June 30, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, George Barros and Frederick W. Kagan

June 30, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the frontline on June 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success on the Levadne-Pryyutne line on the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and on the Mala-Tokmachka-Ocheretuvate line in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces also reportedly consolidated newly reached lines in the Pryvillia-Zalizyanske direction north of Bakhmut and are continuing to exert pressure on Bakhmut’s flanks. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are confidently advancing on Bakhmut’s flanks and that Russian forces have transferred a large number of troops to the area.[2] Malyar added that Ukrainian forces are advancing with varying degrees of success in southern Ukraine, advancing one kilometer on some days and advancing less on others.[3] Select Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked around Kreminna and on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline.[4]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on June 30 that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in eastern and southern Ukraine despite lacking essential resources.[5] Zaluzhnyi said that the Ukrainian forces are still making battlefield gains even if they advance only 500 meters per day. Zaluzhnyi also stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to use Western-provided armored vehicles and tanks in combat instead of saving them for “parades” when responding to a question about military equipment losses. Zaluzhnyi noted that Ukraine needs aircraft in order to support its counteroffensive efforts, which are hindered by the lack of air superiority.

The Russian information space is reacting disproportionately to the Russian military’s failure to drive a small Ukrainian force from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers have complained for nearly two weeks that Russian forces have failed to push a very small Ukrainian force – reportedly of up to 70 personnel – from their entrenched positions underneath the eastern span of the Antonivsky Bridge.[6] The milbloggers complained that the Russian military command blindly ordered Russian forces to retake the area under a span of the Antonivsky Bridge on the east bank, resulting in significant losses among Russian personnel and armored vehicles due to Ukrainian artillery fire and remotely laid mines.[7] The milbloggers called on Russian forces to conduct “accurate” strikes against both the spans of the bridge on each riverbank to prevent Ukrainian forces from using the bridge’s approach spans as cover against Russian air and artillery fire, which the milbloggers previously criticized as inaccurate and ineffective. Russian forces launched an Iskander ballistic missile strike against the east bank span of the Antonivsky Bridge on June 30, though the extent of the damage is currently unclear.[8] Some milbloggers claimed that the strike damaged enough of the standing bridge span to prevent Ukrainian forces from using it as cover, while other milbloggers complained that the strike only partially damaged the bridge and that Russian infantry has resumed attempts to clear Ukrainian positions elsewhere in the area.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on June 1 that Russian forces are conserving Iskander missiles due to a shortage, underscoring the oddity of Russian forces using one of these missiles against a 70-person light infantry element under the approaches to an already destroyed bridge.[10] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems – a scarce military district-level asset – to strike the Ukrainian positions under the bridge after the Iskander strike.[11] One milblogger complained that the Russian 8th Artillery Regiment (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet) does not have enough ammunition to strike the Ukrainian positions.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the “guards” honorific to the 8th Artillery Regiment on June 30, which will not help the regiment dislodge the Ukrainian forces.[13]

The severe milblogger response to the Russian military command’s decision making demonstrates that Russian milbloggers have not rallied around the Russian military command in the aftermath of Wagner’s armed rebellion. Some milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian presence is limited and that there is no significant threat of Ukrainian forces breaking out of their foothold on the east bank.[14] Milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is unnecessarily impaling Russian forces on Ukrainian remotely laid mines and compelling Russian forces to put heavy military equipment in range of Ukrainian artillery fire.[15] One milblogger explicitly blamed Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces (Kherson Oblast) Commander Colonel General Oleg Makarevich, reportedly headquartered in Rostov-on-Don, for these operations, implying that there is no relevant commander closer to the front line responsible for east bank Kherson Oblast.[16] Wagner Group forces notably surrounded the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, which appears to include the “Dnepr” Grouping headquarters, during its armed rebellion.[17] The rebellion and surrounding of the grouping headquarters notably did not stop Russian milbloggers from criticizing the Russian military command, with one milblogger calling for someone to travel to Rostov to beat up Makarevich.[18] The harsh tone of this Russian information space response is reminiscent of the response to the Russian military command’s failed efforts to take Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast in November 2022 and February 2023.[19]

