February 26 that Iran could attack the United States and Israel in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami stated that the United States and Israel should "expect humiliation."[x] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi similarly stated that Iran will "attack [US and Israeli] security without hesitation" if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[xi] These statements come after senior Iranian military commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct direct attacks on US and Israeli interests in the region, likely to deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[xii] Iran still retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East if it chooses to do so. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh recently warned that Iran could attack US bases with short-range missiles in response to an Israeli attack.[xiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 92.5 kilograms (kg), or 2.2 significant quantities, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.
• Nuclear Negotiations: The significant expansion in Iran's enriched uranium stockpile coupled with Iran’s categorical rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States makes it very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States ahead of June 2025. The E3 reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.
• Iranian Preparations for Israeli Strike: Iran is continuing its preparations for a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran will hold nuclear defense exercises at nuclear facilities in Iran on February 26 and 27.
• Iranian Threats Against United States and Israel: Senior Iranian military commanders continued to threaten on February 26 that Iran could attack the United States and Israel in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran.

Iran Update, February 25, 2025

The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations.[i] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The JCPOA itself will also effectively expire in October 2025, which means that Iran and the E3 would essentially have to draft a new agreement from scratch. It is very unlikely that Iran, the E3, and the United States would be able to draft such an agreement by June 2025 given that the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA lasted for years. A new deal would also require Iran to completely change its stance on negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7.[ii] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[iii] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations, which he is unlikely to do.

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[iv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IAEA report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025[v] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on February 14 that the IAEA Board of Governors will not discuss the ”comprehensive report” in its March 2025 meeting, however.[vi]

 

Iran is preparing for a potential Israeli strike on Iran, according to two unspecified senior Iranian officials speaking to The Telegraph on February 25.[vii] The officials said that Iran is bolstering its air defenses, but that Iran’s current systems would likely not be able to defend against an Israeli strike. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rendered Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, which were the most advanced air defense systems that Iran operated, in its October 2024 strikes on Iran.[viii] The Telegraph reported that the damage to Iran’s S-300 systems has ”prompted Iran to pressure Russia”  to accelerate the delivery of the S-400 missile system to Iran.[ix]

A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid warned that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist” an Israeli attack on Iran.[x] Rashid was likely referring to US bases in Gulf and Iraq as well as other sites in the Gulf countries. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xi] Iran has previously attacked US bases in response to Israeli attacks because Iranian officials believe that the United States can prevent Israel from conducting airstrikes targeting Iranian assets. Iranian-backed militants targeted al Tanf Garrison with drones and rockets in October 2021 after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian military targets in central Syria, for example.[xii] 

Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.[xiii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh recently similarly warned that Iran could attack US bases with short-range missiles in response to an Israeli attack, stating that Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles because its missiles can already reach all US bases in the region.[xiv]

The Iranian Artesh and IRGC conducted a joint exercise in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean between February 22 and February 25 that was likely part of Iran’s efforts to project power ahead of a potential Israeli strike on Iran. The Artesh and IRGC concluded the “Zolfaghar 1403” military exercise on February 25.[xv] The Artesh Navy and IRGC Aerospace Force conducted their first joint missile operation in which cruise and ballistic missiles ”fully sank” a simulated target in the northern Indian Ocean.[xvi] This joint effort could help Iran improve its coordination in the event it needs to conduct real-world military operations as part of a retaliation for an Israeli strike. The Artesh reportedly tested the long-range Iranian-made ”Arash” drone, which Iranian officials claim has a range of 1,200 kilometers.[xvii] The Artesh Navy also displayed its surface and submarine fleet, including destroyers, missile-launching vessels, troop carriers, and Fateh- and Ghadir-class submarines.[xviii] The focus on missile strikes in this exercise suggests that Iran may have sought to use the exercise to signal that it might respond forcefully to an attack on Iran.

The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25.[xix] The statement concluded two days of discussion among hundreds of Syrians who gathered in Damascus and joined the conference virtually to discuss their visions for Syria’s future. Syrian officials have promoted the National Dialogue Conference, and its final statement in particular, as the first step toward drafting a new Syrian constitution.[xx] The conference has been viewed as a litmus test for how the HTS-led interim government will respond to minority groups’ demands and represent Syrians in the future government. Syrian media reported that 550 Syrians participated in the conference’s second day.[xxi] Syrian state media added that 6,000 Syrian expatriates participated in the conference virtually.[xxii] The final statement said that the Syrian Preparatory Committee will issue a “detailed report” that presents the attendees‘ opinions and discussions.[xxiii] This report should provide more information about whether and how the large number of conference attendees reached serious proposals or concepts. The attendees’ reaction to the report may also indicate how accurately the Preparatory Committee renders the opinions and discussions of the attendees.

