Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 17, 2024

June 17, 2024, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may take steps to enhance NATO's nuclear deterrence, eliciting varying responses from senior Kremlin officials. The Telegraph reported on June 16 that Stoltenberg stated that NATO states are discussing removing an unspecified number of nuclear missiles from storage and placing them on heightened readiness levels due to the growing threat from Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[i] Stoltenberg stated that "transparency helps to communicate the direct message that... [NATO] is a nuclear alliance." Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reacted in a level-headed manner and characterized Stoltenberg's statements about taking nuclear missiles out of storage as "exercises," stating that he understands that Stoltenberg's statement aims to scare Russia but "on the other hand, exercises are conducted regularly and should be conducted regularly."[ii] Naryshkin stated that there is no "special significance" to Stoltenberg's statement and that Russia "must take it calmly." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, on the other hand, claimed that Stoltenberg's statement is "nothing more than another escalation of tension."[iii] Naryshkin's characterization of NATO's efforts to increase its nuclear transparency as insignificant "exercises" is notably different than Peskov's claims that this is part of NATO's alleged ongoing escalation. Naryshkin has expressed opinions that strayed from the Kremlin narratives previously, most notably when Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly chastised Naryshkin to firmly support Russia's recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics on February 21, 2022, three days before the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[iv]

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed four deputy defense ministers and replaced them with a “close relative,” the son of a former Russian prime minister, and an economist on June 17 in an ongoing purge of officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[v] Putin dismissed deputy defense ministers Nikolai Pankov, Ruslan Tsalikov, Tatiana Shevtsova, and Army General Pavel Popov, replacing them with deputy defense ministers Anna Tsivileva and Pavel Fradkov and First Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Gornin.[vi] Tsivileva is Putin’s first cousin once removed (“niece”), wife of the recently appointed Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, and the Chairperson of the Kremlin-initiated ”Defenders of the Fatherland" Foundation.[vii] Tsivileva was also previously part of the Council on Issues of Trusteeship in the Social Sphere under the Russian Government in 2019.[viii] The Russian MoD specified that Tsivileva will oversee social and housing support for the Russian Armed Forces as deputy defense minister.[ix] Fradkov is the son of former Russian Prime Minister and longest serving Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Mikhail Fradkov.[x] Pavel Fradkov served as the First Deputy Administrator of the Presidential Administration since 2021, Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) from 2012 to 2015, and at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Department of Pan-European Cooperation from 2005 to 2012.[xi] Fradkov’s brother Pyotr Fradkov is the Chairperson of the Russian state-owned Promsvyazbank and recently met with Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on April 9, possibly as part of Kremlin’s efforts to destabilize Moldova.[xii] The Russian MoD reported that Fradkov will oversee property management issues, land resources, construction of MoD facilities, and the national economy.[xiii] Gornin served as the First Deputy Minister of Finance since May 2018, Deputy Minister of Finance from 2012 to 2018, and Minister of Finance and Tax Policy of Novosibirsk Oblast from 2010 to 2011.[xiv] The Russian MoD specified that Gornin will be responsible for the MoD’s budget policy and will oversee financial support for the Russian Armed Forces.[xv] Gornin will also work on increasing the transparency of financial flows and ensuring the effective spending of budget funds. Putin also signed a bill on June 17 that increased the number of Russian deputy defense minister positions from 11 to 12.[xvi]

Tsivileva's, Fradkov's, and Gornin’s appointments support Putin’s recent efforts to introduce his relatives and the children of other senior Russian officials to the Russian public and to install economic advisors to the MoD to improve the wartime economy. Both Tsivileva and Fradkov reportedly participated in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) alongside Putin’s daughters and the children of other senior officials on June 6 and 7.[xvii] ISW assessed on June 7 that Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of officials in his close circle to the public, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government.[xviii] Tsivileva also notably met with Putin on June 1 to discuss state financial support for combatants who had fought in Ukraine as part of private military companies (PMCs).[xix] Putin also has been increasingly appointing economists to take senior positions at the Russian MoD and notably replaced Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on May 12 with former First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov who is an economist by trade.[xx] Putin also replaced former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yury Sadovenko with former Deputy Economic Minister and Federation Council Accounts Chamber Auditor Oleg Savelyev on May 20.[xxi] These appointments suggest that Putin is prioritizing the appointment of officials whom he deems to be loyal to the regime and economists to improve Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Putin also may be attempting to groom possible successors to his regime from the pool of his children and relatives and children of other senior officials.