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces and officials are gradually leaving the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) possibly in preparation for an intentional “accident” at the facility. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 30 that the Russian contingent at the ZNPP is gradually leaving the facility and that three employees of Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom who managed the facility have recently left for Russian occupied Crimea.[20] The GUR reported that Ukrainian employees at the ZNPP who have signed contracts with Rosatom received instructions that they must evacuate the facility by July 5.[21] The GUR reported that Russian forces are decreasing patrols around the ZNPP itself and in neighboring Enerhodar and that workers at the ZNPP have also received instructions to blame Ukrainian forces in the event of an emergency.[22] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian units leaving the ZNPP or the immediate area as of June 30. GUR Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 30 that Russian forces have prepared for an artificial disaster at the facility.[23] Ukrainian officials in Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts oversaw emergency preparation exercises for a possible “accident“ at the ZNPP on June 29.[24] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko reported that Ukrainian officials lack the ability to monitor the ZNPP closely enough to become instantly aware of an “accident” at the ZNPP.[25] The president of Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom, Petro Kotin, stated that the closest radiation censors on the right (west) bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir would alert Ukrainian officials within a few hours of a potential release of radiation at the ZNPP.[26]

Russian forces remain unlikely to cause an intentional “accident” at the ZNPP, and Russia is likely continuing to use the threat of an intentional radiological incident to attempt to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensive actions and Western support for Ukraine ahead of the upcoming NATO summit. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces would not be able to control the consequences of an intentional radiological incident at the ZNPP and that a radiological incident could further degrade Russia’s ability to cement its occupation of southern Ukraine by leaving areas uninhabitable and ungovernable.[27] The likely Russian destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam also adversely impacted Russian forces, however, and possible Russian plans to sabotage the ZNPP cannot be ruled out. Russian forces could conduct several possible radiological man-made incidents at the ZNPP, some more serious than others. Russian forces could discharge irradiated water from the ZNPP into the Kakhovka Reservoir to disrupt a potential Ukrainian crossing of the now largely drained reservoir. Russian forces could also attempt to create a radiological plume to cover a larger area of southern Ukraine, although the reactors are designed to make doing so difficult. The prevailing winds in Zaporizhia Oblast are most often from the north from June 9 to September 3, although forecasted wind directions in the area following the reported July 5 evacuation deadline include days of predominantly easterly winds.[28] A radiation plume from the ZNPP would most certainly affect the Russian forces in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and possibly in Crimea and would likely impact the Russian forces to a greater degree than the Ukrainian forces given the usual direction of the wind in the area. Russian forces could conduct a man-made “accident” that creates a smaller radiological radius immediately focused on preventing Ukrainian advances near the ZNPP itself. None of these options provide more military benefit for Russian forces than the likely consequences they would create. Ukraine, for its part, would derive no benefits from causing a radiological incident at the ZNPP remotely consonant with the enormous price it would pay in irradiating lands and peoples it seeks to liberate and hindering its own ability to advance in the area, making Russian informational efforts to set conditions for blaming Ukraine for such an incident entirely implausible even if it could do so without physically occupying the plant.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on June 30 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s previous statements that Russia was preparing an attack at the ZNPP could actually be an indication that Ukrainian officials are preparing an attack on the facility to pull NATO into the war in Ukraine.[29] Zakharova’s preposterous speculations are typical for the Kremlin’s information operations alleging threats to the safety of the ZNPP. The Kremlin has routinely employed threats of nuclear escalation and have warned of largely Russian created threats to the ZNPP in attempts to pressure Ukraine to constrain its military actions and to prevent further Western support for Ukraine.[30] The Kremlin is likely attempting to signal a feigned intent to create a radiological incident at the ZNPP in hopes of creating fears over a Ukrainian crossing of the Kakhovka reservoir in the area so that Russian forces will not have to defend a larger section of the front. The Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail rhetoric has also heavily targeted Western audiences, and the reemergence of escalatory signals and rhetoric around the ZNPP is likely meant in part to shape Western decision-making vis-a-vis Ukraine ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania on July 11.