The conference’s final statement is not significantly different from the interim government's previous rhetoric and stated goals. The final statement outlined 18 non-binding recommendations for the Syrian government.[xxiv] All of the recommendations are consistent with the goals and values that the Syrian interim government has outlined since coming to power in December 2024. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara highlighted many of the goals that are included in the list of recommendations during his opening speech on the second day of the conference.[xxv] The non-binding recommendations include:[xxvi]

• Syrian unity and sovereignty over all territory and armed factions. The conference attendees rejected any “division” of “part[s] of the homeland” from the interim government’s control. The attendees also emphasized support for a new national army and the dissolution of all armed groups. The conference notably did not include Kurdish officials affiliated with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD).[xxvii]
• Acceleration of the government formation process. The attendees called on the interim government to accelerate the formation of a constitutional committee and an interim legislative council. The constitutional committee will draft a new Syrian constitution that ensures a balance of power and enshrines justice, freedom, and equality as Syrian values. The interim legislative council will assume temporary legislative duties until Syria holds elections for a permanent legislature. Shara previously implied that the interim government would establish these two bodies soon after the National Dialogue Conference.[xxviii]
• Preservation of and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities. The attendees called on the interim government to respect human rights, including women’s rights, and to reject discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sect. The statement called for “peaceful coexistence” among Syria’s diverse communities and rejected all forms of sectarian or ethnically motivated violence.
• An immediate Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria. The attendees condemned the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) incursion into Syrian territory as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and called for an immediate IDF withdrawal. The attendees also called on the international community to pressure Israel to stop its “violations.”

 

The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions. The conference’s recommendations have not been designed to be legally binding in any way but are designed to legitimize the political process by allowing the interim government to note that it consulted a broad swath of Syrians. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara has previously stated that these recommendations will “pave the way” for the “constitutional declaration,” a document that will presumably serve as the legal basis for the transitional period.[xxix] National Dialogue Conference spokesperson Hassan al Daghim recently stated that Shara expects the recommendations presented during the National Dialogue Conference to inform the drafting of this ”constitution declaration.”[xxx]  The committee is not required to consider the recommendations given that the recommendations are non-binding, however. The Syrian government is expected to appoint a constitutional committee in the near future. It is unclear if this committee will be more representative of Syrian society than the National Dialogue Conference Preparatory Committee, which is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[xxxi] The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which is the de-facto governing authority of northeastern Syria, criticized the National Dialogue Conference on February 25 for not fairly representing all components of Syrian society. The AANES stated that it will not contribute to the “implementation of [conference’s] outcomes,” presumably referring to the principles outlined in the conference’s final statement.[xxxii]

 

Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. Hundreds of Syrians gathered in villages across Daraa and Suwayda provinces on February 25 to protest Netanyahu’s demand.[xxxiii] Smaller-scale protests took place in other provinces, including Rif Dimashq, Latakia, Tartous, and Aleppo provinces, and outside the UN headquarters in Mezzeh, Damascus.[xxxiv] Several Syrian protestors carried signs that affirmed their support for interim government control over the south and the interim government’s right to ”defend the homeland” against external forces.[xxxv]

 

These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition. Shara lacks the capacity to seriously counter Israeli operations militarily and risks destabilizing the transition even if he could respond militarily to Israeli operations. Shara recognizes the constraints he operates under and has noted that the interim government does not seek a fight with Israel.[xxxvi] These constraints are temporary, to be sure, and do not rule out a military response from forces loyal to Shara in the future, former Assad regime elements he does not control, or other independent actors. The temporary constraints also do not rule out future attacks from Syria against Israel itself. A group of 50 prominent individuals from Quneitra Province and the Golan Heights criticized Shara’s ”disregard” for the IDF’s actions in southern Syria and called on Shara to apply diplomatic and political pressure on Israel to end the IDF presence in Syria.[xxxvii] Shara also lacks the diplomatic leverage to pressure the IDF to withdraw, however. Shara’s inability to respond to the Israeli military action means that protests may expand as Damascus fails to accede to the protesters’ demands and Israeli operations continue.  