Russian milbloggers largely focused on celebrating the dismissal of Pankov, Tsalikov, Shevtsova, and Popov and largely overlooked the apparent nepotism that benefited two of the new deputy defense ministers.[xxii] Russian milbloggers welcomed new MoD appointments, stating that Putin finally removed officials that thought of themselves as untouchable.[xxiii] Russian milbloggers also claimed that these dismissals are a step in the right direction to resolve corruption in the Russian MoD and improve the defense industrial base (DIB).[xxiv] Russian milbloggers specifically focused on the news of Tsalikov’s dismissal, citing his poor management of the Russian MoD’s information policies and official coverage of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[xxv] Some milbloggers implied that Tsalikov had conflicts with Russian milbloggers who criticized the Russian MoD.[xxvi] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Kremlin stopped considering Tsalikov as Shoigu’s replacement in 2022 after Putin received a memo from unnamed state security agencies about Tsalikov’s corruption.[xxvii] The Wagner-affiliated milblogger added that Shevtsova was the subject of numerous independent investigations, including one into how former Deputy Minister of Finance Tatyana Nesterenko and former Head of the Federal Treasury Roman Artyukhin sang songs that mocked the Russian army and soldiers at Shevtsova's birthday celebration. The Wagner-affiliated milblogger concluded that he was disappointed that Putin did not dismiss Deputy Defense Minister Alexey Krivoruchko, who is a leading figure in many independent anti-corruption investigations, over his corruption schemes involving the Russian joint-stock arms manufacturing company Kalashnikov Concern. Some Russian political bloggers drew parallels between the appointments of deputy defense ministers under Belousov and former Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, who also had an economic background as the Minister of the Russian Tax Service from 2004 to 2007.[xxviii] Russian political bloggers noted that Serdyukov appointed officials from the Russian Federal Tax Service, whereas Belousov is appointing officials from the Russian ministries of finance and economic development and from among Putin’s friends and family.[xxix]

A Russian state media outlet manipulated an interview with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to blame Ukraine for strikes against the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in an attempt to legitimize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine. Grossi stated on June 15 that he would not attend the June 16–17 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland so as to not "mix political considerations with [the IAEA's] technical job," but gave an interview to Kremlin outlet Izvestia which was published on June 17.[xxx] Grossi told Izvestia that unspecified actors have attacked IAEA inspectors and experts at the ZNPP and have violated or compromised the IAEA's pillars for ensuring the plant's safe operation.[xxxi] Grossi stated that there have been unattributed drone strikes against the ZNPP and that the IAEA is unable to identify the perpetrators as it is difficult to identify the drones' departure points or deduce the origins of drones based on debris. Grossi spoke about strikes on the ZNPP on April 7 but notably did not specify if the IAEA assessed that these were Ukrainian or Russian strikes. Izvestia, however, inserted an editorial note claiming that Ukrainian forces conducted the "unprecedented" strikes on the ZNPP on April 7 to directly claim that Grossi was discussing Ukrainian strikes against the ZNPP. The IAEA notably refrained from attributing responsibility for the April 7 strikes at the time.[xxxii] Izvestia's exploitation of Grossi's interview, throughout which Grossi explicitly highlighted that the IAEA cannot identify the origin of strikes on the ZNPP, is part of ongoing Russian efforts to use Russia's physical control over the ZNPP to force the IAEA to meet with Russian officials to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP, and by extension, Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory.[xxxiii]

Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to train more Ukrainian pilots on Western-provided F-16 fighter jets. French outlet Le Monde reported on June 17 that the French Air and Space Force committed to training 26 Ukrainian military pilots from 2024 to 2026.[xxxiv] Le Monde stated that the French Air and Space Force is currently training 10 Ukrainian pilots on Alpha Jet trainers using avionics similar to F-16s. Agence-France-Presse (AFP) reported on June 17 that the Ukrainian pilots are participating in an accelerated six-month training program.[xxxv] Politico reported on June 6 that US Air Force Spokesperson Laurel Falls stated that the US National Guard plans to train 12 Ukrainian pilots on F-16s by the end of September 2024.[xxxvi] Denmark reported in August 2023 that Denmark had started training eight Ukrainian pilots on F-16s.[xxxvii]