The Wagner Group is reportedly still actively recruiting personnel within Russia, although it is unclear if new recruits are signing Wagner contracts or military contracts with the MoD. BBC reported that Wagner Group recruitment centers are still open and are continuing to accept recruits in Russia.[31] BBC reported that several recruiters stressed that new members are still signing contracts with the Wagner Group and not with the Russian MoD.[32] One recruiter confirmed that Belarus is now a possible destination for new recruits while other recruiters said that recruits are still being sent to Molkino, a Wagner training center in Krasnodar Krai, “as usual.”[33] Russian military officials have previously used coercive and deceptive means to compel Russian citizens to sign contracts with the MoD, and it is entirely possible that Russian citizens who sign supposed Wagner contracts are actually signing contracts with the MoD.[34] It is also possible that Russian officials have not yet coordinated their intentions for Wagner with the more than 42 Wagner recruitment centers in Russia.[35] Russia citizens may also be signing contracts with Wagner to serve in Wagner operations abroad. ISW previously assessed that the agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to end Wagner’s armed rebellion will very likely eliminate Wagner as the independent actor that it was before the rebellion but that elements of the organization may endure.[36]

The Wagner Group reportedly will operate three large field camps in Belarus. Russian and apparent Belarusian sources reported on June 30 that the Wagner Group in Belarus will operate out of three large field camps, including the previously observed field camp in Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast.[37] The sources reported that the locations of the other two field camps have not yet been determined but that they will be in western Belarus postured against Poland.[38] The other two unidentified Wagner Group field camps may be located nearby Belarus’ large combined-arms training grounds, such as the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno Oblast, the Brest Training Ground near Brest City, or the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground near Baranavichy. Wagner fighters in Belarus would likely need access to such training facilities to serve in the training and advisory role that Russian sources continue to ascribe to them.[39]

An apparent Belarusian milblogger reported that Wagner Group personnel will deploy to Asipovichy, Belarus, soon. An apparent Belarusian source reported on June 29 that the construction for the Asipovichy camp is complete and that Wagner Group personnel will deploy to the camp on an unspecified nearby date.[40] New high resolution satellite imagery collected on June 30 shows that at least 303 tents, each of which can accommodate between 20 – 50 people, have appeared at the formerly abandoned Belarusian military base between June 24 and 30.[41] There is no evidence of heavy equipment at the Asipovichy camp or that the camp is occupied as of June 30.

Assessing the footprint of the Wagner Group in Belarus may help assess the number of Wagner fighters who opt to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian source stated that it will be possible to estimate how many Wagner Group personnel sign contracts with the Russian MoD by assessing the size of the Wagner Group personnel that go to Belarus (presumably by subtracting the estimated Wagner presence in Belarus from Wagner’s assessed pre-rebellion strength).[42]

