Critical Threats Today
A regular summary of al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa as well as major events in Iran.
These are the major events from March 7 for Iran and for al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa. Please see the Iran News Roundup, the Gulf of Aden Security Review, and the weekly Threat Update for more details.
Senior hardline cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati criticized President Hassan Rouhani’s implementation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s core economic doctrine.
Jannati stated, “If the Resistance Economy has not been carried out as it should…have been, [President Rouhani] must apologize to the people and explain why,” during a meeting of the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the next Supreme Leader. Rouhani promised that his administration would submit a report on the Resistance Economy’s implementation by late March. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and others formulated the Resistance Economy doctrine, which is designed to insulate the Iranian economy from global financial shocks and other economic pressures, while Iran was under increasing international sanctions leading up to the 2015 nuclear deal. Khamenei and Rouhani have offered competing visions of the Resistance Economy that advocate different levels of international engagement. Jannati’s comments regarding Rouhani’s economic record could propel the conservative challengers in the May 2017 presidential elections. The conservative coalition Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces, has drawn attention to Rouhani’s struggle to address unemployment.
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The al Houthi-Saleh faction reiterated its willingness to negotiate a settlement with the Saudi-led coalition.
Al Houthi-Saleh foreign minister Hisham Sharaf expressed the al Houthi-Saleh bloc’s desire to hold ceasefire negotiations with Saudi Arabia in an effort to resolve the Yemen crisis. Previous attempts at direct negotiation between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc have failed. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc is pursuing a settlement in an attempt to secure its position in the future Yemeni state. The Saudi-led coalition seeks to deny Iran a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula by preventing the al Houthis from holding power. The Saudi-led coalition will not agree to negotiations until the situation on the ground shifts in its favor. (Related reading: Pushing Back on Iran: Policy Options in Yemen)
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A rift between the UAE and Somali Federal Government (SFG) undermines the SFG’s efforts to exercise sovereignty.
The dispute may stem from the strategic rivalry between the UAE and Turkey for influence in the Horn of Africa. Turkey has sought to deepen relations with the SFG since 2011 through humanitarian assistance, infrastructure projects, and military coordination. The UAE has mirrored Turkey’s efforts and both countries jockeyed for influence during Somalia’s federal elections. The UAE supported the development of the Puntland Maritime Police Force in the semi-autonomous Puntland region in 2010 and just reached an agreement with Somaliland, a breakaway region in northern Somalia, to construct a military port at Berbera in February 2017. The move was intended to circumvent the SFG, which increasingly favors Turkish support. The UAE recalled its ambassador from Somalia after the SFG rejected the UAE-Somaliland agreement and appealed to Saudi Arabia to resolve the dispute. (Related reading: US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?)
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AQIM- and ISIS-affiliated groups may cooperate against Tunisian security forces in western Tunisia.
ISIS media allegedly reported that ISIS-affiliated Jund al Khilafa militants cooperated with AQIM-affiliated Uqba ibn Nafa'a Brigade militants during an attack in Kasserine governorate, western Tunisia on February 28. AQIM and ISIS militants use the mountainous Kasserine as a safe haven. Cooperation between the two groups could increase their capabilities in the region and increase the threat level in Tunisia, where security forces have degraded Salafi-jihadi networks since 2015. (Related reading:AQIM and ISIS in Tunisia: Competing Campaigns).
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The UN-backed political process is crumbling as Libyan factions fight for control of key oil ports.
The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), a legislative body whose leadership is aligned with Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, withdrew its nominal support for the agreement that established the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). The HoR also voted to suspend the HoR’s participation in the Libya Dialogue Team, which is tasked with amending the UN-brokered agreement. The HoR was under immense public pressure from the eastern Libyan public to reject the UN agreement following an attack by Islamist militias on LNA-controlled oil ports on March 3. Many believe that the GNA supported the attack, though GNA leadership has denied this. Armed actors, including the LNA and hardline Islamist militias, will continue to pursue a military solution to the Libyan conflict.
Citations & Links
The publication of CIA intelligence collection tactics by WikiLeaks will almost certainly decrease the amount of actionable SIGINT collected on Salafi-jihadi groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda.
WikiLeaks published descriptions of how U.S. intelligence agencies circumvent encryption on several messaging services such as Signal, WhatsApp, and Telegram. ISIS and al Qaeda both use these services to disseminate information and communicate across international borders. Groups will adapt their communications practices to thwart collection efforts.