The Kremlin confirmed on June 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea on an official state visit on June 18 and 19.[xxxviii] Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora recently stated that Putin will visit North Korea, and another Russian diplomatic source stated that Putin would visit in the coming weeks around his visit to Vietnam.[xxxix] Putin has not visited North Korea since 2000.[xl] The Kremlin reported that Putin will also visit Hanoi, Vietnam on June 19 and 20 and will discuss the prospects for developing a strategic partnership in trade, economic, scientific, technological, and humanitarian relations.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may take steps to enhance NATO's nuclear deterrence, eliciting varying responses from senior Kremlin officials.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed four deputy defense ministers and replaced them with a “close relative,” the son of a former Russian prime minister, and an economist on June 17 in an ongoing purge of officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Tsivileva's, Fradkov's, and Gornin’s appointments support Putin’s recent efforts to introduce his relatives and the children of other senior Russian officials to the Russian public and to install economic advisors to the MoD to improve the wartime economy.
• Russian milbloggers largely focused on celebrating the dismissal of Pankov, Tsalikov, Shevtsova, and Popov and largely overlooked the apparent nepotism that benefited two of the new deputy defense ministers.
• A Russian state media outlet manipulated an interview with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to blame Ukraine for strikes against the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in an attempt to legitimize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to train more Ukrainian pilots on Western-provided F-16 fighter jets.
• The Kremlin confirmed on June 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea on an official state visit on June 18 and 19.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka.
• Russia is reportedly experiencing issues with producing artillery shells and select artillery systems.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to fight north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 16 and 17. Russian sources published geolocated footage on June 16 purportedly showing Russian forces repelling a Ukrainian counterattack in northwestern Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[xlii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched mechanized counterattacks near Hlyboke and counterattacked from the direction of Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City) and near the Aggregate Plant within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xliii] Russian forces also continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near central Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[xliv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters in the Vovchansk direction.[xlv]

A Ukrainian military official confirmed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to the Lyptsi direction, likely from an area west and southwest of Donetsk City. Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Povkh stated on June 17 that Russian forces redeployed elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to the Lyptsi direction to replace units that have lost their combat capabilities.[xlvi] A Russian source similarly recently claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were operating near Vovchansk.[xlvii] The reported appearance of these elements in the Vovchansk area indicates a possible redeployment from the Donetsk direction to the Kharkiv direction to bolster the Russian grouping in Kharkiv Oblast. Povkh added that Russian forces have been bringing additional military units to support the Vovchansk direction since about June 12-13, namely elements of the Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA,] LMD).[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Berestove; northwest of Kreminna near Hrehivka, Makiivka, and Druzhelyubivka; and west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny on June 16 and 17.[xlix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Ivanivka and Kotlyarivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[l] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove).[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk amid continued Russian ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 17. Geolocated footage published on June 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[lii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on June 16, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[liii] Fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivanodarivka and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 16 and 17.[liv] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating near Soledar (south of Siversk).[lv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 17. Geolocated footage published on June 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[lvi] Additional geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), likely within the past week.[lvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are advancing towards the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal in Kalynivka and that Russian forces control most of the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of the latter claim.[lviii] Fighting continued north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka and Kalynivka; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; in Novyi and Kanal microraions (within eastern Chasiv Yar); and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 16 and 17.[lix] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 17 that Russian forces have increased the intensity of their assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction since June 10, particularly near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[lx] Voloshyn also reported that elements of the Russian 1065th Artillery Regiment (98th VDV Division), 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC), and "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are operating near Chasiv Yar.[lxi]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 17. Geolocated footage published on June 16 and 17 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka) and marginally advanced north of Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[lxii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and north of Arkhanhelske (north of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[lxiii] Fighting continued north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Novoselivka Persha and Sokil; and west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, Nevelske, and Karlivka on June 16 and 17.[lxiv]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Donetsk City on June 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 150 meters deep along a 550-meter-wide front in Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[lxv] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka, Maksymilyanivka, Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on June 16 and 17.[lxvi] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[lxvii]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine on June 17.[lxviii] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Staromayorske, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 10.[lxix] Elements of the Russian 218th Tank Regiment reportedly continue operating in the area.[lxx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued assaults near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on June 16 and 17.[lxxi] Elements of the Russian "Kobra" Motorized Rifle Company of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly operate northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky and Zherebyanky, and elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly fighting in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxii]

Limited fighting continued on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on June 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[lxxiii] Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[lxxiv]

The Ukrainian Armed Forces Strategic Command reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces have struck 15 Russian S-300, S-350, and S-400 air defense installations in occupied Crimea since about May 1, 2024.[lxxv] The Ukrainian Armed Forces Strategic Command reported that these Ukrainian strikes destroyed dozens of missile launchers, over 15 radar stations, and over 10 command posts.

Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on June 17 that Ukraine's strike campaign against Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets has constrained Russia's ability to operate in the Black Sea and conduct amphibious operations.[lxxvi] Pletenchuk stated that the BSF has deployed a submarine in constant rotation in the Black Sea for the past several weeks, however. Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian strikes have destroyed 28 Russian BSF vessels and boats, and that Russian forces are repairing 10 vessels but are still operating some damaged ships. Pletenchuk reported that Russian forces no longer keep missile carriers in occupied Sevastopol. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces may have started loading Kalibr cruise missiles onto submarines in the port of Novorossiysk but that the port still likely lacks infrastructure to load Kalibrs onto surface vessels, unlike occupied Sevastopol. Pletenchuk also stated that Russian forces are not using the Kerch Strait Bridge for military logistics as extensively as Russian forces had previously used it.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck recreation complexes in Kharkiv City with unspecified munitions on the night of June 16 to 17.[lxxvii] Poltava Oblast Military Administration Head Filip Pronin and the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office stated that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Poltava Oblast with a Kh-59 cruise missile on June 17.[lxxviii]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia is reportedly experiencing issues with producing artillery shells and select artillery systems. Ukrainian military analyst Petro Chernyk stated on June 17 that Russia likely has about 8,000 to 9,000 artillery barrels stockpiled and is able to produce about 150,000 to 170,000 artillery shells per month.[lxxix] Chernyk stated that Russia, however, suffers from shortages of explosives for these shells, especially nitrocellulose — an intermediary good used in producing gunpowder and explosives. Chernyk stated that Russia is gradually shifting from using self-propelled racked artillery systems to towed systems but that Russia is suffering from unspecified problems with the tractors needed to pull such artillery pieces. Chernyk stated that Russia will be unable to increase its production of newer, higher-quality self-propelled artillery systems, such as the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV and the 2S34 Khosta, as Russia only has five to six machines that can manufacture these systems. Sky News, citing open-source research from US-based consulting firm Bain & Company, reported on May 26 that Russian defense industrial producers will likely be able to manufacture and refurbish 4.5 million artillery shells in 2024 (375,000 shells per month), suggesting that Russia may be refurbishing more shells than it is producing.[lxxx] US officials have recently stated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia's defense industry with nitrocellulose.[lxxxi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 17 placing the Federal Medical and Biological Agency (FMBA) under the direct management of the Russian president.[lxxxii] The FMBA's tasks include the management of Russian state property in the healthcare sector and the protection of the health of employees of companies with particularly hazardous working conditions and risks of radiation, chemical, and biological damage, such as Rosatom and Roscosmos.[lxxxiii] The Russian government (the executive entity under the Russian prime minister) previously oversaw the FMBA.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Tallamho Design Bureau claimed on June 17 that it created the "Svyaz" field network that will allow Russian military personnel in Ukraine to securely transfer data, including text messages and images.[lxxxiv] The Tallamho Design Bureau claimed that the "Svyaz" network can host up to 255 connected clients, users can use the system from up to 50 meters away, and the servers can be up to 20 kilometers away from each other. The Tallamho Design Bureau stated that it designed the "Svyaz" network to discourage Russian servicemembers from using their personal mobile devices, which are suspectable to tracking, and from using social media applications like Telegram and WhatsApp, which require a working internet connection that can be hard to establish in areas with destroyed cellular infrastructure or jamming.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 16 that Russian servicemembers from the "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces developed the "Perun" unmanned attack-transport aerial drone.[lxxxv] A milblogger similarly claimed on June 15 that former Wagner Group personnel developed the "Perun" drone that can land behind enemy lines, assist with casualty evacuation, and deliver ammunition and supplies.[lxxxvi] The "Perun" can reportedly include an anti-tank missile system that the drone can fire from the ground or air, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces plan to install machine guns and a platform to launch unguided missiles on the drone in future tests.[lxxxvii] The "Perun" drone reportedly runs on Russian software and can carry up to 200 kilograms.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to provide Ukraine with air defense systems, missiles, and other weapons. US President Joe Biden stated during a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 13 that the US has secured a commitment from five unspecified countries thus far to send five Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that other countries expecting Patriot systems from the US in the near future will have to wait.[lxxxviii] Germany recently announced that it is sending Ukraine another Patriot battery, and this is likely one of the systems that Biden identified.[lxxxix] The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Norway will contribute 240 million euros (about $257 million) and that Norway will contribute 125 million euros (about $134 million) to a joint air defense effort with Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands that is sending Ukraine 100 Patriot air defense missiles.[xc] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds stated on June 17 that Latvia has prepared a second batch of drones to deliver to Ukraine and that Latvia plans to contribute 20 million euros (about $21.4 million) to the drone coalition it jointly leads with the United Kingdom.[xci] The Latvian Ministry of Defense announced on June 17 that France and Italy joined this drone coalition and that 14 total countries have joined and contributed a total of 549 million euros (about $589 million).[xcii]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to announce new military equipment production and repair efforts within and near Ukraine. Ukrainian state-owned defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom announced on June 10 that it and German vehicle and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall opened their first joint armored vehicle repair workshop in Ukraine to repair German-made military equipment.[xciii] German outlet Handelsblatt reported on June 12 that both German and Ukrainian representatives confirmed that Rheinmetall and Ukrainian authorities reached an agreement to produce Lynx armored vehicles in Ukraine in 2024.[xciv] Defense News reported on June 12 that Lockheed Martin is considering partnering with Polish defense manufacturer Mesko to produce HIMARS ammunition in Poland after Poland purchased over 400 HIMARS rockets.[xcv] Canadian manufacturer Roshel Smart Armored Vehicles Head Roman Shimonov stated on June 14 that Roshel plans to open a new armored vehicles production plant in Ukraine and hopes to open another such plant in Poland.[xcvi]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Chief Sergei Naryshkin undermined ongoing false Kremlinclaims about the existence of a US military base in Armenia that aim to discredit Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia. Naryshkin stated on June 17 that it is too early to discuss the possibility of the US establishing military bases in Armenia as a result of Armenia’s “changing policies” regarding Russia.[xcvii] Russian state media has routinely claimed that the US either had constructed or was constructing a military base in Armenia.[xcviii] Russian state media similarly absurdly claimed that the US established biological weapons laboratories in Armenia.[xcix]