A Kremlin-affiliated news outlet reported that the Wagner Group will continue operating in Africa, although the details of its operations remain unclear. Kremlin-affiliated news outlet Vedimosti reported that sources close to the Russian MoD claim that the Wagner Group’s pre-existing projects for “the provision of security services in Africa” are ongoing and that there are no plans to transfer Wagner personnel to other departments.[43] Vedimosti claimed that another source familiar with the Wagner Group’s operations in Mali said that Wagner employees have no reason to fear that a supply disruption will interfere with their current tasks.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that this is the correct approach and that Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion should not affect Russia’s long-term plans in Africa.[45] The Kremlin may allow the Wagner Group to continue operating abroad in some capacity, likely in name only and will be subsumed under the Kremlin’s authority.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly dissolved his domestic media company Patriot. Russian media outlet Mash reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin dissolved the Patriot Media Holding, the St. Petersburg based media company that Prigozhin founded in 2019.[46] Russian sources claimed that Prigozhin personally announced the dissolution of Patriot Media Holding and laid off all its employees.[47] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger confirmed the report and claimed that according to unconfirmed information the Russian MoD is also dissolving Prigozhin’s St. Petersburg-based company “Concord” and selling its assets.[48] Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian state media censor Roskomnadzor blocked access to several of Patriot‘s websites, including RIA FAN, Politika Segodnya, Ekonomika Segodnya, Narodnye Novosti and others.[49] The future of Prigozhin’s other companies remains unclear but some Russian sources claimed that the Russian Presidential Administration will likely assume control over Prigozhin’s media assets.[50]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the frontline on June 30.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on June 30 that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in eastern and southern Ukraine despite lacking essential resources.
The Russian information space is reacting disproportionately to the Russian military’s failure to drive a small Ukrainian force from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces and officials are gradually leaving the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) possibly in preparation for an intentional “accident” at the facility.
Russian forces remain unlikely to cause an intentional “accident” at the ZNPP, and Russia is likely continuing to use the threat of an intentional radiological incident to attempt to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensive actions and Western support for Ukraine ahead of the upcoming NATO summit.
The Wagner Group is reportedly still actively recruiting personnel within Russia, although it is unclear if new recruits are signing Wagner contracts or military contracts with the MoD.
The Wagner Group reportedly will operate three large field camps in Belarus and an apparent Belarusian milblogger reported that Wagner Group personnel will deploy to Asipovichy, Belarus, soon.
A Kremlin-affiliated news outlet reported that the Wagner Group will continue operating in Africa, although the details of its operations remain unclear.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly dissolved his domestic media company Patriot.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack and reportedly made some gains in the Bakhmut area.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to skirmish on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Ukrainian forces advanced as of June 30.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian authorities continue efforts to improve monetary and educational benefits to servicemen in order to retain loyalty and incentivize military service.
Russian officials and occupation authorities are attempting to explain away the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in combat along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the Novoselivske direction (15km northwest of Svatove), near Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), and Rozdolivka (31km southwest of Kreminna).[51] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks against Novoselivske, Bilohorivka, and in the direction of Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna).[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in positional battles near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) and Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have the initiative west of Kreminna but failed to break through in the area, only capturing some Ukrainian positions and pushing Ukrainian forces westward.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) continued their offensive operations in the Serebryanske forest area and in the Torske salient (15km west of Kreminna) and claimed that Russian forces must construct a defensive line along the Siversky Donets River to eliminate threats of Ukrainian raids into the forests.[55] Another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an offensive in an unspecified area in the Lyman direction and that Russian VDV forces are maintaining their defense.[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack and reportedly made some gains in the Bakhmut area on June 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had partial success on the Pryvillya-Zalizyanske line (10-15km northwest of Bakhmut) and consolidated new positions.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces made gains near the Kurdyumivka dam about 13km southwest of Bakhmut.[58] The milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking north of Bakhmut near Yahidne (immediately northwest of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut); and southwest of Bakhmut near Pivnichne (20km southwest of Bakhmut), Ozarianivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut), Kurdyumivka, and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[59] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assault operations in an unspecified area within Bakhmut’s city limits, but Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are not within the Bakhmut city limits but maintain control over the southwestern outskirts of the city.[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Bakhmut, Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made limited gains south of Ivanivske and in a forest near Chasiv Yar (12km west of Bakhmut).[62]