 

CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that Israel conducted several airstrikes in southern Syria after CTP-ISW’s data cutoff on February 25.[xxxviii] CTP-ISW will cover these strikes in the February 26 Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations. Iran has continued to prepare for an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Iranian Threats Against the United States: A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.
• Syrian Constitution: The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25. The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions.
• Israel in Syria: Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition.

Iran Update, February 24, 2025

The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice.[i] The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Preparatory Committee started sending invitations to over one thousand Syrians nationwide and internationally on February 23 calling for attendees to report the next day to Damascus.[ii] The Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim said that over 600 invitees arrived in Damascus on February 24.[iii] The short notice prevented the attendance of invitees from outside of Syria and likely decreased participation from remote provinces like Hasakah and Raqqa, given the travel and planning requirements inherent for international travel and travel through lines of control within Syria.[iv] The conference will hold simultaneous 4.5-hour sessions touching on transitional justice, constitutional structure, institutional reform, personal freedoms, civil society, and economic principles on February 25.[v] Syrian interim president Ahmed al Shara will also speak to the conference attendees.[vi]

The conference has not yet met the expectations that the HTS-led interim government initially set due to the 24-hour notice given to participants, which will constrain the ability of many Syrians to attend the conference. The interim government, the Preparatory Committee, and Shara had framed the conference as a chance for Syrians to meaningfully impact the direction of post-Assad Syria and as a gesture of good will to minority groups that HTS would not assume authoritarian power over the state.[vii] The failure to give proper advance notice for the conference is unlikely to achieve these lofty expectations, however.The lack of advance notice means that many Syrians--both inside and outside Syria—will not be able to attend owing to logistical constraints. The conference’s short time frame will similarly not allow for any meaningful discussion on plans for Syria’s future. This may result in a conference that makes few decisions and does not represent large swathes of Syrians.

Some minority leaders in Syria are already expressing their concerns over the short notice, limited scope, and short duration of the talks. A Druze leader, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC) and other Kurdish minority party representatives expressed frustrations with the conference.[viii] The KNC condemned the haste, scope, and choice of representatives.[ix] Damascus excluded the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is heavily influential within the SDF.[x] None of these groups or leaders are representative of the entirety of their minority groups. Their frustrations and concerns do underscore the significant shortcomings inherent in the rapid execution of the conference, however.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded on February 23 that Syria fully demilitarize southern Syria.[xi] Netanyahu said that Israel will not allow any Syrian government forces to deploy south of Damascus and demanded “full demilitarization” of Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra provinces.[xii] Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra make up 11,241 square kilometers. Netanyahu added that Israel will “not tolerate any threat “to the Syrian Druze community.[xiii] Syrians demonstrated against Netanyahu’s statement in several locations across Daraa Province.[xiv] The Syrian interim government has not publicly responded to Netanyahu‘s statement at the time of this writing.

Israel has also offered other opportunities to small numbers of Syrian Druze and reportedly conducted a census of Quneitra Province. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry)—will launch a pilot program to provide job opportunities to members of the Syrian Druze community to work in Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[xv] Local Syrian media claimed on February 22 that Israel conducted a census in Quneitra Province as a part of this program.[xvi] Residents of Quneitra reportedly rejected Israeli job opportunities, labeling any acceptance of the opportunities as ”normalization with Israel.” Local Syrian media quoted unspecified Quneitra residents who suggested that these moves demonstrated Israel’s “intention to remain [in Syria] for a long time.”[xvii]

The continued Israeli presence in southwestern Syrian will provide opportunities for anti-Israeli Syrian groups to attack the IDF. Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara said on January23 that Damascus does not seek a fight with Israel, but Shara has only limited control over southwestern Syria as of February 2025.[xviii] A pro-Assad Syrian militia claimed an attack targeting Israeli forces in Quneitra in early 2025.[xix] These regime remnants currently have very limited capabilities, but a continued Israeli presence could engender increased hostility in southern Israel and enable other anti-Israeli groups to recruit more fighters.

Hezbollah officials said that they will “support” the Lebanese army’s efforts to expel Israel from Lebanon, which reflects the group’s severe degradation and prioritization of reconstitution. Hezbollah officials spoke at former Hassan Nasrallah’s funeral in southern Beirut on February 23 and avoided direct threats against Israeli forces in Lebanon.[xx] The officials instead highlighted the group’s commitment to supporting the Lebanese state’s efforts to expel Israel. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said that Hezbollah had entered a “new phase” in which Hezbollah will support Lebanon’s diplomatic efforts to expel Israel from Lebanese territory.[xxi] Qassem said that Hezbollah could exercise the right to “resist” if its assessment of the situation changed.[xxii] A prominent Hezbollah member of parliament also said the Lebanese state needed to “liberate” the remaining Israeli-controlled territory in Lebanon.[xxiii] These statements indicate that Hezbollah is unwilling to attack Israeli forces in the short term, likely due to Israeli operations that severely degraded the group.