The Kremlin continues to establish Russian propaganda assets in Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) likely to support long-term efforts to destabilize the Western-brokered Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger met with Republika Srpska Head of the Information and Communication Technologies Agency Drajan Visnjic on June 17 and reportedly agreed on "strategic cooperation."[c] The milblogger stated that he will work with Visnjic to conduct social and humanitarian research, develop analytics in the region, and train Republika Srpska journalists within the framework of the milblogger’s recently-established “media school” in the Balkans.[ci]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarus is reportedly advancing plans to cooperate with the Russian aviation industry. Belarusian Education Minister Andrei Ivanets stated on June 16 that Belarus is working with Russia to train specialists in drone and aircraft construction.[cii] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited the Irkutsk Aviation Plant in Irkutsk Oblast, Russia on June 5, and General Director of the Russian United Aircraft Corporation Yuri Slyusar stated that Belarusian enterprises may receive orders worth three to five billion rubles ($33 million to $56 million) annually from the Russian aircraft industry for parts and assembly of passenger and cargo aircraft.[ciii]

First Deputy Chairman of the Union State Parliamentary Assembly Igor Sergeenko stated at the Union State Parliamentary Assembly on June 17 that the Union State should create new programs to ensure its "technological sovereignty" (the Kremlin’s term for its desired objective to eliminate Russia’s dependence on Western-sourced components and technology through Russian domestic production and import substitution, including import substitution and sanctions evasion through Russia’s numerous trade partners) and "safe digital development."[civ] Sergeenko also stated that the Union State Parliamentary Assembly should expand its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.[cv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.