A Ukrainian official provided details of the current composition and strength of Russian forces in the Bakhmut area as of June 30. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that the Russian force grouping in the Bakhmut direction has over 330 tanks, 140 artillery systems, and 50,300 personnel, including airborne forces, infantry units, BARS units, and small units of the “Veterany” private military company (PMC).[63] Cherevaty noted that there are no Wagner Group personnel in the Bakhmut area. A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Bakhmut direction; ISW has previously observed elements of the 98th Airborne Division committed to the Kreminna area and serving in reserve in the Vuhledar area in March 2023.[64]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to skirmish on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Ukrainian forces advanced as of June 30. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced north of Avdiivka west of Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) and in Krasnohorivka (3km northeast of Avdiivka).[65] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Southern Group of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Kamianka (3km northeast of Bakhmut), Kruta Balka (3km east of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions on the Krasnohorivka-Kruta Balka line and expressed concern that Ukrainian forces may capture Vesele (4km northeast of Bakhmut).[67] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces probed Russian defensive lines near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City), Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified partial success along the Levadne-Pryyutne line (up to 20km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and consolidated on newly reached lines.[69] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks south and southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[70] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces counterattacked from Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) towards Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have improved their tactical positions along the Staromayorske-Rivnopil line as of June 30.[72]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success along the Mala Tokmachka-Ocheretuvate line (up to 28km south of Orikhiv) and consolidated on newly reached lines.[73] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast and struck Ukrainian forces attempting to advance south and southeast of Orikhiv.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions in western Zaporizhia Oblast have slowed the tempo of Ukrainian operations and that there are mainly positional battles along this sector of the front.[75] The Orikhiv area received rain throughout June 29 and briefly on June 30, although these storm showers likely did not degrade the ability to maneuver armored vehicles, and recorded winds in the area were likely not strong enough to cause prolonged disruptions to aviation units.[76] Other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations south of Orikhiv on June 30.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces tried to break through Russian defenses near Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) and made marginal advances in the area.[78]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear positions in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on June 30. Ukrainian Strategic Command reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes against a Russian headquarters and a fuel and lubricants depot in the suburbs of Berdyansk.[79] Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows smoke plumes in Berdyansk following the reported strike.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six Storm Shadow cruise missiles at targets in the vicinity of Berdyansk and that Russian Pantsir-S air defense systems shot down some or all of the missiles.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue efforts to improve monetary and educational benefits to servicemen in order to retain loyalty and incentivize military service. Russian sources reported that the Russian government issued a decree on June 28 to increase the salaries of Russian military, Rosgvardia, and some law enforcement personnel by 10.5 percent on October 1, 2023.[82] Russian sources reported that the Russian Ministry of Education and Science has recommended that Russian universities give preferential consideration to applicants who served in the "special military operation" under conscription, volunteer contract, mobilization, or in “volunteer formations.”[83]

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) responded to a recent estimate of Russian military spending by the Stockholm International Peace Research Insitute (SIPRI).[84] SIPRI estimated in its June 2023 report that Russia’s budgeted military spending for 2023 is around 6.6 trillion rubles ($75.4 billion).[85] The UK MoD stated that the exact amount of Russia’s military expenditure remains uncertain due to a lack of transparency around the Russian government‘s total budget.[86] The UK MoD stated that the increase in spending highlights the cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine and that Russia is “almost certainly” paying additional expenses for security in the occupied territories and increased defensive measures in border oblasts.[87]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities are attempting to explain away the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on June 30 that Russia placed 300 Ukrainian orphans in occupied Ukraine under the foster care of Russian families in Russia.[88] Lavrov claimed that Russia publicizes the names of Ukrainian children and claimed that any direct family member can take these children out of foster care. Lavrov added that dozens of children have been picked up from their foster families. Lavrov emphasized that these children were not adopted but placed under preliminary guardianship and claimed that of all 700,000 children who entered Russia from occupied Ukraine, only 2,000 children were orphans from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Kherson Oblast Occupation Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology announced that 18 school children from occupied Kherson Oblast went to children’s camp “We Are the Children of the Volga” in Yaroslavl Oblast, Russia. The ministry claimed that the program will last 10 days.[89]

Russian citizens are purchasing real estate in destroyed and occupied Mariupol city.[90] Russian investigative outlet Bumaga reported that Russian officials began selling real estate in Mariupol as early as May 3, 2022.[91] Some Russian real estate websites reportedly list and sell Mariupol apartments on average for three million rubles (about $33,780).