Hezbollah’s activities on the ground also indicate that Hezbollah is willing to shift more security responsibilities to the Lebanese army, even in Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon. An unspecified source close to Hezbollah told the Wall Street Journal on February 23 that Hezbollah circulated an internal memo to combat units ordering fighters who are not from southern Lebanon to vacate positions and allow the Lebanese Armed Forces to take control of the area.[xxiv] Hezbollah has historically enjoyed de-facto security control over southern Lebanon and has viewed itself the primary node in Lebanon committed to resistance against Israel. Ceding these tasks to the Lebanese state suggests that Hezbollah has indeed entered a ”new phase” that is characterized by its temporary loss of influence in the south in order to prioritize long-term reconstitution and rehabilitation.

Iran emphasized its continued support for Hezbollah and Lebanon in the wake of the October 7 War. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, Ahl al Bayt World Assembly Secretary-General Mohammad Hassan Aktari, Supreme Leader’s Representative in Iraq and Syria Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini, the Supreme Leader’s Office’s Communications and International Affairs Deputy Mohsen Qomi, and Presidential Coordination Council member Seyyed Reza Taghavi attended Nasrallah’s funeral in Beirut on February 23.[xxv] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also declared five days of national mourning following Nasrallah’s funeral.[xxvi]Khamenei also claimed that the resistance Nasrallah built would grow stronger. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reiterated the IRGC’s commitment to ”liberating” Palestinian lands and warned Israeli leaders of their “inevitable fate” in a condolence message for Nasrallah.[xxvii]

Ghalibaf, Araghchi and Iranian Ambassador to Beirut Mojtaba Amani separately met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raji on February 23.[xxviii] Ghalibaf also met separately with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and then Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Shia Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri about Iranian support for Lebanon.[xxix]  Ghalibaf told Berri that Iran considers Hezbollah as ”part of Lebanon’s national security and strength.”[xxx] Ghalibaf added in a press conference that Iran is ready to strengthen bilateral cooperation to achieve “development and security in Lebanon.”[xxxi]

Other Axis of Resistance members also attended Nasrallah’s funeral. Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) officials attended the funeral, including the Chairman Faleh Fayyadh, Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi, and Finance Director Qassim al Zubaidi.[xxxii] An Abu Dhabi-based outlet also claimed that the PMF officials traveled with four million dollars that they gave to Hezbollah.[xxxiii] Asaib Ahl al Haq Deputy Secretary General Muhammad Tabatabai and senior Asaib Ahl al Haq official Jawad al Talibawi were also in Beirut.[xxxiv] Several Houthi officials also attended the ceremony in Beirut, including Houthi Military Negotiating Committee Head Major General Yahya Abdullah al Razami.[xxxv]

Iran reportedly threatened to strike Iraqi Kurdistan with unspecified systems if Iraq fails to implement the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement. Unspecified “informed sources” speaking to Iraqi media claimed that Iran threatened to conduct strikes against unspecified Kurdish opposition groups after Iran observed the groups participating in a military parade in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxvi] Iran and Iraq signed a security agreement in March 2023 requiring Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of the Kurdish opposition groups away from the border.[xxxvii] The agreement followed a series of Iranian strikes against Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan from September to November 2022 after Iranian leaders accused these groups of stoking civil unrest against the Iranian regime and described their presence in Iraqi Kurdistan as a national security threat.[xxxviii] Iranian leaders have previously threatened to resume such attacks if Iraqi authorities do not completely fulfill the security agreement.[xxxix]

