Critical Threats Today
A regular summary of al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa as well as major events in Iran.
These are the major events from March 13 for Iran and for al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa. Please see the Iran News Roundup, the Gulf of Aden Security Review, and the weekly Threat Update for more details.
The Iranian representative of prominent Shia cleric Isa Qassim promised a “bloodbath” in the event of the cleric’s arrest.
The Bahraini government rescheduled a trial on money laundering and other charges for a third time for May after Bahraini oppositions groups launched a civil disobedience campaign on March 14. Qassim’s trial had previously been scheduled for March 14. Sheikh Abdullah Daqaq had warned that a “bloodbath will occur” if the Bahraini government arrests Qassim. Bahraini clerics had also called on the people to travel to Qassim’s village of Diraz and demonstrate solidarity. Hossein Amir Abdollahian, the international affairs adviser to Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, warned ahead of the March 14 trial date that that the Bahraini government is “facing a serious crisis.” Iranian officials explicitly encouraged protests against the Bahraini government during unrest last year surrounding the government’s revocation of Qassim’s citizenship and crackdown against Bahrain’s largest Shia political group.
Citations & Links
The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat al Bayda may be temporarily filling a security gap left by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in central Yemen.
ISIS Wilayat al Bayda claimed to attack al Houthi-Saleh forces for three consecutive days in different locations in al Bayda governorate. An unprecedented rate of U.S. airstrikes between March 2 and 6 likely forced AQAP to withdraw temporarily from the al Bayda frontline. ISIS Wilayat al Bayda likely consists of former AQAP members whose relationships facilitate cooperation between the groups in central Yemen. AQAP will remain the dominant Salafi-jihadi group in Yemen despite U.S. airstrikes. (Recommended reading: Targeting AQAP: U.S. Airstrikes in Yemen.)
Citations & Links
New Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s administration risks losing legitimacy unless it pays security forces’ salaries and improves the security situation in Somalia.
Hundreds of members of the Somali National Army (SNA) took to the streets to protest 15 months of back pay on March 12. The government’s inability to pay salaries comes at a time when al Shabaab is intensifying operations throughout the country. The militant group detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) in Mogadishu on March 13, the fourth SVBIED attack in Mogadishu since Farmajo took office on February 16. The wave of optimism that accompanied Farmajo into office may soon disappear he is unable to make changes on the ground. (Recommended reading: US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?)
Citations & Links
The economic policies of Nigeria’s acting head of state risk inflaming insurgency in Nigeria’s Muslim north.
Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, a southern Christian, ordered all oil companies to relocate their headquarters to Nigeria’s southern Delta region on March 11. Osinbajo says that international oil companies will invest in the infrastructure and people of the Delta if they are not based in Abuja. Economic investment in the Delta is the main demand of the Niger Delta Avengers, a militant group that decimated Nigeria’s economy by destroying oil infrastructure in the south. Increased foreign direct investment in the south will replicate these economic grievances in Nigeria’s north, however. The north view the Delta’s oil reserves as a commodity from which all Nigerians should benefit. Salafi-jihadi groups, such as Boko Haram, al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as the Iranian-influenced Islamic Movement in Nigeria, stand to exploit the economic grievances of Nigeria’s Muslims, further destabilizing the region.
Citations & Links
Russian military personnel are supporting the Libyan National Army (LNA) in eastern Libya in an effort to safeguard Russia’s military and economic interests in the country.
Russia may have deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones to a base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. This deployment may be a response to the LNA’s loss of two key oil terminals to a rival militia coalition earlier in March. Russia seeks to leverage its military support for LNA commander Khalifa Haftar to increase its influence in the Mediterranean, including the development of stronger ties with Egypt. Egypt may have conducted airstrikes to support the LNA’s efforts to recapture the terminals, though relations between Haftar and his primary backer are reportedly tense. Egypt will continue to support the LNA to avoid a security breakdown on the Egyptian-Libyan border. (Related reading: Fighting Forces in Libya: March 2017)