Critical Threats Today
A regular summary of al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa as well as major events in Iran.
These are the major events from April 11 for Iran and for al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa. Please see the Iran News Roundup, the Gulf of Aden Security Review, and the weekly Threat Update for more details.
The Saudi-led coalition aims to launch an offensive to seize Yemen’s second-largest port, al Hudaydah on the Red Sea coast.
A Yemeni military source stated that coalition-backed forces intend to conduct the offensive before Ramadan, which begins on May 26. Coalition-backed forces may not be able to execute this plan along the stated timeline, however. Hadi government and coalition forces will instead attempt to establish a foothold in southern al Hudaydah government before Ramadan in order to spend the month preparing for an offensive on al Hudaydah port. The fight for al Hudaydah will exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and increase local resistance to the coalition and the Hadi government. (Related reading: How the U.S. Should Re-Engage in Yemen)
Citations & Links
Hojjat ol Eslam Ebrahim Raisi is emerging as conservatives groups’ best chance at a unity candidate as the main conservative coalition challenging President Hassan Rouhani struggles to unify.
The Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces, the conservative coalition dedicated to introducing a single conservative challenger to President Rouhani, continues to decline. The Front was forced to revamp its list of five finalists after Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation Head Parviz Fattah stated that he does not intend to run. The Front also delayed its decision regarding the “number of candidates” it will register in the presidential elections to April 12. Another influential hardline group, the Steadfastness Front, also reiterated its opposition to the Popular Front. This move underscores the ongoing division within Iran’s conservative-hardline camp.
The Steadfastness Front nonetheless acknowledged that it may back the same candidate as the Popular Front.
The Steadfastness Front is debating between Raisi, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and several other candidates. Raisi formally announced his intention to run in the elections on April 9, but has avoided pledging loyalty publically to either the Steadfastness Front or the Popular Front. Raisi may be waiting to see whether the larger conservative-hardline camp, and not just one group, unifies around him. Other conservative candidates’ willingness to drop out of the race to support Raisi or another unity candidate remains one of the most significant factors in the outcome of the May 19 elections.
Citations & Links
Citations & Links
The Kenyan military intensified operations targeting al Shabaab positions in areas along the Kenyan-Somali border.
Al Shabaab cells in Kenya may conduct retaliatory terrorist attacks inside Kenya in response to this campaign. KDF artillery fire killed 15 al Shabaab militants in Gantama village in Gedo region, located 65 miles from the border town of Elwaq, on April 10. KDF forces also killed 57 militants in Afmadow, Lower Jubba region, on March 2, and 31 militants near Badhadhe, Lower Jubba region, on March 27. Al Shabaab has not conducted a significant attack against KDF forces since the Kolbio base raid that killed 67 Kenyan soldiers on January 27.
Citations & Links
Boko Haram-Shekau may relocate to northern Cameroon as a rival faction consolidates control in northeastern Nigeria and Cameroonian security forces prioritize quelling civil unrest elsewhere in the country.
Boko Haram Shekau conducted three attacks in three different villages in the Extreme North Region, Cameroon on April 09 and 10. Civil unrest in Cameroon’s southwestern English-speaking region is becoming increasingly violent, forcing the Cameroonian government to turn its attention away from the economically insignificant Extreme North Region. A safe haven in northern Cameroon will allow Boko Haram-Shekau to continue attacking civilian populations in the Lake Chad Basin.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening the peace process in Mali by widening divisions between rival armed groups.
AQIM associates attacked the headquarters Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA) in Gargando, Timbuktu Region, Mali several days before the planned integration of CJA members into the interim government of Timbuktu region. Members of the CJA accused the Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA), a coalition that supports Tuareg independence in northern Mali, of instigating the Gargando attack in retaliation for the CJA’s split from the CMA. The CJA blocked the implementation of the interim government in Timbuktu due to its dispute with the CMA, delaying an important part of the Malian peace accords and furthering AQIM’s goal of undermining the peace process.
Citations & Links
Citations & Links
Al Qaeda-linked militants are infiltrating the armed Islamist movement in southwestern Libya, where forces loyal to the Ministry of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are fighting the Libyan National Army (LNA) for control of Tamnahent airbase.
The Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB), an Islamist militia with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, entered Tamnahent three days after the GNA Ministry of Defense launched an operation to seize the base. The BDB and the GNA-allied forces are attempting to prevent the LNA from seizing Tamnahent and a nearby oil field. Al Qaeda-linked groups’ increasing connections with GNA-aligned militias will deter many Libyan factions from working with the already weak GNA. (Related reading: Ignoring History: America’s Losing Strategy in Libya)