A flurry of meetings between the Kurdistan Regional Government, federal Iraqi government, and Iranian government to discuss border security suggests that Iran may be increasingly concerned about its border security along the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. CTP-ISW cannot verify the reports of an Iranian threat to strike, however. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi federal government joint committee met at the KRG's Interior Ministry on February 22 to discuss continued cooperation between the Iraqi federal government, the KRG, and Iran on border security issues.[xl]  KRG Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed and Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji attended the meeting. Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) President Masoud Barzani separately met with Araji on February 22 to discuss Iran-Iraq relations and review the March 2023 security agreement.[xli] An Iranian Interior Ministry delegation also travelled to Baghdad on February 22 to meet with Iraqi officials.[xlii] Iranian Interior Minister Iskander Momeni met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss bilateral relations and border security as part of the delegation that traveled to Baghdad.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Constitution: The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice. The conference has not yet met the expectations that the HTS-led interim government initially set due to the 24-hour notice given to participants, which will constrain the ability of many Syrians to attend the conference. This may result in a conference that makes few decisions and does not represent large swathes of Syrians.
• Israel in Syria: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded on February 23 that Syria fully demilitarize southern Syria. Israel has simultaneously offered other opportunities to small numbers of Syrian Druze and reportedly conducted a census of Quneitra Province. The continued Israeli presence in southwestern Syrian will provide opportunities for anti-Israeli Syrian groups to attack the IDF.
• Hezbollah in Lebanon: Hezbollah officials said that they will “support” the Lebanese army’s efforts to expel Israel from Lebanon, which reflects the group’s severe degradation and prioritization of reconstitution. Hezbollah’s activities on the ground also indicate that Hezbollah is willing to shift more security responsibilities to the Lebanese army, even in Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon.
• Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan: Iran reportedly threatened to strike Iraqi Kurdistan with unspecified systems if Iraq fails to implement the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement. A flurry of meetings between the Kurdistan Regional Government, federal Iraqi government, and Iranian government to discuss border security suggests that Iran may be increasingly concerned about its border security along the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. CTP-ISW cannot verify the reports of an Iranian threat to strike, however.

Iran Update, February 20, 2025

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Several senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise” attack against Israel.[i] Iran named its previous two direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 “True Promise I” and “True Promise II,” respectively.[ii] Iranian military officials initially threatened to conduct a third direct attack on Israel after the IDF conducted strikes in Iran in late October 2024.[iii] These threats gradually subsided in the weeks following the IDF strikes, however. IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.

Hajji Zadeh highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”[iv] Hajji Zadeh was likely referring to the S-300 air defense systems that the IDF struck in October 2024. The October 2024 IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[v] Hajji Zadeh added that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “first follow-up" during meetings with Hajji Zadeh, Salami, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri is about the issue of “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems.[vi] Khamenei’s prioritization of this issue highlights his concern about a potential external attack on Iran. Hajji Zadeh claimed that Iran will install “anti-ballistic [missile] defense systems” in Tehran and other major Iranian cities in the next Persian calendar year, which begins in late March 2025.[vii]

The Syrian Preparatory Committee held “dialogue sessions” for Raqqa and Hasakah provinces in Damascus on February 20 in which some participants expressed anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) views. The Preparatory Committee’s “dialogue sessions,” which have thus far taken place in provincial capitals rather than in the national capital, are meant to help the interim government "develop an integrated action plan” for the National Dialogue Conference.[viii] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[ix]  Preparatory Committee member and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Muhammad Mastat stated that the Raqqa dialogue session took place in Damascus due to SDF “threats, repression and silence against the people of [Raqqa] province.”[x] Syrian state media quoted an anonymous participant from the SDF stronghold of Qamishli who demanded that the new Syrian state correct injustices that the Assad regime committed against Kurds, but did not otherwise discuss protections for the Kurdish population.[xi] SANA reported that attendees at the Raqqa dialogue session discussed SDF “crimes and violations” against locals, including wrongful imprisonment.[xii]  Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim emphasized that Hasakah, Deir ez Zor, and Raqqa must rejoin the Syrian state under “one army” and called for the dissolution of all military formations outside of the Syrian Defense Ministry.[xiii] The interim government has repeatedly called on the SDF to dissolve in recent weeks.[xiv]

The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. A minority Kurdish party, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants.[xv] The KNC is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). KDP President Masoud Barzani has called on the interim government to respect Kurdish rights and the SDF to cooperate with the KNC in negotiations with Damascus.[xvi] Preparatory Committee members have repeatedly stated that the SDF and its political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), will not be invited to the National Dialogue Conference.[xvii] A Kurdish activist posted a video on February 20 of the Syrian interim government purportedly ejecting a ”representative of the SDF (AANES) from the National Dialogue Committee Session.”[xviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the authenticity of this video. The Deir ez Zor Province dialogue session is scheduled to take place in Deir ez Zor City on February 21.[xix] It remains unclear if representatives from the SDF-controlled eastern bank of the Euphrates River, which constitutes about half of Deir ez Zor Province, will be allowed to attend the session. The potential exclusion of Kurdish groups from dialogue sessions would likely impact the trajectory of the National Dialogue Conference and subsequent drafting of the constitution.