The Kremlin reportedly approved 25 billion rubles ($281.5 million) in special treasury loans for the four occupied regions in eastern and southern Ukraine to “modernize infrastructure.”[92] Occupation officials announced that occupied Kherson Oblast will receive 2 billion rubles, while Donetsk People’s Republic would receive 11.5 billion rubles ($129.5 million).[93]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that another new Belarusian S-400 air defense battery entered service in Belarus on June 30. The Belarusian MoD did not specify where the S-400 battery is located, though the independent Belarusian monitoring organization The Hajun Project reported that the battery is based near Dubrova, Minsk Oblast, at the base of the Belarusian 6th anti-aircraft missile battery of the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.[94] These systems are likely in service with the Belarusian military but under Russian operational control. Russia’s and Belarus’s combined regional air defense system became operational in 2016, effectively subordinating Belarus’ Air and Air Defense command to the Russian Western Military District.[95] Russia deployed more S-400 air defense systems (probably at least a battery) to Belarus on May 28 and Belarusian officials confirmed that Russian-provided S-400 in Belarus became operational and deployed on combat duty on December 25, 2022.[96] ISW forecasted in 2020 that Russia would deploy S-400 systems to Belarus.[97]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qvTPWx4tzaJKqsu8H9Z9oYYTqKXpXfXD1ZfgJhGAG5sA4WzYVZi2sGPNfA2ocFSQl

[2] https://suspilne dot media/518927-sili-oboroni-perehopili-iniciativu-i-prosuvautsa-pid-bahmutom-malar/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/30/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-vidbuvayetsya-prosuvannya-nashyh-vijsk-ganna-malyar/

[3] https://suspilne dot media/518927-sili-oboroni-perehopili-iniciativu-i-prosuvautsa-pid-bahmutom-malar/

[4] https://t.me/wargonzo/13577; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48886; https://t.me/rybar/49181; https://t.me/rusich_army/9669 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9671 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9672

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/30/valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-general-interview/?fbclid=IwAR2bF946OZ3suTPZ4bqv5KDwTSx8XgHqAe1bJZbzwEYIQZHf69X67DX19dI ; https://suspilne dot media/518999-kontrnastup-ce-ne-sou-kozen-metr-daetsa-krovu-zaluznij-rozpoviv-pro-prosuvanna-zsu/

[6] https://t.me/dva_majors/19822; https://t.me/dva_majors/19823; https://t.me/dva_majors/19842; https://t.me/bayraktar1070/1336 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12122; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48887; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2023;

[7] https://t.me/rybar/49171; https://t.me/voenacher/47562; https://t.me/rybar/49177 ; https://t.me/rybar/49176; https://t.me/strelkovii/5819; https://t.me/batalyon15/2171; https://t.me/batalyon15/2171; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://t.me/bayraktar1070/1336 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12122; https://t.me/batalyon15/2171; https://t.me/sashakots/40694 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16625; https://t.me/strelkovii/5819

[8] https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1674726566129958914?s=20; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1674701125872672768?s=20; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1674730728767062017?s=20 ; https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8708 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1674849181473570825?s=20; https://t.me/readovkanews/61750

[9] https://t.me/rybar/49171; https://t.me/voenacher/47562; https://t.me/rybar/49177 ; https://t.me/rybar/49176; https://t.me/strelkovii/5819; https://t.me/batalyon15/2171; https://t.me/batalyon15/2171; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://t.me/bayraktar1070/1336 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12122; https://t.me/batalyon15/2171; https://t.me/sashakots/40694 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16625; https://t.me/strelkovii/5819

[10] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3716929-ukraina-ne-zavdavatime-udariv-po-punktah-dislokacii-iskanderiv-u-rf-ignat.html?fbclid=IwAR3U4iGsLL9b_uSFFO6scy1G50LD6hfii0bc7KULoV7kDvCXoimVWOEo-qo

[11] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12129

[12] https://t.me/dva_majors/19842

[13] https://crimea-radio dot ru/putin-prisvoil-naimenovanie-gvardey/

[14] https://t.me/rybar/49162; https://t.me/dva_majors/19822; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10627

[15] https://t.me/rybar/49162; https://t.me/dva_majors/19822; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37091; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10627

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/19822 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/19823 https://t.me/dva_majors/19842

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/19842

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7

[20] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-zmenshuiut-prysutnist-na-terytorii-zaes.html

[21] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-zmenshuiut-prysutnist-na-terytorii-zaes.html

[22] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-zmenshuiut-prysutnist-na-terytorii-zaes.html

[23] https://suspilne dot media/519139-rosiani-pidgotuvali-zaes-do-stvorenna-stucnoi-tehnogennoi-katastrofi-budanov/

[24] https://adm.dp.gov dot ua/news/na-dnipropetrovshchini-prohodyat-shtabni-navchannya-shchodo-dij-u-razi-avariyi-na-zaes ; https://suspilne dot media/518601-dnipro-krivij-rig-ta-kamanske-ne-vhodat-do-zoni-evakuacii-v-razi-avarii-na-zaes-oblrada/ ; https://suspilne dot media/518599-v-ukraini-proveli-navcanna-z-podolanna-naslidkiv-mozlivogo-teraktu-na-zaes-kuzin/

[25] https://suspilne dot media/519109-ukraina-ne-zmoze-odrazu-zafiksuvati-avariu-na-zaes-galusenko/

[26] https://suspilne dot media/519109-ukraina-ne-zmoze-odrazu-zafiksuvati-avariu-na-zaes-galusenko/

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062223

[28] https://www.windfinder.com/forecast/zaporozhye ; https://weatherspark.com/y/99403/Average-Weather-in-Zaporizhia-Ukraine-Year-Round

[29] https://tass dot com/politics/1641093

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040423; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112122 ;

[31] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66060392 ; https://t.me/astrapress/31422 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/30/nichego-ne-izmenilos-chvk-vagnera-prodolzhaet-nabirat-naemnikov-dlya-voyny-v-ukraine ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/48651

[32] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66060392 ; https://t.me/astrapress/31422 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/30/nichego-ne-izmenilos-chvk-vagnera-prodolzhaet-nabirat-naemnikov-dlya-voyny-v-ukraine ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/48651

[33] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66060392 ; https://t.me/astrapress/31422 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/30/nichego-ne-izmenilos-chvk-vagnera-prodolzhaet-nabirat-naemnikov-dlya-voyny-v-ukraine ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/48651

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223 ;

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2023

[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062423

[37] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26997; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26999 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/17412

[38] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26997;

[39] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26997; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/90761

[40] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/17412; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/90761 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/26997

[41] https://www.svaboda.org/a/32484063.html

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/90762

[43] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/06/30/983060-vagner-ne-otpravyat-v-zonu-spetsoperatsii

[44] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/06/30/983060-vagner-ne-otpravyat-v-zonu-spetsoperatsii

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/90821

[46] https://t.me/breakingmash/45521; https://t.me/bbbreaking/159525 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62128 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/102990 ; https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/30/exiled-wagner-boss-shutters-patriot-media-group-reports-a81707

[47] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/30/istochnik-meduzy-prigozhin-reshil-raspustit-svoy-mediaholding-patriot; https://t.me/rotondamedia/4745; https://t.me/vchkogpu/39697; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6081421; https://t.me/bbcrussian/48692

[48] https://t.me/rybar/49182 ; https://t.me/agentstvonews/3623

[49] https://t.me/istories_media/2943

[50] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2023

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Z5gPgJTa4ae3pe1AAce7bPe573v3e4b5zA14Vbfh3aXCgGcCgKgZG2qJXHhyZJ6Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rt9rBYd4JTyCWPNnNJz3ydcTL7GgDMeLbwQj7DZvpqZzkSUSMKyGgxB6qAwSFmLEl

[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/27969

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48887

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48887

[55] https://t.me/rybar/49175

[56] https://t.me/rusich_army/9669 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9671 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9672

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qvTPWx4tzaJKqsu8H9Z9oYYTqKXpXfXD1ZfgJhGAG5sA4WzYVZi2sGPNfA2ocFSQl