These dialogue sessions are taking place about a week before the March 1, 2025, internal deadline that HTS set for itself to form a transitional government. Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani said on February 12 that Syria will “be launched [on] March 1” and “represent the Syrian people as much as possible.”[xx] The HTS ”Victory Conference” in late January 2025 resulted in the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as interim president. Shara is responsible for establishing a transitional legislature.[xxi]

Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20.[xxii] Azaz is located near the Syria-Turkey border. Security forces dismantled the VBIED.[xxiii] This is the eleventh car bomb or VBIED that has detonated or been dismantled in Syrian interim government and SNA-controlled territory in Aleppo Province since late December 2024, most recently on February 3.[xxiv] No actor or group has claimed responsibility for the recent car bomb and VBIED attacks, and it is unclear if the same actor has conducted every attack. Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media frequently claimed that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the SDF conduct these attacks, which the SDF has consistently denied.[xxv]

The PKK may have conducted some of these attacks, including the attempted car bomb attack in Azaz. Several of the attacks involved relatively advanced VBIEDs that caused high civilian casualties.[xxvi] A relatively organized cell is required to manufacture and transport such VBIEDs prior to their detonation. The PKK has historically operated in northwestern Syria, particularly in northern Aleppo Province, and some of its cells almost certainly remain in the area.[xxvii] ISIS also has some presence in northern Aleppo Province, but it has deprioritized this area in recent years and it very likely lacks the sort of well-developed safe zones required to build and deploy VBIEDs.

It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.[xxviii] Abdi, who is a relative moderate within the SDF, has also verbally agreed to eject foreign PKK fighters from Syria.[xxix] The expulsion of PKK fighters from Syria—many of whom answer to the PKK’s headquarters, not Abdi—which would both increase Abdi’s own power and help him secure a deal with Damascus.[xxx] A deliberate decision by Abdi to permit these attacks on civilians in northern Syria risks scuttling talks with Damascus and destroying the SDF project that Abdi has built since 2015.

Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned that the return of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr to Iraqi politics could threaten the seat shares of their individual parties in parliament and allow Sadr to control parliament.[xxxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose collection of Shia parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr won the most seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections and his movement nearly formed a government with Kurdish and Sunni backing before Sadr withdrew from politics in 2022.[xxxii] His withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain the majority of seats in parliament. An unspecified Sadrist source said on February 20 that Sadr will not participate in the upcoming elections regardless of whether Iraq uses an “electoral district or Saint Lague system.”[xxxiii] The Iraqi parliament has previously frequently modified the Iraqi electoral law before parliamentary elections.[xxxiv] The French Saint Lague system that Iraq used during elections between 2014 and 2020 allocated seats proportionally to Iraqi political parties in a way that often disadvantaged smaller parties.[xxxv] Iraq adopted a majoritarian system in 2020 that enabled smaller parties to win more seats in parliament.[xxxvi] Sadr’s movement won the largest number of seats in the October 2021 elections, largely due to internal competition within the Shia Coordination Framework.[xxxvii]

Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law in 2023 to return Iraq to the Saint Lague system, likely to favor larger Shia Coordination Framework parties in the October 2025 elections.[xxxviii]  State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki recently called on parliament to approve an amendment that would decrease the number of electoral districts in each province, which would further return Iraq to its pre-2020 electoral system.[xxxix] 

Maliki reportedly seeks to amend the electoral law because he is concerned that Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani will prioritize winning a second term as prime minister over ensuring that the Shia Coordination Framework retains its majority in parliament.[xl] Unidentified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani has allied politically with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors. Maliki may be concerned that Sudani’s political aspirations could lead him to further divide the Shia Coordination Framework’s support among Shia voters, which would weaken the Shia Coordination Framework against Sadr’s movement in the upcoming elections.

Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xli] Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be concerned that Sadr could call for protests if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xlii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xliii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xliv] Many of the pro-Iran factions that are part of the Shia Coordination Framework supported the Mahdi government. The fall of Mahdi‘s government led to the premiership of Mustafa al Kadhimi, whose government threatened some of the Shia Coordination Framework factions. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Rhetoric: Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Hajji Zadeh also highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”
• Syrian Constitution: The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. The Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants. This is notable given the KNC’s long-standing opposition to the SDF.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria: Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible PKK vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20. It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.
• Iraqi Elections: Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Iraqi Politics: Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.