[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48887; https://t.me/brussinf/6267; https://t.me/wargonzo/13577; https://t.me/dva_majors/19849

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48887; https://t.me/brussinf/6267; https://t.me/wargonzo/13577; https://t.me/dva_majors/19849

[60] https://suspilne dot media/518927-sili-oboroni-perehopili-iniciativu-i-prosuvautsa-pid-bahmutom-malar/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/30/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-vidbuvayetsya-prosuvannya-nashyh-vijsk-ganna-malyar/; https://t.me/wargonzo/13577

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rt9rBYd4JTyCWPNnNJz3ydcTL7GgDMeLbwQj7DZvpqZzkSUSMKyGgxB6qAwSFmLEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Z5gPgJTa4ae3pe1AAce7bPe573v3e4b5zA14Vbfh3aXCgGcCgKgZG2qJXHhyZJ6Rl

[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48887

[63] https://suspilne dot media/519121-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-nema-bijciv-pvk-vagner-ale-e-rosijske-ugrupuvanna-do-50-tisac-cerevatij/

[64] https://t.me/rusich_army/9665; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2019%2C%202023.pdf

[65] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/19211; https://twitter.com/kors_nick/status/1674795455572770819?s=20; https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1674827990142795780?s=20

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/27969; https://t.me/mod_russia/27965

[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48886

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rt9rBYd4JTyCWPNnNJz3ydcTL7GgDMeLbwQj7DZvpqZzkSUSMKyGgxB6qAwSFmLEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Z5gPgJTa4ae3pe1AAce7bPe573v3e4b5zA14Vbfh3aXCgGcCgKgZG2qJXHhyZJ6Rl

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qvTPWx4tzaJKqsu8H9Z9oYYTqKXpXfXD1ZfgJhGAG5sA4WzYVZi2sGPNfA2ocFSQl

[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/27969 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/27951

[71] https://t.me/vrogov/10633

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/19820

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qvTPWx4tzaJKqsu8H9Z9oYYTqKXpXfXD1ZfgJhGAG5sA4WzYVZi2sGPNfA2ocFSQl

[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/27969 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/27951 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/27967

[75] https://t.me/batalyon15/2171 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/9663

[76] https://www.accuweather.com/en/ua/orikhiv/326320/june-weather/326320?year=2023 ; https://weather.com/weather/monthly/l/274fc64ff7477052fec2d7c348e411e1a5fff25de44cc8f136b08b9e5bab992d ;

[77] https://t.me/wargonzo/13577 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/19820

[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48428 ; http://карта-сво dot рф/

[79] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/18727

[80] https://twitter.com/hochu_dodomu/status/1674656485735817217?s=20; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1674660678978932737?s=20; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1674648264614838272?s=20; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1674717496778055686?s=20; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1674649249844264960?s=20 ; https://t.me/brdVP/11301 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1674672274786463746?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/victor_haydin/status/1674676357362593792?s=20

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/19830 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/19824 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48441 ; https://t.me/sashakots/40689 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/16619 ; https://t.me/rybar/49164 ; https://t.me/rybar/49167 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48875

[82] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/30/oklady-rossiyskih-voennyh-uvelichat-na-10-5 ; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202306300026 ; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202306300026 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62125 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/13730

[83] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18156665; https://fgosvo dot ru/news/view/7341; https://t.me/idelrealii/28554 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62103

[84] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1674661145632731138?s=20

[85] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/sipriinsight_2306_07_russias_military_expenditure_during_its_war_against_ukraine_230627.pdf

[86] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1674661145632731138?s=20

[87] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1674661145632731138?s=20

[88] https://t.me/idelrealii/28555; https://t.me/tass_agency/198891

[89] https://t.me/minecology_hkerson/195

[90] https://t.me/severrealii/18097

[91] https://paperpaper dot io/vojna-zhe-ne-budet-idti-vechno-kto-i-za/

[92] https://t.me/mkhusnullin/1484; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3559

[93] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3559

[94] https://twitter.com/Hajun_BY/status/1674746450138243072